CHAPTER ONE
South Africa and Portugal from the end of the Second World War until 1960

Introduction

This chapter examines the relationship between South Africa and Portugal before 1960 and the first signs of closer interaction between the two countries after the Second World War, including South African support for Portugal’s claims to retain control over its territories in India, which had been under Portuguese rule for centuries. It also examines how the two sides viewed each other’s diverging strategies on how to manage race relations. This chapter also provides an overview of the start of the common front that both countries began to develop before 1960.

a) A brief analysis of Portuguese-South African relations before the early 1950s

Relations between Portugal and South Africa after the Second World War followed a path of constructive engagement, which was viewed as a necessity by the governments of both countries. While the South African government was keen to promote a policy of good neighbourliness with the territories located north of South Africa’s borders, the main priority of the Portuguese authorities was to guarantee the territorial integrity of Portugal’s territories in Africa and Asia. This was also the objective of the Portuguese authorities during the Second World War when the head of the Portuguese government, António de Oliveira Salazar, kept Portugal out of the war in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of the motherland and its colonies, as well as to avoid any attempts to create a federation in the Iberian Peninsula. Such a federation could have materialized if Spain had managed to incorporate Portugal with German support. Salazar’s foreign policy made use of a system of dual alliances. He maintained Portugal’s alliance with Great Britain and at the same time he signed a non-aggression pact with Spain in 1939, which was renewed in 1940. Portugal always made it clear
to the allies that it wanted Britain to win since the majority of Portuguese people and Salazar himself did not accept Nazi ideology. However, as a neutral power, Portugal continued to sell raw materials such as wolfram to Germany. It was only in June 1944 that the Portuguese Government decided to end the sale of wolfram to Germany.

Despite his efforts to keep Portugal out of the war, Salazar could not prevent the occupation of the Portuguese colony of Timor by the Japanese who decided to invade the island after Australian troops landed there at the end of 1941. According to Franco Nogueira – the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1961 and 1969 – it was in 1942 that Portugal became aware of potential threats to its territories in Africa. These included possible threats by South Africa and the Rhodesias, which wanted access to certain strategic locations such as the ports of Lourenço Marques, Beira and Lobito. Salazar was also suspicious of the intentions and motives of the allies throughout the Second World War. He accepted the United States request to use the Azores only after American President Franklin Roosevelt promised that his country would respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies. The Americans also agreed that Timor would return to Portuguese control. It was thus clear that sustained Portuguese sovereignty in the colonies was of paramount importance to the Salazar regime in Lisbon.

It was probably to allay the fears of the Portuguese and others that the South African Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts, said in March 1945 that South Africa’s northern neighbours should not believe that the Union wanted to swallow them up. Smuts responded in the House of Assembly to Dr DF Malan’s questions regarding the possible creation of an African Charter for certain territories in Africa. Malan told the House of Assembly that in 1939 General Smuts had mentioned the possibility of a federation of all British territories south of the equator. During the debate, Smuts explained that South Africa was prepared to discuss matters of mutual interest with its neighbours. The only exception was
the question of native policy, since there were major differences between the native policy of the Union Government and the policies practised by its neighbours in the North. Moreover, Smuts emphasized the need to hold conferences to discuss development issues and to promote the interests of the States concerned. The objective was to develop a spirit of cooperation without interfering in certain areas such as administration. He explained that “administration would have to remain with the local sovereignty, whether it was Portuguese, British or otherwise”.  

He also confirmed that the Union of South Africa had no intention of disregarding the rights, boundaries or status of its neighbours. He also said that for cooperation to succeed it was necessary to be less suspicious. He was obviously referring to the Portuguese Government, which followed a tortuous and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy during the war.

Portuguese suspicions about South African ambitions in its territories were rooted in events prior to the Second World War. During the First World War, Smuts had formulated a secret memorandum that propagated the idea of the incorporation of part of the Portuguese territories in Africa into the Union of South Africa. The secret memorandum mentioned the possible incorporation of Rhodesia and German South West Africa as well as half of Angola into a much larger Union. The incorporation of over half of Mozambique – including the port of Lourenço Marques – was also part of his plan. The justification for such a plan was the perceived inability of the Portuguese to develop their territories, as well as their alleged lack of administrative capacity. However, at the end of the First World War, General Smuts failed to obtain international support for his plan.

The attitude of the Portuguese towards their neighbours was based on real fears. Norton de Matos was the Governor General of Angola from 1912 until 1915, and Angola’s High Commissioner from 1921 until 1923. He believed that the objectives of the regional policies of the Union of South Africa were territorial
expansion and the creation of a United States of South Africa.\textsuperscript{16} He believed that the Afrikaners wanted to extend their influence in the African continent as far as the Equator.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, he also believed that the only way to stop the “detrimental territorial expansion of the Afrikaners” was to create wealth and develop certain territories such as Angola and Mozambique as well as the Belgian Congo.\textsuperscript{18} It is clear that Norton de Matos viewed economic development as the optimal strategy to reduce the Union’s influence in Southern Africa. The Union of South Africa – with its large white population and viable development capacity – was seen as a powerful competitor in the region.

Despite the existing tensions, the two countries knew that they needed each other for various reasons. There was a degree of solidarity between the Portuguese and the Boers in earlier years as a result of what they perceived to be excessive British interference in the region. The Portuguese and the Boers gained some autonomy from the British when the construction of the railway line that linked Lourenço Marques to the mining towns in the Transvaal was completed in 1894.\textsuperscript{19} There were other factors that brought the two sides together, including the use of Mozambican labourers in the Kimberley diamond mines, which started soon after the 1870s.\textsuperscript{20} In 1901 the Portuguese reached an agreement with the British authorities on the use of Mozambican labourers in the mines in the Transvaal, to the effect that the Portuguese authorities received a capitation fee on each Mozambican labourer who worked in the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{21} In exchange for the 80 000 Mozambican labourers who were allowed to work in the Transvaal, 50% of the Rand’s rail traffic passed through Portuguese territory every year.\textsuperscript{22}

However, it was not only the issue of the rail traffic and the Mozambican labour agreement that established relations between the two countries. The First and Second World Wars had an impact on the relationship between the two countries. Both countries acknowledged the need to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness in order to safeguard their respective security interests. The
military occupation of South West Africa by the Union of South Africa in 1915 served the interests of the Portuguese in Angola. Tension had been growing between the Portuguese in Angola and the Germans in South West Africa since 1900. At the end of 1914 the Portuguese lost 69 men in a clash with German forces in Naulila in southern Angola. Portuguese control in southern Angola had not been consolidated before the First World War. The presence of South African forces in South West Africa removed the German threat in southern Angola, which favoured the Portuguese since Portugal had to deal with several internal rebellions in Angola.

During the First World War, the Portuguese mobilized a total of 34,600 European soldiers and 19,500 indigenous troops for their military campaigns in Africa. Despite the high number of troops involved in these operations, the results were not very promising. René Pélissier said that the expeditionary force sent to Mozambique in 1914 was poorly trained and the quality of its commanders was doubtful. The well-planned German counter-offensives in 1917 and 1918 attracted British intervention in Mozambique. It is clear that the presence of South African troops in South West Africa and British forces in Mozambique helped to maintain Portuguese control in Angola and Mozambique respectively. During the First World War, the Portuguese authorities realized that any future threat against their territories in Africa would be overcome only at great cost. The impact of the First World War sensitized the Portuguese to the fact that they needed a policy of good neighbourliness in Africa. However, such a policy did not favour only the Portuguese but also South Africa. Mozambique acted as a buffer against a potential German invasion of the Union of South Africa during the First World War. As a result, it was also in South Africa’s interest to sustain a policy of good neighbourliness – an objective mentioned several times before the Second World War.

The need for a policy of good neighbourliness was expressed by the Union’s Prime Minister, General JBM Hertzog, during the Southern Africa Transport
Conference in September 1936. General Hertzog made an appeal to the Portuguese, French and English speaking delegates to avoid the development of the “enmities, jealousies and rivalries” that were the cause of Europe’s problems. He said there was a need to ensure close cooperation and sincere friendship between the various territories and states in Southern Africa.  

When the Portuguese President António Óscar de Fragoso Carmona visited the Union of South Africa in August 1939, the common theme of the welcoming speeches was the friendly relations between the two countries. The Governor General of the Union of South Africa, Sir Patrick Duncan, emphasized the fact that the Union was surrounded by neighbours that had no aggressive intentions. At the start of the visit, the Union’s Prime Minister, General Hertzog, presented General Carmona with a Portuguese flag that had been seized by troops from the British South African Company at Macequece within Mozambican territory in 1891. The flag had earlier been handed over to the Union of South Africa by Cecil Rhodes. The flag was significant to the Portuguese since the incident took place soon after the British ultimatum of 1890, which effectively put an end to Portugal’s claims to link Angola and Mozambique through a vast tract of territory comprising part of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, as well as Nyasaland. The Portuguese claims were contained in the so-called Portuguese ‘rose-coloured map’. The handing over of the flag was not only a friendly gesture towards the Portuguese but also a reassuring message from the Union of South Africa. General Hertzog, a former Boer General, understood Portugal’s concerns about its territories in Africa.

The Second World War, which began soon after President Carmona visited the Union, highlighted the significance of the relationship between the two countries. In South West Africa, the presence of a large number of German supporters was cause for concern to both the Union and Portugal. This is despite the fact that there seemed to be little contact between the Germans in South West Africa (SWA) and the small German community in Angola prior to the war. The Portuguese Government was concerned about German activities in South West
Africa. In 1940, the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon heard rumours that a sizable number of armed Germans was hiding along the border between SWA and Angola. As a result of these rumours, the Governor of Angola’s Southern Huila Province, Captain Eurico Nogueira, asked the Assistant Native Commissioner in Oshikango in SWA, A Bourquin, to cooperate in the exchange of information regarding German activities in the two territories. The Portuguese Administrator in the Angolan border town of Ondjiva, Freire de Andrade Pimentel, was ordered to remain in close contact with the authorities in SWA.32

The acquisition of intelligence was useful not only to the Portuguese. Whereas in the case of Angola the Portuguese initiated contacts that led to the dissemination of intelligence between the two sides, in Mozambique the South Africans collected the information that they required by themselves. The Consul General for the Union of South Africa in Lourenço Marques, EK Scallan, gathered information about a wide range of issues related to the war.33 This included information on the movement of enemy agents in Mozambique and details about Nazi sympathizers in the territory, as well as information about Portuguese military manoeuvres and the movement of the crews of various enemy ships that anchored at Lourenço Marques during the war.34

Other matters of interest to the South African authorities were the movements of certain prisoners of war who had been interned in South Africa but had escaped to Mozambique, as well as the interception of mail and staff in the German and Italian Consulates in Lourenço Marques. The information collected in Mozambique provided a clear picture of enemy activities near the Union’s borders. This information was useful in a number of ways. An enemy agent, Werner Franz Wilhelm Lodes, planned to enter the Union of South Africa in 1942 after spending one year in Lourenço Marques. The alleged aim of his mission was the assassination of General Smuts. The information collected in Mozambique helped to protect South Africa’s security interests. South Africa’s intelligence-gathering activities included not only the monitoring of enemy agents
and the interception of mail that passed through Mozambique, but also the recruitment of local agents. One of the best-known South African agents was Augusto Escorcio who worked for the Portuguese police in Mozambique.\(^{35}\) Although British secret service members in Lourenço Marques suspected that Escorcio worked for ‘both sides’ during the war, he provided useful information to the Union Consul General in Lourenço Marques from 1940.\(^{36}\)

The existence of a neutral territory right on South Africa’s doorstep facilitated the acquisition of intelligence. Portugal’s neutrality throughout the war enabled the agents of various belligerent powers to maintain a presence in Mozambique. Mozambique’s neutral status worked in favour of the Union of South Africa since it opened a window into the enemy’s activities. Despite its neutral status, Portugal took the views of the government of the Union of South Africa into account. General Smuts was one of the allied leaders – together with Winston Churchill and the Brazilian Government – who requested the termination of the sale of Portuguese wolfram to Germany.\(^{37}\) After additional pressure from Britain, Salazar finally agreed to the request on 5 June 1944.\(^{38}\) In his reply to General Smuts, Salazar expressed his satisfaction that it had been possible to find a solution to the wolfram question that was favourable to the British Commonwealth.\(^{39}\)

The wolfram question highlighted an important aspect of the relationship between Portugal and the Union of South Africa: Portugal had to take cognizance of the opinion of the British government because of the long-standing alliance between the two countries. Portugal also had to accept the views of the Brazilian Government because of the historic ties between Portugal and Brazil. However, the same did not apply to the Union of South Africa. There was no long-standing alliance between the Union and Portugal and no historical ties as in the case of Brazil. The fact that Salazar did not rebuff Smuts’ request for Portugal to stop the sale of wolfram to Germany indicated that he valued the views of the Union government. In addition, he intended to keep the policy of good neighbourliness
alive after the war. Germany’s military fortunes were on the decline in 1944. Salazar understood perfectly well the necessity of maintaining a stable relationship with the Union in the regional location of the two largest Portuguese colonies – Angola and Mozambique.

If the Portuguese Government understood the importance of relations with the Union of South Africa, the same can be said of the Union Government and Portugal. According to the Director of Public Relations at South Africa House in London, Julian Mockford, Portugal was “the most fruitful field for South African public relations work” in Europe. The promotion of South Africa’s interests in Portugal should be given preference over any public relations work in the Netherlands – despite Dutch-Afrikaans ties – as well as France – despite the size of France and its importance in Western Europe. Julian Mockford’s views were made known in a secret and confidential report of January 1949. He called for the creation of a position of a Press Attaché in Lisbon to promote South Africa’s interests in that country. Mockford explained that Portuguese government officials, as well as the news media in Lisbon believed that South Africa and Portugal’s African colonies had much in common with respect to economic and social problems. He added: “similar interests might … interlock more closely for economic benefits in peace and for essential wartime protection should the West have to fight the Communist East”. Such protective measures would include the passage of Allied troops through Angola and the use of a “vast industrial and military base in East Africa served by the integrated productive and transport facilities of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, the Rhodesias, the Congo etc…” Moreover, Portugal itself was potentially the West European springboard of an allied counter-attack in Europe.

The need to achieve closer cooperation with other states in Africa – especially in the defence sector – was seen as a major objective of the Union Government a few years after the end of the Second World War. In September 1950, Britain and South Africa discussed a possible defence pact in Africa similar to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such a pact would have to include not only Britain but also other countries with territories in Africa such as France, Belgium and Portugal. At the time, the United States was reported to be interested in the creation of an integrated defence plan for Africa and South Africa could play a vital role in such a defence plan because of her strategic position. The aim of such a defence plan was the rapid transportation of troops and supplies across the African continent in case of an emergency. The plan was based on the assumption that an enemy attack could take place in the north of the African continent and that military action could also erupt outside the African continent. In fact, the Middle East was perceived to be South Africa’s first line of defence in the event of war. The Union Prime Minister, Dr DF Malan, confirmed in May 1951 that the country’s front line would be North Africa. He told the House of Assembly in Cape Town that South Africa’s first duty would be to protect her neighbours to the north. His viewpoint was that South Africa’s internal security could be threatened from the north since the Union’s vulnerability lay in its relatively small white population, while the “non-European people” were susceptible to communist propaganda. He also warned that European powers with territories in Africa could not expect the Union of South Africa to defend their territories if they did not make some contribution. He was certainly referring to the Portuguese territories located north of the borders of the Union of South Africa.

Portugal participated in the African Defence Facilities Conference, which was held in Nairobi in August 1951. The delegates who attended the conference came from Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia as well as the United Kingdom and South Africa. The aim of the conference was to secure an agreement “on the facilities that would be required for the movement of troops and military supplies on the lines of communication between the South of Africa and the Middle East in time of war or emergency”. The British and Portuguese delegates acknowledged that the Nairobi Conference could issue recommendations but not binding decisions. A similar conference was held in
Dakar in 1954 but the focus of the discussions was West Africa instead of East Africa. The two conferences had only a limited impact on African defence arrangements.

South Africa’s ruling National Party viewed emerging nationalism as well as the expanding communist influence in various parts of the world as dangerous threats in the new post-war environment. Moreover, the Union was increasingly criticized in the United Nations for its racial policies. The National Party government, however, failed to convince European colonial powers of the need to create a permanent defence alliance in Africa. There were several reasons for this. In the first place, the Union refused to allow a multiracial military force and the colonial powers did not really believe that Pretoria faced a direct communist threat. In the second place, the Union’s armed forces were small and the colonial powers were unwilling to form an alliance with a state whose policies were becoming increasingly controversial.

In relation to Portugal, there was still the issue of traditional Portuguese suspicion about the intentions of its neighbours in Southern Africa. The Portuguese perceptions of that time had an impact on the relationship between the Union and Portugal. In July 1952, the Consul General of the Union of South Africa in Lourenço Marques, WC Naudé, believed that Portuguese distrust of other powers was rooted in Portuguese history. He explained that Britain – Portugal’s ancient ally – had taken advantage of its dominant position in the past to extract concessions from the Portuguese on a number of occasions. The result was that any mention of cooperation in Africa raised fears of ulterior motives on the part of other powers.

A secret report written to the Union’s Department of External Affairs at the end of the Nairobi Conference in August 1951 describes Portuguese attitudes during the negotiations on possible defence arrangements on the African continent. Although there was a willingness to cooperate, rigid instructions from Lisbon and
Portuguese neutrality during the Second World War tended to hamper the process. The policy of neutrality inhibited the Portuguese understanding of the needs of modern warfare. Moreover, the Portuguese “were extremely sensitive in regard to any proposals affecting their national sovereignty and there was evidence of their familiar suspicions of the ultimate motives and intentions of South Africa”.

Despite Portugal’s lukewarm approach to the Union’s defence concerns, senior Union officials continued to express the need for greater cooperation on the African continent. During a visit to Lourenço Marques in October 1952, the Governor General of the Union of South Africa, Ernest Jansen, stated that South Africa and Mozambique were linked by a common destiny. He also implied that there was a need to create more trust between the Union and its Portuguese neighbours. He said: “if we, who bring order and civilization to Africa, are ourselves divided, we cannot succeed: let there be no mistake about that”. The Governor General called for the recognition of common problems and a joint commitment to resolve them.

It is clear that at the beginning of the 1950s the South African authorities were keen to engage the Portuguese government in the security sphere. From a South African perspective, one of the main problems was the Portuguese suspicion of foreigners, which included the intentions of the Union’s government. The Portuguese government nevertheless realized that a policy of ‘good neighbourliness’ was the best way to protect its interests and the territorial integrity of its African territories. As one of Europe’s smallest colonial powers, Portugal could only benefit from maintaining good relations with the Union of South Africa, the most developed state in the Southern African region. In addition, the Union of South Africa was part of the Commonwealth and it maintained links with Great Britain, which was Portugal’s oldest – albeit controversial – ally in Europe.
The Second World War was certainly a catalyst in terms of sensitizing Portugal and South Africa about the need to promote greater cooperation. In fact, the Second World War highlighted the importance of the security dimension in Southern Africa. Although both sides did not necessarily agree with each other's internal policies, there was certainly a common view on African nationalism and the potential dangers of confrontation between the West versus the Soviet Union and its allies.
b) **The official Portuguese view of race relations and South African perceptions of the system of assimilation in Portugal’s African possessions**

The need to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness in Southern Africa did not mean that the two Governments necessarily agreed with each other when it came to the issue of race relations and their official race policies. The two regimes followed different strategies to justify their control over large sections of the African population in their respective territories.

In earlier years, officials from both countries often referred to the need to civilize the indigenous population along European standards. However, it was clear that the two countries had different perceptions about relations between Europeans and Africans and the processes that should be followed when it came to the dissemination of European civilization in Africa.

Norton de Matos – who governed Angola just before and after the First World War – saw the process of transforming what he believed to be primitive societies into developed societies as a major challenge that would require sacrifice and commitment. He believed that it would be a very slow process since it implied changing the African man through mutual contact. The challenge was to create a “unity of interests” between the indigenous population and the Europeans from mainland Portugal who settled in Africa. If this failed, the Portuguese would revert to the system of segregation that was practised by the whites in the Union of South Africa.

Portuguese officials displayed a degree of skepticism when confronted with explanations referring to South Africa’s segregation policies. One of these officials was the Portuguese High Commissioner in Mozambique from 1921 until 1923, Dr Manuel de Brito Camacho. He visited the Union of South Africa in 1922 to negotiate the revision of the Mozambique Convention. He soon verified that the Afrikaners, similar to the British, followed a strict segregation policy.
Dr Camacho was quite curious about his neighbours’ views on race relations. During his visit to the Union of South Africa he met General Smuts. Dr Camacho asked General Smuts whether he envisaged the development of a local African civilization after the indigenous population acquired a level of development similar to that of other continents. General Smuts stated he did not believe in that possibility since the black race would gradually deteriorate until it disappeared if it was forced to compete with the white race. General Smuts also told Dr Camacho that the aim was not to hasten the disappearance of the black race but rather to allow it to live on its own and to support its efforts to overcome its own shortcomings. The policy of segregation was thus the best way to achieve these objectives. It is clear that Dr Camacho did not believe that segregation would succeed in the long run. He believed that the black population in the Union of South Africa would always be substantially larger than the white population and that it would in future increasingly reject the colour bar. In addition, segregation would not prevent the African population from attaining a certain level of education, which would foster development – an unstoppable process.

It is clear that the ruling elites in both Portugal and the Union of South Africa had different convictions about how race relations should be managed. This also applied to the development needs of the black population. These different views were expressed not only in the 1920s but also later. In the Union of South Africa, white leaders developed their own particular views of how race relations should be managed from an early stage. Segregation was seen as the only way to protect African traditions and customs as well as to preserve racial purity and public order. According to General Smuts, nothing would be worse for an African than to turn him into a pseudo-European. In 1929, General Smuts stated that segregation was necessary “to prevent native traditions and institutions from being swamped by the more powerful organization of the whites, but also for other important purposes, such as public health, racial purity, and public good order”. The mixing of white and black – which Smuts viewed as two alien
elements – would lead to racial miscegenation and the moral deterioration of both races, as well as mutual antagonism. He believed that residential separation and parallel institutions for blacks and whites were necessary to protect the ideals of both races.\textsuperscript{71}

Since the early decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese authorities and the Union’s ruling elite maintained different convictions on race relations. These perceptions diverged further after the Second World War. The rise to power of the National Party merely accentuated the different approaches followed by the two countries to justify their control over the indigenous population.

During the 1950s, the official Portuguese policy on the indigenous African population was based on pre-1920 legislation. This included the concept of the selective assimilation of a small number of Africans in the Portuguese territories.\textsuperscript{72} This was described in the “Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique”\textsuperscript{73}, a law decree of 20 May 1954.\textsuperscript{74} This decree was in itself based on previous similar legislation such as the “Estatuto Político, Civil e Criminal dos Indígenas de Angola e Moçambique”\textsuperscript{75} of 23 October 1926 and the “Estatuto Político, Civil e Criminal dos Indígenas”\textsuperscript{76} of 6 February 1929.\textsuperscript{77} These laws implied the existence of differences between those who could be considered fully-fledged Portuguese citizens and the mass of the indigenous population. Africans who assimilated Portuguese customs and culture could become full Portuguese citizens under certain conditions but the majority of the population was omitted. The Africans who acquired Portuguese citizenship were called ‘civilizados’ (civilized persons) or ‘assimilados’ (assimilated persons).

Article 56\textsuperscript{°} of the “Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique” of 20 May 1954 stipulated the conditions under which Africans could acquire Portuguese citizenship.\textsuperscript{78} The main conditions were that such people would have to speak the Portuguese language correctly and have a job in order to sustain their families, as well as display good behaviour, which
meant that anyone who had committed a major crime or had been convicted twice would not be granted such a privilege. The acquisition of citizenship was thus viewed as a privilege and not an immediate right. The law implied that a person who became a “civilizado” would have to work hard to achieve that status.

It is clear that many Africans in the former Portuguese territories did not view the acquisition of Portuguese citizenship as a privilege. As Malyn Newitt points out, a black African who became a “civilizado” could not claim rights in communally held land or become a chief in his own right. Moreover, such a person had to pay “European taxes”, which were heavier and less easily avoidable than “native tax”, and lose access to free medical care and free schooling. The Portuguese historian AH de Oliveira Marques agrees that thousands of Africans who could be considered “civilizados” did not actually acquire that status during the 1930s and 1940s because they would be forced to pay higher taxes. Oliveira Marques explains that all the legislation referring to the indigenous population in Portuguese Africa and East Timor defended traditional Portuguese views. However, in the 1930s and 1940s this did not mean that the “natives” who acquired Portuguese citizenship were recognized as first class citizens since they could still experience social and economic discrimination.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Estado Novo’s official discourse portrayed a positive image of the Portuguese overseas territories. The official Portuguese policies avoided any mention of racial discrimination. The Minister of the Overseas Provinces in the early 1960s, Adriano Moreira, preferred to emphasize that the Portuguese assimilation methods were not enforced violently since the Portuguese tried to adapt to the local environment by respecting traditional ways of life. From the late 1950s he insisted that the Portuguese had a “special sensibility” as they did not reject the values of the peoples that they encountered. In addition, he said the Portuguese did not have feelings of racial superiority and they were certainly not trying to dominate people in other parts of the world.
Moreira’s words show that senior Portuguese officials tried to create a positive image of Portugal’s administration of her overseas territories. After the Second World War, the Estado Novo increasingly described its policy in Africa as the best way to deal with the indigenous population. When the Portuguese Minister of the Colonies, Marcelo Caetano, visited Mozambique in September 1945 he indicated that Portuguese policy did not include the race bar but rather the acceptance of social contact with other races. In the early 1950s, Marcelo Caetano was convinced that the Portuguese approach to race relations caused much less friction than the segregation policy of the Union of South Africa. In the preface of the book ‘Compreendamos os Negros!’ written by Manuel Dias Belchior, Caetano explained that the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa had not experienced problems similar to those that existed in the Union of South Africa because the Portuguese followed a traditional approach in dealing with the indigenous population. The book ‘Compreendamos os Negros!’ rejected the notion that Africans were “adult children” who could be judged by Western standards. It was also around this time that Marcelo Caetano wrote his booklet ‘Tradições, Princípios e Métodos da Colonização Portuguesa’, which defined the four main principles that characterized Portuguese colonization in the modern era, namely political unity, spiritual assimilation, administrative differentiation and economic solidarity. With ‘political unity’, Caetano emphasized that Portugal comprised one territory with several provinces, some of which happened to be located outside the European continent. Members of the indigenous population were considered full citizens and participated in the civic life of the Portuguese nation as soon as they acquired “European customs and mentality”.

Political unity was not a new concept but rather one of the main traits of Portugal’s colonization efforts. An example was the territory of Brazil – the largest country in South America and a former Portuguese colony – that never broke up into smaller independent states. Brazil’s political unity stood in contrast to the Spanish-speaking territories in South America that comprised a number of
separate Republics.\textsuperscript{95} Marcelo Caetano rejected the idea that spiritual assimilation meant that Portuguese laws were imposed on the indigenous population. It was rather the “transmission” of the Christian faith and Portuguese culture and civilization in other continents.\textsuperscript{96} Such developments could be successful only if they were a natural process carried out over a certain period. This was followed by the next principle, namely administrative differentiation, which implied that despite political unity and a common nationality, as well as the juridical uniformity present in all Portuguese-controlled territories, there was enough scope for local autonomous administration and financial autonomy.\textsuperscript{97}

The last principle was economic solidarity among all regions that comprised the Portuguese nation. According to Caetano, this principle was based on interterritorial coordination and internal protectionism.\textsuperscript{98} Although Portugal accepted the introduction of foreign capital to help develop its overseas provinces, the economic interests of the motherland and the provinces were paramount. Portuguese capital was given preference in terms of external investment in the overseas provinces and the factories in Portugal utilized as much raw materials from the provinces as possible.\textsuperscript{99}

During the 1950s these were the principles that guided Portugal’s policy in Africa. Although the booklet ‘Tradições, Princípios e Métodos da Colonização Portuguesa’ was published in 1951, the South African authorities became aware of it only in April 1953.\textsuperscript{100} The South African Envoy Extraordinary in Lisbon, SF. du Toit, described it as a “disappointing pamphlet” since it was “by no means profound as a philosophical treatise on their concepts of colonization or as a detailed statement of the organization of their colonial administration”.\textsuperscript{101} He saw the booklet as Portuguese propaganda. SF du Toit stated “it is only too apparent that the purpose was to paint a happy picture in case the current anti-colonialism should turn its attention to the Portuguese Empire”.\textsuperscript{102}
At quite an early stage, South African officials living in the Portuguese colonies were skeptical about the degree of success of Portuguese assimilation policies and what these policies actually meant in practical terms. The South African Consul General in Lourenço Marques in the 1940s, EF Horn, declared that although “natives” and Asians in Mozambique were considered to be Portuguese, distinctions were made on the basis of colour. He observed that the “natives” were treated not only in a fair manner but also harshly since infringements of the law were severely punished. As a result of this tough attitude, very little drunkenness was seen among the “natives” in Mozambique’s urban areas. He explained that although there was no colour bar there was also no equality. Although many Asian merchants were quite wealthy, they were “seldom seen at social gatherings or in the homes of Europeans”.

In the 1950s, other South African diplomats had similar observations as EF Horn. The South African Consul General in Lourenço Marques in 1955, JE Bruce, indicated that the Portuguese authorities maintained a tight control over the “native” population. In practical terms, Mozambique’s urban areas were basically reserved for the whites since the “native” had no automatic right of entry as the inflow of labour was carefully controlled. According to JE Bruce, any native who was unemployed in excess of 72 hours could be evicted from an urban area. However, despite these restrictions, the “natives” were free to acquire a higher social status and to become ‘assimilados’ if they had the ability to do so. However, the “natives” displayed little interest in the political advancement that was theoretically open to them and they appeared to prefer the “prevailing paternalistic system with its discipline and compensatory benefits”. Despite the existing discipline, the indigenous population enjoyed social benefits and basic rights, which were respected by the authorities.

South African officials noted that the status of ‘assimilado’ was granted much more easily in Angola where the indigenous population was numerically smaller than in Mozambique. In fact, the 1950 census of the two territories indicated
that while Angola had a total of 30 089 ‘assimilados’, Mozambique had only 4 349.\textsuperscript{109} At the time, the Portuguese territory of Angola had an indigenous population of 4 036 687 whereas Mozambique had 5 732 317.\textsuperscript{110} Despite the difference, it was clear that only a very small number of “natives” in both Angola and Mozambique attained the status of ‘assimilado’.

The small number of ‘assimilados’ was certainly one of the reasons why South African diplomats perceived Portuguese social integration as a flawed system designed to work as a propaganda exercise. When three “native” soldiers were promoted to the rank of Sergeant in Lourenço Marques in 1957, JE Bruce said he was inclined to believe that the appointments were part of a public relations exercise to impress world opinion.\textsuperscript{111} Such appointments would serve to show the world that there was no racial discrimination in the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa.\textsuperscript{112}

Although the South African news media seldom mentioned the policy of assimilation in the Portuguese territories in the 1950s, there were some reports that highlighted the difference between South Africa’s segregation policies and the racial policy in Angola and Mozambique. In a report in the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} in 1954, the General Secretary of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Major Louis Kraft, explained that the Portuguese were following the tradition of the ancient Romans who made a distinction between “civilized” and “barbarian” peoples.\textsuperscript{113} Major Kraft noted that the Portuguese treated the “natives” in Angola sternly. However, there was a class of “native” who was allowed to progress as long as he broke away from tribal customs and adopted a Portuguese way of life. Citizenship was available to those “natives” who had acquired certain qualifications. By contrast, in South Africa a “colonial attitude” prevailed, which prevented “natives” from progressing any further as soon as they reached a certain level of civilization.\textsuperscript{114}
In the same year, an article in *The Star* implied that there was limited racial tension between whites and blacks in Mozambique. This was the result of the policies followed by the Portuguese authorities in the territory. However, in a report in the *Sunday Times* in 1959, the Portuguese racial policies were described as harsher than those followed in South Africa. The *Sunday Times* quoted a report by Professor Marvin Harris from Columbia University in the United States who visited Mozambique and criticized Portuguese methods to impose discipline on the country’s indigenous population. In addition, Professor Marvin Harris claimed that forced labour still existed in Mozambique. Such diverging reports indicate that the public in South Africa received contradictory information about the racial policies in the Portuguese-controlled territories.

The two countries also had a different approach to the issue of racial miscegenation. The most basic difference was that the Portuguese authorities did not display the same degree of fear of miscegenation that was displayed in South Africa. The main ideologues of the National Party had always expressed a real contempt of racial miscegenation, which was viewed as a threat that could endanger the long-term existence of the white population in the Union of South Africa. In the 1930s, the leader of the National Party, Dr DF Malan, made it clear that “race purity” was the only way to ensure the survival of the white race in the country. At a congress of the party in November 1938, he introduced a motion that specified that “it must be the earnest and conscious aim of the European race to preserve its purity so as to ensure sound relations between the Europeans and non-Europeans and to prevent the economic retrogression of the European race”. In the 1950s, he also indicated that cultural assimilation would lead to the creation of a mixed race with a mixed culture. Since white South Africans were a minority, this would only lead to the end of “white civilization” in the Union of South Africa. It is clear that the main ideologues of the National Party preferred to refer to the issue of racial miscegenation in apocalyptic terms. This was a line of thought that was present before and after
the 1948 elections, which gave the National Party control of the Union Parliament.

The fact that there was no official legislation prohibiting marriage between different racial groups or extramarital relations across the colour line in the Portuguese-controlled territories did not escape the attention of South African officials. While commenting on the 1950 population census in Mozambique, the Vice-Consul in Charge in Lourenço Marques, PH Phillip, noted a higher proportion of coloureds in Mozambique in relation to the white population in comparison with the Union of South Africa. However, although the number of coloureds increased from 1945 to 1950, this was the result of intermarriage within the group itself and not as a result of miscegenation among various racial groups. The majority of coloureds in Mozambique – at least 13-thousand individuals – had a coloured father and a coloured or black African mother. There was an explanation for the growth of the number of coloureds in Mozambique. Phillip pointed out that in 1950 there were 73 white women for every 100 white men. In previous decades, the percentage of white women in relation to white males was much lower than in 1950. The persistent shortage of white women was one of the reasons for racial miscegenation in Mozambique.

The above-mentioned statistics indicate that a shortage of women of a particular racial group, led to an increase in the number of coloureds in Mozambique – at least in the initial stages of such growth. It is clear that the absence of legislation prohibiting intermarriage between different races did not necessarily lead to a high number of mixed marriages in the Portuguese-controlled territories. The fact is that, unlike white South Africans, the Portuguese never viewed the issue of intermarriage in apocalyptic terms as did white South Africans. The Portuguese never saw marriage between different races as something that would endanger their long-term survival in Africa.
During the late 1950s, some prominent members of the Portuguese intelligentsia publicly rejected the National Party’s views on race relations. According to Professor Silva Cunha from the Portuguese Higher Institute of Overseas Studies, apartheid policy was “profoundly unjust, illogical and unnatural”.\textsuperscript{128} He made this statement in his book ‘Aspectos dos Movimentos Associativos na África Negra’\textsuperscript{129}, which was published in 1958.\textsuperscript{130} Cunha believed that apartheid condemned the black race to a permanent position of social inferiority since it prevented the upward mobility of those who had the capacity to improve their social status. The creation of separate areas for the black population was not a feasible solution since it was not possible to prevent the interaction between the two racial groups, especially economic interaction. To him, the apartheid system ensured that black South Africans were placed in a permanent position of dependence in relation to white South Africans. The restrictions imposed on the black population had the potential of creating tension among the various racial groups.\textsuperscript{131}

It becomes clear that after the Second World War the Portuguese and the South African establishments developed irreconcilable approaches to race relations. However, the two countries found enough common ground to come together and face what they perceived to be the rising threat of Asian and African nationalism.
c) South Africa’s support for the Portuguese cause in India

During the mid-1950s there was an incident that brought the Estado Novo in Portugal and the National Party in the Union of South Africa closer together. This event provided the opportunity for cooperation between Portugal and the Union despite the fact that major principles underpinning their respective official ideologies did not coincide with each other and could even be considered to be contradictory. The incident was the Indian occupation – in July 1954 – of the Portuguese enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli, which were located inside India’s Bombay State.132 The events leading up to the Indian occupation of the two enclaves had their origin in the late 1940s. In 1948, the Indian High Commissioner in London, Khrisna Menon, told the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Domingos Palmela, that the Indian Union wanted to discuss the future of the Portuguese territories in India.133 This was after Portugal expressed its willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the Indian Union.134 However, in 1948 and during the next six years the Portuguese government firmly rejected any negotiations about the future of the Portuguese territories in India, which were Goa, Damão and Diu. The Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli enclaves were administered as part of Damão. The three separate territories – Goa, Damão and Diu – were called the Portuguese State of India.

The claims on the Portuguese-controlled territories in India were first made in 1947 soon after India’s independence on 15 August 1947.135 The claims by the Indian Union continued even after the two countries had exchanged diplomatic envoys in 1949. In 1953, the Republic of India decided to withdraw her diplomatic representative in Lisbon after repeated Portuguese refusals to consider the integration of the Portuguese territories into the new Republic.136 At the end of 1953, the Indian authorities began to act more aggressively towards Portuguese interests in India. Portuguese nationals who lived in the Republic of India were prevented from communicating with their families in Goa, Damão and Diu. Foodstuffs and other goods produced in the Republic of India were banned from
entering the Portuguese-controlled territories, especially Goa. In addition, Portuguese government officials who wanted to travel between Goa, Damão and Diu found it increasingly difficult to move across the Republic of India. This happened before post and telegraphic communications between the Portuguese-controlled territories and the Republic of India were cut.137

An ‘Action Committee’ set up by Indian nationalist groups in Bombay on 15 July 1954 announced its intention to start a civil disobedience campaign in the Portuguese-controlled territories.138 This was followed by the occupation of Dadrá on 22 July and the occupation of Nagar-Haveli at the end of the same month.139 The occupation was carried out by groups of volunteers from the Republic of India.140 After the occupation of the two enclaves, the Indian government refused to accept Portuguese demands to allow the passage of Portuguese troops and police through the territory of the Republic of India into the two enclaves141. In addition, a force of 5,000 Indian troops was placed between the enclaves and the nearest Portuguese territory, which was Damão.142

Although several foreign governments expressed concern about the situation there was no direct statement calling for the immediate withdrawal of the volunteers from the Republic of India. The statements issued by various governments merely emphasized the need to avoid violence. While the Brazilian government expressed solidarity with Portugal, the governments of Italy, Belgium, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela called for a peaceful solution to the crisis.143 The British government deplored the existing tension between a country of the Commonwealth and Portugal, one of Britain’s oldest allies. Cuba and the Federal Republic of Germany expressed support of Portuguese demands for the neutral supervision of the borders of the Portuguese territories that India was claiming for itself. In the meantime, the United States agreed with the need to resolve the crisis peacefully but emphasized simultaneously that it was generally opposed to colonial rule.144
The Union of South Africa was probably the only country that expressed strong support for the Portuguese cause in India. Soon after the incident, Dr DF Malan called the Indian occupation of the two enclaves an open aggression against Portugal. He described the Indian Republic’s international policies as a danger to Africa. He called on South Africa and Portugal to cooperate and fight against what he described as a common threat. The position taken by Malan made it clear that the South African government regarded nationalism in Asia as a threat to Africa, especially a threat to the territories under colonial control. The appeal for closer cooperation between the two countries suggests that the threat was very real and any steps that could upset the balance of power were bound to affect the African continent sooner or later. The Portuguese government issued a statement at the beginning of August 1954 thanking Malan for the unconditional solidarity that the South African Prime Minister displayed towards Portugal.

The statement issued by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the Union’s Prime Minister had made a direct public statement condemning the Republic of India while other countries had expressed their solidarity via their respective diplomatic missions.

South African diplomats were keen to obtain additional support for the Portuguese cause in India. A message from the Ministry of External Affairs in Pretoria of 7 August 1954 expressed South Africa’s interpretation: the Union government was concerned about developments in India and it was necessary to lend moral support to the Portuguese authorities. Such support was vital due to the existence of cordial relations between the Union and Portugal and the fact that the two countries were neighbours in Africa. The Union’s image in Portugal was enhanced significantly as a result of the official South African support. This was confirmed by the Press Attaché at the South African Embassy in Lisbon, JHO Adendorff. On the 3 August 1954 the entire Portuguese press hailed Malan’s statements.
It must be pointed out, however, that South African support for the Portuguese cause in India had another important dimension, which played a role in the Union’s willingness to support Portugal. This was the dispute between the South African government and India about the treatment accorded to Indians in the Union of South Africa. The dispute began long before the Second World War but gained new momentum after India’s independence in 1947.

In June 1946, the head of the Indian delegation at the United Nations (UN), Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, submitted a formal complaint to the UN to protest against the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa.154 In November 1946, General Jan Smuts had already been forced to respond to complaints made by the Indian representative at the United Nations, Maharaj Singh, over the land acquisition restrictions imposed on Indians in the Union.155 The Union government had earlier rejected accusations of discrimination against the Indian minority in South Africa.156 The situation deteriorated after 1948 when the programme of the National Party called for the repatriation of Indians, as well as for tighter restrictions that would prevent Indians from moving to the Cape’s urban areas.157 In addition, family allowances for Indians were to be abolished and Indians would not be allowed to reside in areas reserved for other racial groups.158 The treatment of Indians in South Africa remained an issue that fuelled acute antagonism between the governments of the Union of South Africa and India throughout the 1950s.

Despite the apparent similarity regarding the perceived threat posed by the Republic of India to both the Union of South Africa and Portugal, the public position of both countries to defend their respective viewpoints was somewhat contradictory. While the National Party argued that the Indian population should be repatriated since Indians were not part of the Union’s indigenous population, the Portuguese government proposed different arguments, especially on Goa, which had been under Portuguese control since 1510. The official position of the Estado Novo was that every effort was being made to reduce the racial
dimension of the issue. According to Prime Minister Salazar, the inhabitants of Goa could never be confused with the inhabitants of the rest of India for the simple reason that the Portuguese had maintained a visible and all-embracing presence in the territory for hundreds of years. The people from Goa in fact constituted a Portuguese community in India with their own specific culture.159

The Estado Novo clearly believed that the symbiosis between East and West that existed in Goa was something that should be preserved. It also believed that the best way to maintain the Portuguese presence in that part of the world was to emphasize certain traits that highlighted the particular characteristics of the population of the Portuguese State of India in comparison with the inhabitants of the Republic of India. The preservation of unity among all Portuguese controlled territories throughout the world was a fundamental tenet of the Estado Novo. It was a matter of expediency. The fact was that the Portuguese Empire inherited by the Estado Novo had no geographical continuity. With so many distant and diverse territorial entities, the only way to preserve an element of unity would be to engage in an official discourse that played down cultural and racial differences. Such an approach was quite different from the official discourse used by the National Party in the Union of South Africa, which placed race and racial differentiation at the centre of its policies. Although the two countries made use of different arguments to promote their respective viewpoints – which might be seen as contradictory – they were nevertheless prepared to share similar perspectives regarding a common enemy – in this case the Indian government.
d) The emergence of a common front in the international sphere

During the early 1950s South African government officials were well aware of the differences between their official race policies in Africa. Whereas some South African diplomats saw the Portuguese assimilation policy as mere window dressing other South African officials pointed out that race was less prominent in the Portuguese-controlled territories. This observation had some practical implications.

In November 1952, the South African Consul General in Lourenço Marques, WC Naudé, stated that the Portuguese government rejected the race policies implemented in the Union of South Africa. However, the Portuguese tried to make no public or private comments about the way they felt about the Union’s racial policies. There were several reasons why the two sides refrained from criticizing each other’s policies openly. During the 1950s, two factors increased the need for closer ties, namely the growing anti-colonial sentiments and the impact of the unfolding Cold War.

The avoidance of public criticism was a pragmatic way of dealing with the realities of the day. On 17 November 1954, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Cunha, told the South African Ambassador in Lisbon, SF du Toit, that the Union of South Africa and Portugal could have common objectives in the southern hemisphere. Cunha emphasized the importance of maintaining the security of the sea route around the South Atlantic and the Cape of Good Hope. NATO was just starting to establish a merchant shipping pool, which would be of vital importance in the event of a war. Ambassador du Toit understood that Portugal was concerned about a possible weakening in the communication links between Portugal and the Portuguese-controlled territories in Africa if Portugal had to divert shipping resources elsewhere. In January 1952 already, it was stated that the Portuguese viewed NATO’s geographic area of operations as quite limited in the event of war because it did not include the protection of
Portuguese shipping in the Portuguese-controlled territories located south and east of NATO’s area of operations. The security of the maritime route that linked Portugal with its overseas possessions was of primary importance, since it could affect Portugal’s economy. At the African Defence Facilities Conference in Nairobi in August 1951, the Portuguese seemed willing to cooperate in a joint defence arrangement in Africa, but simultaneously displayed their traditional suspicion of foreign powers – at least that was the perception of the South African delegates at the Conference.

Whatever their qualms about the Union’s intentions in Southern Africa and the National Party’s racial policies, it is clear that from the mid-1950s the Portuguese began to give more attention to the question of security and stability in their overseas possessions. The meeting between Paulo Cunha and the South African Ambassador in Lisbon on the sea route in the South Atlantic took place only four months after the occupation of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli by Indian nationalists. During the 1950s, Portuguese security concerns were shared by the Union government. In June 1954, the Rand Daily Mail reported that the South African Minister of Defence, FC Erasmus, had visited the Caprivi Strip to assess the possibility of building a permanent Air Force base and a communications centre in the area. The reason for the visit was to analyze the functionality of a permanent Air Force base and a communications centre in the 300-mile Caprivi Strip, which could be used to monitor the surrounding territories. Since South Africa could not establish a forward base in Botswana, the Caprivi Strip was seen as the best “strategic springboard” in the area.

There were several reasons that led Portuguese and South African government officials to display a renewed willingness to develop closer ties between the two countries. In July 1955, a Paris-based South African diplomat, DB Sole, met in London with Dr Franco Nogueira who represented Portugal in various international forums. Dr Nogueira disclosed that the Portuguese government had become far less suspicious of South African intentions since the first African
Defence Facilities Conference. The Portuguese authorities were cautious about any commitments in the field of defence but they were nevertheless prepared to consider the principle of establishing a permanent structure that could facilitate the exchange of information on security issues. Three months later, the South African Ambassador in Lisbon, SF du Toit, indicated that an attempt had been made to promote cooperation between the Union’s Special Branch – which was in charge of intelligence matters – and the Portuguese secret police, the Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE).

During the 1950s, officials from both countries began to engage in more frequent dialogue about certain specific issues such as African nationalism and the security of the African continent. When the Union’s Minister of Defence, FC Erasmus, visited Portugal at the end of 1955, representatives from both governments discussed the possibility of establishing an air defence network in Southern Africa. Although these were mere proposals, they indicated an apparent willingness for greater cooperation in the field of defence. This was a trend that was clearly visible from the mid-1950s onwards. When the South African Frigate SAS “Vrystaat” called at Lisbon in January 1957, the Secretary of the South African Embassy in Lisbon, PH Phillip, made several references to the importance of such visits. The presence of a modern and well-armed war vessel in a Portuguese port merely demonstrated to the Portuguese that the South Africa Navy was becoming a force to be reckoned with. Phillip described such visits as “clear evidence of the Union’s usefulness as an ally”. Furthermore, in October 1959, the former Governor General of Mozambique, Gabriel Teixeira, implied that Portugal and South Africa should work much closer together in order to protect their common interests. The comments were made during an informal meeting in Lisbon with the Union’s Under Secretary for External Affairs, Dr WC Naudé. Naudé interpreted Gabriel Teixeira’s comments “as a plea for an actual alliance to protect our common interests” although such comments could probably be the personal views of the former Governor General and not really a direct overture by the Portuguese government.
for an actual alliance between the two countries. Naudé explained that according to the Union’s Chargé d’Affaires in Lisbon, the “need for closer cooperation in Southern Africa is a subject often raised by Portuguese officials in informal conversations with members of our Embassy in Lisbon”.

It is clear from these statements that there were officials in both governments who wanted to see the development of much closer and visible relations between the two countries. However, in October 1959 the Portuguese delegate in the United Nations’ Trusteeship Council, Dr Franco Nogueira, rejected rumours about a possible federation between the Union of South Africa and the two Portuguese-controlled territories in Southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique. It appeared that the Afro-Asian bloc had initiated the rumours about a possible federation in Southern Africa in order to criticize the racial policies of both the Union of South Africa and the Portuguese-controlled territories. The Union’s Chargé d’Affaires in Lisbon, John Kincaid, pointed out that the Portuguese privately emphasized the need for closer cooperation between the Union of South Africa and their territories in Africa, as well as Rhodesia. While the Portuguese wanted to feel a sense of security in Africa – which could be obtained through what Kincaid called “a loose and unwritten pact with their neighbours” – in public they denied any association with countries whose internal policies differed from their own.

In 1956, the South African Ambassador in Lisbon had already acknowledged this apparently contradictory approach of the Portuguese in their dealings with the Union of South Africa. According to Ambassador SF du Toit, the Portuguese government wanted to have the support of the United States in the event of a showdown with the Republic of India over the Portuguese State of India. However, while the Portuguese were keen to make public any sign of apparent support from the United States, in the case of the Union of South Africa it was exactly the opposite. The Ambassador explained that although the Portuguese sided with the Union of South Africa in her dispute with India, they were
nevertheless concerned that the UN viewed South Africa as the transgressing party. Therefore, “if they associate themselves too closely and too publicly with us, they probably fear that they will automatically be tarred with the same brush before they have had an opportunity of publicizing their own case against India”. However, despite such fears, during the 1950s the official relationship between Portugal and the Union of South Africa emphasized three common aspects: the good relations between the two countries; a common position against the rising tide of nationalism in both Asia and Africa; and the rejection of communism and Soviet influence in Africa. This was expressed clearly when the Union’s Minister of Transport, Oliver Sauer, visited the Portuguese capital in September 1954. During his welcoming address, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Cunha, mentioned the good relations between the two countries and the role of Europeans as “civilizing agents” in the African continent. In addition, he also expressed his government’s appreciation for the positive role that South Africa had played in the conflict between Portugal and India. In his reply, Oliver Sauer referred to the common danger that Portugal and the Union faced on the African continent, namely the communist threat. He also expressed South Africa’s willingness to participate with its neighbours in what he called the “common defence” against aggression.

During the 1950s, there were certain cultural activities that indicated an increased interest in the links between Portugal and the Union of South Africa. Both the Portuguese and the South Africans expressed this interest in a number of ways. In March 1954, the Union’s Governor General, Dr EG Jansen, unveiled a replica of the Dias Cross in Port Elizabeth. The Portuguese government offered a replica of the Dias Cross to the Union of South Africa to commemorate the arrival of the Portuguese navigator, Bartolomeu Dias, at Kwaaihoek in 1488 where a cross marking the spot where the first Europeans had landed was erected. Dr EG Jansen emphasized that the people of South Africa were aware of the role that the Portuguese had played in the history of Southern Africa.
Official gestures that emphasized the historical links between Portugal and the Union of South Africa continued throughout the 1950s. During the celebrations that commemorated the first centenary of the foundation of the city of Pretoria in October 1955, the Mayors of Amsterdam, Paris, Bonn and Salisbury were invited as guests of honour. The Mayor of Lourenço Marques was not invited initially but a letter from Consul General J Bruce changed this. According to Bruce, although Portugal could not be considered to be what he called "one of the Union's racial mother countries" there was some justification in welcoming Portugal as one of the Union’s founding countries. This was because two Portuguese navigators from the 15th century – Bartolomeu Dias and Vasco da Gama – had been the first Europeans to set foot in the country. Bruce pointed out that Portugal was the first foreign country to have dealings with the Voortrekkers when the District Governor of Lourenço Marques offered shelter to Louis Trichardt and his followers when they arrived in Mozambique in 1838. He made an appeal to the Union government to extend an invitation to the Mayor of Lourenço Marques. After the centenary celebrations, the Consul General indicated that the event had been given wide coverage in the Mozambican press, including the role that was played by the Mayor of Lourenço Marques. That was certainly an objective that Consul General Bruce wanted to achieve.

The next year, in August 1956, the Portuguese government decided to grant to the Union of South Africa the plot of land where Louis Trichardt had been buried in the Mozambican capital. This was an issue that had been unresolved for a number of years. The Louis Trichardt Monument Fund Society was set up in 1952 in the Union of South Africa with one objective in mind, which was the acquisition of the Trichardt graveyard in order to build a garden of remembrance in that same plot of land. In 1956, the South African government authorized the construction of a monument in the allocated site. In the 1950s, there was also renewed interest in the whereabouts of the graves of Boer soldiers and members of their families who had died during internment in Portugal in 1901
and 1902. The first official request – which was made by the Union’s authorities in 1950 – did not have much success. However, additional research by South African Consular officials in 1957 yielded some results. The remains of a few Boer graves or the names of those Boers who died in Portugal were found in or near several Portuguese graveyards.

The renewed interest in past historical links between Portugal and the Union of South Africa had an impact on the political sphere since it emphasized certain aspects such as mutual cooperation between the two sides. In most cases, officials of both countries who were involved in these events had a very clear idea about the message that they were trying to spread. They made use of past historical events to justify the need for closer ties between the two countries in the present. Although the historical and cultural links between the two countries might be viewed by some as very tenuous or limited they served to cement the idea that both countries were facing a common destiny.

Conclusion

This chapter points out that Portuguese suspicions about the intentions of its neighbours in Southern Africa still existed after the Second World War. During the Second World War the Portuguese authorities developed the perception that some of Portugal’s overseas territory could be lost as a result of the conflict that entwined several European countries. Portuguese neutrality was seen as the best way to preserve what remained of Portugal’s centuries-old overseas Empire. In addition, the suggestions that had been made in earlier decades by some South African leaders – such as Jan Smuts – that mentioned the possibility of incorporating part of Mozambican territory into the Union of South Africa were always on the minds of Portuguese officials. The Governor General of Angola, Norton de Matos, firmly believed that the Union of South Africa wanted to expand its territory and incorporate a portion of the Portuguese-held territories in Southern Africa. As a way of allaying such concerns, a number of South African
politicians – both before and after the Second World War – made it clear that the Union of South Africa had no belligerent intentions towards its neighbours. During the Second World War, it also became clear to the South African authorities that the territories of Angola and Mozambique were important to the security of the Union of South Africa. Vital intelligence about the movement and intentions of South Africa’s German opponents was obtained in these two territories. This created the perception among the South African authorities that the Union’s security was also dependent on what happened in neighbouring territories. In 1949, the Director of Public Relations at South Africa House in London, Julian Mockford, made it clear that in terms of diplomatic work, Portugal was more important to the Union than either France – a much larger country than Portugal – or the Netherlands – which maintained close cultural links with South Africa.

There was one difference that was never bridged and that separated the ruling elites of both countries. The two sides had different ideas on how to manage race relations in their respective territories. While the Portuguese viewed the Union’s official segregation policy as unworkable in the long term, the South Africans believed that Portugal’s racial assimilation policy was mere window dressing. Despite such a difference, there was nevertheless sufficient pragmatism that allowed policymakers from both sides to work together in order to achieve a specific objective. South Africa’s support for the Portuguese cause in India indicates that the two sides did not really allow their differences to prevent closer cooperation when a common threat was identified. In this case, it was India that was the focus of attention since it challenged both Portuguese rule in Goa and South Africa’s treatment of its Indian population. The 1950s was also the decade when both sides began, for the first time, to mention possible cooperation in the security and defence spheres. Although nothing concrete came of these informal discussions, there was certainly a feeling on both sides that further cooperation would be needed in future in order to deal with possible threats within the context of the Cold War. It was also during this period that the two sides began to show increasing interest in the historical links between Portugal and South Africa. The
aim of such cultural contacts was to strengthen the view that Portugal and South Africa could work closer together in future.

Endnotes


5 Ibid, p.168.


7 When Franco Nogueira mentions the ‘Rhodesias’ he is referring to Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.


9 Cape Times, 23 March, 1945.

10 Ibid.


13 Ibid, pp.120-123.

14 Ibid, pp.121-122.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, p.38. Mozambique and the Transvaal signed a convention in 1909 that did not alter the main provisions of the earlier agreement. The convention lapsed in 1923 before being replaced by a new convention in 1928, which remained in force for 35 years. Some changes were introduced in 1934 and 1940 before a new series of agreements was signed in 1963. Lourenço Marques guaranteed share of the Rand’s rail traffic only fell away in 1969. For more details about this matter see S.E. Katzenellenbogen, South Africa and Southern Mozambique – Labour Railways and Trade in the Making of a Relationship. Manchester University Press, 1982, p.1 and p.79. as well as p.153.


28 Ibid, p.418.

29 Cape Times, 15 September, 1936

30 Cape Times, 15 August, 1939.

31 Cape Times, 16 August, 1939. This was probably the flag that used to hang on one of the walls of Cecil Rhodes’ library in Groote Schuur. Captain Patrick Forbes captured the flag from the Portuguese in Manicaland in 1891. For a more detailed description of these events consult R. I. Rotberg, The Founder – Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power. With the collaboration of Miles F. Shore. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 2002, pp.380-384.

32 NARS, Buitelandse Sake BTS, Box 1/4/ 5 Vol 1, Old Series – German activities in Angola and other Portuguese territories: B: 13.8.34 / 10.6.41.: Secret letter from Assistant Native Commissioner, Oshikango – Native Commissioner in Ongangua, 23 July 1940.

33 NARS, BTS, Box 4/2/26 A Vol 1, Secret Reports received from the Union Consul General in Lourenço Marques: B:0 6.10.39 / E: 11.05.45 and BTS, Box 37/17 Vol 1, Copies of Secret and Confidential reports addressed by the Union Consul General in Lourenço Marques - Union Government Departments other than External affairs Department: B: 14.08.41 / E: 14.02.42. Detailed information about German activities in Mozambique can also be found in BTS, Box 37/17 Vol 2 Copies of Secret and Confidential Communications addressed by the Union Consul General in Lourenço Marques - Union Government Departments other than External Affairs Department: B: 14.02.42 / E: 13.07.43 and BTS, Box 37/17 Vol 3, Copies of Secret and
Confidential Communications addressed by the Union Consul General in L.M. - Union Government Departments other than External Affairs Department: B: 15.07.43 / E: 03.12.53.

34 Ibid.

35 NARS, BTS, Box 37/17, Vol 2, Copies of Secret and Confidential Communications addressed by the Consul General in L.M. - Union Government Departments other than External Affairs Department: B: 14.2.42 / E: 13.07.43.

36 NARS, BTS, Box 37/17, Vol 3, Copies of Secret and Confidential Communications addressed by the Union Consul General in L.M. - Union Government Departments other than External Affairs Department: B: 15.7.43 / E: 03.12.53: Letter from Office of the Controller of Censorship, 11 February 1946, as well as letter of WB Stuart, 8 February 1946, which is part of the same batch of letters.


38 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/10 Vol 2, Old Series – Portugal: Foreign Policy and Relations: B: 24.8.42 / E: 16.7.57: Secret telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London - Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria 6 June 1944.


40 NARS, Ambassador Lisbon BLB, Box 6, L 2/11, Legation: appointment of Press Attaché in Lisbon and Madrid: Secret and confidential report from Director of Public Relations at South Africa House, London, 18 January 1949. Please note: the date on the first page of the document is incorrect since Julian Mockford left London for Lisbon on the 29 December 1948 and he remained in the Portuguese capital until the 14 January 1949. The date on the first page of the document is marked 18 January 1948. However, it should read 18 January 1949 since he wrote the report after his trip to Lisbon.

41 Ibid. The Union of South Africa sent its first official diplomatic representative to Lisbon in January 1935. For additional details about the appointment of this official diplomatic representative see Diário de Notícias, 12 January, 1935 as well as O Século, 12 January, 1935. In the same year, the Portuguese authorities decided to create an official diplomatic mission in the Union. For additional details about the official Portuguese diplomatic mission in the Union see O Século, 16 March, 1935 and Diário de Notícias, 16 March, 1935.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. It is clear that Mockford was not only thinking about Continental Portugal but also the Azores Islands in the middle of the Atlantic, which would be the United States’ main forward base in case Europe was overrun by communist forces from Eastern Europe.

45 Cape Times, 29 September, 1950.

46 Ibid.

47 Rand Daily Mail, 29 September, 1950.
48 Rand Daily Mail, 8 May, 1951.

49 Ibid.

50 Rand Daily Mail, 18 May, 1951.


52 Ibid.


54 Ibid, p.58.

55 Ibid.

56 NARS, Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury BSB, Box 17, Political Reports S.20/14, Portuguese / Southern Rhodesia Relations and Portuguese / Union Relations: Secret letter from Consul General, Lourenço Marques, 21 July 1952.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.


60 Ibid.

61 Rand Daily Mail, 16 October, 1952.


63 Ibid.


65 Ibid.


67 Ibid, pp.85-86.


70 Ibid, p.49.
James Duffy uses the words “selective assimilation”. He describes “selective assimilation” in the former Portuguese territories as a “safety valve”.

The English translation of the “Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique” is the following: “Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous people of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique”.

The English translation of the “Estatuto Político, Civil e Criminal dos Indígenas de Angola e Moçambique” is the following: “Criminal, Civil and Political Statute of the Indigenous people of Angola and Mozambique”.

The English translation of the “Estatuto Político, Civil e Criminal dos Indígenas” is the following: “Criminal, Civil and Political Statute of the Indigenous people”.


The English translation of the title ‘Compreendamos os Negros!’ is the following: “Understand the Africans!”.
Manuel Dias Belchior was an administrative official who graduated from Portugal’s Higher Colonial School.


M. Caetano, Traditions, Principes et Méthodes de la Colonisation Portugaise. Agência Geral do Ultramar, Ministério do Ultramar. Par Dr. Marcelo Caetano. Lisboa 1951. (French version). The English translation of the title of this booklet is the following: Traditions, Principles and Methods of Portuguese Colonization.


Ibid, pp.31-32.

Ibid, pp.33-34.

Ibid, p.34.


Ibid, pp.31-42.


Ibid.

Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 1/113/3 Vol 1: B: 19.1.1948 / E: 9.1.1961: Top Secret letter from EF Horn, Lourenço Marques - Secretary for External Affairs, Cape Town, 23 March 1948. E.F. Horn was the Union’s Consul General in Lourenço Marques from 1943 until the end of 1947. When he wrote this letter he had already been nominated South Africa’s Envoy Extraordinary in Stockholm in Sweden.

Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/2 Vol 2, Portugal and Colonies: Laws and Decrees: B: 18.7.45 / E:6.9.57: Confidential letter from Consul General, Lourenço Marques - Secretary of External Affairs, Pretoria, 7 June 1955.

Ibid.

Ibid.
108 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/2 Vol 2, Portugal and Colonies: Laws and Decrees: B: 18.7.45 / E: 6.9.57: Letter from Secretary of the Embassy, Lisbon - Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, 29 April 1955.


110 Ibid.

111 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/6 Vol 3, Old Series - Moçambique: Administration and Political Developments: B: 2.10.54 / E: 17.2.58: Letter from Consul General, Lourenço Marques - Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, 11 July 1957.

112 Ibid.


114 Ibid.

115 The Star, 27 May, 1954. The report was written by J.C. Caminada.


117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Cape Times, 9 November, 1938.

120 Ibid.

121 U.S. News and World Report, 16 April, 1954.

122 Ibid.


124 Ibid. The census shows that there were 25 149 coloureds 48 213 whites in Mozambique in 1950. The coloured group increased from 8 357 in 1928 to 25 149 in 1950.

125 Ibid. The census indicates that 9 471 coloureds had a coloured father and a coloured mother while 3 365 coloureds had a coloured father and a black African mother.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid. According to PH Phillip, in 1928 there were only 54 European women to every 100 European men in Mozambique. In 1935 the figure was 66, in 1940 71, in 1945 72 and in 1950 73.

The English translation of the title ‘Aspectos dos Movimentos Associativos na África Negra’ is the following: ‘Aspects of the Association Movements in Black Africa’.

Ibid.

Ibid. Professor Silva Cunha became Deputy Secretary of State for Overseas Administration in 1962 and Minister of the Overseas Provinces in 1965. He retained his position as the Minister of Overseas Provinces until 1973.


Ibid.


Ibid, p.262. The Indian Union became a Republic in January 1950. The first President of the Republic of India was Dr Rajendra Prasad.

Ibid, p.263.


Ibid.

Ibid. One group of volunteers contained recruits from the left-wing Goan People’s Party while another group comprised members of the Free Goa Movement. The Free Goa Movement had the backing of the Indian Jan Sangh right-wing organization. The two enclaves were left in the control of the Free Goa Movement.

Ibid.

NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/1/1 Vol 1, Portugal and Mozambique, Old Series – Portuguese territories in India: B: 9.2.54 / E: 21.9.54: 'Immediate Code Telegram’ from South African Embassy, Lisbon - Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, 30 July 1954. The telegram mentions only one enclave, but in fact there were two enclaves. In addition, it does not mention Damão by name but the “next Portuguese territory”.


Ibid.

The Star, 3 August, 1954.

Jornal do Comércio, 4 August, 1954.

Ibid.

The Star, 3 August, 1954.
149 Diário de Notícias, 3 August, 1954.

150 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/1/1, Vol 1, Portugal and Moçambique, Old Series – Portuguese Territories in India: B: 9.2.54 / E: 21.9.54: Secret ‘Priority Telegram’ from South African Ministry for External Affairs, Pretoria - Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London as well as Prime Minister of New Zealand, Wellington, 7 August 1954.

151 Ibid.

152 NARS, BTS, Box 1/14/1/1, Vol 1, Portugal and Moçambique, Old Series – Portuguese Territories in India: B: 9.2.54 / E: 21.9.54: Document from the Information Office of the South African Embassy, Lisbon, 12 August 1954. The title of the document is ‘Portuguese Press Reaction to Dr Malan's Declaration of South African Solidarity with Portugal’.

153 Ibid.

154 Cape Times, 24 June, 1946.


156 Cape Times, 6 November, 1946. The correspondence between Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and General Jan Smuts regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa is quite extensive. For a more detailed understanding of the different points of view of the two men consult the Annex containing the full correspondence between Nehru and Smuts in Box BLM, 22, 43/1, U.N. – Treatment of Indians in South Africa, B: 17.12.47 / E:06.07.59. The letters were written in 1947.

157 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Supplements: May 22-29, Volume No. VI, 1946-1948. Keesing’s Publications Limited, United Kingdom, London, pg 9292. In addition, see report in the Rand Daily Mail from the 18 November 1948. According to the new Minister of the Interior, Dr TE Donges, there was nothing immoral in the repatriation of Indians since there was a shifting of population all over the world.

158 Ibid.


161 Ibid.

162 NARS, BTS, Box 4/2/35. Vol 3, Periodical reports from the S.A. Legation in Lisbon: B: 15.04.46 / E: 07.11.55: Secret letter from South African Ambassador, Lisbon - Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, 18 November 1954. The letter was written one day after Ambassador du Toit met the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Paulo Arsénio Veríssimo Cunha.

163 Ibid.

164 NARS, BSB, Box 21, S.41, Annexure Jacket I, Top Secret: Secret report on the African Defence Facilities Conference, which was written in Nairobi on the 31 August 1951. The South
African delegation comprised two Ministers. These were the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Defence. Other officials included the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the General Manager of Railways, as well as the Secretary for External Affairs and the Secretary for Defence.


166 DB Sole served as South Africa’s Ambassador in Austria, Germany and the United States during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

167 Dr Franco Nogueira began his diplomatic career in 1941. He became the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1961.


169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.


172 NARS, BLB, Box 5, Vol I, 16/10/1, International Cooperation in Africa: Translation of weekly bulletin from Portuguese Information Office, 26.11.55.


174 Ibid.


176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.


179 Ibid.


181 Ibid.
182 Diário de Lourenço Marques (Guardian), 27 September, 1954.

183 Ibid.


185 Ibid. Dr Eric Axelson discovered the original remains of the Dias Cross in 1938.

186 Ibid.

187 Diário de Lourenço Marques (Guardian), 28 October, 1955.


189 Ibid.

190 Diário de Lourenço Marques (Guardian), 28 October, 1955.

191 Diário de Lourenço Marques (Guardian), 27 August, 1956.


193 Diário de Lourenço Marques (Guardian), 27 August, 1956. The monument was supposed to be completed before April 1959.


195 Ibid.