THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL CIVIC ORGANISATION:
A TWO-TIERED SOCIAL MOVEMENT

NDANDULENI B. NTHAMBELENI

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fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Literature and
Philosophy in Sociology

Supervisor: Professor Peter Alexander

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation expands our understanding of South African social movements through a study of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), a body formed in 1992 as a national co-ordinating structure of regional and local civic associations. It contends that SANCO can only be understood as a ‘two-tiered social movement’.

The study draws on a Human Sciences Research Council survey, to which I contributed as a team member, on participant and non-participant observation, semi-structured interviews and primary literature and a case study of one SANCO branch, Alexandra. The focus of this survey was on the experience of SANCO’s leadership both at national and local level.

Social movement literature reviewed in this study ignored the issue of tiers or levels in social movements. The study demonstrates that it would be worth re-looking at the analyses of social movements with an eye to assess whether distinct levels exist elsewhere. Whilst tiers are likely to be absent from small movements, there is an inherent tension for organisations that have both local units focused on immediate day-to-day concerns and also national structures that represent broader issues within political circles.

The findings of the study defy the dominant view of South African social movements, which emphasise a demobilisation in the post-apartheid period. In the case of SANCO, its demise was substantiated by examining the organisation at a national level, largely ignoring local realities. A two-tiered approach demonstrates that even though local civic organisations experienced difficulties, particularly in the period immediately after the end of apartheid, they continued to thrive.
My findings are in line with the cycles of protest paradigm, which argues that social movements rise and fall and rise again. I have supplemented this approach by adapting Manuel Castells’ threefold typology of identity: resistance, project and legitimising. The thesis is that South Africa’s civic organisations originated as part of the resistance movement in the early 1980s; became increasingly concerned with a national democratic project in the late 1980s’ notably through their involvement with the United Democratic Front, and then in the early 1990s, at a national level, served to legitimise ANC rule through SANCO. Since the end of apartheid there has been a return to an emphasis on resistance at a local level. This is a ‘cycle’, but not a repetition of history. This new resistance excludes upwardly mobile former leaders and has different political implications. This study shows that, since the first general elections in 1994, activism has been instigated and sustained by local concerns, rather than the larger loyalties of national, political struggles.

In the past year, in the period since the fieldwork for the dissertation was completed, it has become apparent that SANCO branches, and to some extent SANCO at national level, are part of a broader movement, one in which resistance to policies and practices associated with President Thabo Mbeki have fed into a new project that calls for support for Jacob Zuma as the next president of South Africa. This development lends credence to the thesis developed in the dissertation. It remains to be seen whether, if this project succeeds, SANCO, at national and/ or local level, will begin to assert a new legitimising identity.
DEDICATED TO NDALAMO AND ANDANI
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Above all, I am thankful to the Almighty God, whose enabling presence gave me patience, endurance, and strength to complete this thesis;

Finally I declare that the thesis submitted in fulfillment of the Doctor of Literature and Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg, apart from the assistance recognised, is my own work, and has not been submitted to another university for any other degree.

Ndanduleni Bernard Nthambeleni
Johannesburg, October 2008
**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Alexandra City Council</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Alexandra Civic Organisation</td>
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<td>AJNF</td>
<td>Alexandra Joint Negotiating Forum</td>
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<td>Alexandra Land and Property Owners’ Association</td>
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<td>Black Community Programme</td>
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<td>BCO</td>
<td>Border Civic Organisation</td>
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<td>Black Local Authorities</td>
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BPC  Black People's Convention
CAHAC  Cape Areas Housing Action Committee
CAJ  Civic Association of Johannesburg
CAST  Civic Association of Southern Transvaal
COSANCOM  Congress of South African Non Racial Civic Organisation Movement
COSAS  Congress of South African Students
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
CONTRALESQA  Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
CRADORA  Cradock Residents’ Association
DBSA  Development Bank of South Africa
EBRA  East Bank Residents’ Association
EISA  Electoral Institute of South Africa
ERAPO  East Rand People’s Organisation
ESKOM  Electricity Supply Commission
EWCCC  Evaton West Community Crisis Committee
FEDUSA  Federation of Unions of South Africa
GEAR  Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy
HSRC  Human Sciences Research Council
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party
IMATU  Independent Municipal and Allied Trades Union
JCC  Johannesburg City Council
JORAC  Joint Rent Action Committee
JOWCO  Johannesburg Water Company
JSA  Jubilee South Africa
KRO  Krugersdorp Residents’ Organisation
LPM  Landless People’s Movement
LGNF  Local Government Negotiating Forum
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<td>MK</td>
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<td>NACTU</td>
<td>National Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>NARCO</td>
<td>National Association of Residents and Civic Organisation</td>
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<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<td>PEBCO</td>
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<td>Public Utility Transits Corporation</td>
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<td>PWV</td>
<td>Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Veereneging</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SABC</td>
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<td>SAMWU</td>
<td>South African Municipal Workers’ Union</td>
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<td>SANGOCO</td>
<td>South African National NGO Coalition</td>
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<td>SANPAD</td>
<td>South Africa–Netherlands Programme on Alternatives in Development</td>
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<td>SASO</td>
<td>South African Students’ Organisation</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>Soweto People’s Delegation</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Soweto Parents’ Committee</td>
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<td>SRDI</td>
<td>SANCO Research Development Institute</td>
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<td>SUBC</td>
<td>Soweto Urban Black Council</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
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<td>TCA</td>
<td>Tembisa Civic Association</td>
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<td>TGWU</td>
<td>Transport and General Workers’ Union</td>
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<td>Urban Bantu Council</td>
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<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VTO</td>
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<td>Western Cape Civic Association</td>
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<td>WECAEC</td>
<td>Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign</td>
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<td>WECUSA</td>
<td>Western Cape United Squatters’ Association</td>
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</table>
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CHAPTER ONE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL CIVIC ORGANISATION:
A TWO-TIERED SOCIAL MOVEMENT

1.1 Introduction

The President of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), Mlungisi Hlongwane remarked in 1996 that, 'If you want to be an instant revolutionary these days and be involved in boycotts, SANCO is no longer a home for you'. He added that although SANCO was an organisation that mastered the art of boycotts, it has made a complete break with its past. SANCO will never be the same again (Lodge 1999: 85). As a national civic organisation formed in 1992 to coordinate local civic structures across the country, SANCO had lost the earlier aggressive agenda that reflected civic movement activity in the 1980s.

By 1994 SANCO had often been at loggerheads with itself because national leaders assumed, wrongly that they could convince local branches to succumb to the authority of the national structure. This has resulted in accusations by branches of a top-down approach, where the higher structures of SANCO dictate terms to lower structures. Local civic leaders often complained that the higher levels of SANCO did not know what was occurring on the ground. Their assessment was strengthened by the fact that SANCO’s national structure is part of the national tripartite alliance with the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). At a local level, SANCO branches generally remained disengaged from government agencies and political parties. Local branches often take positions and organise protests that are contrary to the positions and
national stances of SANCO and in many townships there have been reports of rivalry between the ANC and local civic branches. The general failure of the programmes initiated by SANCO in the late 1990s and the much publicised controversy surrounding its ventures into business were both a result of, and a further impetus for, growing disconnection between SANCO branch structures and the national-level organisation.

It is within this context that I will attempt to argue that SANCO is a *two-tiered social movement*, with distinct national and local dynamics. The thesis contends that these two levels exist and that they play a role in shaping the organisation’s activities, identity and internal conflicts.

My interest in pursuing research on SANCO was stimulated by two earlier academic projects in which I had been involved. Firstly, there was my Masters degree, which focused on the Soweto Civic Association (SCA). Whilst doing fieldwork on the SCA, I attended a strategic planning workshop organised by SANCO-Soweto sub-region on 4 and 5 April 1998 held at Ipelegeng Community Centre. In this workshop SANCO-Soweto delegates bemoaned the decision to disband the SCA in favour of SANCO. In their commission reports, the majority of delegates argued that the decision to join SANCO had crippled local activism, and that the erstwhile highly organised civic structure in the former Southern Transvaal had became very weak. Loss of momentum on local issues was ascribed to a lack of funds caused by disbanding in favour of SANCO.

Secondly, in 1999, after completing my Masters degree I was approached by the former Head of the Democracy and Governance unit at the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), Dr Johan Olivier, to take part in a social movement project sponsored by the South Africa-Netherlands Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD), HSRC, Kurt Lewin Institute and the Free University of Amsterdam. The aim of the project was to investigate social movements, protest events and ‘contention’ in South Africa during the time of
significant socio-political transformation between February 1994 and March 2000. This was interdisciplinary research which comprised three different projects: the creation of a data base of protest events in South Africa since 1970, conducting interviews with representatives of grassroots organisations, and survey research on social movements entitled *Citizenship in Transition*.

The pattern of the study was annual survey rounds, which were held during the period from February 1994 (that is, before the first open democratic elections) to March 2000 (nine months after the second national elections). My role in this research project was to co-ordinate social movement research in five townships of the Ekurhuleni region: Daveyton, Wattville, Kwa Thema, Tsakane and Duduza. Members of local civic branches were interviewed to find out their understanding of democracy, the impact of the end of apartheid on local civic structures, and also the relationship between local civic branches and the SANCO national structure.

Owing to my involvement in this social movement research project I started reading social movement literature. From this literature, I encountered theories that argued that social movements are created, grow, achieve successes or failures and, eventually dissolve and cease to exist. This literature also points out that social movements rise up to challenge an existing order and decline once political change has occurred. The literature suggests that the decline of social movements was mainly conditioned by three factors: firstly, co-option of the leadership of such movements; secondly, by demobilisation of the popular base once demands had been met, and thirdly, as a result of repression and structural limitations to change. However, some schools of thought within social movement literature propose that social movement activity depended on the cycles of contention, which refers to the cyclical rise and fall in social movement activity. This debate caught my attention and became a focus of my interest in pursuing this study on SANCO in post-apartheid South Africa.
1.2 Problem Statement

From the late 1970s, civic organisations that emerged in the black townships in South Africa were at the forefront of struggles, both at the level of community issues and in political battles against the government. These organisations became key players in the resistance movement, with their strategic thrust being that of seizing power from the apartheid government and its structures at a local level. They mobilised township residents against the state and attempted to force the resignation of black councillors as a means of forcing the collapse of illegitimate local authorities. Civic organisations have been associated with a range of anti-apartheid movements that have included political liberation organisations and trade unions. They challenged the laws that underpinned the apartheid system, notably those which separated black townships from white municipalities.

These organisations functioned as centres of opposition and as alternatives to township councils. They provided a different channel for addressing discontent and mediation between residents and the state. They served as a watchdog over councils and contested these bodies’ claims to represent local communities. They also condemned councils as the unacceptable puppets of apartheid. By the late 1990s a number of regional civic structures had emerged, such as the Civic Association of the Southern Transvaal (CAST) and the Border Civic Organisation. In March 1992 the expansion of civic structures led to the launch of SANCO which consolidated all civic structures through the establishment of linkages to all regions of the country.

SANCO became prominent at the national level, playing a central role in the negotiated reform of local government in 1993. The coordination of local civic organisations under SANCO was aimed at providing these local structures with a strong voice, so that ordinary residents of townships and informal settlements
could deal with under-development and other community issues with the backing of a national structure. However, after the 1994 general elections SANCO’s national profile declined and its leadership failed to provide local branches with the independent strategic direction that could champion the cause of action outside the ANC.

In his study of civic movements in South Africa, Friedman (1991: 5) argues that the demise of apartheid would engender a parallel decline of civic organisations. Moreover, he contends that due to the fact that most black civic organisations were historically aligned with the ANC, they might become vehicles for extending ANC hegemony outside the future state and into the sphere of voluntary association. This view was further elaborated on by Seekings (1992: 235), who argues that the civic organisations’ space to perform as a watchdog after the elections would diminish, because they would have to operate as a loyal opponent in a local one party-system controlled by the ANC.

Furthermore, Lanegran (1996: 115) indicates that civic organisations seemed to have abandoned the strategies that characterised them as a social movement, since they no longer strived to nurture a common social identity for township residents and failed to sustain collective action. Lanegran further argues that the post-apartheid period brought constraints on SANCO’s space for transformational politics. Lanegran contests that after the 1994 national elections civics had largely abandoned civil society, entering the realm of political society through being selected as representatives on national and local state structures. This was further aggravated by SANCO which entered into an alliance with the ANC to help it win the 1994 general elections (Lanegran 1996: 115).

James and Caliguire (1996) made a similar point arguing that the end of apartheid had led to a weakening of many civil society organisations. These authors argue that this decline occurred for three reasons: firstly, as a result of a loss of leadership following the move of many skilled individuals into government
or private sector jobs; secondly, through a loss of ideology resulting from political change that took place in 1994 elections; and thirdly, as a consequence of lack of funds, because generous financial support provided by international and domestic institutions was diverted towards government or other programmes with the inception of democratic rule after the 1994 elections. In addition, Goetz (1997: 16) argue that mass-based organisations were weakened by the constitutional negotiations, because the liberal-democratic framework of the negotiating process did not allow for them to be represented. The South African social movement literature appeared to be influenced by the Western literature regarding the life span of social movements. This literature often argues that the demise of apartheid will result in the decline of social movement; this will be explored in Chapter Two.

While I tend to agree with this analysis of social movements as far as SANCO national leadership is concerned, the literature does not explain what happened to SANCO at a local level. Hitherto, a detailed assessment of SANCO’s branches have escaped the attention of social movement research (see Shubane 1992; Hymans and Mayekiso 1993; Swilling 1993; Lanegran 1996; Mayekiso 1996; James and Caliguire 1996; Seekings 1992, 1997, 1998; Houston 1999; Goetz 1997; Zuern 2000, Adler and Steinberg 2000; Heller and Ntlokonkulu 2001; Harrison, Huchzermeier and Mayekiso 2003; McKinley 2004; Gumede 2005; Ballard, Habib and Valodia 2006; Gibson 2006). Consequently, it did not detect the continuing vitality of some, if not many, of the branches, or explain dynamics and conflicts within SANCO. It is against this background that this study will critically examine the dynamics and conflicts that exist within this organisation resulting from its tiers which are local and national.
1.3 Thesis Statement

In addressing the gap in the existing social movement literature, this thesis seeks to achieve three objectives. The first is to chart the history of SANCO, including the dynamics that led to its formation. The second is to understand this history using a lens that distinguishes between national leadership and local mobilisation. The third is to draw out theoretical implications of the analysis, and thus suggest some possible awareness of the need for further research on social movements.

The thesis presents two main arguments. Firstly, it contends that, even though SANCO was formed as a unitary coordinating structure, it never operated as such. Whilst its national level started to signal a pattern of decline soon after formation, its local branches, or at least some of them have remained vibrant. Secondly, it contends that any study of SANCO that purports to analyse it as a social movement, will need to grapple with the existence of its two tiers. This study will demonstrate that in the South African context, and as far as social movements are concerned, especially with civic organisations, that there is a disjuncture between local and national level with regard to how they perceive their roles in the post-apartheid period. The thesis will also attest that the post-apartheid period has not only led to the demobilisation of civic organisations but has in fact led to the reawakening of civic organisations at the local level. The study will further demonstrate that it would be worth re-looking at analyses of social movements with an eye to assessing whether distinct levels exist elsewhere. Whilst this is likely to be absent from small movements, there is an inherent tension in organisations that have both local units focused on immediate day-to-day concerns and also national structures that represent broader issues within political circles.

The reawakening of civics is in line with what was proposed by Tilly in his cycles of protest theory, which argues that social movements rise and fall and
rise again. However, I adapted Tilly’s use of the ‘cycle’ paradigm by drawing on Castells’ threefold typology of identity, which proposed that one can detect three points in the cycle: resistance, project and legitimising. With this classification, the thesis of this work is that the South African civic organisations originated on the basis of resistance in the early 1980s; became increasingly occupied with the national democratic project in the late 1980s through their involvement with the United Democratic Front (UDF); and then in the early 1990s, at least at a national level, tended to legitimise ANC rule through SANCO. However, since the end of apartheid there has been a return to resistance at local level. This is a cycle and not a repetition of history as the new resistance is led by ordinary people and is driven mainly because of unemployment, poverty and the poor delivery of services.

1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis

In order to limit the study without compromising the insights it stood to provide, primary research was largely, but not solely limited to the observation of meetings and other activities and to semi-structured interviews with SANCO’s national leadership and leaders of some SANCO branches. The local observation and interviews were mostly undertaken in African townships in four areas of Gauteng: Alexandra, Soweto, the East Rand and Tshwane. Discussion of civic activity in Mpheni Township in Limpopo province is also included. Local branches included in this study were amongst the most vibrant and influential in South Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s. The thesis does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of SANCO, but it purports to present an overview of this organisation relating to its two tiers or levels.
1.5 Definition of Terms and Concepts

Before proceeding, it will be helpful to clarify my use of two key concepts.

Social Movement

The concept ‘social movement’ is used to refer to large informal groupings of individuals or organisations focused on specific issues. Tilly (1994: 262) defines social movements as series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective demands or claims on others. Drawing on Tilly, Tarrow (1994) describe social movements as ‘collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities’. South Africa’s civic organisations fit into this framework as they were formed to challenge the repressive and unjust policies and practices associated with the apartheid state.

Civic Organisation

The concept ‘civic organisation’ is commonly used around the world to refer to a wide range of popular organisations which are concerned with the welfare of the defined community. As outlined by Swilling (1993: 16), civic organisations are ‘localised grassroots organisational structures that are accountable to local constituencies which seek to address the local grievances that residents have with regard to their conditions of daily living’. In South Africa, whilst these organisations were supposed to be located outside of the formal governmental, party-political or development-agency institutions, they were often affiliated to political organisations, such as the National Forum (NF) and the UDF.
Drawing on Swilling, Zuern (2000: 29) indicates that, in the South African context, civic organisation has a very specific meaning. She argues that civic organisation is a ‘brand name for a particular type of radical community-based organisation which was established to protest and attempt to improve living conditions under apartheid’.

1.6 Breakdown of Chapters

This thesis is presented in eight chapters. In the first chapter, I have briefly presented the statement of the problem and objectives of the study. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical background for the research and debates on which this study is premised. It presents a review of the literature on different approaches to the study of social movements, starting with the collective behaviour theory, resource mobilisation theory, new social movement theory, and the cycles of protest paradigm. This will be followed by a discussion on leadership and social movements. The chapter will argue that SANCO’s history can be valuably understood by utilising the cycles of protest paradigm combined with Castells’ three typologies of identity, which are: resistance, project, and legitimising. Thereafter, the chapter will be concluded with a discussion on social movements in Africa and will reflect on South African social movement literature.

Chapter Three looks at the research design followed to gather the data needed to answer the research questions. It will comment on the use of secondary and primary literature, interviews, surveys, participant and non-participant observation and a case study. Problems experienced during data collection and a number of limitations of these sources will also be considered here. Reasons for selecting Alexandra Township as a case study are also presented.
Chapter Four provides historical background and highlights the important role that civics played in overthrowing apartheid. It shows how, with the rising level of struggle, they move from a resistance to project identity. In this chapter reference will be made to townships and township administration as a context for social movement protest in South Africa. This will be followed by a discussion on black politics and community consciousness and the emergence of civic organisations in the late 1970s in South Africa. The chapter will conclude with the discussion on the rise of the UDF, and in particular, Moses Mayekiso and the factors leading to the rise of CAST.

In chapter Five I discuss the process that led to the formation of SANCO and the organisation’s role in legitimising ANC rule. With the coming of democracy, SANCO struggled to find a meaningful role for itself. Its ability to do so was undermined by its support for the government, such that the national leadership declined to mobilise local structures in support of popular demands.

Chapter Six focuses on SANCO’s return to a new resistance identity. The chapter will demonstrate that local civic organisations did not decline significantly, even though their national coordinating structure showed a pattern of decay following the 1994 general election. This chapter will also discuss the post-1994 relations between SANCO and ANC and reflect on the rise of new social movements. In particular, I give attention to the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Landless People’s Movement (LPM).

Chapter Seven focuses on grassroots dynamics, on how local civic organisations sustained themselves and their experience with the national organisation. For this purpose, the chapter focuses on Alexandra Township which is used as a case study. This chapter will show that local civic organisations continued to fight for political space in the post-apartheid period, and did not succumb to the various challenges brought about by the ending of apartheid.
Chapter Eight, the final chapter, will summarise the findings of this research and provide a conclusion, and suggest theoretical implications for further research. This chapter will conclude that SANCO can best be understood as a two-tiered social movement. The chapter will argue that although the post-apartheid period brought a relative demobilisation of social movements as national organisations, it also saw the remobilisation of civics and other social movements at the local level.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine social movement theory as a framework for furthering our understanding of SANCO. Before turning to the debate on South Africa, it considers some aspects of the broader literature. It does so for three reasons. Firstly, some of this material has shaped the local debate and discussion. Secondly, other aspects about South Africa could be useful in developing our thinking. Thirdly, in order to underline the limitations of an essentially Northern discourse. This final consideration has the potential to point the way to conceptualisation, drawn from a Southern reality which can assist in developing a more universally applicable account of social movements.

I begin with a brief consideration of collective behaviour theory. Notwithstanding its limitations, this did at least focus attention on the growth of collective mobilisation that, either explicitly or implicitly, challenged mainstream politics, albeit in a manner regarded as dysfunctional. It opened the way to assessments that presented social movements in a positive light, as forms of mobilisation that could broaden democracy. The second school of thought, which for the purposes of this dissertation, has been given the label ‘resource mobilisation’, was primarily interested in why some social movements succeed and others did not. This problematic provided the basis for research that was often richly historicised and it produced valuable analyses that probed the internal and external dynamics shaping the movements. However, it can be criticised for an over emphasis on politics and economics. This was a critique advanced by the so-called new social movement theorists, my third concern, who
articulated their case in response to mobilisations that addressed issues of identity, environment and culture, in which the state, in particular, was of negligible or no importance. Whilst the new theory evolved in a context quite different from the main theorists of South African politics, and can be criticised for euro-centrism, the emphasis on identity is of some utility. From here, the chapter moves to two areas that the dissertation will foreground. These are the discussions of ‘cycles of protest’ and of ‘leadership’. In relation to the first of these, the idea that there is an ongoing process of rise and fall is valuable in encouraging accounts that considers continuities and partial repetition, as well as differences. However, I suggest a twist in the use of the ‘cycle’ paradigm. Drawing on Castells’s typology of identity, it is proposed that one can discern three points in the cycle: resistance, project and legitimising. With regard to ‘leadership’ a consideration raised by Charles Tilly and other resource mobilisation theorists, I suggest that the literature is largely silent on the significance of the contrast between the top leaders of national organisations and local leaderships, with the former, because of their structural position and purpose, for more prone to political pressures.

Finally, before considering the South African literature, reference is made to social movements in Africa. This has merit of considering social movements in relation to post-colonial realities, in which they mobilise the poor against their marginalisation and may coalesce into movements for democracy. As such politics is brought back sharply into focus. What this scholarship lacks is a sense of the cycles of protest and levels of leadership. These are also limitations that emerge from a discussion of the South Africa literature.

The literature on social movements is now vast and increases almost daily. This review of the literature is restricted to material that has a bearing on my analysis of SANCO. It includes some seminal texts from the social movement canon and some literature that, from a geographical perspective, is more directly
relevant, but it makes no pretence at being exhaustive. Despite these limitations, I will argue that my study provides some insights that make a novel contribution, albeit a small one, to the theorisation of social movements.

2.2 Collective Behaviour Theory

The emphasis of the collective behaviour approach is based on involuntary, impulsive and spontaneous types of social organisations rather than on planned and purposive organisations formed in order to achieve specific goals. As indicated by McAdam (1982) the collective behaviour approach was first used by Park at Chicago, and employed by Blumer, Smelser, Kornhauser, Gurr and other functionalist theorists of social movements at Berkeley. They assume that structural strain produces feelings of psychological anxiety among individuals, and these become a motivating force behind the emergence of social movements. According to Turner and Killian (1972: 259), the collective behaviour approach considers social movements as semi-rational responses to the abnormal conditions of structural strain between the major societal institutions, leading to the malfunctioning of the complete social system. According to this approach, social movements are symptoms and manifestations of a sick society. They are regarded as deviant forms of behaviour and as outcomes of social disorganisation.

Arendt (1976) elaborates on the mechanism of the emergence of social movements. She argues that healthy society does not need social movements because it will have a conditional form of political and social participation. This approach regards normal or healthy society as characterised by strong class and group solidarities, which play the controlling function and prevent the manipulation of the people. Collective behaviour theory focuses on social stability and tends to reduce agents of change to deviants who wish to disrupt the social
order. Emerging in the 1940s and 1950s, it linked movements to things such as riots and crowds. This resulted in them being seen as potentially dangerous.

The argument here is that, although this approach is regarded as one of the dominant schools of thought in the field, it remained inadequate in explaining the dynamics of social movements because of its tendency to treat agents of change as a form of deviance. The weakness of this was underscored in South Africa, where social movements challenged a regime that was inhumane, and, indeed it widely regarded as deviant.

2.3 Resource Mobilisation Theory

The resource mobilisation approach arose out of a New York-based school scholarship, and comprised two models: an organisational entrepreneurial (economic) model advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1216) and a political opportunity model advanced by Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1978), Gamson (1987) and McAdam et al. (1988). These are mostly historical sociologists who linked social movements to modernity, and grouped their inner working and external determinants. Unlike the collective behaviour theorists, they recognised the rationality behind social movements. As indicated by Gamson (1975), social movements are not initiated because of psychological needs. Instead they have a political basis, and they are rational responses to the system’s failure to provide equal access to political power.

The entrepreneurial model of the resource mobilisation theory focuses on organisational dynamics and leadership in resource management. This model claimed that social movements emerge only when enough resources were mobilised. It was shown that grievances are insufficient as a cause of collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 95). The political opportunity model focuses on changes in the political structure, and examines political power and
group solidarity. This model concentrated on the political struggle instead of economic factors and entrepreneurial ability. The model emphasised the different components of social structure that are important for social movement development. According to this model there are three factors which are central to the process of mobilisation: organisation and leadership, the nature of political systems’ and the structure of political opportunity (Tilly 1978: 78). Because of their significance for this study, these are considered below.

Resource mobilisation theory emphasised the importance of leadership in the emergence of social movements. It further argues that in order for a social movement to organise it must have a strong leadership and sufficient resources. According to this approach leaders identify and define grievances, develop a group sense, devise strategies that facilitate mobilisation, and take advantage of opportunities for collective action. Earlier, Gerlach and Hine (1970) contend that the masses play a more fundamental role than leadership in the emergence of social movements. In contrast, McCarthy and Zald (1973) espouse the view that in ‘many cases leadership availability takes precedence over grievances in facilitating social movement mobilisation’. Freeman (1983: 26) proposes a balanced view and indicated that the weight of leaders and masses will differ from case to case. I will return to this point later.

The second factor which is central to the process of mobilisation is the nature of political systems. In their studies of social movements, Ash-Garner and Zald (1987) contends that the emergence and nature of social movements are conditioned by the governmental structures and the nature of existing political parties. They also hint that the greater the spatial and functional decentralisation of a given political system, the more likely social movements can be effective and autonomous. The weakness of this debate is that the theory assumed that the success of social movements depends on the flexibility of governmental structures.
The third factor proposed by the resource mobilisation theorists which is regarded as central to the process of mobilisation is the structure of political opportunity, which refers to the receptiveness and vulnerability conditions in the political system which either can facilitate or inhibit collective action. In his work, Tarrow (1998: 19) defines political opportunities and constraints as ‘dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’. Political opportunities, according to Tarrow (1994: 17), are shaped by external resources, opportunities and an understanding of social networks to coordinate and sustain collective action.

The contrast between the organisational entrepreneurial (economic) model and the structure of political opportunities model of the resource mobilisation theory arises from the fact that the organisational entrepreneurial model argues that only the wealthy people in society are in the best position to organise for change, because of their financial and political strength to do so. It further maintains that the success of a movement depends on the resources available and on the movement’s ability to link with other group networks and other organisations. The emphasis on resources as suggested by the resource mobilisation approach can play a crucial role in the organisation of the movement. Nonetheless, resources alone cannot always guarantee the movement’s survival, as movements depend on humans as historically situated subjects responsible for particular forms of protest and mobilisation. Fine (1995: 132) explains that cultural expressions, like slogans and patterns of rhetoric in speeches, are vital resources if manipulated consciously, and can serve to energise and justify the action.

My argument here is that, while the resource mobilisation theory had the limitation of placing emphasis on the importance of resources in social movement development and successes, it also raised the importance of leadership in directing social movements, although they fall short of examining ways in which
leaders affect movement strategies. The following section will consider the new social movement theory which views social movements as symptoms of contradictions inherent in the modern society.

2.4 New Social Movement Theory

The new social movement perspective developed in response to the perceived inadequacies of neo-Marxist (structural) models of social movements that had been popular in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. The key figures of this approach include sociologists such as Touraine and Habermas. As distinct from the previous two schools of thought, they are mostly continental Europeans. They tended to emphasise social changes in life-style and culture, rather than pushing for specific changes in public policy or for economic change. As shown by Kriesi (1995; 1996) and Touraine (1995), new social movement theory provides an alternate path of viewing the trend of re-emerging social movement activism, as a rational political choice amongst political activists seeking solutions outside formal state structures.

According to Habermas (1981: 33), new social movements should be seen as deviations from the welfare-state pattern of institutionalised conflict over distribution. Mainly concerned with the ‘grammar of forms of life’, the new movements are said to be essentially engaged in conflicts over the quality of life, equality, individual self-realisation, democratic participation, and human rights. Habermas (1981: 34) further considers the new social movement’s interpretations as both symptoms of, and solutions for the contradictions inherent in the modern society. He views social movement as the tension that rises between the expanding sphere of human anatomy and regulatory interest in the logic of post-industrial development. The main feature that makes new social movements different from the old is their view of the state. He argues that
the new social movements are produced by new contradictions of society, notably the contradictions between individuals and the state.

Similarly, Touraine (1981: 77) views social movements as ‘the organised collective behaviour of an actor struggling against the social control of historicity’. However, according to Touraine, new social movements differ from old social movements in which Marxist writers saw the class struggle as the fundamental motor driving social change. Accordingly, Touraine, points out that new social movement sees change occurring in the post-industrial society as a transformative struggle, which takes place at the cultural level. Touraine’s viewpoint was also shared by Barbalet (1990: 242), who maintains that new social movements are not primarily orientated towards established power structures and that they certainly do not focus on power structures or aspire to use them. Barbalet argues that their main concerns are directed to influencing those individuals that are socially aware or conscious in the community at large, with the primary aim of changing people’s conceptions of their social roles and responsibilities and their social relationships. These made the new social movements to be perceived as anti-political because they concentrate their action against established forms of social and cultural relationships rather than against the structure of political power. Unlike the political parties and pressure groups, which are involved in institutional politics, the new social movements aim to transform existing cultural patterns. Barbalet indicates that many social movements seek to influence the state in order to accomplish their mission. Furthermore, he argues that social movements transform states through the manipulation of cultural symbols in a mutual interaction with the state.

Laclau and Mouffe (1992: 201) expounds the new social movement theory further and argue that new social movements are formed as a result of the new hegemonic formation that emerged after World War II. This hegemonic formation is based on an intensive accumulation regime, the welfare state and
mass communication. These new developments caused new antagonisms, contrary to class-based differences like labour-capital conflict and these are not class-based because they have spread through a capitalist way of life. Therefore, we can neither speak of ‘one central antagonism’ but of ‘antagonisms’, nor of ‘one central subject’ but of ‘subjects’. Class conflict is only one of these antagonisms. New social movements are expressions of people’s resistance to these new antagonisms.

Drawing from the collective behaviour, Melucci (1995: 45-47) points out that the construction of collective identity is a central task of the new social movements. Thus, he asserts that ‘collective identity is the result of purposes, resources and limits as a purposive orientation constructed by means of social relationships within a system of opportunities and constraints’. Melucci argues that actors are capable of producing their own objective actions because they are able to define themselves and their relationship with the environment. He defines collective identity as an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals or groups which are concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place. He proposes three broad propositions that explain the process of collective identity which are as follows. Firstly, collective identity is a process that involves the use of similar definitions concerning the ends, means and field of action. This action is all defined within a language and cultural artefacts or ritual practice. Secondly, he regards collective identity as a process, which encompasses a wide ranging network of active relationships between the actors, who communicated and influence each other, negotiate and make joint decisions. Thirdly, Melucci maintains that the group must share a similar element of emotional solidarity that enables individuals to feel like part of a common unity. Melucci shows that unity of collective action, which is produced and maintained by self-identification, rests on the ability of a movement to locate itself within a system of relations.
Melucci (1995: 112) further suggests that new social movements have six major characteristics which are the following:

1. New social movements are multi-dimensional phenomena that pursue diverse aims and influence various levels of a social system;
2. New social movements are not concerned with production and distribution processes; rather, they challenge the administrative system on symbolic grounds;
3. New social movements are self-reflexive actions;
4. New social movements have a planetary dimension; they display global inter-dependence and trans-national dimensions;
5. New social movements rely on a specific relation between latency and visibility; and
6. New social movements bring about institutional change, new elites and cultural innovation.

From the perspective of South Africa, new social movement theory added nothing to our analytical framework. Even in terms of Europe, new social movement writers may have exaggerated the decline of class politics, the significance of the state and decentralised forms of organisation (e.g. networks). Furthermore, in contrast, the largest mobilisations in the past decade have been against neo-liberal globalisation and against the invasion of and occupation of Iraq. In South Africa, such trends are of marginal significance. Nevertheless, there has been some mobilisation around environmental concerns, but this has been minimal. The main movement concerned with a ‘new’ social movement has been the TAC and that has very clearly built a relationship with the state, with a social base that is overwhelmingly poor and with the main union federation as its principal ally. In relation to the areas of leadership that the dissertation will
foreground, the new social movement theory is very weak on its analysis of leadership in general, let alone levels of leadership. More broadly, new social movement theory is rooted, I think, in the discourse between modern and post-modern, which for the purposes of this study holds no ground. The implication is a point, widely made, that new social movement writers made a false distinction between old and new social movements.

The new social movement theory also located the role of state at the periphery of the mobilisation of social movements. The rejection of the state and its role in political mobilisation by ‘new social movement’ theorists has rendered this approach weak. Thus, redefining the role of the state as a catalyst of initial mobilisation becomes an integral part of any study seeking to understand why communities seek to offer political alternatives. The state remains a significant factor in a movement’s mobilisation because, without it providing the target for discontents there would be little reason for the movement to mobilise.

As pointed out by Tarrow (1994) social movements arose in conjunction with, and as a challenge to the modern state. Social movements have developed through continual and intimate interaction with the state. Since the state is the main source of political resources, social movements have had to approach the state in order to secure some of these. The state also tends to monopolise power and decision making, thereby becoming a prime focus of protest and demand making. I find this argument convincing with regard to the role played by the state in the formation of social movements in South Africa. Radical social movements that emerged in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s had diverse ideologies, but were united in their opposition to the government.

Like the collective behaviour and resource mobilisation approaches, the new social movement theory had its own limitations. It only concentrated on the cultural character of social movements, its loose organisational structure and placed emphasis upon life-styles rather than conventional political issues. Most
importantly, the theory also negated the role of the state in mobilisation and failed to provide the necessary explanation for the rise of contemporary movements. However, other resource mobilisation theorists such as Tilly; Tarrow; Frank and Fuentes have recognise the role of the state in collective mobilisation in the cycles of protest paradigm as we shall see later. These authors suggest that the role of the state as catalyst lies in its ability to reshape the dimensions of the conflict through restructuring and consolidation in direct response to demands from the previously excluded people. They contend that movements are not static as they are dynamic, responsive and continue to evolve as long as discontent and crises exist. In the following section, I will consider the discussion on the cycles of protest.

2.5 Cycles of Protest

One of the key concepts in this dissertation is that of ‘cycles of protest’. The idea that social movements have a life cycle stems from the work of the resource mobilisation theorists, Tilly and Tarrow, and this section begins with an overview of their thinking. However, I have included Castell’s typology of identity, which can be understood as representing three phases in a cycle. The second half of the section reflects on the possibility of merging the two strands of thought.

Before turning to a discussion on the cycles of protest, it is important to briefly provide a definition of this concept. Cycles of protest, also known as cycles of contention or waves of collective actions refer to the cyclical rise and decline of popular action in social movement activity. Tilly and Tarrow contends that since social movements are about change, they work to organise sustained collective action with the express purpose of bringing some form of change to the political, social and economic setting. As indicated elsewhere in the dissertation, the major difference between the collective behaviour approach,
resource mobilisation theory, the new social movement theory and the cycles of protest paradigm, is that the three most dominant approaches failed to find the role of state in the mobilisation of social movements. In their work, Tarrow (1991 and 1993) and Tilly (1995 and 1986) argue that the state remains a catalyst in the collective mobilisation of social movements.

As one of the proponents of the cycle of protest paradigm, Tilly’s (1978) most notable contribution to the study of social movements is the idea of a repertoire of contention. This refers to a variety of different modes of protest that are available within any given social context during a specific historical period. Tilly (1986: 4-7) offers a number of avenues for movements to change in response to external conditions in the life cycle of a movement. Firstly, he argues that the methods of communicating grievances, repertoires of contention may change during different epochs and when different forms of protest dominate. These repertoires become out-dated and change in response to changes in the interests and organisation of societal actors as well as the overall relationship between state and society. The changes are however, extremely gradual in the interim repertoires actually constrain action. Secondly, he indicates that movements often become less active and may eventually die out as a cycle of protest declines. These cycles begin with an increase in political opportunity and reach their peak upon attracting national attention. Their decline may be due to the wider popular acceptance of many of the claims made by the participants, increasing state repression, or simply the loss of energy and frustration on the part of the movements’ participants. Thirdly, he reasons that the establishment begins to accept some of the claims of the movement, leaders become co-opted and organisations become institutionalised.

Drawing on Tilly, Frank and Fuentes (1989: 6-7) argues that social movements are cyclical in two senses. Firstly, they respond to circumstances, which change as a result of political economic and perhaps ideological
fluctuations or cycles. Secondly, social movements tend to have life cycles of their own. Social movements, their membership, mobilisation and strength tend to be cyclical. Thus, much of the reason for and the determination of the present proliferation and strength of social movements must be sought in their cyclical historical context.

Tarrow’s main argument in the study of cycles of protest is that people join social movements in response to political opportunities and then, through collective action, create new ones. He defines the cycle of protest as ‘a phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution’ (Tarrow 1991: 3). Tarrow further argue that the distinction between the old and new social movement is misleading because it obscures the continuities between collective action and social movements over time. He therefore put forward the idea that the so-called new social movements are in fact extensions of the old, since social movement activity occurs in cycles. Thus, what has come to be regarded as the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s in Europe and North America are not best understood as a unique social force, but should rather be understood as ‘being a product of the cycle of mobilisation of the previous decade’ (Tarrow 1991: 4).

In order to understand the context within which collective action takes place, Tarrow (1991: 18) distinguishes between social movements and social movement organisations, where the latter is a ‘sustained, conflictual interaction between social challengers and opponents’. Social movements on the other hand are ‘self-conscious groups which act in concert by confronting elites, authorities or other groups.

The idea of a cycle of protest advanced by Tilly and Tarrow, suggesting that there is an ongoing process of rise and fall in social movements, is valuable in encouraging accounts that considers continuities and partial repetition, as well
as differences. However, I suggest a twist in the use of the cycle of protest by drawing on Castells’s typology of identity. In his early writings, Castells (1983) suggests that social movement mobilisation can be explained by the intensity of contradictions behind them. He maintains that citizens mobilise in response to widening opportunities as cleavages within elites become manifest and new allies appear on the scene. Castells argues that movement mobilisation becomes less active and disappears once a cycle of protest declines.

However, in his later study of forms of collective identity, Castells (1998: 8) identified three types of identity in explaining the conditions which sustain a cycle of protest. Firstly, he refers to the resistance identities which are generated by those actors who are ‘devalued and stigmatised by the logic of domination, and their principles are different from or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society’. This resistance identity leads to the formation of communities as a way of coping with unbearable conditions of oppression. Resistance identities are usually local as they respond to aspects of the system at a point where people feel they have the ability to mobilise. I will return to the discussion on resistance later in Chapter Four. Secondly, there are project identities, constructed ‘when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials available to them, build a new identity that redefine their position in society and, by doing so, seek to transform the overall social structure’. Project identities are about the development of a ‘project’ for the entire society. In the case of South Africa, the struggle for the overthrow of the apartheid government represented a project. Thirdly, there are legitimising identities which are constructed by the ‘dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalise their domination over social actors’. A legitimising identity is about legitimising some kind of social order. In this case, SANCO helped to legitimise the new post-apartheid order.
By linking Tilly and Tarrow’s cycles of protest and Castells forms of collective identity, I hope to demonstrate that it is possible to provide a novel understanding of SANCO, thereby suggesting that both approaches could have wider applicability to studies of social movements in South Africa. However, both the cycle of protest and Castells forms of collective identity formation missed the fact that social movement activity is also determined in some measure by a movement’s structure. Having a good knowledge about the tiers of an organisation, I will argue, is crucial in offering a better understanding of the life cycle of that particular movement. As discussed in the previous sections, the emergence of a popular movement not only requires the existence of a grievance, supporters who frame grievances and historical contexts, it also requires leaders, who interpret the political environment and construct a guide to action. In the next section I will discuss leadership and social movements.

2.6 Leadership and Social Movements

Given the weight this dissertation places on the importance of levels or tiers of leadership, some comments on the relevant texts is provided. Clearly, the literature on leadership is vast, and my discussion must, necessarily, be highly selective and focused. Before proceeding with the discussion on leadership and social movements, it is important that I first clarify the use and definition of the concept ‘leadership’. As indicated by Barker et al. (2001) many studies oversimplify the division between leadership and followers, exclusively focusing on ‘formal leaders’ who hold titled positions in established movement organisations. In this study, leadership is understood as a dynamic process in which people come together to pursue change, and in doing so, collectively develop a shared vision of what the societies should look like, making sense of their experience and shaping their decisions and actions.
Moreover, the most dominant schools of thought in the field of social movements, such as the collective behaviour theory, did not contribute much to the study of leadership and social movements. The collective behaviour theorists argue and emphasises the social structural conduciveness for the formation of social movements. However, they also dismiss the agents of change to deviants who wish to disrupt the social order. Even the new social movement theory, is very weak as far as leadership in concerned. As indicated elsewhere the collective behaviour school of thought and the new social movement theory only concentrated on the cultural character and put emphasis on life-styles rather than conventional political issues like, leadership. However, in his works, Melluci’s theorisation seems to be useful in explaining the construction of collective identity. As with the cycles of protest, my conceptualisation builds on the resource mobilisation theory, which viewed leadership as political entrepreneurs who mobilise resources and founded organisations in response to incentives and opportunities. As indicated by Tarrow (1994: 5), that movements ‘entrepreneurs’ or leadership potentially play an important part in mobilising the consensus which leads to collective action. Although the resource mobilisation theory had implicitly emphasised the importance of leadership in the emergence of social movements, analysts of this approach have generally not examined the ways in which leadership affects movement strategy and outcomes.

In a South African context, Alexander (2003) notes the lack of research on leadership in social movements. His account of Trevor Ngwane’s role within the SECC draws on Barker et al. (2001) typology, which includes Weber’s three ideal types of leadership i.e. bureaucratic, traditional and charismatic, plus a fourth form of leadership, which they define as ‘democratic’. According to Alexander, Ngwane, and probably other successful social movements too, actually combine elements of charismatic and bureaucratic leadership with a democratic type. However, neither Barker et al. (2001, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 8)
nor Alexander distinguished between levels of leadership. In Alexander’s case this may be because he was looking at a grassroots organisation that lacked a national leadership.

Authors who have considered the issue of leadership include Swilling (1993: 22), who reminds us that the survival of movements does not solely depend on the ‘formal leaders’. He argues that although the detention of the leadership of civic organisations during the 1986-1990 State of Emergency led to the collapse of some civics and ended overt civic activities such as meetings, a neighbourhood/street level leadership took over in certain areas by simply keeping civic-initiated strategies, such as rent boycotts, going indefinitely.

Swilling (1993: 22) further contends that movements often have many informal leaders who may not hold any official office and thus are less visible, but who nonetheless play a critical role in the mobilisation process, particularly at the grassroots level. This view was also shared by Barker et al. (2001, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 8), who argue that ‘the focus on great leaders risks neglect of structural opportunities and obstacles to collective action, while an emphasis on structures of opportunity risks slighting human agency’. Moreover, they indicate that an emphasis on leaders seems to unfairly relegate the critical masses of movements to the category of followers. Again, Barker et al. (2001, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 8) caution us that ‘any approach to leadership in social movements must examine the actions of leaders within structural contexts and recognise the myriad levels of leadership and roles of participants’.

Klandermans (1989: 215) indicates that social movements normally develop leadership structures that reflect their ideological values and relative commitment to egalitarianism. Thus, hierarchical relations and centralised power may be rejected in favour of rotating leadership or direct democracy whereby all participants take part in decision making. Klandermans argues that in these
situations, it can be difficult to identify specific leaders. Yet in many social movements a single person often comes to be acknowledged by the movement itself, third parties, the media and opponents as its ‘leader’. Klandermans contends that this person may be regarded as a leader for a variety of reasons: firstly, because of the resources they wield, and secondly, because of the number of followers they command, and thirdly, because of their symbolic importance to the movement.

Ganz (2000) suggests that whatever the source of prominence, individuals are considered leaders because they exercise significant authority within a movement. Gusfield (1966, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 172), argue that ‘leadership functions both within the movement as a ‘mobiliser’, inspiring participants, and outside the movement as an ‘articulator’ linking the movements to the larger society’. The view about the role of leadership in mobilising support around a particular goal has also been elaborated by Barker et al. (2001, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 9) who argues that the right combination of leadership and organisational type defy predictions and empower participants pursuing radical change. Platt and Lilley (1994, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 172) contends that ‘beyond analysing the various roles and functions of leaders in social movements, many researchers have also examined the ways in which leaders gain legitimate authority in social movements. Many draw on Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership, a relational approach that assigns a key role to followers in imputing charisma to leaders’. Mellucci (1996: 336) criticises the Weberian theory of charisma which he argued lends itself to the neglect of the social relationship between leaders and followers by arguing that followers give themselves up to a charismatic leader because they lack agency. In contrast, Tarrow (1998) argues that pre-existing opportunities, like grievances, do not by themselves convince people to organise and join movements. Leaders play an important role in organising and interpreting
opportunities. He argues that owing to a lack of skilled leadership, opportunities may be missed or alternatively, mobilisation may be attempted under unfavourable conditions.

Robnett (1997, Ganz 2000, Goldstone 2001 and Aminzade et al. 2001, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2007: 188), highlights four ideal types of leadership tiers which often exist within movements. Their first tier consists of leaders who occupy the top formal leadership positions of social movements. The second tier consists of those who constitute the immediate leadership team of formal leaders. The third tier consists of bridge leaders, those defined by Goldstone (2001: 158) as ‘neighbourhood and community organisers who mediate between top leadership and the vast bulk of followers, turning dreams and grand plans into on the ground realities’. The fourth tier, are those organisers who develop organisations and also routinely engage in leadership activity. These various tiers of leadership are important and very useful in assisting our understanding of social movements that have existed and are still in existence in South Africa because the success of social movements here are largely based on the combination of leadership and followers.

The above authors provide a valuable insight into, and understanding of the leadership. The approach used by Robnett (1997), Ganz (2000), Aminzade et al. (2001) and Goldstone (2001) is institutional, while mine is concerned with dynamics. In SANCO, too, there are middle levels that mediate between the top national leaders and the township-based grassroots leaders. However, what my study will reveal is a dichotomy between national leaders linked to political concerns and pressures, and local activists who experience and give voice to the everyday concerns of ordinary people.

The comments above highlight a number of arguments. Firstly, this has raised the significance of the role of leadership within social movements and argued that an emphasis on formal leadership is justified. However, this
emphasis should not over-shadow the role played by informal leaders in the process of collective mobilisation. Secondly, I have argued that social movement theory would benefit immensely from an examination of the many ways in which leaders generate social change. However, different theories of social movements surveyed here appeared to be inadequate in explaining the role of leadership, even those theories which assume that leadership is important in movement mobilisation, have also generally not examined the ways in which leaders affect changes in social movements.

Before considering the South African literature on social movements, reference is made to discussion of social movements in Africa. This has the merit of allowing the researcher to consider social movements in relation to post-colonial realities, in which movements mobilise the poor against their marginalisation and may coalesce into movements for democracy. In the following section, I will attempt to outline the structural conditions of social movements in Africa.

### 2.7 Social Movements in Africa

The anatomy of social movements in Africa generally, and the characteristics which informed them, differed from those that emerged elsewhere. Moreover, the issues and strategies adopted by such movements on the African continent and in other places differed due to the unevenness in the pattern of development caused by the post-colonial realities. In most African countries, like elsewhere in the western world, social movements are viewed as critical players in the process of democratisation. These movements are considered to be spontaneous because they do not require formal state registration to exist, and they are not structured as they essentially belong to the people.
A great deal of international literature on social movements focuses primarily on the social movements of the west and in this sense there has been an increasing dominance of the western perspective on this topic. This literature points to the fact that social movements rise up to challenge an existing order and decline after social change. The view of social movement decline after change is also shared by many African scholars of social movements who argue that because social movements emerge spontaneously around social, political or economic goals, they dissolve quickly once they have fulfilled their mission.

As far as the reason for the emergence of social movements is concerned, the African literature on social movement provides us with different grounds which led to the emergence of social movements. In their study Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) argues that social movements are an effective tool for holding governments accountable to their people. They propose that resistance and threats of resistance can motivate governments to act on behalf of concerned populations when other accountability mechanisms fail. However, these authors regret the fact that while social movements have been well studied in the European and American context, they are only sporadically studied in the African context, mainly in South Africa. Be that as it may, the African literature on social movements show that in essence the failure of post-colonial development has inspired the birth and growth of social movements that take up issues of concern to the poor, which sometimes lead to mobilising for democracy.

In a presentation to the third Development Policy Management Forum annual conference on democratisation and conflict in Africa, held in Addis Ababa in 1999, Mafeje (1999: 4) argues that social movements in Africa revolved around three major demands. The first of these was the abolition of the one party state in favour of democratic pluralism; the second was decentralisation of power, geared towards greater local autonomy; and the third was respect for
human rights and the rule of law. He reasons that the rise of such movements is not simply an expression of general disillusionment with the independence when leaders had failed to deliver, but a revulsion against African governments which had become unbearably autocratic and oppressive.

Nyong’o (2002: 2) expounds a similar view in a presentation to the Social Movements and Injustice conference held in Nairobi, in 2002. He reasons out why social movements emerge, and justified their role in terms of expanding the realm of citizen participation beyond the formal and legal frameworks set by governments and other institutions. He further argue that there is always a tension between the legality of participation and the wishes of the majority of people whose involvement in the affairs of their societies are limited by the legality of participation. Nyong’o submits that social movements emerge as popular contestations of the legality of participation, and they seek to redefine and extend the space and limits of acceptable forms of political, social and economic engagements within the polity and society.

In the opinion of Makoude (2002: 3), social movements in Africa emerge for two major reasons: first, for the majority of people development has not worked and they have remained trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty that persists from one generation to the next, and secondly, living conditions are worsening due to abrupt declines in economic performance exacerbated by diseases such as Malaria and HIV/AIDS. Makoude (2002: 4) further offers four crucial building blocks which he considered to be the essential pillars for social movements in Africa. Firstly, he suggests that social movements must work with particular individuals among the socially excluded. Secondly, these movements must organise and make demands on behalf of the socially excluded. Thirdly, organisations and institutions that perpetuate social exclusion need to be challenged and engaged to change their ways of working. Lastly, Makoude argues that there is a need to link up with organisations, groups and individuals
at various levels within and across different countries in Africa and internationally.

Sachikonye (2007: 39) reiterates a similar view to that held by Makoude, and argues that the challenge that faces opposition movements in Africa and Zimbabwe, in particular, is to break through the oppressive system and make political headway in spite of the repressive structures and practises of the oppressive state. He further indicates that historical precedents demonstrate that repressive authoritarianism structures can be defeated. However, he argues this requires a massive coordinated mobilisation strategy by social movements as was the case with the opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa. Social movements in Africa have generally taken a different path from those characterised in most of the new social movement literature, and that actually, these movements have been propelled principally by the kind of economic and political considerations that were central to the discussion in the resource mobilisation literature.

Similar to the international literature on social movements, which postulates that social movements rise up to challenge an existing order and decline after social change, African literature on social movements also depicts a tendency for the state to seek to co-opt those key movements into the state apparatus. Thus, these movements are depicted as extensions of the national political organisations that lead the liberation struggle (Sachikonye 1995: 13). Sachikonye argues that in countries like Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia’s national liberation movements demobilised those social movements that had been active agents in the liberation process. The dilemma which confronted these movements hinge on the issue of whether movements that were active in the liberation process should partake in an institutionalisation process, and remain agents in democratic transformation, or instead, assert some autonomy from the new political dispensation (Sachikonye 1995: 129).
Here there is no consideration of a cycle of protest and levels of leadership. These are also limitations that emerge from discussion of the South African literature which I will discuss later on.

However, unlike the international literature on social movements, the African literature considered social movements in relation to the post-colonial realities, in which movements mobilise the poor against their marginalisation and may coalesce into movements for democracy. In most of this literature, reasons for the emergence of social movements in Africa are linked mainly to the unbearable autocratic oppressive governments and declining living conditions that have worsened due to abrupt declines in economic performance exacerbated by diseases and ethnic wars. In post-apartheid South Africa, social movements have arisen in response to the change in the government’s macro-economic strategy, from the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR). In the next section I will discuss social movements in South Africa.

2.8 Social Movements in South Africa

As indicated in the previous section, social movements have been well studied in the Europe and in North America, but are only sporadically studied in Africa, and then, mainly in South Africa. Furthermore, even the most dominant theoretical approaches to the study of social movements, including the new social movement theory, has failed to adequately dissect what is happening in developing countries like South Africa. Similarly, most of the South African literature on social movements did not make a considerable attempt to analyse the internal organisations and level of leaderships. What this scholarship presents, is an account of the decline of social movements, their remobilisation and activism directed against governmental policies especially on a local level.
due to problems associated with the post-apartheid period. Nonetheless, there are two scholars, notably, Zuern (2004) and Ranchod (2007), who considered internal organisational structures and the level of leaderships in their writings on SANCO, which I will comment on later.

As indicated in Chapter One, Friedman (1991: 5) argues that the demise of apartheid would engender a parallel decline of civic organisations. Furthermore, he argues that given the fact that most black civic organisations were historically aligned with the ANC, they might as well become vehicles for extending the ANC’s influence outside the future state and into the sphere of voluntary association. This view was further elaborated by Seekings (1992: 235), who argues that civic organisations’ space to perform as a watchdog after the elections would diminish, because they would have to operate as a loyal opponent in a local one-party system controlled by the ANC.

Before turning to the discussion on the revival of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa, Seekings (1998: 1) reminds us how community organisations that were active during the struggle against the apartheid regime, became marginalised in post-apartheid South Africa, and why such processes of marginalisation are common after social change. He outlines four broad propositions which he considers as the reasons for such marginalisation. Firstly, he argues that there might have been changes in the level or nature of popular discontent, which refers to the grievances that motivate people to participate or support protest movements. Secondly, the institutional environment or political opportunity structure may have changed and this may have caused the aggrieved people to have other channels through which they could seek to address their grievances. Thirdly, civics may have lost access to resources that enabled them to express or address their supporters’ grievances effectively. This was caused by the failure of SANCO to effectively raise funds because with the introduction of democracy in South Africa, non-governmental organisations that
were supporting the struggle against apartheid also ceased their support. For example, SANCO had mainly depended upon external sources of funding and major donors in 1991-1992, including the USAID and the International Centre for the Swedish Labour Movement. However, in 1996, USAID ceased its funding and as a result, a number of staff were retrenched at SANCO national headquarters. Lastly, civics as a major component of social movements in South Africa might have made strategic or tactical choices that served to marginalise them.

Be that as it may, Buechler (1993: 22) shows that the day-to-day struggles in South Africa are waged at the local level, in areas that were dominated by ordinary people. From this local level, collective action broadens to national level. He further argues that it is more likely that the local level becomes a sphere where ordinary citizens might be able to institutionalise new and inclusive patterns of democracy and democratic participation, triggered by a steady deterioration in the economic standard and exacerbated by the recession, that lead to inequalities that contributed to the building up of a consciousness that valued collective action above individual effort.

In contrast to Friedman and Seekings, Muthien (1999: 19) suggests that after the 1994 and 1999 general elections, the public participation in South African township-based civic organisations maintained its vigour and apparently became more widespread than active membership of political parties. Gauteng province appeared to have the highest level of active participation in civics amongst black South Africans. Drawing on Muthien, Zuern (2000: 412) indicates that the investigation of the experience of the civics and the local townships within which they work, also demonstrates that even though these local organisations were having tremendous difficulties in the post-apartheid period, they did not disappear from the social terrain. As civic organisations attempts to find their way, they continue to exert some influence on the development of organisations in their local areas.
Similarly, Lodge (2001) contends that within black South African communities, civic organisations maintained a conspicuous presence. In periodic polls conducted by the HSRC Social Movement Project between 1994 and 1998, Lodge, indicated that ‘although popular participation in civic associations fluctuates between provinces it has remained fairly substantial over the last four years’. Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier (2001: 8-9) made a similar point and argue that the key finding of the survey conducted by the HSRC as part of its social movement project between 1994 and 2000 in the provinces of Gauteng, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, revealed that while SANCO as a national organisation was indeed ineffective and virtually invisible, its branches however, continued to play an important role in community life.

The view of civic resurgence was also raised by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 8) who, in their survey conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies, caution us that although SANCO as a national organisation was indeed ineffective and virtually invisible, at the branch level, civics continued to play an important role in the community’s life. Different authors of social movements in South Africa, like Saul (2001 and 2002), Pape and McDonald (2002), Desai (2002a and 2003) and Bond (2004), indicates that the post-apartheid period witnessed the emergence of issue-based movements on a local level which focused on issues such as electricity and water cut-offs, evictions, landlessness, privatisation and cost recovery, HIV/AIDS treatment, crime and safety, and anti-GEAR and anti-globalisation sentiment. Likewise, Desai (2002b) argues that new social movements in South Africa arose as a result of the politics of transition and the core of their resistance can be attributed to the struggle for human dignity.

Drawing on Desai, McKinley and Naidoo (2004: 11) remarks that new social movements which emerge in the post-apartheid period were in response to the specific and real failures of a democratic state in the form of the ANC government to deliver on its responsibilities to the citizens it governs. Like
McKinley and Naidoo, Ballard et al. (2004: 13) went further and points out that the most important factor giving rise to the emergence of contemporary social movements in South Africa, was the high and growing levels of poverty and inequality that characterise current South African society. Ballard et al. (2004)’s line of reasoning was further advanced by Zuern (2004: 8) who argue that in the years after the initiation of formal democracy in South Africa, civic structures struggled to redefine their roles and encountered new difficulties in organising residents to meet many of the key challenges faced by the poor township communities. Despite these difficulties, Zuern (2004) contends that local civic structures in many areas continued to exist even as they were struggling. She argues that local civic branches have sustained their presence and momentum even after the 1994 and 1999 general elections. Despite the fact that Zuern has considered the internal structures within SANCO in her study, her account largely focuses on the impact of transition which she argues has weakened civic organisations. Similarly, Ngwane (2005: 1) suggests that the post-apartheid period has brought back a resurgence and renewal of the struggle. He argues that the ‘struggle never stopped, it never died, we might talk of a lull, a demobilisation but the struggle of the working class never stops because the struggle of the working class is found in the daily lives of ordinary people.’

McKinley (2005: 7-13) points out that the ‘rapid growth of social movements in South Africa continue to be up against the inherited and accumulated legitimacy of bourgeois representative democracy as practised, supported and institutionalised by the ANC’. Drawing on Heller and Ntlokonkulu’s view of social movement remobilisation, Nthambeleni (2006: 304) show that the resurgence of new movements occurred on the local level because local level action was becoming more and more urgent, especially in the context of rising unemployment and acute levels of poverty. The view of civic resurgence on a local level was also highlighted by Gibson (2006: 27) who shows that the
demobilisation of civic groups was uneven, with some groups remaining active on a local level even in the post-apartheid period. Ranchod (2007: 19) argues that while SANCO’s ability to engage in and influence policy has been of marginal significance, its affiliated civics have had a significant impact on the local branch level by mobilising around local issues and providing a voice for local citizens’. Ranchod further argue that ‘several of the active branches have been engaging with local authorities by forcing municipal officials to account to citizens, through the exposure of corruption and fraud and dealing with problems of housing, service provision and taxation’. Although Ranchod has considered the level within SANCO, his assessment was more focused on the national level.

In an academic collection edited by scholars associated with the Centre for Civil Society, Ballard, Habib and Valodia (2006: 399) proposes a typology which shows the diversity that is found within the social movements’ landscape in South Africa. Their typology is based on what social movements in South Africa are opposing. Firstly, they argue that most of the ‘activism is directed against government on distributional issues, particularly with regards to the inability of many poor South Africans to access basic services’. Some of the most prominent social movements engaged in these campaigns include: the SECC, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the LPM, the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) and the TAC, as we shall see later in Chapter Six. Secondly, they argue that some social movements ‘oppose the state, banks and private landlords through opposition to evictions and attempts to secure land tenure’. This includes movements like the LPM, the Coloured Citizens Forum (CCF), and the AEC. Thirdly, they identify those movements that ‘target government policy on employment conditions as well as labour practices’. This includes the trade union movements. Fourthly, they ‘identify those movements that directed their activism against corporations and government on issues of pollution and the environment’. This includes movements like the Environmental Justice
Networking Forum (EJNF). Lastly, they identified those movements that oppose multilateral organisations such as Jubilee South Africa.

Ballard, Habib and Valodia (2006: 17) further points out that the contemporary social movements are by no means unitary and uniform. A quick scan of the issues they represent indicates a massive diversity of concerns: land equity, gender, sexuality, racism, the environment, education, formal labour, informal labour, access to infrastructure, housing, eviction, HIV/Aids treatment, crime and safety, and geo-politics. Many movements suggest that they draw from class-based ideologies with notable self-descriptions as: ‘anti neo-liberal’, ‘anti-capital’, ‘anti-GEAR’, ‘anti globalisation’, ‘anti-market’, and ‘pro-poor’, ‘pro-human rights’, ‘socialist’ and ‘trotskyist’. However, while the material improvement of poor people’s lives is at the core of many of these movements, they are by no means limited to demands for delivery or indeed focus on the concerns of the poor. Some also speak to legal rights, social and environmental justice, stigmas and discrimination against of certain categories of people rooted in everyday society and culture. The authors of the new social movement literature in South Africa provide us with a good understanding of the rise of new social movements in the post-apartheid period. However, they lack a sense of periodisation and analysis of internal organisations (e.g. levels).

The argument thus far is that, social movements in South Africa at first sight appear to suggest that these grassroots movements were more dynamic, and possibly more effective under the apartheid regime than under the new post-apartheid dispensation. Under the apartheid regime the principles of mobilisation and struggle were clear, and specific demands could coalesce in a single language of protest. Local level protests gained impetus in response to the repressive rules or intransigence of the regime. But with the transition to democracy the unifying struggle was dispersed, single-issue movements lost their direction, and broad fronts against authoritarian rule broke apart. Politics
became competitive, and parties and interest groups moved to the political centre stage. The targets of mobilisation became blurred, and the rules of engagement in the emerging political society were no longer clear and as a result, social movements became disorientated by post-apartheid politics and began to decline. But movements do not simply decline, they adapt and change. During the period of the authoritarian regimes, grassroots movements became an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon that was motivated by material demands and the search for survival. In conditions of authoritarianism, the material demands often drove further demands for political rights. Transitions to democracy defuse the demands for rights, while economic and fiscal crisis and the short-term social impact of neo-liberal policies make material demands primary again, as suggested by the cycles of protest paradigm which postulates that social movement activity occurs in cycles.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, a review of social movement literature was presented which set out some of the most important assumptions and emphasis of the respective approaches to the study of social movements. As indicated, earlier these approaches had provided a good framework for furthering our understanding about SANCO. Turning now to the three approaches discussed in this chapter, we can see that each of them have some contribution to make towards the analysis of SANCO. The collective behaviour theory directed its attention towards grievances which they argued contributes towards the formation of social movements. However, as I have indicated, this approach has been criticised for its tendency to view change as disruptive.

Unlike the collective behaviour theory, the resource mobilisation approach proved helpful in identifying the reasons for social movement mobilisation. This
approach argues that grievances are insufficient as a cause of collective action. The resource mobilisation school emphasise that resources and political opportunities were the main factors stimulating collective mobilisation. Adherents of this approach also emphasise the importance of leadership in the emergence of social movements. Although the resource mobilisation theorists have argued that leadership is important in directing movements, the theory has not examined the emergence of leadership and the ways in which leaders change movement strategies. Moreover, I have submitted that social movement literature will benefit greatly by also focusing on the ‘informal leaders’. When looking at the role played by social movements in the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa, few people would doubt the importance and the role played by informal leadership in overthrowing the apartheid regime.

Along with the collective behaviour theory, the new social movement theory is inadequate in tackling the reasons for movement mobilisation as a result of resource and political opportunity. The new social movement theory emphasised the non-political aspects and consequences of movement formation. This approach ignored the central role of the state in collective mobilisation. Thus, redefining the role of the state as integral to the process of mobilisation would enhance our understanding of the role played by state in collective mobilisation. As indicated by Giddens (1979), the role of the state in mobilisation remains significant to movement mobilisation, because without it providing the target for discontent, there would be little reason for the movement to mobilise in the first place.

This chapter also examined the idea that social movements have a definite life cycle as has been proposed by Tilly and Tarrow. However, to their ideas I added Castell’s typology of identity which can be understood as representing three phases in a cycle i.e. resistance, project and legitimising. Drawing on the cycle of protest and the discussion of the South African social
movement, I have argued that social movements do not just simply decline, as has been suggested by the main dominant approaches to the study of social movements. As Tilly and Tarrow have shown, after they seemed to have died down, they always continue operating at some lower level. In the next chapter, I will move on to discuss the research design I followed to assemble the necessary data to address the research problems stated in Chapter One.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Introduction

This study seeks to expand our understanding of South African social movements through a study of SANCO, a body formed in 1992 as a national co-ordinating structure of regional and local civic associations. It contends that SANCO must be understood as a ‘two-tiered social movement’. In the previous chapter a review of the literature relevant to the research problem was presented. As indicated in Chapter Two, social movement literature has often narrowly focus on national-level events that often attract media attention, and has paid less attention to low profile, day-to-day efforts that are community- based, yet also seek long-term transformation. Because of the focus on the national level, social movement literature repeatedly points out that social movements rise up to challenge the existing social order and decline after social change has been effected.

This chapter presents a discussion of the research design developed to assemble the data necessary to address the research problem, and provides a justification for the research design chosen and a description of the research setting. It also presents the discussion of various methods of data collection chosen to obtain data.

3.2 Research Design

A research design is a plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions or problems (Kerlinger 1986: 279). Research design describes the procedures for conducting the study, including
when, from whom and under what conditions data were obtained. Similarly, Bless and Higson-Smith (1995: 63), defines research design as a plan for scientific research from the first to the last step. Bless and Higson-Smith further point out that a research design is a programme that guides the researcher in collecting, analysing and interpreting observed facts. In this project, the research was largely qualitative in nature. Qualitative research involves several methods of data collection, such as in-depth interviews, focus groups and field observations. In all of these methods, the questioning approach is varied. In other words, although the researcher enters the field with a specific set of questions, follow-up questions are developed as needed (Wimmer and Dominick 2003: 47). Qualitative research also allows the researcher to exercise judgement and assess and interpret the interrelationships of various human activities. Such activities allow the researcher to determine and attach meaning and significance within a wider paradigm of knowledge. Qualitative research allows us to better understand social context.

In this study the following research design was developed. Firstly, a narrative was constructed involving the piecing together the history of SANCO. The narrative included the historical background to its formation, an assessment of its structures, and an account of key events and the personalities who played an important role in the organisation. Secondly, I presented the background and depth which was based on the HSRC survey,¹ and participant observation. Thirdly, use was made of a case study undertaken in Alexandra and primary literature, interviews and observation. Lastly, I presented phases through which

¹ I am grateful to Dr Johan Olivier, former Head of the Democracy and Governance Unit at the HSRC, and Dr Marlene Roefs for providing access to data from the HSRC Social Movement Survey. Two sets of information have been utilised. The first is material generated by my research team as part of the social movement survey, and the second is statistics used to construct Figure 1.
my research progressed. Based on the premise of qualitative research design, this design was considered suitable for the purpose of this study.

### 3.3 Constructing the Narrative

As defined by Crotty (1998: 42), the constructionist theory is a perspective whereby ‘all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context’. Patton (2002: 81) argues that the primary assumption of constructionism is that humans interpret the world around them through their social, cultural, and linguistic lenses and therefore reality is constructed rather than being objective. Thus, constructionism presents a challenge to the logical positivist perspective where scientific investigation is characterised as neutral and value-free.

In constructing the narrative for this research, secondary and primary literature were used. As pointed out earlier, the reconstruction of the history of SANCO was central to the objectives of this research and in order to achieve this purpose some secondary sources were useful. The secondary materials that were consulted include journal articles, research papers, dissertations, and books. Secondary sources offer an analysis or a restatement of primary sources. They often attempt to describe or explain primary sources.

The primary sources consulted included interviews, survey data, constitutions of various civic organisations, presidential addresses, policy documents and a number of daily, and quarterly national newspapers. A variety of documentary sources, particularly newspaper articles, were consulted in order to construct a chronology of events, debates and issues as they emerged. Relevant documents were studied in order to obtain a perspective on the most
recent research findings related to the topic of this research, and to improve the interpretation of one’s own research results. However, these sources have some disadvantages, as with all sources, newspaper articles and other primary literature needs to be used critically, with an awareness of the subjectivity of the author. Secondary sources were very useful in attempting to construct a clear view about SANCO, and their importance lies in the value for reconstructing the background history leading up to the formation of SANCO. These sources were especially useful in Chapter Four and Five of this dissertation, which looks at civics and the origins of SANCO and the impact of democratic rule on SANCO.

Interviews were a critical source providing first-hand information and revealing valuable experiences. In order to supplement secondary and primary sources used in reconstructing a bigger picture of SANCO, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the leadership and members of various branches of SANCO. In order to establish a relationship between the interviewees and myself I began each interview session with a brief introduction of myself and the purpose of my research as proposed by Creswell (1994: 6). I also asked the interviewee to stipulate whether there was any information which they would like to remain confidential. Nevertheless, I encouraged interviewees to discuss their perceptions and feelings about how they see the role of their civic organisation. However, I did not go into the field clothed in the absolute researcher objectivity, expecting a ‘world out there’ that existed independently of our interpretations of it. As a black South African, I share many cultural values with the people among whom I was conducting my research and such cultural values probably influenced my point of view and interpretation of issues, though, of course, as a scientist, I attempted to maintain a detachment from the immediate concerns of my subjects.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of local civic branches whereby I sought to understand the impact of democracy on local civic
structures and also to try and understand the relationship between local civic structures and the national structure coordinated by SANCO. As pointed out by Fontana and Frey (1994: 365), semi-structured interviews provide a greater depth and allow greater flexibility than structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews also facilitate the development of a trust relationship which is not easily achieved with more impersonal or highly structured interviews (as we shall see later in Chapter Seven where I will discuss a membership survey in Alexandra Township). Punch (1998: 175) notes that ‘while interviewing is basically about asking questions and receiving answers, it also involves creating the reality of the interview setting, and above this, it involves the participation of people who will contribute towards a better understanding of the phenomenon studied’.

Semi-structured interviews were chosen for this research because the participants are free to expand on the topic as they see fit and also because the researcher is free to ask additional questions. The interviewer can also intervene to ask for clarification or further explanation and there is usually no particular time limit. The advantage of the semi-structured interview schedule is that it involves direct interaction between individuals, and responses can be probed, followed on, clarified and elaborated on to achieve accurate responses. The approach is also flexible, with the schedule of questions varying from one interviewee to another. Semi-structured interview methods are also useful where the questions cannot be narrowly defined. The researcher is also free to formulate other questions as judged appropriate for the given situation. When conducting my interviews I did not confront my respondents with already stated definitions or possible answers. Respondents were free to choose their own definitions and describe the situation based on their own understanding. Another advantage of the semi-structured interview is the flexibility to explore areas of questions as they arise during the interview process. The limitation of this
approach is that people’s knowledge may be partial or incomplete, as observed by May (1997: 12).

A total of 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the local and national leadership of SANCO. The majority of people interviewed were community activists, some of whom were local leaders of SANCO, while others were ordinary members. These people were interviewed in order to obtain information about local branches. Apart from the local leadership of SANCO, I also interviewed the national leadership of SANCO in order to understand the growing disconnections and tensions between local and national structure. The interview conducted with these community activists also sought to obtain the biographical data about their political background. The choice of people selected for interviews assisted in answering the research question, to understand SANCO as a two-tiered organisation, because of their level of knowledge of the organisation and the political landscape of South African politics. The length of the various interviews varied between 45 minutes and two hours, while most interviews were between one-and-a-half and two hours. With the exception of five interviews, all were recorded. (See list of questions in Appendix D).

3.4 Background and Depth

The dissertation also gained greater depth through two other aspects of my research: a large survey I helped conduct, and observation (mostly non-participant observation). I obtained a lot of background knowledge and understanding from the survey and observation, but this has not featured prominently in the foreground of my presentation and analysis. The HSRC survey was conducted as part of the social movement project, undertaken between 1994 and 2000 in all nine provinces. This survey investigated social movements, protest events and contention in South Africa during the time of significant socio-
political transformation between February 1994 and March 2000. This was interdisciplinary research which comprised three different projects: a data base of protest events in South Africa since 1970, interviews with representatives of grassroots organisations, and survey research on social movements, which was entitled *Citizenship in Transition*. The pattern of the study was annual survey rounds which were held during the period from February 1994, before the first democratic elections, and March 2000, nine months after the second national elections.

The surveys conducted during the period 1995 and 1998 were stratified according to province and socio-economic classification. The last two rounds used province and lifestyle classification as criteria for stratification. The objectives of the interviews were twofold: to get a description of political and social organisations in South Africa and to assess the role of these organisations in the post-apartheid period. The following characteristics of social and political organisations were assessed: goals, size and funding, characteristics of the membership, activities of the organisation, communication networks and internal communication, organisational structure and strategy. This part of the study aims at a description of the social movement sector and grass roots organisations in South Africa. (See sample size of the HSRC study in Figure 1).
The following questions were asked for the HSRC social movement survey:

Description - Factual information on the organisation

1. What are the goals of your organisation, and the main issues your organisation is dealing with at this moment?
2. How do you make the goals of your organisation known to the community?
3. How many members does your organisation have?
4. What are the main characteristics of your members? (For example in terms of job, race/ethnic group, age, gender, financial situation, political views, language, religion)
5. Why do people join your organisation? (Grievances and motivation).
6. How does your organisation communicate with its members?
7. How does your organisation involve its members in what it is doing?

8. What kind of activities do you organise? When did the last of those activities take place?

9. What are the main financial sources of your organisation?

10. Does your organisation have any paid officials? If yes, how many?

11. Can you describe the structure of your organisation?

12. Are there any other organisations working in the same area? Are they collaborators or competitors?

13. Does your organisation have links with any political party?

14. Does your party engage in any protest activity?

15. What is your organisation's view regarding peaceful actions, more forceful actions and violent actions (advantages and disadvantages)? Has your organisation used any of these forms of action?

16. How does your organisation mobilise its members for protest actions?

Meaning construction - themes addressed

1. What is your organisation's view on the social and political situation in South Africa?

2. What is your organisation's view on the situation of its membership? In comparison to other groups in South Africa, and in comparison to five years ago. What will be its situation five years from now?

3. What, in the view of your organisation, are the main grievances, aspirations and demands of your members?
4. Who is held responsible for these grievances in your organisation's view?
5. How does your organisation make its constituency aware of the issue it is dealing with?
6. What kind of activity/action could your organisation undertake to redress these grievances?
7. What changes in the social and political situation in South Africa should take place? Who should arrange for those changes? How can such changes be accomplished?
8. To what extent can national or local government be trusted to take care of the interests of your people? How could your organisation possibly exert influence on the government?
9. To what extent will protest actions be needed to put pressure on national or local governments? Would your organisation initiate protest if needed?
10. What do you think will be the impact of the elections on your organisation?
11. What plans or strategies does your organisation have to engage a future government?
12. How optimistic is your organisation about the future?

My other method of data collection could probably best be classified as participant observation. However, when I started with this research my intention was to do non-participant observation, but in practise this flows over into participant observation. From time to time I was asked to facilitate meetings, especially during elections, and sometimes handle the registration of delegates. This mainly happened in Alexandra Township while conducting interviews at SANCO branches. According to Van der Burgh (1988: 69), participant observation
involves social interaction between the researcher and those being studied in the environment of the latter during which data are systematically and unobtrusively collected. My role as a participant observer has been explained in the previous section. I developed a good rapport with some chairpersons of SANCO branches, and as a result, I was often notified about branch meetings, educational workshops and Annual General Meetings (AGMs). One such AGM I attended was held at kwa-Bheki ilanga secondary school hall. Several SANCO branches attended this AGM. Most were named after struggle heroes: Richard Mskane, Moses Mayekiso, Joe Modise, Albert Luthuli, Helen Joseph, Langalibalele, Solomon Mahlangu and Nelson Mandela. Another was called Freedom Charter. The AGM’s usually started with revolutionary songs and executive leaders of all branches were given podium seats. The chairperson of the Johannesburg region welcomed all delegates from all branches and introduced himself and requested all branches to sign the attendance register.

The proceedings were well organised. Speeches were mainly in Zulu, Xhosa and Sotho, though from time to time English was used. The chairpersons of the various branches were given time to speak, and they briefed the AGM about the developments and challenges in their branches concerning membership, progress with RDP houses, disputes with councillors, problems posed by the growing number of shacks in the area, and disputes with landlords in their branches. Through observation I was able to collect data which I could not have gathered by means of semi-structured interviews. This research technique complimented the semi-structured interviews in providing me with information about the activities of those 10 SANCO branches, their membership and challenges. However, there are some disadvantages associated with participant observation technique as noted by Schatzman and Strauss (1973: 61), including that activities may use up funds and might not always be directly relevant to the research itself. In my case, my cellular phone and car were often
used by SANCO officials and most often I spent a lot of time either waiting for people to arrive for meetings or accompanying SANCO branch officials to collect keys for the venues from the governing school committees.

The HSRC survey provided me with insight on the roles of social movements in general, in the post-apartheid period. Data from this survey was particularly helpful in developing the analysis of debates and issues around protests events and contention politics in Chapter Four to Six. However, there were some limitations that were noted with the methods used in the research design chosen for this study. The data from the HSRC survey was useful but the questionnaires were very general, covering aspects that were not relevant to my research. As far as the semi-structured interviews are concerned, this method was time-consuming, not only requiring many hours to collect the data, but also much more time to analyse it.

### 3.5 Case Study

Apart from the narrative, background and the depth, I also used a case study approach. This was done in order to gain greater insights into the local dynamics of civic organisations. Case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system being examined. As shown by Yin (1994: 13) a ‘case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident’. Cherry (2000: 4) indicates that, a case study is part of a research strategy rather than methodology. A case study involves a detailed and thorough investigation of a few cases as opposed to the survey method, which is the collection of information on a wide range of cases. The case study approach is particularly useful for researching areas requiring a phenomenological approach.
The advantage of the case study is that it allows flexibility in the choices of methods of data collection. The case study for this research is Alexandra Township which is situated in Johannesburg. The reasons for selecting Alexandra as a case study are explained in Chapter Seven. As the oldest black township in South Africa, Alexandra has a rich history of political struggle and a high degree of political participation. As noted by Rose (1991: 191), one of the features of the case study is its concern with gaining access to the consciousness and experiences of people in specific social, economic, political and historical contexts, and this is what I attempted to achieve. It was not easy for me to gain access to SANCO-Alexandra branches. I made several attempts by approaching the chairperson of SANCO-Alexandra sub-region, Mike Mkgomana. Through him, I tried to secure meetings with different leaders of local SANCO branches. However, this did not materialise as appointments were always not honoured and sometimes appointments were cancelled a few minutes before the scheduled time. With much persistence and eventually a meeting with Gabriel Ngwenya, the chairperson of Albert Luthuli branch, whom I met at SANCO’s regional offices in Johannesburg, I was finally introduced to the chairperson of SANCO-Johannesburg region, Goodwill Qushwane, who agreed to meet me in Alexandra. Through him I was introduced to the various chairpersons of different branches, who welcomed me and promised to assist where they could. I will return later to the details of these interviews in Chapter Seven.

As explained elsewhere, I also obtain data by a means of participant observation. My role as participant observer started after a meeting with Qushwane, after he had introduced me to various chairpersons of local branches in Alexandra. Finally, I used a variety of primary sources, particularly newspaper articles, to construct a chronology of events, and I also drew on documents produced by SANCO, such as minutes of meetings, interviews conducted by other researchers and speeches.
However, the case study approach has its own limitations. Colley and Diment (2001) notes, for instance, that case study researchers risk being overwhelmed by the amount and variety of data they collect, and this is something I found. The advantage of a case study is that it can operate with a severely restricted focus, with this, in turn facilitating the construction of a detailed, in-depth understanding of the object of study. The case study selected for this research provided a vantage point from which to witness SANCO’s dynamics and it provided detailed insights about local processes.

3.6 Phases in the Research

During the process of this study my research progressed in phases. This was not entirely a matter of design, but resulted from the fact that I undertook the project while holding a permanent job. At times it was difficult to find suitable time to do my interviews as planned. This problem was eased when I was granted five months’ study leave which became very useful especially for phase four and five.

The first phase of my interviews occurred in 1998, as a follow-up to my Masters degree (which was focused on the role of civil society in sustaining democracy, by looking at the SCA). The interviews occurred during a strategic planning workshop, organised by SANCO-Soweto branch on 4 and 5 April 1998 at Ipelegeng Community Centre, Soweto. It was at this workshop that delegates expressed their regret about the decision to disband the SCA in favour of SANCO. In their commission reports, the majority of delegates argued that the decision to join SANCO had crippled local civic activism.

The second phase consisted of semi-structured interviews conducted by my students as part of the HSRC social movement research project conducted in five East Rand townships (i.e. Daveyton, Wattville, KwaThema, Tsakane and
Duduza) which happened in mid-2000. This second phase was very successful for a number of reasons. Firstly, interviews were conducted by Zulu and Sotho-speaking interviewers in the respondents’ first languages, which in most cases was Zulu. Secondly, the interviewers were third-year Sociology students from Vista University, East Rand Campus, who were familiar with the townships selected for the study. Thirdly, the fieldworkers were well trained. Interviewers were instructed to allow the respondents to speak for themselves and to note their answers accurately. I will return to this later in Chapter Six when I discuss my findings.

The third phase, which occurred in 2003, included interviews with three leaders of SANCO, two from Gauteng and one from Limpopo province. The first interview was conducted with Simphiwe Thusi, a regional secretary of SANCO in Gauteng province. This interview took place at SANCO regional offices, Compu Star Building, on the corner of Market and Loveday Streets, in the Johannesburg Central Business District. Arranging this interview schedule was very difficult. I was referred to SANCO regional offices by the secretary to the president of SANCO, Hlongwane, after my visit to the national office of SANCO. I was given the name of the building, street name and office numbers. However, the office telephone numbers were suspended.

The next person I interviewed in this phase was Mavhungu Khwathani. This interview took place at the municipal offices in Louis Trichardt, now known as Makhado. Khwathani, at the time, was the secretary of SANCO-Mpheni branch. There were no major problems encountered with this interview since Khwathani and I spoke the same language, Venda, and could understand each other very well. This interview also helped me to understand the local dynamics of SANCO’s local branches. The last person I interviewed in this phase was Victor Khoza, the chairperson of SANCO-Wattville branch on the East Rand. This was a telephonic interview since it was very difficult to arrange a face-to-face interview
with him. The interview took place at the time of serious tensions between the Greater Benoni Municipality and residents of Wattville Township. The Greater Benoni Municipality was then in the process of disconnecting electricity to residents who were in arrears, and SANCO’s national office was accused of being sympathetic to the municipality by urging residents to pay, which did not go well with SANCO local branches. I will return to this interview in Chapter Six.

The fourth phase built on ongoing interactions with SANCO leaders and took place on 1 October 2006 at the City Hall in Johannesburg, at the SANCO-Gauteng Provincial General Council (PGC) meeting. I was invited to this PGC by the regional chairperson of SANCO-Johannesburg, Qushwane. The PGC was attended by the following six regions of SANCO in Gauteng province: Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Sedibeng, Motswedeng and West Rand. The attendance was very good, with about 524 registered delegates. The proceedings were planned to start at 09.30, but was delayed due to the fact that a bus ferrying the Sedibeng region delegates experienced mechanical problems, only arriving at 10.30. The PGC was chaired by Richard Mdakane the provincial chairperson of SANCO in Gauteng. He welcomed all the delegates and the president of SANCO, Hlongwane, deputy president of SANCO, Ruth Bhengu, general secretary, Linda Mngomezulu, and Donovan Williams and other members of SANCO’s National Executive Committee and provincial council. I will provide an analysis of this event in Chapter Six.

The fifth and final phase of my interviews occurred in two parts. The first occurred in mid-October 2006 at Realugile Secondary School in Alexandra. The second batch of interviews was conducted during SANCO-Alexandra’s AGM held at Kwa-Bheki iLanga Secondary School, Far East Bank, Alexandra Township. Attendance at this gathering of Alexandra branches was dominated by women, and the majority of them were unemployed. Amongst issues discussed, delegates raised major concerns about the state of the organisation, where they
criticised their leaders for failing SANCO. They accused the leaders of putting their interests above those of the communities. They also talked about streets without names and how this was causing huge problems for ambulances and police in times of emergency. I will return to this discussion later in Chapters Six and Seven.

3.7 Conclusion

The use of secondary and primary literature, semi-structured interviews, the HSRC survey data, and participant observation generated high quality data. The combination of these methods allowed each to inform the other as the research progressed. The secondary and primary sources offered topics to be raised during interviews, and the interviews provided information that corroborated or diverged from evidence in the documents.

Secondary and primary sources and interview data were particularly useful in constructing the narrative about SANCO. These methods provided a good assessment of the character of this organisation with regard to its size, organisational structure, membership, its relationship with the ANC, and its relationship to wider society, including the state and other organisations. The interview data, HSRC survey and participant observations were particularly useful in providing a background and depth to the study. The case study provided me with insights about SANCO branch dynamics.

This project involved a wide range of methods and a valuable data was gathered. This enabled me to triangulate the subject of my study, SANCO. By the end of nearly eight years of my study on SANCO, I had a good understanding of the organisation’s dynamics, how these related to the wider social world, and how both had changed over time. In the next chapter, I will discuss the history of South African civics that led to the establishment of SANCO.
CHAPTER FOUR

FROM RESISTANCE TO PROJECT: CIVICS AND THE ORIGINS OF SANCO

4.1 Introduction

South Africa has a long history of social movement mobilisation and community involvement in political activities at grass-roots level. Limiting ourselves to the period since World War Two, these have included the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the bus boycotts of 1957, anti-pass campaigns in the 1960s, the Durban workers strike in 1973, the 1976 Soweto Uprising, and the struggle for people’s power in the 1980s (see Rammitloa 1963; Lodge 1983 and 1987; Swilling, Frankel and Pines 1988, Friedman 1987 and 1993; Hirschmann 1990; Price 1991; Carter 1991a; Marks 1993; Bonner, Delius and Posel 1993; Friedman & Atkinson 1994; Pines 2001; Umrabulo No 19, 2003; Bozzoli 2004; and Gibson 2006).

As indicated in Chapter Two, Castells (1998: 8) identified three types of identity: resistance, project and legitimising. My suggestion is that these identities can be applied to a cycle of protest. This chapter will consider the rise of a resistance identity and its development into a project identity. It will also outline the growth of civic-based resistance from the late 1970s, then the formation of the UDF, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and CAST. Specific mention is made of Moses Mayekiso who later became the first president of the SANCO.
4.2 Townships

Contemporary civics, those that contributed to the formation of SANCO, were formed in the years following 1979. To understand the form and politics of these civics, two factors are critically important: first, the social geography and character of administration of South Africa’s townships, and secondly, the consolidation of community consciousness during the 1970s. I will turn to the second of these shortly.

Davenport (1970: 89) points out that the establishment of townships in South Africa came as a result of the promulgation of the Native Affairs Urban Areas Act, which was first considered in 1912, but enacted in 1923 and amended in 1930, 1937, 1944 and re-amended in 1945. The Native Affairs Urban Areas Act, according to Davenport, made provision for the establishment of a special kind of township, by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development for African citizens, when it empowered the Urban Local Authorities to set aside land for occupation by Blacks living in the towns or required by their employers. The Urban Areas Act also laid down the basis for the system of Advisory Boards where each board in every township was meant to have at least three Black members who served in it, either elected or appointed, with a chairman who was normally a white male (Davenport 1970: 89-93).

Drawing from Davenport (1970), Cloete, Schlemmer and van Vuuren (1991: 167) suggests that the Advisory Boards created in 1950, and chaired by white males, were directly responsible for the running of black townships. However, these Advisory Boards were opposed by township residents and were replaced by the Urban Bantu Councils. The Urban Bantu Councils was established in terms of the Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961. This Act made provision for the establishment of elected councils with advisory, administrative and executive powers, but the local fiscal systems remained under the control of white
municipalities. Cloete, Schlemmer and van Vuuren (1991: 168) further demonstrates that the Urban Bantu Councils were referred to as ‘Useless Boys’ Club by the black urban residents because they played a subservient role to the White Bantu Administration Boards. The latter were created by the government to tighten the implementation of apartheid in the townships by structures which were more directly accountable to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

As indicated by Hymans and White (1991: 6), the Urban Bantu Councils were replaced by the promulgation of Community Councils in terms of the Community Councils Act of 1977 which provided for fully elected councils. This was due to a major opposition by township residents. Hymans and White (1991: 7) further argue that the Community Councils also faced opposition and were replaced by the Black Local Authorities (BLA) in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. The BLA was composed of co-opted black leaders who together with the police were responsible for maintaining the status quo and repressing opposition. This new form of representation also caused dissatisfaction among black residents because it was unable to deal with the problems of housing and the provision of municipal services. Because of spiralling bad conditions in the townships, residents organised a rent boycott. Hymans and White (1991: 7) point out that more than half a million households heeded the call to refuse to pay rent to the township authorities. Rassool (1994: 2) suggests that townships were part of a scheme of labour differentiation which attempted to divide urban Africans from rural migrants. Similarly, Camay and Gordon (2002: 11) indicate that townships were created to restrict and control black communities.

In their studies on development in South African townships, Crankshaw et al. (2000) argues that townships were generally poorly planned with no sewerage systems, electricity, and mainly dirt roads in most parts of the
townships. Napier et al. (2002: 28) also shows that in most townships in South Africa, refuse removal was erratic and garbage piled up in open spaces, streets often overflowed with filth and water, and electricity bills were high. The official local authorities which were responsible for the running of the townships were regarded by townships residents as powerless bodies and councillors were seen as self-serving individuals who were often corrupt and usually unresponsive to the needs of residents. These poor conditions in townships became a fertile ground for nurturing a community consciousness and for developing a resistance culture amongst black township residents.

4.3 Black Politics and Community Consciousness

The banning of the main liberation movements in South Africa in the mid-1960s created a political vacuum which led to the growth in community consciousness. As indicated by Lodge et al. (1991: 24) in the 1970s, the ANC had little organisational presence inside South Africa. However, from 1980, the ANC’s nationalist, inclusive non-racial ideology began gaining strength over the exclusivist black consciousness ideology which had dominated black opposition discourse in the earlier 1970s. Horowitz (1991: 14) suggests that the emergence and proliferation of community organisations followed the resurgence of militant black opposition which began in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s. The proliferation of community consciousness was led by organisations wearing the Black Consciousness (BC) emblem. The BC philosophy was adopted by a range of groups such as the South African Students Organisation (SASO), the South African Students Movement (SASM), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), and the Black Community Programmes (BCP), and also by many other political organisations, as well as
theatre and other cultural and community groups, educationalists, journalists and theologians.

Houston (1999: 41) indicates that the two organisations responsible for the popularisation of BC philosophy in South Africa were SASO and the BPC. SASO was established in July 1969 by black students on black university campuses, who, under the leadership of Steve Biko, broke away from the white-led, multiracial National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). SASO linked student protests and their activity with community programmes by encouraging students to become involved in community structures and activities. This was done through the establishment of community health centres, advice offices and literacy classes. Through its involvement in community structures, SASO inspired students under the banner of the South African Students’ Movement (SASM) to organise a mass protest in Soweto on 16 June 1976, against the government’s mandate that Afrikaans be used as a language of instruction for arithmetic and social studies classes. The 1976 Soweto Uprisings led to mass mobilisation and the mushrooming of community organisations.

Lodge (1983: 353) argues that as a result of the political conditions in Soweto caused by the student uprisings, the BPC, an organisation associated with SASO, along with a number of African religious and educational leaders called for a meeting to form a civic organisation which would solve the problems caused by the 1976 Soweto uprisings. The meeting led to the creation of the Soweto Committee of Ten, led by Dr Nthato Motlana. Davies, O’ Meara, and Dlamini (1985: 357) contends that majority of people in the Committee of Ten had strong links with the black consciousness philosophy. The authors further indicate that the Committee of Ten held a two-day conference in September 1979, under the theme ‘Soweto an Introspection’ to discuss the conditions in Soweto. The conference resolved to form a civic organisation in Soweto.
My argument in this section is that, the BC philosophy which had dominated black opposition discourse in the earlier 1970s, led to the development of a new generation of community structures in 1979 in the form of civic organisations and student movements which provided a mass base for the overthrow of apartheid. In the next section I will discuss the emergence of civic organisations in South Africa.

4.4 The emergence of Civic Organisations in South Africa

As shown by Lodge (1983: 321) ‘the resistance of the 1970s provides a startling contrast in terms of scale and duration to the movements of the 1950s and early 1960s.’ As I indicated in the previous section, the 1970s was dominated by BC philosophy which encouraged the formation of community-based civic organisations. Importantly, Houston (1999: 48) contends that the period from 1979 to 1983 was characterised by the resistance struggle, which, for the purpose of this dissertation, has been given the label ‘resistance identity’. This period witnessed an upsurge in major popular community struggles against rent and service charge increases, bus fare increases, and escalating food prices. According to Zuern (2000: 89-91), the increase in food prices was caused by the consumer price index which increased to 38.6% from July to December 1980. During this period of popular struggles and widespread resistance against government, residents of Soweto needed a forum where they could discuss solutions to local problems. This led to the establishment of the SCA which became a vehicle for addressing local concerns.

Seekings (1998: 202) indicates that the SCA was the first community organisation to be formed in September 1979, a brainchild of the Soweto Committee of Ten. It was also the first largest civic organisation to be formally established in an African township. Unlike Seekings, Houston (1999: 49)
suggests that the formation of the SCA was inspired by the rent boycott. He argues that the rent boycott was instigated by the increase in service charges, general opposition to the Community Councils, and an economic recession. These factors prompted a widespread rent boycott in the townships led by the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC). Houston further shows that, shortly after the launch of the SCA, a similar organisation was launched in Port Elizabeth in October 1979 because of problems associated with rent increases. It was called the Port Elizabeth Civic Organisation (PEBCO) under the leadership of Thozamile Botha. Houston contends that like its Sowetan counterpart, PEBCO was built with the help of pre-existing structures such as the local and informal civic groups in the townships of Zwide and Kwaford. Comrades from the SCA visited PEBCO shortly after its launch to share ideas and discuss strategies. Houston (1999: 49) further indicates that both the SCA and PEBCO leadership generally supported BC philosophy.

However, unlike Houston, Zuern (2000: 98) indicates that although the SCA and PEBCO developed under similar conditions and expressed generally similar aims, there were important and revealing differences between the two organisations. She argues that the SCA was led by an older, more conservative group of middle class leaders. Its Chairman, Dr Motlana for example, was a medical practitioner. PEBCO, in contrast, was led by a young, charismatic, working-class leader. Botha was born on 16 June 1948 and started his political career as a trade unionist and was later elected as an executive member of COSATU. Zuern further indicates that PEBCO was a more radical organisation while the SCA adopted a reformist stance towards the local government authorities. Upon its inception in 1979, PEBCO called for a single municipality for the city of Port Elizabeth and rejected the community councils in charge of African townships and the white municipalities in charge of white local affairs. As indicated by Zuern, from its inception, PEBCO tackled both local problems and
issues with national political implications. Local demands assumed a national dimension.

The establishment of the SCA and PEBCO in 1979 encouraged the development of many mass-based civic structures in many of the townships around the country. More importantly, as indicated by Lodge et al. (1991: 41), many of the new civic organisations that emerged after 1979 had different traditions and backgrounds. Some were influenced by BC, some were Trotskiysts, while others were charterists1.

Swilling, Frankel and Pines (1988: 202) show that many radical township-based local associations were formed from the early 1980s across the country. These included the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation (KRO), the Tembisa and Duduza Civic Association on the Witwatersrand, the East Rand People’s Organisation (ERAPPO), the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), the Federation of Cape Civic Associations, the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation and the Cradock Residents’ Association (CRADORA) in the Eastern Cape, the Durban Housing Action Committee and the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) in Natal. The radical character of these new township organisations was also pronounced in an anonymous article published in *Mayibuye*2 (1990: 31) which points out that civics were seen as part of the structures involved in the liberation struggle waged against the white South African government. The article further traced the role of civic organisations in the liberation struggle and pointed out that civics were formed to improve the living conditions of township residents and to represent them against the injustices of the apartheid system. However, the coordination

1 Charterists a phrase used to describe leaders, unions, movements and civic organisations which expressed allegiance to the ANC and its Freedom Charter.

was primarily around bread-and-butter issues such as, leaky roofs, water bills and rent.

The rise of the radical township-based civic organisations was also noted by Friedman (1991: 10), who argues that the civic organisations which emerged in the black townships during the early 1980s, were described as resistance movements at the local level which were brought together by resistance symbolism rather than shared interests, and formed part of the broader anti-apartheid political formation from the outset. They were therefore strongly involved in achieving the expectations of the black population for democracy. Cloete, Schlemmer and van Vuuren (1991: 168) have also argue that the civic organisations formed across the country in the early 1980s, were a response to widespread dissatisfaction with the form of representation in the townships and were also a response against rent and bus-fare increases, evictions, influx control, the housing shortage, inadequate township infrastructures and corrupt or unaccountable local township councillors. Residents complained that their grievances were not attended to and conditions in the townships were not improving. As a result, civics were established with the intention of undermining white rule and replacing the structures created by the apartheid government.

Drawing from Cloete, Schlemmer, van Vuuren and Seekings (1991b: 29) contends that civics in South Africa emerged at the local level out of a long tradition of collective association around the basic needs of the black communities in the late 1970s. This was triggered by a steady deterioration of the economy which was exacerbated by the recession that led to inequalities that contributed to the build up of a consciousness that valued collective action above the individual effort, and the community-wide struggle. Civics tended to accord themselves the sole right of organising and representing communities on the grounds that, in the absence of democracy, townships were vulnerable to the machinations of the apartheid state.
Moreover, Seekings (1992: 217) argues that civics in South African townships were formed because local government institutions were seen as illegitimate and because credible black political parties were banned. These organisations developed a strong organisational structure and became active only when they moved beyond the role of watchdog into the role of alternative institutions of local government. They became a familiar feature of change during the 1980s in the community struggles with municipal councillors. These organisations emerged against rent increases and the discredited township councillors who were forced upon townships residents by the apartheid regime. They later were involved in rent and electricity protests and played an important role in negotiations over rents, service provision and local government restructuring.

Seekings (1992: 33) further show that civics were able to mobilise large portions of the communities in which they operated because of their ‘localised’ approach centred around vast community issues and basic services: water, sewerage, refuse removal, electricity, housing, land, health, education, crime control, welfare, community facilities, local government structures and representation. These issues were of concern to almost every resident and many residents saw civics as the only body which might be able to improve their difficult living conditions. By focusing on local issues civics were able to push a fairly radical approach without immediately attracting state repression. Similar to Seekings, Botha (1992: 63) argues that civics not only opposed government structures of representation but also challenged the very laws upon which such bodies were founded, for example, the Community Council Act of 1977 which provided for fully elected councils. These councils were opposed by black urban residents and councillors were stigmatised by residents for being government stooges implementing government policies.
As reported by Botha (1992: 64) in the 1980s, civic organisations played a leading role in the struggle of the liberation movement in the absence of the banned national liberation organisations. Although they were created as a response by communities to the horrifying living conditions in the black townships, they also functioned as organs of people power through which, amongst other things, it aimed at the transfer of political power from the opposed minority regime to the majority. Civics linked the struggle for bread-and-butter issues with the struggle of defeating the apartheid regime, arguing that key civic issues cannot be resolved without important national changes in the local government system. They played a remarkable role in the struggle against the apartheid state. In most townships across the country, residents organised themselves into local civic organisations to put pressure on white local authorities. Rent and consumer boycotts proved to be an effective way of mobilising communities to protest against discrimination and other injustices.

Drawing from Botha, Seekings (1992: 33) suggests that in the 1980s, civic organisations were propagating the language of the national liberation movement and the only way to do this was through civic issues, which were politicised to get the support of the masses. These organisations were absorbed in the intermediate goal of building a movement of strong local-level organisations with broad and sustained popular participation and thereby transforming the political system. To achieve these goals, civic leaders and organisers focused on gradualist campaigns around civic issues to draw a wide range of people into grassroots, extra-state organisations. Strikes, rent, consumer and transport boycotts, the disruption of classes in schools and universities, marches, the occupation of buildings and offices, people’s courts, petitions and rallies, were all tactics used in protest, increasingly testing the limits of the apartheid state.
The important role played by civics in the resistance struggle in South Africa was also echoed by Houston (1999: 179) who argues that civics played an important role in mobilising and organising people around the concrete particulars of their everyday lives, including rent and bus-fare increases, etc and the aim of transforming their particular interests into a universal political challenge of the apartheid system. As localised grassroots organisational structures that are accountable to local constituencies, civics seek to address local grievances that residents have in their daily living conditions, and are located outside formal governmental, party-political or developmental agency institutions. Since they are independent from government and political organisations they, were able to achieve their policy objectives by mobilising communities to pressurise those with political and economic power.

My argument in this section is that, upon their establishment in the late 1970s and early 1980s civic organisations became predominantly characterised by a resistance identity and acted as vigilant watchdogs against state power. Many of the local issues taken up by the civics were embedded in the national system of apartheid, and in challenging local conditions, civics were drawn into the political arena and mobilised opposition against state structures. These organisations were formed because of the need to address bread-and-butter issues facing residents at local level. However, they soon became politicised upon joining the UDF.

4.5 The rise of the United Democratic Front and the Mass Democratic Movement

The political unrest which broke out in 1984 and continued until 1988, resulted in civics becoming involved in national political issues. Civics linked national and local issues, arguing that key civic issues could not be resolved without important
national changes in the local government system and a shift in political power itself. Due to political unrest, civics put their weight behind political organisations which were leading the challenge against the government at the time. They focused their attention on the national democratic project with the main strategic objective of bringing down the apartheid regime and replacing it with democratic rule. The two major bodies were the UDF, which was formed in 1983, and the MDM, which was formed in 1988. I will turn to the second of these movements later.

As described by Barrell (1984: 9), the formation of the UDF was as a result of the government’s intention of introducing a new constitution that intended to give parliamentary representation to Indians and Coloured people. Barrell argues that the creation of a tri-cameral parliament was meant to ensure that minority groups, Coloureds and Indians, would join whites in opposing the extension of democratic and majority rule and to exclude urban Africans from the central political system by creating black local authorities in their townships. The African population, the majority, was to be physically and politically relegated to ethnic homelands and granted the status of citizens of nominally independent states. Similarly, Seekings (1991: 93) argues that the UDF was formed in reaction to the proposed constitution that was meant to exclude blacks. Among the organisations which opposed the move by the government were the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and the NF. These organisations convened several meetings of protest to challenge the issue of the proposed constitution, and it was at one such meeting organised by the TIC, that the formation of a united front was conceived. Barrell (1984: 10) further shows that arrangements were made for the formation of this front, and on 20 August 1983, the UDF was launched in Mitchell’s Plain outside Cape Town. The reason for the formation of the UDF was to mobilise different organisations to oppose the proposed constitution.
At its founding conference, Lodge (1991: 48) argues that the UDF was supported by 600 organisations, the vast majority of which had been formed after 1979. The groups represented the following: youth organisations, student movements, women groups, religious groups, political interests, ordinary township residents, and professional organisations. Lodge (1991: 51) states that of these groupings, civic organisations were the biggest bloc affiliated to the UDF with 84 organisations, followed by youth organisations. Lodge (1991: 52-53) further argues that many people who were elected to executive positions of the UDF, both nationally and regionally, had strong ANC connections. Among them was Albertina Sisulu, whose husband, Walter Sisulu, was one of the ANC’s top three leaders. Albertina Sisulu was elected as president of the Transvaal UDF regional committee, while Oscar Mphetha, the former national secretary of the Food and Canning Workers Union in Cape Town, was elected president of the Western Cape’s UDF regional committee, and Archibald Gumede, an ANC stalwart was elected president of the Natal UDF regional committee. They had all belonged to the ANC before it was banned.

According to Swilling and Rantete (1993: 202), the formation of the UDF in 1983 was significant for three reasons. Firstly, it was the first ‘Charterist’ national political centre since the banning of the ANC. Secondly, it focused the attention of black resistance organisations on the government’s constitutional reforms. Thirdly, and most significantly, it provided grassroot movements with a vehicle for linking local grievances with national political demands. Seekings (2000: 9) also shows that the formation of the UDF signalled the strongest challenge to date, of the apartheid regime. One of the most important reasons for its success was the localised nature of participating organisations which offered an incredibly strong base upon which to build a loose national structure. The theme at the launch of the UDF was, ‘unity’ under the slogan the ‘UDF
unites-apartheid divides’. A UDF pamphlet explained the aims of the organisation as follows. The UDF:

- believes in a South Africa free of apartheid;
- believes in a government based on the will of the people because South Africa belongs to all of us who live in it; and
- rejects the constitutional proposals and Koornhoff Bill\(^3\) because they are designed to strengthen apartheid and were drawn up with no regard for the demands of the people;

As indicated by Lodge (1991: 52), upon its formation the UDF did not have any discernable ideology as it wanted to attract as many organisations as possible. It also did not identify itself with the Freedom Charter\(^4\). Although many organisational affiliates and individual leaders subscribed to the Freedom Charter, the UDF sought initially to embrace all groupings of people, cheerfully accommodating Islamic preachers, townships capitalists, and a variety of Christians, Marxists, Socialists, Liberals and African traditionalists. The goal of the movement was to bring down the apartheid regime and replace it with democratic rule. In the course of struggle many other concerns were raised by the affiliated organisations. These concerns were incorporated into the overall political framework of being opposed to the apartheid system. A range of issues

\(^3\) Koornhoff Bill was originally tabled in 1980 and consisted of three interconnected Bills, the centrepiece of which was the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the Black Community Development Bill and the Black Local Authorities Bill. These Bills were named after Piet Koornhoff who was the Minister of Sport and Recreation in South Africa from 1973 to 1978, and later, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, from 1979 to 1989, and was in charge of forced removals.

\(^4\) The Freedom Charter was drawn at the Congress of the People in Kliptown, South Africa, on 26 June 1955 by the Congress Alliance. The document is notable for its demand for and commitment to a non-racial South Africa. This has remained the platform of the ANC.
including working conditions, rent, environmental degradation, urban services, liberation theology, school curricula and many other issues were taken up by the UDF. They reflected the range of issues of interest to a civil society that was deeply politicised, but whose concerns extended beyond the issue of state power.

Lodge (1991: 51) argues that although the UDF had never endorsed the charter, because of the individuals serving on its executive who were identifiable with the ANC, the UDF moved closer to the ANC than any of the other political organisations taking part in UDF activities. The UDF’s attempts to be ideologically neutral was compromised by the presence of these individuals who were closely identified with the ANC in its midst. In its publication, *Isizwe*\(^5\), the UDF praised the Freedom Charter as the most important democratic document expressing the wishes and aspirations of the people. By 1986, two years after its inception, although it had not formally endorsed the Freedom Charter, the UDF and its affiliates distributed half-a-million copies of the Freedom Charter in a house-to-house campaign and to celebrate the 39\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Congress of the People. The Freedom Charter was widely accepted within the organisation.

According to Lodge (1989: 211), the first contact between the UDF and the ANC leadership took place on 22 January 1984 when members of the UDF went to Lusaka for consultation on the events within the country. Despite the fact that the Freedom Charter was widely accepted within the UDF and its organisations, the UDF denied its connection with the ANC and denied that its formation was as a direct result of a directive from the ANC in exile. Be that as it may, Seekings (1991: 96) contends that the UDF had a special relationship with the then banned ANC. He point out that the formation of the UDF was guided by internal ANC supporters. Seekings (1992: 218) further shows that from 1979, the

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\(^5\) The official journal of the UDF.
then banned ANC encouraged the formation of sympathetic organisations challenging all aspects of apartheid within the country.

Unlike Barrell, Gibson (2004: 15) argues that the UDF was not the only organisation that emerged in 1983. He argues that there was also the NF which was influenced by BC philosophy. According to Gibson, the NF was formed in opposition to the Koornhoff Bills and it was also perceived to be a forum where different liberation groupings would air their views and narrow some of the differences among them. The NF was officially launched at the fifth AZAPO congress in June 1983 in Hammanskraal. At the end of the two-day deliberations, delegates voted unanimously to adopt the Manifesto of the Azanian People which was based on four basic principles: anti-racism, anti-imperialism, anti-collaboration with the ruling class, and independent working class (Gibson 2004: 16). According to Neville Alexander, quoted by Gibson (2004: 17), many people who were identifiable with the UDF, including Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak, whom he referred to as ‘Charterists’, withdrew their support of the NF, because the NF was acquiring all the hallmarks of a large popular movement, and they (the Charterists) didn’t want to be seen behind a BC initiative. As a result, the UDF which had acquired greater prominence since its formation, managed to marginalise the NF completely.

Lodge et al. (1991: 29-30) argues that the UDF plan of action followed earlier periods of struggle, thereby demonstrating the continuity between different periods of mobilisation. Lodge contends that ‘while at the moment of its birth the UDF undoubtedly borrowed from the traditions, symbols, iconography, and ideology of the ANC, it expressed them with greater force and resonance’. Similarly, Price (1991: 181) argues that the UDF continued with the same tradition and culture of liberation as the ANC did.

Lee and Schlemmer (1991: 202) indicate that between 1984 and 1986, urban African townships were the scenes of intense conflict between the
apartheid government and its extra-parliamentary opponents. In black townships throughout the country civic organisations, students and youth groups affiliated to the UDF and linked to black consciousness organisations, sought to mobilise residents against the official local government system and in support of other demands. In most townships, the local authority collapsed and groups opposed to the system set up alternative structures to represent residents and to administer parts of the townships. It is important to note that the uprisings of the mid-1980s started with the protests against rent payments in African townships, which were then incorporated into a broader campaign against the legitimacy of local councils that were seen as collaborating with the regime. Specific local conditions, grievances and the issue of survival in many localities throughout the country, fed into a strategy of political mobilisation. The local concerns were used as the unifying goal of toppling white minority rule. Civic organisations served as a watchdog over township councils, and contested the councils’ claim to represent the community.

According to Seekings (1991: 94), civics, which were an integral part of the UDF, also became part of the broad liberation struggle. Similarly, Shubane and Madiba (1994: 241) argues that when the struggle against apartheid intensified and after the formation of the UDF, civics were rapidly politicised and developed direct links with the ANC through the UDF. Civics joined the national resistance struggle as part of the ANC’s strategy of ‘Rendering South Africa Ungovernable’ under the organisational impetus of the UDF. In response to those challenges posed by community organisations, the government attempted to use its state machinery to stifle those organisations, which in their view were responsible for the conflict. On 12 July 1985 a state of emergency was declared. This period was characterised by restrictions, scores of activists were detained and tortured, curfews were imposed and security forces moved into many townships in an attempt to re-impose order. Nonetheless, as Lodge et al. (1991: 94)
79) shows, opposition to the state was not crushed as the UDF and its affiliates changed their tactics to include extensive consumer boycotts. Lodge and others further demonstrates that a second nationwide state of emergency was imposed on 12 June 1986 which strongly affected the UDF as the most prominent organisations that provided a platform for internal revolt. As shown by Kotze and Greyling (1991: 209), the 1986 restrictions caused the UDF to lose a great deal of momentum and it was later banned on 24 February 1988. Most of its leadership were imprisoned without trial while others were forced to go underground. Seekings (1992: 222) argues that civics were among the primary targets of state repression under the successive nationwide states of emergency. He contends that large numbers of civic activists were arrested and detained. Moreover, as state repressions continued, Butler (2007: 228) indicates that the UDF received a formidable ally in 1987 during the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) strike. NUM and its leadership, led by its general secretary, Cyril Ramaphosa, decided to join the struggle and become a central actor to make the country ungovernable. Butler also indicated that NUM became the first trade union in South Africa to adopt the ANC Freedom Charter.

However, as indicated by Seekings (2000: 228), during 1988 and 1989, overt protest and resistance to the state re-emerged which culminated in the Defiance Campaign of 1989 under the banner of the MDM. According to Seekings, the MDM was an alliance of the UDF and COSATU. However, within COSATU, strong sentiments were raised about the character of the new movement and the limits of its political alliances. The UDF favoured a loosely structured front while some sections within the unions were against broadening the struggle to include white liberals and business groups arguing that this would compromise their commitment to radical social and economic transformation. The UDF’s view of broadening the struggle to include a wide range of organisations opposed to apartheid was also held by some of COSATU’s national
leadership who recognised the need for a broader struggle, especially within the leadership of a ‘charterist’ NUM under the leadership of Ramaphosa. NUM argued for the inclusion of multi-class organisations, and even organisations which included white South Africans. The other section which was against broadening the anti-apartheid struggle was the group which advocated radical changes, especially those linked with the SACP. Among them was the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) led by its general secretary, Moses Mayekiso, who, according to Butler (2007: 216), was opposed to the ‘bourgeois politics of the ANC and its Freedom Charter’. Be that as it may, COSATU and its affiliates decided that the time had come to work together with even more groups that had similar political objectives (Seekings 2000: 231).

The MDM called for a ‘peaceful national protest’ from 6 to 8 June 1988, which was in effect, a call for a stay-away, although such a call was prohibited. The stay-away was supported by two-and-half to three million people on the first day, although numbers declined on the second and third days. The huge support revealed the new unity that existed between the different organisations. The MDM vowed to strengthen grassroots structures by bringing in all those organisations on the periphery and involving them in the struggle. Many previously excluded groups, including white and homeland groups, were invited to an Anti-apartheid Conference organised by COSATU in September 1988.

The MDM was the name of an informal coalition of anti-apartheid groups. Upon its inception, the MDM became increasingly common in protest circles and did not have any formal leadership but various spokespersons, which amongst others, included: Ramaphosa, the former general secretary of NUM, who was later elected as the secretary general of the ANC in 1991; Harry Gwala, the SACP leader in the Natal midlands; Murphy Morobe, the rural secretary of the Transvaal UDF regional committee; Allan Boesak, a former anti-apartheid activist and leader of the World Alliance of Churches who was also the patron of the
UDF; Titus Molefe; a former UDF executive member; and Moses Mayekiso, whom I will discuss later in the chapter. As an informal organisation, the MDM was established as an anti-apartheid successor to the UDF after the 1988 emergency restrictions effectively banned the UDF and several other opposition groups. Even after 1988, the MDM was a temporary, loose coalition of anti-apartheid activists with no permanent constitution, no official membership rolls, no national or regional governing body, and no office holders (Knowles 2001: 26).

Like its predecessor, the MDM drew much of its support from the black community. A condition for affiliation with the MDM was adherence to the provisions of the ANC's Freedom Charter. The MDM gained prominence in 1989, when it organised a campaign of civil disobedience in anticipation of national municipal elections scheduled to take place in October of that year. Defying the state-of-emergency regulations in effect at the time, several hundred black protesters entered ‘whites-only’ hospitals and beaches. During that month, people of all races marched peacefully in several cities to protest against police brutality and repressive legislation. It continued with the resistance campaign of the UDF, in the form of strikes, marches, transport and consumer boycotts (Seekings 2000: 251).

Under the auspices of the MDM, the civics began to link the local concerns with demands for the release of detainees and political prisoners, the withdrawal of army and police from townships, the unbanning of political organisations, and campaigns for the resignation of town councillors. According to Coovadia (1991: 108), this move was intensified by the call made by the ANC, that demanded the state to allow space for the creation of local elected interim assemblies to negotiate the ways in which towns and cities were to be restructured. The civics were the central players in the Vaal uprisings of September 1984 in the West Rand townships, the Eastern Cape struggle that began in February and March 1985, the consumer boycott that spread from the Western Cape, and the long
term rent boycotts that crippled local government in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Northern Cape (Swilling 1993: 18).

In the Transvaal, the uprisings led to the meeting to negotiate a settlement between the Soweto Council and the delegations from the SCA, called the Soweto People’s Delegation (SPD) led by Frank Chikane, Ramaphosa, Albertina Sisulu and Tutu. According to Swilling and Shubane (1991: 239), the SPD proposed five policy principles as starting points for resolving Soweto’s problems. These were to: write off arrears; transfer the houses to the residents; upgrade services; provide affordable service charges; and establish a single tax base for Soweto and Johannesburg. The concept of the ‘people’s delegation’ was adopted in other areas when meeting with the state authorities. Due to a sustained internal insurrection led by various anti-apartheid organisations, and the hunger strikes in protest against detentions, the government announced that it would release a number of detainees in 1989. This was followed by the unbanning of political organisations and the release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 (Knowles 2001: 26).

Whilst these signalled the forthcoming end of apartheid, the nature of the post-apartheid order was highly contested, and the years from 1990 to 1994 were dominated by political struggles. The civics played a key role in the conflicts of these years, eventually coalescing under the banner of SANCO in 1992. One of the leaders who played a leading role during those years was Moses Mayekiso, the former general secretary of NUMSA and later, the first president of SANCO. In the following section, I move on to discuss Mayekiso and his role at CAST.

4.6 Moses Mayekiso and Civic Association of Southern Transvaal

Moses Jongisizwe Mayekiso, a civic stalwart, played a very important, indeed a crucial role, in the birth of civic organisations in South Africa. He was born on 21
October 1948 in Askeaton, in the Cala district of Transkei in the Eastern Cape. He attended the Askeaton Primary School, the Matanzima Secondary School and later, the Mfundisweni High School in Pondoland East. He left school in 1972 to work on the mines in Welkom, in the current Free State Province, from which he later resigned due to dissatisfaction with working conditions, and went on to stay in Alexandra township near the city of Johannesburg with a relative. It 1973 he was offered permanent employment by the Toyota Marketing Company in Sandton. In 1979, while still at Toyota Marketing Company, he was elected as a shop steward for the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). He was later dismissed, together with other members of the union, after a strike over the recognition of the union by management. In 1980 Mayekiso became the fulltime organiser for MAWU in the East Rand region and in the same year, he participated in the meeting of 37 organisations that formed the Transvaal regional stay-away committee which organised a two-day strike which resulted in his detention together with four other members of the committee (Gastrow 1992: 175).

Houston (1999: 222) indicates that in 1985, Mayekiso was elected as chairman of the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC). His trade union background had strong influence on practices within the AAC which he later organised. This committee was responsible for the street committee structures operating in the township. Mayekiso was also central to the formation of COSATU, where he served on the committee that wrote the constitution and planned its inaugural congress. According to Bozzoli (2004: 83), Mayekiso was instrumental to the uprising in Alexandra, which came to be known as the ‘Six Day War’ between residents and the security forces in 1986. The Alexandra uprising was sparked by the death of four people who were shot by police while attending a funeral of an unemployed youth. During the Six Days War, youth clashed with the police and army. This uprising gained momentum after soldiers in armoured personnel
carriers swarmed the township to disperse about 30,000 people marching to the police station. After the uprising, 17 people were killed during clashes with the security forces. At their funeral, the following demands were made: affordable rents and electrification of the township, dissolution of the council and municipal police, the withdrawal of troops and police from the township, and the unbanning of the ANC. In May 1986 Mayekiso was elected as the general secretary of MAWU and two months later he was arrested for plotting to take over Alexandra and make it ungovernable. He spent seven months in solitary confinement, facing the death penalty on charges of high treason. While in prison, he was elected as the general secretary of NUMSA when it was launched in 1987.

In December 1989, as a result of his role in the re-launching of the SACP, he was elected to the SACP central committee. In April 1990, following the resolution taken by the UDF to disband and promote the formation of national civic body, the National Interim Civic Committee (NICC) was formed which comprised UDF and civic leaders who moved across the country persuading local civic structures to join regional structures, similar to the old UDF regions. Local civic structures held national workshops in Johannesburg and elsewhere with an idea of forming a regional structure which will be free from party political ties, this resulted in the formation of the Eastern Cape Civics Organisation (ECCO) in August 1990 in the Eastern Cape. This was followed by the formation of CAST in September 1990 as a regional civic structure by 38 Transvaal civic organisations. Upon its inception, Mayekiso was elected as its first president. He guided CAST to continue ‘mass action’ in the form of rent boycotts until both black and white local authorities were dissolved. CAST was formed as an umbrella organisation under which community organisations in general, and township civic bodies, could operate. CAST was instrumental in calling for negotiations between civics and the TPA, thus excluding the local Councils against whom they fearlessly
campaigned for their removal. CAST, because of its federal structure, allowed the civics to retain their autonomy and managed their day-to-day activities without pressure from the regional structure (Gastrow 1992: 175-176).

According to Mashabela (1994: 10), CAST was divided into eight regions with more than 60 civic and resident organisations listed as members. It stretched from the Vaal Triangle to Warmbaths in the north, with the organisation’s head office in Johannesburg. Two years later in 1992, SANCO was formed to become the national coordinating structure for all regional and local civic organisations. CAST did not initially join SANCO as it was opposed to the unitary structure adopted by SANCO and it supported the federal structure. Furthermore, the leadership of CAST was embroiled in protracted disagreements about the political direction of the organisation. Some leaders believed that they should not join a national structure which was aligned to political parties. These protracted disagreements led to the resignation of some CAST officials (Seekings 1992: 233).

Mayekiso became the first president of SANCO and he served in this position until 1993. Unlike CAST which was born amidst protest politics to ensure that the democratic transformation was not derailed, the formation of SANCO served to legitimise ANC rule. In 1994, after the first general elections, Mayekiso became a member of the South African parliament. However, he was later recalled from parliament by the leadership of SANCO to head their newly-established SANCO-Investment Holdings (SIH). He later resigned from SIH amid allegations of fraud and mismanagement. He established a rival body which he called the Congress of South African Non-Racial Civic Organisations Movement (COSANCOM). He argued that this new civic organisation would be a federation for bringing together civic organisations, rural movements and white ratepayers’ associations (Mkhabela 2001: 2). However, this new civic organisation did not
materialise and as a result, Mayekiso discarded the idea and went into business. I will return to this discussion later in Chapter Six.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the rise of a resistance identity and its transformation into a project identity. The chapter began with a discussion of various townships which occupied a central place in the process of mobilisation leading to the rise of a resistance identity. Furthermore, the chapter looked at the administration governing townships, and argued that the poor conditions owing to a lack of planning, served as fertile ground that nurtured a community consciousness. With the banning of the ANC and the PAC, the BC orientations and philosophy took centre stage and played significant role in intensifying the resistance struggle against apartheid in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The turning point in this opposition occurred in 1976. The Soweto student uprising ushered in an era of mass mobilisation characterised by a mushrooming of community organisations, like the Soweto Committee of Ten which led to the formation of the SCA and PEBCO in 1979, the first civic organisations to emerge in South Africa. These organisations played an important role in the political and ideological struggle against apartheid. It was through the civics that many black communities were drawn into the struggle against apartheid. Upon their formation, civic organisations linked national and local issues and argued that key local issues could not be resolved without important national changes, and that civic issues could not be seen in isolation to the overall system of apartheid. Civic organisations presented a strong alliance opposing the apartheid regime.

Moreover, their role was further strengthened with the formation of the UDF which brought many of these organisations under its umbrella and provided a national focus to local struggles. Because of the link with the UDF which
embraced the ANC’s Freedom Charter, civics were drawn into the resistance struggle and played a leading role in UDF campaigns. However, when the UDF disbanded, a new informal coalition of anti-apartheid groupings coordinated by COSATU and other social movements like the civics, student and youth congresses emerged which became known as the MDM. With the disintegration of the MDM in 1990, regional civic structures like CAST, under the leadership of Mayekiso, and ECCO were formed, the latter giving way to SANCO when it was launched in 1992. Mayekiso played an important role in the birth of civic organisations in South Africa and later became the first president of SANCO upon its formation. The formation of SANCO represented the project identity, however, after its launch, SANCO moved to a legitimising identity serving to endorse ANC rule after 1994. In the next chapter, I will move on to discuss SANCO: the rows, ruptures and legitimising identity.
CHAPTER FIVE


5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter considered the development of civic organisations in the years up to 1992; this chapter will begin with the formation of SANCO in that year. The co-ordination of civics under SANCO was aimed at providing local civic structures with a space in which ordinary residents of townships and informal settlements could deal with community issues and under-development with the backing of a national structure. However, since its formation, SANCO’s national profile has declined and its national leadership has been severely criticised for failing to champion the cause of action outside the ANC.

In the previous chapter, it was proposed that the development of the civics can be characterised as a shift from a resistance to a project identity. Arguably, the formation of SANCO marked a further shift to a legitimising identity. As noted in Chapter Two, legitimising identities are constructed by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalise their domination over social actors. As far as this legitimising identity is concerned, SANCO at least at a national level, helped to legitimise the new post-apartheid order led by the ANC government. However, as we will see, this legitimising identity was contested. In particular, while the top leadership generally advanced the interests and ideas of the government, at a local level, a new dynamic was emerging.
This chapter will consider SANCO’s founding conference in 1992; Lechesa Tsenoli, the former president of SANCO and his reforms of SANCO in 1994; the impact of democratic rule on SANCO; the HSRC studies and the new mood; Hlongwane, the third president of SANCO; the SANCO/ANC 1997 Summit; SANCO’s 1997 national conference; the formation of a new national civic organisation; SANCO and COSATU; and, lastly, SANCO and the 2000 local government elections.

5.2 SANCO’s 1992 Founding Conference

The discussion about the formation of a national coordinating civic structure was first raised within the ranks of the UDF in 1984. However, as shown by Seekings (1992: 231), it was only in 1991 that the formation of a national structure of civics was fully placed on the agenda. Civics were one of the largest groupings affiliated to the UDF without a national organisation. The idea of a national civic co-ordinating structure was also raised by civic activists at the civic workshop held in Johannesburg in 1990. At the workshop, civic leaders committed themselves to promote the formation of a new national organisation that would be similar to the UDF, but without close political ties. However, the workshop led to the formation of regional civic structures such as CAST and ECCO. At its disbanding conference in March 1991, at Zithabeni (north east of Pretoria), the UDF recommended that a national association of civics be formed to ensure the continuity of an autonomous voice of grassroot movements (Hymans and Mayekiso 1993: 5).

As a follow up to recommendations agreed at this conference, there was a national consultative conference in Bloemfontein, in May 1991. This planned the formation of a national civic body, provisionally to be called the South African National Civic Association (SANCA). However, the formation of SANCA was
postponed because civics had not yet united into regional structures (Hymans and Mayekiso 1993: 5). Furthermore, Zuern (2000: 265) argues that there were rumours that spread suggesting that the creation of a new national organisation, which promised to be independent from political parties, would effectively take masses of UDF supporters away from the ANC into a rival organisation. However, in 1991, the NICC, which was formed after the UDF was disbanded, persuaded 2,500 local associations to join regional structures. These were distributed among 10 regions which were later consolidated into regions reflecting the new provincial boundaries (Seekings 1992: 232). Seekings further argues that the delay in the formation of a national civic co-ordinating body was caused by fact that in some regions, local and regional civic structures were still divided. In the Western Cape, regional organisations were especially fraught with difficulties, despite the nominal existence of an interim regional structure, the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). Disagreements and disputes occurred between township-based civics under the WCCA and shack-based civic organisations under the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WECUSA). A further problem involved the continued division between civic organisations in Coloured and African areas. Also, within the unified regional structures, like CAST, some local civics, such as the SCA chose not to affiliate, because of disagreements about participation in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber. Despite these problems, SANCO was formed in 1992, as a co-ordinating body of civic associations across the country. As Mayekiso (1996: 152) argues, the formation of SANCO was an important endeavour in the pursuit of consolidation and co-ordination within the civic movement.

As indicated by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 13) SANCO was launched at a conference held at Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape in March 1992. Isaac Mogase, the former chairperson of the SCA (interview with author, 1999) suggests that SANCO’s launching conference was attended by a variety of
delegates, which included more than 2000 civic delegates representing different regions, delegates from the NICC, the forerunner of SANCO, ANC officials, COSATU officials, churches, business people, people who were identified with the UDF, the MDM and even AZAPO, and ordinary members of communities. At its launching conference as a national co-ordinating body, the proposed unitary structure was the subject of great debate. Local civic leaders argued over the merits of a unitary structure as opposed to a federal structure. Mogase argues that most delegates from CAST and other local civic structures were concerned with the loss of their autonomy to a national unitary body and preferred a federal structure. On the other hand, some local civic leaders from financially weak organisations, and delegates from the NICC favoured a unitary structure.

According to Lodge (1991: 83), CAST moved that SANCO should be a federal structure and that individual civics be allowed to keep their own constitutions and raise their own funds. Despite these concerns, the argument for a unitary structure won the day as supporters argued that a federal civic organisation would leave the door open for opponents to divide the civics. A unitary structure, it was argued, would promote greater unity among civics. Lodge further indicates that SANCO’s executive committee was dominated by leaders from the Eastern Cape who were generally perceived to favour close alignment with the ANC. Be that as it may, CAST and other independent, civic organisations, such as the SCA and the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO), did not join SANCO at this launching conference, because they remained opposed to the unitary structure of the new national organisation and favoured a federal structure.

Jacobs (1992: 24) indicates that the other reason for CAST, the SCA and ACO not joining SANCO at its launch, was that these structures were financially strong, and they feared that, by joining SANCO, they would lose their financial independence. As indicated by Zuern (2000: 320), both the SCA and ACO had
access to external funding sources and were able to organise workshops and training programs for their leaders, so the immediate benefit of joining SANCO would not be as great for them as for civics with fewer resources. Nevertheless, a year later, at a special general meeting held on 14 February 1993, CAST voted in favour of adopting the constitution of SANCO and officially become SANCO-Southern Transvaal. According to Jacobs (1993: 29), the reason for CAST to join SANCO later in 1993 was influenced by the developments in the political landscape of the country, and in particular, its president Mayekiso who was elected the first president of SANCO upon its formation in 1992.

Like CAST, the leadership of the SCA were concerned about joining SANCO at its launching conference because they wanted the SCA to retain its independence. Mogase (interview with author, 1999) contends that the reason they did not join SANCO upon its formation was because they had problems with SANCO regarding the question of funding. He argues that SANCO wanted to control all funds, while they believed they should continue to raise their own funds as they had always done. However, two years after the general elections in 1994, the leadership of the SCA voted in favour of the motion to adopt the constitution of SANCO at a general meeting held in Soweto attended by 600 delegates from the SCA. The majority of delegates voted in favour of joining SANCO. Mogase argues that the reason for joining SANCO was dictated by the dawn of democracy. When the ANC won the general elections, they believed they should work with the ANC by joining SANCO. Be that as it may, some members of the SCA raised objections towards joining SANCO.

In the Western Cape, the two largest rival civic organisations in the region, WECUSA and CAHAC, which organised largely in the Coloured areas, also refused to join SANCO upon its formation. WECUSA did not join SANCO, even though they were members of the interim committee that led to the formation of
SANCO. They felt sidelined, as they mostly represented squatter areas (Cullinan 1992: 11).

SANCO, as its name suggests, was set up explicitly as an organisation designed to operate at a territorial level, and its member organisations transformed themselves from being autonomous affiliates of an umbrella organisation into branches of a national body. In the words of one critical activist: 'It required that local civics surrender their autonomy and local accountability' (Jacobs 1992: 24).

The preamble to SANCO’s constitution defines it as a body that would 'act as a non-partisan democratic watchdog of the community on local government and community development'. While not all civics joined SANCO, the overwhelming majority did. SANCO became the first national structure to provide unitary representation for affiliated local civics. The constitution adopted by SANCO at its launching conference in 1992, required that all local branches dissolve their local constitutions, refrain from any negotiations with municipal authorities, and cease all fundraising, because funds would be collected by a national office and subsequently allocated to branches. The official ideology of SANCO depicted the civics as independent, non-party political formations that could remain rooted in 'civil society', rather than becoming contenders for local, regional or national governmental power (Swilling 1993: 1).

The establishment of SANCO implied that civic organisations had to disband and be replaced by SANCO branches, for example, the Tembisa Civic Association gave way to the SANCO-Tembisa branch. SANCO pledged to give all local civics a presence at a national-level. Although many civic organisations accepted their new identity, that of being recognised as SANCO branches, in reality, they remained their own masters in addressing the social problems of their respective communities at the grassroots level (Mashabela 1994: 12).
As indicated by Zuern (2000: 57), SANCO adopted a unitary structure despite the great diversity of areas which its structures claim to represent. She contended that all national resolutions were binding upon all local SANCO branches. Local branches accustomed to their earlier independence soon felt removed from the creation of new programs of action and were most often presented with fully conceptualised programs which they were then resistant to implement. As a result of SANCO’s unitary structure, the accountability of local branches was undermined as national level leaders forced local leaders to take actions which were at times contrary to the wishes of their constituencies as we shall see in Chapter Six.

In an interview with Zuern (1999), Emmanuel Tseleli, the former SCA executive, contends that by joining SANCO, many local civic organisations lost their independence. He further explains that ‘if we take a decision here, someone questions you at the other level’. Saying, ‘why do you take such a decision? This is not the policy of the organisation. So whatever we do now, we have to look over our shoulders and say, are we doing the right thing?’ The marginalisation of local structures by a national structure raised by Tseleli was also corroborated by Lucas Qakaza, the provincial chairperson of SANCO in Pretoria (in an interview with author, 2007). Qakaza contends that the ‘unitary position adopted by SANCO at its launching conference was its greatest weakness’.

In terms of the constitution adopted during the launch of SANCO in 1992. SANCO was defined as a unitary organisation divided horizontally from the national level all the way down to streets and yards/blocks. Every level was to have a structure identical to that of the region, namely a conference that elects an executive committee, a general council, office bearers and a working committee (Jacobs 1993: 25). However, this constitution was amended in 2001 to bring it in line with the new geographical boundaries in the country in terms of the new constitution of South Africa adopted in 1996, with nine provinces. Also,
the goals of SANCO changed dramatically, because these goals were linked to the period before the end of apartheid and the introduction of the RDP.

As shown by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 17), SANCO’s new constitution, as amended and adopted in 2001, and its organisational structure followed a model that mimicked the ANC structure which was divided into national, provincial, regional and local branches. The authors argues that each level had a 15-member elected working committee with a president, a deputy president, national chairperson, secretary general, deputy secretary general, treasurer general, and national organising secretary, as well as nine heads of department, and an executive committee which included the working committee and the chairperson and secretary of the constitutive substructures. The national executive committee is the highest ruling controlling body of SANCO which is elected at a national conference. The national structure of SANCO plays a political role, especially with regard to SANCO’s relationship within the tripartite alliance and fundraising (Heller and Ntlokonkulu 2001: 17).

In terms of the SANCO’s constitution as adopted in 1992, civics should strive to:

- Improve the economic, social, cultural and political interests of all South Africans;
- Promote within the community an understanding and appreciation of democratic values and accountability;
- Establish and maintain working relationships with mass-based and progressive organisations which are involved in the struggle for the destruction of apartheid;
- Fight for compulsory, free, non racial and democratic education;
- Address the daily problems which confront residents in all spheres of their lives;
- Fight for the abolition of apartheid’s urban and rural local authorities;
- Campaign for a democratic local government in a free non-racial, non-sexist democratic and unitary society;
- Fight for the abolition of single sex hostels and the homelands;
- Promote participation of youth, woman workers and other sectors of civil society in civic matters;
- Fight against forced removals and the demolition of informal housing;
- Prevent and combat crime;
- Fight for better business and labour practices;
- Fight for better health and welfare services, pensions and transport; and
- Fight for the provision of affordable housing (Mashabela 1994: 12).

As indicated by Mayekiso, cited in Lodge (2000: 37), upon its formation, the leadership of SANCO insisted at the outset that civics must remain independent of government and political organisations, and refrain from pledging loyalty to any political party since civics represent residents, irrespective of political affiliation. As Mayekiso put it, ‘SANCO should be closer to the trade union movement than political organisations: we must remain watchdogs for the community and remain unaffiliated to any political party’. However, even though the ANC and leading civic figures at all levels, including SANCO’s leadership, formally supported the view that civics should be non-partisan, in practise, given the close linkages between civics and the ANC, it has been difficult for SANCO to be free from party affiliation. As indicated by Seekings (1997: 1), since its formation in 1992, SANCO had been more prominent at the national level where it played a central role in negotiating for the reform of local government during 1992 and 1993. (See also Bond 2000).
The argument thus far, is that SANCO’s position of adopting a unitary structure during its launch as opposed to a federal structure which was preferred by a number of its affiliates, and despite a great diversity in areas which its structures claimed to represent, placed SANCO more firmly under the control of the ANC. The unitary position adopted by SANCO at its launching conference was supported, by amongst others by its deputy president, Lechesa Tsenoli, who later became the second president of SANCO.

5.3 Lechesa Tsenoli and the Reform of SANCO in 1994

The first president of SANCO, Mayekiso, left SANCO in November 1993 and joined Parliament in 1994. He was succeeded by his deputy president, Solomon Lechesa Tsenoli, in 1993. Tsenoli was born on 10 February 1955 in Bultfontein, a small village outside Bloemfontein, in the Free State. He attended primary school in Bultfontein. He left school in 1975 and was employed until 1976 as a clerk at Pelonomi Hospital. He left Pelonomi when his contract expired and was employed as a Packer at Frasers Wholesalers in Bloemfontein in 1977. In 1979, he was employed as a freelance reporter for the *Friend Newspaper* in Bloemfontein. In 1980, he relocated to Lamontville Township in Natal (Ngobeni, Molele and Harper 2008: 5).

From 1982 to 1987, while in Natal, he became a leader of the JORAC and in the same year in 1982, he also co-founded the Masibonisane Lamontville Youth Organisation. He was later elected to the regional executive committee of the UDF in Natal when it was formally launched on 14 May 1983, and in 1985 he was elected publicity secretary of the UDF in Natal. Because of his active involvement in community struggles in the southern KwaZulu-Natal region, he was elected the first deputy president of SANCO in 1992, and later, the president of SANCO in 1993 (Seekings 2000: 283). While holding different employment,
Tsenoli obtained four qualifications by enrolling for part-time study at various universities. He obtained the certificate of Development Planning for Community Leaders from the University of the Witwatersrand; a certificate in Adult Education from the University of Natal; a certificate in Public Policy Management from the University of the Western Cape and lastly, a certificate in the programme of Instruction for Lawyers from Harvard University, in the United States of America (Delivery Magazine 2005: 19).

From November 1993 to 1995, Tsenoli served as the second president of SANCO. When his term as the president of SANCO ended in 1995, he did not stand for re-election as he joined Parliament. In 2000, he was appointed as a Member of Executive Committee (MEC) for local government and housing in the Free State Provincial Legislature, a position he held until 2004. In 2005, he went back to Parliament and was appointed as chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture (Interview with Author, 2008).

The first president of SANCO, Mayekiso, remarked that ‘SANCO should refrain from pledging loyalty to any political party’ and should be closer to the trade union movement than political organisations (quoted in Lodge 2000: 2). Mayekiso repeated the same sentiments in an interview in 1997, arguing that SANCO should not work with the governing party because ‘its policies go against the interests of the community’. Despite his pronouncements, Mayekiso (quoted in Lodge 2000: 2) endorsed the ANC’s 1994 general election campaign and was number 17 on the list of ANC candidates. In contrast Tsenoli was unequivocal in declaring SANCO’s support for the ANC (Lodge 2000: 2).

When he took over as the president, the organisation was at that stage beginning to face difficulties with its ANC partisan stance, and coming to grips with post-apartheid politics. This was exacerbated by the fact that after the 1994 elections, some SANCO branches vowed to continue with the rent and bond boycott. The move to continue with the boycott of services drew strong criticism
from government who blamed SANCO for its failure and unwillingness to support
the resumption of service payments. On the other hand, SANCO nationally
argued that the government's emphasis on breaking the boycott was misguided.
It contended that government should focus on why people could not afford to
pay their rents. Contrary to the position taken by SANCO’s branches to
continuing the boycott, SANCO’s president argued in his press briefing on 16
November 1994, in Johannesburg, that SANCO was concerned with the level of
conflict between the ANC and SANCO. He points out that SANCO’s national
executive committee had agreed that there was a need to develop a record of
understanding with the ANC and to redefine their relationship. He argued that
SANCO wanted to clarify areas of co-operation with the ANC and simultaneously
ensure SANCO’s independence. He declares that SANCO was engaged in an
informal alliance with the ANC which was to be on case-by-case basis. This, he
argues, came after their five-day executive committee meeting with the ANC. He
argues that SANCO always saw itself as an important player in the liberation
struggle and that SANCO’s relationship with the ANC was always defined by
issues at hand (Zuern 2004: 6).

Be that as it may, as shown by Cherry (2000: 205), on 20 July 1995, in
Port Elizabeth, SANCO organised a march to the city centre to protest against the
service charges levied by the ANC-dominated Transitional Local Council. The TLC
chairman, Nceba Faku, was ‘booed and heckled’ by a crowd reportedly
comprising between 400 and 1000 SANCO members. Again, SANCO was
particularly criticised by the government for continuing rent and bond boycotts.
As indicated by Cherry, the ANC’s criticism of the march indicated the beginning
of a reluctance to tolerate dissent from any organisation not playing the party
political game. Moreover, Tsenoli’s statement of institutionalising SANCO to the
ANC alliance was strongly criticised within SANCO’s ranks, and in particular, by
the Alexandra civic activist, Mzwanele Mayekiso, younger brother of Moses
Mayekiso. He describes this as the ‘first step in moving from the position of a powerful watchdog to becoming a lapdog’ (Seekings 1997: 2). Mzwanele’s view was also supported by the late Sipho Maseko, an academic at the University of the Western Cape, who argues that SANCO was brought into the ANC, COSATU and SACP alliance through the back door because of its own low profile (Gumede 1996: 17). Tsenoli issued a statement criticising SANCO leaders, such as Mzwanele Mayekiso, who called on SANCO to distance itself from political parties and further declared that there was no reason for SANCO to change its decision to support the ANC (Sunday Times 23 July 1995). Later in 2004, Tsenoli would qualify his support of the ANC during an interview with Chris Ncgobo by arguing that ‘we are conscious of the need to cooperate where possible, but we want to retain a culture of being critical’.

The argument thus far, is that it was during Tsenoli’s tenure as the president of SANCO when the organisation established a closer relationship with the ANC with a view that a close relationship with the ANC would provide the national civic body a vantage position to influence the government directly. However, as we shall see in the next section, SANCO’s role in legitimising ANC rule was also contested. SANCO was also faced with serious challenges brought by democratic rule.

5.4 The impact of Democratic Rule on SANCO

The democratic change that took place in South Africa in 1994 brought profound changes to the political, social and economic landscape. As a result of this change some organisations were unable to adapt to the requirements of the new period and had to disband. This democratic rule also posed a great challenge to SANCO, with the organisation losing not only its leaders to government and to private companies, but also, its financial resources. It was also dominated by
incidents of corruption and the marginalisation of the organisation by the ANC caused by the lack of a strategic political direction.

As shown by Seekings (1997: 5), after 1994, SANCO experienced a high turnover in its top leadership to government. Seekings also suggests that the leadership of SANCO left the organisation because they were attracted by the prospect of better remuneration. Lodge (1999: 83) has also argued that SANCO had lost an estimated 70 per cent of its top leadership to national, provisional and local governments due to its willingness to serve within the ANC government. As suggested by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 12), before the 1994 elections, the leadership of the civics were called upon to play a leading role in building ANC branches. They argue that ‘grassroots organisational activism was thus shifted from building community structures to building party structures’. Again after 1994, large numbers of SANCO activists were deployed to government, as well as ANC structures. The author also contends that the 1995 local government elections dealt local structures a particularly harsh blow. Civic leaders competed fiercely to get ANC nominations, in the process reducing many local structures to personal launch pads for political careers.

This view was further elaborated on by Zuern (2004: 11), who argues that the dawn of democracy in 1994 dealt a serious blow to SANCO as the organisation lost many of its trusted leaders to government. As indicated by Zuern, owing to the loss of its leadership, SANCO resolved through its National General Council to allow individuals to remain in their leadership positions in SANCO while accepting government roles. Most of SANCO’s leaders occupy government positions as members of parliament, provincial and councillors at local level. An example of this is SANCO’s chairperson in Gauteng, Richard Mdakane, who is also the ANC Chief Whip in the provincial legislature. The decision to allow SANCO leadership to take positions in government was criticised by Mzwanele who was later expelled from the organisation. He argues
that SANCO has gained nothing by sending its leadership to parliament or being co-opted into government. Instead, SANCO had lost its important role as watchdog of its member’s interests (Gumede 1997: 17). In the opinion of Mzwanele, SANCO gave in to play the role of a lapdog since the 1994 election. He argued that in post-apartheid South Africa, the civics’ role to represent communities is played by elected local government councillors (Seekings 1997: 2).

As shown by Seekings (1997: 7-10), the turnover of SANCO leadership has been exacerbated by the lack of financial resources which enabled it to express or address its supporters’ grievances effectively. This was also caused by the failure of SANCO to effectively raise funds. As pointed out by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 23), the constitution of SANCO prescribed that a monthly R5.00 subscription fee should be collected from the membership, of which R3.00 was to go to the branches and R2.00 to the national office. However, this did not happen as SANCO was not able to collect subscription fees because it lacked a coherent fee structure. Mogase (interview with author, 1999) argues that SANCO’s national office should have allowed local civics to raise their own funds as they always had, and that SANCO should not have taken the responsibility of issuing national membership cards. He argues that membership cards should have been issued by local branches which, in turn, would have to charge a small fee and pay affiliation fees to the national office.

Apart from the inability to collect membership fees, Lodge (2000: 5) shows that SANCO also lost donations from external sources. Its major donors from 1992 included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Centre for the Swedish Labour Movement. In 1996, USAID ceased its funding to SANCO and as a result, eight staff members were retrenched at SANCO’s national headquarters. As shown by Seekings (1997: 8-9), contributions to SANCO were generally seen as contributions to the
struggle against apartheid and for representative democracy. These funds dried up soon after the ANC government was elected in 1994. The issue of the lack of funds to the national organisation was raised by Mayekiso, who argues that ‘we don’t have enough funds to pay staff, so civics in different regions sometimes negotiate with local institutions for them to pay salaries or to fund a project’. Because of this lack of funds it was agreed that local civics could come up with plans to raise their own funds as long as those strategies were free from corruption. He argues, ‘we could act as consultants, even at a national level, to secure funds for the organisation. But we have to be careful that civics are not used in a corrupt way, such as to help one developer to compete against another’. However, as indicated by Seekings (1997: 9), the new arrangement of raising funds led to a series of reports of corrupt business deals that SANCO had facilitated. In Cape Town, some developers wooed SANCO leaders through promises of holidays, computers and other offers. The same happened in the Free State, where it was alleged that SANCO helped developers to win contracts in return for large donations to SANCO’s coffers. There were also cases of fraud and mismanagement of a joint venture by SANCO to sell policies on behalf of an American insurance group.

As shown by Ngobeni (2001a: 5-6), due to the lack of funds in 1996, SANCO’s national leadership recalled their former president Mayekiso from parliament to head an independent investment arm, SIH. This had been formed in 1995 under the umbrella of the SANCO Development Trust. However, as early as 1997, there were media reports which suggested that through its investment arm, SANCO lost records of its assets and its financial investments worth R80-million when the former SIH financial manager, Joanna Kruis, ‘looted’ the offices. Mayekiso confirmed those allegations and went further to accuse Hlongwane, the president of SANCO, of using former SIH financial manager, Joanna Kruis, to ‘assassinate his character and launch a vicious attack against the investment
company’. Mayekiso argues that Hlongwane backed Kruis, whom SIH had accused of stealing computers, documents and cars, to the detriment of the investment company. Hlongwane dismissed Mayekiso's allegations as ‘absurd’ and argued that Mayekiso was using claims of character assassination to hide his failure to account for irregularities and mismanagement at SIH. Hlongwane further alleged that Mayekiso was hiding behind irregularities at SIH. He argued, ‘we have not had a board meeting in two years and no audited statements since 1997/98’.

Amid these allegations of corruption, Mayekiso left the organisation and established a new civic organisation which he called CONSACOM. According to Ngobeni (2001b: 12), SANCO was entangled in a power struggle and there were splits in the organisation. SANCO’s shift into business ventures was highly criticised by Mzwanele. His criticisms of SANCO’s top leadership led to his expulsion from the organisation. According to Gumede (1997: 9), Mzwanele’s expulsion provoked the SANCO-Gauteng Provincial Council to threaten secession if he was not reinstated. SANCO’s national leaders who were interviewed as part of this study gave different responses, some suggested that he was expelled from SANCO because he opted to further his own interests, and was uncooperative and arrogant. Others claimed that he tried to make SANCO Research Development Institute (SRDI) autonomous from SANCO, and sought to secure funds for himself. Through the SRDI, Mzwanele raised R1 million, which SANCO national leaders claimed the right to use at its discretion. Mzwanele believed that the money should go directly to SANCO branches (Gumede 1997: 9). However, members of SANCO-Alexandra branch, who were interviewed as part of this study, suggest that Mzwanele was expelled from SANCO because he questioned the strategic direction of the civic body. This viewpoint was also corroborated by Seekings (1997: 14).
Apart from its leadership turnover and financial crisis, SANCO also drew criticism from its branches due to its relations with the ANC. As shown by Zuern (2004: 11), SANCO leaders, especially at branch level, often complained about extreme marginalisation and poor treatment they received from the ANC Local branches. The view about marginalisation was also echoed by Ali Tleane, the former president of SANCO-Tembisa branch, who, like Mzwanele, argued that SANCO had placed itself in a difficult position because of its political alliance with the ANC. Tleane insists that SANCO should have adopted an aggressive political agenda that resembled the civic movement in the 1980s. He claims that it was going to be difficult for SANCO to offer any meaningful contributions in terms of policy formulation because of the political relationship it has with the ruling party. He accuses SANCO of working very closely with government to such an extent, that one finds it difficult to differentiate between SANCO and the government. As argued by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 16), SANCO had failed to provide a strategic direction to its branches. This resulted in local structures developing their own policy positions, and as a result, they found it difficult to influence policy-making. The inability of SANCO to provide its branches with leadership due to its relations with the ANC was corroborated by Simon Tshikota (interview with author, 2006), and he acknowledges that relations between SANCO and the ANC, especially at the branch level, was characterised by tension. However, he argues that although they encountered problems with the ANC at branch level, these problems could be managed and he argues that the government which was led by the ANC, was doing a good job, but felt there was a need for SANCO to continually engage with the government on the issues of housing and crime. He laments the fact that the national structure of SANCO was very weak and that it had failed to give a clear direction to the civic movement in general.
Despite this fairly bleak picture brought about by the dawn of democracy upon SANCO, it is, however, essential to point out that the organisation is continuing to thrive. This will be shown through an HSRC study conducted between 1994 and 2000.

5.5 Human Science Research Council Studies and the New mood

Contrary to the suggestions indicating the decline and demobilisation of SANCO in the post-apartheid period, the key finding of research conducted by the HSRC as part of the social movement project between 1994 and 2000 in four provinces, Gauteng, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape, has reveal that while SANCO as a national organisation is indeed ineffective and virtually invisible, its local branches had continued to play an important role in their communities. This confirmed the picture drawn by Muthien (1999: 19) who argues that after the 1999 general elections, public participation in South African township-based civic organisations maintained its vigour and even became more widespread than active membership of political parties.

The results of the interview conducted by the author as part of the HSRC social movement survey in five townships, also assists in showing that local civic branches sustained their presence and momentum even in the post-apartheid period. The results of the interview indicated that at a local level, SANCO’s branches demonstrated a high degree of activity within the local authorities in fighting for service provision. The interview results also indicate that participation in civic organisations, although it has fluctuated over the years in other townships like Duduza and KwaThema, however, it remain substantial in Daveyton, Wattville and Tsakane.

The research evidence from these five townships does not suggest a decline in the activities of the local branches. Most members interviewed in five
townships acknowledged the links between their national level of SANCO and the ANC. However, the majority of its members appear not to be in favour of SANCO’s links with the ANC. They view SANCO’s relationship with the ANC as the cause of its demise. Some even suggests that the ‘ANC has become part of the problem rather than being a part of the solution’.

The majority of respondents, who participated in the interviews in those five townships, were between the age of 25 and 55. While conducting interviews, the following issues were observed. Most civic members interviewed in four other townships, with the exception of Daveyton, were unemployed. Participation in civic organisations in terms of gender appeared to be dominated by women. This has been observed in all five townships selected. In all five townships, SANCO officials claim that they did not receive any donations from SANCO’s national office and they depended on collections which came from membership fees which varied between R10 and R15 as well as donations from their respective community business people. Daveyton, Wattville and Tsakane townships claim to hold and organise meetings regularly and were in constant touch with their members. In Duduza this was not been the case as the leadership of the local civic organisations were embroiled in hostilities, accusing their branch chairperson, Kebane Moloi, of being a loose cannon. Information collected in these five townships showed that participation in civic organisations, although it has fluctuated over the years in other townships like Duduza and KwaThema, it had remained substantial in Daveyton, Wattville and Tsakane.

In an interview with the author (2000), Bonginkosi Phakhathi, like other SANCO branch members, argues that SANCO’s national structure is ineffective. He argues, ‘the only time we hear about SANCO’s national structure is during the time of the national conferences when we need to send delegates.’ According to Phakhathi, the most important structures in SANCO were its local branches. He insists that ‘local civic structures would never cease to exist, because civics exists
as a result of human nature. As long as human beings exist, civics will also exist’. He argues that most Alexandra-SANCO branches still enjoyed significant support within the community and that they were the organisation which could still fill up a community hall during their meetings as we shall see in Chapter Seven. Phakhathi further argues that ‘even the ANC these days cannot fill any community hall when they call their branch meetings.’

Phakhathi was born in KwaZulu-Natal in 1947. Before coming to Johannesburg in 1989, he was a chairperson of a school committee and played a role in many local structures in his community. He also served on peace structures during the period of violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1980s. Upon his arrival in Johannesburg, he joined the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) and was later elected into the yard committees of a civic branch. Phakhathi regards local civic structures as far more important than local government. He argued that the greatest challenge which faced Alexandra was poverty, a lack of houses and high unemployment. He argues that ‘in most cases you will find more than five people staying in one room. It’s a problem and also very frustrating’. The majority of people in Alexandra shack settlements could not afford to buy or rent houses in Far East Bank, an area adjacent to the N3 highway developed in the 1980s occupied by black middle class.

In this section, I have argued that despite the challenges brought about by transition to democracy on SANCO’s national level, its local branches have remained vibrant at the local level. In the next section, I will discuss SANCO’s third president, Hlongwane, and will argue that, like his predecessor, he continued guiding SANCO to legitimise ANC rule.
5.6 Mlungisi Hlongwane, the Third President of SANCO

The second president of SANCO, Tsenoli, left SANCO in 1995 and from 1996 to 1999, he served as a Member of Parliament in Cape Town. He was succeeded by Mlungisi Jonathan Hlongwane as third president of SANCO in November 1995. Hlongwane was born on 28 January 1964 in White City Jabavu, Soweto, in Johannesburg. He attended and matriculated from Lebone Senior Secondary School in Soweto. During his youth, he used to sell sweets and vegetables to the local community. In 1983, after his Matric, Hlongwane was employed as a trainee technician by the then Department of Posts and Telecommunications. In the same year, he became a chief shop steward with the Post and Telecommunications Workers Association (POTWA). He was later dismissed from the Department of Posts and Telecommunication together with over 2 800 other people for his part in a strike that was aimed at eradicating racism in the workplace and seeking salary parity with white employees. After his dismissal from the department, he took up a position as a national education secretary with POTWA and went on to become its general secretary, a position he held until 1985. In the same year he was elected to COSATU’s National Executive upon its formation. In 1987, he obtained a Diploma in Electrical Telecommunication. In 1995, he was popularly elected as a chairperson of the Vaal Metropolitan Council, a position he held until 1997. During this period, Hlongwane was also elected as the Chair of the Vaal ANC branch, as well as being a member of the Gauteng Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC (Kobokoane 1997: 1-2).

In 1996, he was involved in the drafting committee tasked with writing the White Paper on Telecommunications. In 1997, he was appointed as the head of the Universal Services Agency by the then Minister of Post & Telecommunications, Jay Naidoo. The Universal Services Agency was formed by
the Telecommunications Act No. 103 of 1996 and was officially launched in 1997. This statutory body was designed to assist and spearhead the delivery of telecommunication technology and resources to South African communities, particularly those disadvantaged by apartheid. He served as head of this body until 1998. In 1999, he was elected as Member of Parliament in President Mbeki’s government. In 2000, he joined Wireless Business Solutions as executive chairperson. Wireless Business Solutions was the backbone network operator for the National Lottery in South Africa and in the same year, he was requested by the ANC to serve as the Executive Mayor of Sedibeng District Municipality (Kobokoane 1997: 2 and Gardner 2003: 50).

5.7 SANCO, ANC Summit in 1997

When Hlongwane became the president of SANCO in 1995, the organisation was in crisis. Many of its local branches were at that stage criticising SANCO for its continued relationship with the ANC, which they argued had resulted in the marginalisation of the organisation. According to Seekings (1997: 15), the tension between SANCO and ANC results from the fact that from 1992 the ANC leaders allowed civics to play a leading role in local politics. However, by 1997 the ANC had taken the lead and relegated SANCO to a minor position.

In the Eastern Cape, the tension between SANCO and ANC led to the expulsion of SANCO officials from the ANC alliance in Transkei, and the closure of SANCO offices by ANC officials. Again, in Port Elizabeth, the ANC refused to hold meetings with SANCO leaders. This tension between SANCO and the ANC resulted in Transkei’s SANCO regional leadership to announce its secession from the national organisation, citing its dissatisfaction with the organisation’s ANC ties, promising to support independent candidates in the 1999 elections and complaining about the dropping of the RDP in favour of GEAR (Gumede 1997:
5). In Limpopo province, the ANC-controlled provincial and local government disseminated anti-SANCO propaganda which sought to undermine SANCO as the organisation that could not run its affairs properly (Ntlonti 1997). In Gauteng province, in Tembisa and Mamelodi Township in Pretoria, conflict between the ANC branches and SANCO branches took various forms such as fighting over territory and a clash of personalities on the local level. This was made more serious by members of both the ANC and civic leaders who saw themselves as the only legitimate representatives of the community and, therefore, were potential local government leaders. This tension between ANC branches and civic branches was further fuelled by the fact that they both existed in the same community and competed for the same membership. On the local level, civics regarded community elections as its terrain considering that the ANC had stood for national and provincial elections, while the ANC saw civics as “meddling in political affairs instead of attending to civic matters” (Makhura 1999: 19).

According to Mayekiso, in Mdantsane and Alexandra, conflicts were fuelled by a lack of clarity over the division of labour, clarifying which issues SANCO was meant to be dealing with, and how the ANC branches as a political party, concentrated on building its local branches (Mayekiso 1996: 16). Cherry (2000: 13) argues that the tension and confusion between the ANC and SANCO branches was caused by the fact that there was no proper distinction between civic and political issues and the role of ANC branches and SANCO branches.

Owing to poor relations between the two organisations, a SANCO/ANC Summit was convened in February 1997 in Johannesburg, to address the deteriorating relations between the two organisations. At the summit, SANCO leaders at local level complained about the extreme marginalisation of the civic movement by the ANC. They also presented a report that referred to a looming breakdown of political linkages between SANCO and the ANC at various levels. SANCO officials at branch level argue that the ANC only consulted with SANCO
when it needed to mobilise support for elections. The tension between the ANC and SANCO branches was also acknowledged by the president of SANCO in his address to the summit, contending that, ‘it is embarrassing to acknowledge that, whilst we share a common programme of reconstruction and development, and we share common policies, some of our structures and members are drawing daggers and are at each other’s throats’. He further remarked that in areas like the Eastern Cape, ‘we fight over who should be a councillor. We fight over who should initiate or lead development. We fight over consultation, especially where the ANC in government adopts an economic blueprint that becomes non-negotiable. We fight over tariffs at local level. We fight over recognition and respect of each others’ strengths’ (Hlongwane 1997: 2). SANCO’s leadership maintained that, ‘we don’t want to be treated simply just as another non-governmental organisation that will be called upon to make submissions at the tail end of policy formulation’ (Manga 1997: 24).

ANC delegates at the summit maintained that from the outset, the ANC should not have allowed a dichotomy between political and civic matters and if the ANC branch was to become an organ of people’s power, it could not leave housing, water, sanitation, roads, education, health, local economic and development to a SANCO branch. The discussion document tabled by the ANC in the summit, entitled *Unity in Action* proposed the phasing out of SANCO branches entirely from local government and proposed that the ANC take over civic politics. The ANC argued that this move would strengthen ANC branches and bolster the party’s support base. It blamed the failure of local councils on tensions caused by SANCO local branches, and the confusion on the mandate and activities of these two organisations on a local level. Because of challenges with SANCO, ANC officials argued that the ANC branches should function much more as civic organisations, but with a clear political mission. It was felt that the ANC branch should facilitate contact between the local council and the
community, and should act as a forum for this interaction, but it should not be dominated by the local council. In places where there were both SANCO and ANC branches, there would not be a need for a SANCO branch, since the ANC branch could handle the civic concerns of the community. This meant that SANCO branches would not exist, particularly where there was an ANC branch in a local community (Makhura 1999: 18). Makhura further acknowledges that the distinction between the roles of civics and political parties at the local level was very blurred as was reflected in the tensions between the civics and local government representatives. He argues, ‘if a civic branch initiates a project, they see it as their own, whereas the ANC branch believes the project should be led by them’ (Makhura 1999: 19).

Be that as it may, as shown by Ngubeni (1997: 16-18) the summit resolved that there was a need for a closer cooperation between the two organisations, and that they must ensure that their local structures adhered to nationally agreed procedures. Ngubeni further argues that it was agreed that ‘SANCO needs to play a more constructive role in ensuring community participation in government activities, to encourage joint activities, and to compliment the government delivery programme in our communities’, whilst ‘the ANC needs to ensure that government is more accountable to communities by allowing for more civil society involvement in the government decision-making process’. It was also agreed that the two organisations needed to pay attention to procedures for selecting candidates for future local elections, to a media strategy and to drafting a code of conduct. At the summit Lodge (2000: 6) argues that SANCO’s leadership resolved that the organisation would support the ANC in the 1999 national elections, and moreover, it pledged its ‘unashamed’ backing for Thabo Mbeki as Nelson Mandela’s successor.

The argument here is that, even though SANCO from time to time had encountered problems with the ANC, especially at a local level, at a national level
the organisation remained firm in its backing of the ANC and has never openly challenged the ANC. It also moved to endorse the ANC in every local government and national election. It has also never threatened a nationwide action to challenge the government. However, its local branches continued voicing their dissatisfaction with the ANC, as we shall see in the next section.

5.8 SANCO’s 1997 National Conference

As indicated earlier, the purpose of this section is to show that despite the fact that SANCO’s national leadership continued to legitimise the ANC rule, its local branches remain disengaged from the ANC and its structures at local level. This became evident again at SANCO’s national conference which was held from 16 to 20 April 1997 at the Carlton Centre, in Johannesburg, one month after the SANCO/ANC summit. The agenda of this conference was mainly focused on issues which were raised during the summit in February, and a discussion document which suggested that SANCO should transform into a political party. Penrose Ntlonti, the general secretary of SANCO, reported to the conference that, the three years since the last conference had not been an easy period for SANCO. She argues that the organisation's finances were in chaos, its membership was in a mess, and it was increasingly ignored by ANC leaders in government (Ntlonti 1997: 4).

In his address to the conference, Hlongwane acknowledged the organisation’s difficulties and remarked: ‘Let us be at the forefront to admit that the sweeping political changes were too revolutionary in their pace that we were caught with our pants down. We have not come to grips with post-liberation politics’ (Hlongwane 1997: 2).

Hlongwane further declared that ‘it must be emphasised that our support for the ANC is not without qualifications, it is premised on the electoral manifesto
whose cornerstone is the RDP, not European fiscal discipline policies’. In this conference, SANCO leaders at local level were unanimous in criticising the shift from the RDP to GEAR. Nevertheless, SANCO failed to clearly publicise and defend its policy position as SANCO has not threatened mass action to challenge ANC policy since its inception. However, most delegates raised their concerns about the organisation’s relationship with the ANC arguing that SANCO could not serve two masters by being both in government and also serving the communities. Due to these problems, some SANCO leaders suggest that it would be good for democracy if SANCO converted into a political organisation. This view was contained in the discussion document which the organisation released to its structures in 1996, which proposed that the national coordinating structure of civics was transforming itself into a political party to challenge the ANC and other movements in the local government elections (Seepe 2001: 2).

The idea of transforming SANCO into a political party was further strengthened by the following: firstly, the leadership of SANCO believed that there was political space available for an organisation like SANCO, and secondly, they believed that SANCO had strong followers at the local community level because of its ability to drive a pro-transformation agenda (Mngxitama 2000: 2). The reports about transforming SANCO into a political party were dismissed by Hlongwane who argued that SANCO would not become a political party. He further asserted that SANCO would have no relevance if its intention was to compete with the ANC. He maintained that SANCO would remain an independent and autonomous organ of civil society, defending its constituency which was informed by its historical mandate. He concluded by saying that the organisation would not even consider becoming a political party now or at any other time (Kindra 2002: 2).

Although SANCO had resolved in its national conference that its relationship with the ANC had to be clearly defined, David Makibeni (interview
with author, 2006) argues that this issue was never taken further. Despite the tensions between the two organisations, Hlongwane, then a staunch supporter of President Mbeki, argued in favour of the decision to align SANCO with the ANC, which he insists was historical. Contrary to the sentiments raised in the conference, Hlongwane, like his predecessor, once again endorsed SANCO’s support for the ANC in the 1999 general elections. Hlongwane maintained that SANCO regarded the ANC as the only legitimate political organisation committed to steering the cause of transformation in the country. The statement by Hlongwane suggests strong evidence of a legitimising identity. He maintained that the movement remain encouraged by the performance of the ANC in government, as it aimed at improving poor communities (Mkhabela 2001: 2).

The argument thus far, is that SANCO through its leadership, especially its president has continued with its role of legitimising ANC rule despite strong opposition from its local branches. However, as we shall see in the next section, SANCO’s position of legitimising identity and its inability to develop a clear strategy for the local civic organisation, has led to the formation of a new national civic movement established by disgruntled former SANCO members who contended that their new movement would be independent from political organisations.

5.9 The formation of a new National Civic Organisation

The ideas about the formation of a new national civic organisation were first raised by Mayekiso, the former president of the ACO, before his expulsion from SANCO. As indicated elsewhere in this dissertation, it is alleged that Mayekiso was fired from SANCO because he questioned the strategic direction of the civic body. The dispute between Mayekiso and SANCO went to court, and Mayekiso and his fellow dissidents were instructed by the court to refrain from using
SANCO’s name. They thus decided to re-launch the ACO in 1997, the organisation which preceded the Alexandra civic’s transformation into SANCO. After the expulsion of Mayekiso from SANCO, two more influential SANCO provincial leaders resigned from SANCO. They were Ali Tleane, the former president of SANCO-Tembisa branch, and the former general secretary of SANCO in Gauteng province, and Maynard Menu, former president of SANCO-Soweto branch (Sunday Independent 30 August 1998). Zuern (2000: 366) indicates that Menu resigned from SANCO because he became increasingly critical of SANCO’s top-down leadership style and raised uncomfortable questions about SANCO regarding its ventures into business and the influence of the national office upon local concerns. He was also accused by SANCO of supporting the United Democratic Movement (UDM) which was opposed to the ANC. Like Menu, Tleane was accused of not remaining loyal to the ANC and moving SANCO away from the ANC at the provincial level. As shown by Seepe (2000: 5), Tleane resigned from SANCO because he felt SANCO was working too closely with government at the expense of its constituency. He further accused SANCO of aligning itself with the ANC and its willingness to contest the local government elections which he argued was based on the quest for careerism.

These disgruntled former SANCO leaders founded the new national civic organisation on 22 August 1998, which they called the National Association of Residents and Civic Organisation (NARCO). Mayekiso was elected its first president. Upon its launch in Johannesburg, the new national civic organisation was joined by the following civic structures: the ACO, the Soweto Civic Organisation (SOCO), the Tembisa Residents Association (TCA), the Kyalami and the Vaal Triangle Civic Association (VTA) as members (Seepe 2000: 5). Mayekiso, the organisation’s new president argued that the establishment of NARCO was necessitated by the lack of decisive policy formulation strategies since 1994 by mainstream civic structures, whose leadership had either already
defected into government or were vigorously dreaming of doing so in the general elections’ (Tembisan 1998, cited in Zuern 2000: 368).

In an interview with Zuern (1999), Menu, the former president of the SANCO-Soweto branch, contends that the new civic organisation was a federal structure to which local civics could affiliate without changing their name or their constituencies. Branches would be given their own autonomy to fundraise for themselves, to keep their own bank accounts, and own their property without interference from the national structure. Tleane explains that the formation of the new civic organisation was prompted by the lack of direction from SANCO since 1994, and the lack of agency by the mainstream civic structures which collapsed when the leadership of SANCO defected to national and local government structures. He argued that NARCO aimed at ensuring that the traditional watchdog role of the civics movement was maintained. The new civic movement differed from SANCO on the issue of privatisation and the separation of civics as a part of civil society from political society. Tleane defined NARCO as a fully-fledged, independent, non-partisan, democratic and autonomous civic movement that concerned itself primarily with community development and social transformation, a process which had to be dominated and controlled by disadvantaged communities themselves. He argued that the new civic body condemned the government and its neo-liberal policies such as GEAR and privatisation and reaffirmed that they would not sit idly by while the government continued to pass inconsiderate policies that maintained and even increased the gap between the rich and poor in this country (Business day 31 July 2000). He also accused SANCO of losing direction on the strategic objectives of the national democratic revolution. NARCO also criticised the ANC for selling out on its objectives by attempting to privatise all major state assets. NARCO warned that the ‘failure to stop this evil move will result in chaos and lawlessness that will undermine all gains made thus far in the struggle for total emancipation and will
also provide a much needed opportunity to yesteryear’s oppressors to confuse our national agenda’ (Seepe 1999: 2).

On the other hand, the ANC criticised the president of NARCO, Mayekiso and its general secretary, Tleane, who had fallen-out with SANCO, for recruiting SANCO and ANC members into what the ANC referred to as ‘popcorn’ civics, a derogatory reference to non-ANC aligned civic movements that were springing up in townships (Cothia & Xundu 2000: 5). In order for NARCO to play a meaningful role in the democratisation process of South Africa, as an independent civic organisation, the organisation pledged to act as a channel between the state and people to ensure proper delivery of services to communities. NARCO also committed itself to critically engage the state on developmental issues that affect societies. NARCO was constituted in all provinces, except in KwaZulu-Natal. All branches in the other eight provinces remained independent in their pursuit of progressive programmes. The general secretary of NARCO, Tleane, argued that the organisation was totally opposed to the notion of civic movements forming alliances with political parties. He maintained that the organisation as a representative of civil society had to focus on the interests of communities whose political affiliations actively cut across the political spectrum (Seepe 1999: 2).

In terms of its constitution the aims and objectives of NARCO were the following:

- To effectively build NARCO into an organisation accountable to its members through mandates and report-backs;
- To empower communities through workshops, capacity building and leadership development;
➢ To negotiate for and or on behalf of its members with authorities and/or any domestic or international institutions on issues affecting its members;
➢ To liaise with reputable research and development institutions in order to build capacity and technical expertise within NARCO;
➢ To negotiate and participate in planning and development of communities on behalf of its members;
➢ To remain independent of party political influences, and develop friendly relations with all progressive political parties, Ngo’s as well as academic institutions;
➢ To raise funds through membership, donations and grants; and
➢ To protect the interests of its members through negotiations and legal proceedings (Fuphe 2000: 6).

Apart from NARCO as an example of a new social movement that emerge in the post-apartheid period in South Africa, there was also an attempt by the former SANCO president and chairperson of SIH, Mayekiso, to form a new civic organisation which he called COSANCOM, because he believed that SANCO was dead. He insists that the new civic body was not a rival to SANCO and NARCO, but a federation to which other civic organisations, including SANCO, could affiliate as members. According to Mayekiso, COSANCOM would build a truly African, non-racial, non-sexist, non-ethnic organisation by expanding its constituency base to white, coloured and Indian areas (Mkhabela 2001: 2).

Since its formation in 1998, NARCO had a partial success in Gauteng province, especially in townships located within the former East Rand region. This organisation has not been successful in other provinces where it had branches. The only time this organisation is heard is when there are problems in townships when statements are issued that purport to be from NARCO. Be that
as it may, 10 years after its formation, NARCO seemed to be struggling to make an impact. Ngwenya (interview with author, 2006) indicates the NARCO had failed to attract the masses because it was formed for the wrong reasons, that of succeeding SANCO. He argues that NARCO did not promise any new strategies to SANCO, besides being confrontational. As far as COSANCOM is concerned, this organisation was a non-starter. It never took off from the ground because its founder Mayekiso discarded the idea and joined a business venture on a fulltime basis when he failed to muster support for the new organisation. Despite losing ground, NARCO resists the challenge to align itself with political parties as was suggested in SANCO circles that it would support the UDM. The leadership of NARCO at all levels emphasise the independent nature of their organisation. SANCO, on the other hand, remained stuck within its mode of alignment with the ANC and government.

My argument in this section is that, despite the fact that SANCO had experienced strong opposition within and outside of its boundaries, particularly with the formation of new civic organisations, it remains the only legitimate national civic structure so far. It has remained intact partly because of its history within mass popular movements for participatory democracy, and its relations with the ANC. In the next section I will discuss SANCO and COSATU relations.

5.10 SANCO and the Congress of South African Trade Unions

The purpose of this section is to show that, in defending its role of legitimising ANC rule, SANCO also broke ranks with its leftist ally. The history between COSATU and the civics dates back to 1988, after the formation of the MDM, and before the establishment of SANCO in 1992. As shown by Harrison, Huchzermeyer and Mayekiso (2003: 64), even after the formation of SANCO, the two organisations played a central role in the drafting of the RDP document and
negotiations for the new local state which led to the formation of the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF). However, as indicated by the authors, the falling out between COSATU and SANCO started in 1997, when the ANC adopted GEAR as its policy at its congress in Mafikeng. This was after GEAR was announced as government policy. GEAR emphasised the privatisation of public assets and the outsourcing of certain functions of local government, such as water reticulation and electricity supply, by government. It was a macro-economic strategy aimed at reviving the economy. According to the authors, SANCO failed to respond intellectually to the weakness of the GEAR, and its devastating effect on communities. They argue that SANCO also did not highlight the issue to its support base. Despite the significant differences over key policy issues, SANCO failed to clearly publicise and defend its policy position. Nonetheless, as shown by Harrison, Huchzermeyer and Mayekiso (2003: 65), COSATU, the SACP and other community organisations played a leading role in the protest campaigns against privatisation and GEAR.

In an effort to strengthen its relations with SANCO, COSATU set up a bilateral meeting in mid–2000 with the leadership of SANCO to woo them back to the left. This resulted in a broader alliance which was formed between COSATU, the South African National Non-governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO), the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), and SANCO (Gumede 2005: 267). Moreover, in the 2000 bilateral meeting, COSATU adopted a resolution to beef up SANCO branches and run joint anti-privatisation campaigns. SANCO, in turn, announced that it would support COSATU’s scheduled two–day national stay way on 29 and 30 August 2000 (Gumede 2005: 278).

However, a year later, when COSATU made a similar call to SANCO to take part in another two-day strike scheduled for 1 and 2 October, SANCO refused and broke ranks with its leftist allies to take part in what they called, the
“unjustified and misdirected call for a two-day strike by COSATU.” COSATU’s spokesperson Vukani Mde, remarked that in August 2000, COSATU embarked on the anti-privatisation protest action and SANCO supported us 100 per cent. The issues were the same. ‘We find it bizarre and a complete surprise that the organisations that supported us last year, find it difficult to support us this year’ (Cox 2002: 1). A few years later, the rift between COSATU and SANCO was further fuelled by Hlongwane’s stance on calling the ANC to amend the constitution to allow Mbeki to stand for a third term as President of South Africa. I will return to this later in Chapter Six.

In an interview with Zuern (2004), Hlongwane suggests that like COSATU, SANCO was against the privatisation of basic essential services, but they disagreed with COSATU on the reasons for strike action. He insists that he saw the strike action as political and aimed at government instead of the private sector. He argued that the protest against the government is beginning to send the wrong political message to the masses on the ground about our confidence in the ANC government’. ‘In our view’, he reasoned, ‘COSATU is departing completely from what we understood as the glue that held the alliance together, the fundamental pillars of the alliance which included our shared vision of a society crafted along the principles of the Freedom Charter’. The above pronouncement by Hlongwane is a clear illustration of SANCO’s position of legitimising the ANC government despite strong opposition from its ally. Furthermore, COSATU and its allies were stunned by the SANCO national executive member, Donovan Williams’, remarks during his address to the Communication Workers’ Union Congress. He accused COSATU of aligning itself with anti-ANC groups such as the APF and the Solidarity Union, a predominantly white union. He argued that the best way to bring greater benefits and services to communities, would be to support government programs rather than engaging in confrontation with government (Msomi 2003: 1).
My contention in this section is that, in playing its role of legitimising the ANC government, SANCO has in the process sacrificed its allies and remain an alienated organisation from other social movements. In the next section, I will discuss SANCO and the 2000 local government elections, which again will show popular discontent within SANCO’s own branches.

5.11 SANCO and the 2000 Local Government Elections

In the run-up to the December 2000 local government elections, the national office of SANCO issued a clear directive to all SANCO structures that they had to support the ANC in the local government elections. However, as indicated by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 19), the decision to support the ANC was taken before the national conference convened, the highest decision making body. The national office warned SANCO officials and its branches against supporting independent candidates who were opposed to the ANC. Despite the fact that the national office had issued a clear directive to all SANCO structures to support the ANC in the run-up to the December 2000 local government elections, some SANCO branches rejected SANCO’s official instructions and fielded independent candidates in direct opposition to SANCO’s national leadership and the ANC’s wishes. In the Free State, residents of Maokeng Township pelted a polling station with stones to protest the disqualification of 19 SANCO candidates. In North-West province, SANCO branches ignored the leadership directives and fielded their own independent candidates (Gumede 1996: 17).

In the Eastern Cape, several SANCO branches complained to the ANC national leadership that their nominated candidates have been struck off the list or moved to the bottom, thus reducing their chances of being nominated, because they had been too critical of government’s economic policies. The provincial leader of SANCO in Mdantsane, Mzwandile Buzani, argues that ‘we
totally reject the ANC election manual clause which empowers the deployment committee to eliminate the community’s chosen candidate if it sees fit to do so, as totally undemocratic’ (Gumede 2005: 145). The Transkei-SANCO regional leadership announced their secession from the national organisation, citing dissatisfaction with the organisation’s ANC ties, promising to support independent candidates in the 2000 elections, and complaining about the dropping of the RDP in favour of GEAR (Gumede 1997: 19). Six regional SANCO structures in the Eastern Cape took a resolution not to support the ANC in the local government elections at a provincial general council meeting. Those regional structures were the Western, Amatola, Stormberg, Dranskenberg, Wild Coast and Kei district councils. SANCO’s provincial secretary, Ntlonti, argued that there was absolutely no room for negotiations until the ANC seriously looked at SANCO’s concern and that ‘our decision will neither await the endorsement of our national leadership of SANCO nor that of the ANC’ (Feni and Mpondwana 2000: 1).

Ntlonti further argued that the electoral structure within the alliance provided that 60 per cent of elected candidates should be from the ANC and the alliance partners should share the remaining 40 per cent, an arrangement with which SANCO was not satisfied. Ntlonti asserts that ‘the ANC was trapped in a fallacy of thinking it understands the needs of the people, despite its failures to deliver with abundant resources at its disposal’ (Feni and Mpondwana 2000: 2). SANCO-Eastern Cape further accused the government for its failure to address the needs of the poor and unemployed and slammed the ANC local government for cutting services to those who could not afford to pay (Appollis 1998: 3–4). In Port Elizabeth, in the townships of New Brighton, Kwazakele and Zwide, which are been grouped together under the local authority of the Ibhayi council, several SANCO leaders stood as independent candidates against the procedures agreed with SANCO’s senior alliance partners. SANCO-regional spokesperson,
Milke Tofile, announced that SANCO would compete with the ANC and put up its own candidates in the Nelson Mandela Metropole. Tofile argued that SANCO was not satisfied with the performance of the ANC–led local government (Cherry 2000: 2).

In Gauteng province, some SANCO branches announced that they were splitting from SANCO because of the problems with the list of candidates. They maintain that they were disillusioned by the ANC structures’ rejection of their nominated candidates put forward during the nomination conference. In Alexandra township, the East Bank residents boycotted elections because their councillor Aaron Seboyane, had not been nominated as ward councillor for their area. Instead, the ANC-nominated William Chue from Modderfontein hostels was appointed as councillor for the area. Residents wrote numerous letters to the ANC, even as far as the President, but none were acknowledged. The SANCO-Alexandra branch criticised the ANC for undermining democratic principles in choosing candidates, and argued that voting procedures for candidates in Alexandra township were not carried out fairly (Cox 2000: 9).

In an interview with Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2000), Qakaza, the regional SANCO chairperson in Tshwane, indicated that in the entire Gauteng province, SANCO branches in Tshwane were the only ones who actively campaigned for the ANC in the 2000 local government elections. Other SANCO officials in Pretoria noted that SANCO branches were an instrument for community mobilisation for the ANC: ‘The ANC cannot be the mouth of the people because it has constraints in government. When things fail inside the boardroom, then it must come to SANCO to mobilise the community’. SANCO’s national leadership criticised branches which nominated their own candidates to contest the 2000 local government elections against candidates of the ANC. SANCO branches on the other hand criticised SANCO’s national leadership for undermining and compromising the autonomy of local branches (Seepe 2000: 5). The president of
SANCO threatened to suspend or fire members who contested the local government elections as independent candidates against members from its senior alliance partner, the ANC, during the 2000 December local government elections (City Press 28 August 2000).

5.12 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the formation of SANCO in 1992 was an important endeavour in the pursuit of coordinating civics in South Africa. This idea was first advanced in 1986 within the ranks of UDF before it was disbanded. The coordination of civics in SANCO was meant to enable civics to pursue their objectives more forcefully and to function actively with the backing of the consolidated structure. However, at its launching conference, SANCO opted to pursue a unitary structure despite the fact that some of its strongest regional structures were opposed to a unitary organisation and favoured a federal structure. As a result of SANCO being a unitary organisation, some local civics refused to join the national organisation, and those civics which did join SANCO, remained their own masters in dealing with issues in their areas. As indicated elsewhere, the co-ordination of civics in SANCO posed a danger of a top-down approach where higher-tier structures dictated terms to lower-tiers. Local branches often criticised SANCO’s method of operation which they argued contradicted the norms of transparency, consultation and democratic participation. As a result, tensions surfaced in most regions between ANC branches and SANCO branches, for examples, in the Eastern Cape, the North West and Gauteng Provinces. The failure of SANCO to play its watchdog role and to find a meaningful role in post-apartheid South Africa, had put the organisation in a difficult position with its branches.
Despite the fact that SANCO had pledged to be non-partisan at its launching conference, it soon became very difficult for SANCO to cut its informal alliance with the ANC. Through its second president, Tsenoli, SANCO established closer relations with the ANC. As a result of closer relations with the ANC, SANCO released some of its senior national leaders to join government after the 1994 elections and some stood in local government elections. This resulted in SANCO losing an estimated 70 per cent of its top leadership to national, provincial and local government which crippled the organisation. Apart from a leadership vacuum, SANCO had to deal with the lack of funds when its major donors ceased their funding after the 1994 elections. The problem caused by the loss of senior leadership and lack of funds had placed SANCO at a crossroad. However, despite the failure of SANCO’s national structure, its local branches have continued to survive as is shown in the HSRC studies. Local civics defied the prognostications of many social movement scholars who anticipated their demise after the transition period.

As indicated elsewhere, tensions between SANCO’s local branches and ANC branches intensified, resulting from SANCO’s national leadership insistence on legitimising ANC rule. In order to stem deteriorating relations between SANCO’s local branches and ANC branches, a SANCO and ANC summit was convened in 1997. However, this did not help to resolve the impasse between the local branches of these two organisations. The SANCO/ANC summit happened a few months before SANCO’s national conference which took place in Johannesburg. Delegates to the conference criticised SANCO’s leadership for upholding their support of the ANC government and proposed that SANCO should transform itself into a political party. However, its national executive under the leadership of its second president, Hlongwane, SANCO again resolved to support the ANC in the 1999 general elections.
The challenge faced by SANCO in post-apartheid South Africa and its inability to gain momentum on local issues, resulted in many local branches distancing themselves from the national organisation. This also led to the formation of a new national civic organisation, NARCO. NARCO was totally opposed to the notion of forming alliances with political parties as was done by SANCO. Upon its formation, the new civic organisation pledged to revive the civic movement in South Africa. NARCO also pledged to actively campaign on behalf of communities. NARCO has made inroads into the most traditional base of SANCO. They already secured the SCA, the Tembisa Residents Association, the Kyalami and Vaal Triangle Civic Organisation, as members of the new civic organisation. Apart from NARCO, SANCO also became estranged from its traditional ally, COSATU, due to its perceived insistence of supporting government policies which were viewed to be against the interests of the communities.

The loss of authority of SANCO’s national leadership became visible when its local branches defied their national structure’s directive in the 2000 local government elections to support the ANC, and, instead, fielded their own independent candidates. In the next chapter, I will discuss SANCO’s return to a new resistance identity.
CHAPTER SIX

SANCO’S RETURN TO A NEW RESISTANCE IDENTITY

6.1 Introduction

South Africa experienced fundamental social and political changes during the 1990s. The democratic elections in April 1994 closed the book on minority rule, and for the first time, black South Africans were allowed to take their place as full citizens of their country. The democratisation process has impacted on every sector of South African society. Many mass-based organisations that played an important role in the 1980s made little impact in continuing to advance the interests of their constituencies. SANCO, for example, through its involvement in the ANC alliance lost considerable ground. The post-apartheid period witnessed the weakening of SANCO, as the organisation found itself in an unfortunate position, where it embraced two conflicting identities. On the one hand, at national level, SANCO has been part of the ANC-led alliance, and on the other, at branch level, SANCO branches remained largely disengaged from state agencies and even, sometimes, political parties. Thus, local branches often took positions and organised protests that were contrary to the national stance, and in many townships, as indicated in the last chapter, there were reports of rivalry between ANC and SANCO branches. Furthermore, SANCO branches criticised SANCO’s national structure for being ineffective and of failing to develop a clear strategy for the organisation.

In Chapter Four, I looked at civic organisations and their changing role from resistance to project that emerged through the formation of UDF. Chapter Five considered the formation and early history of SANCO, and it showed that, notwithstanding rows and ruptures, SANCO became part of the broader
movement that helped to support the ANC-led transformation. Chapter Six will contend that, in recent years SANCO has returned to a resistance identity, though this developed largely at a local level.

In this chapter, I will discuss the rise of new social movements, particularly the SECC, the TAC, and the LPM; Electricity cut-offs; SANCO’s local activism; the 2006 local government elections; Hlongwane’s suspension from SANCO; SANCO-Gauteng Provincial General Council; the 2006 national conference; Ruth Bhengu, the deputy president of SANCO; and it will also be argued that although SANCO is weak at the national level, it is often stronger locally; and lastly, this chapter will look at SANCO and the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference, discussing the development of a new project.

6.2 The rise of the New Social Movements

This section will briefly consider the rise of new movements and it will contend that some of these new social movements rose up partly due to the lack of decisive strategies by SANCO’s national level in challenging the government. In particular, some of SANCO’s branches around the country have joined hands with the new social movements in protesting against government’s policies. The rise of the new social movements at the end of the 1990s reflected the development of a new mood. As shown by McKinley and Naidoo (2004: 15), this period produced organisations which were competing with SANCO as representatives of popular discontent. These authors argue that the ‘new social movements have taken up issues and struggles that SANCO as a national structure of civic organisations would previously have addressed among the urban poor’. The implication of this argument is that SANCO had lost some relevance to its constituency and had been overtaken by the rise of the new social movements in South Africa. In this section, I will focus my discussion on
the following organisations: the TAC, the SECC and the LPM as examples of new social movements that have emerged in the post-apartheid period, and which have been at the centre of resistance against government policies.

The TAC emerged in response to the HIV and AIDS crisis. This movement was launched in December 1998 in Cape Town, with the active support of COSATU. Papadakis (2006: 25) indicates that the TAC was founded by, amongst others, its former chairperson, Zackie Achmat, and national secretary, Mark Heywood, in order to advocate for access to affordable treatment for HIV/AIDS victims through anti-retroviral drugs. It also advocates the prevention and elimination of new HIV infections particularly through mother-to-child transmission. According to Benjamin (2004: 77-78), the TAC consists of local branches, these branches reporting to a district structure that meets fortnightly. The district elects three delegates to a provincial executive council that meets monthly. The provincial executive committee sends one ex-officio member to the National Executive Committee (NEC). The TAC is organised in six provinces, with approximately 10,000 card-carrying members. However, most of its membership is from the Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Its main objectives are to ensure access to affordable and quality treatment for people with HIV and AIDS, prevent and eliminate new HIV infections, and to improve the affordability and quality of healthcare for all. Much of the confrontation between local communities and the different tiers of government has been around issues of access to basic medication for those who are infected (TAC Newsletter 10 December 2003).

Through public protests, presentations to parliament, and specific campaigns, the TAC’s aims and objectives have been expressed with varying degrees of success and failure. The organisation has used the democratic and constitutional framework of the country to engage the state. It took the former Minister of Health, Mantombazana Tshabalala-Msimang, and the Department of
Health to the Constitutional Court, stating that both were violating the rights of HIV-positive pregnant women by not providing them with anti-retroviral drugs. They invoked clause 27 of the Bill of Rights, which states, firstly; that ‘everyone has the right to have access to healthcare services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security for those people who are unable to support themselves and their dependants’; secondly, it says that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights; and thirdly, it insists that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment (Mosoetsa 2005: 87).

Apart from the TAC, in Soweto, the largest black township in South Africa, a new movement which fought against electricity cut-offs was also established in June 2000. This movement came to be known as the SECC. As indicated by Egan and Wafer (2004: 8), the SECC was formed by Trevor Ngwane after his dismissal as ANC councillor in Pimville. The authors report that Ngwane, together with other community leaders ran a series of workshops on the energy crisis, out of which emerged the primary organised constituency of the SECC. These community leaders linked up with academics and staff of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and the Municipal Services Project (MSP) at the University of Witwatersrand. Together, they forged the SECC’s public profile under the auspices of an umbrella body, the Anti Privatisation Forum (APF). Egan and Wafer contend that SECC is one of the leading affiliates of the APF.

As far as the membership is concerned, Buhlangu (2004: 7) points out that SECC boasts a membership of about 7,000 to 8,000 active members. Moreover, Alexander (2003: 80) presents useful information about the membership of SECC in terms of the attendance at the 2003 Annual General Meeting (AGM). He found that around 110 people attended the AGM on the first day, and 80 on the second day. Apart from the issue of numbers, Alexander
(2003: 81-82) further outlines the profile of the membership of the SECC in terms of age and employment. In his survey, he found that at least 50 per cent of members were in their mid-to-late forties. This, according to Alexander, shows that the SECC has a much older membership than other social movements, in terms of age. On the question of employment, Alexander concludes that only a tenth of the people who attended the AGMs were employed. In terms of its organisational structure, Benjamin (2004: 83) argues that the SECC is different from other new social movements because it is structured more like a civic organisation from the 1980s, with an annual general meeting, an executive committee, and a host of sub-committees.

Like the TAC and the SECC, the LPM was one of the new social movements that emerged in response to the failures of a democratic state. As shown by Greenberg (2004: 27), the LPM was formed as a nationally coordinated movement in July 2001. This movement arose from community-based organisations formed over the preceding decade to gain access to land. The LPM was focused on anti-evictions campaigns, resistance to forced removals from informal settlements, and to press for land for labour tenants on the commercial farms. This movement was at the forefront of criticising government for its lack of delivery on land reform. The LPM had a varied membership, which transcended different political parties. It also banned campaigning for a particular party or for organisations within the movement. An executive member of the LPM, Maureen Mnisi, argues in an interview conducted by Xeswi (2003) that the majority of people within the LPM regard the ‘ANC as being up there while the LPM is down here’. She argues that in the past, SANCO organised all residents, but now ‘SANCO is no longer the umbrella for the informal settlements anymore’. According to Mnisi, the LPM is not fighting for land only, but is also fighting for everything that affects the poor and landless. Xeswi (2005: 193) further reveals that about 36 per cent of the membership of the LPM came from
political parties or civic organisations. He suggests that some of these members decided to join new social movements out of frustration with their organisations.

My argument in this section is that the rise of new social movements represented a new mood of resistance at the local level against government's policies. More importantly, this section shows that despite the fact that SANCO's national leadership has become part of legitimising the ANC-led government, its local branches have since joined in opposition to government emerging at the local level. SANCO's local branches have continued to criticise their national leadership for not understanding what has been going on at the local level, as we shall see in the next section when I shall discuss the electricity cut-offs.

6.3 Electricity Cut-Offs

The background to electricity cut-offs in the post-apartheid period can be traced to the Igoli 2002 plan which was aimed at shifting the economy away from the service delivery mode of the past, where the state granted subsidies and delivered municipal services, towards a model where the private sector provided services for a profit. This new model resulted in an increase in basic costs, which led to councils disconnecting the water and electricity supply of defaulters who could not afford to pay. As indicated by Khunou (2002: 71) in her research, in Soweto, electricity has become another issue of great conflict between the residents and Eskom\(^1\). According to Fiil-Flyn (2001: 2), cut-offs in Soweto were a result of the non-payment by residents who were unable to afford the electricity which was provided. According to MSP researchers, three–fifths of the 200 Soweto households surveyed, had experienced an electricity cut-off in the previous twelve months. Like Fiil-Flyn, Khunou (2002: 66) shows that the reason

\(^1\) A government utility that was formed in 1923 to provide electricity.
for not paying for electricity by the residents of Soweto was not because of a culture of non payment. She indicates that residents were willing to pay for services. However, their inability to pay was caused by the fact that since 1994, there have been increase job losses and many households depended on one income from informal jobs or old-age pensions. As a result of electricity cuts, many people joined the “Operation Khanyisa campaign,” led by the SECC, which encouraged the illegal reconnection of electricity. Within six months of its existence, the SECC had illegally reconnected over 3,000 households. The SECC also broadened its agenda to include a campaign against water privatisation and cut-offs (Vula amanzi—‘turn on the water’) and the eviction of township residents for defaulting on bond and rent payments (Operation Buyel’ endlini—‘go back to your house’) (Gumede 2005: 280).

According to a document produced by the SECC (2001), by June 2001, residents of Soweto identified the biggest problems in electricity provision as the following:

- Massive and indiscriminate cut-offs, including disconnecting whole blocks thereby penalising those who had paid their bills, as well as those who had not-and cutting power to police stations, clinics and supermarkets;
- Cut-offs without proper notice;
- Incorrect bills, including incompetent double billing;
- No proper reading of meters, and the continual use of estimates;
- Un-serviced and faulty meters;
- Huge bills which only a few can afford;
- Huge arrears, which are so huge and un-payable (including many in excess of R30,000 and at least one, totalling more than R100,000);
- No concessions for pensioners, the unemployed and the disabled;
• Bribery, extortion and corruption by Eskom employees; and
• Unfair rates, a tariff structure which favours the rich;
• Unilateral decision-making by Eskom without meaningful participation by residents.

In a press statement, the SECC (2001) claimed that Eskom was cutting electricity at the rate of 20,000 houses per month in Soweto. It was also alleged that Eskom removed cables and destroyed connections while claiming to have no money to roll out electricity to the rural areas. As a result of this impasse with Eskom, Soweto residents embarked on a defiance campaign on 5 April dubbed, ‘Operation Khanyisa’. They had the following demands:

• Stop all electricity cut-offs;
• Scrap all arrears;
• The provision of affordable electricity for all and a free lifeline for basic needs;
• An end to Eskom’s bribery and corruption;
• Democratic control of electricity provision by elected representatives; and
• Stop the privatisation of Eskom.

In 2003, together with local civic branches in Soweto, the SECC embarked on a campaign of removing and destroying pre-paid meters in Soweto. They also expanded their campaign to include all basic services beyond electricity to include water, housing, health care, transport, and education with the protests against food prices (Ndaba 2003). As indicated by Haffajee and Robinson (2003), Operation Khanyisa led by the SECC was successful in that it pushed the government and Eskom to announce that, in Soweto, and nine other townships
in the Johannesburg area, all arrears accumulated since the suspension of the cut-offs would be cancelled. About R1.4 million in arrears was suspended. However, the deal to write-off the outstanding amounts owed during the time of cut-offs was negotiated and finalised by Eskom and SANCO, and not with the SECC, which had led the campaign against indiscriminate cut-offs. Laurence (2007: 2) indicates that the SECC was excluded from the negotiations on the grounds that it was not headed by ‘legitimate elected leaders’. However, this was denied by Ngwane in an interview with author (2007) as will be shown later.

Although SANCO’s national leadership and some local civic branches distanced themselves from the anti-privatisation campaigns led by the APF and the SECC, some of SANCO’s local leaders defied SANCO’s call to withdraw their support for the anti-privatisation campaign. Lodge (2000: 16) points that some of ‘SANCO’s branches were a prime force in the organisation of resistance against rate increases and services cut-offs’. He argues that since 1996, 45 SANCO branches in Soweto led the protests against rate hikes. Another example of SANCO branches supporting the APF and SECC is offered by Lier (2005: 9), who reasons that in Cape Town, a SANCO branch took part in the protests organised by the APF. Again, in Mandela Park in Khayelitsha Township, in the Western Cape, SANCO’s local leaders broke away from SANCO and joined the Anti-Eviction Campaigns (Tadesse et al, 2006: 25). Lastly, Ngwane (2007) argues in his presentation at a Centre for Civil Society seminar that, civics, including those controlled by SANCO, are sometimes involved in various ways in the communities and take the lead in uprisings. In the Vaal region, in the township of Evaton West, the Evaton West Community Crisis Committee (EWCCC), which was affiliated to the APF, criticised SANCO’s leadership for ‘selling out’ its little legitimacy to Eskom’s corporate interests. They argue that ‘SANCO is no longer a representative of the interests of poor communities it has now become part of the ANC government’ (Makopo 2004: 1).
In Wattville on the East Rand, the chairperson of the SANCO branch criticised SANCO for failing to give direction to its local branches. In an interview with the author, Victor Khoza (2001), the chairperson of the local SANCO branch, argues that on a local level, SANCO branches are preoccupied by fighting for service delivery in their local communities and are involved in boycotts against municipal authorities, while on the national level, SANCO’s national leadership is supporting the recovery plan of paying the outstanding debts of municipal services and electricity cut-offs to defaulters. He argues that this has resulted in criticism levelled against SANCO that its national leadership is ineffective and out of touch with issues affecting poor people at local level. The leadership of the SANCO-Wattville branch criticised SANCO’s national leadership for their poor handling of the dispute with Eskom. The discontent with SANCO’s national leadership was also echoed by Ntobong, a resident of Soweto in an interview with Khunou (2001). He indicates that a number of residents expressed doubt concerning the extent to which SANCO’s leadership would help them deal with their problems. He said, ‘just forget SANCO. A lot of people go to them, but what do they get? SANCO does not own electricity, if you owe OK Bazaars\(^2\), you should talk to OK Bazaars, you cannot talk to Checkers. I don’t think SANCO will help me. They are part of the government that is taking away our services’. The above discussion is further evidence that SANCO’s national structure lost some relevance with local communities and that some SANCO local branches continued fighting despite the challenges they faced with their national structure.

The view about SANCO’s national leadership’s inability to champion the rights of the poor was also raised by Ngwane in an interview with the author in 2007. Although this interview was conducted in 2007, it will be discussed here, because it covers issues which happened since 2003, which will assist us in

\(^2\) OK Bazaars and Checkers are the leading retailer stores which sells groceries and other amenities in South Africa.
understanding the dynamics within SANCO and its local branches, which, according to Ngwane, are continuing to thrive. In an interview, Ngwane, the chairperson of the SECC accused SANCO’s leadership of being opportunistic. He argues that the deal to write-off electricity was fought by SECC against Eskom and the government, not by SANCO. He contends that the ‘SECC was not invited to the meeting to discuss the write-offs, because Jeff Radebe, the then Minister of Public Works, did not want to be seen legitimising our cause by talking to us’. Hence his decision of inviting SANCO to claim a victory they never fought for. Ngwane maintains that SANCO is dead, but he respects the rank and file members of SANCO at local branches, whom he indicates that from time to time were willing to cooperate with the SECC on the ground. He argues that ‘SANCO is no longer a watchdog of the communities but have become a government lapdog’. ‘They have deserted their traditional role of fighting for the poor. He mentioned that the only time you hear of SANCO is when they are busy negotiating and cutting business deals instead of fighting for the rights of the poor and oppressed’. He argues in an interview with the author, (2007) that although SANCO still exists by name, ‘it does not bite’ anymore, they are only concerned with running community projects and money making schemes because local government councillors only consult with SANCO’s leadership, rather than other formations which are perceived to be on the left. However, Ngwane further indicates that more and more SANCO branches in a number of townships were becoming fed up with their national organisation and were beginning to align themselves with other progressive organisations like the SECC and the APF at the local level.

In an interview with the author, Donovan Williams (2006) argues that SANCO and the SECC do not have a relationship. He accuses the SECC of

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3 In addition it should be noted that Jeff Radebe was a member of the SANCO National Board. I am grateful to Patrick Bond for drawing this to my attention.
exploiting the plight of the poor to further its political socialist objectives. He maintains that SANCO is not a socialist movement and would not sacrifice poor people to further its objectives. SANCO will always engage the government for the benefit of poor communities. He argues that, the SECC does not have an ‘exit clause’ and this exposes poor communities to suffer more, for an example, he asserts that the SECC does not mind if people are killed through the illegal connection of electricity and if people are arrested. He maintains that ‘SANCO deals with these kind of issues in a different way, firstly, we establish why people don’t pay for their services and try to engage the government, municipal administrators and Eskom to use the correct billing system and encourage communities to pay for their services, whereas the APF will say let’s have free electricity.’ Williams argues that the SECC depends on crises in order for it to exist. William’s sentiments about the SECC will further widen the rift between the two organisations. However, William’s view with regard to the relations between SANCO and SECC was dismissed by Bahle Mfokazi, a member of SANCO-Albert Luthuli branch in Alexandra. Mfokazi asserts in an interview with the author (2006) that SANCO’s national office does not encourage a confrontational strategy when dealing with the government as was always done by the SECC and other SANCO branches in places like Soweto. However, some members of his branch took part in protest marches organised by the Alexandra Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee (AVCC) which has affiliated to the APF and illegally occupied empty flats and reconnected electricity. He affirms that their move was justified because nobody seemed to care about the plight of poor. According to Mfokazi, the failure of SANCO’s national body to champion the cause of the poor and threaten mass action against government was driving many SANCO’s members away from the organisation.

In this section, I have argued that despite the fact that SANCO’s national leadership has denounced and distanced itself from the APF and SECC, some of
its local branches have aligned themselves with the new social movement and took part in joint protests. The argument from such branches suggests that SANCO’s national leadership was unable to control its branches. In the next section, I will move on to discuss SANCO’s local activism. This section will further present evidence of local resistance by SANCO branches against their national structure.

6.4 SANCO’S Local Activism

As argued elsewhere, SANCO has thus far been timid in its criticism of the government and has continued its support for the ANC. As shown by Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 12), ‘its local branches have continued to operate independently of higher structures and in many cases, have been able to nurture significant levels of community participation’. The idea of civic resurgence was raised in Chapter Two, indicating that the revival of SANCO branches occurs on a local level because of the rising unemployment and acute level of poverty. However, Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 29-30) argues that ‘SANCO branches have remained active, but their involvement with the community has more to do with providing what can be called, ‘brokerage services’ rather than partnering with the state’. The authors contend that in Gauteng townships and informal settlements, SANCO local branches were responsible for delivering electricity, toilets, paved streets, community centres and trucked in drinking water.

Similarly, Reitzes and Friedman (2001: 14) argue that at the branch level, SANCO branches offered a different picture. This is mainly because, ‘in their relationship with SANCO national structures, the civics enjoyed autonomy and their activities are largely self-governed, and responsive to the particular needs and interests of their local constituencies. They also often take up positions and organised protests which are contrary to provincial and national stances’. The
authors also indicate that SANCO-affiliated civics addressed ‘bread and butter issues and perform brokerage functions between rate defaulters and the local council, or residents and the electricity provider, Eskom’. The view about brokerage was further highlighted by Zuern (2004: 10), who argues that the ‘SANCO branch in Diepkloof maintain a logbook registering the issues brought to SANCO by local residents; these ranged from a plumbing dispute with a private contractor, to disputes over houses’.

However, apart from its brokerage functions, SANCO branches had also taken part in service delivery protests. In 2001, residents of Duduza township led by the SANCO branch embarked on a service protest against Eskom and delivered a memorandum to Eskom offices and to the council, demanding the immediate reconnections of electricity to the houses that have been cut-off and the immediate suspension of arrears. As showed by Mabindla (2004: 1), about 3 000 SANCO local branch members in East London marched to the Buffalo City municipality to handover their memorandum. According to Yekiso Sicelo, a SANCO official, they were concerned about the lack of service delivery, especially housing problems in Cambridge location. He argues that the ANC-led municipality had pushed SANCO away and as a result, they had no option but to protest against the lack of service delivery.

In 2006, a similar protest march was organised by community organisations including SANCO branches, and about 500 people from Duduza and its informal settlements, to protest against what they called poor service delivery which took place in Mandela Street. During the protests, tires were set alight and street were barricaded. Some protesters in the crowd carried traditional weapons. The meeting turned violent and seven people were shot by police and many more were injured. Community organisations released a statement wherein they blamed the police for provoking what essentially was a peaceful and legitimate public protest. The demonstrators handed over a memorandum of grievances to
municipal officials from Ekurhuleni Mayor Duma Nkosi’s office. The demonstrators were demanding free basic electricity, decent homes, and toilets, saying they were promised these in exchange for voting for their local councilors. They vowed to conduct more violent protests if they didn’t get the houses promised to them by government (SABCnews.com/politics 11 October 2006).

In Cape Town, in 2007, a group of about 50 disgruntled SANCO branch members in the townships around Plettenberg Bay staged a sit-in at the town’s council offices in a bid to meet Bitou Mayor, Lulama Mvimbi, to air their grievances over non-delivery of services. The protest was part of the saga of dissension in Plettenberg Bay that has seen accusations of corruption and nepotism levelled against the council. Phumzile Dalindyebó, a SANCO branch official, said the protest was organised to highlight the lack of service delivery and housing in the areas of KwaNokuthula, New Horizon and Bitterdrift (Business Day 5 April 2007). Again, in 2007, in the North West province, SANCO branch official, Gideon Nkgweng, indicated that his organisation was behind some of the protests that turned violent in the province because of the lack of service delivery (SABCnews.com/politics 12 April 2007).

In Giyani, in Limpopo province, hundreds of residents from Mokgoloboto village marched to the Greater Tzaneen Municipal offices to demand basic services. The marchers waved around fire wood, water containers, placards listing their grievances, paraffin stoves, and lamps. Residents demanded access to clean drinking water, installation of pre-paid electricity, the grading and re-gravelling of roads, the building of a secondary school, a health centre, RDP houses, a social grants pay point, a community hall, a post office facility, and a multi-purpose youth development centre. The chairperson of the SANCO branch in Mokgoloboto village, Masilu Manyama, argued the march was prompted by the municipality’s failure to address their demands for basic services for two years since 2005. Manyama further argued that the failure by the municipality to
implement the integrated development plan and a communication break down between the community and council also gave the community no option but to highlight their plight through a march. He warned that the community would take more serious action if their memorandum was not responded to within a set time frame (Mopani News 9 March 2007).

In summary, this section contends that despite the challenges brought about by the transition and SANCO’s national structures’ continued alignment with the ANC-led government, SANCO’s local branches have maintained their level of activism on the ground. The section has shown that local activism was instigated and sustained by local concerns, instead of larger loyalties to the national struggle. In the next section, I will discuss SANCO and the 2006 local government elections. Again, this section will further demonstrate evidence of resistance by SANCO’s local branches against SANCO’s national leadership.

6.5 SANCO and the 2006 Local Government Elections

As in the 2000 local government elections, the leadership of SANCO called upon all SANCO structures to support the ANC and work together with its alliance partner. Similar to what had happened in the 2000 local government elections, several SANCO branches defined SANCO’s official call to support the ANC and fielded their own candidates. In Free State Province, SANCO branches resolved that they would contest the 2006 local government elections alone, without the ANC. This announcement was made two days after the national organisation had pledged its full support for the ANC. A group of 20 SANCO members in the Bloemfontein region maintained that they would go alone because of the grievances with the province’s list of candidates. They alleged that SANCO’s officials’ were removed from the ANC candidates’ list. SANCO provincial organiser, Thamsanga Mfazwe, argued that ‘SANCO is going to take part, as
SANCO, not as the ANC. We are going to contest because we want to correct the wrongdoings in these local municipalities’. The chairperson of SANCO in the Free State, announced that the organisation would be holding a special extended executive committee meeting in order to resolve the issue. He argued that it is an unfortunate experience where people are unhappy with the way in which the list was drawn up. However, the news about the split in the Free State Province between SANCO and ANC was denied by the ANC’s provincial secretary general, Pat Matosa, who reiterated that SANCO members formed part of the provincial ANC list (SABCnews.com/politics 15 January 2006).

In the Western Cape Province, about 150 ANC and SANCO members have abandoned the party in the five local municipalities of Mossel Bay, George, Oudtshoorn, Kannaland and Knysna and joined a newly-formed group called the Southern Cape Independent Civic Organisation, which fielded independent ward candidates (Robinson 2006a: 1).

The 2006 local government elections revealed that some of SANCO’s local branches were no longer willing to follow the directives of the national structure. As indicated elsewhere, SANCO’s branches not only resisted SANCO’s call, but they also defied the ANC. In the next section, I will move on to discuss Mlungisi Hlongwane and his suspension from SANCO. This section will provide evidence of resistance within SANCO’s national executive committee against their president.

6.6 Mlungisi Hlongwane’s Suspension from SANCO

The national leadership of SANCO has been the subject of much criticism by local branches in recent years. In an interview with the author (2006), Rocelene Cubeni, a deputy chairperson of the SANCO-Albert Luthuli branch, argues that the failures of SANCO were a result of its national leadership, whom she accuses of being focused on furthering their business interests and fighting for political
positions in government, rather than solving the community’s problems. These sentiments were also echoed by the deputy president of SANCO, Ruth Bhengu, who accused Hlongwane of gradually driving the organisation into oblivion (Robinson 2006b: 3). I will return to this discussion later in the chapter.

The series of problems within SANCO’s top leadership led to the suspension of SANCO’s president Hlongwane by a meeting attended by the provincial chairpersons of six provinces (Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Free State, Northern Cape and Limpopo) held in Polokwane on 17 June 2006. The chairperson of the Free State SANCO’s provincial structure, Letsepe Mboweni, indicated that they decided to hold the meeting to suspend Hlongwane because they felt he was neglecting SANCO and was no longer interested in its activities. In her statement after Hlongwane’s suspension, Bhengu, who was appointed as acting president of SANCO until the outcome of the hearing, lamented that ‘the once mighty SANCO has been turned into an invisible and less influential sleeping giant that failed to take up issues affecting people’ (Robinson 2006b: 3).

In the past five years, she argues, SANCO has not confronted any of the bread-and-butter issues that affect most of the communities who live in poverty in both rural and urban areas. Apart from the problems created by the lack of accountable leadership, she said SANCO was suffering because its senior leaders made major policy statements without internal engagement and were only concerned about the creation of personal wealth at the expense of members (Robinson 2006b: 3). These sentiments were also echoed by the provincial secretary of SANCO in Gauteng Province, Toenka Matile, who maintain that Hlongwane was suspended because he was dividing the organisation, lying to the nation, and making proposals that have not been discussed by SANCO’s national leadership. This was in reference to Hlongwane’s proposal that the Constitution of South Africa be changed to allow Mbeki a third term as President
of the Republic. Hlongwane argued that the constitutional clause prohibiting a third term, robs the country of the best brains and should be scrapped. He argued that the ‘maximum two terms that the President can serve is denying the country the opportunity to sustain developmental programmes that have been started, and that this constitutional clause in question, is a foreign concept which worked well in Europe and other countries that have enjoyed democracy for the past 200 years’ (*City Press* 29 January 2006).

However, Hlongwane’s suspension was denied by Williams, a fellow national executive member, who contends that the meeting to suspend Hlongwane was not properly constituted, as some provincial chairpersons did not attend. He argues that it is unfair to blame the poor functioning of the organisation on one person. He reasons, ‘why do they cherry-pick which office bearers to suspend? Why not suspend all of them? They are looking for an easy way out’. He asked that all leaders must ask themselves what they did when they saw that the organisation was suffering (Robinson 2006b: 3).

Nonetheless, Hlongwane was reinstated to his position in an out-of-court settlement with the leadership of the organisation which met and issued a statement explaining that Hlongwane was reinstated and that he was still the president of SANCO (SABCnews.com/politics 10 August 2006). The decision to reinstate Hlongwane was taken by the NEC before the Johannesburg High Court could hear an urgent application lodged by Hlongwane challenging his suspension. Hlongwane’s suspension by the provincial chairpersons of SANCO showed that the provincial executive council and the NEC of SANCO, was deeply divided. The decision to reinstate Hlongwane as president of SANCO also indicated that within the national and provincial leadership of SANCO, there were people who still backed Hlongwane and approved of his leadership.

In the next section, I will discuss SANCO-Gauteng Provincial General Council which took place in Johannesburg. Delegates in this provincial council
were vocal in their criticism against Mbeki for his dismissal of Jacob Zuma, as deputy president of the Republic and they also criticised Hlongwane for his pronouncements suggesting that Mbeki should be allowed to serve a third term as President of the Republic.

6.7 SANCO-Gauteng Provincial General Council

Two weeks after the reinstatement of Hlongwane, I was invited by the chairperson of SANCO’s Johannesburg region, Qushwane, to attend the SANCO-Gauteng Provincial General Council (PGC) which took place on 1 October 2006 at the City Hall in Johannesburg. The PGC was attended by the following six regions of SANCO in Gauteng Province: Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Sedibeng, Motswedeng and West Rand. The attendance was very good, with about 524 delegates present. The proceedings were scheduled to start at 9:30 am, but this was delayed due to the breakdown of the bus which was ferrying the Sedibeng region’s delegates, who later arrived at 10:30 am. Mdakane, the provincial chairperson of SANCO-Gauteng was the programme director. The proceedings were in English, although from time to time, Zulu was used. He welcomed all delegates including the President of SANCO, Hlongwane, deputy president of SANCO, Bhengu, the general secretary of SANCO, Linda Mngomezulu, Williams and other members of SANCO’s national executive committee. He maintains that it was ‘unusual to have all senior SANCO national office bearers attending a PGC’. He told delegates that today is the day of ‘atonement’ or washing of sins and to chase ‘Usathane’ the devil out of SANCO, so that SANCO can emerge as a unified body and speak with one voice. After their welcoming, delegates on the floor started chanting revolutionary songs in Zulu which said ‘we know SANCO is a movement of all residents in general’. After this song, delegates broke into another revolutionary song which praised comrade Zuma and addressed him as
the President of South Africa. Before the song was finished, delegates were interjected by Mdakane, who started giving a brief history of civics in the former Southern Transvaal region, now known as Gauteng Province.

He spent a few minutes explaining the role played by CAST, and how the leaders then were uniting the civic movement. He specifically mentioned Mayekiso and Nomvula Nkonyane and praised them for their outstanding role in building the civic movement in South Africa. He argued that he was privileged to work with such visionary leaders in building the civic movement in the Southern Transvaal region which contributed to eradicating the apartheid regime in South Africa. He urged delegates to continue fighting for the consolidation of the national democratic revolution and cautioned delegates that they should avoid making discriminatory statements as was done by the deputy president of the ANC, Zuma, who made discriminatory remarks about gay people in his address during the Heritage Day celebrations in Kwazulu-Natal. He remarked that such statements were perceived as discriminatory and should be condemned at all cost as this would undermine the democratic culture which SANCO had fought for. However, he pleaded with all delegates to forgive the deputy president of the ANC for such remarks.

In his keynote address to the delegates, the president of SANCO, Hlongwane, thanked the PGC of SANCO in Gauteng for agreeing to postpone their PGC which was supposed to have occurred in July 2006. He announced to the delegates that SANCO’s fourth National Conference was scheduled to take place from 11 to 14 December 2006 in Bloemfontein. Hlongwane’s address was much more centred on healing the rift among the organisation’s leadership stemming from his suspension. He remarked that SANCO belongs to the people, not to the courts. He told the delegates that the recent succession crisis within the ANC had affected SANCO deeply. He accused certain provincial leaders for rallying around the campaign to sideline him. He communicated to delegates that
it was the SANCO leadership who were dividing the organisation and not the local branches for which he strongly apologised. He further cautioned delegates and senior members of the Gauteng Provincial Council to refrain from issuing media statements which fostered division within the organisation. On the question of his suspension, he argue that he found it very strange that the leadership of Gauteng Province were part of the group who was up in arms about his pronouncement about President Mbeki serving a third term. He indicated that this proposal was first discussed by the Gauteng Provincial Council. He reminded delegates that no province had powers over the national conference and that the decision about any change in the leadership of SANCO could only be taken during the national conference and not in any other forum.

In an interview with the author (2006), Hlongwane admitted that the organisation was facing some difficulties at its national level. However, he criticised some of the senior leadership of SANCO at the national and in certain provincial structures, whom he accused of undermining his leadership. He refused to speak about his suspension and asked me to direct all questions about that issue to SANCO’s spokesperson, Williams. In responding to the question about the lack of a strategic direction of the organisation, Hlongwane, contends that SANCO will cease to exist if its purpose was to compete with and criticise the ANC-led government. He contests that SANCO would remain as an ANC ally even if he is no longer the president of the organisation. As far as the political relationship between SANCO and the ANC is concerned, Hlongwane argues that like any other organisation, SANCO structures from time to time do experience problems with the ANC, especially at the local level.

He contends that there were forums in place to argue and debate these problems. Like most of the SANCO leaders that I have interviewed, Hlongwane argue that although SANCO was a unitary structure, it was not a highly centralised structure as its strength lay within its local branches. He pointed out
that SANCO would continue to work with the government and all progressive movements in challenging the government to keep its focus on the developmental needs of poor people and for the benefit of poor communities. He shows that SANCO’s position towards new movements like the APF, which are seen to be totally opposed to government policies, is very clear. ‘SANCO does not take them seriously nor will it ever engage them in any discussion’. According to Hlongwane, SANCO’s local branches which have aligned themselves with the new social movements like the APF, the AVCC and the SECC in criticising the ANC-led government did so out of ignorance of the broader agenda of the so called new social movements which he alleged, was sponsored by people with sinister motives wanting to destroy the country’s democracy. Hlongwane further argued that poor communities were justified in voicing their dissatisfaction about slow service delivery through protests. However, he argue that what he found difficult to understand, was that most of these service delivery protests were becoming very violent and disregarded human life and property.

This section has demonstrated that Hlongwane’s pronouncements about President Mbeki serving a third term, had divided the provincial leadership of SANCO and some of its local branches. However, it also showed Hlongwane’s commitment to the ANC and his disregard for new social movements such as the APF, the AVCC and the SECC, whom he dismissed as led by people with sinister motives. Be that as it may, SANCO has not managed to escape many of the problems associated with democratic dispensation. In the next section, I will discuss the 2006 national conference which will again show evidence of an organisation in disarray at its national level.
6.8 SANCO’S 2006 National Conference

The fourth SANCO national conference was held at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein and was characterised by tensions and drama. On the first day of the conference, delegates from different provincial structures were divided into two camps and chanted slogans outside the main hall of the University. One group was insisting that the conference will not continue until they are granted accreditation to the conference hall, despite not appearing on the official delegates’ list, while the other group insisted that the conference should proceed as scheduled. Seven people were assaulted as they tried to force their way into the Callie Human Hall, a main venue for the conference. Organisers of the conference maintained that only registered delegates would be allowed entry to the hall. In an interview with the author (2006b), an anonymous SANCO organiser argued that people who were disrupting the conference, came from North West, Eastern Cape and North West provinces who claimed to be representatives of SANCO. He indicated that these delegates from SANCO’s parallel structures arrived at the conference only because they were invited by either the president or the general-secretary of SANCO to undermine SANCO’s operations and voting processes. To diffuse the tension, the South African Police Service was called to restore order and conference organisers pleaded with delegates and reiterated to them that only branches which were in good standing would be allowed in the hall. However, this was not adhered to and in the end, all delegates were allowed entry. The mood in the conference was very tense as the leadership of SANCO was deeply divided over the strategic direction of the civic’s movement and Hlongwane’s suspension, due to his utterances which suggested that the Constitution of South Africa be amended to allow President Mbeki to serve a third term.
In his opening remarks to the conference, the president of SANCO, Hlongwane, reasoned that the main objective of SANCO was to restructure itself into a sustainable organisation that would provide greater oversight of the government’s service delivery programmes. He also informed delegates that SANCO would not be forced to take sides in the ANC leadership race. He argues that SANCO respected the independence of members of the tripartite alliance and that all views with regard to the presidential succession debate of the ANC, was up to the members of the ANC and its delegates to deal with. Hlongwane further accuses COSATU of corruption and of trying to buy support to influence SANCO’s leadership election. He claims that ‘one sad political moment emerged that COSATU will even be keen to fund SANCO conference on condition that certain individuals should not be elected into SANCO leadership’. He told the stunned audience that ‘corruption was not only when people defrauded or accepted a bribe. It was counter-revolutionary political opportunism, and yes, corruption, when leaders offer cash bribes for political position’ (Webb 2006: 2). The allegations of corruption levelled at COSATU by Hlongwane were rejected by Solly Phetoe, the North West COSATU secretary, who called on the leadership of SANCO to withdraw statements made by Hlongwane. Phetoe argue that COSATU had no interests in who led SANCO at a provincial and national level (SABCnews.com/politics 13 December 2006).

In his address to the conference, President Mbeki reiterated that SANCO is one of the ANC’s most critical and strategic allies at local government level. He urged SANCO to continue being the instrument of the people on the ground. He criticised individuals within the organisation who campaigned for leadership positions. Mbeki told delegates that no one should join SANCO in order to become a leader, premier or president. He inferred to the delegates that ‘If I ran for the post of the president of SANCO and, in the course of that process, I divided SANCO and created factions within SANCO, and a situation in which it is
impossible to get any work done, then my presidency would be worth nothing’ (Webb 2006: 2). President Mbeki’s address was interpreted by most delegates to be directed at Hlongwane, whom they accused of dividing the organisation. While Mbeki was reading his speech, delegates whistled and shouted remarks in Zulu saying, ‘mtshele, aka nalo iqiniso’ (tell him! there is no truth in him).

Due to the problems with the registration process and discrepancies with the ballot papers, the national conference was dissolved on its second day by the NEC without voting for a new leadership. This came after two motions that were put forward by 872 delegates. Some delegates suggested that the existing NEC be dissolved, while others, who were perceived to be on the side of Hlongwane contended that it should be given another mandate (SABCnews.com/politics 13 December 2006). According to Bhengu, SANCO’s deputy president whose sympathies are believed to lie with Zuma, although she has consistently denied any affiliation with him, the decision to dissolve the conference was taken as a result of the infighting within SANCO’s ranks which had torn apart the organisation. She indicates that some delegates who attended the conference did not want elections to take place because they alleged that the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), which was tasked with running the elections, was not transparent enough (SABCnews.com/politics 14 December 2006).

The problems within SANCO’s leadership were clearly demonstrated during its failed national conference in 2006. As argued by Bhengu, Hlongwane and his supporters avoided elections so that he could continue to be president. In the next section, I will focus on Ruth Bhengu, the deputy president of SANCO.

6.9 Ruth Bhengu, the Deputy President of SANCO

In an interview with the author (2007), Bhengu indicates that she was born in Harding in KwaZulu-Natal which is a rural area, and she obtained her primary
education at a mission school. At that time, she said a radio was the only source of information. She argued that her father was politically active and used to take part in running their community. In 1980, Bhengu moved to Petermaritzburg and stayed at Imbali Township where she later became a secretary of Imbali Unit 13 Resident’s Association. She argues that the Imbali Unit 13 Resident’s Association did not immediately join SANCO when it was launched in 1992, because at that time in the Natal Midlands, Harry Gwala who was a member of the ANC and leader of the SACP, never believed in civic organisations. According to Bhengu, Gwala viewed ‘civics to be elementary in the fight against apartheid and instead of joining SANCO, local civics in the Midlands were encouraged to join the SACP, which according to Gwala, was at the forefront of the liberation struggle’. Between 1984 and 1994 Bhengu was employed by a community-based organisation called the Wilgerspruit Fellowship Centre which has its headquarters in Roodepoort, Johannesburg. In 1997, she was elected as the deputy president of SANCO.

According to Bhengu, SANCO has lost direction and has failed to define its role in the democratic era. The organisation has failed to build cadres within the movement. The role of SANCO, according to Bhengu, is to address the needs of the poor and to ensure that whatever has been promised by government for a better life for all is delivered to the people. She argues that SANCO should have been at the forefront of the community struggle, monitoring and evaluating what the government was doing in their communities. It is also the role of SANCO to mobilise communities and inculcate a community culture, and sense of ownership to communities like what was done by local civics before 1994. Bhengu argued that SANCO will continue with its relationship with the ANC because the ANC is the only organisation that has a track record for addressing the needs of the poor. On the question of her alleged backing of the deputy president of the ANC, Zuma, Bhengu remarks that this was a lie propagated by
Hlongwane and his cohorts who have persistently divided SANCO’s leadership over the ANC succession battle hoping to enhance their chances for another term of office. She cautioned that she has worked well with both the current president and deputy president of the ANC, Comrade Mbeki and Zuma, and she argued that no matter who the ANC chose as its president at the Polokwane national conference in December 2007, she would be available to work with them.

She contends that from 1997 to 2007, under the leadership of Hlongwane, the national leadership of SANCO had failed to give a clear direction to its local branches which has impacted greatly on a number of provinces and has led to the formation of parallel structures which called themselves a true SANCO but which refused to have any dealings with the national office. Bhengu argue that SANCO’s local branches were joining other progressive movements because SANCO wasn’t strong. She argues that if SANCO was a strong organisation, new movements like the SECC, the Western Cape Anti Eviction Campaign (WCAEC), the TAC, Abahlali base Mjondolo, the LPM, the Concerned Citizens Group and many more civic organisations which have emerged in the townships and in the rural areas would not have emerged, since issues which led to their formation would have been tackled by SANCO.

She maintains that SANCO has failed because its national leadership was divided into two factions. There was a group which was loyal to Hlongwane and another group which wanted the chairperson of the SANCO-Gauteng province, Mdakane to become the new president of SANCO. She contended that she supported the group which rallied around Mdakane to be elected as the new president of SANCO, because this would bring new direction to the organisation.

Bhengu’s views were also echoed by Cubeni, the deputy chairperson of the SANCO-Albert Luthuli branch in her interview with the author (2006). Cubeni contends that civics have lost the purpose they had in the late 1970s and 1980s and argued that civic organisations were united in their resolve to fight against
the injustices brought by the apartheid government, and that they succeeded. She argues that the failures of SANCO were as a result of its national leadership, whom she accused of tending to further business opportunities rather than solving community problems. According to Cubeni, the ANC government has done a lot of good things but that it was up to the councillors to deliver service to poor communities. She also blames the members of SANCO branches who failed to take a stand in organising marches against councillors who were deemed to be corrupt. Cubeni was born in 1956 in Queenstown in the Eastern Cape. She suggests that she had also worked with Mayekiso in the early 1980s as a member of the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) and later, the ACO until it disbanded to join SANCO. As far as Hlongwane’s suspension from and reinstatement to SANCO is concerned, Bhengu contends that Hlongwane was suspended because he failed to lead the organisation and caused the internal conflict within the organisation. She argued that the leadership of different provinces which met to suspend Hlongwane, were also suspended by the other group which was loyal to him, and as a result of Hlongwane’s court interdict, challenged his suspension and other counter suspensions, the national leaders felt that it would be proper to reinstate Hlongwane and other national leaders who were suspended because legal solutions would not solve political problems which could only be addressed during SANCO’s national conference. However, the national conference, according to Bhengu, was in a shambles and it was dissolved before the new leadership was elected. In her view, the failure of the national conference was because, before the conference took place, there was no clear audit of all branches in terms of the number of delegates to attend. This audit failure made it easy for parallel structures to feel entitled to attend the conference which caused a major problem for organisers. Bhengu argued that she refused to call the aborted conference, a national conference, because it was
addressed by two people only, Hlongwane and President Mbeki, and there were no robust debates about the situation within the civic organisation.

Bhengu contends that the conference was dissolved because delegates did not trust the electoral institute and the conference was characterised by high levels of mistrust among SANCO’s national leadership. After the conference, Hlongwane invited the ANC, the SACP and COSATU to intervene and deal with problems which led to the dissolving of the SANCO conference. As a result of the intervention by SANCO’s alliance partners, the interim leadership structure was formed which was led by the then general secretary of the ANC, Kgalema Motlanthe, to bring the organisation to life again. The interim leadership structure comprises 12 people, three from Hlongwane’s caucus, three from Mdakane’s caucus, two from the ANC, two from SACP, and lastly two from COSATU. This interim leadership of SANCO was mandated to prepare the organisation for its national conference which was scheduled to take place in September 2007 and which would elect SANCO’s new national leadership executives. However, SANCO’s national conference has until now not taken place. In the 2006 dissolved national conference, the position of the president of SANCO was supposed to have been contested by the current president, Hlongwane and Mdakane, the provincial chairperson of Gauteng. Bhengu said she would contest her current deputy president position to work under Mdakane because he had a vision for the civic organisation.

In summary, most of the arguments made here, linked the failure of SANCO to its president. However, as indicated elsewhere, SANCO’s problems were made more complicated by the ANC succession debate. Regardless of the problems experienced by SANCO, as indicated in the previous sections, its local level had remained strong and vibrant while its national level remained weak.
6.10 Strong at Local level and Weak at National level

This dissertation is entitled ‘SANCO: A two-tiered social movement’. The word ‘tiered’ was synonymously used to refer to levels, in this case the local and national levels. As indicated elsewhere, the formation of SANCO in 1992 helped to give the ANC-led government a legitimising identity and a sense of recognition. However, local civics which accepted SANCO’s identity and became known as SANCO branches, never shared one identity with SANCO and SANCO has not been able to bring all the civics within its control. What SANCO did was to afford different civics a national identity and a sense of recognition. In reality many local civic branches remained their own masters in addressing the social problems and non-delivery of services of their respective communities at the grassroots level.

As was suggested by the mainstream sociological theories, that social movements rise and decline after change has taken place, and I have contested that social movements do not simply decline, as the mainstream social movement theory has suggested. They often adapt and change as has been indicated in Chapter Two. Even the post-apartheid period has not only led to the demobilisation of social movements, as suggested in social movement literature, it has in fact led to the remobilisation of these organisations at a local level.

In the post-apartheid period, SANCO branches offered a revealing insight into the reasons for diminished local commitment to the national structure. Many of SANCO’s branches at the local level both in urban and in rural areas, have slowly reoriented towards development politics and have redefined their roles. The failures by SANCO’s national leadership to develop a clear strategy for the organisation in a post-apartheid period, has led some SANCO branches to denounce their commitment to SANCO and hence, championed a course which was in contradiction to the policy of the national structure, and sometimes
formed partnerships with new social movements which are opposed to SANCO’s strategy.

However, the tensions between these two levels were denied by Thusi, the general secretary of SANCO-Gauteng region in an interview with the author (2003). Thusi argue that SANCO allowed its branches to form these partnerships and guarantees associational practises that define a civic activism. Local branches often take positions and organise protests which are contrary to the stance taken by SANCO’s national structure. He argues that some local branches, which are deemed to be stronger, often operate independently and this marks the branches’ autonomy. Be that as it may, Thusi’s response about the branch autonomy seemed to be inconsistent with the reasons put forward at the launching conference of SANCO in 1992 with regard to SANCO becoming a unitary structure as opposed to a federal structure which would allow civics to maintain their autonomy.

Like Thusi, Williams, the national executive member of SANCO, argues in an interview with the author (2006), that the relationship between the national structure of SANCO and its branches, is very open as the national structure cannot dictate to local branches due to the fact that the national structure does not have control over local civic branches. He argue that this is caused by the fact that SANCO is broke and its national structure has lost influence since it is viewed as weak and out for touch with the day-to-day realities that affect local communities. He concedes that the local structure operates independently, but they also pay their allegiance to the national structure in terms of the policies of SANCO. However, when looking at a local level, there is evidence that suggests that local SANCO branches do not pay allegiance to SANCO. Examples of this are the cases in the following townships: Alexandra, Tembisa, Soweto and the Vaal Triangle who were disillusioned members of SANCO branches which broke away
and formed new civic structures while others have cut their ties with the national organisation.

Despite the inability of SANCO’s leadership to provide its local branches with leadership and a sense of direction, SANCO branches in both urban and rural areas have slowly developed and re-emerged in dealing with issues of development in their communities. These branches are beginning to redefine their position and are re-aligning themselves outside political structures, taking up their traditional roles as civics. Whilst the ruling party has established its power on the basis of an alliance with SANCO at the national level, this has not distracted some civic branches in their fight against service delivery in the post-apartheid period. Many of SANCO’s branches are demonstrating a high degree of activity within the local authorities in consolidating the people-led democracy.

The weakness of SANCO’s national structure in the post-apartheid period was also echoed by SANCO’s president, Hlongwane, in his address to the 2002 SACP Congress in Rustenburg, North West Province, where he made remarks about the weakness of SANCO’s national level and argued that the ANC has courageously and openly admitted in their National General Council (NGC) how their local branches were suffering and, that he expected COSATU and the SACP to say the same regarding the position of their branches. From SANCO’s perspective, he remarked, we have ‘an interesting conundrum, we are very strong at a local level and relatively weak at a national level’ (Hlongwane 2002: 2).

The argument in this section is that SANCO can be best understood as a two-tiered movement, because, while the national structure has shown some pattern of decline and is virtually invisible at a local level, civics have continued to play an important role. In the next section, I will move on to discuss SANCO and the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference. In this section, I will discuss the development of a new project and argue that the conference was a victory for
local branches as the national leadership was forced to come in line with the demands of its general membership.

6.11 SANCO and the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference: A New Project Identity

In order to understand SANCO and the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference and the development of a new project identity, I will first highlight three major events which took place within SANCO which showed that SANCO branches have become part of a broader movement which is opposed to the policies and practises of the ANC government, led by President Mbeki. Firstly, this was evident through in the Gauteng PGC on 1 October 2006. While attending the PGC, delegates sang songs criticising Mbeki for his dismissal of Zuma as the deputy president of the Republic. In their songs, they portrayed Zuma as a leader who empathises with their plight and who will become the next President of South Africa. Delegates were also unanimous in criticising Hlongwane the president of SANCO for his pronouncement relating to Mbeki.

The second event was the suspension of Hlongwane, which I discussed in previous sections. Hlongwane was suspended by the leadership of SANCO from six provinces who accused him of making policy proposals which were not endorsed by the organisation’s top leadership. This was in reference to the issue of calling the ANC to use its majority in parliament to amend the Constitution of South Africa to allow Mbeki to serve a third term as President of the Republic. Hlongwane’s pronouncement was also criticised by other alliance partners, COSATU, the SACP and the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). The general secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi discounted SANCO’s proposal and argued that the union would reject the proposal out of hand. He contends that the proposal by SANCO would take the country on a ‘slippery road to
anarchy, first it will be a third term, and then later a life term’ (*City Press* 29 January 2006). Vavi argued that the call to allow Mbeki to serve a third term was based on the wrong premise that there was a crisis of leadership in the ANC. He contended that there was no leadership crisis in the ANC and the country (*City Press* 29 January 2006). Vavi further made similar comments about COSATU’s opposition to a third term proposal in his address at a rally to mark the 63rd anniversary of the ANCYL. He warned that ‘South Africa’s ruling party, the labour federation, and the communist party alliance would not survive if President Mbeki won a third term as ANC leader’. He comments that COSATU was not mincing its words: ‘We want Zuma to lead the ANC as part of a new collective’ (http://www.polity.org.za). Another alliance partner, the SACP, issued a similar statement and argued that ‘as the SACP, we believe that the decision to limit the presidential terms to two terms was, in all respects, one of the best decisions we made as a country and as a movement. It will therefore be wrong to amend the existing constitution on this matter. We believe as the SACP, our country is not short of progressive leadership’ (*News24* 30 January 2006).

A similar path was followed by the ANCYL, which threw cold water on SANCO’s proposal that President Mbeki be allowed to serve a third term as head of state. The Youth League further questioned whether the proposal to change the country’s constitution was a SANCO position or just the opinion of SANCO’s president, because, according to their knowledge, SANCO was divided on this issue (Moshoeshoe 2006: 1). The ANCYL also called for the disbandment of SANCO, arguing that it had lost its relevance and that it had lately become a vehicle for the jostling of positions. Fikile Mbalula, the president of the ANCYL said that ‘SANCO has become an organisation which only fights for seats’, and that, if one has a grumbling with the ANC, you form SANCO’. He further argued that SANCO was no longer concerned with the shortage of water, the eradication
of poverty, the construction of roads and the provision of municipal services to its constituency (SABCnews.com/politics 22 April 2007).

The third event took place during SANCO’s 2006 national conference in Bloemfontein. I have discussed this national conference in the previous sections. In the words of one SANCO activist, ‘SANCO’s national conference in Bloemfontein was a mirror of the 2007 ANC Polokwane national conference in terms of depicting popular discontents by the local branches towards their top leadership’. Despite the fact that SANCO’s national conference was disbanded without electing the new leadership, the strategies and patterns of events appeared to follow a similar path with those at the ANC Polokwane conference. At the SANCO conference in Bloemfontein, the president of SANCO had the full support of delegates from three provinces: Eastern Cape, Western Cape and North West. The remaining six provinces of Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, and the Northern Cape were divided, but a majority of delegates stood behind Mdakane. Again, in the ANC Polokwane conference, Mbeki had the full support of the following three provinces: Eastern Cape, Western Cape and North West, similar to the support of Hlongwane at the 2006 SANCO national conference, while his opponent, Zuma, had the full backing of KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo Provinces, while delegates from the Free State, Gauteng and Northern Cape were divided.

In an interview with the author (2008), Qakaza, a provincial organising secretary of the SANCO-Tshwane region, argues that SANCO is part of the broader movement that called for the support of Zuma to be elected as President of South Africa. He argued that the decision to suspend the president of SANCO, Hlongwane, was because he undermined the official position taken by most SANCO provincial and local structures which supported Zuma for the presidency of the ANC. Qakaza contends that as SANCO, they are aware of the fact that President Mbeki had served the government well, but their concern is that their
constituencies have not benefited from the policies adopted by his government. He argued the disparities in income and life-styles between the rich and the poor has widened. As argued by Qakaza, support for Zuma is premised on the fact that the new government will be ‘pro-poor’ and continue with the national democratic revolutionary agenda. He argue that SANCO believed the national democratic revolution can be advanced by adopting policies and programmes that will improve the quality of life of the poor. However, since 1999, policies such as GEAR and Black Economic Empowerment that have been adopted by government had only benefited the elite, including the black and white petty-bourgeoisie and capitalist class, at the expense of the black majority who had remained poor. Similarly, Grawitzky (2008: 9) argues that the ANC under Mbeki had pushed the neo-liberal project, which delegates in Polokwane blamed for wealth disparities and massive poverty that characterised the South African state.

In his article about the ANC Polokwane conference, Webster (2008: 6) argues that the division in terms of life-styles among delegates attending the conference was very clear. He contends that ‘he could visibly see and sense the difference in the delegates. The ordinary members arrived by buses or taxi and were served conference food in big tents, while those in power, arrived in their 4x4s with their drivers and entourages and went to lunch in the air-conditioned network lounge where they were served their favourite wines.’ This sentiment about the disparities that existed in the conference was also corroborated by an anonymous ANC delegate, who argues in an interview with author (2008a), that she had attended many ANC national conferences in the past, but the Polokwane conference to her, was a conference like no other. She contends that there was a great sense of ‘us and them’ among the delegates. She further argues that the division and the mistrust among delegates were further fuelled by suspicions and rumours that there was an attempt to assassinate Zuma to prevent him from
running for the presidency of the ANC. Be that as it may, most people believed that Zuma’s government will be pro-poor and this was demonstrated in his first speech as the president of the ANC in Attridgeville’s Super Stadium, celebrating the ANC Anniversary. He stated that education must be free (Mail and Guardian 19 January 2008).

Be that as it may, SANCO has pledged its new support for Zuma as the President of the ANC and has called on the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to abandon all charges against him. SANCO’s national organising secretary Sello Molefe argues that ‘we believe the NPA matter against Zuma is a witch hunt’ (Independent Online 18 December 2007). This call was also echoed by Mbeki’s then most prominent supporter, Hlongwane, the president of SANCO, who has now pledged his allegiance to the new ANC leadership under Zuma. He made his remarks of support to Zuma at the funeral of former COSATU president John Gomomo in Uitenhage and further argued that those who had ‘different preferences before Polokwane, should be respected for the positions they took’ (Independent Online 11 February 2008).

In summary, this section has contended that the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference represented a victory for ordinary members. It has reaffirmed that power lies with ordinary members not with national leadership, and that local structures cannot be taken for granted as they are the real centres of power.

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4 Note added 17 March 2009. The dissertation was submitted prior to the ANC’s recall of Thabo Mbeki as the President of South Africa. Subsequent to this event in December 2008, Mosiuoa ‘Terror’ Lekota and others sympathetic to Mbeki formed the Congress of the People party, generally known as COPE. Hlongwane was one of COPE’s first members, and became the party’s leader in Gauteng. It will be seen that this new affiliation reflects his political trajectory as outlined in this study. After his resignation from the ANC, Bhengu was elected as the President of SANCO at its national conference in December 2008. She is listed at position 96 on the ANC’s list of candidates for the 2009 general election.
6.12 Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was to argue that, despite the fact that SANCO’s national leadership had experienced some difficulties in the post-apartheid period, its local branches have continued to exist. Following on Castells’ model of resistance identity, this chapter contended that SANCO branches have built new identities and have returned to a new resistance identity at the local level in recent years. When SANCO was formed, local civics which accepted the SANCO identity were recognised as SANCO branches. However, since the formation of SANCO, its national leadership has not been able to bring all the civics within its control. In reality, many local civic branches remained independent from SANCO. SANCO’s leadership at a local level openly admitted that the organisation has become irrelevant to local communities across the country and that it has failed to respond to the concerns of the local communities.

In this chapter, I also explained the rise of the new social movements at the end of the 1990s which also represented a new mood at the local level. These new movements are competing with SANCO as representatives of popular discontent. The majority of SANCO’s branches have aligned themselves with the APF, the AVCC and the SEEC in direct opposition to the stance taken by their national organisation. The APF, the AVCC and the SECC are examples of new social movements that have emerged in the post-apartheid period and have been at the centre of resistance against government policies. Apart from the rise of the new social movements, I also discuss electricity cut-offs, arguing that despite SANCO’s national leadership support for the ANC government, many of its local branches continued in their criticism of government and Eskom’s handling of the electricity crisis. Despite the fact that SANCO’s national leadership has not criticised the ANC-led government, some of its local branches have taken part in service delivery protests and continued to mobilise
communities against ANC councillors. In these protests local branches raised issues which should have been raised by SANCO as an organisation that purported to speak on behalf of communities.

SANCO branches criticised their national structure for its relationship with the ANC, which they argued, was the source of problems faced by the organisation. Even though some of its local branches were experiencing serious difficulties with ANC branches, the leadership of SANCO pledged SANCO’s support for the ANC in the 2006 local government elections. This resulted in SANCO branches in some provinces opposing the directives from the national office and fielded their own candidates. Tensions within the national civic organisation led to the suspension of its president, Hlongwane. However, he was reinstated by SANCO after he lodged a case against his dismissal. Its national conference which took place in Bloemfontein in December 2006 was dissolved before the elections of the new leadership were held. The deputy president of SANCO, Bhengu, argued that SANCO had lost touch with its local branches. She blamed the failure of the organisation on its president. However, as indicated elsewhere, despite the fact that SANCO’s national profile has declined, its local branches have remained vibrant. This was also attested to by Hlongwane in his presentation to the SACP 2002 congress, arguing that ‘SANCO is very strong at the local level and relatively weak at its national level’. As pointed out, some of these local branches have become part of a broader movement, one in which resistance to policies and practises associated with President Mbeki have fed into a new project that calls for the support of Zuma as the next President of South Africa. This became evident during the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane conference. The next chapter focuses on Alexandra Township as a case study.
CHAPTER SEVEN

A CASE STUDY: ALEXANDRA TOWNSHIP

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed SANCO’s return to a new resistance identity. This chapter seeks to explain grassroots dynamics and show how local civic branches sustained themselves. It will do so by looking at the activities of SANCO’s local branches over the period from 1992 to 2007, and will argue that civics remained active despite the failures of the national leadership. The chapter will also discuss the demographics of SANCO branches in terms of member attendance at the AGMs and I will argue that the profile of its current membership is different from the membership of the 1980s. It draws ideas from previous chapters in arguing that there is continuing high level of popular involvement within self governing civic structures at branch level. In order to explain these grassroots dynamics I have chosen Alexandra township as a case study, and I will look at its two local SANCO branches in greater detail. The focus on local branches will assist in revealing local dynamics that might be missed if only the big picture is considered. Branch level politics are important because these provide local civics with a space for ordinary residents of townships and informal settlements to associate and deliberate on community issues.

Alexandra has been chosen as a case study because of its historical significance based on the following reasons: Alexandra has a very rich history of political struggles. Its residents organised successful bus boycotts in 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1957. In the 1980s, civics structures in Alexandra were often referred to as the most successful in the country because of its highly organised street committees. In the 1990s, this township witnessed political tensions
between the ACO and the local ANC branches. Upon the formation of SANCO in 1992, ACO was among the civics in the Southern Transvaal which did not immediately join SANCO. After joining SANCO in 1996, the township became a centre of some rivalries within SANCO branches which resulted in some members of SANCO-Alexandra branches to re-establish the ACO.

Alexandra’s civic branches, to some degree, offer a different picture from other local branches and it is possible that the activism reflected in this township might have been absent elsewhere. As in other urban townships, residents of Alexandra are exposed to many environmental health hazards. For example, many residents use coal for cooking and heat in winter which results in thick smog enveloping the Jukskei river valley in the early morning and in the evening. Thus the combination of density, poverty, inaccessibility to cheap electricity, as well as the unsuitable topography, all pose fundamental health risks to the poor, old and very young residents of this township. Citizen-based organisations and local residents have responded to these environmental hazards by launching clean-up campaigns. They also made demands for the provision of dumpsites for refuse and schedules for refuse removal. It is these appalling conditions that led to a profound political activism by Alexandra residents to fight against the apartheid system and the dramatic increase in all forms of social organisation. I will use this context to argue that local civic organisations are continuing to fight for local space in the post-apartheid period and have not succumbed to the problems associated with the post-apartheid period. In the next section I will move on to discuss the background and history of Alexandra.
7.2 Background and History of Alexandra Township

Alexandra is a small, heavily populated township which lies between white suburbs, main roads and light industries. The township is situated on the northeastern side of Johannesburg, in a small area of about 1.5 square kilometres and is particularly well located for jobs, being adjacent to arterial roads and the main highway that links Johannesburg, Midrand and Pretoria. It is highly accessible to industrial and commercial centres. It is a small place where many poor people found residence (see Figure 2).

As indicated by Roefs et al. (2003: 15-16), Alexandra had a population of approximately 400,000 people. Population density in such a small living space with the barest of basic needs left the poor people of Alexandra vulnerable to various environmental risks and hazards, such as fires, and floods. Alexandra is not a homogenous township, it comprises people of diverse cultures, who speak different languages, and have varying levels of income and education. In their research, Isserow and Everatt (1998) found Zulu to be the main language spoken (30%), followed by North Sotho/Pedi (26%), Tswana (12%), Xhosa (10%) with Shangaan/Tsonga, South Sotho and Venda (22%).

According to the Johannesburg City Council’s e-services, Alexandra falls within Region 7 of the municipality of the City of Johannesburg. Alexandra is further sub-divided into four main parts (see Figure 3). Old Alexandra lies to the west of the Jukskei River. This is the poorest and most densely populated area with large numbers of in informal dwellings, three large hostels and blocks of flats. To the east of the Jukskei River is the East Bank which was developed in the 1980s and is now occupied by middle-class blacks. River Park is situated between East Bank and Far East Bank/Tsutsumani Village, this area is occupied

1 Note. Subsequent to the submission of this dissertation, Bonner & Nieftagodien (2008) published a richly detailed history of Alexandra.
by the black middle-income class. The Far East Bank/Tsutsumani Village has RDP houses, built to host the All Africa Games athletes, as well as other housing developments. About 5 per cent of the population of Alexandra lives in the Far East Bank/Tsutsumani (see the location of Far East Bank in Figure 4).
Figure 2: A Map showing the Location of Alexandra Township
(Johannesburg Corporate GIS 2004)
Figure 3: Division of Alexandra Township (Johannesburg Corporate GIS 2004)
Figure 4: Location of Far East Bank in Alexandra Township
The land on which Alexandra is situated was originally part of a farm owned by Hebert B. Papenfus, who wanted to establish a white residential township on the land (Lucas 1995: 89). However, in 1912, Papenfus sold his farm, called Cyferfontein, as a residential area, to the Alexandra Township Company Limited. Because of the lack of interest and demand from whites for whom it was exclusively intended, Alexandra was later converted into a Non-European residential area. In 1912, prior to the 1913 Land Act, Alexandra became one of the few areas where black people could own land under freehold title in urban areas. In the 1930s and 1940s, urbanisation increased rapidly with massive numbers of ‘squatters’ inundating the town in search of a better life. They were met with grinding poverty in these new urban environments. Most of these people settled in Alexandra and because of a critical housing shortage, they built wooden shelters in the yards of formerly private owned homes (Sarakinsky 1984: 2).

Apart from housing shortages, Alexandra also experienced transport problems. Transportation problems were first raised in 1934 by Daniel Khoza, a secretary of the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union, in his letter to the transportation board requesting them to grant licenses for more buses to operate in Alexandra. By that time, Alexandra had only 13 buses available to transport 15,000 people to and from work (Hirson 2005: 188). Furthermore, Lodge (1983) notes that massive urbanisation and transportation problems in the 1940s fuelled resistance campaigns which were spearheaded by blacks in a direct challenge to the whites-only government and companies owned exclusively by whites. The first campaign was the bus boycott which took place in 1940, with commuters forcing bus companies to reduce fares by a penny. The township came out in protest, and for six months residents walked to town a distance of up to 15 km taking them up to two hours to walk the distance each way. This persistence and resilience paid off at the end of six months when the penny
increase was dropped. The residents of Alexandra went on bus boycotts again in the following years 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1957 in a movement called ‘Azikwelwi’ (we will not ride) which became the catchword and reflected the solidarity of workers.

Apart from the bus boycotts of 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1957, and resisting the forceful removal and demolition of the township in 1960s, Alexandra also witnessed another uprising in 1986 which came to be known as the ‘Six Day War’ between residents and the security forces. As indicated by Bozzoli (2004: 83), the Alexandra uprising was sparked by the death of four people who were shot by police while attending a funeral of an unemployed youth. Carter (1991b) argues that during the protests in response to various state actions, community organisations targeted the nearest form of the oppressive government structure, the Alexandra City Council (ACC). The AAC and Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) took advantage of a volatile political situation and launched a rent boycott to protest increases in rent and service charges and the political illegitimacy of the ACC. Consumer and rent boycotts were used as part of a national programme intended to isolate and bring about the collapse of the local administration. The rent boycott proved to be a powerful tool against the ACC. Because the rent and service charges provided the ACC with its only means of generating revenues, the boycott undermined its ability to administer the township. In 1986, the AAC had established control of Alexandra township together with various community organisations such as AYCO. After the collapse of the local administration, residents met to elect the executive committee to serve the AAC.

As noted by Lucas (2000: 146), the AAC was one of the three rival civic organisations led by Moses Mayekiso, who argues that civic demands could no longer be divorced from the wider political issues. The AAC together with the president of AYCO, Paul Mashatile, was at the centre of the uprisings in 1986. Its
founders argue that the formation of AAC was thus a direct consequence of combination of poor living conditions in Alexandra owing to decades of neglect and the need to form a broad political front against the apartheid system. The other two civic organisations were the Alexandra Residents Association (ARA) and the Alexandra Civic Association (ACA). The ARA became the main group mobilising against rent increases and forced removals. After its collapse in the mid-1980s, the ACA started massive campaigns that were aimed at the development of the township. This included the demand for affordable housing for all, health and education. This campaign led to the renewal of attacks on illegitimate apartheid puppet local councillors (Lucas 2000: 146).

In 1986, the ACA and the AAC were merged and the AAC became the sole representative of the people of Alexandra. However, two years later, in 1988, the ACA was fully reconstituted and re-surfaced again to compete for support with the AAC. In 1989, the AAC was transformed into the ACO. Both civic organisations were affiliated to the UDF, but the ACO appeared to have a larger support base. The ACO was a mass based residents’ organisation. It concentrated on community issues, such as housing, services, land and transport. One of its main campaign slogans was ‘Affordable housing for all’. However, participation within the ACO was uneven. Most of the support came from those with the worst living conditions, particularly in the backyard shack areas (Lucas 2000: 147).

Due to intense pressure directed at the local authorities by the ACO, Mayekiso (1996: 212-213) noted that the TPA agreed to meet the ACO and as a result, R12.4 million owed by Alexandra residents in rents and service charges were written off. It was further agreed that future service charges for electricity and water would be based on the criteria of affordability, not on the cost of recovery. Another condition agreed on was the dissolution of the elected ACC and other local authorities to make way for a large local authority with a
common fiscal system, improved services and installation of services where they did not exist, upgrading of hostels, development of the Far East Bank for low-income housing, and investigation of non-racial local government with common tax base. The ACO initiated the Alexandra Joint Negotiating Forum (AJNF) to directly negotiate for a single, non-racial local authority, based on a common tax base, and for physical development programs for the poor. As noted by Schlemmer (1991: 3) the Alexandra Accord was signed on 24 September 1990, officially ending a long electricity boycott.

In 1989, another civic organisation was formed in Alexandra called the East Bank Residents Association (EBRA). The leadership of EBRA believed that there was a need for a separate civic organisation as the area had unique problems which the other civic organisation was unable to solve. EBRA was concerned that the informal settlement adjacent to their residential area would devalue their property (Ebrahim & Mthembu 1994: 51-52). After the unbanning of the ANC and the release of political prisoners, the ACO became closely aligned to the ANC branches. As a result, some executive members of ACO like Mayekiso and few others criticised this move and argued that the ACO’s relationship with the ANC would compromise civic activism. Because of this alignment between the ACO and ANC local civic issues were dealt with by the ACO while the ANC was responsible for mobilising national issues. However, a few years later the relationship between ACO and the ANC branch in Alexandra turned sour, as the two organisations began to compete for local space (Mayekiso 1996: 186). As explained by Mayekiso (1996: 208) tensions between the ANC and ACO were exacerbated by ACO’s refusal to participate in the march organised by the ANC with the Alexandra Peace Forum which was a protest against the killings in the township.

In this section, I have showed that although the details of the project were contested by various civic organisations in Alexandra in the 1980s,
however, all civic organisations shared a concern to overthrow the apartheid government. In the next section, I will discuss SANCO’s activity in Alexandra Township. This section is aimed at demonstrating that despite the problems posed by SANCO’s national leadership since its inception, and the challenges of transition, and especially the relations with ANC branches, local civics had remained vibrant in Alexandra.

7.3 SANCO activity in Alexandra Township

As indicated in Chapter Five, when SANCO was formed in 1992, ACO did not immediately disband in favour of SANCO. It only disbanded in 1996 four years later to become SANCO-Alexandra branch. Upon accepting SANCO’s constitution, the civics were expected to dissolve their own local constitutions and refrain from any negotiations with municipal authorities, and cease all fund-raising because funds would be collected by the national office and subsequently allocated to branches. Although ACO accepted SANCO’s identity and was recognised as a SANCO branch, in reality, it remained independent from the national structure. As pointed out by Ndletyana (1998: 59), after the 1994 elections, civics vowed to continue in their watchdog role in guarding the ANC-led government to honour its promises of a ‘good life for all’. Ndletyana further indicates that there was a need for an organisation outside the ANC that would ensure that the ANC does in fact deliver on its promises.

In their traditional role as watchdog of their communities before 1994, the civics engaged in all forms of protests, including consumer boycotts and marches. However, in the post-apartheid period the civics broadened the concept of a ‘watchdog’ to include participation within the policy frame work. This resulted in the SANCO-Alexandra branch releasing some of its key leaders, such as Nkele Ntingane, Richard Mdakane, Thabo Motloung and Ben Dhlomo to stand
for local government elections in 1995, so that they could serve in the local authority that administered Alexandra. These leaders were released to the ANC with the hope that they would influence policies for the benefit of their local communities. However, they stood for elections as ANC candidates, not as SANCO representatives. This became the source of problems between the ANC and SANCO’s Alexandra branch (Ndletyana 1998: 60-61). Like, Ndletyana, Lodge (2002: 212) contends that after 1995 to 2000, SANCO’s voice in local government was silenced by the ANC despite the fact that a large number of former SANCO officials were councillors.

As early as 1996 some of the leadership of the SANCO-Alexandra branch such as Mayekiso, began criticising SANCO’s national structure for continuing with its support to the ANC-led government, and allowing SANCO leaders to take positions in government. He argues that civics were in danger of becoming ‘rubber stamp vehicles’, driven by political parties (Lodge 2002: 212). In Mayekiso’s analysis, the tensions between ACO and ANC resulted from the fact that civics initially saw themselves as part of one democratic movement and even helped the ANC to launch itself in Alexandra. However, after the launch of the ANC, arguments began to emerge indicating that the ANC should take the lead as the right representative of the people. Whilst, others felt that civics were better placed for this responsibility because of its strong local organisational structure. These tensions were fuelled by the fact that the ANC wanted all civics to be absorbed into its branches and be absorbed into the political struggle for democracy (Mayekiso 1996). This point was also corroborated by Phakathi in an interview with the author (2000), who argued that ‘SANCO is very close to the government to such an extent that one finds it very difficult to differentiate between SANCO and the government.’

Due to the lack of strategic direction from SANCO’s national structure; tensions between the SANCO-Alexandra local branch leadership with SANCO’s
national leadership; and problems between the ANC and the SANCO-Alexandra branches resulted in SANCO-Alexandra branch leaders re-launching the ACO in 1997. A year later in 1998, they established NARCO as discussed in Chapter Five, because they believed that civics should be independent from political organisations. However, some SANCO branches had remain loyal to the ANC as shown by Ndletyana (1998: 68) who reasons that those SANCO branches did not regard their branches as a separate entity from the ANC and that they viewed any form of protest against the local government, not only as a vote of no confidence in the ANC local government, but to the entire national liberation movement of which SANCO forms part of.

Nevertheless, in 2002, some of SANCO branches in Alexandra took part in a mass march to upmarket Sandton, the main venue for World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), against the official position of SANCO’s national office. The decision by SANCO-Alexandra was significant because they chose to work with other social movements. In this protest action about 25,000 people marched under the banner of the Social Movement Indaba, an alliance of leftist groups which included the APF and the LPM against what they saw as the government’s anti-poor policies and the corporate-friendly agenda of the summit.

In an interview with the author (2006), David Zwane, a member of Mdakane branch, points out that in 2002, some of SANCO branches defied their national organisation’s position and joined the march organised by the Social Movements Indaba. He argues that SANCO’s national leadership had failed to provide them with an independent strategic direction. He blames SANCO for being subservient to the ANC. As a result of this lack of direction in Alexandra, there was an increasing rift between the ANC branches and local civic branches. Thus, local branches often took positions and organise protests which are contrary to the national stance. The alliance was strained, with many SANCO
branches feeling that government decisions were not properly informed by consultation or adequate understanding of the real conditions faced by people.

According to Zwane, the tensions between the SANCO branches and the ANC would never end as long as SANCO continued to play a subservient role to the ruling party. He argues that ‘if one raises dissatisfaction about the performance of the ANC’s local councillors you were labelled as unpatriotic’. Zwane further indicates that many more SANCO branches were now beginning to raise their voices against the ANC. Zwane was born in 1955 in Alexandra. He became politically active at an early age through his brother who went into exile as a member of the ANC’s military wing and disappeared in Angola. Zwane left school in 1976 at Standard 8 (Grade 10). He argues that after the 1976 Soweto student uprising there was no formal schooling as students were always running and hiding away from the security forces. He was sent to stay in KwaZulu-Natal with his grandparents and came back to Alexandra three years later. Upon his return, he was offered temporary employment as a messenger by Spoornet, a subsidiary of the Transnet group.

The sentiment about tensions between SANCO and ANC branches was also echoed by Reggie Vilakazi, the chairperson of the Albert Luthuli branch, in an interview with the author (2006). He argues that ANC branches in Alexandra are very hostile to SANCO branches. He indicates that there was a lack of accountability amongst ANC councillors to SANCO which stemmed from the view that the SANCO-Alexandra branch was no longer valuable as an ally. He argues that ANC councillors believed that they controlled government and that there was no need for them to engage with organisations like SANCO as they had done in the past. The leadership of the SANCO-Alexandra branch were often marginalised from the decision-making process by ANC councillors and in some instances by property developers. He blamed the weakness of the local civic branches on SANCO’s national leadership which he argued, had made the local
civic structures weak by not giving local civics clear direction in terms of their role in the post-apartheid period. According to Vilakazi, SANCO’s national leadership only existed in name. He debates that tensions between ANC councillors and SANCO branches and a lack of service delivery in Alexandra, was driving more local residents to support organisations such as the AVCC, an affiliate of the APF. Vilakazi was born in 1964 in Alexandra. He became politically active at an early age as a member of Congress of South African Students (COSAS).

While collecting data in the SANCO branches in Alexandra between 2000 and 2006 by means of participant observation, I noted the following: regular meetings are still held to discuss problems experienced by residents. However, the attendance at such branch meetings varied from one branch to another. These meetings were normally held in schools and community halls. However, in schools, prior bookings had to be made and venues were not always guaranteed. These branch meetings were often called by the secretary of the branch by using the short message service, (SMS) offered by cell phones companies, to all members. All members of the branch were required to register and update their personal details with the secretary of the branch. In all meetings of the branches that I attended, the majority of people who attended these meetings were women as we shall see later.

In some branches, meetings started with the singing of revolutionary songs, while in some branches, members just converged one by one and join the meeting proceedings. Branch meetings were normally chaired by the secretary or the chairperson of the branch, who often started the meeting by welcoming members and stating the purpose of the meeting and the agenda of the meeting and also giving a report back of the previous meetings. Members on the floor were invited and given a platform to raise their concerns, while someone else assisted the secretary by writing down all issues raised and including them in the
agenda. In most of the branch meetings I have attended, and depending on the location of that particular branch, the following issues were raised and discussed: the lack of jobs, poverty, evictions, service delivery, electricity, privatisation and cost recovery strategies, illegal shacks on school property, the transfer of ownership of houses to residents, housing and status of RDP houses, non-payment of service fees and bonds, sanitation problems, the lack of ambulance services, escalating crime rates, the scourge of HIV/AIDS, illegal immigrants in Alexandra especially, from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, lack of attendance by office bearers to branch meetings, the naming of streets, and the erection of speed bumps on main roads to make streets safer for residents from reckless drivers and criminals. Due to issues raised in meetings, branch meetings always became emotionally contested with members accusing the leadership of the branch for not doing enough, and sometimes not following up on what has been agreed upon. In an interview with the author (2006), Jabu Tshawe, a member of the Albert Luthuli branch criticises the leadership of SANCO for pushing their personal agenda more than the agenda of the organisation. He argues that the only time you saw them was when there were elections. He contends that ‘they are using SANCO as a step ladder to local government positions, business deals and tenders.’ In some branches, branch leaders were often accused of using their positions as a career ladder for higher positions with the local government, at the expense of the community.

My argument in this section is that, since 1992 local civics have remained active in Alexandra. This point was also highlighted by Mayekiso (1996: 98) who argued that ‘although the Alexandra Civic and other civics had problems in the new environment, but we are regaining our influence over day-to-day affairs.’ He further argued that ‘the reason for our persistence, in contrast to many international urban movements which fade after a short period, is that the apartheid state failed to crush our political and economic program: the struggle
to transform society through consciousness raising, economic empowerment, participation, and control of community planning, strengthening of civil society, and democratisation of government’. Regardless of the fact that ACO disbanded in favour of SANCO, their relationship did not last. The period from 1994 was characterised by tensions between the SANCO-Alexandra branches and with the ANC branches. This was also exacerbated by the fact that SANCO activists were allowed to occupy some positions within the local government as ANC candidates and did not represent SANCO. Due to problems with the ANC, some SANCO branches aligned themselves with new movements such as the AVCC which was affiliated to the APF. In the next section, I will discuss the membership survey of Alexandra branches. The section will show that the membership of the SANCO-Alexandra branch is mostly female, middle-aged and poor as compared to the membership of the civics in the 1980s which were led by an older generation, the majority of whom had formal education.

7.4 Membership Survey

In order to gain access to local civic branches in Alexandra Township, I made several attempts by approaching the chairperson of SANCO-Alexandra sub-region, Mkgomana. Through him, I tried to secure meetings with different leaders of the SANCO branches in Alexandra; however, this did not materialise as appointments were not honoured and sometimes appointments were cancelled a few minutes before the scheduled time. After much persistence and a subsequent meeting with Ngwenya, the secretary of Albert Luthuli branch, whom I came across at SANCO regional offices in Johannesburg, I was introduced to the chairperson of the SANCO-Johannesburg region, Goodwill Qushwane, who agreed to meet me in Alexandra. Through him, I was introduced to the various
chairpersons of the different branches, who welcomed me and promised to assist wherever they could.

From my observation and discussion with Qushwane, I learnt that there were 10 active local SANCO branches in Alexandra. A branch is proclaimed if it has more than 100 card-carrying members. The membership figures for these branches were given to me by the various chairpersons of that particular branch and were confirmed by Qushwane. However, judging from the AGMs which I attended, very few people attended meetings. In this case high membership figures did not necessarily translate into high levels of activism in the branch, but this varies from branch to branch. The profile of SANCO branches in Alexandra is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Profile of SANCO Branches in Alexandra Township.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SANCO Branches in Alexandra</th>
<th>Number of Card-Carrying members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Mdakane Branch</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Mayekiso Branch</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Charter Branch</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Modise Branch</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Luthuli Branch</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen Joseph Branch</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langalibalele Branch</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent Tshabalala Branch</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Mahlangu Branch</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela Branch</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Richard Mdakane Branch is named after the current provincial chairperson of SANCO in Gauteng and also after the ANC chief whip in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. Mdakane has been involved in civic organisations for many years and played a role in the establishment of CAST, ACO and SANCO. Richard Mdakane Branch covers the area between 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> Avenues. This branch has the highest membership.

The Freedom Charter Branch is named after the historic document which was drawn up as an alternative vision to the repressive apartheid state in 1955, in Soweto, and adopted as the guiding document of the ANC. The Freedom Charter Branch covers part of 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, and 23<sup>rd</sup> Avenues.

Joe Modise Branch is named after the late Joe Modise who was a former resident of Alexandra who became the first Minister of Defence in President Mandela’s cabinet in 1994. Joe Modise Branch covers the area between 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Avenues.

Moses Mayekiso Branch is named after the former civic stalwart, Moses Mayekiso. This branch is the second largest branch which covers the area between 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> Avenue from Wynberg Road and squatter camp settlement to Selbon, Hofmeyer and Von Brandis.

The Albert Luthuli Branch is named after the late Chief Albert Luthuli, President of the ANC from 1951 until his death in 1967, who was also the first black South African to receive Nobel Peace Prize in 1967. The Albert Luthuli branch covers the area from East Bank, Stwetla, Far East Bank, Tsutsumani Village and River Park.

The Helen Joseph Branch is named after Helen Joseph, a dedicated activist who opposed apartheid. Her commitment earned her the ANC’s highest award, the Isitwalandwe/Seaparankoe Medal. The Helen Joseph Branch covers the area around the hostels and the informal settlement.
The Langalibalele Branch is named after John Langalibalele Dube, the first President of the ANC between 1912 and 1917. The ANC was at this point called the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) and remained so until 1923. Langalibalele Branch covers the area from Mayibuye, Klipfontein, Modderfontein, President Park and Limbro Park.

The Vincent Tshabalala Branch is named after a former resident of Alexandra who was killed by a hand grenade in a shootout with police in 1985. Vincent Tshabalala Branch covers 15th, 16th and 17th Avenues from London Road to Vasco da Gama Road.

The Solomon Mahlangu Branch is named in honour of Solomon Kalushi Mahlangu, a 19 year old student activist who left the country after the 1976 Soweto student strike, to join the armed wing of ANC, Mkhontho we Sizwe (MK) ‘spear of the nation’. While in exile, he was sent to Angola where he was trained for an elite force to return to South Africa to carry out a mission commemorating 1976. On his return to South Africa, Mahlangu and Monty Motloung were accosted by police in Johannesburg, and in the gunfight that took place, two white civilians were killed. Monty was brutally beaten during the course of his capture and suffered brain damage, while Solomon was hanged on 6 April 1979. Solomon Mahlangu branch covers parts of 4th, 6th and 7th, avenues and parts of 8th, 9th and 10th Avenues from Wynberg Road, and parts of the informal settlement.

The Nelson Mandela Branch is named after Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, a former President, who was a resident of Alexandra for three years. Nelson Mandela branch covers the area from Ruth First Squatter Settlement towards 12th Avenue from Wynberg Road.

I selected two SANCO branches to study in greater detail and also to compare them. These were the Richard Mdakane and Albert Luthuli branches. As shown in Figures 5-10 below. These two branches were compared in terms of
attendance at the AGM, and were classified by age, gender and employment status. This information was obtained during my initial interviews, while attending the AGM of SANCO branches in Alexandra. Delegates attending the AGM were asked to fill in the attendance registers which required the following details: name and surname, name of the branch and telephone numbers. Before the AGM started, I asked the chairpersons of Mdakane and Albert Luthuli if they would allow me to add three categories (age, employment status and gender) to their attendance registers. This was not agreed to as they felt it would delay the registration process. However, they assured me access to the records and the attendance registers at later stage.

According to the records in the attendance register, about (n=84) members from Albert Luthuli, which represents 24 per cent of the entire membership of the branch, attended the AGM. And about (n=75) from Richard Mdakane which represents 16 per cent of entire membership of the branch, attended the AGM. I made telephone calls to obtain information of members of those two branches in terms of age, gender and employment status. Some of the people I phoned were not interested and refused to confirm their personal details to me, while others provided incorrect phone numbers on the register and some were always unavailable. In these two branches, the majority of those who attended were women, in Albert Luthuli branch (n=51) and in Richard Mdakane (n=39). As far as attendance by age was concerned, in the two branches about (n=64) members were between the age of 40-49, and (n=19) young people between the age of 20-29. As far as attendance by employment was concerned, about (n=75) of those who attended from the two branches were unemployed, while (n=45) were employed, and (n=22) indicated that they were self-employed. The actual number of people who responded and those who refused to participate or not available, are indicated as unknown in all the figures below.
Figure 5: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Mdakane Branch, by Age.

As indicated in the above figure, a majority of members who participated in the Mdakane branch (39%) were between the ages of 40 and 49. This was followed by the group between the ages of 30 and 39 at (19%). The age group of 20 and 29 made up (11%) of the total membership. This branch appeared to be dominated by people between the ages of 40 and 49. The figure also showed that very few people between the ages of 20 and 29 participated in this branch. Responding to my question in an interview (2006), Jonathan Ndebele argues that as a young man, he never understood why people were joining SANCO, and he used to think that SANCO was some sort of political organisation like the IFP or the ANC. He contends that it was only once he had moved out of his parent’s home that he got an idea of what SANCO was all about. He argues that many people are still being ill treated by their landlords and SANCO has intervened in a number of those cases to resolve their problems. This made him change his view regarding SANCO and he finally joined the organisation in 2002. He describes
SANCO as an organisation that is responsible for solving the needs of poor people. To him, SANCO was a watchdog of local government and councillors who do not live up to their promises. Ndebele was born at Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal in 1978. His parents moved to Alexandra in 1979 and they worked in the nearby factories in Malboro. He attended school in Alexandra but left school due to a lack of money. He was then employed by ADT Security Company in 2002. He later moved from his parents four-roomed house and rented a back room where he still resides with his wife and two children.

Figure 6: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Luthuli Branch, by Age

As in the case of Mdakane branch, the participation in the AGM in Albert Luthuli appeared to be dominated by people between the age group of 40 and 59 (43%) as in the case of Mdakane branch this branch had fewer people between the ages of 20 and 29 (8%). This branch had a higher number of older people.
between the age group of 50 and 59 and 60 and 69 participating in its structures, than in Mdakane branch.

Attendance by age in both Mdakane and Albert Luthuli branches appeared to be similar compared with the attendance of the AGM of SECC. Research conducted by Alexander (2003: 81) shows that the attendance in the AGM’s of SECC was dominated by people between the age group of 40 and 59 years. Again, as in the case of both Mdakane and Albert Luthuli branches, very few people between the ages 21 and 39 years appeared to participate in the AGM of the SECC. The reason for such similarities between the SECC and these two SANCO branches is allied to the fact that it is mostly older people in the townships who are faced with the responsibilities of running their homes and families, as was indicated by Ndebele in an interview with the author.

**Figure 7: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Mdakane Branch, by Gender**

![Attendance by Gender from Mdakane Branch](image)

As far as the attendance by gender is concerned, Figure 7 indicates that (52%) of members who attended are females, while (39%) are males. This branch was
dominated by females. The figure also indicates that about (9%) of people in this branch did not respond. Although the branch was dominated by females, the leadership of the branch was dominated by males. This was also observed in all the branches where males were mostly in the leadership positions. According to Zwane, a member of Mdakane Branch, females often refused to be elected to positions of authority. He blamed this on the patriarchal system of a male-dominated society which makes females feel inadequate to lead and are dependent on males. However, this was not a case with Albert Luthuli, were the deputy chairperson of the branch was a woman.

Figure 8: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Luthuli Branch, by Gender

As in the case of Richard Mdakane Branch, the attendance at Albert Luthuli is dominated by females (53%) while males numbered (34%). According to one respondent, the question about why females were not in leadership positions despite being the majority was because in all SANCO branches there were no quotas for women to occupy certain positions, as there was in the ANC. Other
respondents argue that most women were not interested in leadership positions because of their cultural upbringing and stereo types. The figure also shows that (13%) of those who attended the AGM of the Luthuli branch, did not take part in this interview which otherwise would have changed the numbers for either male or female attendance. In terms of comparison with Albert Luthuli Branch the picture looked very similar in terms of attendance by gender.

**Figure 9: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Mdakane Branch, by Employment status**

As far as attendance by employment status in Mdakane Branch is concerned, the above figure indicates that the majority of members were unemployed (54%), while (25%) were employed, and about (12%) of members claimed to be self-employed. The question of a lack of jobs mostly dominates all AGMs, especially with the prospect of the construction of the Gautrain project. Most members believe that they should benefit from this project. When looking at the comparison, Mdakane and Albert Luthuli Branches have high levels of
unemployed people. This is line with what has been highlighted by Isserow & Everatt (1998) in their report that Alexandra had an unemployment rate of (60%). They further indicate that employment status of women in Alexandra was worse than for men. They argue that (40%) of women were unemployed, compared to (19%) of men. For those who were employed, most work in low-skilled or semi-skilled jobs.

**Figure 10: Attendance at SANCO-Alexandra AGM from Luthuli Branch, by Employment status**

In Albert Luthuli Branch, attendance by employment status indicated that (42%) of the members were unemployed, while (31%) were employed and (14%) of the members were self-employed. In both branches, those who indicated that they were self-employed, were mostly in the following trades: plumbing, sales, transportation and car mechanics. Alexander (2003: 82) made a similar finding in his studies on the SECC. He contends that the SECC was a movement of the unemployed.
As indicated above, Alexandra is a community characterised by high levels of unemployment and poverty. When comparing the picture of SANCO-Alexandra branches with the civics in the 1980s, the picture is very different. After 1994 the membership of SANCO-Alexandra appeared to be dominated by females, middle aged and poor people. In the 1980s, the civic struggle was led by a wide variety of people which included educated professionals. As shown in the previous section, the majority of members and the leadership of SANCO-Alexandra branches were middle aged and unemployed people. The SANCO-Alexandra branches were also faced with different challenges than those which faced activists in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the civics were united in their role to overthrow the apartheid government. However, from 1996, the SANCO-Alexandra Branch were particularly involved in the struggle with ANC councillors and ANC branches, and tensions with government over the lack of service delivery.

In the next section, I will move on to discuss views from three Alexandra activists whom I interviewed. The discussion in this section is meant to present the opinions of SANCO’s local leadership, who also argue that SANCO branches in Alexandra were led by young, unemployed activists. The section will also highlight their view with regard to SANCO’s national office and the relations with the ANC branches in Alexandra.

### 7.5 Views from Alexandra Township

In this section, I will proceed to outline briefly, the particular experiences of three leaders of SANCO branches I have interviewed in Alexandra. What emerged from the interviews highlighted the important role played by the local leadership of civic structures in different branches. These interviews were conducted at Realugile Secondary School in Alexandra Township on 22 May
2006. It is important to mention that most SANCO branches in Alexandra Township, do not have offices of their own and they, from time to time, negotiate with other institutions like schools, to use their facilities. Branch officials are not paid for their work and they depend upon donations for travelling doing SANCO’s business. Some officials who are self-employed claimed that they also use their own funds to travel while organising meetings and attending workshops. All local branches collect a R10.00 monthly subscription from members, but this does not amount to a lot of money as most members are unemployed. The membership subscription could have cost more if most people were employed.

The first person I interviewed was Qushwane, the chairperson of the Johannesburg region who was born in the small rural village of Bizana in the Eastern Cape in 1954. Qushwane was born in a poor family were his father depended on farming to support his family. He attended school until Standard eight which is equivalent to Grade 10. However, to a person of his age, having Grade 10 meant that he was quite well educated, but not educated to the extent that he could get a middle class job and move away from the township. His politicisation began at home at an early age. He said that ‘at home I used to witness my father and other elderly men from the village going to hold meetings in the dark during the night. When they came back home, I listened to my father and his friends talking about the problems of the country and reference was made to the apartheid system as the cause of all the misery and pain suffered by black people in the country’.

In 1972, Qushwane left the Eastern Cape and came to Johannesburg where he was given a temporary shelter by a relative in Alexandra Township. He insisted that the conditions in Alexandra in 1972 were very bad. According to Qushwane, Alexandra at that time was not fit to be a residential area. He argues that, although living conditions were very bad, people used to openly gather and
raised their dissatisfaction with their landlords, something he was not accustomed to. In 1986, he played a role in the formation of the AAC which was formed to solve day-to-day problems experienced by Alexandra residents. In 1990, when the AAC became the ACO, he served on its local committee. After the second general election in 1999, he was elected as the chairperson of the Johannesburg region, the position he still holds.

Qushwane contends that not all SANCO branches in Alexandra had a good working relationship with the ANC. However, he criticised the ANC for undermining SANCO branches. In his view, SANCO’s national office was not active. He argues that ‘it has not been active as far as I know.’ As far as the activism of local SANCO branches was concerned, he argued that the role of the local civic structures would never diminish as the majority of Alexandra residents still attended meetings called by the local civic structures and that many people still stayed in flats, and from time to time, experienced problems with their landlords in one way or another. He also mentioned that in Alexandra Township, SANCO branches were more organised and more popular than ANC branches. As far as the rebirth of the ACO and the suspension of Mayekiso is concerned, he indicates that Mayekiso was suspended in 1997 for five years, but that he resigned instead and re-established the ACO, but this never materialised. Together with other former SANCO leaders from the SANCO-Tembisa Branch and the SANCO-Soweto Branch, they established NARCO in 1988.

The second activist I interviewed was Gabriel Ngwenya, secretary of the Albert Luthuli Branch. Ngwenya ascribes his eventual involvement in politics and in SANCO in particular, to the conditions in Alexandra Township. He was born in 1968 and brought up in Alexandra. He came from a working class background as both his parents were employed and could afford to support their family. He did his Standard 10 (Grade 12) at Realugile Secondary School in Alexandra and went to study business administration at a business college. His involvement in civic
structures dates back to 1989 when he served on the local committee of the ACC. He described the conditions in Alexandra during the late 1980s as very difficult as there was no freedom of speech or association. He argues that the 1994 elections brought freedom and everything has changed since then. He describes himself as an engine of the Albert Luthuli Branch and that without him nothing could happen. He reasons that the majority of the Albert Luthuli Branch and all Alexandra residents trusted the SANCO local branches more so than they did the ANC and its local councillors. He insists that SANCO branches were the real vehicles of development in Alexandra. However, he conceded that the SANCO branches were faced with the huge challenges of unemployment, housing shortage, lack of skills, poverty and HIV/AIDS, which he argued is very high in Alexandra Township. As far as the relationship with the ANC is concerned, Ngwenya contended that there was no problem with the ANC itself, but that people representing the ANC, like their councillors, were the ones to blame for any misunderstanding between the two organisations. He also argues that the Albert Luthuli Branch was a home for every resident despite their political affiliation. He boasts that about 37% of the membership of Albert Luthuli comprised of Democratic Alliance (DA) members and he did not have a problem with this, although he himself was card-carrying ANC member. He states that community issues cut across party politics. The DA is an official white opposition political party in South Africa which is perceived by many black people to be representing the aspirations of white people. As far as the relations between SANCO branches and the APF and other organisations that took part in land invasions, are concerned, he argues that SANCO did not encourage any land invasions and the illegal connection of electricity. SANCO’s modus operandi, he argue was through negotiations.

Lastly, I interviewed Julius Nkopodi, the chairperson of Langalibalele Branch, who was born in 1969 in Naledi, Soweto and grew up in Meadowlands
Zone 3, Soweto. He did his Standard 10, the equivalent of Grade 12, in Selelekela Secondary School in Orlando, Soweto. After Standard 10, he went to a Solution Business Collage where he completed a certificate in business administration. He enrolled for part-time study at UNISA, studying for a Bachelors of Commerce degree, but did not complete the programme due to a lack of funds. Nkopodi states that he grew up in the struggle. He joined the ANC Youth League in Soweto in 1986. His political involvement was triggered by the harsh reality that faced young black people in the townships on a daily basis. After his Standard 10, together with his family, he moved to Alexandra, where he joined SANCO in 1999. I asked him about the relations between SANCO branches and other organisations like the LPM and APF. His answer was that, as SANCO branch, they did not encourage the illegal occupation of houses as they relied on the negotiated settlements. He also claims that the membership of his Langalibalele Branch has increased and has remained steady over a number of years. He argues that local civics would never disappear in Alexandra Township. This is because the majority of the residents in Alexandra are poor and do not own their own houses and depended on landlords. SANCO branches were also at the fore-front of helping people whose names appeared on the government list, to get the houses promised to them.

As shown above, the leadership of SANCO-Alexandra branches was young and unemployed. The evidence of the interviews with three Alexandra civic activists showed that SANCO’s national structure had lost touch with its local branches. However, despite the fact that SANCO’s national structure has declined, its local branches are continuing to fight for poor people.
7.6 Conclusion

This chapter was focused on local branch civics in Alexandra Township as a case study to argue that local civic organisations have not succumbed to the problems associated with the post-apartheid period. As indicated elsewhere, Alexandra was chosen as a case study because of its rich history of political mobilisation since the early 1940s and the vibrant civic organisations that emerged in the late 1980s. This chapter has demonstrated that since 1992, local civic branches have remained active in Alexandra, notwithstanding the fact that there was a difference between in the profile of activists of the early 1980s and current activists. The Alexandra case has demonstrated that the majority of members in the SANCO branches, were women and that most of them were unemployed, while others claimed to be self employed and with a very low level of education. As demonstrated through the membership survey, local civic structures were still regarded by Alexandra residents as the real vehicles of development in the township. Interviews conducted in Alexandra supported the argument made elsewhere that suggests that local civic participation has not diminished, in fact, that it has become more widespread. Through my ongoing observation in Alexandra, I have observed that some SANCO branches in Alexandra still enjoy significant support within their communities and command a larger following during their meetings than those of the ANC local branches. Although SANCO’s national leadership and the ANC have maintained their cordial relationship in the post-apartheid period, some branches in Alexandra have continued with their criticism of the ANC-led councillors for non-delivery.

This chapter has highlighted the importance of studying SANCO at the local level and argued that a national-level study of this organisation cannot be conclusive. The analysis of the SANCO branches clearly demonstrates their capacity and ability to mobilise and engage with the state at the local level. In
particular, the Alexandra case adds to the general model presented in the preceding chapters which argued for a sustained process of mobilisation which was rooted in previous cycles of mobilisation as highlighted by Tarrow (1994). The Alexandra case study demonstrates that there is a space for social movements to push for changes on local level. This case study has further revealed that local mobilisation within the branches has become more widespread as a result of high unemployment and poverty. The investigation of the experiences of civic branches in Alexandra demonstrates that even though SANCO is facing tremendous difficulties on the national level, local branches in Alexandra have continued to thrive and the level of activism has remained steady. However, what also becomes clear is that the majority of SANCO’s branches in Alexandra comprise by unemployed people and most branches have high numbers of women in their structures, but not in the leadership structure. The issue of the lack of service delivery has become a source for a further mobilisation against the policies and practises of government which has now led to new project identity with the rejection of President Mbeki’s bid to continue leading the ANC. Be that at it may, it remains to be seen whether SANCO’s national leadership or its branches will begin to assert a new legitimising identity.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study set out to examine and analyse SANCO, and in this way make a contribution to our understanding of social movements, particularly in post-apartheid South Africa. As indicated in Chapter Four, civic organisations in South Africa emerged in the black townships in the late 1970s and were at the forefront of struggles against the apartheid regime. These organisations were key players in the resistance movement, with their strategic thrust being to take power from the apartheid government at national and local levels. In 1992 the expansion of civic structures led to the launch of SANCO, which tried to consolidate all regional and local civic organisations in South Africa. Upon its formation, SANCO pursued a unitary configuration even though some of its regional and local structures were opposed to this type of constitution and favoured a federal arrangement instead. As a result of this strategic direction by SANCO towards becoming a unitary organisation, the more prominent regional and local civic organisations did not join SANCO upon its formation. Even those civic organisations which did join SANCO and did accept its identity remained independent from SANCO in their pursuit of addressing problems in their respective communities. The co-ordination of civics by SANCO was meant to enable them to pursue their objectives more forcefully and function actively with the backing of the national consolidated structure. Yet, this co-ordination posed the danger of a top-down approach, where the highest-tier dictated terms to lower-tier structures.

The study of South Africa’s civic organisations, in particular, SANCO, presents an interesting challenge to the existing social movement literature as
indicated in Chapter Two. This literature suggested that the decline of SANCO as a national social movement was the result of the demise of apartheid, because civic organisations were historically aligned with the ANC and it was expected that they would become vehicles for spreading the ANC's influence in the post-apartheid period. This view was supported by Lanegran (1996), who argues that the end of apartheid had actually led to a weakening of social movements in South Africa. The literature also suggested that the decline of SANCO happened as a result of a loss of its leadership, as many skilled individuals moved into government and the private sector after 1994. This study has argued that theorists investigating civic organisations in South Africa tended to analyse them by focusing on the national level and neglected to address the central questions of how the local branches and local processes interact with the national level. The tendency of these theorists was to speculate that the democratisation processes in South Africa would mean an end to these organisations. While I tend to agree with the analysis of SANCO’s decline being the result of the demise of apartheid, I am contending that the literature reviewed in this dissertation provided its analysis by focusing solely on the national level to suggest a picture of SANCO’s decline in the post-apartheid period. The investigation by the current study of local civics in Alexandra, in particular, demonstrated that, even though local civic organisations were having serious difficulties in the post-apartheid period, they did not disappear but rather continued to exert some influence on the development of civic consciousness in their local areas. This dissertation has shown that on a local level there is evidence that suggests that civic activism has remained vibrant even post the 1994 general elections. This contradicts the national picture presented about SANCO, which suggests a pattern of a decline and demobilisation in the post-apartheid period.

Turning now to the three approaches reviewed in this study, we can see that each of them had a contribution to make towards the analysis of
understanding social movements. The collective behaviour theory directed its attention towards the grievances of the social movements which it argued contribute towards the formation of social movements. This model assumed that structural strain produces feelings of psychological anxiety among individuals, and these become a motivating factor behind the emergence of social movements. Be that as it may, as indicated in Chapter Two, this theory has some limitations as it treats agents of change as some form of deviant. Because of its tendency to view agents of change as deviants, this approach is inadequate in explaining the rise of the new social movement in South Africa. The resource mobilisation approach proved helpful in identifying the organisational dynamics, i.e. leadership, and resource aspects of the movement. Unlike the collective behaviour approach, the resource mobilisation theory argued that grievances are insufficient as a cause of collective mobilisation. The theory further emphasised the importance of leadership in the emergence of social movement. Notwithstanding its strength, the resource mobilisation theory fails for account on ‘informal leaders’, who are often responsible for the day-to-day running of social movements.

Even the new social movement theory had some limitations as it only concentrated on cultural aspects and put emphasis on life-style choices rather than issues such as leadership. More importantly, this approach negated the role of the state in collective mobilisation, and as such failed to provide an analysis of the reasons for the rise of contemporary movements. The new social movement theory could not account for the reasons for the rise of new social movements in the post-apartheid South Africa. The three approaches to the study of social movements failed to account for the reasons that local civic organisations have continued to exist in the post-apartheid period. Nevertheless, some resource mobilisation theorists have recognised the role of the state in collective mobilisation in their paradigm of cycles of protest, which I discuss next.
Apart from the three dominant approaches to the study of social movement, I also draw from the cycle of protest paradigm, which contends that social movements are cyclical because they respond to conditions which are bound to change as a result of political, economic and perhaps ideological variations. Again this school of thought contended that social movements tend to have life cycles of their own; their membership, mobilisation, and strength tend to be cyclical because the movements mobilise people in response to circumstances which are cyclical. The cycle of protest paradigm maintains that social movement activity is governed by a cycle, in terms of which it will reach a decline, and rise to its peak when conditions are favourable. This paradigm offers a model by which social movements’ development can be plotted. Nonetheless, for a protest action to be sustained over a long period depends on the refusal of the state to meet its demands. Thus, the movement becomes dependent on the state to provide a target for discontents. The problem with this cyclical development is that, if the state is not willing to grant significant political opportunity structures, then the conflict between the state and movements may itself become stratified.

However, as indicated elsewhere, the cycle of protest provides an excellent means of understanding the flow of collective mobilisation. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter Two, I have supplemented the cycle of protest paradigm by adapting Castells’ typology of identity which proposed that one can discern three points in the cycle: resistance; project; and legitimising. As far as the resistance identity is concerned, I have argued that civic organisations in South Africa originated from the resistance of the late 1970s. These organisations became increasingly concerned with a national democratic project in the late 1980s through involvement with the UDF to overthrow the apartheid regime. Furthermore, in the first project there was a federal organisation and different politics at township level, but these still shared a project around democracy, with
a great respect for leadership, which was more responsive to the township level branches. At a national level, civics tended to legitimise ANC rule through SANCO. The gap between local civics and their national structure expanded with the legitimising identity, when many but not all SANCO branches rejected the unitary organisation, and with it, to a greater or lesser degree, the legitimising identity (support for the government programmes). This gap became more evident with the development of a new grassroots’ resistance identity, which could be glimpsed in the 1990s but became more pronounced in the 2000s. In this period, the more militant SANCO branches were part of a broader mood of resistance to government policies, and their legitimisation. Eventually, resistance at a local level influenced SANCO nationally, and at this point one can detect some evidence of the emergence of a new project, around support for Zuma, and in some cases of the policies of national democratic revolution. However, it remains to be seen whether SANCO or its branches will now begin to assert a new legitimising identity for the ANC new leadership. Whilst one can discern the development of a cycle, the new resistance identity was not the same as the first. At a local level, the leadership tended to be more poor and working class, as a consequence of the more-middle class leaders moving out of the township.

Notwithstanding their strength, the cycle of protest paradigm, and Castells’ typology of identities have not the considered internal organisational structure of social movements. When looking at SANCO, it is apparent that this organisation has a centralised structure which is divided into three levels, national, regional and local, and it is at its local level where activity that defines a social movement occurs. In this study I have argued that social movement theory, which can offer a wider applicability of social movement activity in South Africa, would have to take into account these two levels: national and local. My submission in this thesis is that SANCO should be understood as a two-tiered social movement. A two-tiered approach towards analysing SANCO has
demonstrated that, even though local civics have experienced difficulties due to problems encountered by SANCO’s national leadership after 1994, some of its local branches continue to exist.

This study has demonstrated that the legitimising identity contributed to rows and ruptures within the movement and to the further decay of the national structure. With the decline at national level, the branches were forced to become more self-sufficient, and aligned themselves with new progressive social movements. This picture was affirmed by looking at the Alexandra township as a case study, which revealed that SANCO local branches still play an important role in solving day-to-day issues affecting communities. The case study also indicated that in some branches membership has indeed increased. Despite the fact that SANCO’s national level is weak, some of its local branches have been strong and able to continue as vehicles of driving development for the poor at the local level. The conclusion of this study is that, even though the post-apartheid period appears to have caused the demobilisation of social movement organisations in South Africa, at the local level there is evidence that the post-apartheid period has in fact led to the formation of new social movements which have challenged various policies of the government. The important thing to note about these new social movements is that they all emerge from the local level, as indicated in Chapter Six.

Drawing from the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, this study has argued that, despite the fact that SANCO was originally formed as a unitary structure coordinating all local civic organisations in 1992, this organisation should be understood as a two-tiered social movement because, from the empirical data presented in the previous chapters, SANCO exists because of its local branches. Regardless of the fact that its national level has declined, local branches have continued to exist in the post-apartheid period, contrary to the view put forward in the social movement literature that a social
movement rises up to challenge an existing order and declines after change. This study has demonstrated that some SANCO branches have maintained their vigour and they have become more widespread, although in some cases there are cases of careerism reported. This is in line with the view put forward by the cycles of protest paradigm, which argued that social movements do not simply disappear, as suggested by the mainstream social movement theories, but that these movements adapt and change with time. This study has shown that the resurgence of new social movement in South Africa occurs at the local-level because the local level action is becoming more and more urgent, especially in the context of rising unemployment and high levels of poverty.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the contributions made by this study to the existing body of knowledge with regard to the studies on social movements. My analysis of the semi-structured interviews, participant observation, HSRC data, and case study notes that made up my data-collection instruments revealed that the existing literature on social movements has some limitations. These limitations will be discussed here and, more generally, the argument presented in this study may encourage further research in this topic. The findings of the study pose a challenge to the social movement literature, which explained the demobilisation of social movement by looking at the national level. The central argument of this thesis is that SANCO should be understood as a two-tiered social movement and that any study of this organisation should move beyond a national level analysis. Empirical data presented in this study demonstrated the need to look beyond the national level politics by incorporating local-level actors.

Social movement literature needs to acknowledge and explain the existence and the role of tiers within the national co-ordinated social movements. By looking at SANCO as a two-tiered social movement, this study has highlighted three implications for social movement theory. Firstly, social movement literature
needs to focus on both national and local levels of social movements in suggesting any picture of decline of a social movement. Secondly, the experience of civic organisations in South Africa has demonstrated the need to look beyond the short transition period to understand the internal contradictions of the larger democratisation process. Thirdly, based on the evidence provided by the Alexandra case study, this study has demonstrated that the sustenance of the protest actions within social movements depends on the movement’s tiers and that social movements do not just disappear as suggested by the mainstream social movement literature. In the case of SANCO, local branches have caused the organisation to continue to exist even though its national level has declined.

While this dissertation does not claim to suggest a more complete theoretical solution with reasons provided for the rise and decline of social movement in South Africa, it has, nevertheless, heightened the need for a more holistic approach to the study of social movements, which approach must examine tiers inherent in social movements. This could enhance our understanding of the dynamics of contemporary social movements. The study also highlights the need for social movement literature to view activities within social movements as representing cycles, and argues that social movement literature would benefit greatly from focusing on the role of informal leaders. For, in ignoring the significance of tiers, cycles and the role of informal leadership, one runs the risk of negating the reasons behind the resurgence of many social movements in South Africa.
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APPENDIX A

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL CIVIC ORGANISATION (SANCO) AS AMENDED AND ADOPTED BY THE 3RD NATIONAL CONFERENCE - APRIL 2001

PREAMBLE

We, the South African National Civic Organization ("SANCO"), pledge our commitment to a unified, democratic, non-sexist, non-racist, non-exploitative South Africa based on the freedoms, rights and values enshrined in the Bill of rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. SANCO as a civic movement, is constituted by the residents of South Africa and is founded on the basic needs, aspirations and expectations of the masses of the people. The guiding motto is "People- centered and People-driven".

We believe that the commitment referred to above and the attainment of our aims and objectives can only be achieved in a united country with strong governance, an effective civic movement and a vibrant civic society. SANCO endeavours to promote nation building, truth and reconciliation, socio-economic and political development, reconstruction, transformation and peace and prosperity.

SANCO therefore, commits itself to the attainment of the following goals:

(i) Improvement of the living conditions of all the residents of South Africa;
(ii) Eradication of poverty, homelessness and insecurity;
(iii) Building of a united community and a united South Africa;
(iv) Promotion of socio-economic and political justice for all;
(v) Creation of empowerment structures;
(vi) Job creation, wealth creation and distribution of resources;
(vii) Attainment of social security and comfort for all;
(viii) Contribution to the promotion and protection of the freedoms, rights and values enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa;
(ix) Promotion the participation of youth and women in all its activities;
(x) Support and promotion of the struggle for the rights of children and people with special needs;
(xi) Contribution to the reconstruction and development in South Africa; elimination of all vestiges of apartheid; and
(xii) From time to time, collaborate with organisations and social formations that will help to attain the aims and objectives of SANCO.

DEFINITIONS

1. “Branch” means an area falling within a specific local council the demarcation of which is determined by the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC).
2. “Constitution” means this constitution.
3. “Departments” means Housing and Land Affairs and Agriculture; Human Resources and Education; Governance and Democratisation; Health, Welfare and nutrition, Economy and Social Development; Environment and Tourism; Sports and Culture; Essential Services; Safety and Security;
and others as may be determined by the National Executive Committee (NEC).
4. “Executive” means a person who holds office within SANCO Committee, either Nationally, Provincially, Regionally or at Branch level.
6. “Leadership” means an Executive member at any level.
7. “Member” means a person who has fully paid his or her subscription fees.
8. “National Office Bearers” means the National President, Deputy National President, the General Secretary, the Deputy General Secretary, the Treasurer, and the National Organizing Secretary.
9. “Organ” means any functional structure of SANCO.
10. “Organisation” means SANCO or civic movement.
11. “Province” means a province as demarcated in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
12. “Quorum” means fifty percent plus one (50% +1) of members present as determined by the composition stipulated in each structure and shall apply to all SANCO meetings and conferences at all levels.
13. “Region” means an area, which has been determined by the province with National Executive Committee ratification.
14. “SANCO” means organisation or civic movement.
15. “Structure” means a committee; subcommittee; commission; province; region; and a branch.

**INTERPRETATION**

In this Constitution and unless the context otherwise clearly stated. Words, including terms and definitions thereof referred to in clause which import the singular number only shall include the plural and vice versa; Words importing
any one gender shall include the other genders; The head notes to the various clauses of this Constitution are inserted for reference purposes only and shall in no way govern the interpretation thereof.

**NAME**

The name of the organization shall be SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL CIVIC ORGANISATION, herein after referred to as “SANCO”.

**COLOURS AND LOGO**

1. The colours of SANCO shall be black, green, and red with gold being the dominant colour.
2. The slogan in the logo shall be “People Centered Development”.

**THE MISSION OF SANCO**

Our mission is to build SANCO into a strong, independent and effective Organization through, among others, mobilizing, recruiting, organizing and conscientising the people of South Africa with special regard to the needs of the poor and the previously disadvantaged;

**AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF SANCO SHALL:**

1. To achieve the goals set out in the preamble;
2. To promote and advance empowerment and capacity-building through projects, programmes, campaigns, education and training;
3. To represent and negotiate on behalf of its members with other parties, organisations, and authorities on any matter affecting their interests;

4. To lobby authorities to propose favourable legislation and to comment on any proposed law, action or policy of any authority affecting the interests of the residents;

5. To institute legal proceedings and any other action on behalf of its members, and to defend residents’ legal interests, either individually or collectively;

6. To co-operate with those progressive organs of civil society, both locally and internationally, which have similar aims and objectives;

7. To conduct, co-ordinate and publish research on developments pertaining to socio-economic and political issues and any other issues of public interest affecting members and residents;

8. To form a Trust on behalf of its members, which Trust shall be the only shareholder in SANCO investment projects;

9. To establish and promote community projects and co-operatives;

10. To do such things as may be in the interest of the organization, its members and communities which are not inconsistent with the objects or matters specifically provided for in this constitution;

11. SANCO shall use powers as necessary to implement all its aims and objectives as set above;

12. The responsibilities set out above shall be carried out by the National Working Committee (NWC) on the mandate of the NEC. In return, the NWC shall delegate such responsibilities, as it deems necessary to the National President and General Secretary.
NATIONAL OFFICE

The National Office of SANCO shall be in Johannesburg or at any other city as may be determined by the National Conference from time to time. In deciding about the location of the National Office, the National Conference shall take into consideration all relevant factors including, but not limited to, the cost of relocation, centrality and easy access.

LEGAL STANDING AND COMPOSITION OF SANCO

LEGAL STANDING

1. SANCO shall be a civic organization registered as a section 21 company. It shall be capable of acquiring rights, incurring obligations, entering into legal transactions and suing and being sued in its own name.
2. SANCO shall operate bank accounts and acquire and own property in its own name.
3. SANCO is a non-racial, non-sexist, independent and unitary civic movement; its policies are determined by its membership and structures.
4. The leadership of SANCO shall be accountable to its membership.
5. Freedom of speech and free circulation of ideas and information shall be upheld within SANCO.

COMPOSITION OF SANCO

The organisational structure of SANCO shall be subdivided into provinces, regions and branches/locals, which shall all be answerable to the National Executive Committee.
SANCO consists of the following structures:

(a) National Conference
(b) National Executive Committee (NEC)
(c) National Working Committee (NWC)
(d) National Office Bearers (NOB)
(e) Provincial Conference
(f) Provincial Executive Committee (PEC)
(g) Provincial Working Committee (PWC)
(h) Provincial Genera Council
(i) Provincial Office Bearers (POB)
(j) Regional Conference
(k) Regional Executive Committee (REC)
(l) Regional Working Committee (RWC)
(m) Regional General Council
(n) Regional Office Bearers (ROB)
(o) Annual Branch Meeting (AGM)
(p) Branch Executive Committee (BEC)
(q) Branch Office Bearers (BOB)

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The National Conference is the supreme ruling and controlling body of SANCO and it must be held every four-(4) years.
COMPOSITION

The National Conference is composed of all provincial delegates. Each Provincial delegation shall be proportional to the membership of each province according to the formula determined by the NEC from time to time. This determination shall be binding on the provinces.

POWERS AND DUTIES

The National Conference shall:

(a) Elect the National Office Bearers and fifteen (15) National Working Committee members who, by virtue of their offices, shall be part of the National Executive Committee;
(b) Decide and determine the policy, programme and constitution of SANCO.
(c) Receive and discuss the reports of the NEC, including the Presidential address and the General Secretary’s report. The latter report shall include a report on the work and activities of all other SANCO structures;
(d) Have powers to review, ratify, alter or rescind any decision taken by any of the constituent bodies, structures, units or officials of SANCO;
(e) Have the power to elect or appoint any commission or committee and assign special tasks and duties to such commission or committee, as the case may be.
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC)

The NEC shall be the national policy-making body of SANCO in between National Conferences and shall be vested with the power to decide on policy issues. Term of office of the National Executive Committee shall be four (4) years.

COMPOSITION

The NEC shall be composed of the following:

(a) The National President, Deputy President, General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, Treasurer, Organizing Secretary, the head of departments and the fifteen- (15) NWC members;
(b) The National office bearers;
(c) Fifteen NWC members;
(d) The Chairperson and the Provincial Secretary of each province; and

MEETINGS

The NEC shall ordinarily meet at least once every three- (3) months on a date fixed by the National Working Committee. Special meetings of the NEC shall be called by the President upon resolution of the NWC or upon written requisition of not less than two thirds of the provinces.
POWERS AND DUTIES

The NEC shall:

(a) Appoint heads of departments;
(b) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the National Conference.
(c) Issue and send directives and instructions to and receive reports from provinces;
(d) Set up sub-committees and determine their nature, membership and scope;
(e) Enforce discipline in terms of relevant clauses in this constitution;
(f) Establish projects and activities in accordance with the aims and objectives of the organisation;
(g) Endeavour to settle disputes within and between structures;
(h) Dissolve the leadership of the Province, Region or Branch where it deems it necessary;
(I) Terminate, in consultation with the Branch the membership of an individual;
(j) Open and operate a banking account in the name of SANCO into which monies raised shall be placed and administer such funds;
(k) Acquire, either by purchase, lease, or otherwise, any movable or immovable property on behalf of SANCO;
(l) Approve annual audited financial statements and balance sheets of the organization and approve the budget presented by the NOB’S;
(m) Appoint any person or persons to fill vacancies within the NEC;
(n) Appoint NEC members to respective departments for area of focus;
(o) Co-opt three NEC members, provided names are approved by two-third majority of NEC members;
(p) Deal with such matters as are specifically delegated to it by the national conference;
(q) Facilitate and encourage co-operation between provinces and other SANCO structures;
(r) Femand and receive reports from SANCO structures;
(s) Manage and control all national property and funds for SANCO;
(t) Convene meetings of the National Conference;
(u) Issue and send directives and instructions to all other structures of SANCO;
(v) Engage employees of the organization, and fix their conditions of employment and define their duties based on recommendations from the National Office Bearers;
(w) Afford legal and other assistance to all SANCO structures and members in furtherance of the aims and objectives of SANCO;
(x) Institute and/or defend legal proceedings against SANCO and to appoint a person to sign any documents with or on behalf of the organisation;
(y) Supervise and direct the work of SANCO generally;
(z) Ensure that all the structures of SANCO function effectively and democratically.

NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE

(1) There shall be shall be a working committee at National, Provincial and Regional levels of SANCO.
(2) Members of these committees shall be elected at relevant conferences of SANCO.
COMPOSITION

The NWC shall be composed as follows:

1. The President, Deputy President, General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, Treasurer, Organising Secretary, elected and co-opted departmental heads and 15 members elected by the relevant Conference;
2. The members of the National Working Committee shall not necessarily be full-time functionaries of SANCO. However, the NEC shall determine the extent to which the elected members shall be full-time functionaries who may be allocated specific responsibilities.
3. The structure of the working committee at Provincial and Regional levels shall mirror that of the National Working Committee in all respects, as far as circumstances permit, including composition, powers and duties.

POWERS AND DUTIES

The National Working Committee shall:

(a) Carry out decisions and instructions of the National Conference and the NEC;
(b) Conduct the current work of SANCO;
(c) Submit a report at each NEC meeting;
(d) Delegate its powers in between the meetings of the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee, to the National President and the General Secretary, who will take whatever decision appropriate for SANCO on behalf of the National Working Committee;
(e) Deal with such matters as are specifically delegated to it by the NEC and the National Conference;
(f) Carry out the duties as mandated by the National Executive Committee; and
(g) Assume all powers of the National Executive Committee in between National Executive Committee meetings as provided for in clause 11 (5).

MEETINGS

(a) The NWC shall ordinarily meet at least once every six weeks on the date to be fixed by the National President.
(b) Special meetings of the NWC shall be called by the President through the General Secretary upon written requisition of not less than two thirds of the NWC members.
(c) The NWC shall have the powers to call a special meeting should it be necessary.
(d) Seven (7) days written notice of the NEC shall be given to each Provincial representative provided that in the case of a special or Urgent meeting, shorter notice of not less than three (3) days may be given.
(e) If an NWC member does not attend a committee meeting, there must be a written apology forwarded to the committee before the meeting, failing which such member shall be guilty of misconduct. Should a member fail to attend three (3) consecutive committee meetings, such member shall be deemed to have absconded her office.
NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

GENERAL DUTIES OF NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

The National Office Bearers, as an organ of SANCO, shall:

(a) Carry out duties as mandated by the National Executive Committee;
(b) Assume the powers of the National Working Committee in between National Working Committee meetings;
(c) Be responsible for the day-to-day executive functions of the organization;
(d) Be responsible to oversee all commercial investments of the organization;
(e) Appoint Trustees to the SANCO Development Trust and approve/ratify appointment of SANCO business ventures at all levels of SANCO structures;
(f) Submit a report to each NWC meeting;
(g) Prepare and submit a report to the NEC; and
(h) Be competent to take decisions and make recommendations to the NWC and the NEC.

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

President shall be:

(a) The head and chief directing officer of SANCO at all levels and in charge of all the structures of SANCO;
(b) Accountable to the NEC for his activities and meetings;
(c) Entitled to preside over all meetings of SANCO at all levels;
(d) The leader of SANCO delegations in meetings with all
persons and organisations with whom SANCO meets;

(e) One of the signatories of bank accounts of SANCO;

(f) Be responsible for presenting the National Conference with a comprehensive statement of the state of Nation and political situation generally at relevant levels;

(g) Be an ex officio member of all committees at all levels of the organization.

The Deputy President shall:

(a) Deputise for the president.

The General Secretary shall:

(a) Be a full time employee of the organization;

(b) Be responsible for all correspondence in the National Office;

(c) Generally administer the affairs of SANCO at National level and keep the president and deputy president posted with regard to relevant developments;

(d) Co-ordinate meetings of SANCO at National level and be responsible for the distribution of minutes and all other relevant documentation;

(e) Attend all meetings of SANCO and be responsible for the minute taking at all meetings;

(f) Head the administration, co-ordinate commercial ventures and receive reports from all departments, staff and all structures of SANCO;

(g) Present and submit to the National Conference, NEC and NWC, an assessment and evaluating report on the performance and external impact. The report shall be prepared by an independent body;
(h) In consultation with the President Issue press statements and deal with the media to make SANCO’s aims and objectives, policies and principles known to the public;

(i) Liaise with the news agencies, newspaper and other media on behalf of SANCO; and

(j) Be responsible for performance of departments.

The Deputy General Secretary shall:

(a) Deputise the Secretary General

The Treasurer shall:

(a) Be responsible for all aspects related to the financial affairs of SANCO;

(b) Co-ordinate fund-raising activities and efforts;

(c) Liaise with funders;

(d) Maintain proper books of accounts and monitor bank accounts of SANCO;

(e) Submit regular written reports to the NOB, NWC and NEC regarding the financial position of SANCO;

(f) Be head of treasury and finance together with all treasurers of structures below;

(g) Be chief custodian of the funds and property of SANCO;

(h) Submit to conference, an independently audited financial statements covering such period as may be determined by the Conference, or National Executive Committee, from time to time.
Organising Secretary shall:

(a) Be head of the recruitment drive of the organisation;
(b) Ensure that membership systems are in place;
(c) Ensure that renewal of memberships is up to date;
(d) oversee the distribution of membership cards;
(e) Ensure safe keeping of SANCO merchandise and memorabilia;
(f) Ensure that campaigns are undertaken and rallies and marches are conducted;
(g) keep and update membership statistics;
(h) Ensure that structures of the organisation are properly launched.

PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE

Every Province shall hold a Provincial Conference once every three years.

(a) All the affairs of SANCO pertaining to a Province shall be decided by the Provincial Conference in line with the national policies and principles of the National Conference (PWC);
(c) The Provincial Conference shall elect the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) and members of the Provincial Working Committee.
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES

COMPOSITION

The PEC shall consist of the Provincial Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Provincial Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Treasurer and Provincial Organizing Secretary;

(a) PWC members;
(b) Regional Chairperson and Secretary
(c) The chairperson and the secretary of each province shall, by virtue of their offices be part of the National Executive Committee;
(d) Term of office of the Provincial Executive Committee shall be three years.

POWERS AND DUTIES

The PEC shall:

(a) Be responsible for carrying out the decisions of the Provincial Conference;
(b) Organize, establish and service branches in the Province and supervise the work of the Regions in the Province;
(c) Carry out the policies and programmes of SANCO and do all things necessary to further the interests, aims and objectives of the organisation;
(d) Consult with the NEC on issues relating to policy matters;
(e) Appoint heads of departments for the province; and
(f) Allocate PWC members to their respective departments or areas of focus.

GENERAL COUNCIL

Each province shall have a structure called General Council, which shall be the highest provincial governing body in-between provincial conferences.

COMPOSITION

A General Council shall be composed of:

(a) Provincial Working Committee;
(b) Five (5) representatives from each Branch;
(c) All Regional Working Committees.

MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL

1. The General Council shall ordinarily meet once every three (3) months.
2. Fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) of members present shall constitute a quorum.

POWERS AND DUTIES

The General Council is competent to accept motions on policy amendments, development programmes and projects, including performances of structures in the province, subject to the proviso that such motions must not be contrary to
SANCO national policy. It is within the powers of the General Council to accept a motion of no confidence of any structure in the province. The General Council has a duty to receive reports from the Provincial Executive Committee.

**DECISION MAKING IN THE GENERAL COUNCIL.**

1. A decision or resolution of the General Council requires at least fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) votes in favour, for it to bind the Province.
2. A motion of no confidence on any Provincial SANCO structure, requires two-thirds (2/3) majority of votes in favour, by the General Council to be binding on the Province.

**REGIONAL COMMITTEES**

The PEC, in consultation with the NEC, shall divide the Province into Regions for the more efficient and democratic functioning of SANCO. The maximum number of Regions shall be determined by the PEC in consultation with the NEC. Criteria for Regional demarcation shall be reviewed by the National Executive Committee from time to time.

**REGIONAL AUTONOMY**

As South Africa is a vast area and regions are great distance from one another, is agreed that the regions have that autonomy of organizationally performing some tasks, campaigning, fund-raising for financial consistency in order to fulfill the regional tasks, but all these must be reported to the NEC in advance, and if it is an urgent matter, a full report that can be accounted for should be tabled. But
such autonomy shall not be contrary to the national policies and principles of SANCO.

REGIONAL CONFERENCE

Each Region shall hold a regional conference once a year which conference shall elect the chair person, deputy chairperson, regional secretary, treasurer, regional organizing secretary and nine additional members:

(a) Officials elected at regional conference shall constitute the Regional Executive committee, which shall have the powers to appoint heads of departments.

(c) Each Region shall hold bi-annual general meeting.

(d) Each Regional Executive committee shall meet once a month.

(e) Additional regional council meetings may be convened by the Regional Executive Committee or the PEC or on the request of at least one-third of the branches.

(f) The Regional chairperson and the secretary shall by virtue of their offices be part of the provincial executive committee.

REPRESENTATION AT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING AND REGIONAL CONFERENCE

Each branch shall be entitled to send at least one delegate to the annual general meeting and/or Conference. Each branch within a region shall be entitled to send delegates to the annual regional meeting and/or Conference proportional to its membership.
REGIONAL GENERAL COUNCIL

Each Region is competent to convene a Regional General Council.

A Regional General Council shall be composed as follows:

(a) Regional Working Committee;
(b) Five representatives from each branch.
(c) The provisions relative to Provincial General Councils shall apply to Regional Councils.

BRANCHES/LOCAL COMMITTEES

Every member of SANCO shall belong to a branch, which shall be the basic unit of the organisation.

COMPOSITION OF STRUCTURES AT LOCAL LEVEL

(a) All SANCO structures at local level shall be the same as those at Regional and provincial level and shall operate on the same principles as regions but at local level.
(b) Each local structure shall be divided into branches as agreed to by the local conference. The structure of such branches shall replicate those of higher structures and operate on similar principles but at the level of a branch.
(c) Each branch shall be further sub-divided into areas and such areas into street committees and shall operate on similar principles as
other structures but shall look into the needs of their respective constituencies.

(e) The area committee shall replicate the branch committee and shall operate on similar principles as other structures above.

POWERS AND DUTIES

The branch shall:

(a) Be registered with the National Office;
(b) Meet at least once a month
(c) Be the place where members exercise their basic democratic rights to discuss and formulate policy matters, which policy matters shall be recommended to the NEC;
(d) Be the basic unit of activity for members;
(e) Elect at an annual branch meeting, office bearers and the Branch Executive Committee (BEC).
(f) Term of office for Branch Executive Council shall be one (1) year.

SPECIAL COMMITTEES, SUB-COMMITTEES AND COMMITTEES

The executive committee shall be empowered to appoint special Committees or commissions when necessary. The executive committee shall be empowered to appoint or co-opt members should vacancies occur for special tasks of SANCO or for replacement of a member who has ceased to be functional at his respective level or sub-committee or department.
PROVINCES, REGIONS AND BRANCHES

This constitution shall be binding on all structures of SANCO.

(a) The policies, principles and of all such structures shall not be contrary to the National Policy of SANCO;
(b) All such structures shall have one name, i.e. SANCO, and one common constitution as adopted by the National Conference of SANCO;
(c) The powers and duties of structures and for leadership at any level shall be similar to those of the national structures;
(d) The portfolios, powers and duties of the members shall be the same as those of the structures below;
(e) The PEC shall be the policy interpretation body in the provinces;
(f) Provincial departments shall be the same as those of the national departments and each provincial department shall have a head who shall be a member of the PEC. The same principle shall apply to regions, locals and branches and other structures of SANCO.

ELECTIONS AND VOTING

Nomination procedures and conduct of elections shall be made by resolution of NEC, PEC, REC, and BEC preceding the conference where elections are to be held.

(a) All SANCO structures shall vote by means of a secret ballot.
(b) Independent electoral officers shall be appointed by the NEC to conduct national elections. Elections of all the structures below shall be conducted by the immediate higher structure.

(c) Each member shall be entitled to one vote.

(d) At a national, provincial and regional level, only mandated delegates and the executive committee of each relevant level shall be entitled to participate in the elections.

(e) No interim structure shall have voting rights and no person from an interim structure shall be eligible to be voted for, at higher level.

The following period of membership applies before a member can qualify to be elected to hold an executive office in the organization:

(a) 4 years for National Executive Committee;
(b) 3 years for Provincial Executive Committee;
(c) 2 years for Regional Executive Committee; and
(d) 1 year for Branch Executive Committee.

**MEMBERSHIP**

Membership shall be open to all South African residents irrespective of race, sex, political affiliation, class and geographical location above the age of 18.

(a) All the members of SANCO shall be obliged to abide by its constitution and code of conduct.

(b) All members of SANCO have to pay an annual subscription fee, which shall be determined by the National Conference from time to time.
(c) The branch executive committee in consultation with the NWC shall have the power to accept or refuse any application for membership. If the BEC does not exist the REC or PEC shall assume responsibility.

(d) Membership cards shall be issued by the NEC to registered members of SANCO and to persons whose application for membership has been accepted, subject to payment of the prescribed subscription fee.

An individual shall cease to be a member of SANCO on the happening of any of the following:

(a) If found guilty by a Court of law for any crime which the NEC in its discretion, regards as serious and warranting termination of membership and may include, but not limited to, crimes involving dishonesty or any violation of human rights;

(b) If he fails to pay his subscriptions fee for six(6) months and after having been so advised in writing;

(c) If he dies; and

(d) If he is expelled from the Organization after a Disciplinary Hearing has been held.

Non-earning members or those with reduced incomes will pay such Lower subscription fees as determined by the NEC from time to time.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS

A member has a right to:

(a) Take full and active part in the discussion, formulation and implementation of the policies of SANCO;
(b) Receive and impart information on all aspects of SANCO policy and activities;
(c) Offer constructive criticism of any member, official, decision, policy, programme or activity of SANCO within the parameters of the code of conduct;
(d) submit proposals or statements to relevant SANCO structure, or organ; and
(e) Take part in elections and be elected or appointed to any structure, organ or delegation of SANCO, unless such a member has been suspended or is otherwise disqualified in terms of the provisions of this constitution.

A member shall have the duty to:

(a) Belong to and participate in a branch;
(b) Inform his branch committee of a change of address and report to the street/yard secretary on arriving at new street/yard;
(c) Explain the aims, principles, policies and activities of SANCO to other residents;
(d) Combat propaganda detrimental to the interests of SANCO;
(e) Defend its aims, principles and policies, activities and programmes;
(f) Fight against any form of discrimination, racism, sexism and
religious intolerance;

(g) Deepen his understanding of the social, cultural, political and economic problems of his city and country as a whole;

(h) Take all the necessary steps to understand and carry out the aims, policies, programmes and activities of SANCO; and

(i) Observe discipline, behave honestly and carry-out the decisions of the majority and those of higher structures within SANCO.

**SANCO EMPLOYEES**

SANCO shall adopt an employment code, which will govern conduct of all staff employed by the organisation. The conduct of any SANCO employee shall be guided by the rules and regulations as laid down in the code of employment.

**CODE OF CONDUCT**

All Conferences and Executive committees at various levels, including Branches/local committees, shall have powers to make rules and regulations, resolutions, policies, disciplinary guidance and so on, with regard to conduct of members, under a given structure, which shall be binding on members amenable to such structure. These shall be in line with this constitution.

The relationship among Executive Committee Members at any level shall be as follows:

(a) When a committee member has erred, another committee member shall first attempt to effect a corrective before the issue is brought to the attention of the committee;

(b) No member of any committee of SANCO shall criticize another
member outside of a meeting or in public;
(c) No member of SANCO shall be insulted or treated in a disrespectful manner by another member;
(d) Character assassination, gossiping and destructive criticism is not allowed;
(e) All members shall comply with the SANCO aims and objectives, principles and policies as well as this constitution;
(f) All members shall be disciplined, obedient and loyal to SANCO at all times;
(g) Any SANCO member who behaves himself contrary to the Code of Conduct shall be subjected to discipline.
(h) No member of SANCO may join another organisation with policies, aims and objectives different from that of SANCO;
(i) No member of SANCO may promote the interests of another organisation with policies, aims and objectives different from those of SANCO;
(j) No member of SANCO may put the organisation into disrepute; and
(k) A member of SANCO who contravenes any stipulation of this code of conduct or any provision of this constitution relative to conduct shall be guilty of an offence and on a guilty finding by the Disciplinary tribunal, be given an appropriate sentence.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

The following rules and regulations shall be observed by all SANCO members:
(a) The taking of drugs and related narcotic substances is not allowed, and excessive drinking is discouraged;
(b) Abusive and disrespectful behavior towards other people is prohibited;
(c) Gossiping shall constitute misconduct;
(d) Behaving in a manner calculated to bring the SANCO into disrepute shall constitute misconduct;
(e) Unauthorized use of SANCO’s property is not allowed; and
(f) Disrupting meetings and interfering with the orderly functioning of SANCO shall constitute misconduct.

**DISCIPLINARY CODE**

(1) There shall be a disciplinary tribunal at each level of SANCO.

(2) An appeal or a review from the decision of a disciplinary tribunal at any level will be heard by an immediate higher disciplinary structure.

(3) For purposes of disciplinary hearings all executive committees at all levels including Branches/Local committees shall sit as disciplinary tribunals.

(4) The highest disciplinary tribunal shall be the National Executive Committee.

(5) Each disciplinary tribunal shall for the purposes of adjudicating on a matter, co-opt a person with a legal background to sit.

(6) All disciplinary tribunals shall have powers to mete out reasonable penalty, including but not limited to, warning, a monetary fine and expulsion from SANCO.
(7) Each disciplinary tribunal shall be composed of two members of the Executive Committee and where necessary a co-opted person with a legal background. The president or chairperson as the case may be, shall appoint people to sit in the disciplinary tribunal.

(8) For each disciplinary tribunal, the president or chairperson, as the case may be, shall appoint a case presenter who will present the case for the complainant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

(1) Any member who contravenes the provisions of this constitution shall be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.

(2) All Executive Committees at each level including branch/Local Committees shall have powers to suspend a member on reasonable grounds presented to it in writing.

(3) Depending on the seriousness of the allegations against a member such member may be suspended before the hearing, or be summarily expelled, which expulsion shall be carried out by the NWC and ratified by the NEC.

(4) In the event of a suspension, the hearing shall take place within Sixty (60) days failing which it shall automatically fall away.

(5) Any person facing disciplinary proceedings shall receive timeous written notice of the hearing containing the basic allegation against him. Such notice shall be given not less than Fourteen (14) days before the hearing.

(6) A party to a disciplinary hearing who is aggrieved by the decision of that disciplinary structure has a right to note an appeal or review to an immediate higher structure within twenty one (21) days.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE HOLDING OF A DISCIPLINARY INQUIRY

The inquiry shall be led by a case presenter who shall perform the following necessary preliminary tasks:

(a) Conduct an investigation regarding the offence;
(b) Interview potential witnesses and take statements from them;
(c) Formulate the charges to be preferred;
(d) Send a written notice to the accused informing him about the inquiry.

This notice shall:

(i) Inform the accused about the time and venue of the disciplinary inquiry;
(ii) Inform the accused about the time frames, within which to submit a request for further particulars to the charges;
(iii) Contain information with respect to the rights of the accused.

These rights of the accused shall include, among others the right to:

(a) Be assisted in the presentation of the case by another member of SANCO;
(b) Challenge the evidence of the witnesses of the case presented by cross examination;
(c) Raise preliminary objections, either to the way the charge has been formulated or to raise an objection regarding the presiding panel;
(d) Raise objections during the proceedings, which objections may either be overruled or sustained;

(e) Present her case if she chooses, either by herself or through her witnesses;

(f) Have the inquiry conducted in the language she understands, failing which, to request to be provided with an interpreter;

(g) Be presumed innocent; and

(h) Remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings.

CONDUCT OF THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

(1) The presiding officer shall first introduce the panel, call upon the case presenter to mention the case and to read the charges that are being preferred against the accused.

(2) The presiding officer shall, thereafter, proceed to explain to the accused his rights in the same way that the case presenter did in his notice to the accused.

(3) He shall inquire as to how the accused intends to plead.

(4) After these preliminaries, the case presenter shall commence with his case, either by giving a summary of the case or proceeding to call his witnesses.

(5) The accused may or may not challenge their evidence.

(6) The accused may raise points to be dealt with before the case begins.

(7) He is also free to raise objections during the proceedings, which objections will either be overruled or upheld.

(8) The accused shall present his case as soon as the case presenter has closed his.
(9) He too may either give an outline of his case or proceed to call his witnesses.

(10) During the proceedings he shall be given ample opportunity to consult with the person assisting him.

(11) After the close of the accused’s case, the case presenter will present his argument, followed by that of the accused.

(12) The presiding officer may either hand down his decision there and then, or may postpone it to a later date, if it will serve justice to do so.

(13) The presiding officer may also pronounce sentence there and then or postpone it to a later date, if doing so, will better serve justice.

(14) Both the case presenter and the accused may appeal the decision of a lower tribunal to the tribunal of a level immediately above that one.

(15) When the proceedings have finally concluded, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall forward a written report to the relevant Executive Committee case, for records purposes.

**INDEMNITY**

(1) An office-bearer of SANCO is indemnified and cannot be held legally liable if acted within the scope of his duties, unless acted deliberately and/or with gross negligence.

(2) SANCO is a National Unitary Structure, but for the purposes of its financial transactions and contracts, its various structures are independent entities. However, all SANCO structures shall report
and be accountable to the National Executive Committee, which in turn, shall report and be accountable to the National Conference.

(3) All office Bearers and employees of SANCO at all levels, shall be indemnified in their personal capacity from all debts and related financial obligations of SANCO, arising from contracts entered into by SANCO.

(4) Each structure of SANCO shall be liable only for debts and related financial obligations arising out of contracts entered into by itself.

(5) Any structure of SANCO shall be liable only for debts and related financial obligations arising out of contracts entered into by another structure of SANCO where it has given its prior written consent to that effect.

**ASSETS OF SANCO**

(1) SANCO is a legal person (juristic person), independent from its members with its own rights and duties.

(2) Every structure of SANCO shall have a right to acquire assets in its own name and on its own account, at its own instance.

(3) Every structure of SANCO shall have an office to operate from with all relevant equipment and employ people.

(4) The assets of SANCO shall be used strictly to promote the interests of SANCO, its members as well as its aims and objectives.

(5) The property of SANCO, or any of its structures, shall belong to it and be separate from that of its members.
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

The constitution shall be altered or amended by two-thirds of the votes of delegates of the National Conference.

DISSOLUTION

(1) SANCO may be dissolved by a resolution of two thirds of those present at a meeting of the National Conference called specifically for that purpose.

(2) Not less than 21 (twenty-one) days notice shall be given of such meeting and the notice convening such meeting shall clearly state its purpose and shall be circulated to all SANCO structures.

(3) Upon the dissolution of SANCO the NEC shall be empowered to distribute the net assets in any manner decided by the special national conference meeting, provided that such assets shall not be paid to or distributed among members of SANCO, staff members or to any person associated with the business of SANCO.

(4) For the purposes of winding-up the affairs and dissolution of the assets of SANCO, the NEC may, by ordinary resolution, appoint one or more liquidators and determine the powers to be vested in such liquidators.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF SANCO OFFICE BEARERS

NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

(List compiled by Author in 2002/3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Office Bearers</th>
<th>Portfolio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mlungisi Hlongwane</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Bhengu</td>
<td>Deputy President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Mngomezulu</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Mahloboegoane</td>
<td>Deputy General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Shabangu</td>
<td>National Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. William Molefe</td>
<td>National Organising Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubrey Mali</td>
<td>Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mcebisi Msizi</td>
<td>Information Technology and Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phumzile Cele</td>
<td>Youth, Women, and Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumisani Mthalane</td>
<td>Economy and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Nkosi</td>
<td>Essential Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddie Goliath</td>
<td>Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumsy Jobo</td>
<td>Social Welfare and Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Maziya</td>
<td>Religion, Gender and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donovan Williams</td>
<td>Policy, Research and Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sylvia Stevens Maziya</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Nkosi</td>
<td>Essential Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloria Seoketsa</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Radebe</td>
<td>Additional Member</td>
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## PROVINCIAL OFFICE BEARERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Provincial Office Bearers</th>
<th>Portfolio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMPOPO</strong></td>
<td>Zacharia Moeletsi</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nelson Ntsewa</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamela Sekonya</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nelson Chauke</td>
<td>Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gilbert Mosena</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GAUTENG</strong></td>
<td>Richard Mdakane</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siphiwe Thusi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toenka Matile</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simon Maphaila</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREE STATE</strong></td>
<td>Alwyn Wittes</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selby Plaatjie</td>
<td>Deputy Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrick Cwebi</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ace Molefe</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edith Goliath</td>
<td>Environment &amp; Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mumsy Jobo</td>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MPUMALANGA</strong></td>
<td>Roy Ledwaba</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Nkhwanazi</td>
<td>Deputy Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dumisani Mango</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mike Soko</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raymond Makama</td>
<td>Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KWAZULU NATAL</strong></td>
<td>Obed Shabangu</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skhumbuzo Mpandza</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN CAPE</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>Deputy Chairperson</td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robbie Tsikwe</td>
<td></td>
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# REGIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

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APPENDIX C

NAMES OF RESEARCHERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE HSRC SURVEYS

Prof. Bert Klandermans, Department of Social Psychology, Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Dr Johan Olivier, Head of Democracy and Governance Unit at HSRC, Pretoria, South Africa.

Prof. Tom Lodge, Department of Political Studies, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Dr Ihron Rensburg, Deputy Director General of the Department of Education, Pretoria, South Africa. Currently vice Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg.

Dr Shireen Hassim, Department of Political Studies, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Prof. Hennie Kotze, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa.

Prof. Ari Sitas, Department of Sociology, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa.

Dr Monique Marks, Department of Sociology, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa.
Dr Marlene Roefs, Department of Social Psychology, Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands and Democracy and Governance Unit at HSRC, Pretoria, South Africa.

Mr Ndanduleni Bernard Nthambeleni, Department of Sociology, Vista University, East Rand Campus, South Africa. Currently with National Research Foundation, Pretoria.

Ms Thembeka Mufamadi, Democracy and Governance Unit at HSRC, Pretoria, South Africa.
APPENDIX D

INITIAL SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR SANCO BRANCHES IN ALEXANDRA

1. Where were you born and brought up, and what was your family background?
2. Which school did you attend?
3. What was the political atmosphere like?
4. How would you define the main priorities and goals of your organisation?
5. When did you join SANCO?
6. How would you define the challenges facing your organisation in the post-apartheid period?
7. How do you define and see the role of SANCO?
8. What is the relationship of SANCO and government, APF?
9. What are the goals of your organisation?
10. How many regions do your organisation has and how has that change overtime?
11. Who in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, class participates in your organisation, and why?
12. What are the main financial sources of your organisation?
13. Can you describe the structure of your organisation?
14. Do your organisation have links with any political parties and why?
15. What kind of relationship exists between the local structure of your organisations and the national structures?
16. To what extent do your organisations trust the government?
17. When was your organisations established?
18. What are the strengths & weakness of your organisation?
19. Who are the leaders of your organisations, and what are their politics?
20. What do your organisations actually do?
21. Do your organisations take part in land invasions, anti-eviction and anti-
   privatisation campaigns and why?
22. What happened to Mzwanele Mayekiso?
APPENDIX E

SELECTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALEXANDRA

Photograph 1. Streets of Alexandra

Source: Greater Alexandra North Link Study, May 2005

Photograph 2. Streets in the informal settlement

Source: Greater Alexandra North Link Study, May 2005
Photograph 3. Young people preparing coal for heating at night

Source: Robin Binkes, June 2002

Photograph 4. Informal settlements

Source: Lucille Davie, 2003
Photograph 5. Informal settlements next to the main road

Source: Lucille Davie, 2003

Photograph 6. Informal settlements with electricity connections poles

Source: Chris Hawkins, September 2002
Photograph 7. Spaza Shop in the street of Alexandra

Source: Craig Lauder, March 2005

Photograph 8. Shacks crowding the pavement of street in Alexandra

Source: Johannesburg News Agency, August 2003
Photograph 9. Shacks on the banks of the Jukskei River

Source: Kathy Brooks, March 2006

Photograph 10. An old house in the Alexandra

Source: Chris Saunders, November 2007
Photograph 11. Conditions during rainy seasons

Source: Alexandra Renewal Project, 2000

Photograph 12. Residents inspecting damages caused by flood in Alexandra

Source: Alexandra Renewal Project, 2000
Photograph 13. Playing ground outside the men’s hostel

Source: Chris Saunders, November 2007

Photograph 14. Old houses in Alexandra

Source: Johannesburg News Agency, 2003
Photograph 15. RDP houses in Stwetla Camp

Source: Alexandra Renewal Project, 2006

Photograph 16. Conditions of M2 men’s hostel in Alexandra

Source: Dan O’Connor, June 2008
Photograph 17. New houses in Far East Bank Extension 7

Source: Alexandra Renewal Project, 2003