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South Africa’s Two Terms in the United Nations Security Council and ‘the Situations in’ Somalia; the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire

A Dissertation

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by

Mpho Tsedu
909707358

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Supervisors
Prof S Graham and Prof C Landsberg
ABSTRACT

The election of South Africa to serve in the United Nations Security Council for two terms in 2007-08 and 2011-12 has been elaborately subjected to academic scrutiny. However, this study uniquely applies functionalism to examine these two terms and, aided by the three levels of analysis in international relations, the exercise focuses on South Africa’s interaction with the situations in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d'Ivoire. The three case studies are selected to assess if South Africa adjusted its stance on these three countries owing to its membership in the UNSC; and if African states behaved and cooperated as a front when considering the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during the two terms. The assessment is contrasted with South Africa’s foreign policy which it committed to pursue at the United Nations.

This study was able to confirm that South Africa did not alter its commitment to human rights and democracy, nor its stance on the selected case studies. Evidence was presented which proved its commitment to the foreign policy it bound itself to upon re-joining the UN. However, what was noted is a shift in method to achieve the desired goals. In that case, there is overwhelming evidence presented in this study that supports South Africa’s shift to political peace agreement initiatives as a way to settle disagreements. Nevertheless, the main aim of this newly adopted strategy, is to protect human rights and advance democracy. Regarding the African bloc, the study confirms the existence of the African Group but no clear record of African member states formally operating as a front when voting on matters affecting the selected case studies has been observed. This is despite all African states voting in alignment on all resolutions that are scrutinised in the study. The study concludes by recommending new areas of research applying functionalism as a conceptual framework. The study applied qualitative research (desk research) methodology to gather data.

Key words: functionalism, foreign policy, three levels of analysis, South Africa, UN Security Council, Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire.
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All praises due to God for the strength and wisdom to fulfil this project. I express my sincere appreciation to Prof Suzy Graham and Prof Chris Landsberg for their guidance and supervision. A big thank you goes to my real friends and family for enduring without complaint my physical presence and mental absence in pursuit of this goal. The project is dedicated to the memory of my late friend Tsietsi ‘Barnes’ Chuene.
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPME</td>
<td>Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of Liberation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Global and Inclusive Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement de Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PRSTs</td>
<td>Presidential Statements</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (The Congolese Rally for Democracy)</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SRI</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WCAR</td>
<td>United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

1.1 Introduction

This study will investigate South Africa’s stance, and its role in a possible united African front, in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in dealing with ‘the situations’\(^1\) in Africa during the periods 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. Based on its foreign policy, South Africa was elected into the UNSC for these two terms. South Africa had committed itself to a programme that would focus on Africa during these two terms in the UNSC (Alden, 2015). Noting that there have been a plethora of resolutions pertaining to the situations in Africa in general, this study’s case studies will be South Africa’s position in the UNSC on the situations in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d'Ivoire. The situations in these three case studies had received the highest number of resolutions that were adopted by the UNSC during the periods under review.

Whereas Bowland (2012) is of the view that South Africa was successful in advancing its Africa-focused programme in the Security Council, this study considered resolutions adopted during those two terms affecting Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire against the country’s post-1994 foreign policy on the same countries. Furthermore, the study will examine the possible existence of a South Africa-led African coalition in addressing the selected case studies in Africa. All this will be done by applying the functionalist conceptual framework. Nelson Mandela said in 1993 that “South Africa’s future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations” (Braga, 2017:27). This belief would remain part of South Africa’s foreign policy plan for the next 20 years, although perhaps not as strongly emphasised as under Mandela’s leadership. Since its readmission to the international community following its democratic transition in 1994, South Africa has sought to play a meaningful role internationally in general and on the African continent in particular.

\(^1\) The UNSC often uses the phrase 'situation in' as the generic title for many of its resolutions and it means that the resolution is referencing the current circumstances (political instability, tensions, violence amongst other scenarios) of that particular country at that particular time.
As the Cold War was ending, political transformation was also gaining traction in the Southern part of the African continent. Following much negotiation and compromising, South Africa eventually reformed into a democratic state in 1994 after holding historic elections. Its reintegration into the global community beginning in the early 1990s saw its diplomatic, political and economic relations expand rapidly to include countries with which it previously had no relations. “By 2012, the number of foreign diplomatic missions, consulates-general, consulates and international organisations in South Africa had increased to 315” (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), 2014: 148) making it the second-largest number of diplomatic offices accredited to any country after the United States of America (USA). Consequently, South Africa has had to adopt various stances and roles on socio-political developments on the African continent guided by its foreign policy and to voice these declarations across its diplomatic spaces globally. Over the years, South Africa has managed to win the approval of a large number of African states as within 12 short years after its transition to democracy, the Republic was nominated to represent Africa, along with two other African states, for two terms in the UN’s most powerful organ, the UNSC as a non-permanent member. It did so twice from 2007 to 2008 and 2011 to 2012.

This study is guided by the three levels of analysis, being the individual, government and the international system (Ray, 2001). These levels of analysis, Tamaki (2015: 85) maintains, provide an opportunity for scholars “to appreciate the various interactions between and among the individuals and the larger political environment”. It is against this background that they are employed in this exercise. They are expected to provide guidelines when responding to the following questions: During its first two terms on the UNSC, did South Africa (that is, the permanent representative or member thereof) act in alignment with South Africa’s foreign policy declarations, in relation to its voting on resolutions based on the situations in Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire or did it alter its stances based on power politics? Did South Africa evolve and adjust its approach to the African continent upon its membership of the UNSC? Did South Africa work with (or not) its fellow African countries on the three chosen situations in Africa during 2007-2008 and 2011-2012, that is, the DRC and Ghana in 2007; Burkina Faso and Libya in 2008; Gabon and Nigeria in 2011; and Togo and Morocco in 2012. Having briefly outlined what the study intends to achieve, the following section

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2 At the time of writing up this dissertation South Africa had assumed its non-permanent seat on the Council for the third time for the period 2019 to 2020.
provides contextual details that are relevant to comprehend the direction the study has opted for.

1.2 A Brief Background to the United Nations Security Council

As aforementioned, this study will examine South Africa’s two terms in the UNSC. It is therefore imperative to provide a brief background of the United Nations (UN) at first and then the Security Council. The UN was founded just after World War II (WWII) to bring about a lasting solution to wars that had ravaged the world. It was a historical epoch which was very different from the current era. The UNSC was established in terms of the United Nations Charter of 1945 on the formation of the world organ (UN Charter, 1945). Article 24 of the said Charter provides for the confines, powers and functions of the Security Council. In general, the Council’s principal job is “to maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter, 1945). This Charter, according to Bosco (2014: 546), “outlines a security structure in which the Council should respond to threats or breaches of the peace and acts of aggression anywhere in the world”. As a result, the Council is able to (whenever the need arises) reach an agreement to intervene in those unstable environments.

Through the Charter, the Council is tasked with an important authority and control function of providing the international community with safety and security. Over the years, debates at various levels have ensued pertaining to how the UNSC is composed (UN Charter, 1945). Indeed, since its inception in 1945, calls have been made for the UNSC to reform its composition. Its composition is dictated by Article 23 of the UN Charter. In 1965 the number of non-permanent members was expanded to 10 which means it has had 15 members ever since. Of this 15, five of the members are permanent and have what is popularly known as veto powers. They are commonly referred to as the P5, being, China, France, Russia, Britain and the USA. The remaining members are elected from, and by, the General Assembly of the UN every two years as non-permanent members.

The UN members have been battling with how to embrace the world by reforming the UN and its structures, most especially the Security Council, which is at the heart of global security coordination (Mahmood, 2013). While South Africa has been among the voices calling for reform at the UN and the UNSC in particular, its previous election to the UNSC for the two terms was also significant because this was an acknowledgement by the
international community of its capabilities to contribute to world peace and security (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2010). It was also a chance for the country to implement its vision (Kagwanja, 2008) which is highlighted below.

1.2.1 South Africa at the UNSC: An Introduction

In 2007, the elected membership of the UNSC comprised of Belgium, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia and South Africa; whereas in 2008 the elected members were Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, Vietnam and South Africa (DFA, 2009). South Africa’s head of state during this first tenure was Thabo Mbeki, the Foreign Affairs Minister was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, while the country’s main representative at the UN, and therefore, the UNSC, was Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo (DFA, 2009). According to the UN (2012), membership of the UNSC in 2011, other than the known permanent five members comprised of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal and South Africa. In 2012, the UN (2012) records that the 10 non-permanent members of the UNSC were Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa and Togo. By this second term, South Africa’s President was Jacob Zuma with his Minister of International Relations and Cooperation being Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. By then the country’s main representative at the UN and the UNSC was Ambassador Baso Sangqu (Wheeler, 2011). The aforementioned details regarding the different leaders who presided over the South African state are not registered for comparison purposes, but for general itemisation.

During its first UNSC tenure, Kagwanja (2008: 36) notes that South Africa considered its primary responsibility and perceived its main task in the Council as one of consolidating peace in Africa. This study will elaborate on this more in later chapters. South Africa was to commit resources to realise this objective. According to Tjemolane (2011), as early as 1997, the office of then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, released a document entitled “The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream”. This document stipulated the main areas of commitment with the rest of the continent as addressing and entrenching democracy in Africa. These aspects were to influence and inform South Africa’s foreign policy on Africa. As a result, Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg (2007:25) argue that South Africa’s foreign policy clearly mirrors some of the African Renaissance agenda facets. This is manifested by, among other
factors, the country’s participation in continental peace making and peacekeeping processes, African democratisation and representation abroad.

Of the various issues addressed by the UNSC in recent years, Resolution 1973 in 2011 on Libya remains one of the most controversial (Porter, 2011). This resolution, coincidentally, was adopted when South Africa was a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the second time in 2011-2012. It has to be noted that it was not the only resolution adopted that attracted a lot of scholarly and public attention. During the same period, Kornegay and Nganje (2012) highlights the situations in Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iran as among other critical matters the UNSC had to deal with. These too, occurred in the presence of South Africa in the Council. However, resolutions like 1747 on the “non-proliferation of arms”, and 1774 on “International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994” are also among landmark decisions which the UNSC took in 2007 (UN, 2007).

Both tenures on the UNSC do not appear to have been easy for South Africa as robust debates and resolutions that were taken reflect an occasional highly divided Council on various issues. Divisions over voting and exercises of veto powers are well recorded. However, while there may have been differences of opinions from different member states, the Israel-Palestine question seemed to top the list on subjects that have left Council members highly divided forcing either votes for, against or abstentions. For example, in this case South Africa has always voted for Palestine. This is in line with a position the South African government has taken on the Palestinian question based on the historical ties between the leading liberation movements of the two nations. Alliances have actually been formed in lobbying for the Palestinian question at the UN. Such alliances reflect links and bonds established during the fight for liberation in South Africa. One of the allies has been Libya. However, in one instance Libya abstained from adopting Resolution 1850 on the Israel-Palestine conflict (UNSC, 2008) despite the resolution being unanimously adopted with the support of South Africa. This reflects the independent behaviour among so-called allies that often vote in their own interests as opposed to the popular pact.
It is worth noting that South Africa has also been non-committal in certain instances when it suited it. An example is when it abstained together with China, Indonesia, Qatar and the Russian Federation when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1757 (2007) “authorizing the creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” (UNSC, 2007). The resolution established the special tribunal for purposes of prosecuting liable persons for the murder of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and other people who died on 14 February 2005. In general, the UNSC member states vote in unison on many resolutions as it will be outlined in later chapters in this study. When they fundamentally differ, it is usually when P5 members elect to use their veto powers on a decision they oppose. Since this is not an exercise aimed at scrutinising that aspect of the Security Council, the subject will not be interrogated further. It nevertheless is important to highlight that the UNSC is a place altogether separate from the General Assembly and other UN bodies, and power politics is more readily apparent in this space.

Turning back to the selected case studies, almost 60 resolutions on Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire were adopted by the UNSC during the periods under review. This becomes the highest number of resolutions taken about the three African countries. The high number of resolutions also influences the rationale behind their selection for examination because it would mean that the UNSC committed its time and resources addressing issues relating to the three countries. A response to the questions below will contribute factual information towards policy formulation efforts since this study provides knowledge that is currently not conjectured from available literature.

Specific questions addressed in this dissertation include among others:

- What was South Africa’s stance on the situations in Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire post-1994 but before it was elected into the UNSC for the first time?
- What was South Africa’s stance on the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire after it was elected into the UNSC for the two terms?
- Did South Africa adjust its stance on these three countries owing to its membership in the UNSC?
- Did South Africa work with other African states as one unit towards the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during the two terms?

At this stage, the chapter outlines the summary of preliminary literature review.
1.3 Summary of Preliminary Literature Review

With this study not being an exception, political science exercises cannot be completed without at some point utilising the prescribed levels of analysis which, generally speaking, Kenneth N. Waltz, Morton A. Kaplan and J David Singer are all credited for by Buzan (1995) as having played the biggest roles in introducing him to international relations. The levels of analysis can assist in analysing international political complexities. Waltz defines these levels as the individual, the state and the international system. Different scholars have applied varying methods of interpreting these levels of analysis of international relations. As a result, there exists a plethora of literature on what the levels of analysis are, and their purpose and application in international relations. For instance, in another piece, Temby (2015) outlines their contribution to international relations theory. Similarly, whereas Bernstein and Weldon (1968) argued for a structural approach to the analysis of international relations, Ray (2001) pursued a path that sought to integrate levels of analysis in world politics. This inevitably leads to the question of state behaviour.

However, as far as the study’s theory of state behaviour is concerned, a literature review that has been undertaken does not reveal any work previously done about South Africa in the UN applying functionalism as a tool of analysis. Scholars who gave functionalism consideration in their work include Sewell (1966) who conducted a study based on the UN’s programmes financing economic development, while Burton (1961) had in an earlier study examined functionalism and regionalism in the UN. Nevertheless, much has been written about the UNSC in general over the years; however, a considerable aggregate of these works has been about the reform of the UN. For instance, as early as the mid-1960s, scholars were already researching about the challenges of the UNSC permanent and non-permanent membership, voting behaviour, and the politics of reforming the Council (Todd, 1966). Proposals for reform that have been tabled since the 1950s at the UN have also been scrutinised by Ronzitti (2010). The UN’s relevance in the 21st century has been questioned (Von Einsiedel, Malone and Ugarte, 2015) while Okhovat (2012) and Popovski (2015) also lamented the lack of reform at the Council. While writing about the 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 terms, Naidu focuses more on South Africa’s role among emerging powers while Matshiqi and Masters opt to question South Africa’s ability to utilise its associations with other UNSC members (some permanent) to advance its objectives (in Kornegay and Nganje, 2012). As the debate ensues, others, like Efstathopoulos (2016) hold the view that South Africa is conflicted by its
associations with some powerful nations and therefore its role in the UNSC can never be significant since its decisions are taken in consideration of those powerful partners. These assertions are corroborated by Hwang, Sanford and Lee, (2015) in the subsequent section. Meanwhile, South Africa’s voting patterns in particular have been well-documented by Bowland (2012) and Graham (2016). However, none of these consider functionalism in their analysis.

When examining a related but not similar topic, Maseng and Lekaba (2014: 395) endorse a view that “South Africa use its strategic partnership within the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), particularly Russia and China as permanent members of the UNSC, to influence the realisation of the reform debate”. Some scholars like Alden (2015: 1) believe that “South Africa’s non-permanent membership on the” UNSC has not received adequate “scholarly attention”. This period, Alden (2015: 1) maintains, was one which witnessed the globalisation and internationalisation “of South Africa’s foreign policy” as it pronounced on internationally important matters of human rights violations like the situation in Myanmar and other politically volatile humanitarian intervention projects like in Syria and Libya. Therefore, Alden, while acknowledging a lack of scholarly focus on those two terms, however, elects to focus mainly on how the country’s foreign policy only impacted peace and security in Africa (Alden, 2015). Once again, a functionalist perspective does not find expression in that study. Of interest is that Adebajo et al. (2007) argue that South Africa’s foreign policy clearly mirrors some of the African Renaissance aspects. This is manifested by, among other factors, the country’s participation in continental peace-making and peacekeeping, African democratisation and representation abroad. For Braga (2017: 26), “the active role of South Africa as a mediator and peacekeeper in several countries, for instance in the DRC, is associated with the historical example of the negotiated transition”. The various divergent voices alluded to above are an indication of the interest scholars have displayed on the UN topic.

As aforementioned, decisions that were taken during the previous two tenures of South Africa in the Security Council have been subject to some degree of critique. They were not without controversy and it appeared as though South Africa had permanently lost a golden opportunity at first shot. In fact, some observers, like Wheeler (2011), were surprised that after its controversial first term in the UNSC (2007-2008), South Africa had received an endorsement for a second term within a few years. Such views create an impression that
South Africa’s performance was confusing during its first term in the Security Council. As a matter of interest, Serrao (2011) maintains that South Africa lost some credibility by voting for what he considers controversial resolutions while supporting debatable stances on critical matters such as climate change and nuclear programmes. Whereas Wheeler (2011) and Serrao (2011) focus on the character of South Africa, this study intends to fill the gap that exists in the topic regarding a functionalist perspective. This will be achieved by providing a scholarly analogy through assessing South Africa’s behaviour during those two terms. While it is undoubted that its first stint in the UNSC was indeed challenging, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (2009: 26), as it was known at the time, noted without contradiction that “South Africa’s experience in the Security Council has provided new insights and knowledge and has strengthened the country’s commitment to building the architecture of multilateral systems of governance, in the interest of all”. Furthermore, Bohler-Muller (2012: 8) records that during its second term (2011-12) in the UNSC, South Africa drove a passionate programme about Africa “culminating in the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2033 to ‘strengthen cooperation’ between the UN and the AU” among others.

Africa’s voting patterns in the UN have been a point of interest for scholars for many years. Among questions that have been subjected to quantitative research techniques include how Africa is divided at the UN, what type of issues divided African states, and once divided, how do these groups vote, work in blocs and isolate one another on issues where there is no agreement (Meyers, 1966). While providing proof of the existence of a formal African bloc, Hovet (1963), also explored the character of the African caucus groups and their factions in the UN. Furthermore, after assessing the UN roll call and prevalence of instability in 34 African nations, Vengroff (1976) was able to conclude that less developed countries in Africa had common foreign policy positions despite their individual variables.

Unlike previous works related to this subject, this study takes an altered posture in that it does not seek to solely record South Africa’s voting patterns (Graham, 2016) or examine South Africa’s referred two terms ‘from a middle power perspective’ (Mbete, 2018) exclusively. It is against that background that functionalism is favoured ahead of all other theories to examine the selected topic since it represents a paradigm shift from previous works related to the topic. In this era of multilateralism in world affairs, it is imperative to examine these international bodies, by taking them, their member states and their actions through a theory that is uniquely designed to analyse global organisations the way functionalism is intended to.
Considering that Van Nieuwkerk (2007: 61), maintained that “South Africa's position in the UN Security Council on issues relating to trouble spots such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe appears to be in conflict with its own principles regarding human rights and democratic governance”; it is the aim of this study to provide an analysis that would explain such assertions as well. Functionalism is considered for this task given the lack of previous academic work that mirrors its application in the analysis of any related topic.

1.4 Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

It has by now been alluded to that this study will apply the functional theoretical framework. By way of context, functionalism is one tool of analysis which was specifically developed to examine international organisations and how they execute the powers conferred upon them by member states (Klabbers, 2014). Unlike other more widely held theories such as realism, liberalism and Marxism that can be applied in all other aspects of international relations, the lesser-known functionalism theory is (in essence) more about world bodies and what influences their compositions and decisions. In this context, this may be inferred to include the powers and functions of the world body. And, in terms of the UN, Article 24 prescribes the powers, composition and functions of the Security Council (UN Charter, 1945). Its authority is therefore derived from Article 24 of the UN Charter.

In the case of the study at hand, functionalism primarily asserts that there are influencing reasons why South Africa took the decisions it did at the UNSC during its two terms. This is because functionalism, as argued by Klabbers (2014: 1), guides an individual state on “how it can adopt legally binding documents and settle disputes between member states”. That in essence is another explanation of management of the relationship between states that belong to a common body. This management at times involves the adaptation of positions and compromises of stances on foreign policy. Often, such flexibility may not be voluntary but considerate of the often-undisclosed interests of the nation. In another mention, although not necessarily in reference to South Africa, Popoviciu (2010: 165) laments thus:

No matter if they are democratic states or authoritative…it is not neither a pretext for free trade or for a world state, but it is just the claiming that the rational and pacifist process of life in common will always depend on an essential principle: the adapting of the political-economic structure that through the existing conditions can produce the better results and the minor frictions.
This means that there could be a force that influences states to act in a particular manner or in this case to vote for certain decisions despite its own foreign policy principles. This study provides an opportunity to examine behaviour against declared foreign policy principles of South Africa. In simple terms, South Africa could have adopted certain positions on Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire before its election into the UNSC but altered such positions once it became a member of the UNSC.

Furthermore, on this theory of analysis, Gehring (1996: 225) asserts that functionalism offers “a broadly applicable concept for the analysis of international cooperative institutions”. It is for this reason that this theory is opted for in an attempt to seek explanations as referred to above. At the end, it should be clear whether South Africa has delegated its authority to the bigger political unit, in this case the UNSC. As further lamented by Ilievski, (2015: 2) “the main point in this integrating activity is the process of delegating the autonomy of the political units to the newly formed political community”. Meaning that following its membership of the political community which the UNSC is, South Africa was part of certain decisions which were taken by the world body. It is such decisions which this study would like to examine as it provides an analysis of South Africa’s two-term membership on the UNSC. As Ozen (1998:2) puts it, functionalism is a “step by step method starting from economic sectors and spreading through political fields for creating a supranational political community”. It is in this political community where some members are said to lose their identity and character owing to economic interests. This point will be elaborated upon in a later chapter. Yet, De Chazournes (2015: 951) notes an argument by Klabbers thus: “the contemporary application of functionalism is understood as organizations being assigned functions, in order both to realize the common good and to deepen inter-state cooperation”. The gist of this submission by Klabbers (2014) is that functionalism pertains to how organisations function to achieve their aspirations and foster relations among states.

While also noting what Mbete (2018) and Graham (2016) have established in their studies of South Africa’s two terms in the Security Council; remarks by Kagwanja (2008: 36) that the country incorporated the doctrines of ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’, provide a clearer picture of which direction the country was headed towards in the UNSC. This, adds Kagwanja (2008: 36), is because the two concepts were “initially meant to enable the UN to intervene usefully in countries embroiled in civil wars”. However, Kagwanja (2008) maintains that the aforesaid doctrines have been effectively abused as tricks
to perpetuate neo-colonialist tendencies by stronger world powers over vulnerable states in Africa in the main. This study holds that a functionalist approach should, for instance, be able to provide a rationale for the above-mentioned as maintained by Kagwanja. It is hereby noted that Hwang et al., (2015: 256) also maintain that “empirical results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank increases”. With such claims on record, this study will put South Africa’s period in the UNSC through a functionalist test to determine if it was externally influenced and whether it behaved according to its recorded positions on the three case studies before it became part of the UNSC. In a related study, Tanter (1969: 398) observed an anticipation made by Mitrany about “the growth of functional organization, e.g., the economic, social, and technical agencies of the United Nations family”. The review of the two terms of South Africa on the Council is by extension yet another example of how broad the UN has grown as a functionalist institution. Functionalism, Hooghe and Marks (2007: 206) argue, “identifies a rational basis for political choice”. Therefore, it is considered ideal to scrutinise South Africa’s political choices prior to its election into the Security Council and during its term of office.

1.5 Research Methodology

The study will apply a qualitative research methodology because it is primarily exploratory in content and design. It will be applied to understand the supporting motives, views, and incentives of the main subject, South Africa and three case studies, Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. Data was collected through conventional platforms of scholarly material of sources in the form of books, academic and research journals, authoritative magazines, online publications, issue-based print magazines, official documents and speeches, published interviews, news articles and publications, and published references. Through a qualitative research methodology, the study applied a functionalist theory approach to present an alternative account of the selected two terms of South Africa on the UNSC, that is, 2007-08 and 2011-12 in relation to the three case studies under investigation.
1.6 Structure of Study

Chapter 1. Introduction

This chapter lays out the background of the study, details the problem statement and outlines the research questions. It is also in this chapter where the aims of the study, research method and structure of the study are covered.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

As the conceptual framework has already been declared thus far, this chapter will fully describe the concept of functionalism. Its definition and interpretation extrapolated from previous literature will be presented. Existing literature relating to the selected topic or its chosen theories will be examined in this chapter. The framework of functionalism will be developed and presented as the guiding principle for this study.


This chapter will establish various notable policy positions taken by democratic South Africa on issues that affected the UN and the three African states that have been identified as case studies, that is, Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire after 1994. Since there is a plethora of foreign policy positions by South Africa on various issues at the UN, the chapter will confine itself to the chosen case studies; to examine the nature of relations that existed between South Africa and the three countries before it served in the Security Council.

Chapter 4. South Africa’s First Term on UNSC (2007-2008)

While reflecting on South Africa’s documented stances in the form of adopted resolutions at the Security Council during the period under review, this chapter will assess resolutions that were taken by the UNSC during this period with the following case studies in focus:

1. Somalia
2. Democratic Republic of Congo
3. Côte d'Ivoire
The chapter will also interrogate any possible alliance among African member states during this term with the aim of establishing if they ever worked in unison or voted in a bloc.

Chapter 5. South Africa’s Second Term on UNSC (2011-2012)

While reflecting on South Africa’s documented stances in the form of adopted resolutions at the Security Council during the period under review, this chapter will assess resolutions that were taken by the UNSC during this period with the following case studies in focus:
5.1. Somalia
5.2. Democratic Republic of Congo
5.3. Côte d'Ivoire
The chapter will also interrogate any possible alliance among African member states during this term with the aim of establishing if they ever worked in unison or voted in a bloc.

Chapter 6. Summary of Main Findings and Conclusion

This chapter will set out key findings and concluding recommendations for future studies.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

As stated in the first chapter, this study is aimed at investigating the stance of the Republic of South Africa and a possible united African front in the UNSC when dealing with situations in Somalia, the DRC, and Côte d'Ivoire during the periods 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. South Africa had committed itself to a programme that would focus on Africa during its first two tenures in the UNSC. Those two terms have come to pass, and this study would endeavour to answer the following questions: Did South Africa continue to act in alignment with its foreign policies or did it alter its stances based on power politics? And did South Africa evolve and adjust its approach to continental issues upon taking up its membership of the UNSC? Even further, did South Africa work with its fellow African states when addressing issues relating to Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during those two terms, or not?

These questions emanate from a position that had been adopted by a democratic South Africa and had been pronounced by the iconic Nelson Mandela on the eve of the country’s democratic dispensation that, human rights will be the central determinant in South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations in general. Speaking in 1993, Mandela said: “South Africa’s future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations” (quoted in Braga, 2017: 27). This position has remained part of South African foreign policy over the years and continues to guide it in its relations with other countries and the UN in general.

This chapter will focus on the theory of functionalism. Some of the themes in international relations are liberalism, realism, constructionism, Marxism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, to mention a few. Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, it was determined that this study will apply functionalism as its preferred theoretical framework. In this chapter of the study, functionalism (as a guide to this study) will be defined and explained in detail. The approach adopted for this exercise has been non-conformist somewhat in that not only does the chapter offer a definition of the concept, but it also traces its origins in international relations and provides a background of one of its main thought
leaders. This is then accompanied by an examination of literature by selected authors who previously scrutinised the application of functionalism specifically in forums of the UN. A concise detail will henceforth be presented encompassing how the three levels of analysis in international relations will be applied in the study; these being the individual, the state and the system. Following that is a brief presentation of why functionalism was preferred over other tools of analysis.

In international relations and political science in general, functionalism (among other things) provides an analysis for a rationale of political decisions in an organisation (Gehring, 1996; Ozen, 1998; Klabbers, 2014). Meaning that, through functionalism, behaviours can be contextualised according to the institution of membership. Therefore, since this study is a political exercise, the theory of functionalism is utilised as a source to interpret decisions that were taken by South Africa in the UNSC and to interrogate the rationale for taking them. This will be done by contrasting South Africa’s political choices with the policies that guided the country prior to its membership of the UNSC or even the UN in general. International relations, after all concerns itself with power relations among nations or different states.

Based on a reflection of its application and practice, a view can be conclusively formulated that as a discipline, international relations concerns trade, exchanges, contacts, stream of data flow and conduct between and among social bodies. And, in exercise, international relations could incorporate a wide range of manoeuvres: political, social, monetary and religious.

Through functionalism, reasons behind a decision or behaviour of a state within the political community are established (Ilievski, 2015). Therefore, it is for this reason that this study aims to examine South Africa’s motivation for its stance on Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during the two terms under scrutiny. There is no single meaning for functionalism, and neither can one topic of investigation fit all the descriptions of functionalism. It is therefore not assumed nor insinuated that the chosen topic could only be examined through functionalism. It was only the preferred theory of analysis, and the reasons for such a decision are detailed herein.

Later on in this study, records will be unpacked which clearly illustrate South Africa’s support for the UN’s positions such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention (Kagwanja, 2008). This already creates an impression of alignment to the human
rights commitment that South Africa had made prior to it being elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member. However, like any subject of pedagogical scrutiny, it is after a functionalist scrutiny has been conducted that a view will be formulated regarding this subject. Meanwhile, some scholars argue that the behaviour of some Security Council members is influenced by their more-powerful counterparts. This is an insinuation that there is no independence in the UNSC because dominant member states (that is, the permanent five: USA, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) are suspected of manipulating the lesser politically and economically influential member states to behave in a certain manner.

In some instances, as Clark (1972: 277) observed, member states become victims of institutionalised behaviour which may be informed by a system of norms, values or culture of an organisation or institution that they belong to. As a result, those institutionalised member states begin to behave or alter their behaviour in alignment with other members of the institution. For example, Hwang et al (2015: 256) maintain that “empirical results show that the elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases”. This behaviour is (in some instances) reflected in the voting patterns of member states, it is alleged. This study will pursue a view that maintains that functionalism is desirable as a theoretical guide or tool in order to comprehend the system that influences the culture of the UN. In the following section though, the meaning of functionalism as observed and applied in the sphere of international relations is probed.

### 2.2 Conceptualisation

The focus of this study is by extension an exercise that scrutinises South Africa’s foreign policy at the UN. As a result, it is imperative to provide a definition of what foreign policy is. As is the case with many other concepts of international relations, there is no single definition of foreign policy. Instead, various scholars have provided an equal plethora of interpretations about foreign policy. However, one definition which encompasses the characteristics of the various interpretations is provided by Bojang (2018) who defines foreign policy as a state’s vision of interests and desired outcomes out of interaction with other states. In essence, it is a guide for interaction among states. While describing foreign policy as a system where international decisions are conceptualised for implementation; Modelski (1962) notes that the formulation of policies is a process that is influenced by certain principles aimed at achieving
targeted objectives. Another perspective was captured by Rosenau (1976) who argues that foreign policy is a combination of principles, commitments and plans. These principles, adds Dugis (2008), guide officials who act on behalf of states when they confront conditions that require them to take decisions that carry external consequences. Meanwhile, according to Gibson (1944), foreign policy is a guide on conducting the business of government internationally.

As it has been declared from the onset that this is a study focusing on activities of the Security Council, and having provided the definition of foreign policy above, this segment will briefly outline operating processes of the Council. According to Article 24 of the UN Charter (1945), the primary responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. It annually submits reports and, where necessary, special reports to the General Assembly. The powers of the Council, as noted by Corel (2014: 40) are regulated as recorded in Article 39 thus: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”. The Security Council also recommends the appointment of the Secretary General to the General Assembly. Concerning its meetings, Article 28 of the UN Charter (1945) dictates that the President may determine and call a meeting at any time. Whereas the above refers to official meetings, there are consultations that happen among members. Those are informal meetings that do not get recorded for Council in accordance with Rule 55 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure (UN Charter, 1945). These informal meetings are as a result of evolution and efforts to make flexible norms and principles; and this has had varying impact on the decision-making process in the Council (Baccarini, 2018). This approach is widely applied in the UN and the Security Council in particular.

Another concept which is worth probing for comprehension is “the situation in” as alluded to in footnote 1 in Chapter 1. The Security Council refers to its resolutions as “the situation in” a particular country. There does not seem to be strong reasons why it opted to use “the situation in” to title its resolutions. However, according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the Repertoire, it “provides an overview of the role of the Council in its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on each of the agenda items that it is seized of” (UN Charter, 1945). The Repertoire records the origins of the involvement of the
Security Council “in a particular situation” and how it applied the Charter in that “situation” (UN Charter, 1945). This is the only trace of the application of the phrase upon the founding of the UN. Therefore, it is concluded that the application of the phrase, “the situation in” emanates from the Charter’s semantics. Nevertheless, the concept is applied without any particular background to it except this link that has been drawn above. Yet, it appears to be a UN ‘language’ since it is also utilised in a descriptive manner in the UN Human Rights Council as recorded by Jordaan (2019). It refers to the current circumstances (political instability, tensions, violence, among other scenarios) of that particular country at that particular time.

2.3 The Meaning of Functionalism in International Relations

It has already been highlighted above that there exists a plethora of interpretations of what functionalism is. For an analytical framework that can be applied in various disciplines of study, including political science, psychology and sociology, functionalism can never have a single definition or interpretation. The field of international relations is no exception. The numerous descriptions that have been recorded present a diverse range of interpretations of this tool of analysis. The intention of this section is not to provide the best explanation of what functionalism is, but to present some of its diverse meanings as recorded by various scholars. This decision is arrived at having noted that there is no common or single definition of what functionalism is. In fact, it can be argued that there is no single definition of functionalism but common traits of description. As a start, Groom and Taylor (1975) regard functionalism as an approach rather than a theory. This is a view supported by earlier scholars like Barkun (1970: 20) who on the other hand maintains that “functionalism is a means of description, not of explanation”. Already, there are noted dissimilarities in understanding functionalism. Nevertheless, it must be reaffirmed that the aim for this section in the study is not to choose the most correct or incorrect interpretation.

Extrapolating from the assessed scholarly material, functionalism can be regarded as a theory of international relations that emerged in between the two world wars from the solid concern about the outdated interpretation of the state as a type of social structure. Unlike the political power and self-interests espoused by realists, functionalists’ focus is on mutual interests and necessities which states have in common in an era of globalisation characterised by the disintegration of state independence (Rosamond, 2000). Others, like Imber (2007), hold that
functionalism is a method pertaining to the establishment of global organizations that promote international economic, humanitarian, scientific and social cooperation. Two interpretations aforementioned embrace what David Mitrany had described as functionalism. Although he never consciously embarked on an exercise to formulate it, Mitrany’s writings earned him the position of being regarded as the founder of functionalism.

Upon scrutiny of the writings about functionalism one of its key aspects is revealed as international integration. As per functionalism, international integration – characterised by collective administration and management; and interdependence (Mitrany, 1933: 101) between states – builds up its own internal dynamism as states battle to prosper in limited socio-economic conditions. As a form of creating solutions to the challenges outlined above, universal agencies would therefore be formed to address human issues, including science and skills development. The advantages rendered by the agencies would draw in the reliability of the communities and ignite their interest (Mitrany, 1933). There are two solid requirements to sustain functionalism: first, the procedure of economic and political integration should happen in an environment of human needs; second, information and expertise should be accessible to address the issues for which the agencies were founded.

This is a view supported by Hwang and Kim (2015) who argue that the theoretical outlook of functionalism emphasises the significance of interface between politics and economy. Thus, at the heart of functionalism, add Hwang and Kim (2015), is the intersecting influence of integration. This means that collaboration and incorporation of economics stands a better chance to lead to teamwork and assimilation in other disciplines of society since there is enormous dependency between economy and politics. Consequently, according to Hwang and Kim (2015: 41), “economic integration will eventually lead to political integration”. In essence, what this means is that the integration that happens in the economic sphere would in all likelihood influence political integration. Such an eventuality supports assertions about the supremacy of the economic aspect of politics. This is also one area which this study aims to explore as it examines the possibility of economic influence or pressure in decision-making by South Africa in the Security Council. This is not surprising at all since in some instances, functionalism does emphasise economic factors as one major aspect of cooperation among states and communities.
In further exploration of the meaning of functionalism, Alger (1977: 73) opts for an explanation that says functionalism is “concerned with the process whereby specific activities (functions) come to be performed by international organizations rather than by separate nation-State authorities”. In this eventuality, emphasis is on the organisation instead of the political structure called the state. A notable view by Klabbers (2014), asserts that functionalism is one theoretical framework which was specifically developed to examine international organisations and how they execute the powers conferred upon them by member states. He also considers functionalism “as a broad church devoted to the law of international organizations not their role in global affairs” (Klabbers, 2016: 976). A closer inspection of explanations offered immediately above, reveal the common traits found in the various definitions and interpretations of functionalism. Shared themes include international organisations, cooperation, integration and execution of mandate. As a theory of international relations, management of power relations among member states of those international bodies is also a point that cannot be ignored.

Research and submissions by scholars like Ruggie (1997) and Milner (1992) also provided insight into the basic understanding of functionalism. Equally did Breuilly (1993) and Connor (1994). Other scholars who have contributed to the definition or description of functionalism include De Chazournes (2015: 954) who contended that in attempting to understand functionalism, it must be considered that it relates to the implementation of some tasks by structures of a global organisation. The aim of functionalism, De Chazournes (2015: 954) continues, is to increase the level of integration between members of a body or group. In the interim, according to Bhambhri (1973), functionalism is a holistic theoretical framework that explains dissimilar aspects of social reality, including political reality. This analysis is in line with Hooghe and Marks (2005) who uphold that functionalism identifies a rational basis for political choice. Yet, according to Gehring (1996: 225), functionalism “promises to offer a broadly applicable concept for the analysis of international cooperative institutions”. All these different interpretations add to the diverse pool of contributions about the interpretation of this theory. Nevertheless, some, like Pentland, align with Mitrany’s interpretation that functionalism adopts the inescapability of socio-economic progression and the hegemony of people’s wellbeing and scientific technological development above politics (Pentland, 1975). The above further demonstrates the lack of consensus on what functionalism is.
For what may be considered an open-ended theory, its interpretation can also be normative as illustrated by Nollkaemper (2016). And therefore, since the aim of this sub-section was not to provide a single definition of functionalism, the overabundance of varying interpretations is noted. They all demonstrated common characteristics in functionalism which include, international organisations, limitation of state power, dependence on world bodies, the demise of totalitarianism, acceptance of international agencies, globalisation, economic interdependence, power sharing, world peace and mutual respect among the states. It is therefore not an anomaly that there is no definite response to the definition of what functionalism is. All the referred articles contribute to knowledge expansion and understanding of the meaning of functionalism. Having noted all the different interpretations and definitions, the section hereunder traces the origins of functionalism in international relations. This is done with the aim of providing further background about the theory.

2.4 Origins of Functionalism in International Relations

Having presented the meaning and interpretation of functionalism in international relations above, this section wishes to locate its origins. Functionalism in international relations can be traced as far back as the origins of international relations itself, leading back to the liberal custom that began with Kant (Rosamond, 2000). And it can be conclusively linked with the emergence of the search for peace in the world, in the era following the founding of the League of Nations in 1919. This was an era of world integration or the beginning of globalisation. Different countries of the world were starting to coexist in a mutually respective manner. Having experienced world wars that brought about some devastating consequences for the world, global leaders proposed a definitive unification of world states as a way to world peace.

The dominant character among this integrationist move was functionalism which increased its presence in the aftermath of World War I (WWI). Essential to the theory of functionalism were the fundamental works of David Mitrany, as mentioned previously, who maintained that with the development of technology and the need for invention in response to modern challenges which transcend geographical borders, individuals will eventually exchange their loyalty from country states to powerful international agencies. These agencies will have economic strength and social collaboration. It can then be argued that this marked the beginning of functionalism as a theory in international relations. Functionalism along these
lines comprised a vital theoretical basis for a few intergovernmental associations set up to meet the functional mandates brought about in the 20th century (Nettey, 1997). In a way, functionalism was a product of dialectical materialism of the 20th century. It was a response to the prevailing challenges of the time that required new approaches.

As per Alger (1977: 76), functionalism and integration were created out of thought, discussion and engagement with “balance of power, collective security and world government as approaches to international peace”. Old methods were not yielding any success in the management of power relations among world states. In fact, the epoch was characterised by anarchy and military conflicts among world nations. The apparent lack of success in the notion of balance of power prompted the emergence of the method of collective security. In this methodology, various nation states (for example, national governments) agree to oppose any individual state that pursues aggression against another. Collective security is fundamentally different and unique in relation to the notion of balance of power, yet the system utilised is the same – military power. The concept of collective security has often failed (with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in some instances) on the grounds that powerful nations have quit, to a great extent due to their capacity to fight for themselves through one-sided utilisation of a similar military power that may have been used for the collective. Research on functionalism has interrogated these limitations and greatly informed the processes that led to the growth of international bodies.

This study notes that Mitrany (1933) gave a noteworthy contribution to functional reasoning in his “A Working Harmony Framework”. Karl Deutsch stimulated a supporting line of thought in his work on integration, with the publication of “Political Community at the International Level” in 1954 and “Political Community in the North Atlantic Area” in 1957. It is essential to note that Mitrany had the capacity to apply knowledge crossing over the obstructions which had been created among research and international associations. While Deutsch obtained the crude material for his work from contextual investigations or case studies, his accomplishments represent developing initiatives that developed to differentiate research from basic thoughts around international organisations. In this event, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, Mitrany is therefore positioned as the main thought leader in the origins of functionalism. Nevertheless, this does not negate the role played by other scholars in the development of functionalism. Mitrany is only acknowledged as having been the main
contributor. Functionalism originated from David Mitrany and his research findings which were also influenced by his personal experiences. It came about as a result of a search for solutions to challenges that faced the world in a particular era.

2.5 Thought Leaders

It has emerged during this exercise that the main source of reference in the study of functionalism in international relations is David Mitrany. However, there are other contributors to the discipline as well. In relation to the question about Mitrany and functionalism, Banyan (2015) remarked that “Mitrany’s contribution to the New World Order is there for all to see” adding that it is risky to ignore. The decision to examine only his work is informed by the limited scope of work for this exercise and his acknowledged influence in the chosen theory of functionalism.

2.5.1 Mitrany

David Mitrany was a scholar who was born in Romania and earned himself the honour of having promoted the functional theory in international relations. Following WWII, the world witnessed the sporadic rise of expert agencies and organisations that defied geographical borders. Such organisations were focused on developmental projects to solve challenges across borders, bearing in mind governments’ financial constraints (Herren, 2013). Mitrany was one of the advocates for such organisations which were organised mainly on functional terms as opposed to geographical territories or states (Murphy, 2005). In his visualisation, the state would still continue existing as influential and self-governing political units. However, a number of their responsibilities and main functions would be taken over by international organisations.

A large number of these particular organisations existed in many parts of the world before Mitrany began researching the subject and prior to the founding of the UN. With particular reference to the USA, Imber (2007: 3) noted thus: “an earlier variety of so-called public international unions, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) founded in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union created in 1875, sought both to promote and to regulate
new technologies”. On the other hand, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was also created in 1919 as an institution meant for organised labour (Braithwaite & Drahos: 2000). Therefore, Mitrany's contribution was the initial inception but the promotion of the development of the number and mandate of the existing organisations, the formation of new ones, and their coordination were feeding into an already existing phenomenon.

As he persisted with his recorded thoughts, Mitrany developed a ‘working peace system’ which would ensure transfer of projects to functional agencies through a process called “task expansion”. This process would broaden the mandate and competence of the agencies compared to those of national governments. Thereafter, the network of interdependent relationships that these agencies would come to manage, (a process called spill over) would create a so-called “working peace system between the members” (Imber, 2007: 3). In essence, some government roles would be redundant as a result of limited operating resources, although that may not have been the aim in the beginning.

As research and development around these organisations evolved, their powers and competence were also expanding and encroaching into government territory. This did not escape the attention of Mitrany as he “also argued that the agencies could apply sanctions to countries that were judged to be acting contrary to international law”, adds Imber (2007: 3). An ideal example would be the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) programme to “detect and destroy Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons program after 1991”. Mitrany was adamant that often the state did not have adequate abilities to deliver to its citizens in areas like social welfare, whereas on the contrary, the state was more than powerful in fields such as military weaponry. He saw the need to strengthen state capacity through launching matching institutions.

After 1945, the focal point of the creation of functional bodies moved from scientific collaboration towards socio-economic development; and there also appears to have been a deliberate move to single out functional cooperation from security and political disputes addressed in the UN and the UNSC (Imber, 2007). This is a point which is elaborated in detail in a subsequent section as it relates to this study. In the 1970s, functional agencies drastically shifted their tasks towards developmental mandates (Herren, 2013). Along these lines, task expansion and extension of authority added new implications to elevate and to
propagate multilateral aid projects (Imber, 2007). The organisations likewise ended up subject to more political debate in characterising their scope of activities.

2.5.2 Mitrany’s Functionalist Theory

It was earlier acknowledged in this study that Mitrany was not the only source of origin of the theory of functionalism but a leading figure. As such, this section will only focus on what has been attributed to Mitrany as his version of functionalism since there are various scholars who laboured in a similar sector. In other words, the segment will interrogate the theory of functionalism as envisaged and conceptualised by Mitrany. It has been noted by Green (1969) that Mitrany’s theory of functionalism sought to achieve two things: world peace and political integration. This becomes a very critical point to note considering the main topic of this study which is investigating the stance of the Republic of South Africa and a possible united African front in the UNSC when dealing with the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire during the periods 2007-08 and 2011-12. To this extent, functionalism, according to Mitrany, has proven to support a narrative that puts at the centre, interest organisations as opposed to political power institutions. In his own words, Mitrany (1965: 133) lamented that “the wider the activity of the state, the wider its direct contacts and relations with organized groups of interest”. This emphasises the need for cooperation between state and non-state actors.

Thoughtfully, Mitrany (1965: 134) believed that “many points of economic and social policy are now settled, or modified in application, through private bargaining between government departments and professional and other organized groups”. This represents a narrative that was expressed by Mitrany and subsequently became the central theme in his functional thoughts, the withering significance of political power. He advocated that authority can best be exercised through a function (Alexandrescu, 2007) and not through political power. Mitrany was convinced that a functional approach stood a better chance to achieve unity and world peace instead of a structured political power unit called government. His belief was that not even geopolitics had an opportunity to usher in world stability.

According to Mitrany geopolitical position and physical location did not translate to the existence of common interests or shared political values that would encourage economic and political collaboration. Meaning that people’s views about their socio-economic and political
conditions were not influenced by where they lived. Therefore, a conjecture that can be made from his writings is that Mitrany considered political democracy union a fallacy that would be weakened due to its lack of flexibility. Having experienced his fair share of totalitarianism in Europe, Mitrany was convinced that an alliance based on political democracy could not necessarily restrict the emergence of anti-democratic forces. This would inevitably propel the rise of opposing ideologies that would lead to rivalry, he argued.

While the citizens’ “political thinking has been so long rooted in the notion that every authority must be linked to a given territory”, Mitrany (1965: 135) believed that, the world was not emotionally attached to the borders that separated them and that they were ready for a new flexible arrangement. He firmly held that there was a need for various new organisations that would cater for specific interests and needs. In his functional way, the harmonisation of actions to attain social and economic solutions would have to be done at global level if it was to be a lasting and effective solution.

Mitrany’s functionalist theory, as articulated in his works, was supported by some scholars who recommended similar international provisions. For instance, Ashworth and Long (1999) maintain that the concept of “political government by agencies and institutions set up with specific functions to meet particular needs” was not a new invention as it had been previously discussed by international relations luminaries like Kant and Comte, commendably before Mitrany. Additionally, Steffek (2016) also considers Paul Reinsch and James Arthur Salter as among the early political scientists who espoused functionalism values. This revelation makes Mitrany a thought leader among a group of other fellow scholars.

Mitrany was for international political transformation but through non-political solutions. “While Mitrany’s theory aimed at lowering expectations about the political arrangements of the post-war world order, it had high expectations about the international private organizations that would set the model for functional agencies” (Rosenboim, 2013: 15). These agencies would then work together with the public sector to provide social services to people all over the world. Tanter (1969) acknowledges that Mitrany had insightfully anticipated the rapid development of functional organisations such as the social, economic, and technical agencies of the UN. As it has not become obvious, Mitrany’s sight always went beyond the state for solutions, and this appears to have given him options. Among them, he established value in non-governmental institutions, particularly the private sector. He was
thus fascinated by the business administration models which he thought could provide much-sought solutions to the world. In his experience, governments were failing to cover certain areas of human interest.

Despite this theory having originated over half a century ago, there are many instances where the functionalist theory as attributed to Mitrany has been applied in contemporary times. While giving credit to Mitrany and his functionalist theory, and addressing a matter similar to the dispute over the use of the iconic Nile River waters in Africa, Mingst (1981: 161) argues that “cooperation in technical subjects is easier to achieve and will result in the long run in extensive political cooperation”. This only serves to confirm the dynamism of the theory of functionalism to be applicable in modern international relations. Meanwhile, Steele (2011: 16) believes that Mitrany’s functionalism “reconstruct[s] practical principles that might be applied to contemporary politics as well as debates in international relations and international political theory”. Similarly, Steffek (2015: 23) holds thus: “Mitrany’s proposal for introducing a functional dimension into the political system can be interpreted as a ‘thin’ cosmopolitanism, designed to free citizens from war and oppressive concentrations of political power”. Once again, political power is relegated to a non-primary role.

As captured by Rosenboim (2013: 14), Mitrany “proposed to provide worldwide social reform by suggesting that the needs of individuals and communities could be solved by agencies with specifically tailored functions located in both the private and the public sphere”. Despite not having clearly outlined which functions these are, from Mitrany’s articles it can be conclusively understood that these include agencies that manage airways, railways, maritime transport, financial and funding bodies, agricultural and fishing services, human rights and food. According to him, institutions were the invention of sectors like transport, and not of speculative ambitions like peace and security. He accordingly gives credit to institutions for the development of infrastructure instead of acknowledging government which he taunts for aiming for hypothetical goals.

Following a critical assessment of Mitrany (1925, 1936 and 1966), a view can be formulated that he believed that theories such as nationalism did not recognise the ability of the state to prosper economically since (according to him) states could not collaborate for the common good owing to political rivalry. His argument was that, state economy is dependent on international relations (specifically fiscal policies and trade) thereby, undermining the ability
of the state to determine the strength of its currency and provide economic direction. According to him, the state did not have the desired power to bring about changes in critical areas of its operations. On the contrary, the private sector was better positioned to deliver developmental projects since multinational corporations operated across borders, establishing dealings that could not be influenced by the state for its internal requirements. Whereas international regional integration was inevitably happening (Young, 1989), Mitrany maintained that a functionalist approach would allow scientific research to categorise socio-economic needs of societies across geopolitical boundaries.

However, solutions for such identified socio-economic needs of societies would be driven by issue-based institutions founded for that specific task only (Mitrany, 1966). There was an emphasis from Mitrany (1936) that the public demands are centred on service provision as opposed to political rights. This increased his call for the private sector to play a more significant role in the administration of such functions for the people in need – wherever they may be regardless of geographical location (Mitrany, 1965). His assertion was that people of the world would work together in all areas where they recognised a common need that can solely be dealt with by institutions that are collaborative in character. Those needs, according to Mitrany, would generate cross-border agencies whose authority would be derived from their functions; and their mandate would be strictly limited. Functional international bodies were, according to Mitrany the only solution to outdated constitutional strategies to solve socio-economic problems facing societies across political territories. In essence, the section above captures what could be regarded as functionalism according to Mitrany. The following section will briefly detail the application of functionalism within the UN and its agencies.

### 2.6 Functionalism in the UN

This study is premised on the narrative that the UN is founded on some basic characteristics of functionalism. According to Banyan (2015), “functionalism offers an alternative model of international order to the power politics approach to international relations which is characteristic of realism; and the idea is to eliminate nationalism which is seen as the root cause of war by attacking national sovereignty”. As briefly mentioned about his views on nationalism, Mitrany was convinced that this would result in a working peace system that would be steadily and systematically built. As per Mitrany’s theory, associations like the African Union (AU) would concentrate on the fulfilment of the welfare needs of its residents
by taking care of their socio-economic needs. Therefore, an international body would emerge to execute certain functions (Banyan, 2015). The UN is one such organisation. Since it was founded in 1945, the UN has provided enormous content for scholars. The following is a selection of authors who previously scrutinised the application of functionalism in the UN.

2.6.1 Riggs

As a researcher, Riggs (2001), examined speeches presented by American lawmakers who were previously delegated to UN General Assembly (UNGA) sessions between 1950 and 1971. The intention was to “test a functionalist assumption that people who become personally involved in the activities of international agencies will develop attitudes more favourable toward international cooperation” (Riggs, 2001: 515). Interrogating the attitudinal element of functionalism, one of the elementary questions addressed was “whether participants in international organizations experience any attitude at all” (Riggs, 2001: 516). This becomes relevant for this study given that it will inevitably refer to South Africa’s attitude and behaviour in the UNSC in the final chapter of the study.

2.6.2 Bleicher

An articulation of the paradox presented by functionalism at the UN is also well recorded by Bleicher (1970), who noted that in its punishment of both Portugal and South Africa for racially-motivated segregate laws, the world body (UN) called upon particular agencies to refuse the two states the advantages of participation in their structures. However, there were some non-conformists in that regard. For instance, an international reconstruction and development bank did not ban the two states arguing that as a non-political functional body, it had no mandate nor powers to impose sanctions on members for their positions on issues unrelated to their core business. This is an illustration that there were some genuine challenges regarding the relations between the UN and other agencies, thus exposing a major dilemma of the functionalist theory regarding world order (Bleicher, 1970). Reference is hereby drawn to an earlier statement regarding the dilemma of exercising power in agencies
of the UN. A more thorough detail is given on the subject in a subsequent section of this chapter.

2.6.3 Luard

Although addressing certain aspects of functionalism, less emphasis has been placed on the political mandate of the UN according to Luard (2001). In a review of functionalism in the UN (with specific emphasis on the 1980s), a reflection was made by Luard (2001) that, as maintained by theorists such as David Mitrany, the UN’s area of expansion has always been in functional areas of international cooperation such as the improvement of world health, development of world agriculture, infrastructure development, education, science and technology. Luard held a view that says the UN, has failed to maintain peace and political stability; therefore, its relevance would be in the growth of its subsidiary functional agencies. To illustrate this point, Luard (2001) gave examples of the growth in UN expenditure on its functional bodies. The numbers of UN agencies have grown substantially, as well as their budgets, Luard (2001) notes. The author makes an excellent reflection of the growth of functionalism in the UN. With functionalism in the UN covered, the following segment briefly reflects on the levels of analysis in international relations.

2.7 Levels of Analysis

It has been noted by Singer (1961) that in any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systematic analysis. Similarly, the interrogation of international relations topics requires tools that have been developed to investigate such subjects; and there exist in this field methods or levels of analysis which, according to Tamaki (2015) provide details of the workings of the international system. These levels of analysis have been categorised into three, following Kenneth Waltz’s concept of images “namely the characteristics or attributes of individual human beings, states and the international system” (Ray, 2001: 355). In this exercise, the “three levels” will inform questions about the role played by individual leaders, the state and the international system in the situations of Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. Soltani, Naji and Amiri (2014: 167) note Waltz’s assertion that “all three levels act under anarchical structure of international system”. The anarchical structure in question is the state of instability or war in international relations. Although this study may not delve into the causes of the wars in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, owing to its scope, it will nevertheless
investigate the role played by the South African individual leaders and UN representatives, the state (the Republic of South Africa) and the system (the UN and UNSC more particularly) concerning the situations in the aforementioned three African states during the period under scrutiny.

2.8 A Case for Functionalism

When examining an institution like the UN or any of its agencies, various tools of analysis can be relevant. However, applying functionalism to examine activities within a UN agency such as the one in question for this study can be a complex exercise. Reasons for the complexity of the task include one that the UNSC is effectively an autonomous body of the UN which to some extent exercises powers that the mother body does not have. The veto powers of the permanent members of the Security Council place them at a level where they individually have the ability to sanction decisions independent of the general assembly of the UN. Whereas functionalism may easily be ideal to examine other UN agencies, when it relates to the UNSC, it becomes a challenging task. What is known to this extent is that functionalism (at least according to David Mitrany) is somehow in contrast with realism and nationalism.

Functionalism strives to demobilise the significance of political power and territorialism whereas the UNSC was established precisely to defend such territories and attributes (Mole, 2014). Therefore, a study that seeks to examine the proceedings of the Security Council through functionalism is bound to encounter contradictions upon commencement. This is because the UN and UNSC often find themselves disagreeing with its members on certain issues, although they are both established to pursue world peace. The UN seeks to (through the general assembly and the secretariat, but most importantly its functional agencies) pursue a developmental agenda and world peace (Luck, 2003). Nevertheless, the UNSC becomes the ultimate agency or structure of the UN to belong to because that is where political power is wielded, in some instances to secure economic interests (Philpott, 2001).

Therefore, functionalism provides an opportunity to examine critically the UN and its agencies in relation to the exercise of power. For South Africa having become a non-permanent member of the UNSC on two occasions, functionalism is a tool that will analyse power relations among its peers in pursuit of a developmental agenda. The contrast in this
study will emerge in that it is not just another agency of the UN in question, it is the UNSC. Noting that the study aims to investigate the stance of South Africa and a possible united African front in the UNSC when dealing with situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during the periods 2007-08 and 2011-12; it is imperative to refer to Groom and Taylor (1975) who lamented that functionalism is an emphasis on commitments or responsibilities, mainly those executed by organisations and such organisations, according to Bezuidenhout and Kleynhans (2014), are the voice of the individual states within them.

The critical question would be: How will functionalism advance the analysis of the chosen subject? Prior to even pondering the question, it is critical to re-emphasise that through functionalism, this study would have to answer the following questions: Did South Africa continue to act in alignment with its policies or did it alter its stances based on power politics? And, did South Africa evolve and adjust its approach to the continent upon its membership of the UNSC? Even further, did South Africa work with its fellow African states when addressing issues relating to Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during those two terms or not? Instead of relenting on the chosen theory, this study maintains functionalism and will follow the lead of other scholars like McLaren (1985) who presented a critical analogy of the feasibility of functionalism as conceptualised by Mitrany.

This study will provide another opportunity to put the theory to the test and identify where there are gaps or opportunities for further critique. South Africa had positioned itself as a champion for peace and African development leading to its assumption of the Security Council seat. There are varying thoughts as to whether it achieved those goals. In the meantime, functionalism maintains that “the main causes of war and conflicts among nations have many social, economic and humanitarian problems of mankind and without solving these fundamental problems, permanent world peace cannot be established” (Mishra, 2015: 1). To solve these, Mitrany (1948) proposed that international organisations could choose among three categories; that is, the UN, federal system or functional arrangements. The conjecture that can be made in this instance is that Mitrany did not consider the UN as a completely functional entity owing to the political content of the institution which may be considered divisive. He nevertheless emphasised the need for “material co-operation” while motivating against “clinging to political segregation” (Mitrany, 1948: 351). The Mitrany approach appears to be the most ideal to examine South Africa’s two terms in the UNSC since its foreign policy was supposed to be in favour of Africa by its own proclamation.
It will be argued that South Africa was also pursuing a functionalist theory in the UNSC. Considering that the AU itself took a decision (Ezulwini Consensus) in support of UN reform (which specifically aimed for permanent membership of two African nations in the Security Council), it is clear that this body sought joint action on common issues – which is a central feature of functionalism as expressed by Mitrany (1948). It nevertheless emerges that Africa has always been committed to functionalism as noted by Nweke (1987: 133) who illustrated thus “the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the product of a compromise between African statesmen who wanted political union of all independent African states and those who preferred functional cooperation as a building block toward the construction of an African socio-psychological community”. Although the OAU had dismally failed in its functionalist approach, Nweke (1987: 133) noted that “in order to revamp Africa's commitment to functionalism, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted in April 1980”. The main goal for that was to achieve a common African market by the dawn of the new millennium. This re-emphasises the narrative that South Africa was not in pursuit of a new goal at the UNSC during its two terms when it sought to pursue an agenda biased towards Africa. It was a continuation of a functionalist struggle that had been engaged in by the founding fathers of a decolonised African continent through the OAU. After considering all the definitions and interpretations of functionalism offered by various scholars, functionalism is affirmed as the theory of choice to guide this study. The amount of evidence provided as supported by various scholarly works also supports the need to apply the theory to test the chosen topic.

2.9 Functionalism and a link to the Levels of Analysis

The aim of this segment is to clarify the link between the levels of analysis and functionalism. According to Breuning (2007), the individual level puts emphasis on leaders; the state level dwells on internal state factors; and the system level stresses the comparisons of states, questioning the state’s economic, technological and military abilities as the drive behind foreign policy. Functionalism, on the other hand, argues Imber (2013) is “an approach to the formation of international organizations that advocates international cooperation on scientific, humanitarian, social, and economic issues”. Therefore, in this study, functionalism is the theory about the formation of global bodies while the three levels explain the behaviour of members (individual and state) in that international organisation once it is operational.
2.10 Conclusion

This chapter was aimed at discussing the conceptual framework of the study, which is functionalism, and in the process, it simultaneously conducted a literature review of the topic. Following a detailed introduction, the chapter covered an elaborate meaning of functionalism in international relations. Different variants of understanding were explored. In the various depictions implied, there were some regular ideas that are found in all definitions and understandings of functionalism that were likewise recognised and recorded. It transpired that regardless of the wealth of these definitions and clarifications of what functionalism is or involves, there appears to be common views from the different researchers that basic attributes of functionalism incorporate global associations, participation, integration, economic relationship, functions and world peace.

The chapter then addressed the origins of functionalism in international relations. It was in this section where the role of David Mitrany was introduced and captured in brief detail. However, it was only in the subsequent section capturing the thoughts of leaders behind functionalism where Mitrany’s role was elaborately recorded. Noting his academic work that led to the theory of functionalism in international relations being formulated, Mitrany’s functionalism was also broadly examined. It emerged in that section that Mitrany had not consciously sought to create a theory of functionalism in international relations. The theory emerged during his quest for answers to challenges that were facing the reorganisation of the world after WWI and WWII. According to Mitrany, the world would not experience any peace unless new strategies and tactics were applied to deal with challenges that faced communities. He then emphasised the importance of creating a world community led by international bodies whose functions addressed people’s needs. The creation of these international bodies had the capacity to undermine the authority of the political state while providing solutions to the needs of the people. The section revealed that Mitrany anticipated that the system of geopolitics will lose influence in international relations. The reason for this was that, people’s challenges like diseases and poverty are not contained or stopped from spreading by geopolitical borders. Therefore, Mitrany saw the role of borders diminishing, while giving more credence to international functionalist bodies that related with people regardless of politics. He emphasised functional bodies rather than state governments.
Although a lot of literature covering functionalism was reviewed throughout the chapter, literature review was again particularly conducted and covered under the section that addressed functionalism in the UN. It emerged that while this is not the first study to be conducted about functionalism in international relations, there had been some research conducted about functionalism in the UN. At least three scholars were reviewed in this section. Owing to the scope of the work, it was not ideal to expand beyond the three scholars, that is, Riggs, Bleicher and Luard. A brief account was also given about the levels of analysis that are applied to interpret activities in international relations. The chapter then presented a case for functionalism. This section extensively analysed the rationale behind selecting functionalism as the conceptual framework for the study. An extensive justification was presented that displayed the relevance of functionalism in the study. It emerged that since functionalism was particularly concerning itself with international organisations, it would be the most ideal out of other theories. Functionalism’s specific focus on international bodies positioned it above the other conceptual frameworks given that this study is also about South Africa’s behaviour in the UNSC. This behaviour will be assessed through the manner in which South Africa voted in the Security Council regarding the situations in the selected three case studies for this exercise. It is understood that functionalism governs the powers of members of international organisations. Applying the three levels of analysis, this positions it in an ideal position to scrutinise behaviour of a member of the Security Council, in this case, South Africa. The theory of functionalism, at least from Mitray’s point of view, affirms the role of leadership in other sectors other than the political office, to offer functional solutions for people’s needs. Such alternative sectors may include UN agencies.

Previous work done applying functionalism at the UN were not aimed at scrutinising South Africa’s two terms in the UNSC nor its behaviour regarding the specific situations of Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. This chapter was able to scrutinise the theoretical framework of functionalism and supported its information with relevant sources from reviewed literature. It can be concluded that functionalism is the most appropriate to examine the chosen topic. The chapter that follows will examine foreign policy positions adopted by South Africa from the day Nelson Mandela took oath of office as President until the next decade. Those policy positions will be strictly noted as they would concern the countries, Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. They will be recorded and later used to juxtapose any inconsistencies, if any exist, in the foreign policy or behaviour in the form of voting in the Security Council.
CHAPTER 3

3.1 Introduction
This chapter will establish various notable foreign policy positions taken by South Africa on issues that affected the three African states that have been selected as case studies (that is, Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire) and were brought to the UN post-1994. These positions will later be evaluated against the policies adopted and implemented by South Africa upon taking its UNSC non-permanent seat in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. Later, the findings will reveal if South Africa acted in alignment with its foreign policies, and if there had been any possible alliance among African member states during this term. The chapter will examine South Africa’s actions and pronouncements about the three case studies in the first 10 years since its readmission into the UN. This will include initiatives which South Africa may have been involved in outside of the UN mandate. The reason for this approach is that South Africa may have been involved in mediation and peace-building efforts affecting the case studies on a mandate that was not granted by the UN. Meanwhile, instead of assessing the first 13 years of South Africa as a member of the UN, the study will only evaluate the first decade. It is because the two years between 2004 and 2006 were characterised by a lot of lobbying for the Security Council seat – an act that can affect the objective judgement on the part of South Africa when addressing issues that affect the case studies or their allies. This exercise opted to steer away from the two years in question to avoid a possible lack of fairness. As a campaigning potential member, South Africa could have taken decisions that favoured (directly or indirectly) those that were to vote for it.

After its emergence from an apartheid past South Africa\(^3\) was clear from the onset upon rejoining the UN that it was to pursue a foreign policy built on democracy and the respect for human rights (Mandela, 1993). Therefore, while the study is largely scrutinising that declared commitment; this chapter will flow in the following sequence where first, it will examine South Africa’s post-1994 policy positions on selected international affairs issues that concerned the UN. Following that will be a reflection of democratic South Africa’s first 10 years in the UN (1994-2004). Subsequent to that will be a scrutiny of South Africa’s policy positions on issues relating to Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire in particular. As a new

\(^3\) In this study the name South Africa will refer to its political leaders and policymakers.
state actor in the international arena (following a long stretch of isolation), South Africa ended up taking an interest in resolutions that tied its pledge to specific qualities, especially those it had conceded to, for example, protecting and advancing human rights and majority rule government.

Despite the country nobly putting a coordinated and organised post-conflict development program resolutely on the schedule of the global community, and then, that of the UN, as argued by Landsberg (2009), democratic South Africa was often accused of dominating other African states (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). In a politically calculated and well-resourced campaign that had the backing of both the state and non-state players, including multinational corporations, South Africa asserted itself on the African continent and the world within a short space of time after its readmission to world bodies (Mthombeni, 2006). Its leadership eloquently expressed its foreign policies without reservation. So candid were the intentions on foreign policy that in the media space, the public broadcaster also launched a continental news channel, namely, SABC Africa, which was accused of biased broadcasting of South Africa’s ruling party’s foreign policy to the rest of the continent (Da Silva, 2006). Accusations were rife and extended to a level of an invasion of Africa by South Africa as detailed by Daniels, Southall and Naidu (2008). The ‘campaign’ to position the country as a new destination was a success as it resulted in the number of foreign missions also dramatically increasing leaving South Africa well-represented on the continent with diplomatic missions in “46 of Africa’s 54 countries” (Landsberg, 2009a: 2) and hosting the second highest number of foreign missions in the world – only second to Washington DC in the USA. The following segment will clarify the role of the individual in the three levels of international relations. This clarification will be based on who the leaders of South Africa were during the period under scrutiny.

3.2 Focus on South Africa’s Leadership and the Role of Individuals

As stated in Chapter 1 of this study, the role of the individual leaders at the helm during the period under review cannot be ignored. Of interest to this segment is their role in implementing foreign policy. While it is widely known that leaders do not formulate policies by themselves alone, Breuning (2007: 9) emphasises the importance of “advisory systems and government bureaucracies” in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies. In Breuning’s perspective, one of the major determining factors in foreign policy is the
individuals and their decisions. Therefore, in an attempt to understand foreign policy, it is imperative to grasp their behavioural patterns and motivations as well as their circumstances (Breuning, 2007). The three levels of analysis capture the difference between circumstances and the individual. During the first term on the UNSC, South Africa’s head of state was President Thabo Mbeki while at the UN the country was represented by Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo. Upon his return after spending a decade at the UN, Kumalo reaffirmed Mbeki’s pro-Africa stance and foreign policy (Rossouw, 2009). The two leaders shared a common vision and never contradicted each other. In paying eulogy at his funeral, Mbeki described Kumalo as an unsung hero, a pan-Africanist with whom he worked as his president but also the first CEO of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation (Mbeki, 2019). This confirms the nature of relationship the two had which started during the liberation struggle days and continued to the days after Mbeki was recalled as head of state. Kumalo’s role in advancing the so-called African Agenda was acknowledged.

Speaking at the same funeral, Kumalo’s former immediate head, former DIRCO Minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma said: “We were certain that he was unshakable in maintaining the principles by which our liberation movement and democracy is founded, we could have not chosen a better representative to protect and promote the interests of our nation and continent” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2019). This reaffirms the commonality in thought among the individuals and their advisory teams, of which Kumalo was part of. He played a critical role and sometimes communicated policy positions without considering what Pretoria thought, thereby not only influencing the country’s position but also formulating it. “One such occasion was in his having discarded recommendations from one of our departments in favour of Justice Navanethem Pillay as the High Commissioner for Human Rights”, said Dlamini-Zuma (2019). The team comprising Mbeki, Dlamini-Zuma and Kumalo was one of common-minded leaders who communicated the same message of negotiated peaceful settlement of disputes. The impact of such a working relationship was felt internationally.

Although this study is not a comparative analysis, it is necessary to note that the two terms fell under two different administrators. Contrary to the above, the second term (2011-12) for South Africa was not as impactful as the first, probably owing to accusations of policy uncertainty that characterised President Jacob Zuma’s administration (Sibindana, 2018). Without dwelling much on the strengths and weaknesses of the two individual leaders (Mbeki and Zuma), the study notes the disparities between their administrations insofar as
international relations and foreign policy articulation is concerned. Instead of continuity, it appears there was change of direction or focus as elaborately noted by Landsberg (2012). Whereas Mbeki’s administration would defend President Robert Mugabe despite growing political and humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe (Braga, 2017), Zuma’s administration voted for Resolution 1973 on Libya (Graham, 2016); thereby confirming speculation that peaceful settlement of disputes was just foreign policy on paper for this administration. They had shut the door on negotiations, something Mbeki’s administration would insist on against all odds (Landsberg, 2012). However, Landsberg (2012) further argue that there were some areas of convergence of policy between the two leaders since Zuma’s administration also opposed military intervention in Syria, instead arguing that the matter had to be discussed at the Human Rights Council as opposed to the Security Council.

3.3 A Selection of South Africa’s post-1994 Foreign Affairs Policy Positions

Speaking at the UN in 1993, then African National Congress (ANC) President, Nelson Mandela said: “We are aware that by our common actions we have sought not only the liberation of the people of South Africa but also the extension of the frontiers of democracy, non-racial, non-sexism and human solidarity throughout the world” (ANC, 1993). This speech represented the principle of what to expect from a democratic South Africa in terms of foreign policy under the ANC. However, it was what Mandela was to later say towards the end of 1993 that put the matter beyond any doubt when he lamented: “South Africa’s future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations” (Mandela, 1993). The belief in human rights promotion remains part of South Africa’s foreign policy engagements (see DIRCO’s Revised Strategic Plan 2015-2020, 2015: 15).

The ANC-led democratic government was to pursue a foreign policy that concentrated on democracy, governance and human rights; and was highly committed to justice and international law, peace and cooperation. Writing about this expectation on South Africa to commit to a foreign policy grounded on human rights and democracy, Borer and Mills (2011) maintain that the world’s expectation of the country to prioritise human rights as part of its foreign policy was not unfounded as there had been a prior commitment to that effect made by Mandela as alluded to above. It was to be later realised that the readmission of South
Africa into the global community carried certain responsibilities which included an opportunity for the country to play a leading part in continental and international organisations (Alden & Schoeman: 2013). It was also an opportunity to break away from the past baggage of the frowned upon apartheid system. After a lengthy process of consultation, a new South Africa deviated from the previous foreign policy which was oriented around the defence for apartheid and its economic interests, to one based on the respect for human rights (Naidoo, 2000). With time it turned towards an inclusive and integrated foreign policy grounded on multilateralism (Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 2000).

Strengthening the multilateral system was among South Africa’s priorities as noted by Bohler-Muller (2012). Furthermore, Landsberg (2015), supported by Muller (1998) and Sidiropoulos (2007), also affirm that South Africa’s foreign policy was centred on multilateralism which gave it a “platform and space” of expression as a developing country. This switch to multilateralism benefited South Africa in more ways than one. “Commitment to multilateralism has stood South Africa and its allies in good stead in developing combined and revitalized initiatives in world trade talks, promoting global arms control and humanitarian measures” (Landsberg, 2015: 44). For instance, South Africa’s diplomats at the Non-Proliferation Treaty held in 1995, facilitated key agreements among well-known nuclear powers and the developing world (Alden and Schoeman: 2013). As a result of this newly found platform, South Africa’s stature grew and began to be trusted as a leading nation that even bid for several positions of leadership in international organisations. It began with hosting the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting of 1996 and then chaired the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban in 1998 (Alden and le Pere: 2003). Under the auspices of an African developmental agenda, foreign policy during the stewardship of President Mbeki (1999-2008) was focused on the African Agenda, and the African Renaissance (Inglis, 2009). This is a legacy President Mbeki has built for himself and he continues to advance even in his retirement.

These ambitious efforts did not just end in talking forums held in air-conditioned facilities. They required South Africa to play a central role in continental peace and security initiatives because the African development agenda was premised “on the understanding that socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability” (Landsberg, 2009a: 1). After realising that its talks-oriented mediation policy was not producing the desired results, South Africa had to deploy troops in UN and AU peacekeeping missions. It
can be submitted, as Sidiropoulos (2007) illustrated, that troop deployment grew to be the country’s foreign policy albeit it was considered a “broader conflict resolution approach, based on South Africa’s conviction that sustainable peace cannot be brought about through military means alone”. With a history of internal armed conflict during the liberation struggle and sporadic invasion missions into sovereign countries like Mozambique and Lesotho in pursuit of freedom fighters, South Africa had wished to shed the image of an army state. But it was not to be as the reality on the ground desired armed missions to bring about stability in many parts of Africa. Consequently, by 2005, the country had assigned over 2 000 troops in about 15 peace missions on the continent (De Carvalho, 2018). Nevertheless, despite these deployments, South Africa still preferred negotiated settlements of conflicts instead of military resolutions. It went to the extent of producing post-war economic recovery plans. Its commitment to reconstruction of former conflict-ridden countries was observed in many parts of the continent as well documented by Landsberg (2009a). Other areas in its foreign policy for which South Africa was applauded included the prevention of arms of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament as well as conservative weaponries and landmines (Muller, 1998). The government viewed this as an extension of its commitment to social justice, human rights and democracy.

Whereas the Mandela era may have concentrated on mending relations and establishing new ones with the international community, South Africa quickly directed its international engagements towards a solid economic diplomacy component. Its intentions were to increase investment and trade, including information technology cooperation. There also was a notable output of economic and financial resources towards African governments and programmes. To illustrate this, Landsberg (2009a) noted that South Africa signed the Abuja Treaty in 1997 thereby committing itself to the policy of strengthening African integration through regional economic communities (RECs). Contrary to what others believed, this focus on Africa did not contravene South Africa’s ambitions of participating in other forums outside the continent since remarkable progress was also made with partners outside Africa which resulted in the signing of “the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement” in 1999 (Twenty Year Review, 2014). Furthermore, in the period beginning 1999 when the G8 countries enhanced their engagement with Africa, South Africa became one of the regional powers to benefit from agreements that guaranteed market access, debt relief and trade opportunities. South Africa’s global status was greatly enhanced as a result. Despite all this, there was no fundamental shift on policy as Sidiropoulos (2007) reflected that South Africa’s
foreign policy was still motivated by its principles and it held that trying to oppose the international system’s ‘twisted’ environment need to be a vital part of its foreign policy. Against all odds, the South African government remained committed to the Africa Agenda programme while at the same time seeking expansion of influence outside the African continent.

South African leadership was also affianced to Africa and evidence exists to support this assertion. As it was mentioned in the beginning of this segment that South Africa’s drive involved both government and the corporate sector, it has been recorded that corporate South Africa had to adjust and invest on the continent following the political decision to boost the continent’s economy by Pretoria. To corroborate this, Hamman and de Cleene (2005) give an account of companies from South Africa dominating local markets in the DRC and Kenya as a result of their innovative technology and developed economies. Furthermore, through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a subsidiary initiative named the NEPAD Business Foundation was established made up of mainly South African companies and business associations (Hamman & de Cleene, 2005). The aim was to extend South African corporate citizenship and responsibility to the continent. These companies that were investing on the continent were also expected to apply and impart South African policies such as the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and the second King Report on Corporate Governance. The two systems advocated for South African companies to adhere to and annually report on issues affecting transformation and other corporate practices. Meanwhile the JSE Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) index recorded assessment of South African companies on various aspects including corporate governance (Hamman & de Cleene: 2005). The section above was meant to briefly highlight generic foreign policy initiatives and positions taken by South Africa in the period prior to it becoming a member of the Security Council. Following henceforth is a reflection of the first 10 years of South Africa in the UN in general, that is, from 1994-2004. Highlighted moments or significant positions taken by South Africa will be recorded in the section.

3.4 South Africa at the UN 1994-2004

The ANC as the biggest party of the liberation movement in South Africa had ensured that the struggle against apartheid was an international project. Besides having diplomatic representation in various countries, the party also utilised the UN platform to campaign
against apartheid. As a result, a relationship was forged between the ANC and the UN even before the death of apartheid in South Africa. Therefore, upon its readmission to UN activities, a democratic South Africa was enthusiastically welcomed by a UN body that was also willing to assist in its rebuilding. Speaking as a debut state president at the General Assembly, Nelson Mandela appealed to all UN members to continue their interest in his country although this time it would be to better the conditions of the lives of South Africans – black and white (Mandela, 1995). Following this appeal, the UN, subsequent to the General Assembly Resolution 48/258, encouraged its members to assist South Africa’s reconstruction and socio-economic plans (Rauschning, Wiesbrock and Lailach, 1996). This was accompanied by a consideration by the Secretary General’s office to assign a senior UN manager to oversee UN activities aimed at the reconstruction and development of South Africa (Rauschning et al., 1996). Owing to this support, South Africa was to play an influential role from the onset at various UN platforms. However, the beginning of this relationship was not without its own challenges. South Africa and the UN differed on various aspects including attempts by the UN to sway the recently voted government and President Mandela to service a US$2.65 billion debt (Stanglin & Satchell, 1995). The South African government argued that it was not liable for an apartheid government’s debt, although this attitude was to later change.

In the main, South Africa became somewhat of a role model given its stance on human rights as the core of its foreign policy even at the UN level. It therefore came as no surprise when it was elected to serve in various platforms of the UN within a short period of time from its readmission. As stated earlier in this chapter, Inglis (2009: 61) remarked thus:

in 1996 South Africa had the task of presidency of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IX) serving a four-year term; in 1997, the country served as the vice-president of the United Nations General Assembly as well as becoming chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term.

Around the same period, it was also the chair of the Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban while also a member of the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s council (Inglis, 2009: 61). A few years later in 2003, South Africa was elected as deputy chair of the General Assembly’s Economical and Financial Committee. These positions were considered highly strategic and influential. Although it was within a decade of its readmission, South Africa had already begun to raise other critical questions in the UN, including the reform of the Security Council
(Venter, 2003). South Africa projected itself positively by also hosting various UN conferences, among other things.

3.4.1 The UN Host

Within the first decade as a member of the UN, South Africa made its indelible mark as a host for successful conferences of the world body. Not only were these conferences platforms for international dialogue, but also an arena for South Africa to showcase its potential as a developing country that has just been readmitted to the international stage. These forums furthermore provided an opportunity for this international novice to advance its foreign policy on various issues. In affirming this assertion, Inglis (2009) refers to Sills (2002) who argued that these conferences were opportunities to create norms. Overall, these conferences also attracted a lot of media attention thereby assisting South Africa with international profiling. In the process, South Africa also became part of the history-making process as these conferences discussed critical questions. In addition, Van der Westhuizen (1998), remarked that its willingness to host such occasions is clarified by the desire to maintain its figurative power as a prominent representative for the emerging world. Major UN conferences in the 1990s, observed Ono (2001), addressed critical universal issues including global development. In all these platforms, South Africa was taking centre stage in both debates and international branding.

As Mandela had committed at the General Assembly, no sooner had South Africa been readmitted to the UN than it became a vocal campaigner for human rights and equality. South Africa emerged powerfully against sexual orientation discrimination during the 1995 United Nations (UN) Women’s Conference in Beijing (Girard, 2004). This stance did not go down well with some fellow African delegates who challenged South Africa on its stance on the subject of sexual orientation. However South Africa dismissed them by explaining that its constitution outlawed sexual orientation discrimination (Jordaan, 2017). In 1997, Kinna (2016) records that South Africa became an inaugural party to the UN Watercourses Convention. The treaty was aimed at advocating for penalties and liabilities against environmental transgressions particularly on water resources. The reason for highlighting these conferences is to make a point that South Africa was already regarded as a reliable host of international events by the UN.
One of the most talked-about summits of the UN to be held in South Africa was the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Discrimination (WCAR) which was hosted in Durban in August 2001; which the media projected as being a failure (Lusane, 2001). This is despite its objectives having been noble as suggested by Sabourin (2001). There were controversies around this particular conference which were fuelled by the walkout of the USA which made international headlines. Despite that media backlash, South Africa did not suffer any confidence loss as the City of Durban in South Africa was to host another less-profiled conference of the UN in 2003. That was the fifth World Conservation Union – International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – World Parks Congress which issued a list comprising 102 endangered zones around the globe (Steiner, 2003). This pertained to the management and protection of natural resources while at the same time striving for the balance between public access to parks and preserving wilderness – a subject of international concern. The subject was of great concern to activists and academic researchers who plied their trade in the obscured space.

In their work, Hileman, Long and Trzaska (2002) highlight the significance of the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa in August 2002. The summit was aimed at addressing and improving challenges faced by people of the world. It also endeavoured to create policies that would safeguard the environment (Schmidt, 2002). Whereas the outcome and political agendas of these conferences may have been on a different topic, their logistical organisation undoubtedly painted a picture of a South Africa that was capable of hosting international events. While Cornelissen (2006) maintains that the outcomes of (particularly the WCAR and WSSD) laid bare numerous shortfalls on South Africa’s endeavours to position herself at the diplomatic front of the emerging world, Inglis (2009) maintains that the aforementioned conferences nevertheless presented an opportunity for South Africa to raise matters of African side-lining and the inequality within the international arrangement. Regardless of the outcome, South Africa had successfully placed itself on the diplomatic map as a host of note. All the conferences that were hosted on South African soil ended without any major incidents and were generally a logistical success. Adequate evidence has been presented in the section above that confirms the abilities of South Africa as a host of UN-level conferences. The following chapter segment explores some of the notable positions that were taken about the case studies in this study.

3.5 Notable Positions
This section will now explore the position adopted by South Africa on situations that affected Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire in the era between 1994 and 2004. That was the first decade when South Africa was just an ordinary member of the UN. Meaning that, this section will record South African decisions and positions taken about those three selected case studies before it served in the Security Council as a non-permanent member.

3.5.1 Somalia

South Africa re-joined the UN at a time when Somalia was in the midst of a war that had destroyed every government component and left it without some of the basic facets of an independent state, like currency. It was also around the same time when the UN and the US were withdrawing their military and humanitarian involvement in Somalia (Gilkes, 2002). This, after realising that the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) efforts had failed to bring about any peace in the troubled nation state (Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh, 2006). In an environment where no government institutions or authority were in charge (Djama, 2007), and total state collapse was imminent (Menkhaus, 2007), armed militia groups exploited the lack of security to trade in arms (Abild, 2009). The last administration that had controlled a unitary Somalia was a government led by Siad Barre which collapsed in 1993 (Fisher, 2012). Therefore, South Africa re-entered the international community at a period when the Somalis did not trust either the US or the UN because none of the two’s peacekeepers and aid administrators had brought any peace to Somalia by the time that they withdrew their personnel (Moller, 2009). This may be the reason behind what appears to have been a lull in interest from the international community and the UN on Somalia for a decade between 1995 and 2005, leaving Somalia in an anarchic state (Morolong, 2007). The situation was chaotic and not conducive for any administration to exercise authority or control.

Nevertheless, Morolong (2007) further notes attempts and interest by African states to restore peace in Somalia during that decade of little activity by the UN. South Africa being a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), later the AU, and the UN had no independent role to play in the situation of Somalia; albeit this study is strictly confined to its role through the UN. In this section of the study, focus is mainly limited to the UNGA. The UN comprises of six main organs: the UNGA (made up of 193 member states); the UNSC; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (made up of 54 elected members); the
Trusteeship Council (which suspended operations on 1 November 1994); the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat (Graham, 2016). As a member belonging only to the UNGA, South Africa did not contribute in any manner to the UNOSOM II (Williams, 2015). This was because UNOSOM II was a Security Council project which followed the adoption of Resolution 814. Various resolutions were adopted giving UNOSOM new mandates until they ultimately withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 (Philipp, 2005). Despite this, there were various attempts towards peace, including the Sodere Agreement.

In that regard, South Africa did not register any recorded objection to the UN-backed negotiations that culminated in the Sodere Agreement by the end of 1996. Moreover, the initiative also had the support of the OAU – of which South Africa was a member (Yusuf, 1998). Another peace initiative that enjoyed the support of both the UN and the OAU was the Cairo Accord of 1997 which convened a meeting of warring factions in Somalia (Mukhtar, 2003). Similarly, there are no records of South Africa having objected to the peace effort at any of the two bodies (UN and OAU).

Resolution 1407 of 2002 and Resolution 1519 of 2003 were among the many interventions by the Security Council aimed at addressing the situation in Somalia. Whereas Resolution 1407 was intended to monitor any violations of the embargo against any military support for Somalia (Surhone, Tennoe and Henssonow, 2011), through Resolution 1519, the Security Council deployed an actual four-man expert monitoring group “to carry out field-based investigations in Somalia, where possible, and in States neighbouring Somalia and other States” (UN Security Council, 2003). Those resolutions were part of the 15 that were taken by the Security Council between 1994 and 2006 on Somalia (Security Council Report2, 2019); however, as it was earlier alluded to, they did not have direct bearing on South Africa’s foreign policy stance to warrant a reaction from Pretoria. While the aim of this chapter is to specifically examine South Africa’s stance on Somalia during the period between 1994 and 2004, there is no indication that South Africa did not support decisions that were taken by structures of the UN – including the Security Council. It can be conjectured that South Africa (as a member) supported UN initiatives on Somalia. Notably, there were no formal diplomatic ties between the two countries during the period under scrutiny. However, according to SA News (2012), the government of South Africa was “active in responding to the humanitarian situation in Somalia by offering aid and logistical support to efforts by
SADC countries and the international community aimed at combating the humanitarian crises”. At some point a cargo aircraft flew from Pretoria to Mogadishu carrying aid supplies.

3.5.2 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Covering an area of 2,345,410 sq. km bordering nine countries, and home to around 300 ethnic groups, the DRC is undoubtedly “the richest in terms of natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa” (Olaopa & Ojakorotu, 2016: 247). This is one country where South Africa has kept its foreign policy focus intact over time. Whereas South Africa has sought to involve itself in “conflict resolution efforts and the promotion of peace and stability on the African continent”, its involvement in the DRC in particular, “was encouraged by its vision to see the end of human suffering and the emancipation of the DRC people following the intra-and inter-state wars of the late 1990s” (DIRCO, 2019). This vision corresponds with the commitments that were referred to in this study that South Africa’s foreign policy would be centred on human rights.

The situation in DRC was never a simple one to be addressed through easy solutions. Complex solutions would have to be applied. Makgetlaneng (2019) laments South Africa’s history that gave it a better chance to resolve the DRC conflict. Considering the extent of differences amongst African states, South Africa became the single country that could initiate efforts to end the conflict in the DRC (Makgetlaneng, 2019). During this conflict, South Africa was in the midst of formulating its foreign policy on its involvement in international peace missions.

Towards the end of 1998, the guiding document in this regard was the White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions. The White Paper was succinct on the subject as it declared that South Africa would provide backing to the UN and, where appropriate, to the OAU and SADC by appropriately contributing to international peace efforts (Malan, 1999). Backed by legislation on the side, South Africa pulled out all stops to ensure peace in the DRC. Malan (1999) notes that a peaceably established DRC was a priority for South Africa, and the country’s involvement to such an international peace mission would have to be equally significant and noticeable. In doing this, South Africa was obliged to act on an international mandate, and as it unfolded, that mandate often came from both the UN and the OAU – later the AU.
It is not in dispute that South Africa played a major role in the stabilisation of the DRC (Hengari, 2016). Emerging from the deadly war that displaced millions of Congolese and eventually settling on a truce, the peace accord that was agreed upon in 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, had two dimensions to it. First, it entailed the placement of a UN peacekeeping force to watch over the cessation of hostilities, look after citizens and neutralize and demobilise armed groups, as well as Rwandese and Ugandan rebels (Adebajo & Virk, 2018). This was not an easy task since the main participants in the DRC conflict were three Congolese rebel movements and at least 14 organised armed groups plus countless militia. These armed forces left in excess of 3.3 million Congolese dead; and destabilised most of Central Africa (Autexerre, 2008). As a result, the chaos that emanated from the war affected mainly the region, but also the continent as a whole.

Acquainted with the recognition President Mandela’s administration had given in 1997 when the DRC was founded following the demise of Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire (Malan, 1999), and following its significant efforts to secure the DRC peace accord in 2002, it is succinctly noted by Adebajo and Virk (2018) that South Africa contributed 1400 troops to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) operation. Later, after observing the serious challenges experienced in the DRC, Fuamba, Yonekawa and Seegers (2013) also noted that around 2003 and 2004, the UNSC sanctioned peace implementation powers to MONUC for the protection of UN staff and ordinary citizens who were vulnerable to possible danger of physical attacks. For a considerable period now, South Africa has remained part of these UN initiatives in the DRC (Hendricks, 2015).

The second dimension of the peace accord signed in Lusaka in 1999 was the establishment of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Whereas “the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999” had “brought the major belligerents (Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the Congo) and major rebel groups (RCD and MLC) to agree to a ceasefire and the removal of foreign troops” (Moffett, 2009: 5), ICD was destined for chaos (Boshoff & Rupiya, 2003). This is because it had accommodated lesser known armed groups that came through military tyranny and not as a result of popular support among the Congolese populace.

Following various mishaps, the dialogue finally commenced in South Africa under the facilitation of President Thabo Mbeki and former Botswana President Keitumetse Masire. To
illustrate the world body’s backing for South Africa’s initiatives, Hendricks (2015: 23) observed thus “with UN support, Masire received additional mediation assistance from Moustafa Niassse (former Senegalese President) and Haile Menkerios (Eritrean Ambassador to the UN)”. As recorded by Davis and Hayner (2009) the dialogue led to the Global and Inclusive Agreement (GIA) being adopted in 2002; paving the way for a provisional constitution in the DRC. This became one of the highlights of South Africa’s international interventions. Also marked as an achievement for South Africa out of this, Adebajo and Virk (2018) maintain, was the Pretoria Agreement signed by the DRC and Rwanda in July 2002. This agreement marked the end of the Rwandan military operations in the DRC; and South Africa also played a major role in the elections in 2006 as a follow-up to both the GIA and ICD (Adebajo & Virk, 2018). In doing this, Hengari (2016) holds, South Africa was guided by its norms and principles of human rights, democracy and constitutionalism; but above it all, solving the problems that beleaguered the African continent. According to the Security Council Report (2019), there were 25 resolutions passed on the DRC at the UNSC between 1999 and 2006. This makes it one of the biggest African countries of interest to the UN.

On its own though, South Africa has contributed significantly to the rebuilding and transformation of the public service sector in the DRC. Following the adoption of an action plan for reform by the DRC government in 2003, it was agreed that “South Africa would provide both technical and financial support regarding the implementation of the projects on areas of support” whereas “the Department of Defence is playing a vital role in the upgrading of military training centres, the training of military personnel, and the provision of medical assistance” (Landsberg, 2009a: 21). Most of these projects were implemented together with MONUC – which gives South Africa an approval stamp from the UN. Having displayed the involvement and role South Africa played in the situation in the DRC during its first decade as a member of the UN, the next segment turns to Côte d’Ivoire to perform a similar assessment.

3.5.3 Côte d'Ivoire

Since the country has experienced political violence and wars in the past, the contemporary political crisis that degenerated into war in Côte d'Ivoire is attributed to identity and nationality dynamics that became rife in 1995 when President Konan Bedie came to power and used the popular nationalism concept of patriotism known as “Ivoirite” to exclude
political opponents from the electoral processes (Rametsi, 2006). According to this concept, Landsberg (2009a) notes, any presidential candidate would have to be born of Ivorian parents. This meant that both the father and mother of the contender must have been born in Côte d’Ivoire – which was not the case with one candidate. Nevertheless, the 1995 period coincides with the readmission of South Africa at the UN. After a lengthy period of reconciliatory mediation which engaged “the former prime minister, Alassane Ouattara, leader of the RDR party, and Lambert Kouassi Konan, vice president of the Ivorian Democratic Party, and the main rebel leader, Gillaume Soro” (Landsberg, 2009a: 18), it was (by then) President Mbeki who under the mandate of the AU, announced in November 2004, a ‘Four Point Plan’. This plan included efforts to resuscitate the peace process, and “the amendments to Article 35 of the Constitution which changed the provisions on Ivoirite” (Landsberg, 2009a: 18). South Africa was part of these processes.

To demonstrate the seriousness of the situation in this country, at least 20 Security Council resolutions were adopted pertaining to Côte d’Ivoire between 1994 and 2006 (Security Council Report1, 2019). However, the UN had not always been involved in the country’s affairs. As recorded by Boutellis (2011: 6), “the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was first established in 2004 as a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with civilian, judicial, correctional, police, and military components”. According to UNSC Resolution 1528 (2004), “UNOCI was mandated to monitor the ceasefire and armed groups; to help the Government of National Reconciliation implement a national program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the combatants (DDR)”. Resolution 1528 was also meant (together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other international organisations) to support the Government of National Reconciliation in re-establishing a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire. In the end, South Africa, under President Mbeki, was key in the peace talks that ended the war in Côte d’Ivoire.

In emphasising the significance of the role played by South Africa, Boutellis (2011: 6) holds that “it was however only after the Pretoria Peace Agreement of April 2005 that the UN mission started implementing part of this mandate, prompted by the need to ensure security in the area under FN control”. This Pretoria agreement provided that, “600 individuals from the FAFN will be recruited and trained on the basis of national gendarmerie and police criteria” by UNOCI (UN Security Council Resolution 1603: 2005). The section above has

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter above has presented adequate records that can be subjected to a critique under international relations levels of analysis, and occasionally, the individual; for example, Mbeki, the state and systems level as represented by South Africa’s foreign policy towards Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. It has illustrated in brief a few policy positions that were taken by South Africa upon its readmission to the UN. Those policy positions define the character of a nation that South Africa was in the process of constructing in the international arena. There also was detail of the first 10 years spent in the UN by South Africa. That brief section captured some major South African highlights and achievements of the first decade in the UN. Among other things were the various major UN conferences and events that were hosted in South Africa. A section dedicated to the three selected case studies was presented in brief detail covering the interaction South Africa had with the three countries – either directly or through their issues being addressed at the UN. The chapter depicted a South Africa that played a part at the UN at various levels and in numerous capacities. This chapter has demonstrated that South Africa had both direct and indirect roles to play in stabilising the situations in the three case studies. There was no observed deviation from the declared foreign policy. The following chapter will interrogate South Africa’s first term in the UNSC (2007-2008) using the same case studies.
CHAPTER 4

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to examine the resolutions that were taken in the UNSC during the period 2007-2008 in relation to the situations in the states of Somalia, the DRC, and Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa’s positions on them. The chapter will also investigate any possible alliance among African member states during this term with the objective to note if they ever worked in solidarity with each other towards an ‘African’ position.

On 16 October 2006, at a sitting of the UNGA, South Africa was elected into the UNSC as a non-permanent member; a role it officially assumed on 2 January 2007 (DIRCO, 2007). Besides South Africa, the UNSC also elected Belgium, Indonesia, Panama and Italy as additional non-permanent members for the two-year term. Other than the five permanent members (P5) the other non-permanent members in the term to complete the tally of 15 as determined by the rules were Congo, Ghana, Peru, Qatar and Slovakia (Security Council Report, 2006). Acknowledging that it had secured its position on the backing of other critical partners, South Africa recognised the role played by African states through the AU for its election, and committed to advance an African cause (Wheeler, 2008). Having provided a brief background, the aim of this section is to scrutinise Security Council resolutions taken concerning the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, during the 2007-2008 term and to study the voting actions among African states to assess if they voted together as a bloc. These resolutions will assist to formulate a view about South Africa’s consistencies with its declared foreign policy since it was a member of the Council when those resolutions were adopted.

In general, 56 resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in 2007 (Graham, 2016). Besides Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, the resolutions also covered the situations in Liberia, Iraq, and Rwanda. There also were resolutions on non-proliferation, S/RES/1747 (2007) and two reports by the Secretary General on the situation in Sudan, S/RES/ 1769 and 1779 (2007). Out of these resolutions, at least 32 pertained to situations in African countries, and 14 specifically about the case studies of this exercise (Graham, 2016). The number of resolutions taken in the Security Council regarding the situations in Africa is considerably high and this highlights the reform argument that Africa needs permanent representation in
the UNSC. The Security Council dedicates a considerable amount of its peacekeeping budget towards addressing situations in Africa (Cockayne, Mikulaschek and Perry, 2010). In the meantime, a further 65 resolutions were adopted in 2008 at the Council; 10 of them relating to Somalia, six affected the DRC while only three pertained to Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2008). At the time, the Security Council was made up of the P5 and the following elected member states: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam (DIRCO, 2009). With that background noted this study will now examine resolutions that were adopted affecting the chosen case studies.

4.2 The Somalia Case Study

When South Africa assumed its non-permanent membership of the Security Council for the first time in 2007-2008, it expressed its desire to have an all-inclusive reconciliation plan to resolve the crisis in Somalia. It also committed itself to peace efforts by the UN, AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in stabilising Somalia (Morolong, 2007). Records by Graham (2016) also reveal that 13 resolutions were adopted at the Security Council pertaining to the crisis in Somalia during 2007-08, and South Africa supported all those resolutions without fail (Dlamini-Zuma, 2009). The stabilisation of Somalia was of great priority as it will be demonstrated in this section. Following now is a record of all those resolutions that were adopted pertaining to this particular case study in the period 2007-08.

4.2.1 Resolution 1744

The first resolution relating to the situation in Somalia to be adopted in the presence of South Africa was S/RES/1744 (2007). The resolution acknowledged the efforts initiated at the behest of the AU Peace and Security Council and authorised the deployment of a mission to Somalia (AMISOM) for six months by AU member states (Fall and Ahmed, 2007). According to S/RES/1744 (2007), AU member states were supposed to lead the process of peace restoration in Somalia by supporting AMISOM with all necessary resources including finances and personnel; and eventually overseeing the withdrawal of all foreign armies in Somalia and their replacement by AU member states' armed forces. Despite this expectation from the Security Council, lack of experience and scarcity of resources on the part of AU member states, Tlalka (2016) maintains, may be the reason why peace was not immediately restored in Somalia. Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, South Africa’s representative, Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo said the resolution would demonstrate to the
people of Somalia that the international community cares about their situation (S/RES/1744, 2007). For South Africa, this resolution was a means towards the actual goal of finally restoring peace and security in Somalia.

4.2.2 Resolution 1766
This resolution extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group by six months. The Monitoring Group was established to monitor any violation of the arms embargo in Somalia as recorded in S/RES/1766 (2007). The violation could have been either through financial support, maritime law violation or in any form. This violation was, according to Menkhaus (2009: 223), inevitable since the UN and its actors’ policies “helped to inflame armed conflict and insecurity there”. Other than South Africa, African member states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.2.3 Resolution 1772
Adopted at the 5732nd meeting of the Security Council in August 2007, S/RES/1772 (2007) reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions to assist them with their responsibilities of government and security for important assets, including aid vessels (Guilfoyle, 2008). It also emphasised the significance of demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation of former armed fighters while at the same time being critical of acts of violence and radicalism in Somalia. Hitting a reconciliatory note, S/RES/1772 (2007) noted that the Council applauded the convening of the National Reconciliation Congress which it regarded as an inclusive process that represented all stakeholders in the peace process including representatives from the political, business, clan and religious sectors. According to Shay (2017), the resolution impressed upon all member states, with particular emphasis on those much closer to Somalia, to obey the arms embargo that was adopted in 1992 through Resolution 733 of the Security Council. Other than South Africa, African member states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.2.4 Resolution 1801
The Security Council adopted S/RES/1801 (2008) through which it decided to renew the mandate of AMISOM for a further period not exceeding six months. With this resolution, all stakeholders were expected to ensure the safety of AMISOM and strive for an environment
conducive to humanitarian aid being distributed freely in the country. Other than South Africa, African member states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. A quick review reveals that this resolution represented the views which South Africa had been striving for, that is, creating a peaceful environment conducive to peace and security.

4.2.5 Resolution 1811
With the adoption of S/RES/1811 (2008), the Security Council extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group in Somalia by another six months. It also urged the UN Secretary General to source financial support for the Monitoring Group and recommended for the improvement of compliance and monitoring concerning the arms embargo. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council at the time were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.2.6 Resolution 1814
Besides supporting the plan to relocate the UN Political Office for Somalia from its Nairobi location to Mogadishu, S/RES/1814 (2008) requested “the Secretary-General to continue his contingency planning for the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia to succeed AMISOM”. It also urged the Secretary General to bolster the capacity in the UN Political Office for Somalia. This was done in an effort to improve the protection of human rights in Somalia. South Africa’s policy on human rights also found expression in this resolution. Other than South Africa, Africa was also represented in the Security Council by Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.2.7 Resolution 1816
Through S/RES/1816 (2008), the Security Council condemned and bemoaned all activities of illegal piracy and armed robberies targeting cargo vessels off the shoreline of Somalia. At this time, piracy was already an international problem in that region affecting both public and multinational private sectors. While this resolution was about prevention of piracy, Zou (2009) clarified that it (by extension) authorised the entry of territorial waters of Somalia by member states for the aim of suppressing piracy and armed robberies at sea through any means required. This act, Treves (2009) argued, widened the range of international law on piracy especially in territorial waters. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security
Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. No African state was involved in the proposal of the resolution at the Council, however, a scrutiny of S/RES/1816 (2008) reveals that South Africa was part of ‘behind the scene’ negotiations that led to the adoption of this resolution. As recorded in the resolution documents, in his reply following the adoption, South Africa’s Ambassador Baso Sangqu said: “In negotiating and agreeing to the resolution, we were guided by the fact that it limits itself to the situation in Somalia” (S/RES/1816, 2008). The open-endedness of the powers ceded to member states in this resolution could be the reason behind the particular emphasis of Somalia by Sangqu.

4.2.8 Resolution 1831
In essence, S/RES/1831 (2008) recorded the Security Council’s decision to further extend AMISOM’s mandate by another six months. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.2.9 Resolution 1838
By adopting S/RES/1838 (2008), the Security Council once more reiterated its condemnation of illegal piracy and armed attacks against vessels off the coastline of Somalia. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. Although no single African member state submitted the draft resolution, South Africa made a statement following the vote for its adoption. As recorded in the resolution documents, in response, Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo said: “It is South Africa’s view that the conflict in Somalia cannot be countered solely through maritime security actions” adding that “piracy is part of the larger problem of the lack of peace and stability within Somalia itself” (S/RES/1838, 2008). This expressed South Africa’s belief that piracy was only a part of the bigger problem affecting Somalia.

4.2.10 Resolution 1844
In an attempt to fortify the resolve on arms restriction in Somalia, the Security Council adopted S/RES/1844 (2008). This resolution demanded that member states should immediately freeze any funds and commercial assets of any individual or entity that may undermine a total arms embargo against Somalia. Besides South Africa, other African states
in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. The trend of consensus about these resolutions may reveal a common belief among member states on how the crisis in Somalia had to be resolved.

4.2.11 Resolution 1846
Instead of just condemning and criticising acts of illegal piracy and armed robberies against vessels in jurisdictional waters and seas off the coastline of Somalia, S/RES/1846 (2008) called upon member states to take action and report to the Security Council about their efforts to curb this scourge. The Council was in essence calling on countries to move away from making commitments that were not accompanied by action. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. Records of S/RES/1846 (2008) show that the draft resolution was “submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America”. Worthy to note is that not a single African state was involved in the submission of the draft resolution.

4.2.12 Resolution 1851
The Security Council utilised S/RES/1851 (2008) to urge member states and international organisations to fight against piracy and vessels robberies in Somalia. While Shabazz (2008) noted that the resolution authorised member states participating in the stopping of piracy occurring off the coast of Somalia to utilise terrestrial-based manoeuvres in an effort to curb the threat, the USA regarded the resolution as a strong signal against piracy, while Russia maintained that piracy in Somalia cannot be addressed through force only. Other than South Africa, African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. In its response to the vote, South Africa continued to caution that piracy was just one of the symptoms causing conflict in Somalia.

4.2.13 Resolution 1853
In brief, S/RES/1853 (2008) extended the Monitoring Group’s mandate by a further 12-month period. The terms were not altered but aligned to immediate previous resolutions authorising a similar extension. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security
Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. The extension of the Monitoring Group’s mandate was in line with South Africa’s position on Somalia.

4.2.14 African States’ Voting Patterns
An analysis of the resolutions outlined above reveals that all five African states, South Africa, Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Libya voted “YES” in resolutions that addressed the situation in Somalia in the period 2007-08. However, this was also the case with all other member states at the time, including the P5. In the final analysis, a determination will be made on the implications of such a trend. To this extent, there is no evidence that suggests that there was a particular caucus or lobby group that convened prior to such resolutions being tabled at the Council. This does not disregard the membership of all African member states to the African Group which meets to formulate common positions on issues that emanate.

4.3 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Case Study
At the time when South Africa became a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2007-08 term, the UN already maintained a presence in the DRC through MONUC which was a peacekeeping force made up of 17 000 personnel (Shabazz, 2008a). MONUC was first deployed by the Security Council as a result of Resolution 1258 of 1999; and it was tasked with ending the DRC’s invasion by Rwandan forces and the Ugandan army as well as an intra-state armed conflict which squared Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) against the national government under President Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Koko, 2012). When South Africa assumed its 2007-08 term, the DRC had also just emerged from general elections earlier in 2006 (Weiss, 2007). These elections did not diffuse political tensions in the DRC, more especially the eastern part (Neethling, 2014). Meanwhile, according to Graham (2016), a total of 12 resolutions pertaining to the situation in DRC were adopted by the UNSC in 2007-08. Nonetheless, South Africa had been involved in resolving the DRC conflict since the days of President Mandela, through to Thabo Mbeki’s term.

4.3.1 Resolution 1742
Following criticism about lack of capacity and incidents of observed limitations to its operations in the Kivu area (Terrie, 2009), the Security Council adopted S/RES/1742 (2007)
which extended both the personnel strength and mandate of MONUC. The aim was to bolster capacity of the deployed armed forces having experienced endless sabotage. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.2 Resolution 1751
The MONUC mandate and personnel strength were further extended by the Security Council through S/RES/1751 (2007). This followed on from experiences of incidents that exposed military limitations on the part of MONUC. The rebels were not relenting but instead mounting more attacks directed against the UN peacekeepers. Upon review, S/RES/1751 (2007) was adopted to remedy the situation by deploying more soldiers on the ground. Other than South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.3 Resolution 1756
Further deployment of MONUC totalling 17,030 military personnel, 391 police trainers, 750 personnel of police and 760 military observers’ units were sanctioned through S/RES/1756 (2007). The resolution also urged armed militias to demobilise and negotiate. The move to urge armed militias to come to the negotiating table will be explained in the findings section of the study as it reflects a trend that has been noted about South Africa’s strategies and tactics of conflict resolution. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.4 Resolution 1768
To try and curb the supply of arms and ammunition which were clearly aiding the war in DRC, the Security Council had in earlier years resolved to place an arms embargo on DRC. Therefore, the adoption of S/RES/1768 (2007) extended the arms embargo that had been enacted by Resolution 1493 in 2003 as amended by Resolution 1596 adopted in 2005. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.5 Resolution 1771
Owing to lack of peace, the arms embargo was further renewed as per S/RES/1771 (2007). The review was made upon increased attacks on MONUC and ordinary civilians by armed rebel groups. However, despite this extension of mandate, there does not appear any shred of evidence that it was serving as a deterrent to armed groups that were targeting MONUC. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.6 Resolution 1794
While extending the mandate and capacity of MONUC through S/RES/1794 (2007), the Security Council conveyed its concern over the Kivu region. This region was notoriously controlled by the rebels and it was proving difficult for MONUC or the government to take over. Resolution 1794 also called on Laurent Nkunda’s armed militia to cease attacks, release all children abducted and used as soldiers, and for MONUC to address the sexual violence unleashed in the course of the war. This came in the wake of increased violation of human rights. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.7 Resolution 1797
A decision for MONUC to support DRC authorities to organise local government elections was adopted through S/RES/1797 (2008). This decision was based on the reality that the DRC did not have internal capacity to organise credible elections on its own. With bolstered capabilities from MONUC, DRC authorities stood a better chance to facilitate the upcoming local government elections. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.8 Resolution 1799
After observing that peace was evading them as a result of the guns not silencing in the DRC, the Security Council further granted the extension of the arms embargo as per S/RES/1799 (2008). Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.9 Resolution 1807
Likewise, with no end of military attacks in sight, particularly in the Kivu region, the Security Council adopted S/RES/1807 (2008) to extend the arms embargo and freeze all funds under the control of persons directly or indirectly associated with military activities in the DRC. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.10 Resolution 1843
According to Kambala (2010), Resolution 1843 was an unambiguous mandate for MONUC to protect civilians. Through this resolution, the Security Council authorised an increase in personnel for MONUC by 2,785 military personnel and 300 officers for the police unit (S/RES/1843, 2008). Their main mandate following this reinforced capacity was to protect civilians. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. Records reveal that South Africa was the only African country that was involved in the submission of the draft resolution which was “submitted by Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America” (S/RES/1843, 2008). A view about this gesture will be formulated in a later chapter as it indirectly relates to one of the main questions of this study.

4.3.11 Resolution 1856
After the crisis in Kivu escalated and Laurent Nkunda’s rebels seized the town of Goma (Kambala, 2010), in retaliation, the Security Council adopted S/RES/1856 (2008) which decided “to extend the deployment of MONUC until 31 December 2009 and authorizes the continuation until that date of up to 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units”. They were also mandated to thwart and react to sexual violence (Kovatch, 2016) which had become a weapon utilised against women and girls by rebels. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. Speaking after the adoption of S/RES/1856 (2008), Ambassador Kumalo said: “It is also important to emphasize that the solution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is political, and therefore the Goma and Nairobi process remain the only architecture for addressing the challenges before us” (S/RES/1856, 2008). Kumalo urged surrounding countries to “continue
to support the peace and national reconciliation process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to speed up the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, signed in Nairobi on 15 December 2006 with a view to creating conditions for lasting peace and stability in the region” (S/RES/1856, 2008). Once more, South Africa’s emphasis on the support for peace and national reconciliation is noted for expansion in the final chapter of this exercise.

4.3.12 Resolution 1857
As the conditions on the ground had warranted, a decision to extend the arms embargo, freezing of funds and a travel ban was further reaffirmed by the adoption of S/RES/1857 (2008). Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.3.13 African States’ Voting Patterns
An analysis of the resolutions outlined above reveal that all five African states, South Africa, Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Libya voted “YES” in resolutions that addressed the situation in the DRC in the period 2007-08. However, this was also the case with all other member states at the time, including the P5. For the time being this point is set aside for further elaboration in the concluding chapter. It informs the question around the collaboration of African states in the Security Council as stipulated for scrutiny in this study.

4.4 The Côte d'Ivoire Case Study
South Africa became a member of the UN Security Council for the 2007-08 term when the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) mandate and that of the French armed forces had just been extended (Africa Research Bulletin, 2006). According to Refworld (2019), there had already been more than 20 resolutions adopted including a presidential statement on Côte d'Ivoire since 1960. Regarding the situation in Côte d'Ivoire eight resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in 2007-08 (Graham, 2016). However, in the interest of this study, of much significance for South Africa and the Côte d'Ivoire situation at this stage is the Pretoria Accord which as Rametsi (2006) alluded to, was the result of a mediation led by President Mbeki as designated by the AU and ECOWAS. This confirms that the Côte d'Ivoire situation was already on South Africa’s agenda.
4.4.1 Resolution 1739
The adoption of S/RES/1739 (2007) ensured the mandate extension of both UNOCI and the French army. Furthermore, it gave UNOCI authority to use whatever resources to carry out its mandate in Côte d'Ivoire; and the French army was also given similar authority to support UNOCI operations. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.2 Resolution 1761
Following the deployment of the UN Group of Experts in Côte d'Ivoire as per Resolution 1727 of 2006, the group’s mandate was extended as per S/RES/1761 (2007). Their intervention was advisory more than anything else. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.3 Resolution 1763
When the reality on the ground called for it, a further extension of the mandate of the French armed forces and UNOCI was granted through S/RES/1763 (2007). The situation was not diffusing, and the Security Council had to act responsibly by extending the mandate of both the French army and UNOCI. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. This point will be scrutinised in the final chapter as it will inevitably inform the final findings of the study.

4.4.4 Resolution 1765
Besides granting a further mandate extension to the French armed forces and UNOCI, S/RES/1765 (2007) also urged UNOCI to ensure that the Ouagadougou Political Agreement was implemented in full and committed the world body to electoral support to hold internationally-benchmarked free and fair elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement enjoyed the backing of the UN and was seen as a way to peace in Côte d'Ivoire. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.5 Resolution 1782
The adoption of S/RES/1782 (2007) signalled an extension of sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire and renewed the mandate of the acclaimed UN Group of Experts. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Congo and Ghana. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.6 Resolution 1795
Another mandate extension for UNOCI and the French armed forces was granted through the adoption of S/RES/1795 (2008). The resolution also condemned the reported acts of sexual exploitation occurring in the midst of the conflict, which had become a weapon used against women and girls. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.7 Resolution 1826
An additional renewal of the mandate for UNOCI and the French armed forces supporting it was granted as per S/RES/1826 (2008). Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members. This point will be laboured on in the final chapter under findings of the study.

4.4.8 Resolution 1842
The last resolution that was adopted during the 2007-08 term when South Africa was in the Security Council pertaining to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, was S/RES/1842 (2008). Through this resolution, the Security Council extended restrictions against Côte d'Ivoire, and further granted a mandate extension of the UN Group of Experts. Besides South Africa, other African states in the Security Council were Burkina Faso and Libya. All three voted yes for this resolution, just like all the other 12 members.

4.4.9 African States’ Voting Patterns
An analysis of the resolutions outlined above reveal that all five African states, South Africa, Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Libya voted “YES” on resolutions that addressed the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in the period 2007/08. However, this was also the case with all other member states at the time, including the P5. A determination of the implications of this will be made in the concluding chapter of the study.
4.5 Conclusion
A total number of 33 resolutions taken at the Security Council were examined in this chapter. The resolutions pertained to the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during 2007-08. It has emerged that South Africa voted in favour of all those resolutions. These resolutions referred to above mainly extended mandates of operation for various UN peacekeeping forces and initiatives. But they also exercised some stringent power over non-conforming actors by imposing sanctions and embargoes. The actions expressed the UN’s commitment to world peace and security. In instances where they were expected to act, the UN (through the Security Council) exercised its authority over member states and non-state actors alike. The situation in Somalia was protracted and complex; however, resolutions outlined above present a UN that was involved in bringing about peace and stability there as was the case with the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. Unlike in Somalia where it only provided humanitarian aid, South Africa had been directly involved in the efforts to restore peace in the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of DRC, negotiations among warring factions were even held in South Africa. Meanwhile, the Pretoria Accord was also a milestone achievement towards peace in Côte d'Ivoire. These scenarios positioned South Africa as a nation of interest to observe. Items that refer to the levels of analysis and functionalism have been noted. Nevertheless, the three countries had secured the highest number of resolutions among themselves during the 2007-08 term and South Africa’s voting pattern was not different from any other African member state of the Security Council at the time or any other member of the UNSC in general. Therefore, the existence of an African voting bloc has not been conclusively established at this stage. Nevertheless, it is a point that will continue to be explored in the following chapter for the purposes of gathering enough data to draw an informed conclusion in the end. The next chapter will explore the case studies in the second term of 2011-12.
CHAPTER 5
SOUTH AFRICA’S SECOND TERM IN THE UNSC (2011-12)

5.1 Introduction

Having discussed South Africa’s first term in the UNSC in relation to the three case studies in the previous chapter, the following segment of the study intends to note resolutions that were adopted by the UNSC in the period 2011-12 regarding the state of affairs in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. This section will also include a probe into any possible cooperation among African member states during the period under assessment. With endorsement from both SADC and the AU, South Africa was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC at a sitting of the UNGA on 12 October 2010 by 182 votes out of a potential 190 (Masters, 2011). Since this was their second stint at the Security Council, South Africa assumed the seat with greater ambitions, among which were to add value to peace and security efforts in Africa, and to foster better relations between UN and AU bodies (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013). Other non-permanent members that were elected with South Africa, Masters (2011) further notes, were Colombia, Germany, India and Portugal. When the term ended, remarks Mxakato-Diseko (2013), South Africa had taken part in 790 Security Council official meetings, including its working groups and subsidiary organs. During that period, 118 resolutions were adopted, wherein South Africa supported all and also voted in favour of all the 51 presidential statements (PRSTs) and 150 press statements (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013). Although Somalia was a humanitarian disaster and catastrophic failure (Seal and Bailey, 2013), 12 resolutions pertaining to the situation in Somalia were taken by the Council.

South Africa was concerned about Somalia. So committed to Somalia was South Africa that, according to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (2011a), 264 tons of food aid was airlifted to Mogadishu from Johannesburg in November 2011. A total of 14 resolutions were unanimously adopted by the Security Council concerning the prevailing situations of the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. Whereas the five resolutions about the situation in the DRC and the nine resolutions about the prevailing situation in Côte d'Ivoire were not adopted as a result of South Africa’s sole initiative, Romita (2011) commends the role played by South Africa in pursuing an agenda that was focused on Africa during the period under review. This was the period when it served as chair of the Council’s Ad Hoc
Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. The study will now focus on resolutions adopted during the 2011-12 period concentrating further on the case studies.

5.2 The Somalia Case Study

South Africa’s second term in the Security Council coincided with an era of endemic instability, uncertainty and piracy in Somalia, argues Adebajo and Paterson (2011). Thousands of Somalis had fled the country owing to the civil war, leaving the country in a state of insecurity, famine and complete chaos (Ismail, 2011). The period also marked the acceleration of an offensive against the militant al-Shabaab by AMISOM which was an initiative of the UNSC (Mosley, 2015). The forced resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed A. Mohamed in 2011 exacerbated the deterioration of the political, humanitarian and security crisis (Dagne, 2011). Meanwhile, as it had committed, South Africa, through the Security Council working group, performed some activities for both the Security Council and the AU in contribution towards the resolution of the Somali crisis (Romita, 2011). This was mainly through deployment of army personnel during both AU and UN-sanctioned operations. At least 12 resolutions concerning Somalia were adopted by the Council during the period under review in this section. All of them were unanimously adopted, with South Africa supporting each of them.

5.2.1 Resolution 1972

When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1972 in March 2011, it resolved to suspend the embargo on assets that was initially confirmed in Resolution 1844 of 2008. Resolution 1972 made permissible funding and financial support by agencies and non-governmental organisations aligned to the UN (Darcy, Bonard and Dini, 2012). Proposed by the United Kingdom (UK), the unanimous adoption of S/RES/1972 (2011) meant that the Security Council wanted an easy flow of resources urgently needed for humanitarian aid in Somalia. As noted in S/RES/1972 (2011), this act was in reaction to the assessment made by the Security Council on the impact of sanctions in Somalia. Nevertheless, the Council emphasised the role all members needed to play to ensure that they obey the arms embargo and travel restrictions upon individuals and bodies that were involved in any activities that jeopardised peace and impeded free flow of humanitarian aid into Somalia. The humanitarian crisis that had emerged, argues Gonzalez (2013), was not only because of the uninhabitable conditions that prevailed following the war in Somalia, but also, humanitarian aid
organisations often faced challenges of dispensing aid in risky locations in the world (in general) following the 11 September 2001 (known sometimes as 9/11) terrorist attacks in the USA, fearing prosecution under new laws that would accuse them of aiding terrorist organisations.

5.2.2 Resolution 1976
With the draft resolution submitted by Gabon, Nigeria and others, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1976 following the report by advisor to the Secretary General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Jack Lang (Scharf and Taylor, 2017). The Lang Report emphasised the importance of legal action against pirates operating off the Somali coastline. Whereas this was a significant step in the fight against piracy in Somalia, Tanaka (2011) maintains that by adopting S/RES/1976 (2011) on 11 April 2011, the Council openly acknowledged piracy as a criminal offence subject to international law. The Council took a decision to consider establishing special courts operating in Somalia and the region after realising that maritime violence and armed robbery continued unabated (Scharf and Taylor, 2017). Meanwhile, the Lang Report also proposed special jurisdictions in the form of a Somali court in Arusha, Tanzania and centres in Puntland and Somaliland. Coming at a cost of around US$25 million in the first three years, Hodgkinson (2013) observed that those courts would enjoy international jurisdiction on piracy according to a new anti-piracy piece of law. It was a ground-breaking legislative move that was being recommended; one which was not very common in Africa at the time. Its funders included several member states and antidrug and piracy agencies of the UN (Hodgkinson, 2013). This resolution marked the beginning of new ways to fight piracy in Somalia.

5.2.3 Resolution 2002
The adoption of Resolution 2002 formalised the reinstatement of the UN Monitoring Group. With Gabon being the only African country that was involved in the submission of the draft resolution, other member states who had a hand in the process were France, Germany and the UK (S/RES/2002, 2011). The Monitoring Group sought to investigate any operations at the Somalia seaports which may generate financial income for the militant al-Shabaab (S/RES/2002, 2011). It was also to investigate all activities that would violate the arms embargoes imposed against Somalia and Eritrea (S/RES/2002, 2011). In all its efforts, the Security Council sought to ensure that humanitarian aid due to the vulnerable people of Somalia was not held up by any armed rebel activities. As a result, Resolution 2002 was
ultimately intended to thwart piracy deeds that affected the dispersal of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, the protection of human rights and provision of security were equally significant to consider. The resolution was unambiguous about its intention to close the flow of financial aid to al-Shabaab.

5.2.4 Resolution 2010
With Nigeria being the only African country involved in the submission of the draft resolution, upon adoption, S/RES/2010 (2011) renewed the authorisation of AMISOM and extended its support for logistical provision (S/RES/2010, 2011). As noted by Lotze and Williams (2016), the Security Council also welcomed improved security conditions in Somalia’s capital city of Mogadishu and wanted AMISOM to cooperate with the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia (TFIS) to stabilise the capital city. Furthermore, the Security Council acknowledged the critical role that could be played by an adequately empowered police force in stabilising Mogadishu and emphasised the need for the development of an active Somali Police Force. As a result, the Security Council applauded the AU’s intentions to establish a police division inside AMISOM (Lotze and Williams, 2016). This resolution was adopted without any objection.

5.2.5 Resolution 2015
Whereas Resolution 2015 generally condemned activities of piracy and armed robberies off the coastline of Somalia, the resolution also called for the criminalisation of piracy by all member states. Although Security Council resolutions are often interpreted in a highly contested manner (Deplano, 2015), characterised by robust behind-the-scenes discussions; with resolutions pertaining to Somalia, emphasis was always put on threats to peace and impediment of humanitarian aid flow (Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia, 2014). The draft resolution for S/RES/2015 (2011) was submitted by USA, Lebanon, Denmark, France, Gabon, Ukraine, India, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Germany, Portugal, Greece, Russia, Spain, and the UK. It was unanimously adopted.

5.2.6 Resolution 2020
While in the main condemning armed robbery and piracy activities against vessels in the waters off the Somalia coastline, S/RES/2020 (2011) also stressed the need to address comprehensively the scourge of piracy as well as its causes. The number of resolutions addressing piracy in Somalia indicates that the Security Council was preoccupied with
attempts to curb it. With time, it became clearer that piracy in Somalia was influenced by many factors. The absence of a credible central government made it easy for pirates to operate freely off the coast of Somalia since the ports remained unsecured resulting in hostages and hijacking of many vessels and their operators (Nelson and Fitch, 2012). This phenomenon was equally hurting both the private and public sector as the number of hijacked vessels for ransom escalated. This resolution was drafted and submitted without any African member state being involved.

5.2.7 Resolution 2036
South Africa welcomed the adoption of Resolution 2036, which was a special report by the Secretary General on Somalia. In an unprecedented move, S/RES/2036 (2012) imposed a ban on charcoal imports from Somalia and expanded the mandates of AMISOM. Reacting to this, South Africa’s Ambassador Baso Sangqu cautioned that his country was not blind to the challenges facing Somalia at security, political and humanitarian aid levels (SC/10550, 2012). However, South Africa, Sangqu added, was concerned that the resolution did not cover all the proposals of the Secretary-General and AU. Sangqu said South Africa believed that the only maintainable resolution of the Somali crisis was a process that encompassed all relevant stakeholders, led by the Somalis themselves and guided by the Djibouti Agreement (SC/10550: 2012). The resolution also augmented AMISOM’s capacity from 12 000 to 17 731 uniformed personnel (Williams: 2013). Nevertheless, the resolution was unanimously adopted.

5.2.8 Resolution 2060
When the Security Council unanimously adopted S/RES/2060 (2012), it brought into motion new measures that would relax procedures detrimental to the flow of humanitarian aid in Somalia. This was a clear indication that the primary aim was not to harm the innocent people of Somalia. Meanwhile, the Council also extended the decree of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea referred to in paragraph 3 of Resolution 1558 of 2004. Furthermore, through S/RES/2060 (2012), the Security Council condemned the politicisation of human aid distribution and demanded that all parties involved in the Somali conflict must ensure that humanitarian aid is not misused but distributed to the people in need across the country. Without any African country involved, the draft resolution for S/RES/2060 (2012) was submitted by the UK.
5.2.9 Resolution 2067
South Africa was one of the countries together with Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, and the UK to submit the draft for the adoption of S/RES/2067 (2012). This was another report of the Secretary General on Somalia. In it, the Security Council also expressed concern over reports of intimidation and other irregularities during the selection process of members of parliament. It condemned human rights violations attributed to al-Shabaab and called for the equal treatment of women and their representation in all spheres of Somali society that are intended to maintain and promote peace and security in Somalia. This included being considered to serve in the parliament.

5.2.10 Resolution 2072
The UK single-handedly submitted a draft resolution for the adoption of S/RES/2072 (2012) which authorised a brief extension of AMISOM. The AMISOM mandate was expiring on that same midnight of 31 October 2012, meaning that, as alluded to by Council President Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala, if there was no agreement among members on that day, AMISOM would not have a mandate beyond midnight of the same date (SC/10804, 2012). The meeting lasted only five minutes, and by the end, the resolution was adopted unanimously (SC/10804, 2012), with AMISOM’s mandate extended until 7 November 2012. All members of the Council worked together to avoid what would have been an unprecedented catastrophe.

5.2.11 Resolution 2073
Notwithstanding their support for the adoption of Resolution 2073 which prolonged the mandate of AMISOM by four months and added more personnel, South Africa had reservations that a request by the AU regarding the extension of AMISOM’s logistical support was rejected (S/PV.6854: 2012). South Africa’s representative expressed that, together with the AU and neighbouring states, they strongly maintained that the UN was supposed to support the AMISOM maritime component (S/PV.6854, 2012). It also concerned South Africa that the AU’s appeal to lift the arms embargo on Somalia’s National Security Forces had not been addressed in S/RES/2073 (2012) due to differences and disagreements among Council member states (S/PV.6854: 2012). The draft for this resolution was submitted by France and the UK.

5.2.12 Resolution 2077
Following relentless acts of armed robberies and piracy off the coastline of Somalia, the Security Council adopted S/RES/2077 (2012). Without any African state sponsoring it, this resolution renewed (for 12 months) authorisations for global action to combat crimes in partnership with the newly formed government of Somalia (SC/10824, 2012). It also called for the deployment of navy vessels as well as arms and military aircraft while being persistent that the Somali government should pass laws that would outlaw piracy and declare an exclusive economic zone (S/RES/2077, 2012). Although it welcomed the adoption of the resolution, South Africa’s representative urged the international community to closely focus and channel resources towards the real source of Somali conflict which it maintained were socio-economic and political challenges (S/PV.6867: 2012). South Africa had been consistent in reaffirming its stance that the crisis in Somalia was not caused only by piracy and tribal wars. Having explored the first case study, the following section will focus on the next case study.

5.3 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Case Study

Amid accusations of being the cause of the DRC conflict (Barrera, 2015) and inefficient international peace-building efforts (Autesserre, 2012) that are said to be answerable for collapsing the legitimacy of the state, (Kabamba, 2012), Council members, particularly France, consistently showed concern over the DRC. The UN maintained its presence in the borders of the DRC through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) which had its mandate to operate there often extended (Ahere, 2012). Whereas South Africa has been contributing troops to MONUSCO, Besharati and Mthembu-Salter (2016: 3) maintain that this is not a new phenomenon since “South Africa’s early engagements in the DRC were largely driven by political solidarity and President Mandela’s and President Mbeki’s efforts to establish peace and stability in the region”.

Given this interest in the DRC, Makanda (2016) argues that South Africa unsurprisingly contributed US$15 million towards the election’s costs in 2011. Subsequent to those disputed elections, South Africa was quick to recognise Joseph Kabila as a democratically elected president, and soon thereafter an agreement was signed by the two countries regarding the Inga Dam project (Makanda, 2016). This paved the way for South Africa to be involved in the reconstruction and development of the DRC after the war. Despite its direct involvement
on the ground, South Africa did not register much formal interest in the affairs of the DRC at the Security Council as it only sponsored a single draft resolution out of the five that were adopted during the period under review.

5.3.1 Resolution 1991
Upon the adoption of S/RES/1991 (2011) on 28 June 2011, MONUSCO’s mandate was extended to 30 June 2012 (SC/10299, 2011). Through this resolution, the Council also demanded that every armed formation, in particular, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), should immediately end violence and human rights abuses in the area (Leal, Santin and de Magalhaes, 2016). These included sexual violence, particularly rape, against women and children (SC/10299, 2011). The FDLR and the LRA had managed to inflict immense casualties on both civilians and UN-backed forces. Of critical significance is that the resolution was taken at a time when the DRC was preparing itself for the elections. Therefore, in consideration of that reality, the Security Council resolved that, through MONUSCO, it (the Council) would support the upcoming November elections by offering logistical and technical assistance (Leal et al., 2016). However, said Stuenkel (2014), the Security Council also reminded the DRC government of its responsibility to ensure security and respect human rights. It is not clear if this caution was informed of any noted transgressions on the part of the government. Nevertheless, Gabon was the only African state that sponsored the draft resolution for adoption of this resolution.

5.3.2 Resolution 2021
While being critical of the enduring illegal movement of weapons inside and from outside the DRC, the Security Council adopted S/RES/2021 (2011) which renewed the arms embargo. The Council resolved that all armed formations, particularly the FDLR, LRA, “Mai Yakutumba, the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)”, should demobilise (SC/10464, 2011). The resolution also emphasised what it stated was the primary obligation of the DRC government; this responsibility, Vanlandingham (2012) elaborates, was to ensure safety in its jurisdiction and to defend its citizens concerning the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law. France was the only state that submitted the draft for this resolution.

5.3.3 Resolution 2053
Pursuant to the murder of hundreds of civilians by rebel groups on the boundary between North and South Kivu, Boutellis (2013) suggests that it was in reaction that the Security Council adopted S/RES/2053 (2012). This resolution extended MONUSCO’s mandate by another year (Boutellis, 2013). Through the resolution, the Security Council emphasised the necessity for the culprits behind all crimes to be detained and brought before courts of law, specifically Bosco Ntaganda, the head of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). This was a separatist rebel movement notoriously operating in the north of Kivu (SC/10687, 2012). Nonetheless, France single-handedly submitted the draft resolution for adoption without any co-sponsors.

5.3.4 Resolution 2076
The seizure of the town of Goma by the M23 rebel movement called for serious measures on the part of the Security Council. With the adoption of S/RES/2076 (2012), the Security Council demanded that the M23 armed group should withdraw from Goma and halt any additional planned advances. The council also made it clear that it would consider reinforcing MONUSCO and imposing additional targeted sanctions against M23 leadership and its backers. South Africa and Togo were the only African states that sponsored the draft resolution.

5.3.5 Resolution 2078
Noting that there was no end in sight of the sporadic and coordinated insurgent attacks in the DRC, the Security Council adopted S/RES/2078 (2012) in response. The resolution reiterated the Council’s demand for an immediate end to external support to rebel movements in the Kivu region. The Security Council also agreed on the renewal of the arms embargo and other linked sanctions on the armed militias in the DRC; including travel restrictions and asset freeze on transgressors of the embargo. The draft resolution was submitted by France alone.

Following the noted resolutions adopted in relation to the case study above, the next section reflects on adopted resolutions of the next and last case study.

5.4 The Côte d'Ivoire Case Study

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire presented a critical foreign policy test for South Africa, argues McGurk (2013). Its second tenure in the Security Council (2011/12) was at a time when Côte
d'Ivoire had just emerged from presidential elections that left the country with two leaders, incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara both claiming to be presidents (Boutellis, 2011). This followed a run-off that was necessitated by an initial outcome that left Gbagbo securing 38.30% of the vote followed by Ouattara with 32.08% while the lesser fancied Henri Konan Bédié managed 25.24% (Zounmenou and Lamin, 2011). While Ouattara was widely recognised and accepted by the international community as the legitimate president; Boutellis (2011) notes that Gbagbo instead demanded that UN peacekeepers should leave Côte d'Ivoire accusing them of supporting his rival.

In the interim, Ouattara based his win entitlement on the run-off results that were UN-certified and declared valid by the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). According to these results, Ouattara garnered 54.1% while Gbagbo got 45.9% of the votes (Cook: 2011). Meanwhile, Gbagbo appealed the results to the Constitutional Council, which, upon review, invalidated them, instead declaring him president with 51.5% of the votes compared to 48.5% for Ouattara (Cook, 2011). Both of them then took oath of office (Gagnon, 2013).

In the midst of this controversy that escalated political tensions, South Africa had always featured since its former President, Thabo Mbeki, acting on the AU’s mandate, had not succeeded in his attempts to mediate between the two Ivorian warring leaders (Gottschalk, 2013). Mbeki’s unsuccessful peace talks in December 2010 had resulted in the AU suspending Côte d'Ivoire from its ranks until a democratically elected president assumed office (African Union, 2010). The AU and UN took a position to recognise Ouattara as the appropriate president of Côte d'Ivoire (Adebisi, 2012). However, it was DIRCO’s statement that sealed South Africa’s own stance on the matter. In reply to a parliamentary question, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation said South Africa recognised Ouattara as legitimate president of Côte d'Ivoire. This was in line with the AU Peace and Security Council decision of 10 March 2011 (Dirco, 2011b) and it somewhat informed how they related in the future as the country shunned Gbagbo’s claims.

5.4.1 Resolution 1967
sanctioned the placement and mandate of an additional 2,000 troops for UNOCI. The extension was authorized to end on 30 June 2011 (McGurk, 2013). According to S/RES/1967 (2011), the blockade near the Golf Hotel where Ouattara was headquartered was also supposed to be lifted. Additionally, the Council demanded that the media refrain from false propaganda that incited violence and hatred among Ivorians. This followed subjective positions adopted by various media groups aligned to either of the factions that fuelled the violence among the locals. The media had taken sides in the violence that was destroying the country.

5.4.2 Resolution 1968
In a draft resolution that was submitted by France on 16 February 2011, the Security Council adopted S/RES/1968 (2011) which extended provisional redeployment of infantry units and an aviation division from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI. The aviation unit was made up of military helicopters and crew members.

5.4.3 Resolution 1975
Through the adoption of Resolution 1975, the Security Council froze the assets of former Côte d’Ivoire Prime Minister, Laurent Gbagbo (Brubaker and Dorfler, 2017). This followed the widespread violence meted out against the people of Côte d’Ivoire following the disputed presidential elections. In another development, Abatan (2015) laments the likelihood of Gbagbo’s attacks against civilians bordering on crimes against humanity as a propeller for the Security Council having adopted S/RES/1975 (2011). As a result, UNOCI was authorised by the Council to defend the civilian population by any means required (Smeulers, Weerdesteijn and Hola, 2015). The UNSC condemned Gbagbo’s decision to refuse the proposed political solution of the AU’s High-level Panel of Experts, and advised him to step down immediately (McGurk, 2013). The unanimous adoption of this resolution, argues Mohamed (2011), was an indication of the widespread opposition to Gbagbo’s hold on power and an approval of sanctions as a method to be used in situations of conflict.

Speaking after the adoption of S/RES/1975 (2011), South Africa’s Ambassador Sangqu said his country supported the resolution because it was “fully in line with the road map outlined by the African Union, which calls for an end to hostilities, for the protection of civilians, and for the parties to implement the political road map outlined by the High-level Panel”. He said
the resolution strengthened the UNOCI by permitting it to safeguard civilians from looming danger of physical violence. According to Sangqu, South Africa remained extremely worried about the worsening state of affairs in Côte d’Ivoire, believing that a political solution would bring about democracy, reconciliation and unity. Although South Africa had fully supported it when voting, the draft resolution was only sponsored by France and Nigeria.

5.4.4 Resolution 1980
The Council renewed the arms embargo against Côte d’Ivoire and targeted sanctions prohibiting free travel and finances of people it considered a threat to peace and reconciliation when it unanimously adopted S/RES/1980 (2011). In a draft resolution that was submitted by France for adoption, the Council also expressed concern over the presence of mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire.

5.4.5 Resolution 1981
Through the adoption of S/RES/1981 (2011), the Security Council extended UNOCI’s mandate until 31 July 2011. Furthermore, by this resolution, the Security Council also approved the provisional reassignment of military personnel and helicopters (SC/10251: 2011). Preceding the adoption of the resolution, the US representative wanted the aviation assets that were redeployed to UNOCI to be returned to UNMIL by the end of June to guard against weakening Liberia (SC/10251, 2011). The resolution was sponsored by both France and Lebanon and was adopted unanimously.

5.4.6 Resolution 1992
The delicate state of security in Côte d’Ivoire and its western frontline borders with Liberia prompted the Security Council to adopt S/RES/1992 (2011). Through this resolution, the Council resolved to supplement UNOCI troops by adding an extra 2 000 military personnel and helicopters (SC/10303, 2011). The Secretary General had provided an assessment that helicopters were a huge deterrent to attacks by armed mercenaries, mainly in the western part of the country where they operated unabated. It was reported that helicopters provided UNOCI with the required mobility to guarantee suitable assessment of the borders and neighbouring areas, and they would be able to respond timeously to cross-border attacks (SC/10303, 2011). South Africa supported the draft resolution submitted by France.

5.4.7 Resolution 2000
Following a determination by the Security Council that the prevailing conditions in Côte d’Ivoire were still a threat to worldwide peace and security, the Security Council adopted S/RES/2000 (2011), which further extended UNOCI’s mandate in the country. In a draft resolution that was submitted by France and the USA, the Council further urged the new administration to strive for the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be fully operational as soon as possible.

5.4.8 Resolution 2045
In a quest to protect the vulnerable peace initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire, the Council adopted S/RES/2045 (2012) which prescribed adjusted sanctions and prolonged the mandate of the panel of experts to monitor the state of affairs in the country. The council impressed upon all UN member states to stop the availability of arms to Côte d’Ivoire, whether through sale or ordinary supply (SC/10627, 2012). However, the revised sanctions were not absolute. For instance, there were exceptions for military artillery including arms and allied apparatus meant to assist the local state security forces with maintaining public order. Furthermore, the Council renewed the ban on importation of all unprocessed diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. The draft resolution was submitted by Togo, France and the UK.

5.4.9 Resolution 2062
Upon recommendation by the Secretary General that UNOCI’s capacity be reduced, the Council adopted S/RES/2062 (2012) which decreased it to the level of a battalion. The military component was thus adjusted to 8 837 personnel, made up of 8 645 troops and administrative staff supported by 192 observers (S/RES/2062, 2012). This mandate was extended for another year ending on 31 July 2013. The resolution further prevailed on the government to make sure that it brought to book everyone answerable for gross human rights cruelties and violations of international humanitarian law. The council also urged the government to continue liaising with the International Criminal Court. The draft resolution was submitted by France, the UK and USA without any formal sponsorship from an African member state.

5.5 Cooperation among African States in the Security Council

The emphasis by Mxakato-Diseko (2013) on the number of ‘official’ meetings of the UNSC attended by South Africa indicates that there are ‘unofficial’ meetings that take place relating
to the business of the Security Council. It is actually remarks by South African ambassador Baso Sangqu after the adoption of Resolution 2036 (2012) which reveal that there are indeed negotiations that happen among member states prior to a draft resolutions being formally proposed at a Council sitting. This occasion of consultations is an opportunity for member states to raise their concerns and influence each other. However, as Sangqu divulged, it is not always that such consultations’ outcomes are considered in the final draft. The question of collaboration among African countries is addressed by Bowland (2012) who confirms the effectiveness of their cooperation when declaring that of the 10 resolutions sponsored by South Africa in 2011, all of them were co-sponsored by Nigeria and Gabon. According to McGurk (2013), there was an improved cooperation among African states during South Africa’s in the second term. This assertion is supported by the increased coordination of votes and draft resolutions, she argues. The reason for this, assumes McGurk (2013), could be that South Africa was more experienced in coordination during the second term as opposed to its first stint in the Council in 2007-08.

Surprisingly though, the African Group is not credited for this development. In the main, the situation of Côte d'Ivoire illustrates South Africa’s prowess in coordination since it made sure that its position reflected that of the AU although there was often no consensus (McGurk, 2013). Nevertheless, a scrutiny of Security Council resolutions about Côte d'Ivoire reveal that France has always taken the lead in proposing decisions while other member states would ordinarily follow suit (Novosseloff, 2018). All the same, there does seem to be some form of coordinated standpoints at the Security Council although African member states could have been taking the lead from the AU.

5.6 The African Preference

Prior to its election to chair the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, an ambitious South Africa conveyed a wish to strive for a dynamic programme of the Working Group. As a result, by the beginning of October 2011, the group had already been convened five times (Romita, 2011). The agenda of those meetings reflect a somewhat natural preference towards issues concerning Africa. According to Romita (2011: 11), topics discussed were “Enhancing the role of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Resolution in Africa”, “UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council Cooperation”, “Early Warning Tools and Indicators to Assess the Risk of Election-Related
Violence in Africa”, and “The Root Causes of Conflict in Africa: New and Emerging Challenges to Peace and Security”. To top it all, when discussing “UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council Cooperation”, South Africa, as chair of this working group, invited delegates of the 15 AU Peace and Security Council missions to the UN to deliberate with their UNSC counterparts. The result of this meeting as noted by Romita (2011) was a communiqué between the two councils concentrating on Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. This confirms that South Africa prioritised issues that affected Africa as a whole while serving in the Security Council.

5.7 Conclusion

Having voted in the affirmative for all the resolutions that were adopted in the period 2011-12 pertaining to the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa did not nevertheless project itself at the UNSC as an endorser of ‘any and all’ proposals that came before it. If anything, its voice was not silenced even in instances where it did not share the same views on issues with other member states. Instead of taking a back seat when it did not have its way around items on the agenda, South Africa was also able to adjust its stances in favour of issues of African and global importance. As opposed to abstaining from voting, South African representatives remained focused on achieving more through the Security Council by voting although they did not absolutely agree with some proposed resolutions.

In this section, it has become apparent how the Security Council was intensely involved in efforts to resolve man-made conflicts in the three case studies. Except for Somalia whose problems centred a lot on piracy, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire’s challenges concentrated a lot on leadership. In essence, the UN and by extension the AU, were engulfed in addressing all challenges that make up the three levels of analysis. This chapter examined the anarchic states of Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire during the 2011-12 term of South Africa in the Security Council. As prescribed by the levels of analysis in international relations, the wars in those three states were caused by the individual leaders in the case of DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, and the dysfunctional state system in the case of Somalia. South Africa attempted through various platforms to place the interests of the African continent at the centre stage. Its second
term was productive and a reflection of a democratic state that was maturing. Its obligation to peace, stability and development in Africa is noted. This chapter noted all the resolutions that were adopted pertaining to the case studies in the period 2011-12. In the process, South Africa’s involvement was also explored. Henceforth, the study will present a concluding chapter. This chapter will detail the summary of main findings, possible recommendations and areas of future research.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is a summary of the main findings and conclusions emanating from the study. Having examined the two terms in which South Africa served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, herein lies a demonstration of the country’s stance on the situations in Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire; prior to and during its membership of the Council. This chapter also determines South Africa’s foreign policy consistency in addressing issues relating to the three case studies. In the process, whether or not there was any public cooperation among African states at the UNSC is a point that is also established. A literature review that was conducted in the first chapter of the study revealed that David Mitrany was the main source of reference on the opted conceptual framework of functionalism. Kenneth Waltz also emerged central due to the international relations’ three levels of analysis that are attributed to him. Both Mitrany and Waltz’s theories are conclusively summarised in later sections of this chapter.

The chapter is designed first to provide a review of the established conceptual framework of the study. Subsequent to that is the summary of the first 10 years South Africa spent in the UNGA before it was elected to the Security Council. Thereafter, the chapter will detail the main findings of this exercise according to each case study. In this section, all the study’s specific questions as detailed in Chapter 1 will be answered. Since it was also emphasised in Chapter 2, a summary of inferences of the levels of analysis as applied in the study will be presented. In the final section, the chapter will detail suggestions of areas for further research.

6.2 Conceptual Framework

This exercise examined South Africa’s stance and its role in a possible united African front in the UNSC when addressing the situations of Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire during the periods 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 through the theoretical framework of functionalism. Owing to the centrality of the concept in the study, an elaboration was made about the definition of foreign policy. It emerged in Chapter 2 that there was no single definition of functionalism; however, there were various interpretations of its meaning and what it entails.
Given the aims and objectives of the study, the following interpretations of functionalism were found to be relevant for application in this study: (i) A means that provides an analysis for a rationale of political decisions in an organisation; (ii) A system that provides reasons behind a decision or behaviour of a state within a political community; (iii) A method that guides the formation of international organisations that promote collaboration in socio-economic and humanitarian efforts; (iv) A system where functional responsibilities are performed by international organisations instead of state governments. In all the various versions and numerous descriptions alluded to above and including those not reflected in this particular section due to the limited scope, there were specific common concepts that are found in all definitions and interpretations of functionalism that were also identified and recorded. It emerged that despite the abundance of these definitions and explanations of what functionalism is or entails, there appeared to be consensus from the various scholars that common characteristics of functionalism include international organisations, cooperation, integration, economic interdependence, functions, world peace, development and management. The recurring accuracy and applicability of these commonalties pertaining to South Africa’s mandate as a member of the UN and the Security Council is unequivocal in this study.

Although it had not been part of the initial plan, the chapter had to inevitably expand its scope to address the origins of functionalism in international relations. In this section, the role of Mitrany in the establishment of functionalism as a theory was introduced and covered in passing detail. Nevertheless, in the subsequent section that captured the thought leaders in the field of functionalism, Mitrany’s contribution was elaborated upon. It emerged in that section that Mitrany had not consciously sought to create a theory of functionalism in international relations. The theory emerged during his quest for answers to challenges that were facing the reconfiguration of the world after WWI and WWII. He advocated for new tactics to confront new challenges, which led to his convictions of creating a world community led by international bodies whose functions addressed people’s needs. As it was established, the creation of these international bodies had the capacity to undermine the authority of the political state while providing solutions to the needs of the people. The section revealed that Mitrany anticipated that the system of geopolitics will lose influence in international relations. The reason for this was that, for example, people’s challenges like diseases and poverty are not contained or stopped from spreading by geopolitical borders. Therefore, Mitrany saw the role of borders diminishing, while giving more credence to international
functionalist bodies that related with people regardless of politics. He emphasised functional bodies over state governments.

In the process of that section, a literature review was also conducted leading to a section that focused on functionalism in the UN. It emerged that while this is not the first study to be conducted about functionalism in international relations, there had been some research conducted about functionalism in the UN. At least three scholars were reviewed in this section. However, due to the limited scope of the work, it was not ideal to expand beyond the three scholars; that is, Riggs, Bleicher and Luard. A brief account was also made about the levels of analysis that are applied to interpret activities in international relations. The chapter then presented a case for functionalism. This section extensively analysed the rationale behind selecting functionalism as the conceptual framework for the study. An extensive justification was presented that displayed the relevance of functionalism in the study. It emerged that since functionalism was particularly concerning itself with international organisations, it would be the most ideal out of other theories to test the topic of this study. Functionalism’s specific focus on international bodies positioned it above the other conceptual frameworks given that this study is also about South Africa’s behaviour in the UNSC. This behaviour was to be assessed through the manner South Africa voted in the UNSC regarding the situations in the selected three case studies. It is understood that functionalism governs the powers of members of international organisations. This approach enabled the researcher to scrutinise the behaviour of a member of the Security Council, in this case, South Africa.

The theory of functionalism, at least from Mitrany’s point of view, affirmed the role of leadership in sectors other than the political office of government, to offer functional solutions for people’s needs. It is maintained herein that such alternative sectors include UN agencies, to which South Africa belonged, functioned and cooperated with to achieve the mandate of the UNSC, world peace, and to offer humanitarian aid. Efforts and commitments to bring about peace in Somalia, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire since joining the UN and becoming a Security Council non-permanent member, project South Africa as a country that executed a functionalist agenda in the UN and the UNSC in particular. This agenda is not materially different from simply adopting a multilateralism foreign policy at the UN, which is what South Africa is doing in the current era. The study is populated with resolutions on the three case studies adopted by the Security Council in the presence and support of South
Africa aimed at bringing peace in the three countries. Collectively, all those resolutions encompass principles of functionalism as reflected above in the four selected interpretations of the theory. It is presented conclusively that functionalism was suitable, appropriate and applicable to examine the selected topic, and this chapter was able to elaborately scrutinise this theoretical framework and, supported its arguments with relevant sources from the reviewed literature. Having substantiated the case for functionalism, the following section presents the main findings of the study.

**6.3 Summary of Findings**

Subsequent to the presentation of the analytical and theoretical framework of the study above, the third chapter covered the first 10 years of South Africa in the UN (1994-2004), and had to answer the following questions that were presented in the first chapter:

6.3.1 What was South Africa’s stance on the situation in Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire post-1994 before it was elected into the UNSC?

South Africa was clear from the onset upon re-joining the UN that it was to pursue a foreign policy built on democracy and the respect for human rights. It also committed to playing a role in fostering peace in the world. Therefore, these are the benchmark and points of reference of this study. As alluded to above, by evaluating the first 10 years of democratic South Africa’s behaviour in the UN in relation to the three case studies, this chapter sought to establish various notable foreign policy positions taken by South Africa on issues that affected the three case studies (that is: Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire) that were brought to the UN. The intention was to later evaluate those policies against the ones adopted and implemented by South Africa as part of the collective group upon taking its UNSC non-permanent seat in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012; with the aim to appraise the consistency or shift in policy stance on the same case studies. In a broader sense, the chapter was to examine South Africa’s policy positions on issues relating to Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire; this was to include initiatives which South Africa may have been involved in outside of the UN mandate relevant to the case studies. As a new state actor in the international arena (following years of segregation), South Africa found itself having to participate in decisions that tested its commitment to certain values, particularly those it had committed itself to, for example, peace building, human rights and democracy promotion.
(a) Somalia

The decade under review witnessed little activity from the UN; however, African states demonstrated interest in restoring peace in Somalia during the same period. As a member of the UN and the OAU, which later became the AU, South Africa did not have any independent role to play in the situation of Somalia. As a member of the UNGA, South Africa did not contribute in any manner to the UNOSOM II. This was because UNOSOM II was a Security Council project which followed the adoption of Resolution 814. Various resolutions were adopted giving UNOSOM new mandates until they ultimately withdrew from Somalia in March 1995. In spite of this, there were various attempts towards peace including the Sodere Agreement. In that regard, South Africa did not register any recorded objection to the UN-backed negotiations that culminated in the Sodere Agreement by the end of 1996. Moreover, the initiative also had the support of the OAU – which South Africa belonged to.

Another peace initiative that enjoyed the support of both the UN and the OAU was the Cairo Accord of 1997 which convened a meeting of warring factions in Somalia. Similarly, there are no records of South Africa having objected to the peace effort at any of the two bodies (UN and OAU). While the aim of the section was to specifically examine South Africa’s stance on Somalia during the period between 1994 and 2004, there is no indication that South Africa did not support decisions that were taken by structures of the UN – including the Security Council. It can be conclusively argued that South Africa (as a member) supported UN initiatives on Somalia that were aimed to bring about peace, democracy and respect for human rights. South Africa’s own humanitarian aid to Somalia has been recorded. Interestingly though, there were no formal diplomatic ties between the two countries during the period under scrutiny; most likely because of Somalia’s inability to maintain stable government structures for so long. Formal ties between South Africa and Somalia were only established in 2012.

(b) DRC
South Africa was in the midst of formulating its foreign policy on its involvement in international peace missions around the initial stages of the decade under review. This resulted in a White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions of 1998. The White Paper was succinct on the DRC matter in particular as the White Paper only declared South Africa’s support for the UN and, where appropriate, the OAU and SADC, by offering a suitable support to international peace missions. Some scholars note that the DRC was a foreign policy priority for South Africa. Its involvement in the restoration of peace and democracy in the DRC was derived from a UN and OAU mandate. South Africa was among the first countries to recognise the post-Mobutu Sese Seko administration in the DRC in 1997. It was also among the first countries to contribute troops to MONUC.

There is, however, an observed shift in strategic and policy focus by South Africa. The first hint in this study that suggests South Africa’s divergent strategy from pure human rights initiatives to dialogue is visible when President Thabo Mbeki and former Botswana President Keitumetse Masire facilitated the adoption of the GIA with UN support. The GIA paved the way for a provisional constitution in the DRC and it became one of the highlights of South Africa’s international interventions. This is a part of the role played by the individual as per the dictates of the three levels of analysis. Also marked as an achievement for South Africa out of this; was the signing by Rwanda and the DRC of the Pretoria Agreement in July 2002. This agreement marked the end of the Rwandan military operations in the DRC. Furthermore, South Africa also played a major role in the elections in 2006 as a follow-up to both the ICD and the GIA. South Africa also had a foremost part in the rebuilding of the DRC where in 2003 the country provided both technical and financial support regarding the implementation of the developmental projects while the Department of Defence played a vital role in the upgrading of military training centres, the training of military personnel, and the provision of medical assistance. South Africa was guided by its norms and principles of human rights to an extent, but primarily dialogue for democracy and constitutionalism, when involving itself in the DRC. The economic benefits that were accrued by South Africa upon contributing to the political stability of the DRC are a point to ponder.

(c) Côte d'Ivoire

Besides the Pretoria Peace Agreement of April 2005 which illustrates the significance of South Africa’s role in efforts to bring about peace in Côte d'Ivoire, it was South African
President Thabo Mbeki who, under the mandate of the AU, had earlier announced a “Four Point Plan” in November 2004. This followed a lengthy period of reconciliatory mediation which engaged Alassane Ouattara, Lambert Kouassi Konan, vice president of the Ivorian Democratic Party, and the main rebel leader, Gillaume Soro. This plan included efforts to resuscitate the “peace process, and the amendments to Article 35 of the Constitution” which changed the provisions on the controversial Ivoirite principle. Once again, there is more focus on peaceful negotiations and reconciliation efforts instead of South Africa pushing for adherence to the principles of human rights. Once again, the role of President Mbeki as an individual is acknowledged.

Thus far, the aforementioned demonstrates the involvement of South Africa in UN-driven-cum-sanctioned processes in Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. It is clear that South Africa had both direct and indirect roles to play in efforts to stabilise the situations in the three case studies. There was no observed contradiction to the foreign policy except for an emphasis on negotiations. This attitude can be attributed to South Africa’s own experience of a democratic dispensation which was a negotiated settlement instead of warfare peace agreements.

Whereas a notable development registered from findings contained in Chapter 3 of the study is what has so far been referred to as a deviation from emphasis of human rights, it is ironic and to an extent inconsistent and a shift in focus, from the human rights narrative to one of dialogue and prioritising finding political solutions. However, the paradoxical determination in that regard is that the new focus does not represent an alteration or contradiction of foreign policy because in the end, South Africa pursued a policy of negotiation to create an environment where human rights will be respected and protected.

Findings from questions that were interrogated in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation are now presented.

6.3.2 What was South Africa’s stance on the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire after it was elected into the UNSC for the two terms?

The question above was examined in Chapters 4 and 5 of the study, first, by assessing resolutions taken at the Security Council in the period 2007-2008 in relation to the situations in the states of Somalia, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. A similar approach was used to assess
the second term covering the period 2011-2012. In general, 56 resolutions were adopted by
the Security Council in 2007, and from these resolutions, at least 32 pertained to situations in
African countries, and 14 specifically about the case studies of this study. In the meantime, a
further 65 resolutions were adopted in 2008 at the Council; 10 of them relating to Somalia,
six affected the DRC while only three pertained to Côte d'Ivoire. This brings the total number
of resolutions adopted about the case studies in the 2007-2008 term to 33. South Africa voted
in favour of all those resolutions.

These resolutions referred to above mainly extended mandates of operations for various UN
peacekeeping forces and initiatives. But they also exercised some stringent power over non-
conforming actors by imposing sanctions and embargoes. The actions expressed the UN’s
commitment to world peace and security. In instances where they were expected to act, the
UN (through the Security Council) exercised its authority over member states and non-state
actors alike. The situation in Somalia was protracted and complex; however, resolutions
referred to above present a UN that was involved in bringing about peace and stability there.
And it was also the case with the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. Unlike in Somalia where it only
provided humanitarian aid, South Africa had been directly involved in the physical efforts to
restore peace in the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of the DRC, negotiations among
warring factions were held in South Africa. Meanwhile, the Pretoria Peace Agreement was
also a milestone achievement towards peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

In Chapter 5, the study assessed resolutions adopted in the second term of 2011-2012
pertaining to the case studies. As indicated in Chapter 5, since this was the Republic’s second
opportunity to sit within the UNSC, South Africa assumed the seat with greater ambitions,
among which were to add value to peace and security efforts in Africa, and to foster better
relations between UN and AU bodies. When the term ended, South Africa had taken part in
790 Security Council official meetings, including its working groups and subsidiary organs.
During that period, 118 resolutions were adopted, and South Africa voted in favour of them
all. South Africa supported all 51 PRSTs and 150 press statements. A total of 12 resolutions
pertaining to the situation in Somalia were taken by the Council in that term while 14
resolutions were unanimously adopted concerning the prevailing situations of the DRC and
Côte d'Ivoire. At least five of those resolutions pertained to the situation in the DRC and nine
focused on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. This was the period when South Africa served as
Chair of the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in
Africa. It has been observed that South Africa did not project itself at the UNSC as a non-objective and mere endorser of any proposal that came before it regarding the case studies. If anything, its voice was not silenced even in instances where it did not share the same views on issues with other member states, including the powerful P5. Instead of taking a back seat when it did not have its way on items on the agenda, South Africa was also able to adjust its stances by prioritising issues of African and global importance. As opposed to abstaining from voting, South African representatives remained focused on achieving more through the Security Council by voting although they did not absolutely agree with all proposed resolutions initially. Focus will now be directed to the individual case studies’ resolutions.

6.3.2.1 Somalia

South Africa supported all the resolutions that were adopted by the UNSC regarding the situation in Somalia, and it has been noted and observed that South Africa moved its focus from human rights to peace and stability, and humanitarian aid. It was urging armed militias to demobilise and negotiate. Resolutions adopted by the Security Council pertaining to Somalia sought to ensure that humanitarian aid needed by the vulnerable people of Somalia was not held up by any armed rebel activities. For example, Resolution 2002 was ultimately intended to thwart piracy deeds that affected the dispersal of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, the protection of human rights and provision of security were equally significantly reflected in those resolutions. However, South Africa believed that the only maintainable resolution of the Somali crisis was a process that encompassed all relevant stakeholders, led by the Somalis themselves and guided by the Djibouti Agreement. It also concerned South Africa that the AU’s appeal to lift the arms embargo on Somali National Security Forces had not been addressed in Resolution 2073 due to differences and disagreements among Council member states. The above reflects emphasis on political solutions as methods to find peace.

South Africa had been consistent in reaffirming its stance that the crisis in Somalia was not caused only by piracy and tribal wars but also socio-economic and political challenges; therefore, even the solution would have to be multipronged with emphasis on negotiated political solutions.

6.3.2.2 DRC

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Some resolutions adopted about the situation in the DRC with the support of South Africa, for example, Resolution 1843, confirm that its main mandate following the reinforced MONUC capacity was to protect civilians. Nevertheless, South Africa had always emphasised at any given opportunity that the solution in the DRC is political, and therefore initiatives like the Goma and Nairobi process remain the only architecture for addressing its challenges. Former, and late, South African Ambassador Kumalo, is on record having urged surrounding countries to support the peace and national reconciliation process in the DRC and to speed up the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. Once more, South Africa’s emphasis on the support for negotiated peace and national reconciliation is noted and acknowledged.

6.3.2.3 Côte d’Ivoire

South Africa gave its full backing for the Ouagadougou Political Agreement which also enjoyed the backing of the UN and was seen as a way to peace in Côte d’Ivoire. While this may indicate the importance of a system of political negotiation, South Africa had not in any way discarded its commitment to initiatives that protected human rights and restored peace in the process as witnessed by the adoption of Resolution 1795. The resolution also condemned the reported acts of sexual exploitation, occurring in the midst of the conflict, which had become a weapon used against women and girls. However, South Africa remained dedicated to negotiations as confirmed by its support for its condemnation of Gbagbo by the UNSC over his decision to refuse the proposed political solution of the AU’s High-Level Panel of Experts. South Africa’s Ambassador at the time, Baso Sangqu said his country supported the road map outlined by the AU, “which calls for an end to hostilities, for the protection of civilians, and for the parties to implement the political road map outlined by the High-level Panel”. According to former Ambassador Baso Sangqu, South Africa remained extremely worried about the worsening state of affairs in Côte d’Ivoire, believing that a political solution would bring about democracy, reconciliation and unity. In another resolution, South Africa supported the call for the new administration to strive for the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be fully operational as soon as possible. This furthermore entrenches the observed finding that political management of the peace processes was the preferred method by South Africa.
6.3.3 Did African states behave as a front or work and/or operate as a unit in considering the situations in Somalia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire during the two terms?

It is argued by Jordaan (2019: 24) that “African states have a reputation for voting as a bloc”. Furthermore, these African states are generally known for an unpopular character of impeding efforts aimed at advancing human rights at UN forums (Jordaan, 2019). An assessment of the adopted resolutions during both terms indicates that South Africa’s voting pattern was not different from any other African member state of the Security Council at the time or any other member of the UNSC in general for that matter. Therefore, the existence of an African voting bloc has not been conclusively established. However, it is common knowledge that through forums such as the African Group at the UN, African states canvass common positions and support for their individual proposals. It is one of the biggest blocs in the UN made up of all African states which also functions as a caucus group and coalition at conferences. The African Group is a formal structure that exists even at other UN organs like the UN Human Rights Council where it occupies 13 seats (Jordaan, 2019). However, there is no evidence of such a bloc operating at the UNSC except for regular lobby meetings that occur among Security Council members. As indicated earlier, the emphasis by Mxakato-Diseko (2013) on the number of ‘official’ meetings of the UNSC attended by South Africa indicates that there are ‘unofficial’ meetings that take place relating to the business of the Security Council. This so-called ‘coffee diplomacy’, where state representatives may meet in the corridors and continue to discuss matters ‘over coffee’, could also influence UN decisions. However, this study is limited to the official resolutions only which are public record in the UN archives.

Confirmation of these ‘unofficial’ meetings is sourced out of the remarks by former South African Ambassador Baso Sangqu after the adoption of Resolution 2036 (2012) which reveal that there are indeed negotiations that happen among member states prior to a draft resolution being formally proposed at a Council sitting. This occasion of consultations is an opportunity for member states to raise their concerns and influence each other. However, as Sangqu divulged, it is not always that such consultation outcomes are considered in the final draft. The question of collaboration among African countries is confirmed when the effectiveness of their cooperation is lauded. At least 10 resolutions sponsored by South Africa in 2011 were all co-sponsored by Nigeria and Gabon. This means that whereas there may not be a formal structure at the UNSC where African states caucus their positions prior to formally tabling
them, there is, however, a coordinated manner through which African member states cooperate. This cooperation was said to have even improved during the second term; an assertion supported by the increased coordination of votes and draft resolutions submitted. In the main, the situation of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates South Africa’s prowess in coordination since it made sure that its position reflected that of the AU. Nevertheless, a scrutiny of Security Council resolutions about Côte d’Ivoire reveal that France has always taken the lead in proposing decisions while other member states would ordinarily follow suit. All the same, there does seem to be some form of coordinated standpoints at the Security Council; although African member states could have been taking the lead from the AU. It is, therefore, not clear if African states coordinated at the UNSC or rather pursued a stance that had already been taken at the AU; and then appear as though the position is locally brewed. Nonetheless, an analysis of the resolutions examined in the study reveal that all five African states, South Africa, Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Libya voted “YES” in resolutions that addressed the situation in all the case studies in the periods 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. However, this was also the case with all other member states at the time, including the P5.

This presents a dilemma: because if all states, including non-permanent African states, voted yes, how can such a vote be attributed to an African voting bloc? This argument must be acknowledged. However, there are also instances where South Africa abstained or voted against fellow African states in other resolutions that are not within the scope of this study. Therefore, in conclusion, given South Africa’s efforts to work towards improved relations among African states and AU organs with the UN and its organs, in relation to the three cases under investigation in this study; it is concluded that serving African states appear to have aligned positions at the UNSC in the years under discussion, especially those that have already been tabled at AU forums.

6.3.4 Did South Africa adjust its stance on the three country case studies owing to its membership in the UNSC?

The imaginary world of smooth negotiations and respect for human rights based on its own experiences, led to South Africa adopting policies that were influenced by the prevailing mood at the time of emerging from a segregated apartheid policy. It was hailed as a model country and a success for the world to marvel at. Yet, in reality, South Africa was inexperienced in world affairs. Its behaviour on the international front was that of a classic
emerging middle power as accurately described by Mbete (2018) and van Nieuwkerk (2007). Its foreign policy was also a reflection of such; reformist in character. However, when a 15-year review was conducted by DIRCO from 1994-2008, the government made an admission that it had to constantly realign its foreign policy in order to competently respond to both global challenges and opportunities. This is confirmation that South Africa had to move away from the foreign policy that was based primarily on the promotion of democracy and human rights. In the document, the adherence to international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes are mentioned in that order ahead of human rights. South Africa during this era of ‘human rights and democracy foreign policy’ was led by the reconciliation idol himself, Nelson Mandela. However, with the change of guard, Thabo Mbeki pursued the Africa Agenda foreign policy. Evidence shared in this study provides a shift towards an inclusive political governance policy. This is a view that is also supported by de Cavarlho (2018) who said that mediation played a key role in South Africa’s foreign policy in countries like the DRC.

This was done in the midst of reforming UN and AU organs’ alignment towards the pursuit of the African Agenda (Alden, 2015). Paradoxically, according to DIRCO, the African Agenda was also based on a commitment to the promotion of human rights and democracy, yet it emphasised the commitment to international peace and agreed methods of conflict resolution. However, in support of the latter, the 25 Year Review Report (2019) confirms that South Africa’s concentration is on negotiation and inclusive political settlements, citing among others the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. Its determination, as indicated in the resolutions adopted, is to apply negotiations as a means to settle conflicts.

6.4 Implications for the Levels of Analysis

This section presents another paradox in the main questions of this study. While the exercise undeniably qualifies to be subjected to Waltz’s three levels of analysis of international relations which are the individual, the state and the international systems, there is overwhelming evidence that Mbeki, the individual, albeit he was not the cause for the war; deviated from the Mandela-era South Africa’s foreign policy of prioritising human rights in its engagements. Thabo Mbeki was more inclined to a foreign policy that prioritised dispute resolution and negotiated political solutions instead of the priority protection of all human rights.
For example, Mbeki, acting on the AU’s mandate, did not succeed in his attempts to mediate between the two Ivorian warring leaders Gbagbo and Ouattarra. His unsuccessful peace talks in December 2010 had resulted in the AU suspending Côte d’Ivoire from its ranks until a democratically elected president assumed office. This is a clear prioritisation of a negotiated settlement to resolve conflicts. Although it has not been proven that Mbeki did not recommend the deployment of troops as an immediate resolution to the challenges facing Côte d’Ivoire, the AU still resolved on soft sanctions of membership suspension from the organ as a first step. That is the role played by the individual, Thabo Mbeki, to resolve the conflict. On the contrary, while still addressing the role of the individual in the levels of analysis, there is irresistible confirmation of the role an individual called Gbagbo played in causing the war that occurred in Côte d’Ivoire.

In the case of DRC, the non-democratic state under Mobutu Sese Seko led to an individual leader called Laurent Kabila taking up arms to start a war. Even in the event when victory was secured against the dictator, the DRC never experienced peace since individual leaders like Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda persisted on fuelling the war. They were singled-out in UNSC resolutions for their role in creating instability in the country. Another level of analysis is the role of the government in creating conflict. In the case of Somalia, the forced resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed A. Mohamed in 2011 exacerbated the deterioration of the political, humanitarian and security crisis. The absence of a credible central government made it easy for pirates to operate freely off the coast of Somalia since the ports remained unsecured; resulting in hostages and hijacking of many vessels and their operators. Still on the government role, insofar as the DRC is concerned, the government has been accused of lacking political will to articulate a national security vision, which has led to corrupt networks stealing national funds and exploiting natural resources.

In this section, it has become apparent how the Security Council was intensely involved in efforts to resolve man-made conflicts in the three case studies. Except for Somalia whose problems centred a lot on piracy, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire’s challenges centred a lot on individual leaders. In retrospect, the UN and by extension the AU were engulfed in addressing all challenges that make up the Waltz theories of international relations. This section examined the anarchic states of Somalia, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire during the 2007-08 and 2011-12 terms of South Africa in the Security Council.
6.5 Suggestions for Further Research

Several areas that emanate from this study require further probing. It would be worth an academic exercise to compare the first three presidents of South Africa, excluding the caretaker President Kgalema Motlanthe, on how they personally influenced foreign policy on Africa at the UN. Noting that it is at the time of this study serving its third term in the Security Council, further studies could, from a functionalist perspective, explore how South Africa has altered its approach of interaction in its third term. Finally, the case studies that were selected for this exercise can be re-examined to assess the impact of post-war interventions from South Africa, if any, or the UN in general. Questions to be examined could include, did the African Agenda reduce the number of conflicts or change the methods of peace engagements; and what are its achievements?
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