

## How can a society make its citizens just?

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### 1 HOW CAN A SOCIETY MAKE ITS CITIZENS JUST?

How can citizens be made just? I focus on how modern constitutional democracies can entice, convince, and guide their citizens to become just. I rely chiefly on Rawls's theory of justice (1971), as well as the work of sociologist Derek L. Phillips. I argue that internal control by citizens themselves is the best option. This view is attractive because every citizen can play a part in establishing and maintaining the public conception of justice by being role models, engaging in dialogue with fellow citizens, or by simply doing their part in maintaining just institutions.

**Abstract**

I show how citizens can become just. I first set out fundamental assumptions about the role of justice in a society. Thereafter I discuss the patterns of moral development citizens go through in order to live in accordance with their voluntary acceptance of the rules of justice. Then follows a discussion of what ensures voluntary compliance with a conception of justice. I add dialogue and emotions to the Rawlsian account. In conclusion I answer

the moral issue, i.e., whether people can be made just in ways that respect their moral autonomy and comply with the requirements of justice itself.

### **How can a society make its citizens just?**

How can a society ensure that all its members accept the conception of justice operative in that society and live according to its rules? Two broad options are available (cf. Phillips 1986: 4). The one option is to enforce a conception of justice through some form of external control. Citizens obey the prescriptions of a conception of justice out of fear for the consequences of disobedience. Strict enforcement of laws and regulations, a competent police force, an efficient judicial system, and well-run prisons can instil fear in citizens to ensure compliance to a conception of justice. Although any conception of justice must be enforced, this means of ensuring compliance with a conception of justice is second best if used on its own. When relying on external control alone, compliance with a conception of justice can be very costly. If people do not willingly obey just laws and regulations of their own accord, but they try to violate rules of justice at every opportunity, law enforcement agencies will be kept very busy trying to stem the tide of unjust behaviour. To enforce a conception of justice in a society where citizens have no effective sense of justice means that a government has to deal with rapidly multiplying crimes. Under such circumstances governments and their law enforcement agencies often restrict -- and even violate -- the rights of citizens in order to control escalating crime rates. The manner of enforcing a conception of justice can then easily come in conflict with the letter and spirit of justice itself. Promoting justice through enforcement becomes a cause of injustice itself.

Establishing and maintaining a just society through external control is not effective on its own. The second option for establishing and maintaining justice in a society is through internal control. When compliance with a conception of justice is accomplished through internal control, citizens regulate their own behaviour and discipline themselves - and one another - in accordance with the rules dictated by a conception of justice. Admittedly, nowhere in the human world will every single citizen in society willingly obey the rules of justice of their society. Similarly, very few people are capable of dealing fairly and justly with those who have violated their human rights. For these reasons enforcement of a conception of justice through external control will always be part of the life of a just society. Nevertheless, if a large majority of citizens willingly obey the rules of justice operative in their society, the task of enforcement becomes so much smaller and it is possible to ensure just treatment to suspected and convicted violators of the shared conception of justice (Phillips 1986: 240-241).

Both internal and external control are thus needed to ensure that citizens become just people who willingly accept and obey the laws, rules, and regulations flowing from a shared conception of justice. In this essay I want to focus on how a society can lead its citizens to develop internal control of their behaviour that will ensure that they accept and live according to the rules of the conception of justice accepted in their society. The end result will be that the conception of justice will become a truly shared one that citizens have consensus on. This means that their conception of justice functions as a framework within which they can debate, negotiate, and reinterpret their conceptions of justice whilst these are being applied to specific issues.

The issue of how citizens can be made just, or be led to become just, is important for all societies with an interest in being just, regardless of how long a particular society has

shown a commitment to justice. Stable modern constitutional democracies with a long history of dealing seriously with issues of justice have a strong interest in maintaining their just society through teaching children to be just and by keeping adults convinced to adhere to the rules of justice, or else be convicted through law enforcement for violations of justice.

In societies with much shorter histories of striving collectively to establish justice for all citizens, like South Africa, the issue of how citizens can become just has two added urgencies. One urgency concerns the need to firmly establish just institutions and to ensure compliance with the conception of justice embodied in human rights and enacted in the laws and regulations produced through just institutions.

The other urgency complicating the issue of how citizens can be made just results from the baggage carried over from the former unjust regime. Besides ensuring compliance with the new conception of justice, a newly established just society must deal with the legitimate demands for justice raised by people harmed and disadvantaged by the previous unjust society. In the case of South Africa, lots of people were murdered, maimed, tortured, degraded, and humiliated by government agencies.

They had their properties confiscated without adequate compensation and were denied opportunities to develop and exercise their talents. These issues of transitional justice make establishing and maintaining a conception of justice more complex than is the case in societies with a longer history of being reasonably just. Nevertheless, there are strong overlaps, as both societies have strong interests to convince citizens to willingly accept and voluntarily act in accordance with the rules of justice.

My focus in this article will be on the overlaps of interests that modern constitutional democracies - regardless of their age - have in enticing, convincing, and guiding their citizens to become just in ways that comply with the conceptions of justice operative in those societies. When the means used to make citizens just fully comply with the ends articulated by the conception of justice, justice will be served better through explicit recognition of its guidance in all dealings of citizens with one another. In this article, I rely chiefly on neglected aspects of Rawls's theory of justice (1971) that explicitly deal with these issues, as well on sociologist Derek L. Phillips's interdisciplinary book, *Towards a just social order* (1986), in which he fuses sociological theory with normative political philosophy. The topic of how citizens can be made just has not yet received the attention it deserves from political philosophers.

In the next section I want to set out some fundamental assumptions about the role of justice in a society that will form the foundation for what follows. Thereafter I will discuss the patterns of moral development citizens are expected to go through in order to live their lives in accordance with their voluntary acceptance and compliance with the rules of justice. Then follows a discussion of the crucial elements that ensure voluntary compliance with a conception of justice. I conclude with two additions to the Rawlsian account of how a society ought to make citizens just. The moral issue involved in this essay is whether people can be made just in ways that respect their moral autonomy and that comply with the requirements of justice itself, i.e. can people be made just justly?

### **The goal: A well-ordered society**

A well-ordered society in Rawlsian terms ought to be the goal of anyone who wants to educate citizens to become just. Why? Rawls's definition (1971: 453-457) of a well-

ordered society embodies crucial assumptions about the role of justice in a society. A well-ordered society, Rawls (1971: 453) says, is designed to "advance the good of its members." Justice as shared public morality embodied in public institutions and used for regulating many aspects of citizens' interaction has as central aim to protect every citizen's interests. Educating citizens to become just thus becomes easier, as they must be convinced that the conception of justice is in their best interest. This point is similar to Rawls's elaborate arguments about the original position, where the participants will only accept a conception of justice that will advance their interests.

The presumption that a conception of justice aims to advance every citizen's interests generates considerable controversy in societies recently transformed into just polities. Formerly oppressed citizens make claims of justice to have their injustices from the past addressed, e.g., they want their injuries, harm, and damage compensated and their confiscated properties restored. A policy to restore justice and to rectify past injustices, such as affirmative action for example, temporarily impacts on accepted criteria for just employment practices and threaten the interests of citizens who are members of the previously advantaged groups. Thus, both citizens advantaged and disadvantaged by a former unjust society often feel that the new political order threatens their interests through correcting past injustices too fast or too slow. Past injustices thus distort their experience of the equal protection of everyone's interests offered by the new public conception of justice.

The second characteristic of the Rawlsian well-ordered society is that its main public institutions are effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. For Rawls this means that such a society fulfils three requirements. The first is that those institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy the agreed upon shared conception of justice. In the case of modern constitutional democracies -- even recently established ones -- this requirement is usually true. The second requirement is more problematic, as it states that every citizen accepts and knows that the others accept the shared public conception of justice. In societies recently transformed into modern constitutional democracies, citizens look sceptically at one another and doubtfully wonder whether former racists, perpetrators of violence, exploiters, and instigators of civil unrest and disobedience have been morally transformed into liberal-democratic citizens in accordance with the strong values of equality and liberty embodied in a constitutionally enshrined bill of rights. Widespread corruption, fraud, murder, rape, assault, and other crimes fuel these doubts and thus call for an urgent programme to educate citizens to become just.

The third requirement that a society must fulfil to qualify as a well-ordered society effectively regulated by a public conception of justice, is that citizens must acquire an effective sense of justice that will give them the desire to act as the conception of justice requires. The idea of a sense of justice presupposes that citizens know and understand the requirements that a shared public conception of justice places on them. When citizens acquire an effective sense of justice in accordance with the public conception of justice, their society becomes stable. Rawls (1971: 454-457) describes a society as stable when the sense of justice has a stronger hold on most citizens than inclinations to do injustice. For Rawls this means that behaviour and acts that disturb the equilibrium of just institutions will bring forth forces strong enough to restore the just equilibrium in an acceptable time. Thus, even serious threats to the justice of the society can be countered by citizens strongly committed to uphold just institutions and to embody the public conception of justice in all required aspects of their lives.

If one of the most important aims of modern constitutional democracies is to effectively ensure their continued functioning as well-ordered societies, then the development of an effective sense of justice in their citizens must have top priority. What are morally legitimate ways of educating citizens for justice so that they will voluntarily acquire a sense of justice through exercising their autonomous judgement and choice? The three levels of moral development - distinguished by the social sciences and refined by Rawls - are good starting points for a moral way of developing a sense of justice in citizens (Rawls 1971: 461-478). Rawls discusses the three levels of moral development as three stages that follow in sequence as children develop into adults. In recently transformed modern constitutional democracies these levels might be applicable to people of all ages. Special circumstances - for which Rawls allows - might apply to some adults in such societies. These adults, with limited moral insight, might find it difficult to adapt to a transformed society based on the new values of liberty, equality, and solidarity that are embodied in the public conception of justice.

### **The morality of authority**

The first level of moral development that leads to acquiring an effective sense of justice is the morality of authority (Rawls 1971: 463-467). This morality has a limited role of introducing newcomers to the public conception of justice in a simplified way. Nevertheless, the morality of authority is subject to the full scope of the shared public conception of justice. Newcomers subject themselves to people with legitimate authority, as the newcomers cannot yet assess the validity of the roles and regulations of justice for themselves, nor doubt them with adequate reason. Figures with moral authority should exemplify the values of justice, explain the reasons for them in accessible terms, and act towards newcomers in ways that affirm their worth. Newcomers are assured of their worth as human beings and develop love and trust toward the authoritative figures. Love and trust towards authoritative figures lead to guilt when newcomers fail to obey the rules of justice. These guilt feelings are linked to the newcomers' experience of authoritative figures as role models worthy of esteem. The newcomers thus develop a wish to emulate those people who live lives of integrity, complying with the values of justice they teach to others.

### **The morality of association**

The morality of authority gradually gives way to a morality of association (Rawls 1971: 467-472). Newcomers in contact with authoritative figures are also involved in all kinds of associations, including families, schools, and neighbourhoods. In those associations, they learn to adjust their behaviour according to a set of rules or an ideal defined for a specific role, position, or status. They follow the rules or embody an ideal under the guidance of the other members of the association and especially those in positions of authority. In associations there are people who qualify as moral exemplars. These people "display skills and abilities and virtues of character and temperament, that attract our fancy, and arouse in us the desire that we should be like them and able to do the same things" (Rawls 1971: 471). These people play a crucial role in generating moral development that facilitate the transfer of moral values to newcomers.

The more citizens participate in such associations through learning the moral requirements of different roles and positions, the more their moral awareness increases. They become increasingly aware that effective social co-operation requires adherence to shared moral rules and they experience how people develop friendly feelings and trust toward one another if everyone does their duties and fulfils their obligations. They learn that doing

their part benefits others and vice versa. They experience the value of reciprocity and that in the long run following shared rules of justice is in their best interest.

Citizens who live up to the expectations that their fellows have of them, i.e. that they will uphold and abide by just and fair rules, are responsible for establishing ties with one another and for creating strong feelings of associating and identifying with one another. These ties and feelings motivate everyone to do their part. If they fail to do their part, they have feelings of guilt towards fellow associates. These feelings of guilt, Rawls argues, must include an admission of wrongs and apologies for them, a willingness to repair harm done, and an acknowledgement of appropriate punishment and censure. Citizens without these ties and feelings are willing to associate with others without adhering to a shared public conception of justice. They do not care whether they create more burdens for, or harm, to others and ignore the loss of trust and friendly feeling among citizens that their behaviour causes. Newcomers who experience such people get a small window on the ghastly Hobbesian war of all against all that can only be prevented when effective law enforcement agencies act against citizens refusing to acquire or live by an appropriate sense of justice.

The morality of association develops a citizen's ability to co-operate with others in terms of a shared conception of justice and stimulates a citizen's sense of responsibility for doing his or her part in establishing and maintaining the fundamental rules underlying human associations. Rawls recognises that the morality of association requires citizens to develop intellectual judgement and moral discrimination. For Rawls this means the following. Through participation in associations, citizens learn that other citizens have different responsibilities and views that depend largely on their positions or stations in life. They must learn how to gather the information needed to understand the views and perspectives of other citizens and how to process that information in order to identify the characteristic features of what and how others think. Once that is understood, citizens can develop the imaginative capability of placing themselves in another's position so as to understand their way of thinking, especially the moral considerations they take into account (Phillips 1986: 198-200). Understanding others' thinking enables citizens to manage their own behaviour most appropriately through taking note of the views, lives, and behaviour of others. Morality becomes so much easier to implement once others and their concerns as fellow associates are clearly noted and taken into account.

### **The morality of principles**

The morality of principles is the end result of the process of moral development that educates citizens to become just in accordance with the shared public conception of justice operative in their society (Rawls 1971: 473-478). This level of moral development includes the other two, as their ideals, precepts, rules, and values must be integrated, explained, and justified by the broader perspectives provided by a conception of justice that is embodied fully in a morality of principles.

The morality of association flows into a morality of principles when citizens learn to identify the fundamental principles of justice that underlies all the ideals, duties, and obligations of roles and positions in the associations in which they have participated. Citizens recognise that just principles and just institutions benefit them and thus they develop a strong commitment to honour and protect justice. They show a "willingness to work for the setting up of just institutions, their maintenance, and reform" (Rawls 1971: 474). Once citizens reach the level of the morality of principles, the moral development

needed for the establishment, maintenance, and renewal of a well-ordered society is sufficient. Citizens with a morality of principles are capable of the internal control needed to uphold just institutions and to implement and develop the publicly shared conception of justice to ensure that justice prevails indefinitely.

### **Shared aspects of developing the three levels of morality**

The development of the three levels of morality share important characteristics. These shared characteristics are noteworthy, as they map out clearly the nature of justice and the role of citizens in justly establishing, maintaining, and refining a shared, public conception of justice. Although governments at local, provincial, and national levels have to play important roles to safeguard justice through law enforcement, just policies, examples of integrity, and unambiguous endorsements of the rules of justice, ordinary citizens must play a similarly crucial role to make justice work.

The first shared characteristic concerns reciprocal benefit. A conception of justice must secure the fundamental interests of all citizens, so that they all have a strong incentive for doing their part to maintain just institutions. Not only do they have a strong incentive to do their own part, but also to see to it that others do likewise. The non-compliance of some citizens threatens the well-being and liberty justly available to all others. When citizens indeed do their part to maintain just institutions, their fellows are motivated to do likewise and they develop trust and ties of friendship toward one another. Improved social co-operation follows, as well as feelings that the rights protecting their fundamental interests are and will be respected. These feelings of attachment and commitment to fellow citizens doing their just part are then transferred to the conception of justice underlying their conduct and embodied in a set of rights and public institutions. Justice as fundamental public morality is not aimed at selfless service at the cost of a person's own interest. How praiseworthy supererogatory acts may be and how admirable we think sacrificing your own interests for the benefit of others is, a conception of justice applicable equally to all citizens in a society does not operate on those grounds. A conception of justice generates its own support among citizens when its full implementation and careful maintenance safeguard their fundamental interests. It might, however, be difficult to convince all citizens that the shared public conception of justice can protect their individual interests at all times as well.

A second characteristic of the development of the three moralities is the importance of role models. Citizens who both understand the requirements of justice and live according to them play a crucial part in convincing other citizens of the value and worth of a conception of justice. They give the abstract conception of justice a friendly, inviting face and make its rules alive by embodying them in their lives.

A third characteristic is the importance of intellectual understanding. The morality of authority is the first level of development and aimed at children and adults who have difficulties in fully understanding the full scope and depth of a conception of justice. Nevertheless, authoritative figures must clearly explain precepts and injunctions of justice and present the reasons that justify them understandably. In the morality of association this process of understanding what justice requires and understanding the reasons for those requirements continues, as citizens gain experience of different roles and develop the intellectual skills for understanding the rationale of a conception of justice and the interests of their fellow citizens (cf. Phillips 1986: 198).

Rawls's account of how citizens can be made just is not the full story, but needs to be supplemented by at least the importance of both dialogue and emotions in establishing and maintaining justice. Dialogue can play a crucial role in educating citizens to become just. The reason for this crucial role is that dialogue is both a means to justice and one of the ends of justice. This will be explained by first defining dialogue, then showing why dialogue is an end of justice, next setting out the prerequisites of dialogue, and finally showing the different ways in which dialogue can help citizens to become just.

Dialogue can be defined as a form of human communication in which two or more people exchange views about a matter, subject, or issue. They do it in such a manner that each person has a reasonable opportunity to state his or her case and its supporting arguments, while others listen to what this person has to say. A listener then responds in the same way by making use of a similar opportunity. In this way, the participants in a dialogue co-operate in a mutual quest. What do they expect to find? Clarity, mutual understanding, a new perspective on the matter being discussed and on one another, and sometimes agreement or convergence of opinion.

Dialogue plays a crucial role in contemporary constitutional democracies, regarded as the best examples of just societies today. This crucial role of dialogue in establishing, applying, and maintaining justice makes it one of the ends of justice. Constitutional democracies require continual dialogue among people. A constitution is itself the product of dialogue among representative political leaders. A democratic constitution allows free speech, which enables voices of individuals and groups to be heard. Dialogue through free speech is only one kind of dialogue enabled through a democratic constitution. Dialogue among the three branches of government, that is, the executive, legislative, and the judiciary, is another example. The executive, in the person of a president, can engage in dialogue with a parliament to determine whether the legislature's decisions are appropriate.

More kinds of dialogue are possible within constitutional democracies. The judiciary applies the values entrenched in the Constitution to conflicts among citizens, groups, and state institutions. The work of the judiciary results in dialogue among citizens, political groups, representatives of civil society, and governmental leaders about the interpretation of the fundamental values accepted in a democratic constitution. If democratic constitutions specify public offices, such as auditor-general and public protector, to check the use of public resources and appropriate conduct by governmental agents, then dialogue about adequate standards for the use of resources and appropriate conduct is needed. Thus, dialogue is a fundamental tool for living with the demands of democracy. Citizens ought to be vigilant to detect voices aiming to dominate or silence ongoing dialogues.

Through dialogue citizens in constitutional democracies create space in which the voices of all people can be heard, regardless of their race, gender, sexual orientation, culture, moral values, religious beliefs, and socio-economic status. Dialogue positively affects relations between individual citizens. Participants in dialogue provide one another opportunities to express their differences. Dialogue requires tolerance for people being different and having opposing viewpoints.

Tolerance implies that you accept one another as mutual partners in dialogue, without having to agree with the other person's views. Such disagreement, however, has to be settled through argument and counter-argument, persuasion, good reasons, and peaceful methods of resistance. Settling disagreements does not necessarily imply that participants



in dialogue reach consensus on all important matters. Dialogue leading to empathy for others and mutual understanding of differences may be sufficient to defuse some conflicts.

The prerequisites for engaging in dialogue are important because they exemplify core values of contemporary theories of justice. Citizens engaging in dialogue thus already gain experience of acting according to such values. One prerequisite for dialogue is that people should be willing to become participants and be prepared to discuss any matter that is raised by other participants or that arises in dialogue.

Participants should regard each other as worth listening to, and responding to, in earnest. Another prerequisite is that participants must be willing to have their views and arguments criticised and corrected by others. These prerequisites indicate that genuine dialogue presupposes the acceptance of principles of justice for that situation in which dialogue takes place and that are equally applicable to all participants.

Simply put, the acceptance of something like the core values of many contemporary theories of justice, i.e. the principle of equal consideration of interests and equal respect for every participant in dialogue is presupposed by, and underlies, the prerequisites for dialogue. When citizens thus engage in dialogue, they are using, affirming, and experiencing central values of justice.

Dialogue ought to be used as the preferred method for conflict resolution in all kinds of relationships. When educating people to become just, dialogue can enable in depth discussions about conflicting views of justice. Dialogue embodies respect for persons and equal concern for their interests. It has the best chance of succeeding to resolve conflict peacefully, as everyone feels recognised and considered in a process of genuine dialogue. Dialogue can play this role in conflict resolution, because engaging in dialogue can change people's ideas, rid them of prejudice, modify their view of their society, and stimulate new ways of perceiving political reality. They will also be able to review proposed political action in a new light and with fresh insight.

Dialogue can nurture exploration of mutuality by determining why some things are disputes. By examining all sides of disputes, people come to understand one another's point of view. At the same time the conflict may be redefined and viewed in a new light. Treating fellow members of a society in this way can lead to the development of affiliation and affection because strangers are transformed into neighbours by means of empathy and the discovery of shared interests.

True dialogue exemplifies a willingness to find just solutions. When citizens are prepared to invent new options through dialogue, a best possible solution might be created that imaginatively accommodates all interests. Such a solution must conform to, or extend, our firmest convictions of justice and fairness and be consonant with the underlying values embodied in a constitution. Solving problems in this way educates participants. This happens through articulating their own interests, engaging in debate and argument, listening to knowledgeable partners, and learning from mistakes, successes, partners, and outcomes reached in dialogue. When citizens follow public dialogues, they experience different participants who are knowledgeable to differing degrees on diverse subjects, and exchanges or arguments between such participants broaden everyone's outlook and offer an education without specific teachers. Participation in dialogue teaches participants to identify issues, formulate proposals, weigh evidence and arguments, express preferences

and values, give grounds for their views, and acquire rhetorical skills - all skills relevant to functioning in a just society.

Citizens who use dialogue as method to explore issues of justice will experience a sense of accomplishment and the feeling that the solutions reached really belong to them. Such solutions would have a high degree of legitimacy due to their origin in a process in which everyone could take part as an equal, who had the freedom to participate fully and could give or withdraw support voluntarily. Dialogue thus reinforces the autonomy of the participants because they examine and evaluate their views and change or replace them if they deem this necessary. To discover various aspects of a conception of justice for oneself through engagement in dialogue will similarly give a person the feeling of autonomous decision-making and co-ownership of the conception of justice.

Dialogue demonstrates an important aspect of the nature of justice, i.e. the fact that a conception of justice is open-ended and never finally formulated. There are always issues that are in dispute, applications of principles that are contested, and new problems that are debated. Conceptions of justice are developed through dialogue, where citizens argue with one another and resolve conflicts through peaceful means.

Dialogue has effects on participants that show why it can play a major role in changing citizens to become more just. Citizens engaging in dialogue often know what they want only in part. Although they all have preferences, wishes, values, and information, these are often unsure, incomplete, confused, in conflict, and not necessarily relevant to the matters under discussion. Through dialogue citizens become aware of conflicts, confusions, uncertainties, and inconsistencies in their views and this awareness leads them to modify, give up, or tone down some of their values, wishes, preferences, and objectives. By confronting points of view with one another and questioning, alternatively, one point of view by means of the other, their issues and viewpoints are clarified. Minorities and lone individuals can experience the satisfaction that their views are heard and taken seriously, as dialogue allows anyone to express strongly held ideas, frustrations or grievances. For these reasons, dialogue is a means for articulating the claims and interests of individuals and groups, as well as for convincing and persuading others of the legitimacy of such claims and interests.

It would be a mistake to think that acquiring a sense of justice includes intellectual skills but excludes any emotional involvement or refinement (cf. Solomon 1990: 196-298). For this reason the role of emotions in acquiring a sense of justice must be acknowledged. If it is true, as Solomon (1990: 201, 244) argues, that a sense of justice originates from feelings of being deprived, humiliated, or unfairly treated, then citizens of recently established modern constitutional democracies have more than enough experiences to employ in the development of a strong sense of justice. Such emotions that express feelings of injustice must, however, be educated to come in line with the principles and rules of a conception of justice, so that emotions about individual experiences can be transformed into emotions that sensitise citizens to prevent similar experiences of injustice to any citizen (cf. Phillips 1986: 186-187; 205). Not only can emotions sensitise citizens, but they can spur them on to action to deal with injustice and thus to fight for justice.

Emotions are not necessarily irrational factors in the process of making citizens just. They can in fact be judged for their rationality (Phillips 1986: 206-207). Emotions are rational when a person can present adequate reasons for them. Such reasons must, in this case, come from the conception of justice. A conception of justice identifies the fundamental

interests of citizens and indicates the priorities assigned to them. For this reason violations of principles of justice should justifiably lead to feelings of moral indignation - the emotion of being angry is rational when citizens are treated without respect and their rights are ignored. Emotions like moral indignation can inspire long term commitments to improve the situation of whichever citizens are suffering injustice. In this way emotions reinforce the sense of justice.

Emotions play a crucial role in securing just behaviour (Phillips 1986: 210-219). Guilt has an important role in convincing citizens that they have violated some aspect of a conception of justice. Guilt edges citizens on to reflect on their behaviour and to evaluate what they have done to harm or deprive other citizens. Shame is a more social emotion as it makes citizens aware that others know and disapprove of their violations of principles of justice. Citizens do not want their fellow citizens to frown on their behaviour and to think that their actions are despicable - especially if those fellow citizens matter to them. Shame increases as those who deplore our behaviour are people who matter more to us or are more significant in our lives (Phillips 1986: 214). Thus, the emotion of shame can give citizens a strong role in enforcing a public conception of justice through putting interpersonal and public pressure on fellow citizens to conform to acceptable standards of behaviour.

### **Full compliance is impossible**

Although the development of the three moralities in citizens through the experience of reciprocity, the strong examples of role models, increased understanding of the nature and rationale of justice, dialogue with fellow citizens, and the employment of the emotions as guardians of, and motivators for, justice looks promising to engender a strong and effective sense of justice, no one should think that all citizens will fully comply with a shared public conception of justice. The shortcomings of people, such as a lack of knowledge, the absence of moral sensitivity, selfishness, and short-sightedness will cause violations of justice.

Added to the shortcomings of human beings, interminable disputes about the meaning and application of principles of justice will always lead to continuous debates about, and disruptions of, the just order (Solomon 1990:171).

These disputes originate in people whose interests clash, who pursue their aspirations, work hard to realise their ends, and are not afraid to press their claims on one another and society (Rawls 1971: 489). This is no reason for concern, as long as such pursuits are conducted within just institutions and violations of justice are punished or censured appropriately.

### **Conclusion**

In this article I have shown how a well-ordered society can be established through processes of moral development that educate citizens to control their behaviour and actions in accordance with the publicly shared conception of justice that they have voluntarily internalised. The attractiveness of internal control and the ways best to inculcate it in citizens is that every citizen can play a part in establishing and maintaining the public conception of justice by being role models, engaging in dialogue with fellow citizens, or by simply doing their part in maintaining just institutions.

Is this process of making citizens just a moral one that complies with the requirements of justice? The core aspects of the process are [1] explaining, justifying, and exemplifying a

conception of justice designed to protect the fundamental interests of every citizen; [2] displaying the important role of individuals and groups who live these values and thus function as moral exemplars worth emulating; [3] engaging in dialogue to clarify, debate, and appropriate a public conception of justice.

None of these core aspects violate any requirements of justice in any way. Rather, these core aspects affirm the status of citizens as moral agents who make their own decisions and they provide citizens with an opportunity to inculcate justice justly.

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