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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANC AND IFP SUPPORTERS
AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT IN KWAZULU-NATAL

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND CONCEPTS

When dealing with the conflict, reference to the following concepts is common.

Amabutho - This is the warrior society common among the Nguni peoples. Many writers seem to refer to the amabutho only when dealing with the Zulu, pro-Inkatha Impis. However, during the course of the study it has become evident that the Xhosa-speaking warriors are also known as amabutho.

AmaKosi - Senior chiefs.

ANC - African National Congress

"BLANKET MEN" - Xhoza Amabutho

IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party

Induna - Zulu headman and sub-chiefs appointed by a chief in control of an area, tribe and/or military formations in a time of war.

KZP - KwaZulu Police

MK - The abbreviation for Umkhontso we Sizwe, meaning "Spear of the nation". This is the military wing of the ANC.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.

Resolving conflict in South Africa is one of the greatest challenges facing the country, in addition to being a basic prerequisite to creating a political and economic climate conducive to development. The continued violence between the ANC and the IFP, has been one of the main components of conflict in this country. It can be argued that the resolution of this particular conflict would be synonymous to having brought relative peace to South Africa, while simultaneously serving as a model for dealing with future conflict. It is the objective of this study to investigate the origins, characteristics and magnitude of the ANC/IFP conflict, thereby serving to create a basis for understanding and managing the conflict.

Once clarity is achieved in this regard, the study will focus on the impact which conflict can have on development, with special reference to the KwaZulu/Natal region.

1.2 THE HYPOTHESIS.

The hypothesis being advanced in this thesis is that the violence in South Africa is closely related to the past, ethno-cultural realities, competition for scarce resour-
ces, as well as the revolutionary objectives which the ANC/SACP alliance subscribed to, having a negative and impeding impact on development. The study examines, besides the conflict as such, the implications which conflict can have on development, whilst attributing the causes of the conflict to the deeply rooted historical, ideological and ethnic differences in South Africa.

1.3 METHODOLOGY.

The study was conducted in various ways, covering the period 1983-1994 in particular although historical reference is part of the study, covering those aspects of Zulu history which have been identified as causes for contemporary internal conflict among Zulu-speaking people. Initially there was the intention to interview the leaders of various organizations in order to record their respective views. It seemed however that the views of the leadership are well represented in the media and could under the present political circumstances amount to merely another repetition of political rhetoric and sloganism. Therefore, interviews were conducted on grassroots level instead. Access in this regard was achieved through exposure to the conflict as a soldier in the SADF over a number of years. The sources are therefore considered reliable as they were sampled out of situations as they were occurring or shortly after the event had taken place. Much of the fighting described in the study was witnessed by the writer himself. Empiric evidence was collected in
trouble spots on the reef and in KwaZulu/Natal respectively, with both these areas having been visited repeatedly since 1986. The writer has also visited hostels on the reef and around Durban over the period 1986-1992. There will be reference to this in the study.

A literature study of both revolutionary doctrine as well as the chronological sequence of events was also made, with ANC/SACP literature forming a significant portion of the material. The Literature study extends well into the development field with comparative analysis of similar situations in other countries. Relevant magazines in addition to daily/weekly local publications have also served as valuable sources. The study relies heavily on primary sources through the interviews conducted with people in the affected areas, in addition to supplemented by the opinions of academics and experts who shed light onto the actual consequences which the continued violence has on development.

1.4 STRUCTURE.
The study is divided into several segments. The first segment is the conceptualization segment, intended to make the rest of the study comprehensible to the average reader. The second segment of the study deals with the actors in the conflict giving a brief history of both the ANC and the IFP.

Ethnicity is the third segment of the study. The fourth
segment of the study elaborates on the ideological differences between the actors.

This section of the thesis is integrated with the events themselves, whilst aiming to provide a frame of reference in terms of understanding revolutionary theory.

Chapter five explores the issue of land and the intense competition for resources which is seen to be contributing to the conflict.

The sixth segment of the study deals with the impact of this conflict on various aspects of development.

Throughout the study it is accepted that there are three primary role players, namely the ANC/SACP alliance, the IFP and the former government; and three primary causes for the conflict, namely historical competition for resources, ethnicity and ideology eg. Zulu versus. Xhosa, Marxism versus Apartheid. It was deemed necessary to include the former government in the discussion, as it was a major role player in combatting the ANC/SACP while being also the targeted "Apartheid regime". Furthermore, the study accepts as a point of departure that the ANC versus. IFP conflict cannot be discussed in isolation, given the political status of KwaZulu as part of South Africa, and the strategic considerations of the ANC/SACP which placed great emphasis on the fall of both Inkatha/IFP and the South
African Government. Clearly, the action by ANC/SACP alliance politically and militarily, aimed at the former South African government, make it an important component of this study. The obstruction which Inkatha posed for ANC strategic planning in terms of mobilization and mass action, placed the latter into the "firing line" and in the camp of the "enemy" by implication. Inkatha may well have found itself in the position between 1984 - 1994 where it had a political two-front war, as it was adamant about its opposition to "Apartheid" and "Communism" at the same time. For contextual reasons, the study can also not deal with the conflict without consistent reference to the conflict at hostels on the reef, as this theatre of war was/is too closely related to the conflict in the KwaZulu/Natal region to be excluded.

Secondary role players and causes are also referred to in so far as they are deemed relevant. In this regard there is reference to culturally motivated attitudes and perceptions, as well as faction fighting. This is necessary in order to differentiate between the various causes of conflict in order to cover the entire spectrum of factors contributing to the violence, these often being not strictly political in every aspect.

1.5 THE CONFLICT.

1.5.1 DEFINING CONFLICT AND PEACE.

"Conflict leading to organised violence emerges
from a particular combination of parties, incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and military actions" (Holsti:1988:396).

In order to understand the nature of conflict, one has to define the concept. Holsti’s definition of conflict seems applicable to almost the entire political spectrum, both national and international, developed and developing worlds.

This may be largely due to the modern definitions of conflict as well as the acceptable norms of dealing with this phenomenon. Bozeman (1976:13) adds another somewhat more relevant and applicable dimension to this definition by stating, "The absence of transculturally valid norms provides one explanation of why thought on war and conflict has been allowed to escape into the realms of ideology or private sentiment. Certain wars are thus condemned as absolutely unjust, others by contrast, are applauded as entirely justified; but most judgments of this kind are found, upon examination, to derive from value preferences rather than from the application of firm criteria of differentiation."

Bozeman’s earlier reference to culture and norms can be particularly applicable to this study because it shares a common point of departure
which suggests that the heterogeneous population composition of South Africa provides a diversity of culture and therefore also diverse interpretations of the nature and/or causes of the conflict, these interpretations thus undoubtedly influenced by the cultural frames of reference and values. This is also supported by Shibutani and Kwan (1965:375) who add that, "(Ethnic) violence is most likely to occur where groups are no longer willing to accept the evaluation placed upon them by the dominant group." This applies to South Africa in particular because the conflict discussed here is a triangular one, fought by the ANC in ideological opposition to Apartheid, by Zulus for or against traditionalism and ideology, by tribes eg. Zulus versus Pondos and clans on the grounds of competing and conflicting interests regarding access to resources.

Conflict in South Africa has reached a level which has elicited considerable reaction from foreign countries who seem to attribute the cause to the policy of "Apartheid" alone, whilst the contention here will be that the existence of conflict in South Africa has its origin not in the apartheid era alone but indeed extends well into the colonial and pre-colonial era.
What does seem true, is that the system of apartheid served as a catalyst to provide the conflict in South Africa with the present magnitude and its international dimensions through elevating it to that level through its unacceptability.

Norms and values which determine the acceptability or unacceptability of a political system or condition, change with time and can almost be compared to fashion. Furthermore they are subject to cultural judgement, determining political legitimacy ie. Grass roots and/or popular support for the system. A case in point is the acceptability or unacceptability of the current socio-political position of women in Islamic society, which by Western norms would not be acceptable yet will not change through criticism by Western society, but only through a change of attitude among Islamic countries. Hence the international debate on issues such as when military intervention in a conflict is justified. The indecision among the international community regarding for example the issue of intervening in Bosnia-Herzogovina, whilst the decision for intervention in Somalia was almost a non-event, is an indication of how norms which determine
intervention in one case do not seem to render the same action in another case. Such developments in the climate of political opinion have led to a significant blurring of distinction between when a conflict can be described as a "war", and when the intervention in this conflict is deemed "just", this being expertly illustrated by the situation in Rwanda. Therefore, in the absence of any one universal set of values which help to determine a set of behavioral guidelines, ethno-cultural guidelines can be expected to prevail in decision making on issues dealing with collective interests. "Where a system of ethnic stratification is not firmly established, persons of different ethnic categories are brought into direct competition with each other" (Shibutani and Kwan:1965:378).

The ultimate question, whether any one set of universal norms and values can ever serve as a substitute for the above described, is a difficult one. If one accepts that at the root of development lies "peace", the definition of when a region or country is at peace, is still ambiguous, as the concept may mean different things to different people. In South Africa for example the white population may not have viewed the country as being at "war", whilst the black
population may see this differently. To many whites the conflict in South Africa represented little else but a communist inspired revolution, while many Blacks will undoubtedly see it as a liberation struggle. According to one set of values peace may be defined as being the absence of violence, whereas by other values it could be viewed as being the absence of opponents. These norms and values are usually influenced by "the cultural milieu of the writer" (Bozeman: 1976:15).

1.5.2 THE START OF POLITICAL UNREST.
On September 5, 1984 riots and violent unrest began in the Vaal Triangle and in five townships around Johannesburg, spread quickly throughout the country. By the middle of 1986, the casualty toll stood at 2000 dead (Intelligence Briefing, 15 June 1986, Infantry School, Oudtshoorn). Clashes between police and radical black demonstrators broadened to include radical "neck-lacing" of so-called "collaborators" in South Africa's black areas. Images shown by the media locally and abroad showed the increasing levels of conflict which the country was experiencing. Violent clashes between proponents of United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Inkatha movement, between the UDF and the black consciousness
Azanian People's Organization, (AZAPO) between Zulu and Asians, between Zulu and Pondo, between Ndebele and Pedi, and between the "comrades and "vigilantes".

Naturally the parameters of the study, as laid down by its title, do not make it possible or desirable to include all these dimensions in it. However in so far as they are deemed relevant there may be reference to some of the above mentioned.

Internationally South African violence featured prominently as James D'Amato (American review, Fourth Quarter, 1990:3) writes, "South African political unrest and violence was an extremely attractive event for American television news. The beating and whipping of black children by white police, mass funeral marches, protests and demonstrations, police dogs, armored vehicles and tear gas, and squalid townships and tearful Bishops became daily features on American television news. To millions of Americans such images became the reality of South Africa and evidence of escalatory unrest which appeared to be rapidly leading to a bloody race-orientated civil war."

Considering that it is accepted as a point of
departure in this study that the country was/is threatened by revolution, this being discussed in further chapters, the implications which this "Internationalization" of the conflict would prove to have, are vast.

Indeed, the impact which the subsequent economic sanctions would have on the population of South Africa in terms of development are perhaps as equally devastating as the ideological conflict itself.

The international attention which the conflict attracted was very much a part of ANC/SACP strategy, as will be illustrated in depth later in this study. It played an important role in the turn of events which determined the solutions to the problems in South Africa.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT.

2.1 INTRODUCTION.

As a point of departure, it is accepted that ideologies are generally viewed as being conducive to the creation of conflict, especially so when two or more ideologies are competing with each other for power within the same system or indeed for control over the same territory.

In the conflict in South Africa, there are strong ideological currents which serve to provide a source for polarization. The ideology of "apartheid" opposed by "Marxism", Liberal Democracy opposed by "Communism", the Free Market economy opposed by State-Controlled or centralized economy, Private ownership opposed by communal ownership or nationalization. Having dealt with the issue of values in chapter one, it should be pointed out that values are fundamental in the creating and shaping of ideology, as ideology in itself represents a view of the ideal society, which cannot exist or enjoy support in the absence of value systems providing a particular vision of the future.

The actors in this form of conflict are committed to
specific ideological schools of thought. This chapter will examine their origin, their history and their ideological position.

2.2. ANC/SACP ALLIANCE

2.2.1 TRANSITION FROM NATIONALIST DEFIANCE TO COMMUNIST INSURGENCE

The ANC was founded in 1912 as the South African National Native Congress (SANNC). Renamed in 1923 to African National Congress (ANC), the organization was primarily concerned with achieving equal rights, and in particular the repeal of the 1913 Land act which was viewed as a great cause of discontent among the black community. It petitioned the crown in this regard, as South Africa was still part of the British Empire (Leatt:1986:90). It was ignored.

Campbell (1986:7) contends that the link with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), came about through a "directive from Moscow to create a black republic." This indicates a dramatic shift in policy, when one considers the 1922 miner strike slogans of "Workers Unite To Keep South Africa White." Therefore one could argue that the party redefined the concept of "proletariat" on a racial basis, the emphasis now being the mobilisation of the black community as
opposed to that of the whites, the potential for success having been greatly reduced since the successful suppression of the strike through the Smuts Government. Advances made by the then Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) towards the ANC in 1928 were positively received by ANC President Josiah Gumede. However, he was voted out by the ANC and replaced by a more conservative Pixley Seme. He seemed to seek the preservation of tradition and encouraged selfhelp. In later years the launch of the ANC Youth League brought Anton Lembede into the political arena with his appointment as President of the Youth League. He too encouraged "Africanism", as a response to Afrikaner Nationalism.

The shift towards Communism

The ANC Youth league under the leadership of Lembede worked towards the radicalization of the ANC by accusing the older leadership of "collaboration with the oppressor" (Leatt ed:1986:93).

Prominent names among the younger leadership included Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo.
In 1949 a Programme of Action was accepted which provided a turning point in the approach and method of the ANC as an organization. This was followed by the ANC defiance campaign in 1952 which, under the leadership of Chief Albert Luthuli, was aimed at the pass laws, which was seen as particularly oppressive in so far as every black person was compelled to have a pass with him/her at all times. In 1950 the government had announced legislation which was termed The Suppression of Communism Act, and now 8000 blacks were arrested due to the defiance campaign, which was viewed by the government as being Communist inspired (Barber and Barratt: 1990:45).

The Government had identified Communism as the paramount threat to South Africa, and indeed the entire continent. The Government seemed to have been totally committed to this belief, as attempts were made to promote this contention internationally, with limited success. Keeping in mind that the continent was experiencing colonial unrest on an unprecedented level, there appeared to have been some concern on the part of colonial powers in this regard, but engaged in a process of decolonisation they seemed pre-occupied with managing "the winds of change" within their own sphere of influence.
Barber and Barratt (1990:45) argue that the South African Government equated the independence wars in Africa to the East/West confrontation which was globally manifested in the raging of the cold war. This may have been an attempt to achieve understanding for the dynamics of the South African political situation from the West, by attempting to enhance anti-communist sentiments which were very evident in the United States, where the Committee on Un-American Activities was in the process of suppressing Communist activity in the early 1950’s.

South Africa also seemed to have grasped the opportunity, in responding to what was perceived to be an international threat of Communism, by passing the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act.

The government clampdown on the ANC-led campaign, also included a restriction on Luthuli which forced him to remain at his home, nearly 500 km from the ANC headquarters. Campbell (1986:53) contends that this restriction on a rather moderate leader of the ANC, provided the opportunity for the radical and communist inspired Youth League to conduct a take-over of the ANC. Subsequent to this, the ANC took on a considerably more active role with members
receiving training in East-Bloc states, whilst the movement adopted the 1955 "Freedom Charter."

The creation of the PAC.

The ANC was in effect split into two groupings, namely the Africanists and the Charterists. The Marxists realized that the support for the movement was based on African nationalisms, and perhaps tribalisms, to the extend that it could not be transferred to a class struggle, nor produce a purely class programme. Hence the need for the "Freedom charter" in 1955.

Jeremy Cronin (Currently senior SACP official) explains, "All people's programmes anywhere in the world spring from a given objective reality. Once it has been hatched, the particular programme cannot be detached from its historical incubator. For the charter was meant not only to project the ideal society, but also to influence the situation in favour of the accomplishment of the ideal. The charter had to influence the Western world and enhance the credibility of the popular struggle against the Apartheid regime. This position would have been severely weakened had the people of South Africa come up with a document espousing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The socialist world and the people's republics in Eastern Europe would likewise have
lost interest in our struggle if the Freedom Charter had turned out to be a purely bourgeois program" (Cronin and Suttner:1986:178).

In 1959 this resulted in the creation of the Pan Africanist Congress which remained committed to the notion of Africa being only for Africans, thereby excluding others by implication. This was in contrast to the ANC which at this stage was already in a de facto alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) comprised of numerous whites, such as Joe Slovo (Long time leader of SACP and Chief of Staff of MK).

The ideological lines were clearly drawn between the Africanist faction and the so-called "charterists" which in practice was tantamount to an unofficial alliance between the ANC and the SACP.

However, the conflict between the two groups did not surface on any significant level as there remained a degree of unity in their opposition to the system. In 1960, both were banned by the South African government.

**THE M-PLAN**

The control of the ANC by radical Marxist elements, may be considered as having been
instrumental in the implementation of any armed campaign due to the persistent commitment of Chief Luthuli to peaceful resistance.

Powell (1991:24), who deals extensively with the Mandela Plan, or M-Plan, writes, "Nelson Mandela and Govan Mbeki formulated this insurgent strategy in consultation with the National Action Committee of the ANC during the 1950's. Mandela claimed that it had been drawn up with the assistance of the South African Indian Congress."

The plan was designed to create a network of structures which could give the ANC the ability to survive a major security clampdown, whilst simultaneously creating the ability to mobilize among the people.

SHARPEVILLE AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE

In 1960, the ANC and the PAC launched another defiance campaign which resulted in the death of 69 protesters at the Vaal Triangle township of Sharpeville. This incident would go down in history as the "Sharpeville massacre", with serious international implications for South Africa.

In terms of violence it was the first widely publicized, bloody clash between the so-called
apartheid government and the so-called liberation organizations. Although the casualties were almost exclusively PAC supporters, both organizations benefitted in terms of publicity and a subsequent increase in international pressure on the SA government. Chief Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Price and recommitted himself publicly to peaceful methods of achieving political change in South Africa (Barber and Barrett:1990:75).

In 1961 the ANC formed its Military wing "Umkhonto we sizwe" "Spear of the Nation", embarking on a programme of armed struggle. The PAC in turn formed POQO, its military wing.

RIVONIA

Most of the leadership of the Umkhonto we sizwe (MK) was arrested at Rivonia in 1963. The trial which followed resulted in long jail terms for many. Oliver Tambo remained of the original young radicals, after he had left the country in 1960 in order to gather support for the ANC abroad, and in anticipation of a government clampdown (Campbell:1986:55).

It is almost ironical that the government fears of the ANC being part of the international programme, believed to have as its aim the
creation of "World Communism", seemed perhaps a little premature in 1948, but appeared to be quite relevant in the late 1950's and early 1960's, if one considers the pattern established by similar independence struggles and insurgency wars, globally. One view is that of Du Plessis in Hough (1985:46), stating, "If the linking of South Africa with Nazism had occurred only in isolated cases it could have been discounted, but reference to this connection has been too wide and orchestrated, a fact which points to centralized planning on Moscow's part."

Nonetheless, the situation in South Africa was/is also influenced by factors which have their origin elsewhere and should not be simplistically attributed to the ideological clash with communism. Van Der Waals (1990:29) explains; "Om rewolusionêre oorlog, soos die Franse Weermag, as 'n sentraal - beheerde Kommunistiese sameswering te sien is waarskynlik te dogmatis en het dan ook heelwat kritiek uitgelok omdat hierdeur versuim word om rekening te hou met die inheemse en diepgewortelde oorsake en omstandighede van elke besondere oorlog." This study will refer to these factors later. Meanwhile, the death of Luthuli took away the final obstacle to the creation of the ANC/SACP alliance as a permanent and official reality which, in the in the light
of the global ideological conflict of that time, would prove to be controversial yet ultimately successful.

MOROGORO CONFERENCE
Powell (1991:26) states that the aim of this conference in 1968 was,"...aimed at restructuring the organization after its leadership had been forced into exile by the banning of the organization and the trial of its members after the Rivonia conspiracy."

At the conference, the ANC formulated a document entitled, "Strategy, Tactics and Programme of the ANC."

Therein it was explained that the movement would now transform itself once more, to a more conventional form of liberation movement with a structured programme of guerilla warfare, thus making MK into a greater contributing factor in achieving power in South Africa (Powell:1991:26).

Therefore the conference objective may be seen as an attempt to initiate "transition from the political to the military phase of revolutionary warfare" (Hough:1986:31).

The ANC faced several problems in achieving this transition. The geographic features of the
country rendered any attempt at following the classical revolutionary approach, which was being utilised with success in South East Asia and Africa north of the Limpopo, useless.

The detail of ANC insurgency will be discussed in later chapters. It is suffice to say that the intensification of the struggle was adopted with considerable optimism by ANC strategists (Powell: 1991:26).

1976

The ANC appeared to have had limited success in creating a revolutionary climate, which would bring about victory in the short to medium term. The 1976 unrest however, provided greater impetus in so far as it resulted in a increase in recruits from the townships. Thousands of students are believed to have left the country on this occasion with the intention of receiving training in order to join the struggle (Malan:1990:33). One could subscribe to the view that the harshness of the government clampdown on rioting students, directly contributed to the exodus and may have laid the foundation for the future ability of the ANC to gain control of the townships from 1984 onwards.

What should be clear up to this point, is that
the ideological commitment to the ANC/SACP alliance, together with the programme of violent insurrection, was gaining momentum in the townships.

2.2.2 MARXIST INFLUENCE IN PAST ANC THINKING AND STRATEGY.

After Luthuli's death in 1967, Oliver Tambo became acting President. In 1969 he became the ANC president at the Morogoro Conference. It would appear that he remained loyal to Marxist ideology, if he is judged by his statement made in 1985, dealing with the war in Afghanistan. He said; "the democratic, anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan has been saved with the support of the Soviet Union" (APN, First Quarter 1990: 3). At the conclusion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the war had claimed the lives of almost 50% of the population, according to documentary on the subject (Video documentary, Wars in Peace, 1991).

The relationship between the ANC and its alliance partner, the SACP, was described by Oliver Tambo as, "...not an accident of history. The SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people. Ours is not merely a paper alliance...it is a living organism that has grown
By subscribing to the Marxist doctrine of revolution, the ANC/SACP alliance brought about a number of strategies designed to remove any form of legitimacy which the "regime" may enjoy. The implicit targets of these strategies were not the direct agents of the state such as the SAP or SADF. Had that been the case, the conflict in South Africa would have been a pure "Guerilla" conflict. Instead, the strategy of the ANC/SACP alliance was multi-dimensional, one of targeting the so-called "collaborator" whilst simultaneously creating terror among a relatively highly protected white community (Powell:1991:26-27).

The late, senior SACP member, Chris Hani has made it clear that the ANC/SACP was not concerned about the stigma of communism, when he stated, "Yes we must continue to be communists and build up the party in order to bring about democracy and social justice in South Africa" (Sunday Star, 17 November, 1988).

One day later he added that, "We in the Communist Party have participated in and built the ANC. We have made the ANC what it is today and the ANC is our organization"(Citizen, 18 November, 1988).
It is submitted here that the subscription of the ANC/SACP to broad Marxist ideology and principles is beyond any reasonable doubt.

2.3 INKATHA AND THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP).

2.3.1 INTRODUCTION.

Before becoming a political party, the movement "Inkatha" already existed since 1924, when its inception may have signalled a revival of Zulu nationalism. The early Inkatha aimed to promote Zulu unity and Zulu culture. Maylam (1990:74) writes that the organization "represented an alliance of the tribal elite and upwardly mobile petty bourgeoisie."

He goes on to explain how some capitalist orientated Zulus saw this as a movement to counter the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), being the first major black trade union to emerge in South Africa, causing consternation among employers.

Inkatha did not play any major role during the "apartheid", but was revived by Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975, although more in the form of a Zulu cultural movement. This followed after the 1970 establishment of Zulu Territorial Authority, which was the forerunner of the 1972 KwaZulu legislative assembly. The
executive council which was also created, was headed by Buthelezi. In 1977 the extension of powers of selfgovernment, saw Buthelezi at the head of the cabinet.

Unlike the ANC/SACP alliance, Inkatha even in its transformed state as a political party, lacks much of the ideological dogma of its Marxist opponents. The IFP is structured as a political/cultural movement, rather than a political/revolutionary one.

It would appear that the IFP has, since its inception as a political party, placed great emphasis on Western political and economic principles such as individual freedom, freedom of association, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of work, etc. (IFP Booklet, 1993: 3). One could even suggest that the IFP’s policy documents attempt to refine the charterist values in order to make them applicable to the individual, something which may be very attractive to whites, but which could be seen as contradictory to the adherence or support of traditional political structures in the KwaZulu/Natal region.
There clearly is a shift away from such traditional communalist and/or tribalist views, towards Western Liberal democratic standards with economic free market principles. Without elaborating too much on the subject, the IFP policy documents point towards a strong emphasis on economic issues. Under the heading of "Freeing of market forces and promotion of enterprise", the IFP criticizes socialist economic policies to the point of condemning the National Party government for its "socialist economic policies designed to create sectional economic interests" (IFP Booklet, 1993:3).

The IFP or the former Inkatha's efforts at liberation could never be regarded as being in the same category as the ANC/SACP alliance or the PAC, Buthelezi making this clear when he says, "It is the stated policy of the ANC to kill for political gain and to seize power in South Africa. To this end it receives arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc" (Clarion Call, Special edition 1987:48).

However, the acceptance of Western democratic principles may seem contradictory and with traditional political structures by which chiefs and indunas are appointed rather than elected,
this having led to great criticism of the movement in the past.

2.3.2 TRADITION

Traditionalism is a very significant factor contributing towards the IFP's position within the greater South African political context. The IFP is very strongly aligned to the traditional Zulu Monarchy which, under the leadership of King Goodwill Zwelethini, has in the past been strongly opposed to the ANC, "The ANC and its allies have apparently not heard our Zulu voice say that we claim the right to selfdetermination and that in exercising that right we demand that nobody ever again tries to drag us into a new political dispensation with which we disagree" (Transcript of speech, 25 July, 1993). This conflict thus is not only a simplistic ideological problem which could be resolved through compromises or agreements. Instead, the nature of the conflict is determined by a multitude of traditional and cultural factors which add to the complexity of the problem, elevating it to a another level of conflict namely that of tradition versus modernization. (Recently the king has changed his position vis a vis the IFP, and has seen to be supported by the ANC aligned Natal Congress of Traditional
leaders in his decision to cancel the annual Shaka day celebrations. The issue has not been resolved before the completion of this study.) Reed (1994:114) quotes Powell as saying; "It's a clash between modern and antimodern forces. For every youth who aspires to a Malcolm-X T-shirt and a box haircut there is another who wants to marry three women and carry a spear."

Roy Mpungose, for example was on his way to becoming a Inkatha leader in his village in Southern Natal. In the mid 1980's much of the youth was starting to fall under the influence of the ANC. This resulted in conflict, which he attempted to solve through suggesting that the leadership address the issue through dialogue with the youngster which were starting to defect to the ANC. Other loyalist youngsters then turned on him and eventually forced him to leave (Time, February 22, 1993).

The ANC's former Natal midlands leader, Harry Gwala, states that, "Some people think Freedom means going back to the traditional way of life and the great kings. Traditionalist who dream of the past, belong to Inkatha. Those who go into the ANC are urban youth and industrial workers" (Reed:1994:108).
Tim Cohen (Business Day, 9 August, 1990) disputes Gwala's view and summarizes as follows: "The popular perception of the support profile of Inkatha is that its members are older and more traditional rural residents, while those supporting the ANC are the opposite. In fact Inkatha enjoys the support of many urban residents and has a strong youth movement, whereas the (former) UDF-affiliated Congress of Traditional Leaders claims the tacit support of 300 traditional chiefs."

The ideological contrast between the ANC and the IFP is particularly apparent in the challenge which the ANC poses for the traditional Zulu leadership, based on inheritance through bloodline. Although on lower leadership level indunas sometimes support the ANC, this is less the case as one seems to move closer to the central hierarchy of the traditional Zulu leadership and the royal family. Buthelezi for example counters the challenges leveled at his leadership by the ANC, through referring to his traditional right to hold this position.

"I have a number of different hats to wear, as the English expression goes. I am President of the Inkatha Freedom Party. On many occasions I
speak and act in that capacity, within the context of that organization. I am also Chief Minister of Kwa Zulu and I also, on many occasions, speak and act in that capacity. What some people try to ignore is that in addition to these roles, I, Your Majesty, am also your Prime Minister. I was born to follow a course in life which was fixed by nearly two centuries of Zulu history. I have the right and the duty to speak for the Zulu people, as Zulu people on occasions like this, which no power on earth will take away from me. The authenticity of what I say as a Zulu leader by birth, ranks side by side with the authenticity of what I say as a Black South African elected to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by the people of Kwa Zulu. I was born to lead, and I was also elected to lead" (Transcript of Speech, 25 July 1993).

When cascaded down to other leadership levels however, the political and traditional position of the chiefs appear not as easily defined, "What makes the situation more difficult and involved is that the chiefs of today are not only traditional leaders but are at the same time political leaders having to pay homage to both the king (traditionally) and the political leader of the KwaZulu government simultaneously. This
reality creates a lot of frustrations" (Veiligheidsfokus, February 1994:9).

2.3.3 THE SHIFT TOWARDS NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY.

In dealing with this issue it should be pointed out that the shift towards nationalism has been most evident in the period between the IFP withdrawal from the mainstream negotiation process and the 1994 election. Nonetheless, prior to this period, there were strong indications that the former Inkatha could afford to appeal to Zulu identity, Louw and Bekker (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992:28) offering the argument that; "A strong Zulu nationalist strand existed in the ideology of activists in townships, and had the UDF presented itself as not anti-Zulu, Inkatha's claims to represent all Zulus would have had less impact."

In the same way that the ANC became stigmatized with socialism/ Marxism, the IFP has recently, particularly before the election, become more vocal on the issue of the Zulu kingdom and nationalism.

Although secession in itself can perhaps not be seen as an ideology on its own, there are vast implications for a country where such a collective feeling may appear to exists. However,
secessionist or separatist trends are usually fuelled by nationalism which can well be viewed as being an ideology. Afrikaner nationalism in the past and present, has been labelled as "institutionalized racism" by some (Leatt ed: 1986:66), while Liebenberg (Personal communication, 30 September, 1994) qualifies this by stating, "Nationalism is not equal to an ideology, but in its extreme form can lead to or become an ideology."

Nonetheless in present modern political trends, this view may have to be revised in order to redefine the position of nations, such as the Zulus who feel obviously ethnically and nationally linked in protecting common ethno-cultural interests; feel strongly about their culture, traditions, values and norms, and who choose maximum territorial autonomy as a means to expressing this. "You must secure your freedom as Zulus to be Zulus in the New South Africa. If you, as Zulus, permit yourself to be stripped of your Zulu heritage, and you allow a South Africa to develop around you which is intolerant of your ethnicity, those who strip you of that right to be yourselves will not stop at penalising you" (King Zwelithini, 25 July, 1993, Transcript of speech).
THE MARCH ON ULUNDI - THE MOBILIZATION OF LOYALISTS

The planned march on Ulundi in 1992, KwaZulu capitol and seat of the Royal House, may serve as a barometre in determining how serious the above statement would be taken by nationalist Zulus. Here the Zulu loyalists had shown the will and ability to rally around Zulu traditional and ethnic symbols in significant numbers. The planned march was seen as an invasion once Reggie Hadebe of the ANC Midlands branch was alleged to have said that the ANC/SACP alliance's intention was to unseat the KwaZulu government (The Star, 19 September, 1992).

According to the Sunday Times's Roy Rudden, "Hundreds of thousands of Zulus were in a state of war preparedness. They were not only ready but excited at the prospect of going into battle to defend their capitol, Ulundi, from what they regard as a threatened invasion by the forces of the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance. These are the warriors of the three royal regiments of King Zwelithini who, Zulu spokesmen say, are ready for the first washing of spears since the Battle of Ulundi saw their army's defeat at the hands of the British in 1879" (Sunday Times, 22 September, 1992).
A senior officer of the King's Inala regiment was reported to have said, "It's not a march, it's an invasion; we are not only ready for it, we welcome it. The people are elated. They see this as a way to end the violence by a washing of spears. There will be no more violence after the defeat the invaders will suffer" (Sunday Times, 22 September, 1992).

The ANC's attempts at dismantling Kwa Zulu, were seemingly viewed by the IFP and the Zulu royalists as being a direct attack on the Zulu people and the traditional system as such. The planned march was described by pro-IFP Induna Albert Mncwango as, "... the last straw. We are sick to death of the violence at the hands of the ANC. My phone has not stopped ringing. Zulus want to know when the March will take place as they intend taking leave from work to join us" (Sunday Times, 22 September, 1992).

It could be argued that KwaZulu herewith also proved its ability to defend its geographic area, even in the absence of an official Defence Force, showing that when faced by a perceived threat, there is access to a definite popular support base.
In response to IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s allegation that attempts were being made to "annihilate Kwa Zulu" (The Star, 12 July, 1993), the ANC claimed that it was fighting to dismantle all apartheid-created structures, but that "the Zulu kingdom, like all others, will thrive under a democratic South Africa" (The Citizen, 13 July, 1993).

TEMPORARY MARGINALISATION

The apparent marginalisation of the IFP in the political arena, during parts of the constitutional negotiation process, seems to stem from the National Party’s fears of being too closely associated with the IFP. Particularly after the Boipatong massacre in 1991, where forty ANC supporters were killed by Zulu hostel dwellers, the NP showed an increasing inclination to hold bilateral talks with the ANC. Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe, former Cabinet Minister and NP General Secretary, said; "In a Black vote market, a close relationship with Inkatha is dangerous" (Time, March 22, 1993: 35).

Having faced a number of seemingly bilateral agreements between the government and the ANC, the IFP had taken some steps which seemed to
suggest a move towards the secession of Kwa Zulu in the event of an NP/ANC settlement, at the expense of Zulu interests. Already in December 1992 the IFP was starting to indicate considerable dissatisfaction with the De Klerk/ Mandela talks and agreements, when the Kwa Zulu legislature assembly adopted a constitution for "the newly created state" (Time, 22 March, 1993:35).

Since then, the IFP has shown some reluctance to clarify its position on the issue of secession, despite the media speculation and the links which the party had within the former Concerned South African Group (COSAG), which was comprised primarily of parties interested in a territorial dispensation for the country. This trend in IFP strategy reached a climax prior to the 1994 election when hints at secession were viewed with alarm by some observers. "The possibility of armed efforts at secession by IFP supporters should not be entirely discounted" (African Defence Review, March 1994:34).

However, the party continues to have a relatively moderate image in the eyes of many whites who view the IFP as being the ideological opposite
pole of the ANC/ SACP alliance, and a party which upholds reasonable levels of Western democratic principles. The defection of former NP MP's, seems to support this view. An IFP spokesman commented, "There's no doubt, especially in Natal, that the IFP commands incredible support and Whites are realizing the way forward is with predominantly Black organizations" (The Citizen, 22 March, 1993).

The IFP claims that it has seen a further surge in membership since the funeral of senior SACP member Chris Hani (The Citizen, 20 May, 1993), the accompanying violence apparently having frightened moderate whites into supporting the IFP. In the April 1994 election the IFP managed to unite the majority of votes under its banner in the KwaZulu/Natal province.
CHAPTER THREE

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF ETHNICITY.

"African Intellectuals and leaders want to base their political, economic, social and cultural development on their indigenous values and institutions in order to be grounded in the African realities. But such a contextual approach to development would imply recognizing and empowering ethnic, subnational groups that are discredited as primordial, backward and antithetic to nationhood" (Ethnic Studies Report, July 1991:1).

3.1 INTRODUCTION.

"When the men occasionally went for their spears, there were killings. In one such fight in 1878, sixty or seventy men were killed. King Cetshwayo was powerless to stop the bloodletting" (Edgerton:1988:30).

The statements quoted in the previous chapter, dealing with tradition, by both the Zulu King and the Chiefminister Buthelezi seem to suggest not only adherence to the traditions of Zulu culture, but indeed appear to appeal to the Zulu people as an ethnic group, emphasizing the importance of being recognised as Zulus representing matters which are important to them. It is difficult to draw a line between traditional interest and ethnicity, and this chapter should serve as an indepth look at ethnicity in so far as it has re-emerged as a factor in violence.
ZULU HOMOGENEITY.

Subsequent to the creation of the Zulu empire in the Natal region, the Zulu people started to show signs of fragmentation. Mzilikazi took large segments of the Khumalo family and fled across the Drakensberg into the present Transvaal and OFS region in 1823. This was the first significant breakaway of Zulus from the Zulu kingdom (Morris:1973:17).

Yet, perhaps the idea of the Zulu nation being one solid homogeneous unit was an illusion from the start, if one considers the fact that a small numbers of Zulus were already assisting the Boers at and after the battle of Bloodriver. Harrison (1981:20) speaks of," a force of Zulus who had deserted from Dingane", and "...the Zulus met in bloody battle." For the "deserters" to risk open confrontation with the main Zulu army, their numbers had to be significant and this already raises serious questions about Zulu homogeneity. Minnaar (1990:5) also speaks of refugees from the Zulu kingdom as early as 1829 and holds the "arbitrary rule" of Dingane responsible for this.

Zulu aspirations for power had led to the first bloody civil war in 1839 as Dingane, "looking for a scapegoat for recent defeats at the hands of
Boers and Swazis" (Minnaar: 1990:6), turned on his half brother Mpande. Waves of refugees fled from Zululand, the geographic area north of the Tugela river, into the areas known as Natal, South of the Tugela. When Mpande fled the wrath of Dingane in 1839, he led the first wave of 17000 refugees into Natal. Up to that time there were only about 3000 Blacks living in the Natal area, although Van Aswegen (1989:280) places this figure at 10 000. By 1845 this number had risen to 40 000 with many of Mpande's followers staying behind after his return to Zululand in 1843, having assisted the Boers in the final defeat of Dingane. The other people had been returning to their ancestral areas in Natal, from as far as the highveld, from which they had fled during the rule of Shaka, whom they no longer had to fear. Although the majority settled in and around Port Natal, other settled in the interior, spreading out into hundreds of little kraals which had no political connection with each other. Another wave followed in 1848 when the Mawa followers of the Hlubi tribe streamed into Natal, thereby basically depopulating parts of Southern Zululand. By 1850 the population south of the Tugela was already at 150 000 "Natal Kaffirs" (Morris:1970:165). In 1856 there had been open civil war between the
sons of King Mpande for succession of the throne, resulting in the massacre of 20 000 Zulus of the iziGqoza tribe who were attempting to flee into Natal, the future Zulu King Cetshwayo leading the punitive royalist forces (Morris:1970:197).

The strict discipline, which was a characteristic of the Shaka era, had been gradually eroded, and Edgerton (1988:33) argues that this caused considerable fragmentation in so far as Zulu unity was concerned. At the start of the 1879 Anglo-Zulu war, only about 50% of Zulu men served with the royal regiments of Cetshwayo. The rest were content with belonging to the local warrior groupings who were loyal to the local Induna rather than the King as central authority, or belonged to the tribal regiments who were openly independent. In some regions, particularly along the coast, more men joined the "territorial units" than the royal regiments, despite the official conscript tradition of the Zulu Kingdom. Tribal contributions in terms of manpower varied distinctly from tribe to tribe. The Cube people refused to fight against the British, the Qulusi were prepared to fight only on their home territory.
The British victory was followed by another Zulu civil war in 1880 for reasons of purely political nature, namely the issue of Cetshwayo's return from exile which was clearly being opposed by others with political aspirations. "By 1881 raids and counter raids were the order of the day" (Minnaar:1990:7).

That these historical splits in Zulu homogeneity are still relevant in the conflict today, is also the finding of a publication of the Department of National Strategy at RAU which reads, "Another reality is that the Zulu nation is by no means a homogene nation but is made up of plus/minus 134 tribes which were brought together under the reign of the late King Shaka. Thus, long before the situation has been as politicized as it is today, this region has had its fair share of tribal differences and fighting" (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:9).

One could deduce from this that the Zulu People, welded into one unit by force, lacked the cohesion which may have been wrongly attributed to it in the past, and that past differences may even be manifested in present political affiliation to either the ANC/SACP alliance or the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
3.2 THE ROLE OF THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM IN THE REVIVAL OF ETHNICITY.

"Yes, you have beaten us. You have beaten us well, but there are the Ama Zulu warriors! Can you beat them? They say not. Go and try."

(An old Galeka warrior to a British officer 1878) (Edgerton:1988:18)

The policy of apartheid not only encouraged ethnicity in the context of achieving the objectives of "separate development" but seemed to have inherited and maintained the migrant labor system, which was leading to significant demographic changes in the country creating an ethnic mix in most of the country's industrial centers. Most of the townships which exist today had their origin in the manpower requirements of the steadily industrializing South African Economy. The mining industry in particular, was known for its labor intensity, and attracted rural black people, who were experiencing overcrowding in the tribal lands.

The reasons were quite obvious, a Lebowa migrant making the 350 km trip to Johannesburg was 170% better off in money terms if he stayed for six months. For Tswana workers from Bophuthatswana the standard of living could be increased by 85% if the individual spends nine months working in Pretoria. For a Xhosa worker from the Ciskei to do the same
in Pietermaritzburg, would amount to an improvement of 234% (Harrison:1981:252-253). Naturally this led to a greater influx of non-Zulus into traditionally Zulu areas around Durban and Pietermaritzburg, shifting some emphasis from faction fighting to ethnic conflict, whilst simultaneously "more than half of KwaZulu's men work outside their boundaries" (Baxter and Boulle:1981:36).

In order to stem the tide, several measures such as "pass laws" had already been introduced long before "apartheid". The intention was to allow labor into the country on a temporary basis, thus keeping the families in the homelands. In the homelands, with land shortages already a serious factor, a population explosion took place, which continues unabated with even a present day African rural fertility rate still estimated at between 6 and 6.7 children per woman in some areas (Newsweek, 12 September 1994:26).

Combined with traditional agricultural methods which often proved destructive for the agricultural land in the areas, the homelands could simply not sustain the ever growing population. More and more people moved to what was considered to be "White South Africa."

The temporary facilities created to accommodate the migrant laborers, were inadequate in catering for the influx of people. In addition to this, the nature of the South
African economy was such that the black labor force was no longer only a migrating labor force. Many were permanently employed and many more were born within the urban areas, thus losing much of their traditional rural culture and roots.

This phenomenon was unpopular with the post-1948 government. Clearly the influx of large numbers of blacks on a permanent basis, would place increasing socio/political pressure on a government, which aimed at achieving maximum homogeneity within the borders of what was termed "White South Africa." With this in mind the government maintained that, "Control over the rate of urbanization is, in the light of the circumstances in South Africa, an absolutely essential social security measure" (Harrison:1981:253).

Despite continuing the "pass law" practice, and the utilization of forced removal, there appears to have been some unofficial, underlying realism. Soweto as we know it today, came about as a direct consequence of the government supplying housing in the early fifties (Facts About Greater SOWETO, May 1989:1) thus by implication accepting the permanent nature of the black people residing there, although still making no effort at providing for their political aspirations.
Most major cities experienced similar expansion of the black population. In fact one may contend that the NP victory of 1948 was partially due to the significant increase in black influx which was experienced in the war years. The South African economy, in particular the steel industry, was contributing to the allied war effort, and was experiencing a need to replace the white men who had left the country to fight abroad. The black labor force was expanded to maintain the industry in the absence of the whites, and could not be wished away after the conclusion of the war. Hence, the "swart gevaar" phenomenon of the National Party election machine, may have seemed very much a reality to the electorate of 1948.

The migrant labor system, or rather the non-return aspect of it, did not only provide a potential threat to the political stability of "White" South Africa, which denied the resident black population political rights, but also seemed to revive age old ethnic strive. "Faction fighting" was quite common on the mines and sometimes in the townships, as Minnaar (1990:36) claims, "rural rivalries are transferred to the townships." All in all, it seemed to be sporadic and never took on proportions which could be seen as directly threatening the stability of the country, until 1990.

By 1990 the demographic realities of South Africa were such that large Pondo and Xhosa groupings were permanent or
semi-permanent residents in and around Durban. In 1970 the number of Xhosas, Pondos and Swazis made up no more than 3% of the population while 75% of the population was Zulu speaking (Baxter and Boulle: 1981:10), a result of the economic magnetism leading to increasing urbanization. Large Zulu groupings were resident in the PWV area. The continued population growth and the crippled South African economy, intensified the competition for resources in the country, speeding up the already rapid process of urbanization.

Although the spirit of the "new South Africa" had brought about a general feeling of optimism, after the 1989 NP election victory, the rise of ethnicity as a factor in the ideological confrontation in South Africa, seemed somewhat unexpected and would dampen the euphoria considerably before 1990 was through.

On 2 February 1990, the State President Mr. F.W. de Klerk, announced in Parliament that the previously banned organizations with revolutionary objectives, would now be unbanned. Up to this point, the Inkatha/UDF confrontation was slowly intensifying in Natal. In the Transvaal region, the confrontation remained limited to occasional skirmishes between hostel residents wanting to go to work during stay away action, and "comrades" from the surrounding communities attempting to coerce people into supporting the action. The hostels now became embattled with the surrounding pro-ANC residential areas.
3.2.1 HOSTELS

The economic realities of South Africa, include a large migrant labour force which is mostly accommodated in hostels within the townships adjacent to the industrial areas supplying employment, or on mine property. By 1990 the SA government had built 180 hostels with 600 000 beds, although the population in the hostels is much larger, with most people sharing beds. Socio-economic conditions in the hostels, it seems generally accepted, are shockingly inadequate with overcrowding and sanitation posing a major problem (Visits to Hostels, 1986-1992). Olivier (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1994:11) adds that; "The extreme conditions under which hostel residents live have created several social problems by forcing them into the informal sector activities like shebeens, prostitution and drug dealing."

The majority of hostel dwellers on the reef are Zulus originating from KwaZulu, with Reed (1994:43) making the point that Zulus workers were popular with employers because they tended to be hard working, respectful and politically conservative, therefore reluctant to join strikes and stayaways.

Previous interaction between Zulu Hostel dwellers and surrounding residents has always seemed somewhat strained with both sides, although socially inter-
acting occasionally, holding certain stereotyped views regarding the other. "Becoming a Township Zulu indicated that you had broken your connection with the land and the ancestors. In the eyes of some traditionalists that made you a pariah. If you were a Township Zulu you no longer spoke proper Zulu, you used Township patois, a hybrid vernacular based on Zulu with plenty of Xhosa, Sotho, Tswana, English and Afrikaans words mixed in. During the civil war speaking the wrong dialect was an automatic death sentence" (Reed:1994: 53). It is important to note the emphasis on traditionalism which continues to surface in the conflict.

Foster's (1962:20) explanation may provide some clarity in this case when he points out that, "When a person goes to live and work in a society other than his own, even though he understands the language, he will not work effectively until he learns the tips and cues enabling him to understand and anticipate the behavior of other people."

However, the reverse is also true, Coleman (In Foster: 1960:95) speaking of a process of community disintegration in Nigeria which is accelerated by seasonal or migrant laborers who return to their villages with new tastes and ideas. This suggests a cross-pollination of values and traditional norms
which undoubtedly has some impact on the traditional environment.

Generally the relationship between hostel and township residents seemed consistently tense while not taking on the proportions of mass confrontation. Olivier (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1994:11) writes, "Tensions between hostel dwellers and the surrounding communities regularly result in overt acts of violence. These conflicts in many instances had their roots in competition for scarce resources such as community amenities, jobs, women, and more recently, political power bases. Ethnicity also has been a contributing factor on more than one occasion."

**MASS CONFRONTATIONS**

The transition from low intensity conflict to mass confrontations, took place shortly after the unbanning of the ANC/SACP alliance and became most apparent through the focus having shifted from the rural areas to the urbanized hostels and surrounding areas. The heightening of the revolutionary climate in 1990, together with the high concentrations of people attending mass ANC/SACP rallies, provided a sense of insecurity for Zulu speaking people who cared little for the revolutionary objectives of the alliance. These people were increasingly becoming subject to abuse and intimidation by township residents who were celebrating what was perceived to be a victory. The
previously mentioned unwillingness among Zulus to become involved in ANC strike action, was leading to frustration among both sides.

Themba Thobela, a former township resident describes the situation as follows: "They (The Comrades) know we don't want this strike and stayaway thing. We want to work because we must eat. Our children live in Natal and they get the money we send them. Now the ANC says we must stay away. We say "No", you can stay away. Mandela is your leader, not ours. When we say that, they refuse us to use the trains. Often we hear of Zulus that are thrown off the trains when they go to work. Sometimes we fight just so that we can go to work with the train" (Interview, Meadowlands Hostel, 3 July 1992).

On a visit to the Dobsonville Hostel, large sections of the hostel were destroyed, only about five hundred hostel residents could be seen to have remained of the original three thousand. The people there had permanent guards placed at the perimeter of the hostel which were reluctant to answer questions. One person who answered questions was unwilling to give his name. For the aim of the study he will be known as "A". He also refused to speak in the presence of a tape recorder.

The following dialogue was written down to the best of
the recollection of the interviewer, once back at the vehicle.

INTERVIEWER: "Is this hostel an IFP area?"
A: "Yes"
INTERVIEWER: "What about the houses around the hostel, are they IFP?"
A: "Some, but others have had their houses burned by the ANC."
INTERVIEWER: "These broken walls here in the hostel, who broke them?"
A: "Two months ago, we all went to Orlando to listen to the Chief Minister. When we returned, the ANC had broken everything. They were shooting at us from those houses."
INTERVIEWER: "Why do you think there is this problem?"
A: "Since Mandela came from jail, these people have been attacking us. They say we are sellouts, that we are the friends of the Boers who oppress the people. But actually the problem is that they don't like Zulu people because we don't like to throw stones and help them. They say that our leaders are "puppets."
INTERVIEWER: "Where are all the people that lived here?"
A: "They have gone. Some have gone to Natal, some have gone to Marafë hostel or other hostels. Some have gone to Emdeni, where there are many Zulus. Things are not so bad there."
INTERVIEWER: "What will the rest do?"
A: "I don't know. We are too few now to really fight. The ANC is afraid of coming into the hostel, but we too are afraid. We can't go out sometimes. Maybe we will leave also."

Although the notion of the release of Nelson Mandela being the sole trigger for violence, as is being implied by many IFP people, seems somewhat simplistic, there is empirical evidence to suggest that there was a definite increase in violence subsequent to his release and the unbanning of the ANC/SACP alliance (See Appendix A).

After 2 February 1990 the first wave of violence left 458 people dead in March. August of the same year saw 700 deaths in political clashes between the ANC and the IFP (Veiligheidsfokus, August 1991).

The clashes in Soweto and the East Rand were characterized by Zulu impis in confrontation with the residents of the areas surrounding the hostels. Beating their shield in rhythm to war songs, the Zulu Impis were often seen penetrating the ANC areas, sending residents into flight to chants of "You strike a Zulu, you must be crazy." (SAP unrest video, August 1990).

The chant itself seems to suggest that the Zulus perceived themselves to be retaliating and reacting
rather than being on an offensive with set objectives. Chief Minister Buthelezi accused both de Klerk and Mandela of collusion in the conflict, saying that they were "sanctioning a strategy of ethnic cleansing against the Zulus" (Time, 12 October, 1992:48).

The ANC was meanwhile pressurizing the government for the abolition of the hostel system. Although the official motivation for this was the poor conditions of hostel inmates, the IFP seemed to think that these were in fact strategic considerations. Powell (Personal Communication, 8 August 1990) of the IFP described the ANC pressure as being the result of the fears of the political threat which some of the Hostels posed for the ANC, in so far as they were IFP strongholds within ANC controlled areas. He also described the position of besieged Hostels, in the current violence, as being similar to that of the old military kraals of the 19th century Zulu kingdom.

An International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) fact finding team, on visit to South Africa in 1992, seemed to support this view to some extend, though for different reasons, by stating, "We are satisfied that many hostels in the Transvaal are today used as Inkatha barracks" (Citizen, 30 March, 1992). There was no similar reference by the commission as to the military status of the surrounding ANC controlled areas.
With the heightening of the revolutionary climate, came the more frequent occurrence of such confrontations.

The spark which would lead to the contemporary level of low intensity conflict in Soweto, came in July 1990. The scholars attending a school adjacent to the Meadowlands hostel, were children from both the hostel and the Mzimhlope/Meadowlands residential area. They had attended school together for years, when a number of school children "necklaced" a Zulu child on the soccer field in full view of the hostel (Kmdt. Van Eeden, Personal Communication, 26 June 1992). Other Zulu children fled from the school and took refuge in the hostel.

The hostel at this point was not a homogeneous unit of Zulu, Inkatha supporters, but had in fact a number of residents of other ethnic and political affiliation. Many resided in the hostels in order to avoid involvement in the revolution, or simply because they could not get accommodation in the township. That night a revenge attack led to the death of 24 Xhosa speaking men, with many people fleeing the hostel (W. Buys, Personal Communication, 17 July, 1992).

Township residents in the Meadowlands/Mzimhlope area say that this had nothing to do with the real reasons for the violence. Lucky Ralochoeng (Personal
communication, 17 July 1992) an unemployed youth in the area, blames the violence on the Zulus who "fight just for nothing."

Asked about the political problems, the area is experiencing, the reply was, "The Zulus all belong to Inkatha. They used to travel through here to the station, even when the people told them not to ..., because of stayaways. They always refuse to help in bringing liberation to our people. They are always 'hardegat,' you know. So, we all decided to push them out. Now they don't use the station anymore. They've got their own taxis now."

By August 1990, South Africa was seeing unprecedented levels of violence. Townships on the East Rand, Thokoza, Tembisa, Katlehong, Daveyton and Vosloorus were the epicenter of the violence on the Witwatersrand.

At Thokoza, on the east rand, a SABC crew asked a group of hostel residents on 8 August 1990, as to the reasons for the fighting. "Because we are Zulus and they are Xhosa. We are not fighting for De Klerk, or the police, ... We are fighting for us, for ourselves, for the Zulus (SABC News Broadcast, 8 August, 1990).

"Members of ethnic groups who suffer losses in conflict often claim that they are the victims of
unjust persecution. From their standpoint this is frequently the case. But losers are not alone in believing that they have acted honorably; the victorious are often convinced that they have done the right thing, that they have been goaded into violence" (Shibutani and Kwan:1965:372).

A Sunday Tribune journalist entered a strife torn Alexandra, finding destroyed and hastily abandoned shacks. He comes across two young men, and asks, "Who are you?"

"We are Zulus," they reply.

"What are you doing here? Where are all the other people?"

"They ran away. They were Xhosa and Shangaans. We live here now, so there is no trouble."

"What trouble?"

"This thing about Inkatha and ANC. For years we lived here. We were Zulus and Shangaans and Xhosa all mixed up but now we are fighting and I don't know why" (Sunday Tribune, 5 April, 1992).
CHAPTER FOUR

CONTENDING IDEOLOGIES.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

"The long conflict between Inkatha and the ANC has many roots. At its core is a power struggle between the Congress, an organization Buthelezi sees as Marxist and dangerously revolutionary, and Inkatha, which the ANC depicts as a rightwing, ethnic party led by an autocrat" (Time, 11 April, 1994:17).

4.1.1 UDF/ANC VERSUS INKATHA/IFP.

The policy of "Separate Development", envisaged the eventual establishment of an independent Zulu state. The foundations for this were laid through the creation of KwaZulu, in so far as the territory was granted legislative powers. Despite pressure from the South African government, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, refused to accept total independence.

Nonetheless, the selfgoverning Kwa Zulu administration was viewed by the revolutionary groupings as a "homeland" or "Bantustan", and thus its administrators as "puppets of the
Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement as "puppets" led to his response, describing the ANC as "fighting for liberation from the diplomatic cocktail circuits."

In 1979 the ANC and Inkatha held talks in London, to try reach a settlement of some sort. Little progress was made, with the ANC describing Buthelezi as an "obstacle to the struggle." There seemed to be little recognition from the ANC for Buthelezi's stance regarding independence, which he claimed to reject out of opposition to the Bantustan, or homeland, policy of the government (Leach:1986:131).

4.1.2 UDF LAUNCH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL.

In August 1983 the UDF was launched with roughly six hundred organizations aligning themselves within this new umbrella body. The UDF started organizing throughout the country. In 1984 the local Black councils announced an increase in rentals. The UDF held protest meetings and on 3 September 1984 the first major "stay away" was held in the Vaal Triangle, with an estimated 60% of workers and scholars participating in the protest action (The Citizen, 4 September, 1984).
Violent clashes followed between supporters of the UDF and people opposed to the protests, as well as security forces. The violence spread rapidly to Soweto, the East Rand Townships, Pretoria, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape.

Another stayaway was held in November, and both Buthelezi as well as Black Consciousness groups accused the UDF of intimidation against fellow blacks in order to boost participation (Barber and Barratt:1990: 304).

ANC supporting Zulus who have been interviewed have posed the question why Buthelezi condemned the UDF for its actions instead of throwing his weight into the "struggle", thereby creating a favorable image for his already one million strong Inkatha movement, among the country's black population.

There may be a multitude of reasons for this, but by far the greatest would appear to be the UDF's opposition to traditional leadership, which could be interpreted as a direct challenge to Inkatha. "The relationship between the UDF and Inkatha was from the inception of the UDF never anything but tense and mutually aggressive" (Keys: 1992:131).
Reed (1994:119) quotes an example near Pietermaritzburg, which illustrates this vividly: "This area belonged to Chief Nhlabunzima Mapumulo. He used to recruit youngsters from this area to be in charge. As a result children started to hold meetings in the forest. We were surprised by these meetings of the children without the consent of their parents. Then we sent men to the chief to find out whether this was acceptable. His answer was, let the children do as they please. They are free, they will rule in the future. Chief Mapumulo was Inkatha to begin with. When he changed to the ANC he forgot to tell us."

Already shortly after the UDF launch in 1983, serious violence broke out at the University of Zululand, whose Chancellor was Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

Some students had distributed pamphlets describing Buthelezi as "a sellout, traitor and Pretoria puppet." By breakfasttime the following morning, six students were dead and dozens injured (Leach:1986:133). Minnaar (1992:2), describes the incident somewhat differently, stating "University of Zululand students were attacked in their hostels by Inkatha supporters."

Keys (1992:131) accepts that the UDF "saw Inkatha
as a 'sell out' organization participating in the oppression of the majority of people in Natal" and that it openly labelled Buthelezi as a "puppet of the Pretoria regime." This was in stark contrast to the fact that Inkatha was originally seen as an Anti-Apartheid movement and viewed as a hostile force by the former Vorster government (Maylam: 1990:74).

Subsequent to the Natal University incident, the confrontation now continued to escalate with fighting between the two sides eventually reaching a level claiming the lives of more than four hundred people around Pietermaritzburg, Natal's provincial capital, over a period of just one year from early 1987 to early 1988, then climbing to 282 in just the 5 months from July to November 1989 (Minnaar: 1992:12). The UDF blamed the fighting on Inkatha "Warlords" and Zulu traditionalism, with Reed (1994:12) quoting an unnamed so-called "Zulu journalist" as saying, "The killers here in South Africa are the Zulus. Wherever there are Zulus there is fighting. Zulu culture is violent, every man must carry a stick. It is easy to die in Natal."

Statistics nonetheless suggest that it is not the traditional weapon which accounts for most of the fatalities in Natal but instead the relatively
modern AK47 assault rifle which is sarcastically referred to as the "ANC's traditional weapon" (General reference by soldiers serving in Natal, December 1991).

Inkatha blamed the fighting on the UDF/ANC attempting to take over control of the townships. David Ntombela, IFP leader of the Natal Midlands, summarizes as follows; "What the ANC cannot control, they send MK to kill" (Time 12 October, 1992:49).

IFP National Chairman, Dr. Frank Mdlalose, says; "The reality we have to face is that our party officials are regularly assassinated and this is designed to limit our ability to canvass support" (Barometer, July 1993:5).

On 29 January 1991, the leaders of the respective parties, namely Nelson Mandela and Mangosuthu Buthelezi agreed to the "Royal House Minute", wherein both parties agreed to cease all hostilities with immediate effect and agreed to work together to eradicate apartheid. On grass-roots level however, the agreement was placed under strain almost immediately after it was announced, with eight people killed and 56 houses burned at Umgababa, on the Natal South Coast, on 31 January (Beeld, 30 Januarie 1991:4). Despite the meeting between the two leaders, violence rather seemed to increase instead of decrease, as
was expected by many observers. A total of 17 Inkatha supporters were killed in an ambush at Taylor's Halt outside Pietermaritzburg on 10 February, leading to the KwaZulu Legislative assembly delegate David Ntombela to accuse "ANC people" of staging the ambush. He added that,"They (the ANC) want to finish off all the Inkatha members. We and the Government all know the ANC intends to take over the country and is causing all the fighting. They protest about our traditional weapons but they do nothing about the AK 47's which their own men have" (The Star, 11 February 1991:1). Whilst it is hardly ever the case that all the blame for conflict can be placed upon one party, and whilst the study accepts that a number of additional factors are equally the cause of the violence, David Ntombela's statement seems to gain credibility when senior ANC/SACP leader Chris Hani says,"It is not in our interest to stabilise the country" (Business Day, 2 May 1991:1).

4.1.3 THE "AMABUTHO" VERSUS "THE BLANKET MEN."

The "amabutho", the warriors, are not restricted to the Zulu nation. The blanketed Xhosa warriors are also referred to with the same name. The amabutho are the warrior class among both these Nguni sub-groups, and both seem to refer to them
as such.
The closest the IFP can get to the ANC's Umkhonto we sizwe, is their traditional amabutho, which could be compared to those impis which served with the royal regiments in the time of Cetshwayo. The amabutho are often accused of vigilantism (Minnaar:1992:69) and are often alleged to be perpetrators of violence against the UDF, later ANC, cadres; "In Natal many of the incidents perpetrated by the amabutho have been linked to members of Inkatha (Haysom: 1986:2-3). The "Blanket Men" or Xhosa version of the amabutho were equally active although rarely reported. Reed (1994:39-42) reports extensively on attacks against Zulus conducted by this group.

Usually poorly armed in comparison to MK, the amabutho have shown great determination in their struggle against the ANC. Although heavily outgunned, they have been able to secure those areas under siege by the ANC. Sgt. Sithole of the SAP's Unit 9 in Durban says, "The amabutho are the ANC's nightmare. Although they are often the underdog due to the lack of automatic weapons, they continue to confront the ANC. The other day they launched a counter attack to recapture sections of the Malugasi area. The ANC was shooting from the area into the amabutho. Residents from
the eastern malugasi section cheered for the ANC whilst taking the property of the IFP people from those shacks not yet burning. Down there in the valley, the amabutho would take cover when the shooting got too much. When the shooting stopped, they would advance some more until the firing started again. As they worked their way up, the ANC retreated slowly. Among the first intact shacks recaptured, the amabutho found an old IFP man who was blind and bedridden. He had been stabbed more than thirty times. The amabutho started chanting "Kill the Xhosa dogs." People still engaged in plundering the shacks, now fled back to their own section and kept moving until they reached the "Uganda" section. We managed to stop the amabutho just here on the tar road. Since then we have had many problems" (Personal communication, Malugasi, 16 December 1991).

The reference to "Xhosa dogs" seems to suggest that the demographic composition of the area is multi-ethnic of nature, with ethnic differences playing a role in the identification of friend and foe.

The role of the amabutho was vital to the defence of hamlets in IFP areas under pressure from the ANC. Down the valley from Ixopo, the hillside
village of Gengeshe was attacked in October 1992. The ten amabutho, who confronted the attackers, chased them into a gully, only to realize too late that they had been led into an ambush, were out-gunned and nine were killed (Time, 12 October, 1992).

4.1.4 THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY.

The ANC has over the years continued to criticise the position of KwaZulu and the role of Inkatha in the administration. It was contended by the ANC that the 1.5 million membership which Inkatha claimed to have by 1987, was largely the result of coercion, questioning the legitimacy of Inkatha and its relationship with the KwaZulu legislature.

The African Communist (No.111, Fourth Quarter 1987:15) featured a battery of articles throughout the conflict, levelling accusations at the Inkatha orientated KwaZulu administration, "Africans living in Kwa Zulu are driven to take out Inkatha membership as a form of insurance."

Criticism was also levelled from abroad, "Chief Mangosuthu's organization, Inkatha, does not represent even a majority of Zulus and relies heavily on violence to maintain its power ... Candidates wishing to stand for election to either central or local government in Kwa Zulu
must be members of Inkatha whose members staff the bureaucracy of Kwa Zulu which controls the rural areas of Natal as well as the vast urban Townships of Umlazi, Kwa Mashu, and parts of Inanda. Traders find it almost impossible to get licenses without an Inkatha membership card; pensioners say the card is needed to collect their allowance; migrant workers say it is difficult to get a job without a card; teachers and school inspectors all have to be members of Inkatha, as are schoolchildren by virtue of paying school fees (The Guardian, 19 September, 1986).

Thus not only was the geographical existence of Kwa Zulu questioned by the ANC, but also the political hierarchy which governed it. Buthelezi's view was that, "Those in the ANC who reject me, pretending they do so because I occupy the position of Chief Minister of KwaZulu, do so as a part of their propaganda campaign. They know the truth. My only sin is that I refused to make Inkatha a surrogate organization of the (former) external mission of the ANC (Clarion Call, Special edition, 1987:46).

The political allegiance of the bureaucracy in KwaZulu, specifically that of the KwaZulu police was/is continuously challenged.
4.1.5 THE KWAZULU POLICE AS A FACTOR IN THE CONFLICT.

"The KwaZulu police force is about 4000 men strong and its detractors argue that it has played a partisan role in the violent political rivalry between the IFP and ANC supporters" (African Defence Review, March 1994:34).

The KwaZulu police force is the only security force available to the geographical region of Kwa Zulu, following the handing over of SAP stations to the newly established KZP in 1981.

Criticism of the IFP has often dealt with the political role which the KZP is alleged to play in the ongoing conflict. Only three weeks after the handing over of jurisdiction to the KZP in the Kwa Mashu and Umlazi areas, it was reported that twenty affidavits were submitted by residents, complaining of "vicious attacks" by members of the KZP (Sunday Tribune, 14 May, 1987).

Criticism of the IFP in this regard was also expressed by segments of the international community with a team of civil rights lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) blaming Mangosuthu Buthelezi for the escalation of violence in black townships and in KwaZulu/Natal in particular. "The five man ICJ team said the KwaZulu police was biased against foes of the IFP and flagrantly joined in attacks on township
residents in strife-torn Natal. There is overwhelming evidence that they are one-sided, and openly join in attacks by members of Inkatha on people in their homes", the jurists concluded (Citizen, 30 March, 1992).

The Commission makes no mention of the attacks on security force members which have been part of the strategy of the revolutionary movements and which are documented in great detail. "The violence which used to be directed at the state and which manifested itself ... has to a large extend moved its emphasis to attacks on Security forces, including the Police Force of the KwaZulu government. These attacks not only take the form of physical attacks, but include a campaign of intimidation and subversion directed against members of this force" (Veiligheidsfokus, February 1994:12). The losses among members of all security forces was put at an average monthly rate of 19 killed in the four months up to October 1993, with the number of policemen killed since July 1983 being 1029 (Fast Facts, October 1993:1).

Whilst criticism of the KZP is widespread among many sources consulted in this study, only Reed (1994:54-57) points to the impact which the con-
The conflict was having on SAP discipline, pro-ANC SAP members in particular. In December 1990 Xhosa policemen sympathetic to their clansmen in Phola Park entered the Zulu Mshayazafe Hostel early in the evening and told the hostel dwellers that the police was planning a raid that night, advising them to bury their weapons. Thereafter the Xhosa policemen joined up with a local Xhosa war party attacking the Zulu hostel, fighting shoulder to shoulder. Meanwhile Zulu policemen had grown suspicious of the whereabouts of their Xhosa colleagues. They decided to check the hostel, arriving in time to see the Xhosas retreating, having already killed 12 Zulus inside the hostel.

It seems clear from this that the factors which had resulted in the obvious transgression by Xhosa SAP members may equally apply to all ethnic groups, the KwaZulu Police being no exception.

Accusations against the KZP usually include the following points:
- harassment and intimidation.
- collusion with Inkatha elements and/or participation with these elements in attacks.
disruption of political activity, eg. meetings.
- failure to assist complaints and investigate matters.
- complainants are usually non-Inkatha people.


4.2 THE ANC'S STRATEGIC APPROACH - A FACTOR IN VIOLENCE.

4.2.1 INTRODUCTION.

"The ANC declares that our movement is a national liberation movement, that it is fighting not simply for civil rights, but for the overthrow of the colonial regime and that it is committed to the struggle for the seizure of power by the masses of the people. This is why the ANC has decided to raise the liberation movement to a new and higher level. Its strategic objective is to mobilize the masses of the people for seizure of power. The movement has entered the stage of armed struggle" (Oliver Tambo, World Marxist Review, December 1975).

On the part of the government, the Marxist threat was considered to be the root cause of the growing unrest, as the counter-strategies in the form of the "total onslaught" would seem to suggest.
It is not the aim of this study to judge which is correct. Instead their may have been some truth to both, even from a clinical strategic perspective. Both Apartheid and Marxism may be considered as being part of the factors leading to violence in the country as a whole and in the Kwa Zulu Natal region in particular.

Having discussed the 1976 uprising earlier, it may serve as a good example of just how intricate a revolutionary war usually proves to be. In terms of immediate control, it is undisputed that the government achieved this objective within days. With the aid of hindsight however, the Soweto clampdown may have greatly enhanced the ANC's position at a time when there still appeared to be little enthusiasm among the masses for a revolution.

4.2.2 THE WILL TO REVOLT.

Indeed, there is a lot to be said about what exactly triggers a revolution. The popular reasons, such as "oppression", "freedom" etc., are perhaps somewhat simplistic. There are clearly other factors which provide stimuli for uprisings and revolutions Taber (1970:18) speaks of an upsurge of "popular will. "In fact, one could
point out that oppression of some sort has been endured worldwide by most people for as long as mankind can recall. That this has sometimes led to revolt seems to be viewed as a logical consequence, simply because economic deprivation and poverty is believed to fuel revolution.

Yet, these condition have existed in many countries without the faintest signs of resistance. Why would the black population of South Africa revolt in the presence of living standards not seen elsewhere in Africa, where one-party rule and military dictatorship seems to be the norm and yet seldom resisted?

One may subscribe to the view that the will to revolt is not so much a reaction to political circumstances or material conditions, not the consequence of a "cause", but instead the result of potential.

Limitations that had been formerly accepted, suddenly became intolerable. Not the conditions, but the sudden opportunity which may have arisen, provides the stimuli for revolution. The will to act is born through this. It is a state of mind which the political activist or insurgent must attempt to transmit to the masses if he is to
enjoy popular support. "His secret weapon is the ability to inspire this state of mind in others" (Taber:1970:19).

It seems only logical that the ANC was faced with a situation in 1976 where the above applied. The government reaction to the education crises, together with the subsequent unrest, may quite easily have brought about the necessary state of mind which provided the foundation for the next stage of the revolution.

4.2.3

PROPAGANDA.

"In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies" Churchill, Teheran 1943 (Young and Stamp:1989:3).

Ellul (1973:6) contends that, "most people are easy prey for propaganda because of their firm but entirely erroneous conviction that it is composed only of lies and tall stories and that, conversely, what is true cannot be propaganda."

In a war of perceptions, which most wars to a greater or lesser extend are, the perceived truth is of vital importance in maintaining the "will" to fight among the sides in conflict with each other. It is naive and simplistic to assume that
modern propaganda is necessarily comprised of lies. It operates instead with various kinds of lies, truths, half truth, truth out of context and limited truth (Young and Stamp: 1991:3).

Another basic misconception which makes people vulnerable to propaganda, is the notion that it serves only to change opinion.

Although there can be little doubt that this is most certainly one of the functions of propaganda it, much more importantly, aims to intensify existing trends, to sharpen and focus them, and to lead men to action or non-action (Ellul:1973: vii). In the KwaZulu/Natal context, which may be applicable to the rest of South Africa's trouble spots, the influence of the "organisational press" was identified as a definite factor contributing to violence in the area (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:10).

In South Africa the use of propaganda has seen great utilization from both the government and the revolutionary forces. To illustrate how propaganda has benefitted the ANC in its campaign against the government and in the mobilization of internal and external support, one can look at a number of instances where the ANC version slowly
became the generally accepted one.

There was much ridicule aimed at the NP "Swart gevaar", "Rooi gevaar" slogans, pointing to the apparent inability on the part of the government to enhance its credibility among even its own power base which was the target of this propaganda. In the same way, the revolutionary forces have made great efforts at discrediting the South African government, as well as the "Bantustans."

In personal communication with William Sibisi (2 October 1991), an ANC supporting student, the extend of successful propaganda became clear with statements such as "The white people forced black people to read the bible. If they could not recite the ten commandments, they were shot or crucified."

As one cannot seem to trace any official literature to support the above statement, one can find substantial evidence in Maoist doctrine which would suggest that the apparent untruth is part of the "education" process, designed to stimulate action among the target group.

By "education" is not meant, the intellectual instruction or the promulgation of information.
Information-directed and manipulated, moreover on the Leninist pattern was, together with instruction, incorporated into an education whose aim was to modify the whole human being by giving him a totally new view of the world and awakening in him a range of feelings, reactions thoughts, and attitudes entirely different from those to which he is accustomed (Ellul:1973:304).

This "people's education" is part of the alternative structures discussed elsewhere in this study. The message is disseminated in all possible ways. Dr. Allen Boesak (1976:118), well-known cleric, wrote "The first step in Christian life is to know that there is an enemy and the man who helps you forget that there is an enemy, is your worst enemy. That is the white man who pretends to be your friend. Of course white people are not only the enemy, they are also outside the nation."

It is safe to assume that those who would learn from those writings, may be inclined to develope certain perceptions about whites, which in the revolutionary context would lead to "action", as explained earlier.
This is where the individual is becoming ripe to be absorbed in an organization, part of the organization phase of any revolution. By organization is meant that every individual must be put into a network comprising many organizations that surround him on all sides and control him on all levels. But the aim is not to stifle the individual through organizations; it is to make him an active member of that organization (Ellul: 1973: 304).

This method of propaganda is utilised not only to discredit the Government, but also those perceived to be enhancing or at least maintaining the position of the Government. This is where the "puppet" image of the IFP leadership and third level Government may have originated, the ANC having been aware of the need for propaganda aimed at countering the restrictive measures which the former National Party Government had imposed on it.

The ANC utilised specific campaigns, such as the "Free the children" campaign, to discredit the Government internally as well as abroad. Through these campaigns it achieved a high level of internal politicisation and mobilisation by gaining support from the community for local
issues and connecting those issues to national issues. Simultaneously the issues achieved international strategic objectives of the ANC through furthering efforts towards greater isolation, one of the victories in this regard being the US 1986 sanctions bill introduced as a measure designed to force the South African Government to greater reforms.

The ANC furthermore made great use of alternative media which started to appear in the townships. These publications are also referred to organisational press which "in mobilizing support makes itself guilty of creating unrealistic expectations in order to gain support" (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:10). Together with publicity campaigns whereby funerals were often used for political meetings, the ANC made a point of making false allegations to discredit the Government. These were not uncoordinated campaigns, but were based on achieving both tactical and strategic objectives, such as the sanction bill, within the war of perceptions.

The ANC exploited the fact that it was restricted, by continuously pointing at these restrictive measures and disseminating misinformation. The gains made by the ANC are explained by Carlos
Marighella who says, "The war of nerves or psychological war in an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government. In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through. At a point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is subject to being broken at any moment. The objective of the war of words is to misinform, spreading lies among the authorities, thus creating an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty and concern on the part of the government" (Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla, 1985).

In the South African conflict, the above model together with the examples mentioned, is not the only dimension of propaganda. Another important dimension which proved to be highly successful, is the so-called "Brainwashing".
According to Ellul (1973:311) the process has three phases which in effect aim to retrieve enemies (in the South African context, the ruling class whites and the collaborating non-whites) and transform them into allies or, as is more common in the white South African community, inactivity or paralysis.

For the purpose of clarity and relevance to the South African situation, Ellul's theory has been placed into context with South African parallels.

Phase 1
The individual is cut off from everything, from his former milieu, from news and information. In the South African context this was done through the isolation of the country from Western countries. The international isolation in almost every sphere was part of the ANC/SACP four pillar concept.

Phase 2
Through isolation circumstances the individual is now bombarded with slogans, through media or fellow countrymen. (In the war scenario-fellow prisoners)
In the beginning this evokes the subject's scorn and disbelief. After some time, erosion takes place. Involuntary penetration is achieved after extensive exposure to this. In South Africa, this was achieved through a vacuum in multiple political/ideological thought. Most whites for example subscribed to the official government line of thought, from strong pro-apartheid in 1976 (80% pro-apartheid vote) to strong anti-apartheid in March 1992 (68% Pro-reformist vote).

Phase 3
This phase may provide one explanation for white South African support for the reform process and the apparent 180 degree political turn over the last decade. The notion that they have cooperated because they have suddenly come to reject what are considered racist views, is seriously questioned here. The primary objective of this phase would be to create doubt, followed by the feeling of guilt. The feeling of "I belong to a group of people who have done harm", is enhanced. This kind of thinking attaches itself to the Christian conscience. History and the universe is depicted with the help of very clever dialectics. An entire "Weltanschauung" is unfolded progressively (Ellul:1973:311-313).
In this way the perceptions of the White community may have been changed over the years to accommodate the ANC/SACP, whilst making it possible to marginalise the IFP.

The late Chris Hani seems to have shown considerable comprehension for this form of propaganda, which he saw as relatively successful, judging from the following statements, "I don't think whites want to die for apartheid" (New York Times, 12 June, 1988).

This was followed by, "'The whites' life is good. They go to their cinemas, they go to their braaivleis. That's why they support the system. Part of our campaign is to prevent that sweet life. The bombs were to tell the whites, they can creep and crawl next to you.' In pursuit of this goal he regards as legitimate the assassination of Inkatha warlords and those Inkatha Central Committee members who aid and abet them. Other targets Hani regarded as legitimate were other Black collaborators, selective individuals involved in implementing apartheid laws, including members of Parliament, White policemen and reactionary judges who 'dish out death sentences to our people'" (Weekly Mail, 16 June, 1988).
Important to note in this statement is that it closely links the struggle against "Apartheid" with the conflict with Inkatha, thereby seemingly confirming the link between the two theatres of conflict which this study has maintained throughout.

How efficient the ANC propaganda has proven to be, can be judged by its ability to seemingly digest radical statements with limited consequences to the movement, primarily due to the perceptions of guilt having been driven home successfully among significant segments of the targeted group, to the point that the ANC is allowed to proceed almost unopposed.

In addition, the ANC version of the conflict was the one mostly broadcast by the international media, the consequent isolation of South Africa having been an important component of ANC/SACP strategy (See following chapter). In terms of news coverage, South Africa provided a textbook case of "crisis coverage", depicting what seemed to millions of viewers as "reality". The perceptions which were formed through this, undoubtedly contributed greatly to the international pressure which was placed on South Africa. In the US for example, Television news is the most dominant source of information (American
As many studies have suggested, however, television news suffers from an innate operating "bias" which mandates the manufacture of a simplified "created reality" in substitution for the reality which it is meant to portray. This bias is not necessarily ideological; rather is a bias of format, organization, and perspective.

Television news has the logic of drama and engages in what has been labeled "real fictions", which organize and select events into an "intentional unity that might not otherwise exist" (American Review, Fourth Quarter, 1990:2). Hence the ability of the ANC to achieve the objective of international pressure. On the other hand, the ANC/SACP publications were very careful not to enhance ethnicity in its propaganda onslaught, always restricting its verbal attacks to tagging by reference to them as "counter-revolutionary" (African Communist, Second Quarter, 1988:49), and character assassination of Chief Buthelezi (African Communist, Fourth Quarter, 1988:85).
4.2.4 THE FOUR PILLAR CONCEPT.

The early eighties saw a South African government which showed signs of reform, through the introduction of the tricameral system and "power sharing."

The creation of expectations may well have created the perception of a presence of "opportunity" and "potential", as discussed earlier. Having dealt with the launch of the UDF and the level of unrest in Chapter two, the study will now attempt to place those events into a strategic context.

The ANC shifted emphasis from peaceful protest to violent protest. This was followed by the announcement of the "peoples war", by implication thus a popular war. In 1984 the "four pillar" concept became known to be the following:

1) THE ARMED STRUGGLE
2) MOBILISATION OF THE MASSES
3) UNGOVERNABILITY AND ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES.
4) THE ISOLATION OF THE RSA.

(Sechaba, February, 1984)

Through the promotion of the four pillar concept, the ideas of revolution were expected to obtain popular support internally and externally, which
would eventually discredit the Government whilst simultaneously attaining "popular movement" status for the ANC. To achieve that, popular support for the Government among the black community, in so far it existed, had to be eroded. Dissatisfaction among blacks needed to be exploited for mobilisation purposes.

Those who argue that they fail to see the logic in the ANC/SACP launching an all-out offensive in the face of promising reforms, are perhaps ignorant of revolutionary doctrine. The insurgent is subversive of the existing order and is the disseminator of revolutionary ideas.

To achieve military victory or the overthrow of the government, is secondary in so far as that is expected to be an integral part and logical consequence of the popular revolt which is being promoted (Taber:1970:19).

Priority is given to the stimulation of the "will", through the introduction of the community to subversive values not far removed from those familiar to the community. For example, the traditional values of black tribes to share grazing, could allow the revolutionary to promote socialist ideas, which appear quite sensible to
the recipients of the ideas. In short, the insurgent in the South African context possibly had the advantage of utilising African communalism, to promote Marxist Communism.

4.2.4.1 UNGOVERNABILITY.

It should be kept in mind that "ungovernability" is the ultimate objective of the insurgent, prior to the eventual transfer of power to the "liberating" forces. It provides him with the ability to move more freely, which in turn allows him greater operational capabilities for mobilisation aimed at achieving greater instability.

It is therefore not surprising that those structures which appear to be supportive of the Government are perceived to be obstacles which would have to be removed. After all, the mere existence of a state of ungovernability in itself poses a serious threat to any Government, as its legitimacy is automatically questioned. In addition, the insurgent requires a base from which the insurrection can be planned, supporters trained and based. "This base area is distinct from a contested area in that the insurgent must be able to maintain a semi or permanent level of
control over the population in the specific region" (Powell:1991:79).

Louw and Bekker (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992:27), quoting extensively from the 1991 South African Institute of Race Relations annual report, clearly view the strategy of ungovernability as a great contributing factor in the violence experienced in KwaZulu/Natal and the country as a whole; "This strategy was intended to destroy apartheid by rendering black communities ungovernable through the targeting of 'collaborators'. This was to be achieved through boycotts, stayaways and violent attacks on councillors, members of the police, and their property. Homelands were also identified as a major target. The intention was to overthrow these governments which were perceived as collaborating with the state, and to use homeland areas as bases from which to continue 'People's war'; adding that," In some cases, accordingly, the strategy resulted in anarchy. Furthermore, to mobilize people at a young age to act against 'collaborators' promoted the growth of a culture of violence which has persisted into the 1990's."
The promotion of ungovernability in the 1980's thus provided two major logical objectives:

a) Destruction of Third level Government structures in townships in the form of councils.

b) Destabilisation of Homelands or Self-governing areas, Independent States.

Powell (1991) describes in great detail how the UDF promoted ungovernability in every sphere. Without elaborating extensively on this, at the expense of the subject of this study, it is suffice to say that the revolutionary doctrine subscribed to by the ANC/SACP alliance certainly seemed to provide successes in so far as the creation of "liberated Zones" was concerned. In the 1987 New Year message, the ANC stated, "In many parts of our country we have already made important advances towards the creation of these mass revolutionary bases. We have destroyed many of the enemy's organs of apartheid rule. The masses of the people have played a central role in this process as active participants in the struggle for their own liberation. We have also succeeded to create mass democratic organizations representative of these active and conscious masses, ranging from street committees to COSATU, the UDF, the NECC and their affiliates and other democratic formations" (Sechaba, April, 1987:1).
4.2.4.2 THE NEED FOR BASE AREAS.

The ANC was forced to recognize the need for the creation of base areas due to the difficulty which the organization was experiencing in organizing itself among the population. The ANC had received complaints from returning MK cadres relating to the apparent reluctance of the population to accept and assist them (Kasrils in Powell:1991:49).

Powell writes that this "...led to a realization that true support from the people could only be created in an environment created and maintained by the ANC" (Powell:1991:80).

Clearly the ANC's decision to shift strategic emphasis in the early 1980's was a well-considered move which had a distinct influence on the dynamics of the revolutionary conflict, which until then had been restricted to the lowkey, and often shortlived, insurgency.

Despite the attempts by the ANC to achieve "Liberated Zones" status for many of the country's townships, this was not achieved entirely. Particularly the 1980's saw only limited success in this regard.
Nonetheless, the ANC was successful in implementing "Peoples structures" in many townships, thereby rendering third level government practically useless. Local government, having been targeted for elimination for representing the "regime", was brought to near collapse. Subsequent to the "necklace" death of Councillor Dlamini in 1984, many councilors were similarly killed or chased out of the townships. The threat to resign or be killed was very serious indeed, enhanced by the seeming inability of the South African government to protect the councilors. From 1984 onwards the government attempted to reinforce its Black local government through stabilizing the townships with the assistance of the SADF.

The situation continued to deteriorate, with the ANC's 1987 New Year's message stating: "In many parts of the country we have given concrete form to that emerging alternative power by destroying the enemy's structures of government and setting up organs of peoples' power. The gains we have made in this regard have meant that the apartheid regime has lost its administrative power over us in many areas of South Africa. This is a development of immeasurable historical importance for the success of our revolutionary struggle. It has
laid the basis for us to make advances towards our common goal. We have, in previous years spoken of mass bases as a very important and central element in our strategic outlook. Our success in destroying the enemy's administrative control over large areas of the country constitutes a high point in the struggle for the emergence of these bases. One of the principal tasks we face in this regard is that we should continue to escalate our offensive to smash the organs of apartheid state power and construct organs of peoples' power in their place. Our objectives must be to create mass revolutionary bases in all black areas throughout the country and to mount an strategic offensive against the enemy in its stronghold in the towns and cities. The campaign to make the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable must result in the emergence of these bases which must be characterized by a number of features. One of these is that the masses of the people should not only have a high level of political consciousness but should also be active in the struggle to liberate themselves. In some areas including the Bantustans, we are still faced with the task of destroying the fascist government apparatus and making the advances we have made elsewhere.
We urge the revolutionary forces to engage the enemy in these areas as well" (Powell:1991:87).

(The implicit threat for Kwa Zulu seems quite obvious in the last section of the message.)

In an attempt to provide greater legitimacy to councils, the 1988 municipal elections appear to have been an attempt at providing councilors with a popular powerbase among the people. The ANC’s position was clear in not allowing the election to proceed undisturbed. British Intelligence Digest (22 June, 1988:23) carried an article on the subject which read,"In four month’s time municipal elections are due to be held in South Africa. Chris Hani...has said that the ANC is committed to aborting the municipal elections. To achieve this the ANC will ‘use revolutionary violence... to stop blacks from collaborating ... we want to warn them that they do this at their own risk.’"

The election was boycotted to such an extend that a mere 11% of the eligible voters actually participated. Among the participants though, emerged the predominantly Zulu speaking Sofasonke Party. It would thus appear that those in defiance of the boycott campaign headed by the
ANC, were predominantly of Zulu origin, thus projecting the first signs of ethnic groupings becoming apparent in the Reef Townships.

MASS RESIGNATIONS

The unbanning of the ANC, together with the subsequent increase of instability, resulted in the resignation of another 138 Transvaal councilors in 1990. Similar numbers resigned in the following year with a levelling off in 1992, when only 61 councilors resigned.

However, the situation of third level government remained in a state of near collapse with 59.23% of all posts empty. At least 49 of the former province's 85 Black local authorities could not muster quorums with 401 of the 677 positions vacant (The Citizen, 19 September, 1992).

Within the chaos created in the townships, the ANC was provided with the environment which lends itself to the implementation of "Peoples Structures" which would replace the council authority and provide the ANC with apparent legitimacy. "Peoples courts" which passed harsh sentences were utilised to achieve total, control over the community in order to provide the necessary discipline required for the successful
mobilisation of the community.

The strategy employed was clear in so far as the existing structures were simply replaced by alternative structures headed by revolutionary elements.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that many of South Africa's townships eventually reached such levels of ungovernability, that they quite easily qualified for the classification of "mass bases."
CHAPTER FIVE

KWAZULU/NATAL - REGIONAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The KwaZulu/Natal conflict has additional contributing factors which, when closely examined, makes the problem more complex than in the rest of the country. Geographically the KwaZulu area, as well as the small so-called "Transkei island" situated in Southern KwaZulu/Natal, is primarily a number of patches of land, without any clearly defined boundaries. For the managing of the conflict in the region this has posed the rather frustrating problem of jurisdiction with regard to governing bodies and policing. "The area of KwaZulu is divided into 26 different magisterial districts and governed along tribal lines by a Chief Minister and a Legislative Assembly of elected chiefs. These Chiefs again govern their specific areas through indunas" (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:6).

For the communities, the geographic division has fueled historic land disputes, complicated by colonial and apartheid administrations. Meanwhile, KwaZulu/Natal has been burdened with the highest loss of life as Appendix B illustrates. Measured over a period of one year (1993),
based on figures released by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies in Durban, this region accounted for roughly 53% of the deaths recorded.

5.2 LAND

Land in the Natal region, or rather the lack thereof, is as controversial an issue as elsewhere in South Africa or the developing world as a whole, except that in Natal it is more intense because the Kwa Zulu area alone, making up 8% of South Africa's surface, was inhabited by more than 20% of South Africa's population as early as 1970 (Baxter and Boulle:1970:44). By the year two thousand this figure is estimated to increase to around 23% (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992:17).

The issue of land deals with land as a resource and a prerequisite for existence and development, as well as a cause for conflict in so far as there exists competition for that land, based on the principles of survival.

From a geopolitical perspective, the traditional lands of the Zulu have changed significantly since the days of Shaka. If relative homogeneity was maintained by Shaka and perhaps even beyond his era, the coming of the whites would serve as a constant drainage on Zulu solidarity already referred to earlier.

The obvious immediate consequence was the loss of land to the Boers which included most of the land South of the
Tugela (Van Aswegen:1989:264). Yet this may have been only one of the minor problems facing the Zulu nation. Instead, the coming of the missionaries and the colonization of Natal by the British posed a greater threat, in so far as it challenged Zulu culture and internal discipline through the changes it would bring, particularly after the defeat of 1879.

5.3 FRAGMENTATION.

5.3.1 THE RESERVES

In order to deal with the influx of refugees from the Zulu Kingdom. The treaty of 1843 between the British and Mpande finalized boundaries and maintained that the Zulu King no longer held any authority over the tribes and clans outside the borders of his kingdom. In order to resolve the dispute between white farmers and the refugees, Shepstone devised a location policy which demarcated certain reserves for exclusive occupation by blacks.

Indications are that already by 1870 there were complaints by the inhabitants of these reserves that the lands were not large enough for the needs of agriculture. By 1882 the African population was estimated at 375 000 of whom 169 800 were resident on the reserve, 162 600 were on
private land as tenants and laborers, with the remaining 42 600 squatting on so-called crown land (Minnaar:1990:11).

Zulu defeat in 1879 brought about the fragmentation of Zululand into thirteen areas, in accord with the terms of the Wolseley Peace Settlement, each controlled by appointed chiefs. This fragmentation was continued in terms of Shepstone's policy, which was in step with the general British colonial policy of allowing and encouraging fragmentation in order to divide and rule. As Packenham (1991:XXV) states, "When effective occupation is necessary to establish good title, conflict became inevitable." To minimize this conflict, the British colonial administration preferred to ensure that no coordinated opposition would evolve in its territories, therefore allowing sections and factions of tribes to split off and create "new" tribes (Minnaar:1990:12). This not only weakened the Zulu people, creating additional divisions and systematically eroding the cohesion of the tribe, but also resulted in increasing conflict over resources such as grazing.

In addition to this, the British crown rewarded military assistance received from individual
tribes, as in the Anglo-Zulu war, with the allocation of land. This even led to the creation of a Sotho enclave and the Xhosa "Transkei island." At the same time, rebellion or tax evasion by other tribes, as was the case with the Hlubi people, was punished through dispossession and the confiscation of land and dispersing of the tribe (Minnaar:1990:11).

5.3.2 MISSION COMMUNITIES.

Missionaries arrived with the first whites. Missionaries provided sanctuary for Zulus who fled the consequences of their transgressions of Zulu law. In effect therefore, the missions accumulated the perceived "criminal" elements and the refugees of the Zulu Kingdom. Many of those elements would later assist the British army in the Zulu war of 1878. Minnaar (1990:17) explains: "The establishment of African communities around the various mission stations led to further divisions between Africans in Natal itself. Africans at the missions were treated differently in terms of access to land and educational facilities. If they were converted their acceptance of Christianity set them in opposition to traditional tribal authority. Once converted they were expected to conform to a Christian marriage, in other words
reject polygamy, and give allegiance to the church and its doctrine alone. Implicit in this conversion was the discarding of ancestor worship and witchcraft. The mission stations did provide a convenient place of refuge to Africans who belonged to no tribe or who had incurred the wrath of their chiefs. Very often the mission stations became the focus of opposition to tribal authority and led to conflict between mission Africans and those in the reserves."

5.4 THE IMPACT OF FRAGMENTATION

The significance of these developments lies in the coming about of separate political entities which were forming within the protective boundaries of British colonial rule south of the Tugela river as discussed earlier, and which came into conflict with traditional norms, values, political authority and structures.

With British annexation of Natal as well as the two subsequent Anglo-Boer wars, Boers who fled Natal had their farms repossessed by the British government. These farms were thereafter given to those Zulus who were seen to be friendly to the British cause and/or assisted in the suppression of rebellions (Pakenham: 1979: 468).

These segments of the Zulu nation were in closer contact with the colonial authorities and were more Westernized
through the influence of the missionaries. In this sense there was a widening gap between them and the Zulu traditions. These areas, both dispossessed farms and the missions, where these people settled became known as the "amakolo" meaning "the spots."

In today's conflict, these "spots" tend to be ANC orientated areas surrounded by IFP orientated areas. Minnaar (1990:16) names violence torn Edendale near Pietermaritzburg as an example, it being the oldest mission station in KwaZulu/Natal. Linscott supports this view although adding an ethnic dimension, saying "Edendale is the home of the Kholwa people who have a tradition, going back to pre-colonial times of resisting Zulu authority. They regard themselves as part of Pietermaritzburg, and no appendage of Ulundi. Their ancestors made common cause with the Voortrekkers against the Zulus. Then they fought on the British side in the Zulu war. They occupy their land by freehold and are hypersensitive to any suggestion that they should be incorporated with Kwa Zulu where land ownership is communal" (Linscott, Pretoria News, 1990).

Another factor complicating the matter, is the fact that the mission communities generally represent a different class of people which look down on the more illiterate and more rural Inkatha, "We are the heirs, in South Africa, to the terrible mistakes made by western advisors and African governments in the 1960's, and which flow from the general contempt which urban educated people have for rural
Pietermaritzburg is an example of a combination of all the above factors, being an industrial center whilst having been the capitol of the erstwhile British colony and the later South African province. Today, the violence around the town is almost legendary, with IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi describing it as "the ANC’s killing fields" (Citizen, 6 April, 1989).

In personal communication with Powell (14 July 1993), the complexity of the situation in the Pietermaritzburg area was described in great detail. One example of how the IFP of the outer perimeter black residential areas is affected by the ANC’s political action, is the access to bus routes. Powell explains that every time the ANC hold a stayaway, the IFP people are unable to get to work, as the bus drivers are mostly ANC members who partake in the stayaway, as part of their union’s pro-ANC stance. At the same time, the bus routes often lead through ANC areas (Amakolo), enhancing the possibility of ambushes of busses.

Powell’s version of the dependency of residents on the busses, and the consequent animosity towards the bus drivers, seems to be supported by attacks on the bus service even in other areas. On 29 April 1993, two Umfolozi
transport workers were shot dead in a bus travelling from the Empangeni bus depot, both the victims having been TGWU shop stewards. On the same day, two IFP supporters are found guilty in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court of killing ten bus passengers near Table Mountain in March (Conflict monitor, April 1993).

Another incident which serves to illustrate the point is that of IFP supporters on their way to a rally in Durban attempting to pass through Edendale.

David Ntombela, IFP leader in the Natal Midlands, as quoted by Reed (1994:111), tells of an attack on busses carrying IFP supporters to the rally, "I ordered 105 busses from KwaZulu Transport for my area. It began to rain. People got wet and the busses turned back. The first eight busses were stoned and shot at as they passed through Edendale, an ANC stronghold." Reed adds that the police had asked Ntombela to take another route but that he insisted, saying that his people could defend themselves.

Liscott (Pretoria News, 14-18 May 1990) points out that the general pattern which seems to have emerged is one similar to the amakolo phenomenon, whereby in urban areas there is essentially ANC control of the townships where non-Zulus (mainly Xhosas, Basotho and Nyasas) are concentrated, along with Zulus whose connections with the traditional system has become remote. Gathered about these urban strongholds are the Inkatha controlled shacklands and the rural areas.
5.5 FACTION FIGHTING IN KWAZULU NATAL.

5.5.1 SUB-LEVELS OF CONFLICT.

Fighting in the region, even relatively recently, was not always politically motivated, although often the same reasons apply. This creates an overlap which can mean that a particular issue is contested both on tribal and/or political level. This once again varies from area to area. Causes and Symptoms of the conflict, in addition to the obvious ideological ones, in the region include the following factors:

a) Land shortages.
b) Boundary disputes.
c) Competition for crown lands.
d) Eviction of squatters from white owned farms.
e) Disputes regarding hereditary succession.

(Minnaar:1990:28).

5.5.2 MSINGA - A CASE IN POINT.

The Msinga area’s problems are very suitable for closer examination in this study when attempting to establish patterns in the conflict. Msinga includes many of the factors mentioned above, many of them being equally relevant in other areas of the region.
The Msinga valley, near Tugela ferry, has much fertile land which remains unused due to the violence going back to the 1920's, when two Zulu subtribes contended for ownership. Apart from this animosity between the two subtribes, there are another five tribes who have interests in the Msinga valley. The Zulu nation is divided into 250 such subtribes who in turn are divided into dozens of subgroups called "isigodis" which normally number approximately five thousand people. Land disputes was one of many reasons which would lead to the various subgroups to confront each other on either isigodi or tribal level (Malan:1990:87).

Population density in Msinga is 101 people per kilometer, with 80% of the population in the area not having enough land to feed themselves. Much land remains unused due to fear of attacks, therefore completing the vicious cycle which makes development impossible. To break the cycle, the KwaZulu government attempted to take direct control of the development of land in order to make the area selfsufficient."An official involved in the project was assassinated. After that, Kwa Zulu formed a cash crop consortium with some white farmers and planted strawberries on the disputed land. When the first crop was ripe, someone opened the gates and drove hundreds of
cattle and donkeys over the strawberry fields. The consortium disintegrated. The government gave up. The land lay fallow, and the people of Msinga stay hungry (Malan: 1990:297).

Malan (1990:326) quotes an example from an interview with a resident of the Msinga area, Masithela Mbatha, involved in a war between two clans. "It all started in Kimberley in 1965, when a young man named Ntsele was sitting quietly and drinking his beer. Two men from Ndlela sat down with him and helped themselves to his beer. Ntsele said, 'How can you drink my beer without asking?' And the Ndlela men said, 'How can you stop us?' "Ntsele was from Mhlangaan, and he told his brothers about this rudeness. The insults festered for weeks. Then Christmas came, and all we Zulus gathered for a beerdrink. Everyone was discussing this thing that happened to Ntsele, and the young men wanted to fight. I was there. I fought too. We fought with sticks and spears and knives. Five men were killed - four of them and one of us."

The men were arrested, but released for lack of evidence. Once set free, they returned to Msinga and continued the war in the hills. Eventually the fighting stopped. In 1982, the new generation of warriors in Ndlela said, "You killed our
fathers in Kimberley, so we must kill you." The fighting started again.

Malan is supported by Minnaar (1990:24) who points out that so-called "beerdrinks" are traditionally renowned for ending in violence and for being a wellknown cause of faction fighting even outside the Msinga area.

THE ROLE OF ZULU CULTURE IN CONFLICT.

"Other social concepts such as the need to prove one's courage and manliness are also elements in the perpetuation of the violence" (Minnaar:1990:37).

Malan (1991:297-299) states that the wars in past were conducted in an honorable fashion with strict adherence to Zulu warrior traditions. Casualties were light, and offenders were not charged for murder under western law. Instead African law was applied, even by the white SAP, which respected the laws of the Zulu. An old policeman questioned by Malan stated,"The Zulu is a brave man. You and I would not go into something looking to be killed, but a Zulu will, if honor demands it. If we go out to stop a war, the men know we are coming. Once we're gone the fighting starts again."
It would seem that the Zulus adhered to the rules of their military tradition, wherein fighting was a logical product of conflict and wherein there were factors such as honor and pride which played a role. Being a proud people, the Zulus nonetheless accepted defeat with dignity when and if it occurred. After the Zulu defeat at Ulundi in 1878, Charlie Hartford met a lone Zulu warrior, "He came up and asked if any of us had been at Isandhlwana ... 'You fought well and we fought well'" (Edgerton:1988:192).

Here again, Msinga serves as an example in illustrating the adherence to the warrior culture of the Zulu. "The longterm enmity between the Tembu and Mabaso tribes in Msinga, caused by the dispute over boundaries, came to a head in 1922. In April 1922 the magistrate in an effort to solve the problem, set up a provisional beacon between the tribes thereby redefining the boundary. The Tembu took the law into their own hands and attacked the Mabaso but were driven off. The following day the Tembu attacked the kraal of Gqikazi, the Mabaso chief, killing him and 23 of his followers" (Minnaar: 1990:29). The surrounding tribes would subsequently also become involved in the fighting which has raged periodically in the region since.
The carrying of traditional weapons which is very much part and parcel of Zulu culture, came under fire by the ANC and resulted in an agreement between the ANC and the government which placed a ban on the carrying of "any" weapons. The intention of banning the carrying of traditional weapons was described as "cultural castration" by Buthelezi at the 1992 Shaka day celebration (Time, 12 October 1992), and the ban was largely ignored.

5.5.4 THE INTENSIFICATION OF COMPETITION.

The competition for scarce resources has become more evident in the squatter communities surrounding the cities, culminating in a heightened conflict potential. In Durban, the access to a tap, which was the only source of water for several hundred squatters, led to a violent confrontation between Pondos and Zulus in the squatter camp (Malan:1990: 77).

Squalid socio-economic conditions result in rapid urbanization which in turn results in large squatter communities living in shacks around urban industrial centers. "Competition for jobs is also the cause of fighting. Some of the more recent faction fights in the squatter towns surrounding Durban involved intertribal violence, such as that between Makhanya and Embo
clans (February/May 1985) and Zulus and Pondos (November/December 1985). Pondos migrating to Durban to seek work squat on land claimed by certain Zulu tribes. When ordered off the Pondos refuse to leave since their work is close to Durban and often they have brought their families with them" (Minnaar: 1990:37).

The metropolitan subregion which comprises the Durban Functional Region (DFR) and the Pietermaritzburg complex, grew most rapidly during the 1980-1985 period at an estimated rate of 6% per annum, with the 1989 estimates placing more than half the residents in the entire region of Kwa-Zulu/Natal into the category of "functionally urbanised" (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992:16-17).

In the middle 1980's the steady stream of Transkeian migrant labor had turned into a flood, as these Xhosa speaking people continued to settle. "Before the fighting began in 1985, Pondos from the Transkei had moved into Malakazi and Umbogintwini No 5 squatter settlements and begun putting down permanent roots. Until November/December 1985 tensions between established residents and the new arrivals had not assumed tribal form. The fighting started
with a small incident. A Pondo man molested a Zulu woman in Malakazi. He was stabbed by Zulu men in retaliation, and then fighting broke out between Pondos and Zulus. The Pondos were forced to flee Malakazi and sought refuge in Umbogintwini No 5. The Zulus proceeded to attack them there, but were driven off leaving behind seven dead. Eventually on Christmas day a battle took place among the shacks, involving 5000 Zulus and Pondos, resulting in more than 60 people killed" (Minnaar:1990:43).

Sgt. Law of the Internal stability unit in Durban explains the dilemma faced by some; "A Zulu worker will go up to Transvaal, where he fights alongside his fellow Zulu co-workers against the Xhosa. When he returns, he may have to fight against the IFP people here, because his clan is pro-ANC or involved in a land dispute. Its a contradiction from a Western point of view, but the Zulu political allegiance is strongly related to, if not outright determined by, the political allegiance of the Induna or the chief. An entire area can change sides over night. Many people who travel to and from the Transvaal on a regular basis, carry both ANC and IFP membership cards" (Personal communication, 16 December 1991).
Communities removed during the course of the apartheid era are now reclaiming the land which they lost. Two communities forcibly removed in 1968 from the Roosboom and Charlestown areas in Natal, won their land back at the end of 1992 through a court decision. In April 1993, the communities were however asked to pay back the compensation received in 1968, before the land can be returned (Conflict Monitor, April 1993:2). Though this seems a fair proposition, the inability to pay increases the level of frustration.

5.5.6 LAND OWNERSHIP AND FARMING PRACTICES.
Last but not least, traditional land ownership and farming practices contribute in no insignificant way to the conflict. Having pointed towards the opposition from amakolo residents to incorporation in KwaZulu, due to their insistence on specific landownership patterns, it is important to note that land in the traditional areas is allocated to tribal followers by the chiefs and indunas. This has created the situation whereby people were displaced from their areas, caused by the killing of people, sometimes with their chiefs, or by the killing of the chiefs themselves (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:7).
In concurrence with this, traditional farming practices including communal grazing, has resulted in the continued deterioration of soil and degradation of land leading towards increasing dependency on external food supplies. This problem is not new to the region with declining self-sufficiency first noted as far back as the 1880’s.

This deterioration of agriculture, in addition to the high population growth, meant that the reserves were less able to support the inhabitants. The corollary of declining productivity and poverty was a rise in the number of migrant labourers with all its concomitant social problems (Welsh:1990:17).

Clark (1993:193) points to the "appallingly rapid soil erosion", as "the seeds of bitter strife." It is also added that the "Grand-Apartheid" policy had handed the homelands some of South Africa’s most precious as well as vulnerable agricultural land. Three quarters of the homelands were in the "over 500mm" rainfall region, and yet the farms yielded 1/6 of white owned farms in similar areas.

Traditional farming practices leading to over-grazing is given the blame, with the Zulu people and cattle increasing steadily, whilst the amount
of land remains the same. To the Zulu, numerous cattle are tantamount to wealth and instead of being slaughtered, two in three cattle in Zulu-land die of natural causes.

Gert van Rooyen, who farms on the border to KwaZulu, near HluHluwe, describes how the conflict is managed between white farmers and the Zulus. "We (the farmers in the area) often turn a blind eye, when the local Zulus chase their cattle into our pastures, in order to avoid problems with the traditional leadership. We do that so that the ANC doesn't get a foothold in this area, through an issue which we can actually sort out ourselves. Usually we find that the people chase their cattle into our pastures after ten o'clock at night, and remove them at about three o'clock in the morning. Their own pastures are hopelessly overgrazed. Sometimes this causes great damage to our other crops, and we have court cases as a result of some incidents. On the whole we see it as a price we pay to keep the peace. Once we actually start fighting with the local Indunas, we would be threatening his authority thereby driving him to the ANC. Even if he didn't do that, his younger people would consider that sort of step (joining the ANC), and before long we would also have a situation similar to that in
5.6 SUMMARY

The problems identified with the land issue may intensify in the future with the urbanization process, in addition to the high birth rates, increasing the magnitude of the conflict, keeping in mind that estimated black urban population growth is at 4,2% in Natal (Woods:1992:39). It should also be remembered that in the non-homeland area of South Africa there are 15,4 ha of farmland per person while the homeland position is 1,7 ha of farmland per person (Fast Facts, January 1993:6). This gap between the two will undoubtedly be a point of great deliberation in the future, keeping in mind that the land issue is anchored into an historical maze of land claims. This precludes any quick settlement of the issue. The consequential spinoffs which the land issue includes are vast and equally contested, namely water, housing, competition for jobs and access to schooling and essential infrastructure. Access to these resources is a pivotal factor amongst the aspirations of the masses in South Africa.
CHAPTER SIX

THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON DEVELOPMENT.

6.1 INTRODUCTION.

The impact of conflict on development in the KwaZulu/Natal region cannot be discussed in isolation, it being part of the greater South African picture and therefore directly affected by developments in the rest of the country. The discussion will be divided into two segments, namely the Macro and Micro impact on development in order to separate the national impact from the regional one, in so far as this is possible and keeping in mind the above mentioned reality.

6.2 THE MACRO IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT.

6.2.1 ECONOMIC DECLINE.

i. Disinvestment.

"In 1986, the US Congress voted for economic sanctions, overriding President Reagan’s veto. American companies and other foreign investors backed away from South Africa and soon the economy slipped into a long recession" (Newsweek, 9 May: 1994: 17).

Having explained earlier that the ANC/SACP’s four pillar concept prescribed the international isolation of South Africa, the
impact of this isolation would be felt in the mid-eighties. This included economic isolation and the climax of this campaign was reached with the introduction of mandatory sanctions passed by the US Government in 1986.

Inkatha, at that stage still a movement rather than a political party, opposed sanctions and reaffirmed its stance in its later publications (IFP policy document, 1993:18), thereby intensifying the conflict in the region and nationally, by opposing the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance also in this regard. To the Inkatha leadership the issue may most likely be best summed up by Buthelezi's reaction to the US sanction bill, "Our need is for peaceful change, and foreign investment is one of the best agents of that change. Foreign investment creates jobs which bring money to the blacks, who are by far the majority of all industrial labour. Money means more power; and working in industry also gives the black man the training and experience that he will need to assume a rightful place in our country—just as he did in America" (Ghersi and Major, 1989:187).
From the IFP's point of view, the impact of economic sanctions negatively affected those it was intended to help, namely the black population of South Africa. The economic setbacks have been described by numerous writers and it is not the intention to go into detail here, other than to say that it did hit the black population hardest, thereby proving the Inkatha fears as justified, whilst sanctions also played a role at bringing about "liberation". However, the shrinking South African economic growth would inevitably have negative implications for an evergrowing population. Some may even argue that the economic impact of sanctions served to increase the levels of violence insofar as the rising unemployment is concerned. Unemployment figures were put at 43% by the Citizen (17 August, 1992).

The disinvestment and sanctions campaign of the mid-1980's as part of international isolation has been replaced by what could be termed "voluntary disinvestment", brought about by high levels of violence and the unreliability of the very militant labour force, posing a threat to assets. A special
report published by Time Magazine (25 April, 1994:39-67) paints a picture of the South African economy which serves to illustrate to what extend South Africa can expect to be economically positioned in the absence of political stability and peace. Redman (Time Magazine, 25 April, 1994:40) writes: "Violence may be causing investors, domestic as well as international, to ponder the risk-to-reward ratios and question the wisdom of pouring money into the country. But it is abundantly clear that unless there is investment and growth, unless jobs and wealth are created unless poverty is alleviated and a deeply divided society can be brought closer together, there will be no end to the violence and thus no future for South Africa."

At the outbreak of unprecedented violence in 1990, real gross domestic investment declined from R25,8bn in 1990 to R23,6bn in 1991, which amounts to a 8,5% drop. Meanwhile, the net capital outflow in 1991 was R6bn, compared with the R2,9bn in 1990 (Fast Facts, January, 1993:3). A local panel discussion held by leaders in the field of business, politics and development also concluded that, "The new government must quickly move to establish
its authority and quell political violence, a top concern for potential investors" (Time, 25 April, 1994:51).

US companies have indicated that one of the conditions to be met before significant investment is possible, would be, "a decrease in the extent of violence which is currently causing a perception of an unacceptably high level of risk" (Environmental Analysis, 1992:18).

ii. Brain Drain.
A characteristic of many developing countries, the political instability of South Africa has also led to the exodus of manpower. Indications are that the country has been experiencing the outflow of skilled labour due to the violence. A survey by management consultants FSA-Contact (The Citizen, 15 September, 1994) concluded that "South Africans who left their jobs last year to emigrate were mostly specialists and managers. The survey of 2000 companies found 1% of staff had resigned to emigrate. Of these, 43% were senior supervisors or people with specialized advanced skills and 27% midlevel managers or people with
specialized skills." The chief executive of Damlin college, Mr. Johan Brummer, estimates that South Africa would require 500,000 new managers by the year 2000 (Fast Facts, January 1993:1).

iii. Lowering of productivity.

The role which strikes, stayaways and highly politicized unions has played in the conflict is partially reflected by the following statistics. According to a study by the SA Chamber of Business, South Africa has increasingly lagged behind its competitors in terms of productivity since 1975 (Environmental Analysis, 1992:17).

The lowering of standards experienced, is primarily related to the unrest experienced by industry and in the education and training fields. Indicative of this is the decline in productivity by 2%, over the period 1980-1991, compared to an increase in productivity of 53% and 78% in Japan and Taiwan respectively. This is according to the National Productivity Institute (NPI), which added that South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita decreased by 13% over the same period (Fast Facts,
October 1993:6).

If this trend is maintained, South Africa may experience difficulty in remaining competitive in international markets, leading to further unemployment locally.

6.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE.

The impact which conflict has on the environment is particularly relevant when searching for ways to resolving it. It is widely accepted that the world's resources are limited and that there is increasing strain on the environment, seriously threatening the ecological balance. From the late seventies, the apparent failure of the homelands provided the Durban area with an increase of squatters from 500 000 in 1979 to 1 300 000 in 1982 in spite of influx control and pass law legislation (Minnaar:1990:44). Already then the population growth in South Africa, partially due to influx from neighboring countries, was starting to exceed the economic growth.

With violence escalating in the mid eighties, refugees and other displaced people added further pressure on the already limited land available. The two main consequences, stemming from this pattern were:
i. Pollution.

The pollution of rivers and the air, is the most common phenomenon experienced. Poor sanitation and the absence of waste disposal which is often directly affected by the violence, results in highly polluted rivers, as many squatter settlements are situated in the vicinity of rivers. "Urban and suburban streams have become strips of neglected land drained by ugly sluices into which people dump refuse, obsolete kitchenware, supermarket trolleys and even car hulks" (Clark:1991:271).

Streams running through informal settlements are often utilized for the dumping of corpses by criminal and political perpetrators of violence, causing extreme pollution (Personal experience, 1991).

ii. Soil erosion.

High levels of soil erosion are symptomatic of the overpopulation and traditional farming practices experienced throughout the country, worsened by the fact that aspects which make it a modern versus anti-modern conflict, make it difficult to convince tribesmen to change to improved farming practices, as any suggestion in this direction can lead to distrust. Although the study has dealt with this earlier, it is
important to note that the 1993 President's Council Report spoke of 300 million to 400 million tonnes of arable topsoil being washed into South African rivers annually (Fast Facts, January 1993:6).

Bates in Hopkins (1979:242) makes an important observation with regard to the problem of soil erosion in Tanzania; "During World War 2 the colonial government promoted the production of cash crops at a maximum rate, irrespective of the effects on the ecology or the environment. One result was extreme monocropping with the attendant depletion of soil; another the extension into marginal lands. The result of both was increased soil erosion, leading to downstream flooding and the loss of crops by those who planted alluvial gardens, whilst the loss of crops offset the increase in the production of foodstuffs." The colonial government attempted to introduce better agricultural practices but was ignored, attempted again through legislation but was ignored again. Finally the government was facing riots and revolt throughout the country. Similar examples of this can be found in other parts of Africa, Hopkins (1979:247) citing Uganda as another example with many parallels to the situation in South Africa, with Natal's
difficulties experienced with traditional farming practices and attitudes, having been discussed in Chapter 5.5.2 and 5.5.6. of this thesis.

According to Professor Carroll (Development and Democracy, 7 April, 1994:52), "The failure of African agriculture in South Africa, and the neglect of African agriculture in our discussions of development problems is, in my view, the Achilles heel of our development efforts."

6.3 THE MICRO IMPACT.

As with the Macro Impact, the following factors complement and overlap with each other, none of them entirely unaffected by the other.

a. Loss of Education.

"A generation of radicalized black schoolchildren has lost critical classroom time to violence and political upheavals" (Newsweek, 9 May, 1994).

Township violence and power and water supply cuts brought education to a standstill during 1990/91 with matric pass rates among black pupils countrywide, ranging between 35% - 40% (Environmental Analysis, 1991:42). The destruction of schools and school books has been practiced throughout the conflict, statistics having been mentioned earlier in the study. This contributed to the bringing about of the so-called "Lost Generation."
In the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal many schools have been found to be periodically closed due to conflict in the communities whose children are pupils at the particular school. The conflict has also made way for a change of attitude among students, combined with a breakdown of discipline and the manifestation of a culture of violence.

"In sommige skole breek leerlinge graag hul eie deure tussen klaskamers en dink niks daarvan om deur een klaskamer te stap om by 'n maat in 'n volgende klaskamer te gaan kuier nie. 'n Politieke byeenkoms kan te eniger tyd "aangekondig" word, waarop besluite geneem kan word wat onderrig vir die res van die dag kan beinvloed" (Insig, Februarie, 1990:39).

Policies, enforced by ANC alligned "comrades" of "pass one, pass all", have had a devastating impact on the maintenance of standards and may still be felt in trying to satisfy South Africa's future skilled manpower requirements, "Een onderwyser vertel dat slegs twee uit die dertig leerlinge in sy standerd negeklas teen die einde van die jaar geslaag het. Hy sou baie van hulle laat slaag, maar indien sy lewe bedreig word, sal hy almal laat slaag. In die jare sewentig het die kinders die bevrydingstryd in eie hande geneem, terwyl hul ouers toegekyk het. Die geweld wat in die nadraai gevolg het, het nou deel van
Politically motivated Teacher strikes throughout the country added to the problem. Schools under the Department of Education (DET) having lost the equivalent of a term of schooling, Soweto schools even the equivalent of two terms (Fast Facts, October 1993:6).

Schools under the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Department of Education and culture have traditionally shown better attendance figures during national UDF/ANC instigated stayaway actions, later clashing violently with ANC aligned Student Representative Councils. Gwala (1992:59) writes, "This further intensified the animosity between the youth and Inkatha, since the latter controlled the schools and interpreted any attempts to form alternative governance as a direct challenge to its authority." In the continued tug-of-war between the two opposing actors, for control among the scholars, there were also investigations regarding allegations that bribes and sexual favors are prerequisites for teachers wanting jobs at certain schools under its jurisdiction, following claims by an IFP leader and...
KwaZulu Legislature Members that malpractice is rife in Kwa Mashu (Conflict Monitor, February 1993:1), a traditionally ANC stronghold within KwaZulu jurisdiction.

Despite the destruction of schools, the average number of pupils per classroom at schools administered by the DET (including all the homelands except the Transkei) decreased from 55:1 at primary and 43:1 at secondary schools in 1988 to 41:1 at primary and 36:1 at secondary schools in 1991 (Fast Facts, January 1993:5).

b. Loss of Land and Housing.

In a conflict where the obtaining of land is a major objective, it seems logical that the loser of such conflict would be, at least temporarily, evicted from this land, whilst in cases of a stalemate much land can become "no man's land", unavailable to any of the contesting groups.

The study has elaborated on the relationship which traditional chiefs have with their subjects and regarding the allocation of land, his death or that of too many of his followers leading to the abandoning of the area. "These people have nowhere to go unless they find another chief who has enough ground and who is of course willing to house them. It must be remembered that these displaced people, in all probability, have
nothing to pay taxes with. They often cannot go back to their original areas because these may have been claimed by other people, usually by those who chased them off the land in the first place. It is this very situation that leads to the establishment of so-called squatter camps or refugee camps which in turn creates tremendous suffering and problems of its own. The power struggle between the ANC and IFP has resulted in clearly demarcated so-called "no-go" areas (Veiligheidsfokus, Februarie 1994:7).

To support the points made here, Smith (1992:82) gives an account which includes a combination of the factors covered individually in this chapter; "On the nights of 6 and 7 December 1989 predawn raids by well armed men from Lindelani into F section of neighboring Ntuzuma left forty homes damaged or gutted by fire, another 51 looted, seven vehicles burnt out and at least seven people dead. Hundreds more fled their homes in panic leaving behind large areas completely deserted. Many of the houses were looted before being burnt, an ominous new development in the conflict in the township. Apparently many of the looters were newcomers to the urban areas, recruited into the raiding parties with the promise that if they joined they could keep what they looted. Besides the ongoing struggle between Inkatha and the UDF, the desire by the warlords was to create panic among the squatters
so that they would abandon the areas. This would allow the warlords to occupy the vacated land for their followers to squat on. In this manner the warlords were able to extend their control over larger areas, increase the number of people they controlled, provide land for those people coming from the rural areas and increase their tax base, since it was the warlords who now directly rented out the newly occupied land."

Given the current socio-economic conditions of squatters in the country as a whole, the De Loor group estimates that 198 000 houses would have to be built annually for the next ten years to eliminate the housing backlog, whilst ESKOM says it plans to supply electricity to 164 000 new households a year until 1996. (Fast Facts, January, 1993:2).

The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme plans to build 1 million homes, electrify 2.5 million dwellings and redistribute 30 percent of arable land, over the first five years of its implementation (Newsweek, 9 May, 1994).

c. Loss of Infrastructure.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa estimated that in 1992 20% of the population (4 million people) had a minimal water supply and 33% (7 million people) had minimal sanitation (Fast Facts, January 1993:5). Violence has directly resulted in the destruction of
infrastructure throughout South Africa. This is illustrated by the damages caused by the general security situation which by 1986 already amounted to; 7700 buses petrolbombed, 1447 schools and 985 black-owned businesses torched. Another 46 churches, 26 clinics, 60 halls, 3920 private homes and several hundred "collaborators" and "informants" were also burnt (Malan:1990:217).

d. Loss of Trust.

The loss of trust between the various actors and parties is one of the more lasting consequences of conflict, due to the fact that it seriously jeopardizes development projects. "Ontwikkelingsprojekte het gaan stil staan, bestaande projekte is beskadig. Op sosiale terrein het die afstand tussen ANC en IVP tot wantroue gelei, wat veroorsaak dat hulle nie kan saamwerk t.o.v projekte in hulle gebied nie" (Coetsee C.J., Personal communication, 13 September 1994). Co-operation is seriously curtailed with the focus fixed on "who is in control?" Foster (1973:116) writes," Opposing factions will attack almost any project sponsored by their rivals, finding innumerable reasons why it is bad for the community. Though the project may have the noblest aims, such as improving the health of the children, the other side will surely find something in it to criticise. Every resident knows the real reason
for the attack: the enmity between the factions involved."

At the same time, there is mistrust towards government initiated projects due to opposition to Apartheid as Maritz explains, "In 'n situasie van dominasie, waar die heersende eenheid die orde voorskryf, word oor tyd heen dit 'n emosionele saak vir die nie heersers. Die ontwikkelingsformule wat dus deur die heersers aangebied word, word deur die nie heersers uit wantroue verwerp. Dit ly tot die vernietiging van die simbole van ondergeskiktheid soos bv. skole, alhoewel dit hulle eindelik bevoordeel" (Personal communication, 13 September 1994).

This mistrust creates obstacles in trying to introduce a number of vital development principles including more environmentally sustainable agricultural practices.

e. Vicious cycle of violence.

In most areas affected by the violence, it is almost impossible to establish who started it. Accusation are made by both sides and the passing of time, does not seem to reconcile differences, as the Msinga case study has shown that revenge attacks can occur many years after the previous conflict.
Both sides accuse the other of provocation. The hostel dwellers maintain that the ANC brings in people from the outside who would fire at the hostel. Hence the retaliatory attack on the township dwellers. On the other hand the ANC claims that the hostel dwellers' attacks were unprovoked and aimed at destabilizing and driving the ANC activists from the township (Minnaar: 1992:149). This cycle continues, including all segments of the community, workers and scholars alike.

f. Vicious cycle of poverty.

The existing violence impedes development, making it extremely difficult to improve living standards. The additional destruction of property places greater pressure on the existing shortages experienced.

The urbanizing population, having often fled from rural unrest areas where tribal land and housing was either destroyed or abandoned, faces great poverty in the squatter areas where they usually settle. This, together with other factors, results in further violence and the continued denial of basic needs such as water, sanitation and housing. 84% of the rural population earns less than R700 per month in 1991 according to Africa Confidential (November, 1991:22). Still, Cosatu estimates that 11 million of South Africa's 17 million poorest people, (including the ten homelands) live in the rural areas (Fast Facts, October, 1993).
Estimates of the number of people living in informal settlements and backyard shacks in 1992 ranged from 3.5 million to 10 million (Fast Facts, January 1993:5).

Unemployment is expected to be at 57% by the year 2005, amounting to 11.5 million unemployed unskilled or semi-skilled workers (Environmental Analysis, 1992:21).

A good example of how devastating an impact political instability can have on the level of poverty, is that of Sudan. "In 1982 the United Nations estimated that Sudan could feed 260 million people; today the 27 million Sudanese suffer persistent famine due to political chaos" (Newsweek, 12 September, 1994:27).

Unrealistic expectations.

During conflict, both sides are inclined to make promises, many of which are intended to assist in the mobilisation of support, and which are well received by those who have been deprived. Dr Frank Mdlalose warns that, "We have had three successive years of negative economic growth coupled with population growth, rising unemployment and declining per capita income - potentially explosive in the light of the too high expectations many people have of the new South Africa and the need for fiscal prudence. The IFP has always warned against the creation of unrealistic expectations" (Barometer, July 1993:4-6).
6.4 CONCLUSION.

There can be little doubt that the above mentioned factors, each of them interlinked thereby causing and/or placing pressure on each other, have a negative impact on development in South Africa. Apart from the violence contributing to the creation of these problems, they each are capable of acquiring a momentum of their own whereby each problem is increased in magnitude through the existence of the others. In the same way, it appears that when solutions are offered, their implementation can often not be afforded simultaneously, illustrating the difficulty which can be experienced in attempting to determine priorities.

At the risk of appearing negative on the prognosis of how the above factors can be addressed in the future, it is the contention here that the above factors are subject to the basic conflict equation in South Africa, namely that the aspirations of the masses exceed the resources of the country, and will therefore require sensitive management on the part of the government and all parties involved.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.

Based on the contents of the study the hypothesis, which contends that the conflict between the IFP and the ANC has a negative impact on development in South Africa, has been proven to be correct. The factors considered to be conducive to the conflict have been discussed. It is accepted that the impact of conflict in the developing world is inherently negative and severely obstructs development. Unlike the developed world, where conflicts are usually digested with time and have in fact resulted in accelerated development and rapid renewal, the developing countries do not appear to have that capacity. Once the, often extremely fragile, infrastructures of developing countries are exposed to conflict this almost inevitably seems to result in long term collapse. There is no Marshall Plan for these countries, nor does it seem possible for them to implement let alone maintain such a programme, lacking any such capacity on almost every level and in almost every field.

In the final analysis South Africa’s conflicts, and the conflict in Kwa Zulu/Natal in particular, in many ways reflect the conflicts in the rest of the developing world and especially Africa. It is almost as if the entire continent is currently experiencing an intermediate period of instability brought about by the need for traditional societies to adjust to the modern
global political and economic order of the post-colonial and post
cold war era. Standing halfway between the two worlds, the
transition appears to bring with it an inherent degree of
instability. Within the strategic context of the cold war,
developing countries of strategic significance were not only
supported by either East or West, but were also often targeted
for destabilization from the opposing side. There can be little
doubt that these strategic interests also applied to South
Africa, given the ANC/SACP’s position within the ideological
framework and objectives of the former East Bloc. This
ideological stimuli from outside the developing world manifested
ideological conflict within societies who had hardly been given
time and opportunity to evolve from their traditional socio-
political structures.

This applies also to the position of ethnic groups and sub-
groups, like the Zulu people, where the role of ethnicity was at
one point almost forgotten when dealing with development.
Ethnicity and the existence of different values and ideals, is
a concept which fundamentally undermines the pre-conceived ideals
of some developers who have often taken selective eurocentrist
values and criteria when judging as to how things "should be."
It is through their perception of development that certain
realities are seemingly reasoned away. Deng in the Ethnic Studies
report (July 1991:2), quotes a Nigerian political economist as
saying; "Because the development paradigm takes an
uncompromisingly negative view on people and their culture, it
cannot accept them on their own terms and it cannot even take
interest in the realities on the ground and the people to be developed. Its point of departure is not what is but what ought to be. The paradigm's interest in Africa focuses on the possibility of Africa becoming what it is not and probably can never be. Development is not for people who do not know who they are and where they are coming from, for such people are unlikely to know where they are going."

The report goes on to say that it is currently widely accepted that the operating paradigms for African development have largely failed, "rather than developing, Africa appears to be sliding back, down the ladder of underdevelopment. And with that degeneration, African countries are failing to provide even the basic needs for survival, often aggravated by conflict. Famine whether drought generated or conflict related, becomes a recurrent affliction that the affected countries are incapable of arresting without resort to external assistance, shamefacedly and reluctantly requested, nearly always belated, and often taking the form of emergency operations on a massive scale" (Ethnic Studies Report, July 1991:2).

The apparent disregard for ethnicity as a matter of convenience and political correctness, with the concept often redefined and occasionally declared "dead", can seemingly no longer be afforded when attempting to deal with the developing world, and particularly in KwaZulu/Natal. It continuously seems to resurface in the form of conflict, Rwanda being the most recent example thereby placing the focus on the negative aspects of strong ethnic feelings. Ethnicity has at its core certain cultural value
systems, as is the case with many Zulus, which when closely examined can provide insight into the collective aspirations of ethnic groups. It is one of the conclusions of this study that the concept of ethnicity is an integral part of human nature and should not be seen to serve only negative purposes as Foster (1972:18) explains; "Every culture has a value system. All of us, to a greater or lesser extend react emotionally to our culture. We are not neutral in our attitude towards most of its elements. A value system gives stability to a culture. It can be seen as a balancing wheel. Most individuals find security in conforming to the standards of their culture’s value system."

African developing countries face the dilemma of being entangled in arbitrary colonial boundaries which not only divide tribes and ethnic units with international borders, but also throw together ethnic units which are often inherently and/or historically hostile towards one another, often resulting in antagonistic internal interests and relations which dash any hope of achieving the basic prerequisite for stability and growth, namely peace. The conflict potential, which stems from the artificial colonial boundaries and other ad. hoc. decisions during colonial rule, as outlined above, is also the heritage of KwaZulu/Natal and therefore most certainly appears to be one of the main root causes for the current conflict in that area.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Based on the above, it would appear that South Africa and the African continent should consider moving away from central decision making, and devolve authority to ethnic, sub-ethnic and even tribal level, with the aim of allowing these groups to determine their respective priorities and manage the resources at their disposal.

2. Certain realities, such as overpopulation and the destructive environmental impact of traditional agricultural practices, may only be seriously considered by people once they realise that they are in control and will have no access to more land. It is here that much of the development resources previously lost in the process of supplying "needs" which merely amounted to presentation, can be applied to stimulate participation.

3. Countries, like South Africa, who are economically intertwined to the point that a territorial dispensation, similar to that implemented in Ethiopia, is not possible, should look at other systems of ethno-cultural and tribal stratification in order to reach the position described in the two points above.
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Appendix A.

POLITICAL DEATHS 1985-1992

Source: SAIRR
APPENDIX B

POLITICAL DEATHS BY AREA (1993)

KWAZULU/NATAL: 53.2%
TRANSVAAL: 34.0%
WESTERN CAPE: 4.4%
E&N CAPE: 2.5%
ÖFS: 1.5%
Homelands: 4.4%