CHAPTER TWO

Portuguese-South African relations from 1960 until 1965

Introduction

This chapter deals with the beginning of the insurgency wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau as well as South African perceptions of the instability in the Portuguese territories in Africa. It also analyzes the development of the informal alliance between the two countries – including the contradictions in the political sphere as well as the strengthening of relations in the military and security spheres.

a) The start of the insurgency wars in Portugal’s African territories during the early 1960s

The year that marked the beginning of the toughest challenge to Portuguese rule on the African continent was 1961. After an attack on a prison in Luanda by a group of African nationalists on the 4 February 1961\(^1\) there was a wave of violent attacks in Northern Angola carried out by the União das Populações de Angola or UPA.\(^2\) The violent attacks started on 15 March 1961\(^3\). It was on this date that about 5 000 men crossed Angola’s northern border with the aim of wiping out local settlements and farms.\(^4\) Several hundred whites were killed together with several thousand black labourers who worked for the Portuguese.\(^5\) The scale of the atrocities was divulged to the public: between five and six thousand civilians were killed together with between two and three thousand attackers who were shot dead.\(^6\)

A steady flow of reinforcements was sent to Angola. Between July and August 1961 about 20 000 troops from mainland Portugal arrived in Angola.\(^7\) Progress
was slow. Incoming troops had to face constant ambushes and other obstacles before reoccupying abandoned villages. A company of troops that was moving from Angola’s capital, Luanda, to the town of Maquela do Zombo was forced to remove 1,950 trees placed across the 500 kilometre road.

The scale of the attack and the initial difficulties faced by the Portuguese military seemed to indicate that Portugal was not really prepared to defend her territories in Africa. From a Portuguese perspective, the main drawback was the limited strength of the Portuguese Armed Forces, especially in dealing with major counter-insurgency campaigns in Africa. It also appeared that it would be difficult for the Portuguese to finance large scale military operations in Africa. In 1960, the Portuguese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was US $ 2.5 billion compared to the British GDP of US $ 71.0 billion and the French GDP of US $ 61.0 billion. However, despite her economic shortcomings, Portugal was not prepared to consider losing her largest African territory. Any withdrawal from Angola would imply that the Portuguese could also be pushed out from their other territories in Africa and Asia. On 13 April 1961, the Head of the Portuguese government, António de Oliveira Salazar, made a public speech calling for a determination of the defence of Angola. Salazar made it clear that it was necessary to move rapidly and with much strength so as to ensure the restoration of law and order in Angola.

An immediate result of the Portuguese counter-offensive in Northern Angola was fierce criticism by the United Nations. In June 1961, the United Nations Security Council called on the Portuguese government to “desist forthwith from repressive measures in Angola”. The rebellion in Angola immediately attracted the attention of African nationalist leaders elsewhere on the continent. President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and President Ahmed Toure of Guinea condemned the Portuguese measures to contain the rebellion. They also indicated that they were ready to support the “liberation of African countries still under foreign control”. The condemnation of these two African leaders
indicated that Portugal would face persistent opposition from African nationalists who opposed the continued Portuguese presence in Africa.

Despite criticism on international forums such as the United Nations, the Portuguese authorities wasted no time in consolidating their military positions in other parts of the continent. While the military operations in Angola were still under way, thousands of Portuguese troops from mainland Portugal were sent to Mozambique. The aim was to forestall any surprise attack against Portuguese-controlled positions in that territory.

The new military units were deployed along Mozambique's Tanganyika and Nyasaland borders. In addition, arms depots were set up in various farming areas in the north of the country. It soon became clear that the Portuguese were preparing for a long drawn out conflict in their African possessions. This position was not well received by those who advocated the independence of territories under European colonial rule, including the United Nations. In November 1961, a five-member sub-committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations called on the Portuguese government to negotiate with African nationalist leaders in Angola. The sub-committee called on the Portuguese authorities to implement administrative reforms and to prepare the territory for self-government.

Although the Portuguese authorities did not support any suggestions of self-government, they were aware of the need to introduce reforms in their territories in Africa. In May 1961, the Minister for the Overseas Provinces, Dr Adriano Moreira, had already indicated that economic and social reforms were needed in order to increase the opportunities for the advancement of the local black population. Moreover, he explained that it was necessary to mobilize the entire civilian population in Angola in order to deal with the insurgency threat.
In July 1961, Salazar and Moreira met in Estoril on the outskirts of Lisbon to discuss the situation in Angola. The two men agreed on the abolition of the ‘Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique’ of 20 May 1954, the legislation regulating the status of assimilated Africans. Moreira interpreted the violence in northern Angola as a sign that the multiracial integration in Africa had to be pursued more aggressively. To him, the Portuguese nation should be subjected to one law irrespective of race, religion or culture.

Moreira rejected accusations that the Portuguese system of assimilation was a failure since only a small minority of Africans benefited from this policy. He explained that the second generation of ‘assimilados’ were not registered as such since they were considered to be Portuguese citizens. In addition, many inhabitants in the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa who could claim the status of “assimilados” did not do so because of a lack of interest. As it was explained in the previous chapter, an African who claimed the status of “civilizado” lost rights in communally-held land and he had to pay heavier taxes and lose the right to have access to free medical care and free schooling.

In September 1961, Moreira abolished the legislation on assimilation in the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa since this legislation appeared to be inefficient in its scope and implementation. The law that abolished the ‘Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique’ mentioned the need to recognize the dignity and equality of all men. The law effectively meant that all black Africans living in the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa were Portuguese citizens who had a right to use the same identity documents used by other Portuguese nationals. The use of a single identity document by all Africans in Portugal’s African territories was a symbol of common citizenship. The aim of this measure was to deflect any criticism directed at Portugal’s desire to remain in control of its overseas possessions in Africa and to reduce racial tension.
In addition to the above-mentioned legislative innovation, during the early 1960s the main focus of the Portuguese initiatives was the military effort in Africa. Legislation did little to prevent the spread of subversive activities in other Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa, which would place further strain on Portugal’s limited military resources. The first signs of subversion against the Portuguese authorities in Guinea Bissau started at the beginning of 1962. These activities were carried out by the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). In January 1963, the first armed clashes between PAIGC guerrillas and Portuguese troops took place in southern Guinea Bissau. By 1964, guerrilla activity had spread to the northern regions of Guinea Bissau up to the Senegalese border. In Mozambique, the armed insurrection against Portuguese rule began in 1964 in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The movement responsible for the armed insurrection was the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO).

In the early 1960s, the most debilitating strike against the Estado Novo did not take place in Africa but in India where the Portuguese lost Goa, which had been occupied by a large contingent of Indian troops. On 17 December 1961, 45,000 Indian troops attacked the 3,500 Portuguese troops who had been deployed in Goa. The humiliating defeat was more incisive considering the superiority of the Indian military forces: they used modern combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and heavy artillery as well as airborne troops and amphibious units, whereas the small Portuguese military contingent was poorly armed and it lacked armoured vehicles and artillery. The Indian military had established an efficient information network in Goa in order to collect intelligence about Portuguese military capacity. Ineffective Portuguese counter-espionage methods allowed the Indians to establish their networks over a long period of time. Furthermore, the Indian military also occupied the smaller Portuguese-controlled territories of Damão and Diu.
The events in India highlighted the weak connection between Portugal’s official policies – the aim of which was to ensure control over Portuguese possessions in other continents – and the resources granted to the Portuguese military to exercise such control.\textsuperscript{37} The lack of resources to fight a war became apparent in Angola at a very early stage. During the initial stages of the conflict there was a shortage of ammunition and the Portuguese troops were armed with rifles and light machine guns and mortars, which were clearly inadequate to deal with the task at hand\textsuperscript{38}. Moreover, the communication equipment at the disposal of the Portuguese troops in Angola was old. Most of the communication equipment had been used during the Second World War. In addition, it was only in 1962 that proper transport vehicles for the troops in the bush – such as the Unimog vehicles – reached the units in the frontline. Up to that time, the Portuguese military had used jeeps.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition to the lack of military preparedness and inadequate equipment there was the issue of logistics. The size of Portugal’s African territories made it difficult to coordinate logistics. Moreover, the subversions were taking place in territories that were geographically distant from mainland Portugal. Angola’s capital, Luanda, was located 7 300 km from Lisbon whereas the territory of Guinea Bissau was located 3 400 km from Portugal.\textsuperscript{40} One of the main Portuguese military bases in Mozambique – which was located in the city of Beira – was around 10 000 km from Lisbon.\textsuperscript{41} The three different operational theatres were not contiguous either and were located far apart. This effectively meant that flying from one territory to another was quite a long journey. Such distances made it difficult to send reinforcements at short notice or to provide much needed supplies in case of an emergency.

Moreover, as John Cann points out, the geographic size of the three operational theatres also had to be taken into account. Angola comprised a total of 1 264 314 square kilometres whereas Mozambique comprised 784 961 square kilometres and Guinea Bissau comprised 36 125 square kilometres.
Angola had the longest border with 4,837 kilometres followed by Mozambique with 4,330 kilometres and Guinea Bissau with 680 kilometres. It was impossible to seal off such vast borders completely or to prevent the passage of infiltrators from neighbouring territories. With the exception of the French in Algeria, no other counter-insurgency campaigns were fought in vast territories such as the Portuguese had to fight in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. These circumstances caused problems for anyone who had to decide about the appropriate distribution of troops and equipment as well as how to manage logistics. Moreover, the Portuguese also had to fulfill their commitments to the NATO alliance as well as ensure the security of other territories in Africa. These other territories were the Cape Verde and São Tomé and Principe islands. The Portuguese also had to guarantee the security of Macau and Timor in Asia.

The terrain in the three African operational theatres also hindered the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations. In Northern Angola, the terrain comprised a patchwork of mountains, swamps, rivers and dense bush, which favoured guerrilla fighters. The same could be said of Guinea Bissau where most of the territory comprised of dense forest, rivers and swamps. In Mozambique, the long coastline and the thinly spread population plus its tropical climate also complicated matters for the Portuguese.42

One of the immediate concerns of the Portuguese authorities was to increase the number of troops in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. A year prior to the hostilities in Angola, the Portuguese Armed Forces consisted of a total of 79,000 men.43 As a result of the hostilities in Angola, the number of Portuguese troops there rose to 33,000 by the end of 1961.44 This number continued to increase during the next few years, up to 57,000 by the end of 1965. The number of troops in Mozambique began to increase in 1961 and in Guinea Bissau this process began in 1963, although on a smaller scale.45
A Centre for Special Operations (the Centro de Instrução de Operações Especiais or CIOE) was established in the town of Lamego in Portugal in 1960, to train Special Ranger Groups (the Companhias de Caçadores Especiais or CCE). These were the first units in the Portuguese Armed Forces that had knowledge of subversive warfare. Before the end of 1960, three Ranger companies were sent to Angola whereas Mozambique received one Ranger company. The deployment of a small number of counter-insurgency units shows that the Portuguese authorities were concerned about the possibility of subversive activities in their African territories. The French withdrawal from Indochina during the 1950s and the growing subversive activities in Algeria demonstrated what could happen if a nationalist-inspired uprising was not curtailed in time. However, it is clear that the Portuguese authorities were not prepared to deal with the size and scope of the rebellion in northern Angola. The three Ranger companies that were sent to Angola could not have arrested the wave of attacks that began in March 1961.

Soon after the start of hostilities in Angola in 1961, the Portuguese Military Academy began teaching subversive warfare. By 1966 there was already a standard guide ‘O Exército na Guerra Subversiva’ referring to counter insurgency techniques. The focus of military operations in this type of warfare was not only to destroy the insurgents and prevent foreign support from reaching them via the extensive border regions, but also to prevent contact between the civilian population and the insurgents, as well as protect farming areas or any other areas of economic importance. It was also necessary to protect communication routes such as roads, bridges and railway lines.

All of these objectives could be achieved only if the vast geographical areas were patrolled regularly, which was a very time-consuming process involving a high number of participants and complicated logistics. The collection of intelligence was important in subversive warfare. It implied the existence of properly trained agents who had to infiltrate the insurgent groups or establish themselves among
the population under the control of the insurgents. The collection of intelligence also implied the recruitment of translators conversant in local languages. There was a need for a militia force capable of conducting reconnaissance missions at local level. The Portuguese military also had to recruit local scouts to detect any visible physical vestiges of the insurgents’ activities and their routes. Finally, it was necessary to launch major operations that involved the deployment of several thousand troops and air support, as well as properly coordinated logistics. In the three operational theatres some of these operations could last for 30 days.\textsuperscript{50}

A major effort had to be made to train soldiers and lower ranking officers in various areas of expertise. This would be a long-term project. At least 18 Training Centres for basic military training and 57 Special Training Centres to train experts in various fields were fully functional between 1961 and 1974\textsuperscript{51}. Basic training was nine weeks and additional seven weeks were provided in order to give special training in various fields. Another three weeks were used for operational training, which helped to improve coordination between various military units. There was an annual average intake of between 54 000 and 69 000 soldiers for basic military training. This occurred continuously from 1961 until 1974.\textsuperscript{52}

Several new laws were required to deal with the insurgency threat from 1961. As a result, Decree Law number 43568 of 28 March 1961 set out the rules referring to the organization and training of civilian volunteers in Portugal’s overseas territories during an emergency.\textsuperscript{53} More important was the legislation to create appropriate intelligence structures in Portugal’s largest overseas territories. These intelligence services were of crucial importance given the surprise insurgent attacks in Northern Angola in March 1961. The International Police for the Defence of the State (the Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado or PIDE) was responsible for the collection of intelligence in the Portuguese territories in Africa from 1954.\textsuperscript{54} However, according to an expert on Portuguese military
affairs, António Silva Ribeiro, PIDE’s intelligence collection efforts had serious shortcomings since it operated as a combination of a crime investigative service and an intelligence service. Such a broad mandate hindered the effective collection and analysis of intelligence. In addition, PIDE operated unconstitutionally since many of its extensive powers could be solicited only if a real state of siege existed in the country.

The need for accurate information led to the promulgation of the Decree Law number 43761 of 29 June 1961. The Services for the Centralization and Coordination of Information (SCCI) in Angola and Mozambique were established in terms of this legislation. These were local intelligence structures that collected and provided accurate information about the political as well as the administrative and security situations in these two territories. Later, a similar type of intelligence structure was set up in Guinea Bissau. These local intelligence structures had a research office and an office for military affairs, as well as an office for political affairs and an office to monitor administrative matters.

There were other issues that affected the performance of the Portuguese military forces in Africa. During the initial stages of the counter-insurgency war in Angola, there were insufficient logistics structures to deal effectively with the increasing number of troops from mainland Portugal. In Mozambique, the main problem was the extremely long distance that separated the main logistics base – the city of Lourenço Marques – from the operational theatre in the northern part of the territory along the Tanzanian border. As in Angola, the road network in Mozambique was quite poor. In Guinea Bissau, the Portuguese military faced similar infrastructural problems. The military had to make use of small boats and the country’s many rivers in order to move its forces to the interior of the territory. Moreover, local tides forced boats to follow a predetermined timetable, restricting operations to certain fixed periods.
It is clear that during the early 1960s Portugal was not prepared to face major guerrilla rebellions in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The Portuguese military faced a variety of complex problems in the three operational theatres. These problems became apparent as soon as the insurgencies in the three territories began to take shape. Portuguese problems became more acute as the scope and size of these rebellions expanded. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the rebellions broke out in three separate and distinct territories.
b) White South Africa’s perceptions of the instability in the Portuguese-controlled territories and other parts of the African continent

South Africa’s ruling elite viewed the early 1960s as a period of mounting challenge regarding the concept and the objectives of separate development, as well as the notion of white control. According to James Barber and John Barratt, “many dangers were rooted in the past but they gained a new intensity from the rising expectations and militancy of blacks inside the country and international pressures outside.” ⁶³ This was a period when African nationalism strengthened its appeal in Africa and in the wider international environment.

In 1960 at least 16 African countries obtained independence. ⁶⁴ Events in the Congo proved that independence might not lead to peace and political stability on some parts of the African continent. The riots in Leopoldville in January 1959 caused hundreds of casualties, which included the murder of some whites ⁶⁵. By the time the Congo became independent in 1960, domestic chaos erupted. A mutiny conducted by local African troops trained by the Belgians resulted in severe atrocities including the rape of 251 white women. ⁶⁶ The conflict that followed included the involvement of United Nations troops and mercenaries. Many white South Africans feared that the crisis in the Congo would spread to South Africa. ⁶⁷ In July 1960, the First Secretary at the South African Diplomatic Mission in Salisbury, AM Grobler, wrote a confidential memorandum describing the flight of whites in hundreds of cars from the Congo into Northern Rhodesia. ⁶⁸ According to Grobler, for the first time in Southern Africa, “the white man was on the run”. ⁶⁹ It was clear that the collapse of Belgian control in the Congo, would spur African nationalists elsewhere on the African continent to challenge white rule.

In South Africa itself, the incidents at Sharpeville in March 1960 indicated that black opposition to apartheid or separate development was bound to increase. ⁷⁰
The death of 67 black protesters at Sharpeville was perceived to be part of the African nationalist struggle on the African continent.\textsuperscript{71} Additional deaths in Cape Town’s Langa and Nyanga townships provoked more internal protests and they intensified international condemnation of the situation in South Africa.\textsuperscript{72}

Sharpeville marked the beginning of a process seeking to achieve change not only through peaceful protest but also through the use of strategies of resistance and violence.\textsuperscript{73} The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) as well as the South African Communist Party (SACP) initiated their policy of violent resistance against the status quo at the end of 1961.\textsuperscript{74} South Africa’s administrative control over South West Africa was also increasingly challenged since the early 1960s. The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) was established in 1959.\textsuperscript{75} SWAPO evolved from an earlier organization – the Ovamboland People’s Congress (OPC). From the beginning it was viewed by the South African authorities as an organization with communist objectives. By 1962, SWAPO had already decided that its objectives could be achieved through a combination of political and military actions. A number of SWAPO members received military training in several African and Eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{76}

In June 1961, the South African Diplomatic Representative in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, HLT Taswell, had already expressed concern about possible threats against South African rule in South West Africa.\textsuperscript{77} Taswell was concerned about the presence of an Indian military contingent in Katanga at a time when the United Nations was beginning to show vigorous opposition to the continued South African presence in South West Africa.\textsuperscript{78} The Indian contingent was part of a United Nations force sent to the Congo on peacekeeping duties. He anticipated that the Indian troops might be waiting for the right moment to move into South West Africa. His suspicion was due to the fact that India played a prominent role in the Afro-Asian bloc, which was strongly opposed to South Africa and Portugal. He believed that if the insurgents expelled the Portuguese
from Angola, South West Africa would immediately experience border attacks and internal unrest.\textsuperscript{79} The rebellion in northern Angola in March 1961 was viewed as an attempt to eliminate the presence of yet another European colonial power from Africa as well as prepare the way for additional pressure on South Africa and its racial policies.

The initial South African response was that Portugal would not be able to withstand the attacks against its presence in Africa. In April 1961, the South African Consul General in Luanda, CBH Fincham, expressed the view that the Portuguese military was ill equipped to deal with the rebellion in Northern Angola since the insurgents were able to attack small towns with impunity.\textsuperscript{80} The Portuguese authorities appeared to have counted on the loyalty of the non-white population and they were not really prepared to deal with an insurgency in Angola.\textsuperscript{81} Fincham was convinced that Angola would become an independent country within one or two years since the Portuguese government in Lisbon seemed unable to come up with any innovative solution to resolve Angola’s problems.\textsuperscript{82} A secret telegram from the South African Embassy in Washington emphasized the fact that the US Government believed the situation in Angola was “quite desperate” and there was the possibility of a complete loss of control on the part of the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{83} The US Government could not see how the Portuguese with only 60 000 trained troops could restore control in Angola and simultaneously deal with any unrest in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{84}

The situation in Angola was viewed from a different perspective in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In May 1961, secret correspondence between the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB) from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and South African diplomats indicated that Portugal would probably face a very long guerrilla war in Angola, which would place excessive strain on Portugal’s limited human and financial resources.\textsuperscript{85} There was the possibility that such a prolonged campaign might result in the overthrowing of the
Portuguese government. Such an event would have a profound impact on the Southern African region.\textsuperscript{86}

Such different assessments indicate that Portugal’s closest neighbours in Africa – including South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – did not really have a clear picture of how events would unfold in the Portuguese territories. This indicates a lack of understanding of long-term Portuguese intentions. The security situation in the Southern African region was of major concern to the South African government, which felt that the situation in Angola could negatively affect the security of other parts of the African continent. These concerns had to be seen within the context of the Cold War. The instability prevalent in Angola throughout 1961 alerted the South African Government to the possibility of external involvement in the affairs of the region by the Soviet Union.

In June 1961, the South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs sent a list containing the names of several Soviet fishing vessels in the South Atlantic to the South African Consul General in Luanda.\textsuperscript{87} The list mentioned that although there was no immediate evidence about the exact activities of Soviet fishing vessels it was generally believed that such vessels collected intelligence for military purposes.\textsuperscript{88} The arrival of the vessels in the South Atlantic was significant since they might be involved in espionage and propaganda and perhaps even the landing of weapons and agents. The Consul General in Luanda was ordered to submit the list containing the names of existing Soviet vessels in the South Atlantic to the Portuguese authorities.\textsuperscript{89}

The fear that the Portuguese would not be able to withstand the pressure in the various Portuguese-held territories in Africa and Asia grew as the year came to an end. In December 1961, the occupation of Goa by Indian troops was seen as the second major event that would undermine the morale and the will of Portugal to resist opposition in her overseas territories. In December 1961, the South African Ambassador in Lisbon, AHH Mertsch, observed that many Portuguese
appeared to be frustrated because they were aware that as a “small nation” Portugal could do little to prevent the occupation of Goa by Indian troops. Mertsch interpreted the lack of support from Portugal’s traditional allies – especially the United Kingdom and the United States – as cause for serious concern since the invasion of Goa by Indian troops would encourage aggression against other Portuguese-controlled possessions in Asia and Africa. It was anticipated that such attacks would have the support of a number of African States.

South African newspapers also noted the success of the Indian invasion of Goa and its potential impact on the African continent. In December 1961, an article in the Rand Daily Mail predicted the intensification of violent opposition against Portugal in Africa as a result of the success of the Indian invasion of Goa. Earlier in that same year, The Star indicated that the average South African was perplexed to see Portugal – the poorest of the European colonial powers – “marshalling all her scant metropolitan resources” for the defence of Angola through the force of arms. The Star pointed out that although Belgium was wealthier than Portugal, it had judged correctly when it decided not to hold on to the Congo through the force of arms.

South Africa was interested in obtaining accurate details about developments in the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa and by mid-1962, the Portuguese Consul in Salisbury, João de Bastos, agreed to have one monthly meeting with HLT Taswell in order to exchange information. The focus of the monthly meetings was the situation in Southern Africa within the context of the Cold War. During the first meeting, the two diplomats discussed how the Soviet Union could use Mozambique as a launching pad to prepare attacks against South Africa. This was in case Mozambique became independent.

The South African authorities were concerned with possible outbreaks of violence in other parts of Southern Africa in addition to the unrest in Angola. In
December 1961, the South African Vice Consul In-Charge in Lourenço Marques, DV Louw, mentioned the possibility of a partial Portuguese retreat in case of a major rebellion in Mozambique’s northern regions.98 This was despite the fact that the Portuguese had taken ‘extraordinary measures’ to strengthen their control over Mozambique’s northern regions, especially the areas bordering on Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.99 In December 1961, the South African Ambassador in Washington, WC Naudé, believed that the Portuguese would possibly have to withdraw to the ‘line of the Zambezi’ in case of a major uprising in northern Mozambique.100 The Ambassador explained that it would be very difficult to prevent the smuggling of weapons into northern Mozambique.101

The statements made by South African diplomats indicate that at the beginning of the 1960s the South African authorities were clearly concerned with the possible outbreak of a major rebellion in northern Mozambique. The Portuguese had not been able to retain Goa as a result of a massive Indian military attack and they were now under extreme pressure in northern Angola. The South African authorities viewed these developments with alarm since there was a degree of skepticism about Portugal’s military capabilities. From a South African perspective, the Portuguese Armed Forces were quite small and Portugal did not have the material resources to engage in long-term military campaigns. There was also the fear of Soviet involvement in Southern Africa and the possible outbreak of violence in South West Africa. The Belgian withdrawal from the Congo and the subsequent chaos strengthened the perception that any change to the status quo would be accompanied by violence and unrest.
c) **External pressure and the informal alliance between South Africa and Portugal**

The early 1960s was the period during which there was a consolidation of economic ties and the development of air links between South Africa and Portugal. In September 1962, the two countries agreed to renegotiate the Mozambique Convention on rail traffic between South Africa and the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. The Convention was renegotiated in September 1962. On 25 September 1962, a secret agreement was signed in Lisbon. The agreement guaranteed that 47.5% of all commercial sea-borne goods traffic imported into the Witwatersrand Competitive Area would be routed through Lourenço Marques. This provision would be maintained only until the end of 1963. In 1964 it would be reduced to 40% and would not be enforceable after the 1 January 1965. A public agreement referring to the Mozambique Convention was also signed at the same time. The agreement stated that the two countries had agreed to revise the Mozambican Convention.

The next step that highlighted closer ties between the two countries was the signing of an air agreement. In May 1963, South Africa and Portugal signed an air agreement in Lisbon that stipulated the routes and the number of passengers that could embark and disembark at the respective airports in the territories of both countries. This agreement revoked the air agreements that had been signed before the start of the Second World War. The initial agreements referred to air links between South Africa and Mozambique as well as between South Africa and Angola. The new air agreement confirmed that such air routes would continue to be operated. This showed that South Africa was not really experiencing serious external pressure despite growing resentment by newly-independent African States.
In September 1960, military officers from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had already warned the South African Diplomatic Representative in Salisbury, HLT Taswell, that certain African countries could prevent aircraft of both the Federation and South Africa from flying over their territories. The safest air routes to Europe passed over the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa, which included Angola and Guinea Bissau, as well as the island of São Tomé and the Cape Verde islands. Taswell emphasized that South Africa should explore alternative air routes as soon as possible. The South African authorities were certainly interested in making use of air routes over Portuguese-controlled territories. In 1963, the South African government asked the South African Reserve Bank to grant a loan to the Portuguese government for the construction of airport facilities in Cape Verde’s Ilha do Sal, which would be used by South African Airways. The loan was worth R3.8 million.

The signing ceremony of the new air traffic agreement was used to explain the context of the political links between the two countries. This happened when a senior South African delegation visited Lisbon in May 1963 to sign the new agreement. During a speech in the presence of the South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Eric Louw, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, Franco Nogueira, emphasized the need for cooperation in the Southern African region. He explained that South Africa and Portugal had to face fierce criticism and hostility at the United Nations, especially from the Afro-Asian bloc. He described such criticism as irresponsible and demagogic. He made it clear, however, that the objectives that the two countries wanted to achieve were different and that both Portugal and South Africa would continue to follow their own respective paths. This was a subtle way of highlighting the political links between South Africa and Portugal and simultaneously pointing out that both countries would follow a different path when it came to their respective policies.

The Afro-Asian bloc viewed South Africa and Portugal as close partners in the Southern African region despite different domestic policies. During a debate in
the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1961, Ghana appealed to all other African member states to join efforts to expel South Africa and Portugal from the UN.\textsuperscript{116} Sri Lanka also called for UN pressure on both Portugal and South Africa.\textsuperscript{117} Although Sri Lanka did not call for the expulsion of the two countries, its appeal made it clear that South Africa and Portugal had then been considered a joint threat to the stability of the African continent.

Although such calls were ignored by both South Africa and Portugal, the two countries did not want to be lumped together when it came to the promotion of their image in the international arena. In January 1962, the South African government ordered its permanent delegation in New York to ask the Portuguese delegate in the UN whether it would be advisable for South Africa to participate in a General Assembly debate about the situation in Angola.\textsuperscript{118} The South African government made it clear that if the answer was ‘yes’ then the South African permanent delegation to the UN should indicate openly that South Africa was not content with the United Nations’ interference in “a member State’s legitimate exercise of its sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{119} Various African states at the UN were directing harsh criticism against what they perceived to be Portugal’s excessive use of force in northern Angola. However, the Portuguese delegate in the UN made it clear that South Africa’s participation in the debate would not be the best strategy.\textsuperscript{120} Such a posture indicated that the Portuguese government was concerned that any direct South African support might create the impression that the two countries were close allies or had similar political objectives.

During the same period, the South African permanent representative to the UN, BG Fourie, noted that he would also have to assess how far he could support Portugal “without making it possible for our critics to launch an attack on South Africa”. Fourie explained that during the previous ten days the focus of the discussions in the General Assembly was the situation in Angola. In the meantime, South Africa had largely been forgotten.\textsuperscript{121} This indicates that South African diplomats did not want UN member states to link Portugal’s use of
military force in northern Angola to the prevailing situation in South Africa. It is clear that the two countries did not want to encourage the perception that their respective national interests were somehow intertwined.

There were also other instances that highlighted the fact that both sides wanted to avoid any indication of a close alliance. Although the Portuguese often praised the policy of good neighbourliness in Southern Africa, they expressed dismay at South Africa’s racial policies. In November 1962, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, Franco Nogueira, told a journalist from South Africa’s Sunday Times, Pieter Lessing, that there were some “basic differences” between South Africa and Portugal.122 Portugal viewed South Africa’s apartheid policy as “morally wrong and politically dangerous” while South Africa viewed Portugal’s racial policy “as morally dangerous and politically wrong”. Portugal opposed United Nations’ criticism of South Africa’s apartheid policy since it was “a political attempt” to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Nogueira rejected the possibility of a military agreement between Portugal and South Africa because “whatever may happen in Angola, in Lisbon’s view, the moral condemnation of having to accept aid from South Africa would be too high a price to pay”.123

Nogueira later stated that the Sunday Times had misquoted his remarks.124 He defended himself by telling the South African Ambassador in Lisbon that he had told the Sunday Times that relations between South Africa and Portugal were excellent but that “even good neighbours sometimes had problems which with goodwill could be easily solved”.125 Nogueira and the South African Ambassador discussed the same matter a few weeks later.126 Nogueira acknowledged that the racial policies of the two countries were different. However, when he mentioned these differences he did not in any way imply criticism of South Africa’s racial policies. In a letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria, the South African Ambassador expressed his suspicion that the Sunday Times article might be partially correct. The Ambassador pointed out that the
Portuguese government wanted to dismiss rumours about a secret military pact between South Africa, Portugal and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.\textsuperscript{127}

In November 1962, the Portuguese Representative in the United Nations in New York, António Patrício, refuted accusations that there was a secret military pact between South Africa, Portugal and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.\textsuperscript{128} Ghana earlier accused the three countries of having forged an alliance in order to perpetuate racial discrimination in Southern Africa. Patrício emphasized Portugal's conviction in the equality of all races and its opposition to racial segregation and any form of racial supremacy.\textsuperscript{129} It is clear that the different racial policies in the Portuguese-controlled territories and South Africa caused tension between the two countries. In August 1961, the South African Consul General in Lourenço Marques, RJ Montgomery, criticized the “histrionic outburst” in the local Portuguese media, which had focused its attention on the wedding of a black South African woman and a German citizen in Mozambique where mixed marriages were permitted.\textsuperscript{130} Montgomery noted that from the point of view of the Portuguese, the wedding of a black South African woman and a white man was “an excellent opportunity to present their policies and practices in a more favourable light to the world at large by comparing and contrasting them to those applicable in South Africa”. Montgomery explained that the attitude of the Portuguese was “symptomatic of the efforts presently being made to prove to the world, and to the local non-European population that in the eyes of their law and custom all men are, and have always been, equal”.\textsuperscript{131}

In September 1963, Montgomery once again referred to the way in which South Africa was portrayed in the Portuguese press in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{132} Newspapers in Mozambique were subject to censorship and as a result they were not really hostile when they reported about South Africa. However, Portugal’s official racial integration policy provided local newspapers with the opportunity to demonstrate the fairness of Portuguese customs in comparison with South Africa’s racial
policies. News reports from international news agencies were carried in local
newspapers under headings mentioning international condemnation of South
Africa’s racial policies.  

A few South African government officials acknowledged Portuguese efforts to
achieve racial integration in their African territories. When the South African
Diplomatic Representative in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
Taswell, visited Angola in March 1962, he noticed that the Portuguese had begun
to speed up racial integration, especially in schools, hotels, nightclubs, cinemas
and the workplace.  

Taswell observed that the Portuguese were less colour
conscious than whites in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, Taswell believed
that below the surface there was “a deep-rooted reserve about colour which one
finds in all classes of Portuguese society”. It is clear that he was not convinced
of the long-term success of Portugal’s racial integration policy.

The issue of non-white Portuguese nationals visiting South Africa was also a
constant source of tension between the two countries. In October 1963, the
Mozambican newspaper Notícias da Tarde noted that despite the excellent
relations between Portugal and South Africa, there was no reciprocity when it
came to traveling procedures between the two countries.  

South African citizens of all races were allowed to visit Mozambique without bureaucratic
formalities. However, when non-white Portuguese nationals wanted to visit South
Africa they had to apply for permission three months in advance to enter the
country and on many occasions their request was declined.

In August 1963, the Chairman of Mozambique’s African Association, José João
Craveirinha, sent a letter of protest to the Portuguese authorities complaining
about the way in which the South African authorities treated non-white
Portuguese nationals who wanted to visit South Africa. This included not only
Portuguese nationals who were black but also Portuguese nationals who had
Indian, Chinese or Coloured ancestry. Craveirinha noted that those nationals
enjoyed the same citizenship rights under Portuguese law and it was not acceptable that South African officials decided on visit access using racial classification criteria.\textsuperscript{139}

The aims of South Africa’s official apartheid policy and Portuguese efforts to portray racial integration in Portugal’s African territories to the international community were indeed contradictory. A journalist from the \textit{Rand Daily Mail}, Donald Prosser, who visited Angola and Mozambique during the early 1960s, noted this glaring contradiction. In July 1963, Prosser pointed out that during his visits to Angola and Mozambique, senior Portuguese officials were very anxious to dismiss any suggestions that they would subscribe to policies that promoted racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{140} The Portuguese press knew how to draw a sharp distinction between South Africa’s racial policies and the policy of multiracialism in Angola and Mozambique. Prosser also noted that a military alliance between South Africa and Portugal was not really viable since South Africa did not have sufficient military manpower to send forces across the Limpopo at short notice. Such an alliance would imply a massive increase in South Africa’s defence budget as well as the maintenance of a standing military force of between 150 000 and 200 000 men. Prosser doubted very much that such an alliance could ever materialize since it would attract the attention of the United Nations, as well as the possibility of, which he called a “technical state of war” with independent African States, which would view such an alliance as an affront.\textsuperscript{141}

Despite obvious differences in the political sphere and the avoidance of any formal alliance, the two countries continued to make efforts to promote informal cooperation in a number of areas. During a visit to Lisbon in October 1964, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, disclosed that the two countries had reached an agreement on the joint utilization of the waters of the Kunene River – which would benefit the population of Southern Angola and South West Africa.\textsuperscript{142} The two countries also agreed on the construction of additional cooling facilities for citrus fruit exports through Lourenço Marques.\textsuperscript{143}
During his stay in Lisbon, Hilgard Muller, explained that the two countries had agreed to strengthen economic cooperation. However, there would not be a joint military agreement since a defence pact had not been discussed with the Portuguese authorities.

In March 1965, it was disclosed that South Africa would grant a loan of R5.75 million to Angola’s Matala hydro-electrical project while Portugal had agreed to provide 90 million kilowatt hours of electricity annually to South West Africa at a cost of 0.5 cents per unit. Furthermore, the two countries would examine the possibility of building a hydro-electrical power plant near Ruacana on the South West African side of the Kunene River. The Portuguese authorities also agreed to allow the South African Banana Control Board to inspect Mozambican bananas imported into South Africa at Komatipoort. The Portuguese would also provide facilities for South African inspectors in the port of Lourenço Marques. The inspectors were responsible for examining the quality of maize exported through Lourenço Marques.

In the meantime, it was disclosed that South Africa had agreed to export a minimum of 4,5 million standard boxes of citrus fruit via the port of Lourenço Marques during a three-year period. This was the best way to repay the Portuguese for extending the capacity of their citrus cooling facilities in Lourenço Marques from 3,800 to 7,800 cubic tons. Moreover, in July 1965, the Portuguese national airline, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (TAP), was authorized two flights per week between Lisbon and Johannesburg. South African Airways (SAA) was already flying between Johannesburg and Lisbon twice a week. The two carriers agreed on a pool arrangement that gave them mutual air traffic rights between Johannesburg and Luanda.

In May 1965, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs described relations between Portugal and South Africa as excellent despite the fact that Portugal did not agree with South Africa’s domestic racial policies. He emphasized that
Portugal would continue to fight against, what he called, “communist infiltration in Africa”. \(^{151}\) Such statements indicated that although Portugal rejected racial segregation it nevertheless viewed Portuguese-South African relations as very important. Moreover, Portugal was prepared to resist communist expansion on the African continent, which was a stated goal of the South African government.
d) Closer cooperation in intelligence, military communications and logistics

The 1960s was the decade that witnessed the development of close cooperation between Portugal and South Africa in the field of intelligence and the exchange of information. It is certain that the Portuguese security services, PIDE, exchanged information with the South African police as early as 1960.\(^{152}\) In May 1960, a PIDE agent, Amorim Lopes, received information from the South African police about the movement of 15 alleged members of the South African Communist Party who intended to use false passports to enter Mozambique before moving to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.\(^ {153}\)

The initial groundwork for the exchange of intelligence between the two countries had already begun in the 1950s. A PIDE Inspector, António Neves Graça, had already visited the Union of South Africa in December 1954 to establish contacts that could facilitate the exchange of information between the security services of both countries.\(^ {154}\) According to Graça, the visit was carried out after the South African Government made it clear that the security services of both countries should engage in close cooperation.\(^ {155}\) During the visit, the two sides discussed the need to monitor the flow of foreigners and nationals of both countries crossing the common border between the Union of South Africa and Mozambique. There was concern about mechanisms to deal with Soviet infiltration in the region. During his visit, Inspector Graça provided information about PIDE’s operational procedures, especially the methods used to stop subversive activities.\(^ {156}\)

As a result of Graça’s visit, PIDE received authorization to initiate further contacts with the South African security services.\(^{157}\) However, cooperation between the Portuguese and South African security services remained underdeveloped during the 1950s. In 1960, a secret Portuguese document mentioned that a Colonel Prinsloo of the South African police’s Security Branch had informed the
Portuguese military attaché at the Portuguese Embassy in South Africa that cooperation between the security services of both countries was not very effective, but the South Africans were keen to develop stronger links with the Portuguese security services in both Angola and Mozambique.158

During the early 1960s, the Portuguese were also developing links with other security services in order to obtain a clearer picture of developments in neighbouring countries. In May 1961, the Director of the Federal Intelligence Service Bureau (FISB) of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Basil Maurice de Quehen, visited Angola to improve cooperation between his service and the Portuguese security apparatus in Angola.159 The Portuguese were promised intelligence about the situation in Ghana and the Congo. A joint meeting of representatives of the FISB, PIDE and South Africa’s Security Branch was also discussed. The aim of the exchange of information was to disrupt subversive groups threatening the security of the Federation and the Portuguese-controlled territories.160

The South African security services indicated their interest in cooperating with the Portuguese in the field of intelligence. In June 1962, the Portuguese Consulate in Windhoek informed the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon of the interest expressed by the Commander of the South West African police, Colonel Botha, in links with PIDE in Angola.161 Botha requested the confidentiality of future negotiations in order to avoid public awareness of such cooperation.162 In July the same year, the PIDE structures in Angola confirmed the establishment of formal links after a meeting in South West Africa.163 The rebellion in Angola in 1961 had aroused South African interest in events in Angola and Mozambique. The two Portuguese-controlled territories shared a common border with South West Africa and South Africa respectively. South Africa wanted a clear picture of the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in Angola. A South African Diplomatic Mission report provided an account of the type of information the South Africans wanted in 1961.164 The report described
the operational set up of the Portuguese Army and the Portuguese Air Force in Angola as well as the areas under the control of the insurgents who were moving around in small groups in order to avoid detection. The report described Portugal’s psychological warfare efforts including the deployment of teachers and medical officers to win the hearts and minds of the population in the areas where the insurgents were most active.

Portuguese suspicions of South African intentions in Angola and Mozambique were spelt out clearly in a document from the Office of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry of February 1962. The secret document rejected a proposal that called for the deployment of a South African Military Attaché in Angola and another one in Mozambique. The request was made in an Aide Memoir by the South African Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese authorities on 2 November 1961. The request was initially made by the South African Minister of Defence, JJ Fouché, who visited Portugal in July 1961.

The Portuguese Overseas Ministry regarded the exchange of military information between the Portuguese and the South African military establishments as not really desirable. The following reasons were offered:

- There were still some South African sectors that displayed what the document described as “old attitudes” towards the African territories under Portuguese control. This alluded to Portuguese fears from the end of the 19th century that parts of Portugal’s territories in Africa could be taken. The Office of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry claimed that it was aware of “certain South African projects”, which would be implemented should events on the ground force the Portuguese government to lose control of the situation in Angola and Mozambique. There was the perception that if the Portuguese authorities had lost control of the situation in Angola and Mozambique, the South Africans
could possibly take over some parts of these two Portuguese-controlled territories;

- The white population living in Angola and Mozambique was favourably disposed towards South Africa at a time when there were doubts about Portugal’s capacity to deal with the ongoing rebellion in Angola. The deployment of South African Military Attachés could result in what the document called “undesirable developments”. This implied that the Portuguese authorities suspected the white population in Angola and Mozambique to be more amenable towards South Africa if Portugal was unable to guarantee the security of its African possessions;

- The development of a closer relationship with South Africa – especially on matters of “mutual security” – should not be in the form of a formal arrangement because African nationalist propaganda would be directed against Portugal as a result of South Africa’s racial policy. The ongoing propaganda had already mentioned the existence of a colonialist conspiracy aimed at the ‘oppression’ of the black masses in Southern Africa. Cooperation between Portugal and South Africa therefore had to be less visible in order to avoid or reduce the potential of criticism;

- Although defence cooperation between Portugal and South Africa would boost the confidence of the white population in Angola and Mozambique, it could have the opposite effect on the black population. The black population in Angola and Mozambique could perceive any growing South African influence as a direct threat because of South Africa’s racial policies. This could jeopardize Portuguese efforts to improve relations between different races on the basis of non-discrimination.\textsuperscript{171}

The Portuguese Overseas Ministry emphasized that it was necessary to convince the South Africans that their security would not be affected by events in
Angola and Mozambique but that it was advisable to keep the South Africans “reasonably informed” of developments in the two territories. The deployment of South African Military Attachés in Angola and Mozambique was not deemed to be appropriate. They could rather be deployed in the Portuguese capital, Lisbon. In addition, one of the Attachés would be allowed to travel to Angola on long trips as long as he moved around under Portuguese supervision. In Mozambique such visits would have to be less frequent and of short duration. The Portuguese viewed overt military cooperation differently from the secret cooperation that was developing between the security services of both countries. A more open and visible military cooperation entailed certain political risks that appeared to be too problematic for the Portuguese who did not want to attract international scrutiny, especially in relation to Portugal’s African territories.

Towards the end of 1961, PIDE had already noted that certain unidentified South African sectors wanted to see the incorporation of Lourenço Marques into South Africa. The Office of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry was in constant contact with PIDE about this matter. Portuguese suspicions about South African intentions were based on a report in The Star of October 1961. The leader of the Transvaal branch of the United Party, Henry Tucker, mentioned the possibility of the incorporation of Lourenço Marques into South Africa. At the time, Tucker insisted that South West Africa should be incorporated into South Africa and in addition to Lourenço Marques, the territories of Southern Rhodesia and Swaziland as well as the Bechuanaland Protectorates and Basutoland should all become part of what he called a “greater Republic of South Africa”. Despite the fact that these were not official South African government statements, they still raised unnecessary Portuguese fears about South Africa’s alleged territorial ambitions.

However, despite Portuguese suspicions and the fear of the consequences of a more visible and closer relationship with South Africa, the military structures of both countries began to interact more closely. South African military officers who
visited Portuguese territory were warmly welcomed by their Portuguese counterparts. In June 1961, the South African Consul General in Lourenço Marques, RJ Montgomery, described the visit of a ship of the South African Navy to Mozambique, the SAS Vrystaat, in very positive terms. According to Montgomery, a visit to the Portuguese East African ports could be described as the “easiest and possibly the most pleasant” missions that was undertaken by the officers and sailors of the South African Navy who experienced “the sincere hospitality” of the Portuguese.177

The two countries began to discuss stronger links in the military sphere during the early 1960s. When the South African Minister of Defence, JJ Fouché, visited Lisbon in July 1961, Portugal and South Africa discussed possible cooperation between the South African Air Force (SAAF) and the Portuguese Air Force (FAP).178 The discussion focused on the training of SAAF paratroop instructors by the FAP as well as the possible provision of an aircraft maintenance service and the supply of aircraft ammunition by South Africa.179 In December 1961, the Portuguese Military and Air Attaché in Pretoria, Colonel A Silva Viana, suggested the creation of effective telecommunication links between the military authorities of both countries.180 This would include not only the direct transmission of radio messages between the South African and Portuguese military authorities, but also the transmission of radio messages between the military authorities in Portugal’s African territories and their representatives in South Africa, as well as the transmission of radio messages between the South African military authorities and their representatives in the Portuguese territories. The telecommunications centres that would later be used to transmit the radio messages would be the Portuguese Naval Communication Centres in Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques.181

In April 1962, the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, GP Jooste, approved the request to establish a military radio telecommunications service between Portugal and South Africa.182 In August the same year, the
arrangements to set up a permanent military radio communications service between Portugal, Angola and Mozambique as well as South Africa were completed. This allowed the Portuguese and South African military establishments to be in direct and permanent contact with each other.

The Portuguese also looked towards South Africa as a potential source of supplies for their military personnel. In May 1961, a Portuguese trade official contacted the trade section of the South African Consulate in Lourenço Marques to obtain army rations from South African firms for 10,000 Portuguese soldiers deployed in Mozambique. The geographic proximity of South Africa to Mozambique facilitated the acquisition of these supplies.

In September 1963, the South African Prime Minister, HF Verwoerd, wrote to his Portuguese counterpart, António de Oliveira Salazar, stating that South Africa was glad to have provided “material assistance in the shape of military equipment during the Angolan rebellion last year to the extent that our resources and supplies permitted”. Verwoerd indicated that South Africa was prepared to continue with cooperation in the defence sector “if such assistance is requested” since “it has at all times been our desire to maintain and strengthen our good neighbour policy towards the overseas Provinces of Portugal”.

In relation to intelligence cooperation, it is clear that both countries gradually displayed renewed interest in the exchange of information, especially when this referred to potential security threats. In November 1963, Angola’s intelligence structures began to receive information from the South African police in South West Africa about SWAPO members involved in pulling down the border fence between the two territories. The names of the alleged SWAPO members were submitted to the Portuguese authorities. The Portuguese also received information about SWAPO political meetings in South West Africa, as well as the names of SWAPO representatives in African countries who had been born in
Angola.\textsuperscript{189} The information helped the Portuguese authorities to monitor the activities of people perceived to be involved in subversion.

In November 1963, South Africa appointed military officers to the positions of Vice Consuls at the South African Consulates in Angola and Mozambique. The aim was to create a permanent connection to exchange intelligence.\textsuperscript{190} The presence of South African diplomatic personnel with a military background in both Angola and Mozambique indicated that whatever misgivings the Portuguese authorities might have had about direct military links between the two countries, it was deemed necessary to maintain close contact with South Africa’s military establishment in the long term. At the beginning of 1964, the Portuguese authorities in Angola believed that although the South African security services were able to contain SWAPO, there was the possibility that this movement would extend its subversive activities to the Angolan side of the border. The reason for this was that people from the same ethnic group – the Ovambos – lived on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{191} It was apparent that there was a need to continue to exchange intelligence on a permanent basis.

The South African authorities were equally concerned that FRELIMO’s insurgency efforts in Mozambique might affect South Africa’s security. In December 1964, the South African Vice Consul in Lourenço Marques, RV Lamb, reported that some FRELIMO members had managed to reach Southern Mozambique and Swaziland.\textsuperscript{192} Although he believed the Portuguese security forces would be able to deal with any threat it would be best to build what he called “a first class road system” that would link Southern Mozambique with South Africa’s Natal region. Such a road system would allow the rapid deployment of South African troops in Mozambique in case the Portuguese needed military aid. The existing land route via Komatipoort passed through built-up areas which created bottlenecks.\textsuperscript{193} Lamb criticized the lack of direct communication between the Commander of the South African Police in Maputa in Natal and his Portuguese counterpart in Bela Vista on the Mozambican side of
the border. There was also a need to build a watchtower near Maputa and prevent people from crossing the common border illegally.

As security concerns intensified, cooperation between the military and security structures from both countries increased. Such cooperation appears to have developed quite easily, especially in Angola and Mozambique. In October 1964, the General Commander of the South African Police, General JM Keevy, asked the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique to arrange a meeting with senior Portuguese officials in Lisbon. In exchange for this request, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon to arrange a meeting between General Keevy and Portugal's General Police Commander. This demonstrated that relations between senior police officials in South Africa and Mozambique were straightforward and uncomplicated. One reason for this was that South Africa was located closer to Mozambique than Portugal, which facilitated local interaction without interference from the central authorities in Lisbon.

Closer relations began to develop between senior Portuguese military officers in Mozambique and their South African counterparts. In November 1964, the Portuguese National Defence Deputy Secretary, General Venâncio Augusto Deslandes, indicated that several senior South African military officers had visited Mozambique during the year while Portuguese military officers had also started to visit South Africa. Deslandes noticed a greater degree of interaction between military personnel from both countries. The reason for these trips was to strengthen relations between the two countries.

The South African authorities were also interested in the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in Guinea Bissau. At the end of March 1963, the South African Military Attaché in Lisbon, RPD Dymond, visited Guinea Bissau to assess the security situation in that territory. He noted that several hundred insurgents had been killed during clashes with the Portuguese security forces. However, the
Portuguese forces experienced some difficulty in moving around the country since most bridges had been destroyed and many roads obstructed. The aim of the insurgents was to cut off several key areas in southern Guinea Bissau from the rest of the country. The insurgents in Guinea Bissau were disciplined and followed a properly laid out plan of action and they tried to persuade black soldiers in the Portuguese Army to abscond from their units.\(^{201}\)

The Portuguese gradually began to display greater willingness to obtain South African logistical support. In September 1964, the Portuguese military authorities in Angola felt sufficiently at ease with the South African Consul General in Luanda, EM Malone, to request spare parts for their Alouette III helicopters directly.\(^{202}\) Senior Portuguese military officers indicated that they were interested in a permanent future arrangement to obtain spare parts in South Africa.\(^{203}\) In the past, such requests had been placed on an informal basis.\(^{204}\) By February 1965, Malone realized that the Portuguese viewed the war in Angola as a joint effort against subversion and South Africa was thus expected to play her part in this effort.\(^{205}\) The Portuguese did not view the requests for material support that were addressed to the South African authorities as a favour. Malone stated: “rightly or wrongly, I suspect that the feeling among the higher military and civilian echelons is that it is not really for them to beg, but for us to offer”. Malone noted that Portugal was already spending 40% of the national budget on military expenditure.\(^{206}\)

**Conclusion**

The Portuguese authorities faced very serious problems during the early 1960s as a result of growing opposition to Portugal’s continued presence in Africa and Asia. Portugal was not able to stop the invasion of Goa by a well-armed and numerically superior Indian Army and it had to deal with expanding insurgencies in several Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa. Portugal faced several
challenges – including international pressure from the new Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, as well as the fact that the Portuguese Armed Forces were relatively small and unprepared for counter-insurgency warfare. The Portuguese Armed Forces also faced serious logistical problems since the various insurgencies were taking place in territories that were located geographically far apart from each other. There was also the issue of maintaining military forces in territories that were much larger than Portugal. Angola was fourteen times larger and Mozambique nine times larger than mainland Portugal. There was also a lack of basic infrastructure in these territories – such as roads and bridges – which hindered the movement of military contingents. One way to deal with the crisis was to pass legislation that promoted racial integration and the creation of multiracial societies in Portugal’s African territories.

From a South African perspective, the chaos in the Congo and the start of Angola’s insurgency war marked the beginning of a new period of instability on the African continent. The South African government also began to experience increasing pressure from organizations such as the ANC, PAC, SACP and SWAPO that opposed white dominance in South Africa, as well as South Africa’s continued control of South West Africa. Initially, South African government officials were not too optimistic about the potential of success of the Portuguese Armed Forces. The perception was that the Portuguese were overstretched and did not have sufficient material resources and manpower to sustain long-term counter-insurgency campaigns. The South African authorities were particularly concerned with the expansion of any insurgency in Mozambique, which shared a common border with South Africa.

At the political level, one factor that created some tension was the different domestic racial policies of the two countries. The official message that Portuguese representatives wanted to divulge in the United Nations was that Portugal believed in the equality of all races and opposed racial segregation, which contrasted sharply with South Africa’s racial segregation policy.
South African government officials believed that Portugal’s racial integration policy was mere window dressing in order to deflect Mozambican territory into the Republic of South Africa. Although the comments were not made by South Africans, as well as increasing contacts between South African and Portuguese military personnel indicates that existing political tensions were not sufficiently important to prevent the start of an informal alliance between the two countries. In the meantime, South African government officials believed that Portugal’s racial integration policy was mere window dressing in order to deflect international criticism directed against Portugal’s willingness to hold on to its territories in Africa and Asia.

In addition to the different racial policies followed by both countries, there was another issue that created a cleavage between the two sides. During the early 1960s, some Portuguese officials were still suspicious of South Africa’s motives. Such suspicion was based on comments made by a South African opposition politician who called for the integration of parts of Mozambican territory into the Republic of South Africa. Although the comments were not made by South African government officials, they still raised doubts about South Africa’s real intentions in relation to Portugal’s African territories.

Despite these tensions, the early 1960s was the period when the military and security establishments of both countries began to interact more closely and to expand cooperation in the intelligence and logistics fields. The creation of direct communication links between the military establishments of both countries, as well as increasing contacts between South African and Portuguese military personnel indicates that existing political tensions were not sufficiently important to prevent the start of an informal alliance between the two countries.

Endnotes

1 M.F. Rollo, Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Volume I. A-L. Direcção de Fernando Rosas e J.M. Brandão de Brito. Bertrand Editora. Venda Nova 1996, p.413. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) claimed responsibility for this attack. However, according to the Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, the most recent research into this incident seems to
contradict this interpretation. In A. Afonso, C.M. Gomes, *Guerra Colonial. Nova Força. De 21 Setembro 1997 a 13 Setembro de 1998*, p.29, the attack was described as being conducted by about 100 men that comprised a large number of UPA members and a smaller number of MPLA sympathizers. Forty attackers were killed together with seven policemen.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


12 *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 June, 1961. According to the Rand Daily Mail, Britain and France abstained from the vote while the United States voted for the draft resolution, which was submitted by the Afro-Asian bloc.


15 Ibid. Tanganyika and Nyasaland were the names given to Tanzania and Malawi during colonial times.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


27 The law that abolished the 'Estatuto dos Indígenas' was Decree Law nº 43 893 of 6 September 1961.


29 Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 C.A. Morais, *A Queda da Índia Portuguesa – Crónica da Invasão e Cativeiro*. Histórias de Portugal, Editorial Estampa, 3 Edição, 1999, pp.56-92 as well as pp.193-195. According to Morais, the Indian military deployed an aircraft carrier as well as destroyers and frigates against the Portuguese naval forces in Goa. In addition, the Indian military made use of helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, bombers and fighter aircraft. In terms of personnel the Indians made use of 45 000 men plus 25 000 men from the reserve forces as well as elements of the State Reserve Police plus naval and air force personnel. The Indian ground units also made use of recoilless artillery, mortars, amphibious vehicles, armoured vehicles and heavy artillery.

36 Ibid.


39 Ibid.


41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.


45 Ibid.


48 The English translation of the title ‘O Exército na Guerra Subversiva’ is the following: ‘The Army in Subversive Warfare’.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.


52 Ibid. Special training comprised over 200 areas of expertise in various military specialties that ranged from artillery and cavalry to communications, engineering, transport and logistics.


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid. In Guinea Bissau, the SCCI was set up in 1969.

58 Ibid.


60 Ibid.

62 Ibid.


64 Ibid, p.67.


66 Ibid.


69 Ibid.


73 J. Barratt and J. Barber, South Africa’s Foreign Policy – The search for status and security 1945-1988, p.70.


76 Ibid.


78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid. See translation of an article from the Portuguese newspaper Diário Popular. The article was written on the 26.12.61. This is part of the same batch of documents (BTS, Box 1/190/1). In the article, António de Oliveira Salazar explained that Portugal was located many thousands of miles away from Goa. Moreover, with her small population of 9 million people it could not really afford to become involved in a war against India with 400 million inhabitants. He also explained that during the Second World War, the use of the Azores by the Allies had reduced the heavy losses sustained by Allied convoys in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Winston Churchill had asked the Portuguese to allow the Allies to use the Azores as military bases in 1943. Although Portugal was a neutral country during the Second World War, it decided to allow the Allies to use the Azores. Salazar explained that despite crucial Portuguese support during the Second World War, the United Kingdom and the United States had not really helped Portugal during the Indian invasion of Goa.

Ibid.


Ibid.

NARS, BLM, Box 26, 51/4, Vol II. African Defence, B: 06.01.1960 / E: 26.11.1962: Secret letter from South African Vice Consul In-Charge, Lourenço Marques, 20 December 1961. The South African Vice Consul In-Charge mentioned the possibility that the Portuguese would have to withdraw to the Zambezi in case of a major rebellion in Mozambique’s northern regions.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 10/5/31 / 2, Vol 2, Revision of Mozambique Convention: Secret document written on 25 September 1962. At the top of the page it says ‘Office of the Minister’.


Ibid.

Ibid. The issue of the guarantee that a substantial portion of all commercial sea-borne goods traffic imported into the Witwatersrand Competitive Area would be routed through Lourenço Marques was later brought back into negotiations between the two sides. For a detailed explanation of this issue see S. Cunha, O Ultramar – A Nação e o “25 de Abril”. Atlântida Editora. Coimbra 1977, pp.204-205. It was only in 1969 that South Africa was finally free of any obligation to channel imports via the port of Lourenço Marques. The details of this arrangement can be found in the Financial Mail, 27 September 1974.


Ibid. The public agreement noted that the two countries had agreed to revise the Convention of 11 September 1928, modified on the 17 November 1934, taking into account the interests and needs of the two parties.

AHD, PAA 1132: See ‘Information Note Nº 13-63’, which was written on the 10 May 1963. The note is from the Information Services of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was agreed that South African air companies were allowed to make use of the following routes: a) Johannesburg-Brazzaville or Luanda-Kano or Sal-Lisbon-Paris or Amsterdam-London b) Windhoek-Luanda c) Johannesburg-Lourenço Marques d) Durban-Lourenço Marques. In the
meantime, Portuguese air companies were allowed to make use of the following routes: a) Lisbon-Johannesburg b) Luanda-Windhoek c) Lourenço Marques-Johannesburg d) Lourenço Marques-Durban.

110 AHD, PAA 1132: See speech of Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, 6 May 1963. Nogueira and his South African counterpart, Eric Louw, signed the new air agreement.


112 Ibid.

113 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/3, Vol 4. Portugal, Relations with SA. B: 07.01.1970 / E: 27.09.1972.: Letter from the Ministry of Finance, Pretoria – Minister of Transport, Pretoria, 18 October 1971. The request for the South African Reserve Bank to grant the loan is mentioned in this letter, which was written much later.

114 AHD, PAA 1132: See speech of Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, 6 May 1963.

115 Ibid. The speech was made in the presence of Eric Louw on the 6 May 1963.


117 Ibid.

118 NARS, BTS, Box 1/22/1, Vol 5. Angola: Political Situation and Developments. B: 20.08.61 / E: 18.01.62: Secret telegram from Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Cape Town – South African Permanent Delegation at the UN in New York, 17 January 1962. The Portuguese Delegate in the UN was Vasco Garin.

119 Ibid.


121 Ibid.


123 Ibid.

124 NARS, BLB, Box 8, Press Propaganda and Publicity as well as Radio and Television P.5 / 1: Confidential letter from South African Ambassador, Lisbon – Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 28 November 1962.

125 Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

NARS, BLM, Box 22, 45/1. Vol I, Moçambique – Relations with S.A. B:10.03.61 / E:29.06.62.: Confidential letter from South African Consul General, Lourenço Marques - Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 12 August 1961. The name of the African woman was Stella Josephine Daisy Thomas while the name of her German partner was Harry Schumann.

Ibid.


Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 1/22/1, Vol 8. Angola: Political Situation and Developments. B:14.01.63. E:23.12.63.: Secret report from South African Diplomatic Representative in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, March 1962. Also see BTS 1 / 22 / 2, Vol 3, Angola: Economic and Financial Situation, B:14.01.61 / E:20.06.68.: The secret report is mentioned in a confidential letter from the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which is addressed to the South African Secretary for Commerce and Industry as well as the Secretary for Mines. The date of this confidential letter is 9 May 1962.

Ibid.

Notícias da Tarde, 9 October, 1963.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Rand Daily Mail, 14 October, 1964.


The Star, 14 October, 1964.
Rand Daily Mail, 20 March, 1965. The aim of the construction of the Matala hydro-electrical project was to provide additional electrical power to the towns of Moçamedes and Sá da Bandeira in southern Angola. Some of the electrical power produced in the Matala hydro-electrical project would also be sold to the South African authorities in South West Africa. The electrical power was also supposed to be used in helping to expand agricultural projects in Southern Angola. For more details about this project and similar projects please see page 25 of the 'Angola-Mozambique Supplement' of the Financial Mail, 15 August 1969.

Ibid.

The Star, 8 July, 1965.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid. The 15 alleged South African Community Party members who were mentioned in the report were the following: i) I.O. Horwitch ii) A.H. Selby iii) B. Arenstein iv) Markus Kooper v) Joseph Mathews vi) Patric van Rensburg vii) Peter Raboroko viii) Jack Hogson ix) Vrou Molesi x) Ruth First xi) Moses Mabida xii) V.W. Mkwarai xiii) Julius Baker xiv) Ben Turok xv) P. Beyleveld.

AHD, PAA 1139: Confidential letter addressed to the Portuguese Ambassador in Cape Town, General Adolfo do Amaral Abranches Pinto, 17 February 1955.


Ibid.

AHD, PAA 1139: Confidential letter addressed to the Portuguese Ambassador in Cape Town, General Adolfo do Amaral Abranches Pinto, 17 February 1955.


Ibid.

AHD, GNP-MU, Arm.1, Gav.3 M339: Secret letter addressed to the Governor General of Angola, 23 June 1962. The document mentions that a Colonel Botha was the Commander of South West Africa’s police force.

Ibid.
The document explains that Angola had been divided into two operational zones. Zone I comprised the area north of Luanda up to the Congolese border. Zone II was located south of Luanda. In Zone I, the Portuguese troops were deployed among specific sectors according to operational demands. Zone II had not yet been subdivided into sectors. In relation to the Portuguese Air Force there were two main bases in Angola: the first base was the Luanda Air Base while the second base was the Negage Air Base. In relation to insurgent operations the picture was the following: insurgent attacks were continuing in Zone I. Moreover, the insurgents were still in control of the following areas: i) the area northeast of Caxito ii) the area southwest of Damba iii) the Sacandica-Chinque-Inguvo-Quimbelo route iv) the area north-west of Damba up to Cuimba.

NARS, BTS, Box 74/29 (F1), Burgerlike Lugvaart en militere verbindingen. B:02.10.61 / E:12.11.64.I: Secret memorandum from Colonel A Silva Viana, Pretoria, 14 December 1961. The secret memorandum is addressed to the Deputy Commandant General of the South African Defence Force.

Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 74/29 (F1), Burgerlike Lugvaart en militere verbindingen. B:02.10.61 / E:12.11.64.I: Top secret letter from Secretary for Foreign Affairs - Secretary for Defence, Cape Town, 9 April 1962.

Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 74/29 (F1), Burgerlike Lugvaart en militere verbindingen. B:02.10.61 / E:12.11.64.: Top secret letter ‘Military Radio Communications between South Africa, Portugal, Angola and Moçambique’, Pretoria, 31 August 1962.


AHD, PAA 1132: Letter from HF Verwoerd to António de Oliveira Salazar, 17 September 1963.

Ibid.


Ibid. In this particular document, the following SWAPO members were identified: i) Abraham Mboime ii) Lukas Pohamba iii) Andreas Njhole.


Ibid.


Ibid. The Vice Consul mentioned the case of a camper who was staying in Ponta do Ouro on the Portuguese side of the border who illegally visited Kosi Bay on the South African side of
the border while driving a motorbike along the beach. The local lighthouse keeper spotted the camper.

196 AHD, PAA 1132: Letter from Office of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry, 2 October 1964.

197 Ibid. The meeting would also include the participation of the PIDE Director in Lisbon.

198 AHD, PAA 1132: Secret letter from Portuguese National Defence Deputy Secretary, 30 November 1964.

199 Ibid.


201 Ibid. The areas that the insurgents wanted to cut off from the rest of the country were the following: Fulacunda, Catio, Cacine, Xitale, and Bolama.


203 Ibid. The request was made by Portuguese General Joaquim Brilhante Paiva from the Portuguese Air Force.

204 NARS, BTS, Box 1/22/5, Vol 2. Angola: Defence. B: 05.04.61 / E: 29.11.67.: Secret letter from South Africa’s Department of Defence, 5 April 1965. The letter says the following: “…it has been the practice for the Portuguese authorities of both Angola and Mozambique to send tentative feelers through the Vice Consuls for specific items of equipment required for the conduct of their operations. These requirements are then weighed by the South African Defence Force and other appropriate authorities and an informal indication is given of the South African attitude in that regard, which incidentally has so far always been favourable, provided our stocks permitted the supply without jeopardizing our own security”.


206 Ibid.