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THE PAN-AFRICAN IDEAL UNDER A NEW LENS:
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THABO MBEKI OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MUAMMAR GADDAFI OF LIBYA,
1994-2008

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
Master’s in Politics and International Relations

University of Johannesburg

February, 2019
DECLARATION

The research project is the original work of Suhfree Cletus Suh and has not been submitted before in any University for an award of a degree

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The research has been submitted to the University for examination with the approval of the student

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DEDICATION

To my late parents who inspired me to work hard and make sure it happens. To my family members; Fuhsuh, Sirri and Ngwesa who stood by me at all times. To my children, Alieh Precious and Oretlholetse Abongne’ who are the reason I kept working. To my Love, Anna Memme Moerane, the sparkling light in the darkest nights. To Ambazonia, all my colleagues and friends; who put it all together.

February, 2019

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Special thanks to God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit for Wisdom, Knowledge and Good health throughout this study.

Special gratitude goes to my supervisor Professor Chris Landsberg for his fatherliness, his shrewdness, open debates on the topic, his direction and constant follow-up of my work. His instructive criticisms as well as valuable remarks and the inestimable archives he offered played a great role for the accomplishment of this dissertation.

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I also doff my hat to the H.O.D, Professor Suzy Graham, whose timely intervention, advice and encouragements pushed me to finish in time.

Finally, the accomplishment of this study would not have been conceivable without the assistance and references provided by the University of Johannesburg library. I thank the staff who facilitated the task.
ABSTRACT

During the period when African countries struggled to gain independence, they embraced the ideology and philosophy of Pan-Africanism that would finally unite the continent as a single unit in the fight against Western imperialism. This struggle that began long before the 1950s can be considered as one of the most significant for people of colour worldwide. It became a time when the ‘black’ race worldwide united against a common enemy, system and policy; and perhaps the highest moment witnessed in history where Africans in the diaspora, like WEB DuBois and Africans on the continent, such as Kwame Nkrumah, achieved solidarity. Williams (2005: 174) iterates that the concept of Pan-Africanism is incomplete if it is not traced as far back as the times of slavery and colonialism where “brothers and sisters of the continent were stolen”. He goes on to highlight the critical role of African warriors like Yaa Asantewaa of the Gold Coast (today’s Ghana) and King Chaka of the Zulu of South Africa whose resistance against Western invasion of Africa was tantamount. When Pan-Africanism became the key hope for Africans, the United States of America (the New World) and the West Indies became the first to implement strategies towards liberating the black race from the bondage of slavery and colonialism. This dissertation concerns itself with 21st century Pan-Africanism, wherein it throws light on the continental political body, the African Union (AU) as well as examining the role played by two distinct ‘sons’ of the union and Pan-Africanist thought leaders in their own rights: Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, and the late Libyan head of state Muammar Gaddafi. From 1994-2008, the dissertation examines their ideals and contributions towards emancipating the people of African descent across the world and on the continent of Africa from foreign control and domination. The study investigates if indeed Mbeki and Gaddafi contributed enough to earn the description of ‘the New Lens' of Pan-Africanism vis-à-vis defending the continent against foreign exploitation, control and domination. The reader is expected to grasp from the dissertation what new impetus Mbeki and Gaddafi caused drawing from the historical development of Pan-African activities which began as a mere concept in the London conference of 1900. One of the hosts at this conference was Henry Sylvester Williams of the West Indies. After London, Pan-Africanist movements eventually sprouted across the diaspora and Africa, particularly after World War I. The role of Du Bois ‘the Father of Pan-Africanism’ is discussed in this study. The study as well deliberates on the Pan-African Congresses and Conferences which paved the way for Pan-African ideals and philosophies among the black race globally. It examines the role of Africans like Nkrumah who became a leading African politician, nationalist and future leader by embracing Pan-Africanist ideals. Moreover, this study examines the Pan-African ideals and contributions of Mbeki and Gaddafi in detail.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>African Americans</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>African Central Bank</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRO</td>
<td>African Currency</td>
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<td>AHOF</td>
<td>Assembly of Heads of States</td>
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<td>Arab Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>African Union</td>
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<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>AU Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight World Top Economies</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LAP</td>
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<td>LIA</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millennium Africa Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
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<td>MNO</td>
<td>Multinational Organisation</td>
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<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for Advancement of Coloured People</td>
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<td>NACDP</td>
<td>Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>Union of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>West African Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIA</td>
<td>Universal Negro Improvement Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States of Africa</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Logan (1965: 90-104) defines Pan-Africanism as “self-government or independence by African nations south of the Sahara, a movement to encourage mutual assistance and understanding among peoples of Africa and of African descent from the beginning of the twentieth century”. A straightforward version of Pan-Africanism can be described as a philosophy and political project that called for a unified African state where all Africans belong (Appiah, 1997: 13-34). According to Appiah, Pan-Africanism created an opportunity for people of African descent outside the continent to return to Africa, the mainland. At the same time, it empowered African elites in Africa to fight for independence and eradicate colonial rule.

In a more cultural and vague form, Pan-Africanism is a project that pursued artistic as well as literal models to unite all people of African descent worldwide (Appiah, 1997: 13-34). While the concept is rich, it has a multifarious tapestry dating back as far as the 18th century. Ideologically, the roots of Pan-Africanism do not belong to mainland Africa but rather the New World and the Caribbean Islands. The Pan-Africanist forerunners of the concept include Prince Hall and Paul Cuffee of Massachusetts (USA), 1787. They indignantly requested the immediate repatriation of blacks back to Africa with compensation (Langley, 1973: 8). By 1815, these men spearheaded a mission that successfully saw the repatriation of 40 African-Americans to Sierra Leone, West Africa (Langley, 1973: 9).

Pan-Africanism is a “global movement to unite Africa and its people against racial oppression and exploitation associated with European hegemony” (William, 2005: 173). Okhonmina (2009) and Mbayo (2004) pictured the philosophy as strides towards the mobilisation of the African continent against racial discrimination and colonialism; a concept philosophy as grounds for the construction of a unified continent under a supreme continental body, the African Union (AU). Regarding the ‘African father of Pan-Africanism’, Kwame Nkrumah, he combined both the
endogenous Western ideas of Du Bois and Marcus Garvey: the rights and pride of the African; unity and freedom; and his exogenous ideas of unification, ‘the United States of Africa’, as the main way forward for the liberation of the continent. By endogenous, Nkrumah demonstrated the sustainable, functional and people-centred development where he championed the cause for Africans to take charge of their future through harnessing political, social and economic ownership of the continent on a united Africa agenda (Appiah, 1992: 1). Exogenous ideas of unification entail the continuous forging of a new path for Africa that will be able to push out Western imperialism and reignite African pride, black solidarity and ultimate unity of the continent (Fierce, 1972: 50-61). This dissertation will be lacking if it does not discuss the critical role of the AU in promoting Pan-Africanism. Worthy of note is the fact that the AU portrays Pan-Africanism as a movement and ideology that supports African solidarity globally. Its goal is to uplift and unify the black race, in the homeland of Africa and in the diaspora, and uphold the belief in the ideology that blacks worldwide share both a common history and destiny (AU Echo, 2013).

Pan-Africanism dates from the second half of the 19th century with Marcus Garvey’s slogan ‘Africa for Africans’, a clarion call for the Declaration of Rights of the Negro in 1920 (Hakim, 2003). From its initiation, the philosophy generated a strong spirit of unity within the African people. By the close of the 19th century, the most venerated Pan-Africanist WEB DuBois developed an ideology of ‘Race Consciousness’, later adopted by Wilmot Blyden in his writings and speeches about ‘African Personality’, across the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Africa (King, 1973). As a concept, Mazrui (2015) states that Pan-Africanism has been quite an important subject of debate by different scholars and schools of thought thereby heralding several interpretations of the concept. However, the ideals are difficult to define as there are numerous versions about the details leading to the origin of Pan-Africanism: was the primary focus geared towards the restoration of the dignity of ‘black people’ in the diaspora (Africans of the blood) or black people on the mainland of Africa (Africans of the soil)? This study attempts to assess the vital development of Pan-African ideology. It examines the valuable contributions and analyses, the ideals and political ambitions, of Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya respectively from 1994 to 2008. The 14 years in the lives of these statesmen witnessed significant changes within the Pan-African ideology that
stand as a solid reference for the continuous growth of an integrated Africa since the days of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. As Pan-Africanists in their own rights, Mbeki and Gaddafi’s Pan-African ideologies of the ‘African Renaissance’ and ‘The United States of Africa’ for instance, renewed interest that once again inspired Africans on the continent as well as in the diaspora. By describing Thabo Mbeki as a man dedicated to the transformation of Africa, Gevisser (2009: 14) highlighted in his book *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Differed* the contributions and ideas of Mbeki towards the formation of the AU. Mbeki’s role in the process of transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU was a giant step towards the reinterpretation of Pan-Africanism under the guise of African Renaissance.

Mbeki is often compared to Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie’s Pan-Africanist style of compromise and concealment, when he convened and chaired a meeting of Africa’s 32 independent states in May 1963. Mbeki was categorical in his opening address that the creation of a single African organisation was paramount and if it failed, Africans would have shirked their responsibility to Africa and its people; meanwhile, success would mean African people had indeed justified their presence in the meeting (Adenkule, 53: 14). Mbeki utilised a compromise and concealment model to slowly but steadily transform the OAU to the AU and the creation of its supplementary organs. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Africa's Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) cemented the economic arm of the union. For his part, Gaddafi was influential in his role in the creation of the AU. His ideals were resolute and he was often compared to Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who wanted to see a swift political unification of the continent. Gaddafi hosted Africa's heads of states and government in the fifth extraordinary summit of the Assembly of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 (Baimu, 2001: 18). The summit culminated in the Sirte Declaration which announced the decision to establish the AU, Gaddafi's huge financial generosity towards the growth of the continent's economy, his call for a single African army, his Pan-African currency programme (de-dollarisation) and his vision of The United States of Africa (USAF), borrowing from Marcus Garvey's 1924 poem, *Hail United States of Africa* (Mmegi, 2010: 33) and Nkrumah’s vision for nationalism and a united Africa (Biney, 2008; Rooney, 1988).
1.2 Rationale, aims and objectives of the study

The aim of this study is to assess the significant progress made by the Pan-African ideology. It argues that from its origin, the ideal of Pan-Africanism was characterised by moral values and political aspirations that were grounded on the aspiration to overturn the dominant views of African inferiority. The racial connotations, as well as the identity that has for decades provoked the proliferation of views about Pan-Africanism, have not yet been resolved. However, Pan-Africanism has gradually transformed itself into the most influential tool for the restoration of black pride, emancipation from slavery and colonial bondage and in Nkrumah’s own words, “the necessity for well organised, firmly-knit movements as a primary condition for the success of national liberation struggle in Africa” (Nkrumah, 1970: 134).

The period 1994 to 2008 marked a turning point in Pan-African drives across the continent of Africa as it witnessed a wide-ranging declaration of a meticulous brand of the Pan-African ideology. Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya were two outstanding African architects of this development. The study aims to analyse their theoretical and practical ideals of Pan-Africanism during the 14 years of their mandates as statesmen. The period was timely because on the one hand, Gaddafi who seized power from King Idris through a bloodless coup in 1969, an admirer of Egyptian Pan-Africanist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser; had suddenly abandoned Pan-Arabism (global support for Muslim unity) projects during the Cold War and turned his focus towards building a Pan-African ideology: an ideal Nkrumah enunciated. Within the context of such developments, one, therefore, explains the reason why Gaddafi hosted 43 African presidents at the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in September 1999, it was where the decision to create the AU was taken (Makinda, Okumu and Mickler, 2016: 34).

For his part, Mbeki vigorously pushed for the ideals of the African Renaissance, then for NEPAD in a bid to satisfy critics of Nkrumah’s dogma of the 1960s that had sought to unite Africa mainly through economic cooperation. NEPAD was supported by the APRM which Mbeki regarded as a key governance tool for a debt-ridden continent, hence advancing an Africa of economic growth, peace, good governance, globalisation and security. Following these
developments, under the auspices of Mbeki, the AU was launched in Durban, South Africa on 4 July 2002 (Makinda, Okumu and Mickler, 2016: 35).

The objectives of this study are threefold: first, to offer knowledge that helps in the construction of an understanding of all the ideational and practical actions of Mbeki and Gaddafi on the continent from 1994 to 2008. Second, to assess at the ideational level, how both leaders actually introduced a new lens to Pan-Africanism through the raising of Pan-African and African Renaissance flags respectively. Third, the study will examine the practical level and investigate the two leaders’ contributions to implementing their ideals of Pan-Africanism as highlighted above.

1.3 Problem statement

The research problem influences the research design. This research’s primary objective is to find out if the Pan-Africanist ideals of Mbeki of South Africa and Gaddafi of Libya actually led to any contributions to the growth of Pan-Africanism that can be termed “a New Lens” from 1994 to 2008 as statesmen of South Africa (SA) and Libya respectively. Narrowing down the research question raises two points of discussion that guide the research.

First, since several schools of thought battled to settle on what Pan-Africanism actually stands for, it becomes problematic to see a clear picture of whom exactly the philosophy of Pan-Africanism represented; Africans in Africa or the people of African descent worldwide. Can Pan-Africanism, therefore, be understood to be a continental struggle or philosophy as defined by M'bayo (2004: 5) and Okhonmina (2009: 6), as attempts to mobilise continental Africans against colonialism and racism while acknowledging the notion as a philosophical foundation for a united continent through the AU. Or is Pan-Africanism better reflected by the global stance of William (2005: 173) who defines it as “an international movement aimed at uniting Africa and its population against racial domination and exploitation related with Eurocentric supremacy?”

The period 1994 to 2008 therefore placed Mbeki and Gaddafi in a unique position to continue with the promotion of economic and cultural Pan-Africanism through the AU’s bodies like NEPAD and the APRM, the enforcement of the unification of the continent as one indivisible
body under the guise of the USAF agenda (Asamoah, 2005: 43). Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi participated strongly in the realisation of these objectives as seen in their ideologies, notably the last OAU summit hosted by Gaddafi in Libya in 1999 that ultimately paved the way for the formation of the AU in 2002, hosted by Mbeki in South Africa.

Second, the research problem lies in the proposal of a likely relationship between two African statesmen whose ideologies seem to contradict each other. While the intentions, as well as ideologies of both Mbeki and Gaddafi, were directed towards a new lens of Pan-Africanism on the continent, they did not agree on how to go about it. While Mbeki utilised the gradualist theory of the Monrovia group by employing economic ideals in advancing the continent, Gaddafi was more radical in his ideals, copying from Nkrumah’s ideology of nationalism and the USAF (M’bayo, 2004: 18). From the two perspectives, therefore, the Pan-Africanist ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi although dissimilar in nature, were intended towards consolidating and restoring the reason behind the concept and philosophy of Pan-Africanism.

1.4 Research question

Having reconciled with the fact that Pan-Africanism’s definitive task remains an ongoing argument within various philosophical conservatories and examining Pan-Africanism through a new lens from 1994 to 2008 based on interrogating the ideals of Mbeki of SA and Gaddafi of Libya; the study makes sure the ideals of both statesmen fall in line with the Pan-African philosophy. The study, therefore, answers the following question:

What new contributions and ideologies constituting a new lens of Pan-Africanism, were introduced by Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi towards Pan-Africanism during their term as statesmen of South Africa and Libya respectively from 1994-2008?

1.5 Research methodology

O’Sullivan et al. (2003: 25), state that a method or design directs all decisions on data management as it generally takes the researcher towards the rationale behind the study. Like any social scientific research, O’Sullivan et al. conclude that the research aim varies from the
explanatory to the descriptive. Babbie (2001: 7) argues that research theories are strongly based on the rationale or aim of the study that produces them. This study has chosen to make use of the qualitative method of research. Also, Nudzor (119) added that qualitative research methodology and its technique of gathering different data not because only qualitative research method could be utilised in social science discipline or as a superior to quantitative research methodology, but because the candidate judged it to be an outstanding, if not, best to drive the point and answer the research question. Defending qualitative methodology, Berg (2001: 6) states that qualitative research sufficiently looks for answers to questions as it rigorously examines the nature of the individuals within the setting as well as in different social settings.

Jacobson (2002: 145) emphasises that the qualitative method is most suitable when a researcher embarks on an understanding of a unique philosophy or phenomenon, as in this case (Pan-Africanism). Jacobson (2002: 146) adds that the qualitative method is important as it employs a deeper theoretical understanding from the beginning since it is often a challenge to retrace and change what questions are asked during the research process.

Within the paradigm of a qualitative model, the study is based mainly on secondary sources of information, including books, academic journal articles, publications, newspaper articles, media reports and other relevant literature. It consists of a critical literature review, wherein theories of International Relations (IR) are applied to the already existing literature and attempts at classification are assessed accordingly (Sprinz and Wolinsky, 2004: 12). The qualitative model will therefore identify, investigate and rigorously discuss Mbeki and Gaddafi’s ideals and contributions to Pan-Africanism. The rationale here will be on Mbeki’s African Renaissance agenda of 1999, the Millennium Africa Programme (MAP) of 2000, and his role in the setting up of NEPAD. Likewise, Gaddafi’s Pan-African currency programme (de-dollarisation) and the USAF agenda will be explored.

1.6 Limitations of the study

In terms of time frame, the study is limited to the period 1994-2008. This period is chosen for two reasons. First, Thabo Mbeki came into the corridors of power as deputy president of South
Africa in 1994 and later president in 1997 when his Pan-African ideology moved towards the formation of the AU and his African Renaissance ideals until he stepped down in 2007. Second, it was in 1994 that Gaddafi abandoned Pan-Arabism in favour of Pan-Africanism and later pushed for the summit in Sirte which announced the ultimate creation of the AU in 2002. Moreover, it was in 2008 that Gaddafi hosted 200 African traditional leaders in a grandiose ceremony to forge a better future for the continent. Also, the time frame of 14 years does not enable the thesis to cover a wide scope of everything within the Pan-African ideologies of these two statesmen. A broader and more comprehensive study with a longer time frame for research will improve the quality and depth of the current research.

Another constraint of the study is the accessibility and availability of the information. Some literature is available only in Arabic and as the researcher does not have Arabic language skills, the dissertation relies mainly on sources in English and French. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of the ongoing crisis in Libya, the Libyan government's publications on this matter have been limited.

1.7 Literature review

As a political thought, Pan-Africanism symbolises the philosophical, spiritual, cultural, scientific and historical legacies of the African continent from the past to the present (Esedebe, 1982). The Pan-African ideology can be understood to be an embodiment of the history of Africa and the mechanism used to battle the struggles against slavery, racism, colonialism, capitalism, neo-colonialism and brain-drain (Legum, 1965). This period spans ancient history, and generally promotes principles that constitute the product of black civilization and black foreign policy. Worthy of note is Chaka of the Zulu of South Africa, ‘the black Napoleon’ who in the 1800s tried to unite Africa through conquering smaller kingdoms (Peires, 2009: 159) and Ghana’s NaNa Yaa Asantewaa, a powerful African queen mother of the Ejisu clan in the 1900s. Their resistance to Western colonialism and their long battles against British colonial invasion left significant pedagogic and Pan-African ideology for the continent as a whole (Mensah, 2010: 1).

William (2005: 175) states that though Pan-Africanism has been generally considered as one of the most lasting concepts across the international African society for many decades, the theory
still lacks pertinent instruments to move the continent forward ideologically and economically. It is this obstacle that continues to drag Africa back as the continent continues to be plagued with wars and instability as well as terrible economic tragedy. The gap identified here is that of continuity by African leadership hence, the contributions of Gaddafi and Mbeki come in handy to address this problem. William (2005:175) further argues that Pan-Africanism promotes a sense of cooperative movement among people of African descent to unite their efforts towards a total liberation of the continent and its scattered and suffering people worldwide. Legum (1975: 23) joins William in highlighting that the new ideals of Pan-Africanism, whether intertwined or not, will go a long way to promote African unity; hence Mbeki and Gaddafi.

However, the Pan-African ideology far predates that of political unity for the continent. Okhonmina (2009: 86) aligns with the ideas of William and Legum in their allusion that creation of the OAU and its eventual replacement with the AU iterates Africa's clear institutional demonstration of its pursuit for unity.

In defining Pan-Africanism, Padmore (1956: 10-30) depicts it as a reaction against the oppression of the black people and the racial doctrines since the period of slavery and the slave trade. Shepperson (1960: 30) analysed the influence of African-Americans on the emergence of African nationalism with invaluable information on the beginning of black nationalism in America and its long-term impact on African nationalism. Much emphasis was laid on significant contributions of black nationalists; his work, however, was void of the definition of Pan-Africanism. When the American Society of Culture (1962: 37) edited a book titled: Pan-Africanism Reconsidered, it traced the roots of the Pan-African movement and its growth on three continents; the USA, Europe and Africa. It holds that WEB DuBois of the USA and Henry Sylvester Williams of the West Indies were key role players of the Pan-African movement and conferences. Ali Mazrui (2002) discusses Africa’s civilisation and Pan-Africanism as critical subjects among his numerous writings. His definition of Pan-Africanism vividly explains how vital the concept is to the people of African descent across the globe. WEB DuBois is mentioned as the grandfather of Pan-Africanism; Esedebe (1984: 1) states that the ideology gave birth to a Pan-African movement that was aimed at uniting and creating an understanding among all
clusters of people of African descent. Pan-Africanism was more or less identical to the theory of ‘Negritude or African Personality’ (Diop, 1962: 8). To Diop (?), African personality represented the backbone or foundation of African humanism with a strong goal of freeing the people of African descent completely from the Western political and socio-economic grip.

One of the earliest works on Pan-Africanism was an article written by Drake, (1958: 7-10) called *Rise of Pan-Africanism*. He interpreted the concept in terms of a racial movement underscoring social causes. Meanwhile, C Legum (1962: 5-14) in *The Journalist*, criticised Drake’s definition because it only depicted a skeletal origin of the movement. He went further to term the concept “an expression of a sense of unity and solidarity among the up-rooted Africans in the diaspora” as a result of Western subjection, maltreatment and its deathly nature. In opposition to the philosophy, Geiss (1974: 13) posited that Pan-Africanism is an irrational perception, and simply a matter of vague emotions. His attack seemed to be founded on earlier definitions of VB Thompson in his book *The Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (1996). Esedebe (1984: 4-5) states categorically that Pan-Africanism is still in its infancy despite the inflow of literature on the subject. He argues that besides the deep divide on the clear meaning of the subject among politicians, philosophers and scholars, the key goals and ideology of Pan-Africanism are mostly buried rather than clearly highlighting the relevance of the concept. For his part, Legum (1962: 14) holds that Pan-Africanism essentially involves “the movement of ideas and emotions; at times it achieves a synthesis; at times it remains at the level of antithesis”. Adding to Legum is Langley (1983), who iterates that Pan-Africanism as a concept is indeed “a protest, a refusal, a demand and a utopia born of centuries of contact with Europe”.

Tukumi (2003: 5) discusses the subject of Africa’s racial and geographical foundations and that without Pan-Africanism in place, the subject inevitably becomes problematic to achieve. Black people in the diaspora inspired the ideology after realising that their freedom in the diaspora is impossible if ‘motherland Africa’ is not totally free from slavery and colonial bondage. It was, therefore, a clarion call for solidarity among the people of African descent across the diaspora to unite and advocate for ‘black rights’.
After the disastrous First World War (WWI), Europe, in particular, was politically weakened and economically shattered and people of African descent in the diaspora took this opportunity to begin making demands for an ‘independent Africa’; among them was WEB Du Bois (Ledwidge, 2012: 24). He negotiated with the French minister for the creation of a new independent state of Africa under the leadership of an African. Haile Selassie, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Sekou Toure and Samora Machel were among top emerging African leaders who strongly embraced the Pan-African as well as the nationalistic ideology. Influenced by Du Bois’ idea of a united Africa, great strides were made to realise this on the continent of Africa. Pan-African institutions were created such as the OAU in 1963, replaced by the AU in 2002 (Manelisi, Kornegay and Rule, 2000: 34). Although the former lacked the political will to strongly pursue the Pan-African Agenda as laid down by Du Bois and the emerging leaders, the AU under the auspices of Mbeki and Gaddafi of SA and Libya reignited the ideology.

For his part, Kwame Nkrumah’s book *Africa Must Unite*, 1970, praised the works of WEB. Du Bois as the founding father of Pan-Africanism. In 1965, Joseph (1965: 10-11) studied the similarities and differences between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism comparing it with Pan-Slavism. His work greatly inspired Magubane to take on a PhD thesis in Sociology two years later where he critically painted a picture on the definition and the origin of Pan-Africanism and concluded that 1900 was indeed the genesis of Pan-Africanism and that Sylvester Williams was the ultimate initiator (Magubane, 1967: 242). Shivji (2006: 208) portrays a close relationship between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism. He ascertains that African nationalism is bound to fail if it does not tag along with Pan-Africanism. In addition, Shivji asserts globalisation undermines Pan-Africanism as it is one of the antitheses of Pan-Africanism as well as African nationalism since it transforms into African imperialism; the last stage of capitalism. Agyeman (1975), Saaka (1994), Adogamhe (2008) Okhonmina (2009), Biney (2011) and Olaosebikan (2011) all came to the conclusion that Kwame Nkrumah was both a visionary and the main voice that championed the campaign for a united Africa. Nevertheless, Botwe-Asamaoh (2005) and Olaosebikan (2011) describe how many African leaders, including Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Nigeria’s Tafawa Balewa, Benin’s Sourou-Migan, Cameroon’s
Ahmadou Ahidjo, openly rejected Nkrumah’s radical approach to the political unification of Africa and chose a gradualist approach instead. Williams (2005) portrays how Nkrumah’s vision had been inspired by a number of African traditional leaders; Chaka of the Zulu of SA and Ghana’s Yaa Asantewaa. They strongly criticised the Western countries' decades of slave trade and colonial dominance and fought them in wars. Williams (2005) stated that the actions of Chaka and Asantewaa were Pan-Africanist in nature. Their constant calls for the immediate release and return of the ‘stolen’ African people shipped away to foreign lands belaboured the point.

Pan-Africanism principally promoted Africa’s unity (Leer, 2012: 12). It was never a racist movement or anti-white nor anti-Arab as purported by several researchers. Rather, it is a pro-African movement which understood that only through an ideology of Pan-Africanism, Africa and people of African descent worldwide, would restore the African pride and dignity from the gloomy history of the past (slavery and slave trade, colonialism and exploitation), and unite the people and the continent. Prah (in Leer, 2012: 15) argues that Pan-Africanism today has moved from the philosophical ideals of African nationalism towards encompassing wider projects like the political and economic unity of the African continent rather than neocolonial state formation. He highlights that the ideals of Pan-Africanism took centre stage when many lives were lost “the nameless Africans who gave their lives...” in the promotion of the concept, hence Pan-Africanism became inevitable.

The Pan-African conferences were a subject of mixed feelings to numerous scholars. Ajala (1973: 4) echoed that establishing solidarity among African descendants, fighting colonial powers, and working for the equality of Africans throughout the world was the major objective of the conferences. Such struggle through international conferences was described by Thompson (1969: 14) as “that struggle which men of African blood have been engaged in since their contact with modern Europe”.

Chime (1977: 121-122) analyses how it was the Pan-African ideology of the mid-19th century that put an end to the dehumanised slavery and slave trade in Africa and the diaspora. He mentioned the slave routes that began from Africa to America, South America, across to the Caribbean and Sahara deserts. Chime explains how slavery in Africa was later followed by the radical and brutal colonisation of the continent that began with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (Chime, 1977: 123). Across the globe, the people of African descent began to rally and in solidarity founded solutions to solve the ‘African global problem’, a key ideology: Pan-Africanism. In 1900 the first Pan-African conference was held in London; 1919 (Paris); 1921 (London, Brussels, Paris); 1923 (London); 1927 (New York); 1949 (New York). Among the influential scholars and politicians who attended these conferences were WEB Du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Mohammed Ali Duse, and Sekou Toure (Chime, 1977: 124).

Pan-Africanism stirred the formation of the OAU and five key central tenets including: African identity; African unity; decolonisation and internationalisation (Williams, 2007: 262). Qobo (2007: 2) analyses how regional integration became the pillar for development across Africa; a journey inspired by the 1945 Pan-African Congress. This atmosphere inspired Pan-African leaders within the movement who became heads of states and leaders in their respective countries. After independence, the quest for such unity and integration sprang from three perspectives according to Qobo (2007: 3). The primary concept situates the certainty in the ability of incorporation to empower Africa with the need to effectively combat numerous encounters posed by a fast-moving globe. The next component is that of comprehension, wherein the perceived discussion on African unity is realised. The last is the worry that the African continent should not be left lagging behind a world that is fast integrating regionally from various corners.

about the lack of seriousness by signatories to live up to expectations of the Constitutive Act of the AU. Mbeki’s remarks touched the critical subject; continental unity which is needed for the continent to easily operate a common market and open border trade system among African states. Meanwhile, Landsberg and Kornegey (1998: 18-20), proposed that Mbeki’s idea of the African Renaissance as an approach to development within Africa is indeed Pan-Africanism from all indications. This stance could equally be compared to Nkrumah’s ideals of African nationalism.

In 1998, Mbeki iterated the aspect of continental unity, echoing that no single country is an island which can isolate itself from the rest and that no single country can truly succeed if the rest fail (Mbeki, 1998). His coining of the phrase, African Renaissance was part of his idea to renew or rebirth the identity of the continent. The best place to do that was within the OAU. Schraeder (2001: 9) argues that, given that SA is Africa’s most industrialised economy, the country sees itself as a leader, hence it is in the best position to steer the continent’s political and economic potentials. Meanwhile, Ahluwalia (2002: 265) held that Mbeki was merely continuing the struggle and vision of earlier Pan-Africanists to “fight and challenge the prevailing representations of Africa”. Mbeki, according to Ahluwalia, was therefore fighting against an age-old stereotype of what Africa was, is and is to become.

Held (1987: 44) posited that Gaddafi's change of political ideology to a Pan-Africanist stance constituted part of the radical strain of Western democratic thinking primarily associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Gaddafi did more than any other leader to ensure the creation of the AU in 2002, hosting several meetings, forcing Nigeria and SA to react to his frantic drive towards creating a federal body (the USAF), an all-African army and a common monetary union (Adebajo, 2011: 15). Gaddafi (1978: 44) describes the economic basis of the third universal theory which will bring about the solution for Africa's economic problem under the guise of ‘socialism’. Likewise, Adebajo’s (2011) journal article in The Guardian Post portrayed how Gaddafi swapped his Pan-Arabian robes for Pan-African garments. His role in the creation of the AU cannot be overlooked, even although he clashed with Mbeki ideologically. In a 2013 journal article, the SA-based think tank, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) also highlights how
Gaddafi used vast Libyan oil resources to push the grandiose idea of a USAF. He advocated for an immediate unification of African states into one national and sovereign federation. Seay (2011) strongly advocated that “without Gaddafi, the Pan-African movement is dead” as Gaddafi was “the only prominent voice driving that movement. He was keeping the ideas alive and there is nobody else with the financial resources available”. The ISS article also exposed an alternative to Gaddafi’s immediate unification ideal; Mbeki’s step-by-step approach towards a union government often referred to as ‘the gradualist school’.

Gaddafi’s *The Green Book* (1978: 17) challenged the French’s strong control and exploitation of Francophone Africa as if they remained French colonies. He iterates that “the legitimate purpose of the individual's economic activity is solely to satisfy his material needs”. It has no intention to create a surplus in order to gain a profit. It outlines Libya’s foreign policy actions in three categories: (1) those in reaction to a perceived regime threat, political and economic alike; (2) those in reaction to a perceived external threat or isolation; and (3) policy actions when there is a threat to both the regime and to the state’s borders. This is also well reiterated by Deeb (1991: 17), MacLeod (2006: 66) and Tamura (2008: 26) who argue that Gaddafi’s third category can be applied to Libya and the AU when attacked by the West. In addition, the literature on Libya’s role in the formation of the AU points to Gaddafi’s desire to ‘rehabilitate’ his image by fixing his relations with the West, that is, being conciliatory, and aligning himself with Africa rather than with Arab states.

Huliaras, (2001: 5) details the vital role Gaddafi played in achieving his Pan-African goals. When the USA imposed extended sanctions on Libya in 1993, it was the OAU and not the Arab League that passed a resolution requesting the UN to drop sanctions. Gaddafi wanted a more united Africa (Browne, 2003:19), with one government and military-inspired; from the concept of Marcus Garvey’s 1924 poem, *Hail, United States of Africa* (Hunter, 2016). Also, Deep (1991: 189) analyses how Gaddafi’s idealism and leadership on the basis of a ‘people ideology’ led him to fight against imperialist Western powers on the continent. Perhaps, it was the wrath of the West (Abdul-Raheem, 2009) in the form of sanctions imposed on Libya for his supposed hand in
the Lockerbie bombings that made Gaddafi realise Pan-Africanism was the way forward if he needed to successfully fight ‘Euro-American hegemony’. Makinda, Okumu and Mickler, (2016: 35) illustrate the ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi under their Pan-African and African Renaissance flags respectively. This led to the ultimate formation of the AU in 2001, thereby carrying on the Pan-African torch left behind by the African father of Pan-Africanism, Kwame Nkrumah (Mickler, 2016: 36).

It was therefore the aim of this research to dig into the above arguments and gather convincing solutions to the statement that Mbeki of South Africa and Gaddafi of Libya merit the appellation of ‘the New Lens of Pan-Africanism’ following their ideals of Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance and the USAF respectively. The research sought to cover the gaps pertaining to the ideology and concept of Pan-Africanism and how the New Lens of Pan-Africanism of Mbeki and Gaddafi contributes to the progress of the philosophy.

1.8 Structure of the study

The dissertation is broken down into six main chapters. Each of these chapters begins with an introduction. The reader is informed about what the chapter plans to cover from the beginning to its end. The following represents the basic summary of each chapter.

**Chapter One** of this research is an introduction to the study. It provides background information about the research topic, literature review, research questions and objectives, theoretical framework that guides the research and finally, the research methodology that is used.

**Chapter Two** details the ideology of Pan-Africanism and Africa from the 1900s. This chapter will provide an overview of the existing literature on Pan-Africanism; the concept, the history, the origin and growth of Pan-Africanism as a political thought, that provides context to the dissertation's breakdown and enabling a comprehension of the reason why unity was a key factor. The chapter as well examines the Pan-African Conference and Congresses, Pan-Africanism and the Cold War and post-Cold War times, the foreign policy of Pan-Africanism
and the New Lens of Pan-Africanism with the ultimate formation of the two continental organs, the OAU to the AU.

**Chapter Three** provides a theoretical outline which will inform the dissertation. First, the purpose and development of IR is provided based on theoretical assumptions of Bull and Watson (1984). The duo hinted at “the expansion of International society” with numerous IR theories deeply contested by different schools of thought. Some of the disputed topics include philosophical beliefs, power, material wealth, and military. Second, the chapter offers a description of the key instruments of Pan-African thought which include but are not limited to concepts of race, black people and people of African descent; populism, socialism, Ubuntu, black education and Negritude. Third, the dissertation explains fundamental norms of two methodologies that constitute the study’s framework, being constructivism and neoliberalism.

**Chapter Four** portrays Thabo Mbeki as a Pan-Africanist and it expounds on his approaches from 1994 to 2008. The chapter establishes a basis for evaluation of Mbeki’s different principles that relate to economic growth and explore the New African rulebook, the concept of African Renaissance of 1999, the MAP of 2000 followed by NEPAD in 2001. Also examined is Mbeki’s role in the creation of the AU in 2001. The chapter attempts an explanation of why Mbeki’s Pan-African attempts at economic unity became problematic.

**Chapter Five** depicts and explores Muammar Gaddafi as a Pan-Africanist and discusses his approaches from 1994 to 2008. It begins with a brief biography of Gaddafi, his foreign policy agenda, his political philosophy, Gaddafi as the ‘modern day Nkrumah’, the strategic building blocks towards the formation of the AU. The chapter also establishes a basis for evaluation of Gaddafi’s ‘open-cheque-book’ diplomacy in Africa and the different principles that relate to Africa’s political independence and economic growth. An examination of Gaddafi’s USAF agenda, his move to Pan-Africanism from Pan-Arabism, his de-dollarisation programme of 2009, his role as AU chairperson and the ultimate creation of the AU in 2002 constitute part of this chapter.
Chapter Six collates the findings and conclusions drawn from chapters two, three, four and five and makes evaluations and recommendations for Africa and Pan-Africanist ambitions to consider new approaches towards the achievement of a united continent.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IDEOLOGY OF PAN-AFRICANISM FROM THE 1900s

2.1 Introduction

This chapter details the origin, ideologies and the concept of Pan-Africanism and Africa from the 1900s. It presents a summary of the existing works on Pan-Africanism, the growth of Pan-Africanism as an ideology. It provides context and analysis to the dissertation, and at the same time facilitates a clear understanding of the reasons why African unity is an utmost prerequisite to liberate, empower and develop the black man and the African continent from foreign exploitation and manipulation.

According to Esedebe (1982: 1-2), the literature on Pan-Africanism or the Pan-African ideology is enormous, it can be simply explained as a powerful weapon that liberates, unites, educates, empowers and drives Africans and the people of African descent to redeem themselves and become free of the bondage of the past: slavery, colonialism, brain drain and imperialism. Apparently, this becomes the sole reason why numerous scholars, historians, revolutionaries, politicians as well as researchers and students have critically examined it from its embryonic stage. While the search for knowledge of the subject seems to become more and more interesting, Olusanwuche Esedebe, the renowned US-based Nigerian scholar defends his arguments that, although Pan-Africanism or the Pan-African ideology is endowed with great literature, works on the subject remain in their infancy (Esedebe, 1982: 1-2). He argues that there are several definitions about the philosophy and ideology of Pan-Africanism. There is the version of the African-Americans and people from the West Indies on the one hand; and the Africans on
the continent of Africa on the other. Esedebe (1982: 2) continues that whereas the former holds the opinion that, it is the USA, also called the ‘New World', that is the birthplace and origin of Pan-Africanism, quoting the prolonged battle against slavery; the latter maintains that without the African continent, there is no movement, hence Pan-Africanism sprouted from Africa (Esedebe, 1982: 2-3). Therefore, a comprehensive review of Pan-Africanism through a thorough examination of its major works will in no small way set the pace towards a better understanding of the philosophy as well as opening the study for wider research.

2.2 A review of the concept of Pan-Africanism

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Pan-Africanism has been mainly embroiled in two key questions, according to Landsberg (2007: 1): first, which particular body should administer and lead over Africans, and, second, what is the suitable definition of an African? From the times of Du Bois to Nkrumah and the Mbeki and Gaddafi moments, Pan-Africanism has adhered to two critical and fundamental goals: independence and liberation of Africa from foreign domination and control, and the harmony and camaraderie of the black race worldwide. Landsberg (2007: 1-2) continues that with the collapse of apartheid in 1994, Africans became more confident that they could now govern themselves as they had collectively and successfully defeated and pushed out the last colonial edifices that remained on the continent. As the years passed, Africans both in the diaspora and in Africa began to create new ideologies to take the continent forward. From post-apartheid, post-Cold War, post-colonial times, the late 20th and the early 21st century, Pan-Africans had suggested three new questions to uplift the state and status quo of the continent. They include the following: first, how should the African people be governed at a national, regional and continental level? Second, the question of ‘who is an African' resurrects what type of citizenship should be employed, who should benefit first hand for being an African; and third, what kind of trajectory towards development should be implemented and pursued by African leaders?
According to Walraven (1999: 86) and Geiss (1974: 4) the road to Pan-Africanism has not only been a daunting task as it is embedded with distinct and contradictory philosophies but also it was a task largely dominated by the political elite and intellectuals. Walraven (1999: 86-87) insists that without these groups of trained ideologists, from the diaspora and later from the African continent, the Pan-African agenda would have been but a mere travesty. The dissertation has chosen to use dictionary definitions for the simple reason of a clear and easy understanding of the concept of Pan-African and the origin of the name. Comparisons of this definition among three dictionaries serves the purpose of variety as different interpretations of Pan-Africanism symbolise the various schools of thought engaged on the subject. This gesture, however, does not mean the work ignores definitions from authors in IR, history, politics, political science and across the humanities field of study.

The Oxford Learner’s Dictionary (2010: 60) defines the ‘Pan’ prefix as a Greek word that means ‘all inclusive’ including or relating to particular organisations, racial groups and continents. The Dictionary’s 2018 edition defines Pan-Africanism as “the principle or advocacy of the political union of all the indigenous inhabitants of Africa”. For its part, Pan-Africanism is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary (2018) as “a belief that people from Africa and their descendants should be united, or a movement to achieve such unity”. For the purposes of balanced argumentation, this dissertation also looks into the definition of the subject in the Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary (2018), which describes Pan-Africanism as “a movement for the political union of all African nations”.

Amate (1986: 19) iterates that in the USA, Pan-Africanism is closely linked to the politics of ‘Black-American ideology’, an African identity that originated from the 1960s and 1970s civil rights movements. This is corroborated by the African-American historian, John Henrik Clarke who depicts that “movements by ethnic groups with the aim of recovering and reclaiming their culture, history and national identity, after years of slavery, forceful migration, war, or otherwise, can be referred to as a ‘pan’ movement” (Clarke, 1988: 26). Clarke continued that, “any thought or action on the part of an African person to protect and defend his concept of culture, history
and politics and to defend his rights to self-determination, is an aspect of Pan-Africanism”. While Clarke's definition and ideology provide quite an easy understanding of the key principles of Pan-Africanism, it is nonetheless found wanting when one considers the existence of several other pan-movements. The writer is more or less drawn to his role as an obvious participant in a pan-movement or has his study focused on one particular pan-movement.

Another distinguished Pan-African and African-American scholar, Rayford W Logan, states that Pan-Africanism meant “self-government or independence by African nations, South of the Sahara” (Logan, 1962: 37). His definition made it his intention to particularly exclude the northern part of Africa. He based this assertion on the notion that ‘Arabs were not part of the action’, meaning that they had been exempted from discrimination, torture and dehumanisation undergone by the black African majority because of the colour of their skin. Logan’s definition was criticised by Mohiddin, (1981: 44) based on the fact that although Arabs did not endure discrimination and torture because of their skin colour, they too suffered some form of discrimination and torture. The Europeans referred to them as ‘natives’ and ‘indigents’ distinct from the European superiority and inevitably pushed away from the white suburbs.

Among 21st century historians there was Ahmed Mohidden who held that Pan-Africanism is two things in one: an idea and a movement. He suggested that Pan-Africanism could be embodied with profound feelings of rejection, segregation, dispossession, oppression, persecution, and humiliation. This happened because of the inhumanity and abusiveness inherent to slavery and colonialism respectively. Therefore, the ideology of Pan-Africanism matured into the political space with the goal of black emancipation, unity and solidarity of the people of Africa under a unitary government (Mohiddin, 1981: 195-196). Esedebe (1982: 19) attempts to put together an almost unique definition of the concept. In his words, "Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural phenomenon regarding Africa, Africans and the people of African descent as a unit". By this, Esedebe argues "Pan-Africanism seeks to renew and unify Africa, builds a culture of oneness among the people of the African world, glorifies the history of Africa and restores pride in the African values".
For their part, a handful of scholars, political analysts as well as historians; believe that the creation of the OAU and its successor the AU laid concrete foundations for the rise of Pan-Africanism and its various movements in the 21st century. Sherwood and Adi (2003: 22) argue that the formation of the AU was backed by a strong need by the leaders of Africa to unite the people of Africa. The reason for unity was to make it possible to easily handle the biggest challenges of the 21st century: globalisation and the pressure from emerging super-powers like China. China is singled out as a threat to contemporary Africa because it has comfortably sat in the driving seat colonial Europe manoeuvred decades ago. The only difference between China's exploitation of Africa's resources today and that of Europe in the past is the absence of its military presence. Therefore, globalisation and China's influence directly sway relations from the Global North to the Global South, a move that did not, has not and certainly will not benefit the people of Africa. Sherwood and Adi (2003: 22-23) warn that although the presence of the AU signified a new dawn for Pan-Africanism in Africa and "a demonstration of the ascent of the Pan-African ideologies," the impact on economic development and greater political upliftment was farfetched. Moreover, the concept of Pan-Africanism itself has never had a worldwide accepted definition. Unfortunately, even 21st century writers of Pan-Africanism have been reluctant to offer a balanced definition, thereby acknowledging the fact that the vagueness in the definition of Pan-Africanism is as a result of the concept having been shaped in different historical periods and geography. Cheikh Anta Diop and Obenga Theophile (1987: 109-118) portray the Pan-African ideology as 'activism' or backing towards a 'political African unification'. Meanwhile, the majority of scholars, among them Amate (1986: 13) and Badejo (2008: 11), state that generally Pan-Africanism was simply a crusade of the people of African descent: of males and females alike with the aim of achieving political independence, economic freedom, social redemption and the total rejuvenation of people of African descent.

The above definitions are all vital in the sense that they concentrate on the subject of the political liberation of an identity of the black African in general and draw a strong connection to African ancestry. A large portion of the analysis of the scholars pinpoints the origin of the calamity that faced the African race, hence Pan-Africanism: the inhumane and barbaric transatlantic slave
trade that shipped Africans from mainland Africa to the New World, the USA. Shivji (2008: 33) concludes that Pan-Africanism, therefore, came to unify the various differences between the people of African descent worldwide, something Adi and Sherwood (2003: 43) call the "belief in some form of unity or common purpose among the people of Africa and the diaspora". Hence, the unity that began among the scholars and political activists of the diaspora: Marcus Garvey, Aime Cesaire, Walter Rodney, WEB Du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams on the one hand, and Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Haile Sellasie, Samora Machel on the other.

2.3 Pan-Africanism: tracing the history and origins

According to Landsberg (2007: 1), Pan-Africanism has gone through five key stages. First, led by scholars of African descent based in the diaspora like DuBois, Sylvester Williams and George Padmore. Second, the struggles for liberation and independence to free Africa from colonialism. Third, the construction of nation-states with the view of uniting African statesmen like Nkrumah and Nyerere. The fourth stage dealt with the formation of regional bodies like SADC, CEMAC, ECOWAS and COMESA and the fifth phase, the current step towards a union government for Africa. In the same vein, Geiss (1974: 4) presents a continuum of six political stages of Pan-Africanism as seen in Figure 1 below and explained accordingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afro-Asia Pan-Colonialism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pan-Negroism</td>
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<td>Pan-Africanism</td>
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<td>Sub-Regional Pan-Africanism</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>Ethnicism</td>
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Figure 1: The Continuum of Pan-Africanism (An adaptation from Geiss 1974: 4)

From Figure 1 above, Geiss (1974: 4) clearly categorises his philosophy of the continuum of Pan-Africanism beginning with, the Afro-Asia Pan-Colonialism (the union of coloured and colonial peoples also called Pan-Coloured or Pan-Colonial); Pan-Negroism, perceived as a crusade of black African peoples, particularly, from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with the exception of Africans in the diaspora. This was followed by Pan-Africanism which represents a concentrated measure mainly focused on uniting the agenda of Africans on the continent, this excludes Africans in the diaspora; sub-Regional Pan-Africanism (development of continental unity at the semi-regional level); Nationalism (efforts at the national level wherein tangible emancipation strategies were implemented); and finally, Ethnicism (Pan-Africanism at the ethnic level which grew and matured into a countrywide achievement). From the preceding, therefore, Geiss argues that Pan-Africanist thought and theory evolved as it encapsulated the concept of a free and united Africa. This spanned the liberation actions designed to free people of colour and spread across the board to involve Africans defined by racial lines as well as Africans defined by indigenous confederacies.

However, in general terms, historians and scholars tend to agree that the philosophy of Pan-Africanism originated in the early days of the 20th century at a conference put together by Sylvester Williams, a barrister from the West Indies in July 1900 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974: 372). The ‘African-Association’ was founded by Williams in September 1897 and later recognised as the first-ever Pan-African organisation in the world. The Pan-African association had actively advocated and promulgated unity among the people of African descent worldwide and simultaneously embarked on a mission to safeguard ‘the rights of the Black man’ (Hooker, 1975: 30). Nevertheless, the term ‘Pan-African’ only came into use in London, at its very first Conference held from 23 to 25 July 1900 (Ramla, 2000: 36). As expected, this conference became the very first step towards the formation of the world's biggest black African network and pressure group to loudly pronounce black injustices by the dominant white majority race
In the words of Contee (1969: 54), the conference went ahead to underline what Pan-Africanism generally meant:

…Africans and New World Negroes…unite their efforts in a common struggle to destroy the derogatory image of Africans and Negroes, which is the legacy of slave trade…unite in the struggle against racial discrimination everywhere and for self-determination.

Despite the fact that the word Pan-Africanism has flourished since the London Conference of 1900, Esedebe (1982: 3) strongly argues that no one scholar or research institute should be ascribed the privilege of the origin of the concept. He insists that the exact time when the first Pan-African opinions were expressed and by whom can never be justified. However, he concludes that most views held by researchers and schools of thought are that Pan-Africanism originated from the acts of slavery. For instance, the transatlantic slave trade; the different wings of the struggle that fought for the abolition of slavery and slave trade; European colonisation of the African continent; and the struggle for independence by various African countries; were indeed the basis of Pan-Africanism.

2.4 Pan-Africanism: tracing the philosophical and ideological concepts

In light of the philosophical perspective, Pan-Africanism signifies the amalgamation of the political, socio-economic, scientific, artistic, spiritual, historical and cultural legacies of Africans across the world from the past, present and future (Sherwood, 2003: 44). It traces its origins from the ancient era as ethical model that endorses African values, fights against slavery and slave trade, racism, colonialism, neocolonialism and widely promotes African civilisation. Whereas Pan-Africanism celebrates ‘Africanness', it also exposes the long history of European imperialism and exploits on the continent's natural and anthropological resources. It uncovered a system where Africans suffered enslavement, domination and hardship; hence, Pan-Africanism kindled the spirit of resistance and liberation.
The philosophy also laid the foundation for a political movement across Africa, Europe and the Americas in the late 18th century wherein connections were created that served as solidarity networks aimed at stopping “white oppression and subjugation” of Africans (Adi, 2003: 96). In the UK, London to be precise, Harris (2003: 30) underlined that the ‘Sons of Africa’, a political group, was formed to address the question of the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. In 1971, he addressed the group on the theme of *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery*. The African abolitionist, Quobna O Cugoano stated categorically that a massive campaign should be launched in the form of letter writing and countless visits to key European statesmen to pressure them to bring about a total termination of slavery in Africa and of people of the ‘Black continent’. Among those who received letters from the Sons of Africa were King George III of Britain and the Prince of Wales; Granville Sharp and William Pitt of the White Abolition Movement.

Harris (2003: 34) concludes that by the end of the 20th century, Pan-Africans in London gradually created a ‘modern and organised Pan-Africanist movement’ in the form of the African Association. In 1887, this was later renamed ‘the Pan-African Association’ by Sylvester Williams, the Trinidadian. The major challenge of the association was to look for solutions to the 20th century problem termed ‘the colour line’. This meant the security of the political as well as the civil rights for all people of African descent was of primary interest.

Williams had conceived that it was Edward Wilmot Blyden, an American educator, librarian, writer, diplomat, politician and revolutionary who was the brain behind the idea of Pan-Africanism that signified "the unity of all continental Africa" before the concept expanded to include the African diaspora (Badejo, 2008: 24). Other political brains, as well as institutions preaching Pan-Africanism, included Marcus Garvey’s ‘Universal Negro Improvement Association’ and Du Bois' group; ‘the Niagara Movement' in 1995. The group was galvanised by its protesting nature and constituted of African-American professionals and scholars.
As a legendary scholar, Du Bois edited several journals that promoted the rights and freedoms of African-Americans in particular and the people of Africa globally, in general. *The Moon* (1906) and *The Horizon* (1907-1910) were journals strongly related to the Niagara Movement. From 1909 to 1912, Du Bois helped to found ‘The National Association for the Advancement of the Coloured People’ (NAACP) and served as one of the board members as well as taking up the role as the NAACP's first publicity and research director from 1910-1934 (NAACP, Internet: 2018). The NAACP’s journal, called *The Crisis* was edited by Du Bois and it helped boost the interest and achieved the goals of the organisation.

The ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism was the critical re-examination of the history of the African continent from the perspective of the African and a subsequent return to the originality of African value concepts, culture and general societal norms. For instance, Badejo (2008: 25) maintains that the great Egyptian nation held various great characteristics of ‘Black African’ cultural, social, economic and political lifestyles known in other words as ‘The Nile Valley or African Civilisations’.

Like Badejo, Da Costa (2007: 23) explains that the 1950s, as well as early 1960s, witnessed four major categories of the evolution of the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. First, there was the realisation that the rising African nationalism had to take the form of Pan-Africanism; second, that what was described as ‘territorial nationalism' were artificial borders built by colonial Europe within brotherly African people, and was to be considered unreal and not recognisable; third, that Pan-Africanism should be regarded as none other than a political project and machinery to pilot consistent anti-imperialist agendas; and fourth, than Pan-Africanism built Pan-Africanists who were to remain unrelenting in their struggle for a united Africa, much more as a voluntary mission rather than by force. Da Costa (2007: 24) depicts that the 21st century witnessed the creation of a new Pan-African movement with a similar goal of ensuring the achievement of the “long aspired African unity and solidarity”. This time, the Pan-African spirit brought with it an extraordinary level of peace, unity, solidarity and African independence.
through arms liberation, development, and democracy intertwined with the interdependence of states. The creation of the OAU in 1961 and its eventual replacement with the AU in 2001 along with its network programmes like the APRM and NEPAD meant Pan-Africanism had reached quite an optimal stage.

2.4.1 The contributions of Ghana’s Yaa Asantewaa and South Africa’s King Shaka of the Zulu

As early contributors of Pan-Africanism and pace-setters of the ideology from the continent, both Shaka and Asantewaa were from royal households. Pan-Africanism therefore had greater impetus for success that even Mbeki and Gaddafi would for decades afterwards join in the journey and produce new blueprints of Pan-Africanism: the ideals of a New Lens. This section of the work delves into the contributions of these pioneer Pan-Africanists and how they successfully laid concrete foundations for the rest of Africa to emulate. The discussion begins with analysing queen Asantewaa of the Ashanti and king Shaka of the Zulu.

i. Queen Nana Yaa Asantewaa and British aggression

As a Pan-Africanist and queen mother, Nana Yaa Asantewaa stood firm against British invasion of Asante, white injustices: slavery, colonialism, looting, imperialism and dehumanisation of blackness (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007: 27). Described as ‘Africa’s first female General’, Yaa Asantewaa commanded an army against the British invasion in the Ashanti region of Ghana. Her war skills, spiritual powers, strong army, strategic planning, distinct style of war and knowledge of the terrain consolidated resistance of the Ashanti kingdom. The British army were defeated and pushed back since they were ill-equipped, numerically inferior and had limited knowledge of the terrain. This victory enabled the Yaa’s Esuji inhabitants to expand their land and property as they co-opted small tribes to join them while others willingly surrendered to the allegiance of Queen Asantewaa (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007: 28). Asirifi-Danquah added that Yaa Asantewaa believed in risk taking, Yaa persuaded her kinsmen to do the same for the love of tradition, the
land and the people. Her famous saying was “sometimes, we rulers have to think for those who find it difficult to take risks”. According to Boahen (2003), the British pushed back and conquered the Ashanti people between 1884 and 1888, with the aim of capturing the golden stool of Asante. When the British Governor failed to secure the golden stool of the Asante kingdom and gave an ultimatum for the priceless royal edifices, Nana Asantewaa had to intervene: she removed the interpreter and addressed the British governor directly:

Foolish White man! Who are you to demand the Golden Stool?
The Golden Stool is the property of the King of Ashanti and not
For people like you: Do you belong to the royal family?
Where is our King? Go and bring him to show you
where the Golden Stool is kept. He is the sole custodian
and he knows where it is hidden.

(Asirifi-Danquah, 2007: 61)

All in all, Yaa Asantewaa exhibited courage, patriotism, Africanness, resiliency, fairness and equality. Queen Yaa Asantewaa’s legacy is not only a pedagogical case for the proponents and researchers of African Renaissance and USAF it goes further to depict her sense of leadership, activism, character, power, steadfastness against both local indigeneity and Western marginalisation and colonialism.

ii. King Shaka and the British invaders

Shaka of the Zulu was indeed a complete Pan-Africanist from his actions and model of unification of the African people. Born in 1787 in uNtulikazi, present day KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, he became the most influential ruler of the Zulu kingdom as tens of thousands of African men, women and kids looked up to the great leader at the time. According to Wylie (2006: 518) in 1816, Shaka was raised as the leader of the Zulus as he greatly distinguished himself in battle. He introduced a new political system that combined a series of revolutionary
political, social and economic changes. Shaka defined a systematic administration that was built on Pan-Africanism, respect, strength, equality, unity and patriotism. His involvement of women in leadership symbolised a new political system that changed the roles of leadership on the continent entirely. More so, Shaka refined African ideologies like “the Ibutho” where he forged alliances with smaller tribes against bigger invaders like the Ndandwe and the British invaders (Morris, 1994: 17-69). He also used the skills of diplomacy rather than war to broker peace with some resisting clans. Shaka strengthened the concept of ‘war or combat’ known in Zulu as “Impi”. These contributions upheld the Pan-African spirit of resistance against colonial invasion until his death in 1828.

Shaka was not only known as ‘the African superman’ and ‘superhuman’ but also as an innovator and ‘state builder’ who fought against colonialism and imperial rule of the West. Recognised as ‘Shaka the Great’, Wylie iterated that he united the Zulus and many other tribes like the Xhosa of Nguniland under one rule and went forward and constructed a new type of unique state. Cooper (1966) described this state as ”one man ruled, disciplined and strong and expansive”. Defending the Zulu clan and Pan-African pride, values and culture, Shaka engaged in a bloody war against the British: The Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 (Knight, 1992: 8). This war and Shaka’s strategic war techniques, leadership model, gender empowerment and deep Africaness concludes that Shaka of the Zulu of South Africa like Nana Asantewaa of Ghana played a key role in laying the Pan-African foundation.

2.5 The geographical and racial foundations of Pan-Africanism

A discussion on Pan-Africanism is incomplete without analysing its geography as well as its racial foundations. Tukumi (2003: 89) portrays how black people in the diaspora like WEB Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Henry Sylvester Williams greatly inspired the ideology because they believed the ‘freedoms' of black people in the diaspora were incomplete without the total liberation of the ‘African people' in the motherland of Africa. This was, therefore, a clarion call
for all people of African descent in the diaspora to unite and pursue their rights to freedoms and to spread this right to all blacks globally. Tukumi (2003: 90) further states that Pan-Africanism also aimed to inspire emerging leaders on the African continent to accept the spirit of solidarity; as the key tool of liberation and to shake off the colonial hoax that had engulfed the continent since the 1880s. Therefore, astute African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Haile Selassie of the Kingdom of Ethiopia, and Sekou Toure of Guinea, among others, were strongly influenced by the Pan-African ideologies of Du Bois and his idea of a ‘United Africa'.

Going forward, major success was achieved through the creation of institutions of Pan-Africanism like the OAU in 1961 to ensure total political independence of the African continent. This was followed by the AU which replaced the OAU in 2001 with the goal of economically empowering as well as liberating the continent from neocolonialism (Manelisi, Genge, Kornegay and Rule, 2000: 55).

2.6 The Pan-African Conference and Congresses

The Berlin West African Conference that was held in Europe from 1884 to 1885 laid down rules for the total Balkanisation and subsequent colonisation of the African continent. Convened by the state of Portugal and officiated by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, with no African voice represented, Pringle (2016: 34) states that the black continent was subject to the complete destruction of its geopolitical and socio-economic structures such as its empires, kingdoms, traditions, languages and religions. Redressing and fixing these historical and political wrongs became imminent for Africans in the diaspora and African political elites on the battered continent. From 1900 to 1945 and beyond, Pan-African conferences became the main tool used to rebuild the continent as well as instilling hope and restoring human rights and dignity to the people of African descent.
2.6.1 The Pan-African Conference, London 1900

The first Pan-African Conference took place in London in the 1900s under the auspices of Henry Sylvester Williams supported by WEB Du Bois, Blyden, Delany and Crummell (Whittall, 2011: 18). Following the 1899 preliminary conference, the London conference was attended by 19 African-Americans, 15 West Indians, five black Britons and nine Africans who were students in the UK; representing the Gold Coast, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. For more than three days, the conference addressed the burning issue of discrimination and continuous white domination of people of African descent. According to Sherwood (2012: 107), a decision was made to change the name of the association from African Association to Pan-African Association (PAA). The PAA had four primary objectives:

i. The total security of political and civil rights for Africans and their generation internationally.

ii. To engage with European and American governments to persuade them in considering the interests of the black race. The appalling situation of the black race was highlighted and a call for drastic and fast amelioration was imperative.

iii. Encourage all Africans worldwide to embark on education, industrial as well as commercial projects.

iv. To build relations between two races; the Africans and the Caucasian peoples who have suffered similar fates of discrimination for centuries under Western domination.


2.6.2 The first Pan-African Congress, Paris, 1919
In 1919, WEB Du Bois chaired the first Pan-African Congress that took place in Paris. The Congress brought together key representatives from three continents: Africa, Europe and the Americas. The focus here was the plight of colonialism in Africa and how to derive an international political strategy to eradicate colonial bondage which had become such a heavy burden to Africans in Africa vis-à-vis blacks worldwide (Geis, 1974: 23). The experience and success of the 1919 Paris Congress paved the way for other Pan-African Congresses in London, Brussels, and Paris; still under the stewardship of Du Bois. This second Congress witnessed an addition of delegates from Portuguese and French colonies in Africa. It also gave birth to an ultimate declaration insisting on the question of ‘equality’ between races, a complete ‘return’ of African slaves ‘Negroes’ in the diaspora to their respective countries, the dissemination of democratic practices and a development programme for political institutions on the African continent (Geis, 1974: 24). Geis as well states that the congress insisted that the main world international body, The League of Nations, pay particular attention to the racial discrimination that triumphed in the industrial world and the unequal treatment meted on the workers in both the African colonies and the American plantations.

2.6.3 The 1921 and 1923 second and third Pan-African Congresses in London

The second and third Pan-African Congresses took place in London and stretched to Lisbon, Portugal, where WEB Du Bois addressed a number of Portuguese politicians. His speech highlighted the plight of Africans in their colonies and asked them to unite and end colonialism in these African colonies (Wilson, 1978: 98). The Congress also intensified calls for the independence of African colonies and witnessed the swearing in of the first Liberian president. Du Bois was the official US representative. During this time, there was enormous ‘war-pressure' within European countries together with a heightened arms race which was speedily leading to World War II (WWII) (Appiah, 2009: 25). On the contrary, the tensions in the West became an advantage to the Pan-African struggle across the diaspora in particular, and Africa as a whole. A Jamaican immigrant to the USA called Marcus Garvey championed the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) (Appiah, 2009: 26). The UNIA ultimately became the biggest
movement of people of African descent across the diaspora and had as its slogan, ‘Back to Africa’ (Appiah, 2009: 27). Garvey envisaged a shipping network that transported ‘Negroes' back to their homeland of Africa in his quest to reconnect them to their roots. Appiah (2009: 30) iterated that Garvey was strongly committed to uplift black racial pride and the celebration of black achievements throughout history.

2.6.4 The fourth and fifth Pan-African Congresses, New York 1927 and Manchester 1945

The fourth Pan-African Congress that took place in the USA in 1927, in New York City, laid a foundation for the 1945 Congress held in Manchester, UK. George Padmore (Hakim, 1998) who had joined Sylvester Williams, Du Bois among others in the Pan-African activism in the UK supported CLR James' International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA) later replaced by the International African Service Bureau (IASB) (Sherwood, 2012: 108). Padmore criticised Italy for attacking Abyssinia, and Europe and Russia for supporting Italy while simultaneously being concerned with racial discrimination of the black race under the IASB umbrella. In 1945, discussions on holding another Congress ensued and it was slated in October to be hosted by London (Sherwood, 2012: 109). During this time, Kwame Nkrumah, the first indigenous prospective presidential candidate for the Gold Coast visited the UK from the USA in May 1945 and assumed the position of Regional Secretary of the Pan-African Federation. He was joined by Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Peter Abrahams of SA both of whom worked in the organising committee. The goals were absolute and complete independence for all the peoples of Africa; the complete demilitarisation of British troops from Egypt; the unconditional granting of independence to Egypt and the Sudan; the unequivocal acceptance of the demands of the indigenous people of Libya, Morocco, Tunis and Algeria by colonial superpowers: France and Britain (Sherwood, 2012: 109). After the 1945 Manchester Congress, there were a number of congresses held in Africa that mainly aimed to achieve independence for all colonies in Africa,
self-rule, economic development and ultimately a united Africa. These Congresses were the sixth Pan-African Congress of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1974, the seventh Pan-African Congress of Kampala, Uganda in 1994 and Accra, Ghana in 2014 (Sherwood, 2012: 110).

2.7 The Cold-War period and Pan-Africanism

By 1945, Pan-Africanism had already taken centre stage (Lee, 2013: 8). However, the Cold War advanced the ideology further, not because it was on the agenda of the Western or Eastern Blocs but because the black diaspora did not welcome the intentions of either bloc in using the people of black descent as pawns to push their different Cold War agendas (Lee, 2013: 9). Among the very strong Pan-African projects at the time was George Padmore's ‘International African Service Bureau' and journal that aimed at uniting all Africans across the globe. CLR James another Pan-African strongly opposed the manipulation of the black race by Stalin of the Soviet Union to achieve his Cold War agenda. He, therefore, advocated for a movement that strongly advocated black rights that included freedom from exploitation and discrimination from the white racism and discrimination that systematically and intentionally affected the development of the black race (Lee, 2013: 10). In the diaspora, Manchester hosted the fifth Pan-African Congress with the aim of laying the foundation for an Africa independent from the evil yoke of colonialism. Second, the black race had come of age to shake off white domination and to begin implementing significant decisions for the development of Africans and improvement of the stature of African people worldwide. Pan-Africanism presented a blueprint that fought against Western influence and instituted the system of ‘Black self-determination', free from the existing manipulation from Moscow and Washington since 1947 (Lee, 2013: 11).

In 1957, Ghana became the first independent African country after Britain relinquished their colonial rule of the Gold Coast as it was then known (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004: 118). Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, the country, newly named Ghana, took centre stage in promoting Pan-Africanism by galvanising the total independence of all of Africa. Nkrumah's
independence day address is remembered with this statement, "the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up to the total liberation of Africa" (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004: 119). Nkrumah's statement strongly paved the way for the unification of black socialist and communist unions which previously belonged to opposing camps. Ghana was later joined by Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia which all achieved independence from Western colonial rule between 1960 and 1970. The ideology of Pan-Africanism thus grew strongly across the globe from Africa to the diaspora.

2.8 The post-Cold War period of Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism did not just promote black freedom globally; it endeavoured to achieve independence for all African states under colonial rule. Similarly, the Pan-African ideology spurred continental development, hence the imperative for able Pan-African institutions that could realise the goals of Pan-Africanism. In East Africa, for example, the East African Community (EAC) is a typical extension of Pan-Africanism as this region not only has a concrete regional trading bloc that promotes free trade across the border but went further to create legal institutions in the form of the East African parliament and court (Kantembo, 2008: 107).

Pan-Africanism in the post-Cold War era was nevertheless met with challenges; crises around the issues of the sovereignty of states and political legitimacy, the grip on autonomy, economic sustainability, African 'continentalism' (regionalism) and globalisation. The key challenge was how independent African states would successfully manage to combine the status-quo of its constitution and the rights of its citizenry (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004: 119). Therefore, the initial Pan-African ideology of unifying people of African descent, the quest for an independent African continent and the ultimate unification of the continent, as well as complete eradication of Western imperialism, became compromised. More still, the grip on autonomy by states or the
fear of losing their power stalled the Pan-African ideology further. The lack of motivation to form a concrete African union that works towards uniting the continent and fighting against regionalism and state cooperation remains a great challenge. Besides, the post-Cold War period left independent African states with the burden of economic growth and development and the capacity to raise sustainable national income, free from Western loans and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) (Francis, 2006: 20). In addition, some African states like Botswana and South Africa gravitate more towards African continentalism (an agreement on norms that highly favour regional state unity instead of a continental unity as advocated by Pan-Africanism). Such a stance has perpetrated the creation of smaller and new political bodies across the continent that damages the Pan-Africanist agenda even further (Landsberg, 2012: 47: 2).

Nevertheless, tentative solutions were sought by sovereign African states to weather such storms. For instance, in 1991, the Abuja Treaty was adopted by two-thirds of the members of the OAU. The treaty was aimed at consolidating measures towards a sustainable African economy, fair trade and mutual understanding (Genge, Kornegay and Rule, 2013). Against this backdrop, there was the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) with the goal of fostering socio-economic and cultural integration on the continent. In 2002, there was the creation of the AU which replaced the OAU. This was largely influenced by the post-Cold War politics which shaped the dynamics of IR politics. The collapse of apartheid rule in South Africa also shaped the continental politics; hence the AU undertook a more radical approach in dealing with political, economic and socio-cultural challenges on the continent. In concluding this section, one is forced to highlight that the ideology of Pan-Africanism in the foreign policy of Africa has been watered down as a result of regional trading bodies and African continentalism policy.

2.9 Pan-Africanism and foreign policy of independent African states

Pan-Africanism and the foreign policy of independent African states are vital in continental IR. It is Pan-Africanism that laid the foundation for the independence of African states that have been
subjected to colonialism and white exploitation. Despite the fact that each African state that
gained independence became sovereign with its own nationalistic foreign policy agenda, all of
Africa is tied together by a common historical background of colonialism and European
exploitation (Nanjira, 2010: 453). Therefore, the Pan-African ideology played a very big part in
the enrichment of the relations between African states.

Nanjira (2010: 455) further argues that the foreign policy of Africa is highly piloted by its value
systems wherein key ideologies like "Ujamaa, African socialism, Ubuntu, Negritude" are
embedded in Africa's foreign policy. These ideologies generally stand for unity and oneness
within the dynamics of Africa's foreign policy and were the original pillars instrumental in
Africa's fight for independence and self-rule. In the case of Negritude, for instance, it was an
instrumental foreign policy ideology coined by Aime Cesaire, a Haitian historian and
revolutionary (Nanjira, 2010: 456). He promulgated his ideology as an ‘African value' where
‘Blackness' was symbolic of beauty and pride. Cesaire's ideology was tied to that of Pan-
Africanism as both promoted the superiority of the black man and people of African descent over
white and colonial thoughts that for centuries had uplifted white superiority.

Moreover, Negritude like African socialism, Ujamaa and Ubuntu were all foreign policy
ideologies that generally appealed to Africans worldwide to be proud of their culture, their status
and the colour of their skin. A united African continent would eventually bring into the limelight
the rebirth of a new, strong and powerful nation whose foreign policy goals would rejuvenate
black pride and enhance black influence and power within the international community (Nanjira,
2010: 460-70).

2.10 From the OAU to the AU: the new lens of Pan-Africanism under construction
After succeeding Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s second democratic president, Thabo Mbeki intended to use his Presidency to kick off his ideology of African Renaissance (Mbeki, 1998). Barely four months into Mbeki’s presidency in South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo won elections in Nigeria as a democratic president, his second stint as Nigeria’s leader after serving as military leader for a three-year period from 1976-1979 (Obasanjo and Mosha, 1993). The two statesmen garnered enormous aspirations, at least at the beginning, to carry out reforms to the OAU so that it reflects their objectives. Gumede (2007: 32) wrote that among these objectives were human rights violations, promotion of democracy, bad governance, security frameworks to address conflicts across Africa, a road map to eradicate poverty and unemployment on the continent as well as protection against foreign influences and aggression. Nevertheless, it was the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who came from behind and actually triggered the replacement of the OAU (OAU, 1999 Secretariat, Sirte Declaration).

At the 1999 Summit in Algiers, Algeria, Gaddafi interfered to call for an urgent extraordinary summit of the OAU to be held in Sirte, Libya later that year under his sponsorship. His proposal was to make the OAU a more effective organisation and to attempt to change the already dying organisation by replacing it with a new and vibrant one that matched 21st century challenges. Coming from a failed union with Arab states as a result of inadequate support, Gaddafi was bent on succeeding in Africa amidst international sanctions in the 1990s. Having been welcomed in the OAU, the ‘brother-leader’ as he was fondly nicknamed by fellow African leaders went ahead in 1998 to declare that “the Arab World was finished” and that it was time Nkrumah’s USAF proposal was revived in the Sirte summit (Huliaras, 2001: 5-25). Olufemi George, a Nigerian diplomat stated in his memoirs that Gaddafi expected to “railroad” other presidents into signing a declaration that would speedily create a “federal United States of Africa with a unified parliament in Sirte”. Olufemi continued that, Gaddafi was so convinced that his peers “would sign the declaration that he had already started to transform Sirte into a befitting capital, including the construction of brand new edifices to house the Africa Parliament” (George, 2012). As far as Mbeki and Obasanjo were concerned, Gaddafi’s Sirte Declaration was a “phantom concept” which, like many of his previous efforts at the OAU, was “doomed to failure” (OAU, (1999) Secretariat, Sirte Declaration). Nevertheless, the duo let Gaddafi go ahead and host the summit because they, like many African leaders, did not want to bear the cost of hosting such an expensive summit in their respective backyards.
At the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government (AHSG) on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, all 53 participant states signed what became known as the ‘Sirte Declaration’ which paved the way for the adoption of a Constitutive Act of the AU in Lomé, Togo on 11 July 2002. All 53 heads of state on the African continent signed and ratified the document formally replacing the OAU with the AU (African Union, Archives 2004). In a statement in Durban at the inauguration of the AU in 2002, South Africa's then deputy president, Jacob Zuma stated that transitioning from the OAU to the AU ‘was not simply a name change’, (African Union Archives, 2004). Among the many reasons why the OAU was replaced with the AU was the burning issue of states' 'sovereignty and non-interference' (Franke, 2008: 14). The AU Constitutive Act repealed and replaced the OAU's Charter and stringent ideology on sovereignty and non-interference, with the AU’s Act of ‘sovereignty and non-indifference' (Franke, 2008: 15-16). Ultimately, the continent’s central position on security changed from that of "state security to human security" (Franke, 2008: 17). This shows a clear change in focus by African states from an OAU Charter crafted on decolonisation and the preservation of states’ power versus the AU's Constitutive Act that upholds human rights and non-indifference in conflict situations on the continent (African Union Archives, 2004). Unlike the OAU Charter, the AU's Constitutive Act aligns to the Charter of the United Nations (UN) as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The latter also embodies in its Act various articles particularly protecting the rights of man; on the question on humanitarian intervention, article 4 (h) provides "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision deemed by the Assembly in respect to serious violations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (African Union Archives, 2002: 6-7). Murithi (2007: 42) refers to the AU Charter as the new body that adopted a more interventionist ideology and carries a superior mandate, unlike the OAU's Charter. Nevertheless, Kioko (2003: 19) argues that in spite of the new standpoint of the AU, the body has hardly let go of the sovereignty concept as its Constitutive Act still protects states’ power. He, however, noted that the AU's principles, as well as objectives in the Act, do highlight measures towards redefining the question of sovereignty within the union.
Geldenhuys (2014: 41) describes how state sovereignty was instinctively based on three main traditional Westphalian principles. They include the non-intervention in the national affairs of states, the legal equality of states and the dearth of supranational authority over states. For the AU therefore, the introduction of the new theory of non-indifference substituting that of non-intervention within the African states was significant for two reasons; on the one hand, states had to protect and adhere to the rights of their citizens and on the other hand, the AU called states to order when they failed to act in similar fashion. Williams (2009: 400) argues that the slow shift in sovereignty was as a result of the fact that a third of the member countries that signed and ratified the OAU Charter refused to abandon the Westphalian traditional model of the ‘conservative conception of sovereignty’. One is tempted to conclude that such stance is therefore not far from the global understanding of sovereignty as a whole (Sturman and Cilliers, 2002: 28-29). Unfortunately, the Charter of the UN is built on the same conventional description of sovereignty (Dzimiri and Spies, 2011: 51) Inevitably therefore, Africa with its ugly colonial and imperialist history of constant Western domination will obviously stick to the concept of non-interference in sovereignty more than any other continent (Williams, 2009: 36).

On the second point, the OAU's Charter brought with it a key feature; the protection of all states as well as regimes. Clapham (1996: 111) describes it as "the OAU's purest statements of elements of juridical sovereignty to be ever embodied in an international organisation". This position, therefore, gave birth to incumbent regimes on the continent that characterised inhuman violations. Moller (2009: 20) recounts the various humanitarian crises on the African continent as a result of the non-interference principle that transformed African leaders into dictators hiding under the protection of the sovereignty clause. According to Abass and Baderin (2002: 41), African leaders ratified the AU Act in 2002 thereby agreeing to intervene in the internal affairs of member states if need be. This shift in perception of sovereignty on the continent meant a move from one extreme end of non-interference of the OAU to another extreme end of non-indifference under the AU. Hence, Tieku and Powell (2005: 948-950) note that the ratification of the AU Constitutive Act seems controversial to the stance of most African states because their leaders were mostly dictators who felt the Act was interfering in their affairs thus, weakening their political power. However, this Act was symbolic because the AU became the first
continental union in the world to endorse a clause that ensures "the right to intervene in a state for humanitarian objectives" Murithi (2008: 44). This was further described by Tieku (2004: 250) as "the most significant political change in interstate relations in Africa in almost 40 years". Thus, the recent missions in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Gambia are a clear statement and demonstration of the practice of the policy of interventionism by the AU.

2.11 African state foreign policy: key determining factors

Africa’s foreign policy today is highly characterised by several adjustments that the continent was forced to make as a result of Western marginalisation, control and influence since the period of slavery and the slave trade from the 15th to the 19th century (Vaughan: 2006: 44); colonialism from the 1870s to 1900 (Ekechi, 2002: 13); WWI from 1914 to 1918 (Erickson, 2001: 25-29); WWII from 1939 to 1945 (Tyner, 2009: 65); and the Cold War from 1947 to 1991 (Ninkovich, 2003: 71). Nanjira, (2010: 475) describes levels of key determinant factors of the foreign policy of states. These include the national, regional and international levels. All three levels have the specific agenda of promoting national sovereignty, the interest of the region and the continent respectively. In this light, therefore, Africa's foreign policy resolved to survive and the policy of non-alignment was among them.

Nanjari (2010: 476) further explained how the survival of states essentially meant the understanding of the environment and mastering the global political agenda for the interest of the state particularly, then the region and continent. Within this scope, therefore, the 21st century world portrays the greatest height of capitalism evident within the existence of widespread liberalisation of the international market since the 1940s. This influenced African states to make important decisions that uplift their status: hence Pan-Africanism remained a key strategic tool. Adogamhe, (2012: 2) notes that from the diaspora to the first SSA leaders who championed independence from the 1950s, the unique solidarity within Africans became sustainable as unity bred development. As a concept, Pan-Africanism also spread to the northern part of Africa
mostly inhabited by the Arabs. As per the UN Development Programme’s list of September 2016, these Arab countries include Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, (UN Statistics Division. 11 February 2013. Retrieved 20 July 2013). As North African countries, they were not spared from the yoke of colonial rule and marginalisation (Adogamhe, 2012: 2-3). In fact, the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi (although not black African or a descendant from Africa), had an ideal and contributions that were immeasurable towards Pan-Africanism. His charismatic role in the achievement of the AU and his revolutionary stance and call for a USAF aligned him to Kwame Nkrumah (Adogamhe, 2012: 3).

2.12 Conclusion

As iterated in the introduction above, the study details not only the Pan-Africanist ideals and strategies of both statesmen but as well takes a critical look at how the Pan-African ideology united the continent. By bringing Africans and people of African descent, a people with a common ancestry and history together worldwide, inevitably empowered them to fight racism, colonialism and Western epistemologies and ideologies as a whole (Adogamhe, 2012: 10). Pan-Africanism taught the African people steps towards a united Africa as it was before the 15th century when slave trade began on the continent, how to utilise the power of unity, how to create and navigate vital agendas and construct hypotheses that would go a long way to obtain long-term goals like the protection of the continent against foreign forces, facilitate economic development on the continent, boost international trade, participate on equal grounds within the global space as well as develop skills towards the maintenance of peace on the continent, in particular (Adogamhe, 2012: 12).
Therefore, the independent African leaders today, and the African diaspora have to work together to produce and maintain a steady flow of formidable policies reflecting the Pan-Africanist ideology. Among such ideologies is the promulgation of black integration within the regional and global levels. In other words, free trade, open borders, a single African market and currency and visa-free travels among Africans and people of African descent. These measures will go a long way to drastically reduce the dependency on Western and foreign aid in general (Ibid. 14). Some of the goals have fallen short as result of bad leadership and foreign manoeuvring of African states and systems, coupled with the continent still battling to unite and agree on many key ideals (African Union Archives, 2015). However, there seems to be hope as Pan-Africanism is continuously being practised through the creation of regional economic blocs that promote Africa's economic agenda and intervenes occasionally to ensure peace and stability on the continent. The regional blocs that promote integration include the EAC and the Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (COMESA), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the South African Development Community (SADC) among others (African Union Archives, 2017) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) whose military intervention codenamed ‘operation Restore Democracy’ ensured peace and security in the Gambia over the case of ousting the Gambian dictator, Yahya Jammeh (after a 22-year term) for the democratically elected leader, Adama Barrow in 2017 (African Union Archives, 2018).

The following chapter analyses the dissertation’s theoretical framework that guides the study, touches on the critical topic of IR vis-à-vis Pan-Africanism and generally lays down blueprints for understanding related concepts that strengthen the topic.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a theoretical outline which will inform the dissertation. First, the purpose and development of IR is provided based on theoretical assumptions of Bull and Watson (1984). The duo hinted at “the expansion of International society” with numerous IR theories deeply contested by different schools of thought. Some of the disputed topics include philosophical beliefs, power, material wealth, and military. Second, the chapter offers a description of the key instruments of Pan-African thought which include but are not limited to concepts of race, black people and people of African descent; populism, socialism, Ubuntu, black education and Negritude. Third, the dissertation explains fundamental norms of two methodologies that constitute the study’s framework, being realism and idealism.

3.2 The birth and development of International Relations Theory
Before WWI in 1918, legal minds across the globe strongly believed that the right of states to proclaim war was inherent in their nature. However, after WWI, the playing field of international politics changed as novel viewpoints emerged in the way states conducted their business with other states on the global stage (Brown and Ainley, 2005: 9). In the middle ages, canon lawyers and theologians considered the war to be justum meaning regular and lawful. Hence, legal doctrine and ethical principle were derived to defend the use of war as a solution to international rivalry and misunderstanding. War, therefore, became an important tool to defend as well as endorse laws, in situations where something illegal had been committed by one state or the other (Dugard, 2005: 500). Progressively, stronger states used it as an opportunity to exploit weaker states through the initiation of wars (Dugard, 2005: 501; Brierly, 1945: 19).
The consequences of WWI were disastrous for both stronger and weaker states, as well as initiators. The war saw the massive loss of millions of lives, the collapse of political regimes and of formidable economies. Such a disaster needed to be prevented in the future and solutions had to be adopted to avoid a second world war. Steps had to be taken by IR and legal experts to secure a peaceful world going forward. Theories became the major solution to this world problem as the question of peace needed to be addressed (Burchill & Linklater, 2005: 11). Three reasons are highlighted why theories are vital for the future of world peace: first, there is a need for preconception of facts to see which are important and which ones are unimportant; second, sets of facts, although validated as true and considered vital, can have several explanations; third, no ambassador, academic or not, can easily bring into line content with facts because all social actions involve principled interrogations which cannot be decided by proof. In sum, theories are important because they ask questions that have no answers without past reflections as well as suitable abstract consideration (Linklater and Burchill, 2015: 11).

3.3 Pan-African Theories in International Relations

IR also describes theories as images, traditions, discourses, perspectives, paradigms and schools of thought that do not necessarily pursue similar objectives. Waltz (1979) describes seven diverse principles that theories follow:

- First is an understanding of the laws of international politics and the regular patterns of a state's behaviour;
- Second is that theories explain and forecast an understanding of the global political state of affairs, from the behaviour of the different actors of state (Smith and Hollis, 1990);
- Third, theories are traditions that help to speculate on affairs between states that concentrate on power brawls, the possibility of genuine globalisation and a concrete nature of the international society satisfactory to all states (Wight, 1991: 12);
- Fourth, theories are also empirical data used to analyse global hypotheses like the presence or absence of war between liberal democracies (Doyle 1983: 20);
- Fifth, the concepts and their usage are better clarified by theories. A good example is a concept of ‘Balance of Power’ as discussed by Wight and Butterfield (1966: 19-20);
- Sixth, is perspectives in IR as well as forms of domination within the international space. Theories criticise them, otherwise, they transform publicly constructed and unpredictable circumstances to look natural and irreversible, also called ‘the critical theory’ (Doyle 1983: 21);

- The seventh principle analyses two facts: first, there is a proper organisation and concrete scrutiny of the main focus of theories in IR: how the different human rights concepts operate and how the social justice norms of the world are formed, practised and defended remains a priority to theories, termed ‘the normative and global ethics theory’ (Wight, 1991: 13). Second, theories study the process of epistemology and ontology in the way they reflect on the theorising processes. Epistemological claims on how human species relate to the world and the ontological assertions about what the international community is actually made of comes to mind; the question of whether the few world superpowers take key decisions on global issues with far-reaching consequences on behalf of the rest, majority sovereign states, is democracy in any form (the constitutive theory) (Doyle 1983: 22).

The seven different theories above as referred to by various theoretical houses constitute strong components in the arena of IR. Their diversity is as a result of the type of questions asked at any given time and place. At times, the question lies with what should be done, in relation to what particular action is necessary to produce the kind of result rightfully desired. On the other hand, the question lies in what particular item or means is needed to resolve a problem and how exactly it is supposed to be interpreted (Ainley and Brown, 2005: 7). The following theories of power, material and military played key roles in the building of Pan-African philosophy as they corroborate Doyle’s narrative of a sovereign and democratic state and continent.

3.3.1 The Theories of Power, Material wealth and Military

Power, Material wealth and Military are themes and key concepts that have been of great interest within the human sciences for a long time, probably centuries. These ideologies are inter-linked
and play back-to-back roles in the exercise of the duties of states, interstate and international negotiations of all kinds. In the study of Pan-Africanism too, power, material wealth and military plays a dynamic role throughout the struggle; from the days of King Shaka of the Zulu, Yaa Asantewaa, WEB Du Bois to the days of Mbeki and Gaddafi.

Generally, power engulfs the military in most cases as the heads of states and leaders in power automatically become head or commander-in-chief of the military. This section of the dissertation discusses power considering that it includes the characteristics of material wealth and the military. This research presents the need for the reader to understand what exactly power, material wealth and military actually mean when discussing IR and Pan-Africanism. As defined by Weber, military or what is popularly referred to in history and IR as ‘military power’ refers to armed forces of a nation. In a narrow scale, this involves soldiers in uniform armed with weapons to defend the interest of the state. In a wider sense, it involves great military power to start a war with the involvement of aircraft, rockets and nuclear bombs. On its part, wealth is described by Schweikart (2009) in simple terminology as financial, material and natural resources, earned or obtained legally or illegally for the pleasure of human desire and the benefit of one’s family and nation. Power in itself is a complex phenomenon, therefore, when discussing the concept, it is necessary to know exactly whose power one refers to. Max Weber (1947: 152) defines power as ”the probability of one actor within a social relationship to harness the position to execute his personal volition in spite of resistance”. On his part, Arendt (1970: 44) described power as a philosophy belonging to existing individuals, a group or an organisation that strives for change. Such power disappears when such individuals, groups or organs collapse. In IR as in Pan-African studies, power remains a critical and constant subject. With Pan-Africanism living up to a New Lens with the ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi, power became an imperative factor that drove their agendas forward. While the former utilised his position as SADC’s strongest leader and bread-basket to the sub-region to push through the African Renaissance in relation to MAP, NEPAD and the APRM; the latter used his financial wealth in the North of Africa and his oil power to make his impact felt across the continent as he pushed through the ideology of the USAF. The actions of both Mbeki and Gaddafi are justified by Morgenthau (1954: 11) when he connected power with the control of perceptible and quantifiable mineral and natural resources,
national stability, resources, giant industries, booming and wealthy economy, strong military capacity, spacious geography, vast land and a sizeable population. Fortunately for the New Lens Pan-Africanists, they both had these resources at their disposal at the time they pushed their ideals of Pan-Africanism. Going forward, Carr (1946: 109) contended that among the list of resources mentioned by Morgenthau, he considers military power to stand supreme. According to him, military power serves as both ‘a means to an end and an end to itself’ because it keeps the state in peace as well as upholds the status of the president in case of any attacks; foreign or domestic. Finally, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) argue that among the advantages of military might, be it in IR or Pan-Africanism, such power can go as far as incorporating external forces: neighbouring states, geopolitical relations that go a long way to consolidate advancement of ideals by one statesman to the other. Baldwin (2012: 18) corroborates that power analysis stands out as one of the most promising and at the same time one of the most ancient theories used by humanity to navigate both the study and dispensation of world politics by different races globally. Hence, Mbeki and Gaddafi’s motives or drives towards a New Lens of Pan-Africanism cannot be too farfetched from the scholars’ approaches discussed above.

3.4 Addressing the link between International Relations and Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism deals with beliefs, opinions, people’s interest and power dynamics within the global arena: universal political mediums and international political economy, as such, it is, above all, an international phenomenon (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1994:109). This sub-section is the gap within the study of global systems as well as an analysis of ‘black consciousness’ widely practised through Pan-Africanism since the end of the 19th century. Having discussed already the broad view of Pan-Africanism, we will proceed to engage with its multidimensional meanings within international politics and its fluctuating character throughout history since 1900.
3.4.1 The return of Pan-Africanism

After the death of Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism seems to suddenly have lost its flare if not its existence. From 1980 to 1990, a significant silence on the subject became the norm. This was the period when globalisation took centre stage in Africa and when a great number of African leaders turned their backs on the Pan-African ideals of ‘unity, solidarity, and a general Africanist character’. Nevertheless, Pan-Africanism re-emerged as a discourse within the Global South (countries of Africa with low income, and countries with middle and low income such as Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the World Bank) (World Bank, 1992). These countries offer arguments such as ideological world views deemed by the dissertation to be sensible, authentic, strong, and of an opposing nature. These views stand on the sidelines and oppose the ‘mainstream, domineering and hegemonic’ Eurocentric views of the Global North countries: USA, Europe and Canada. Pan-Africanism defines, recognises and interprets the present modern system of the world as a patriarchal, capitalist, imperial, hierarchical, colonial, heteronormative, biased and exploitative international social order (Mignolo, 1995). Frantz Fanon discussed this in his popular book, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon, 1968).

The apex of such truncated international social order in the USA and ‘Eurocentric universalism’ across the Western world simultaneously places Africa in particular and the Global South in general at the subaltern level. At the epicentre of this modern global system is the philosophy of ‘coloniality’ defined by Quijano (2000: 342) as “a Eurocentric project based on the imposition of racial, ethnic and gender classification of the global population as the cornerstone and defining element of the modern international system.” Among the greatest consequences of coloniality was the Berlin West African Conference of 1884 where the entire continent of Africa was chopped up and shared among European nations as some sort of free material and human possession. Eurocentrism vis-à-vis the superiority complex of the Global North pushed them to assume that Africa was an opportunity for controlling, reaping, looting, stealing, maiming, taxing, exploiting, destroying, killing and continuous claim of hegemony (Adebajo, 2010: 8-9).
Pan-Africanism therefore struggled to understand why Europeans thought it was their right to hijack the modern international order and make it their own while simultaneously dictating to other continents, labelling them down and encroaching deep into their backyard. Afrocentrism expressed strong doubts of the social identity question: white and black and the cultural delineations of the planet into portions named America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Was Eurocentrism guilty of the naming and differentiation of the human race into different races of black, white, coloured, Indian and inferior and superior, rational and irrational, civilised and primitive, modern, traditional. More still, was Pan-Africanism questioned if it was reasonable for Europe to usurp strange capitalist modalities that released ‘darker’ features of innovativeness such as colonialism, slave trade, mercantilism, so-called ‘legitimate trade’, apartheid and today’s globalisation in Africa (Quijano, 2002: 8-11).

Realising that Europe and Eurocentrism was guilty of ruthlessly hijacking the IR standards and norms, Pan-Africanism had to address these Eurocentric imperfections, inhumanity and massive global bias for the people of African descent in particular and for the world at large by redressing, reversing and replacing such world order which was not supposed to exist in the first place. An alternative world view emerged from the premise of equality between Africa and Europe. Bringing to an ultimate end the inimical slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, neocolonialism, and globalisation and its Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is the first step in the right direction. The success of this means curtailing the very visible asymmetrical power relations imposed on the continent by Western modernity. Quijano (2002: 9) reiterates that without the works of Pan-Africanists in diaspora, their thorough and direct clash with coloniality for instance, the solidarity Conferences and Congresses across Europe, USA and in Africa, tagging along with the Global South in general, the racial hierarchy, patriarchy, hegemonic, capitalist, heteronormative international social order; would not have died and gradually disappeared at the time it did.

Nevertheless, the Pan-African project has in the 21st century died a natural death. After the exit of Nkrumah particularly, the heads of states left behind and the new generation arising from the
1980s and 1990s literally collapsed the ideology. With the exception of major Pan-Africanists like Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, and even with support from Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, the continent’s interest in Pan-Africanism has generally lacked support. Without African leaders across the board of the AU transcending from their narrow mentality nationalism to a European Union (EU) style of value maximisation of Pan-Europeanism as they strengthen their states, Pan-Africanism has no future, nor has Africa as a continent. At another level, the Pan-African task suffers from new imperialism orchestrated by the USA and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This body does not support a vibrant and united African union and continent within the present modern global system, because a new and formidable actor arising from the Global South is seen as a threat to world power and most importantly as an impediment to Western exploitation such as the EU and USA whose forefathers looted, destroyed and underdeveloped the continent in the first place.

3.5 The origin and development of African political thought and theory

Over time, historical philosophies and ideologies have evolved and African political thought and ideology are not excluded from this. However, what makes it different is the focus on the consistency of ideas that have forever stood on the issues of unity and freedom of the black race worldwide. This could be attributed to Pan-Africanism, a political philosophy whose evolution swept across university corridors and in the process empowered and transformed young Africans with the intellectual capacity to take on the world in the promotion of black political thinking and ideology. Armah (1973, 2000, 2008, 2010) described this Pan-African process as "an intellectual and philosophical movement tied to the aspirations of people of African descent in different parts of the world with the goal of liberation".

The political thought of Africa refers to "the original ideas, values, and blueprints for a better Africa that informs African political systems and institutions from the ancient period of Kush,
sixth Century BC to present" (Guy, 2012: 1). African political philosophy is quite an exclusive domain of literature that is categorised into two distinct bodies: the aboriginal and the contemporary African political knowledge. The indigenous came into existence as far back as the times of "the golden age of history" (the times of great African empires of Kush/Nubia, Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Kanem-Bornu) with scholars like Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Battuta, Leo Africanus and Al Bekri. These scholars were associated with ancient indigenous Afro-political systems and institutions. On the other hand, the contemporary African political belief arose from the dusk of the 19th century and the dawn of the 20th century with a significant focus on aspects of ‘black nationalism and African socialism’ (Cooper, 1997: 60).

Championing the course were scholars, revolutionaries and politicians like Wilmot Edward Blyden Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, James Africanus Horton, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. In addition, African scholars who developed innovative concepts for an original, autonomous and free continent were: Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aime Cesaire, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Cheikh Anta Diop, Ali Mazrui, and Mahmoud Mamdani, Samuel Ajayi Crowder, Claude Ake, John Mensah Sarbah Mueni Muiu, Alexander Crummel, Blaise Diagne and Herbert Macaulay (Guy, 2012: 1-2). In West, East and Southern Africa, early nationalists comprised of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Tom Mboya, Felix Houphouet-Boigny (who became president of Burkina Faso) and Nelson Mandela. Among African liberal advocates were: SA’s Robert Sobukwe; Eduardo Mundane, Agostinho Neto, Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egyptian founding political father and first democratic president), Jacques Rabemananjara and Oginga Odinga. The populist-socialists include Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings; while the populist socialist figures were Cheikh Anta Diop, Pathe Diagne, Anton Mziwakhe Lembede. Walter Rodney then concludes the list as one of the outstanding African populist characters (Cooper, 1997: 60-62).

Martin Guy (2012: 3) states that African political theory features and exhibits the works of legendary African scholars, advocates, revolutionists, statesmen, activists, musicians and traditionalists across the board. Initially Africans in the above categories began as activists and political thinkers like most of the world's renowned philosopher-kings. Second, Guy argues how
at the time of a global revolution of ideas, it was no surprise to record a high percentage of Africans who have largely embraced the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Third, a true and thorough dedication to the cause of country and people hence, crowned as dedicated nationalists of the African continent (Guy, 2012: 3). Last, the Pan-Africanists from both the diaspora and from mainland Africa were faced with heavy-handed Western threats at political and scholarly levels. Therefore, at the end of such a war of redeeming the African personality and recreating Africa’s own philosophy, such lives and terms of political office were simply short-lived. For instance, Walter Rodney, Steve Biko, Patrice Lumumba, Thomas Sankara, Samora Machel, Amilcar Cabral, and Eduardo Mondlane were viciously murdered by secret agents and services of the West. Frantz Fanon died of a mysterious disease while Kwame Nkrumah and Mohammed Gaddafi although older, were systematically thrown out of power through Western-sponsored coups until their subsequent tragic deaths (Guy, 2012: 3-4).

Mnguni (2018: 113-120) further expounds that with the fall of the Marxist-Leninist as well as the European socialist ideologies from the East, during the post-Cold War eras, black statesmen just like black scholars began the swift introduction of ‘African nationalism, African socialism’. There were the ‘theoretic paradigms and the theoretical models of Pan-Africanism’, ‘Negritude, the Populist Ideology of the Socialist Part I’, of Congo’s Patrice Lumumba and Samora Machel, the ‘Populist ideology of the Socialist II’, of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. President Nkrumah again championing the USAF ideology, Frantz Fanon and Steve Biko’s ‘Populist-Socialist ideology’ and the ‘Africanist-Populist ideology of development and popular democracy in Africa’. These were subsequently followed by African-Populist theories such as the land reforms championed by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe in the 1990s and continued by president Jacob Zuma of SA in the 2000s. Similarly, while Thabo Mbeki of SA came up with the new adage of the African Renaissance, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi picked up Nkrumah’s USAF agenda and ran with it right until his assassination in 2011.

Martin Guy (2012: 4-6) went further and concluded that what became known as ‘the African political thought’ like other political beliefs springs from an examination of various political
thoughts and theories. Such theories and ideologies were established on the ideas of a number of African scholars and statesmen. It hails from the articulation of writings, autobiographies, speeches and policy statements of African scholars, politicians and statesmen and women. Political dogma preoccupies itself with meticulousness and information about political action; whereas, political theory stimulates political thinking and research. African political theory takes two forms; the traditional (folk philosophy) and modern politics (Western philosophy). The former was suitably understood through the means of anthropology and within the latitude of recent politics wherein even the likes of Western ideas of philosophy are usurped. The two are therefore inextricably linked to each other where, while the former makes available solutions to all economic, social, cultural and political glitches; the latter influences structural growth and action through catchphrases and slogans.

Nevertheless, African political thought has met significant criticisms concerning its place in the arena of international political research. Cooper (1997: 65) underscores the concept of African political thought as a subject that has unfortunately taken rather a peripheral position on the academic scenery. It has neither captured centre stage within African research nor has it frequented the broader spectrum of universal debates on political theories. According to Cooper (1997: 65-66), this is due to contradictions in the Western literature within Africa that has destroyed the continent’s curriculum as well as its political background well into post-colonial Africa. This, therefore, challenges the continent to make room for greater exploration of African political theory with a focus on the "dualism in colonial thinking".

Frantz Fanon’s *Towards the African Revolution*, 1986 also expresses fear about the Western denial and neglect of African political thought and ideology in his own words:

Colonialism and its derivatives do not, as a matter of fact, constitute the present enemies of Africa. In a short time, the continent will be liberated. For my part, the deeper I enter into the cultures and political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology (Guy 2012: 1-2).
According to Etieyibo (2016: 3), African political thought is a philosophy that can be best understood through insight into the use of "universalist" and "particularist" theories. By universalist, Etieyibo draws allusion to affiliates of the universalist school of thought who hold the view that humanity as a whole is subject to equality. Therefore, in terms of methodology, philosophy should be considered equal both in the Western and African epistemology, be it analytic, rigorous, scientific, rational, systematic or universal. On the contrary, particularists coming from the particularist school of thought iterate that some systems are superior to others hence, cannot be considered equal since various cultures possess varying frameworks and philosophies unique to themselves. This study utilises both a "geographical point" and "psychological attitude" to demonstrate the positions of the universalists and particularists alike (Appiah, 1992: 9). Appiah (1992: 10-15) continued and underlined that from the geographical perspective, people who originate from or are located in countries like the USA and Europe are referred to as "the West" and considered as "superior". Also, examining the "psychological attitude", people sympathetic to Euro-American and Canadian culture and models represent the "Western World" much in contrast to people living in geographical areas like Africa, the Middle East and Asia. They are classified as "inferior" and any affiliation and philosophy they hold other than that of the West, relegates them to a backdoor position of the "undesirable and expendable" despite the richness of their philosophy and political thought or theory.

3.6 Blackness: black scholars and the evolution of African political thought

When the identifiable movement of Pan-Africanism formally kicked off in 1900 with its premiere Pan-African Congress in London, it left a distinct road map of black emancipation, rejuvenation, power and hegemony that began shattering the borders of Western imperialism and Westphalian power. Kehinde (2017) portrayed that ‘Blackness’ became a symbol of resilience, power and personality of the African people, the African race and the African ‘nation’ or continent. It as well laid the foundation of black liberation from slavery and slave trade, torture and racism in all its forms. Also, Marcus Garvey, in his writings described as ‘Garveyism’
created and led a mass movement of black people in the diaspora rooted on the premise of a ‘Black Nation’. Malcolm X took up from where Garvey left off and developed what became known as ‘the organisation of Afro-American Unity’. This chain of reactionary spirit of the black race meant that blackness was on a steady rise in an ideologically possessive world of ‘Whiteness’, wherein the latter had no room yet for newcomers. Therefore, blackness had to force its way through into the white dominated world that resisted ideologically and militarily. These acts consolidated the route of revolutionary thought and practice of nationalist pride that till this century stares straight into the eyes of white supremacy across Africa in particular and the world as a whole. It is such blackness of pride, protection and power that Mbeki and Gaddafi found fit their new Pan-African ideals.

On the dialogue of black scholars, it is problematic to think that Africa as a continent can boast of a particular date when African political thought was founded. Nevertheless, the continent like the rest of the other continents of the world possesses its own unique collection of scholars who have established theoretical instruments that could put the continent on the map, advance its own agenda and qualify its beliefs and philosophy which the rest of the world could learn from. In 1954, Marcus Garvey championed the most influential write-up that spoke of ‘Afrocentricity’ as a theory to rival ‘Eurocentricity’ (Verharen, 2000: 223). Afrocentricity and Afrocentrists picked up momentum during the days of the Civil Rights Movements in the USA.

Diop (1981: 84) argues that despite the fact that the African scholars rose at different moments in history, they nevertheless provided adequate solutions to the challenges they encountered about Africa and its people. Against this backdrop, Diop presents examples of African intellectuals like Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Franz Fanon, Eduardo Monlane, Thomas, Sankara, and Nelson Mandela among others; who constituted the backbone of Africa as they represented various brands of philosophies including Marxism, Leninism, African socialism, Ubuntu, Negritude and African nationalism. Etieyibo (2015: 147-70) contends the intellectuals mentioned and their above theories gave birth to one magnificent project: Pan-Africanism. This was the unique political philosophy that stood out and brought
about an 'African rejuvenation' of its political prodigy that spread out across the continent though its seeds were planted miles away from the continent by African-Americans and West Indian scholars and political activists. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian political philosopher, wrote *The Prison Notebooks* wherein he demonstrated how important the work of African scholars was within the global space as they had to convince and prove to the prejudiced body of Western scholars that African political thinking and philosophy was real and had stood the test of time. Gramsci made a very clear differentiation between two theoretical classifications of scholars namely, “the organic and traditional intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2000: 22). While the former concentrate on the subjects of aims, ideals and objectives that arise within the social structures, like persecuted social and ethnic classes; the latter focuses on, and identifies with the superior governing classes within states, whereby they defend both their philosophical and theoretical objectives.

Gramsci alludes to this phenomenon as an "international procedure". Within the context of Africa, Wa Thiongo (2009: 26) maintains that the fight against conventional colonialism and imperialism witnessed a great number of African scholars falling within the classification of ‘first category’ (the bourgeoisie ). Meanwhile, during the post-colonial era, similar to the achievement of African independence across Africa, a group of African intellectuals emerged who fell under the ’second category’ (the underprivileged class). Unlike Ngugi Wa Thiongo, whose works finds him aligned to the second category as he lambastes African bourgeoisies for abandoning the goal of independence and impoverishing the majority of Africans; Ali Mazrui on the other hand was a Kenyan traditional scholar, whose works and philosophical pieces defended the interest of the bourgeoisie in Africa (Mazrui, 2014: 46). Fanon (2015: 43) like Ngugi castigates the oppressive African governing class in his book *The Wretched of the Earth* published in 1998. He vividly evaluates and positions the evolution of African scholars within the continental spheres. Fanon draws a distinction among three stages penetrated to obtain what he qualifies as “true historical calling”. They included: national liberation struggles, assimilation; and questioning or rebellion. All three phases are determined either by political, economic as well as socio-economic features and procedures. For instance, the national liberation struggle phase saw the likes of Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, Sankara and Samora championing the course
of national liberation and freedom to become pioneer presidents. On the contrary, the assimilation phase groomed Africans who unfortunately aligned with colonialist tendencies and went as far as defending its ideology. A good example is Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese national who served France for a long time and made history as one of the first Africans to become a Deputy in the French National Assembly.

3.7 Colonialism as a tool of Western exploitation of African political thought

Colonialism, according to Mudimbe (1998: 1-2), was a "new historical form, an intellectual project and colonising structure" by the West from the political and economic dimensions. Mudimbe’s comments presented a fundamentally new model of dissertations on Africa’s culture and tradition which went further to open a space for "consistent socio-political expression of conquest". Africa, therefore, became a victim of exploitation in the field of anthropology through the development of Western techniques and models that only saw Africa as a "dark continent and primitive" (Mudimbe, 1998: 17). This gave birth to new forms of discourses, radical in nature with a keen focus on "African traditions and cultures". At the dawn of the 20th century, such discourses had been characterised with elements of racism and inequality. Mudimbe (1998: 17-18) refers to this as "discourses consistent with the socio-political expression of conquest", visible in anthropology, demonstrated in labelled African political thought as "the primitive" in agreement with fluctuating tendencies within the agenda of "the civilised" Western political ideology. Hence, the increasing contrast between the "traditional versus the modern", "African versus European", "the indigenous African versus the external Western" ideologies. Against this backdrop, Mudimbe and Appiah, (1993: 118) emphasise that the Western ideology, therefore, preoccupied itself with two disruptive opposite systems of knowledge which in the long run greatly tainted the image of African political philosophy and political theory and simultaneously hampered its future research deep into the 21st century. It is against this backdrop that this study found it necessary to adopt Michael Freeden’s ideological method and political theory with the aim of revamping Africa’s political thought into a well-defined and unique empirical revision and theoretical survey. This allows room for a spontaneous understanding and clarity of the
elements of the historical, socio-cultural and political contexts of political belief and theory of the "Dark Continent" (Freeden, 1996: 132).

3.7.1 Freeden’s ideological analysis of ideology

Michael Freeden conceptualised his ideologies in a "sphere in which political theory as a discipline can find its rationale". This indeed appeared as a convenient vehicle to drive Africa's political theory in the perfect direction. The approach made way for a proper examination of the theory of African socialism on the one hand and the culture of Ubuntu on the other (Freeden, 1996: 106). His argument involved facts that each successful analysis of political theory would not be limited by a deconstruction of philosophy from an individual perspective of a political concept. This is as a result of the fact that the concepts of political theories attain their meaning from "the idea-environment in which they are located". Therefore, according to Freeden, political concepts intertwine with each other in various ways that lead to distinct unique configurations (ideologies). Freeden (1996: 132) further refurbished ideological studies as well as prescribed how political theory should embrace the socio-cultural environment which forms political concepts for the obvious reclaim of "its rightful place in the extensive area" prevailing beside the empirical analysis and political philosophy. This research will focus on how Freeden's description of ideology benefits Africans and at the same time demonstrates the usefulness and importance of African political philosophy and theory. The ideologies of African socialism and Ubuntu will be summarised exclusively at society's general level.

i. The ideology of African Socialism and Populism

Cooper (2002: 38) attempts to define African socialism based on two key historical factors: first, "the loss of her global legitimacy to colonial Europe" since the Berlin Conference of 1884 that saw Africa politically dominated, economically exploited and socio-culturally discriminated. Populism is defined by Will Brett (2013: 10) as “a classic example of a stretched concept, pulled out of shape by overuse and misuse”. According to Allcock (1971: 372), it was a term that
originated from ‘self-designation’ since the 19th century and was widely used by US majority white citizens against the minority blacks and Red Indian population. Canovan (1981) describes three types of populism that govern the theories of leaders worldwide. These include: Revolutionary populism, Little Man populism and Authoritarian populism. In the context of this research, Pan-Africanism ties in well with revolutionary populism where the dire state of events of black people worldwide triggered agitation, resistance and revolutions. From 1957 to the 1960s, African nationalism pushed for the decolonisation and independence of several African states beginning with Ghana, previously called the Gold Coast. Second, "the Cold War between the Capitalist West led by the USA and the Socialist East led by Russia" became an advantage to Africa's political thought as it presented Africa with the chance to independent policy on whom to support and on what gains. This became possible in the 1955 Bandung Conference with the Non-Alignment clause (Westad, 2005: 2-3).

Assensoh (1981: 74) iterates that one of the core values of African socialism is its ultimate demand for "freedom for the African population, the end of colonial exploitation, the assertion of African independence and the rejection of colonial boundaries". Herein, unity and resistance became the key weapons of achieving these demands as Ghana achieved independence in 1957 and paved the way for other African countries to follow. Colonial artificial boundaries were erased and unions formed with examples like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union (1958-1963), EAC from 1967-1977 and the Senegal-Mali Federation (June-September 1960).

Although they were not sustainable unions they, however, paved the way for greater unions and regional blocs that eventually led to the OAU, Africa's first continental body on 25 May 1963. This continental institution adequately usurped African socialism and nationalism where it championed the cause for the total independence of all of Africa. Africa’s last country to achieve independence was Namibia, former South West Africa. The German territory was placed under administration with the South African apartheid government until a peace deal was brokered by the UN on 21 March 1990. The OAU had achieved its mission and was replaced by the AU in Durban, SA on 9 July 2002 (Assensoh, 1981: 81).
Moreover, academic discourses also triggered the exceptional character of African socialism. African scholars who had been schooled and trained in Europe and the USA returned to the continent and championed the revolution through various means. For instance, the Senegalese Leopold Sedar Senghor was praised for his poetry and intelligence in his writings, by the French scholars, anthropologists, philosophers, schools of political theory, the Catholic church and by the French government (Hymans, 1971: 87-88). Alongside Senghor were Kwame Nkrumah and Amical Cabral (Assensoh, 1998: 71). Besides African socialism, African scholars were also inspired by their local upbringing as it enhanced their principles and philosophies. The Marxist theory was also embraced by Senghor and Nkrumah and it enabled them to transform into leading Pan-Africanists from the 1960s. Meanwhile, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere held on to Fabian socialism and subsequently became the father of independence in his country (Idahosa, 2005: 52).

Mazrui (2000: 101) makes a fundamental assertion that one of the "most authentically indigenous of all the legacies of political thought" on the African continent is its traditional atmosphere of "the collectivist". This meant, "linking the past with the present and the future" on a well calculated cumulative compromise that constitutes a vital part of the political ideology. As leaders of nationalist movements, the widespread support that Senghor, Cabral, Nkrumah and Nyerere enjoyed was thanks to the collectivist characteristics they pursued. All in all, African socialism could be said to possess both the scholarly inspirations and holding the post of theoreticians who sought to transform their philosophies into dominant ideology despite their status quo as politicians and intellectual elite.

**ii. The ideology of Ubuntu**

The South African Archbishop and anti-apartheid activist, Desmond Tutu said, “a person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully formed…We need other

This section of the dissertation discusses the African Ubuntu philosophy, its practice and its significance to the African ideology and its success in bolstering Pan-Africanism. The word Ubuntu originates from an African Nguni (isiZulu) ethnic clan in Southern Africa. It takes from the aphorism: *Umumtu Ngumuntu Ngabantu*, translated as “a person is a person, because of or through others” (Moloketi, 2009: 243). Khoza (2006: 6) argues that Ubuntu is the human capacity within the African culture to express compassion, uphold dignity, humanity, reciprocity and mutual interests of constructing communities with mutual benefits and the maintenance of equal justice for all. The Ubuntu philosophy is practised with the aim of unlocking the capacity of an Afrocentric culture. Poovan, Du Toit and Engelbrecht (2006: 23-25) describe this practice of Ubuntu as a situation whereby the people will showcase acts of humanity, empathy, mutuality, sympathy and dignity with the aim of uniting communities to instill growth, peace and unity. Koster (1996: 99-118) and Nussbaum (2003: 21-26) add that the Ubuntu philosophy instills respect and encourages love within African ethnic communities; hence the construction of an African framework and network. The Pan-African perspective of ‘priesthood’ completely throws out the concept that an individual can be identified or recognised to undertake an important project through his psychological as well as physical features. Lastly, Ubuntu prides itself on an “African communal life that expresses the common humanity, interconnectedness and the responsibility of individuals to each other”.

Ubuntu as a philosophy for the promotion of Pan-Africanism exhibits profound knowledge of the ideology within an African context. Dia (1992: 26) and Mbigi (2005: 75) argue that significant research on the subject has been carried out during the last four decades and indeed justifies the vital role Ubuntu plays within the political leadership structure in Africa. For instance, community life is deemed paramount to personal preferences. Hence, the Ubuntu philosophy stands to guard and preserve ‘the African style of politics’ wherein personal relations with one’s community at its best sets precedence for other successes that arise. On this note,
Heuvel, Bunt and Mangaliso (2006: 48) corroborate that Africans generally are considered social beings that are in constant dialogue with each other. More often than not, the Ubuntu philosophy is used to communicate with each other with the ultimate understanding that one’s happiness, growth and prosperity only comes to pass if one ensures the next person enjoys similar benefits. Therefore, one can conclude that survival of humanity in this context depends hugely on the people that belong within that community or perhaps, society.

Wilson (2001: 14) elucidates that Ubuntu surfaced as a historical framework as a consequence of the racist apartheid system in SA by the minority white race over the majority black race. Ubuntu was prompted by the fall of the Cold War in the West, wherein Russia and the US brawled diplomatically at all levels. Ubuntu as an ideology steadily dismantled the apartheid system by utilising revolutionary models of strikes, sabotage, propaganda and boycott. Eventually, the apartheid system of rule collapsed, to be replaced in the 1990s by a democratic system of multiparty politics, a new political structure that witnessed SA’s premiere democratic elections with the ultimate election of Nelson Mandela as president. Wilson further argued that while the end of the Cold War collapsed apartheid rule in SA, it also coincided with the collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), further boosting democracy on the continent. This finally buried the justification for the defence of the apartheid system that claimed that the leading black party fighting the system, the African National Congress (ANC) was backed by the USSR's communist agenda. Moreover, the collapse of communism paved the way for a new kind of world system termed 'liberal democratic capitalism' which controlled both the world's politics as well as its economy. The majority became the new norm and 'one man, one vote’ ruled; hence, SA seized the opportunity and through democratic elections, apartheid was pushed out. The political control by the black majority, therefore, became what Webster and Adler (2001: 1-24) termed "the bargained character of transition" that led to economic liberalisation which made room for black business start-ups.

From the discussion above, the study argues that both the ideologies of African socialism and Ubuntu came about at precarious historical moments during which African societies generally
took back their power of self-rule and restored their dignity, at the same time kicking out colonialism and imperialism. This platform, therefore, empowered the ideologies of African socialism and Ubuntu; clear terminologies such as "explicitly African alternatives", "distinct from Western ideologies", "community building ideological models" and "normative guidance for Africa's development" (Adler 2001: 1-25).

Despite the insinuations and logic discussed concerning the uniting factors that exist between African socialism and Ubuntu, the study finds a contrasting opinion between the two when we consider their historical background as well as their idea-environment. Wilson (2001: 195) argues that whereas African socialism succeeded in achieving independence, democracy and black majority rule in South Africa; for Ubuntu, the ideology seemed to have met several stumbling blocks. In the pursuance of radical economic structures, post-apartheid SA was challenged and as a result the majority of the black population remained deep in poverty as against a white minority wielding more than 80 per cent of the country's wealth (Ramose, 2006: 19). Moreover, the process of articulation of both ideologies was problematic. While African socialism was aimed at empowering and fine-tuning political leaders for the pursuit of independence, Ubuntu took centre stage as a result of the contributions of scholars, religious leaders and politicians alike who more often navigated varying intellectual standpoints (Ramose, 2006: 19-24).

3.8 The political and cultural ideology of Pan-Africanism

The approach here was straightforward and proposes that blacks in their homeland of Africa and those abroad must find knowledge that is clothed with an Afrocentric standpoint. This position meant that African political and cultural ideologies could be best understood from an African viewpoint hence, Africans will regard themselves as central actors and participants rather than simply peripheral agents when non-African theories are engaged. According to Malcolm (1989: 53), strong proponents of black American emancipation in the US took a radical political and
revolutionary stand to defend the African identity. He argued that the African or black past and philosophy were "completely destroyed when we were forcibly brought to America in chains". Malcolm X was deeply surprised at the complete lack of knowledge of African history and education of the average African-American, particularly. In his own words,

the average black person in the United States knows nothing about ancient Egyptian civilisation on the African continent, the ancient civilisation of Mali on the African continent and civilisations that were highly developed and produced scientists (Malcolm, 1989: 37).

He stated that Afrocentrism was quickly replaced with white ideals that made Africans believe there was "no black history than the encounter with white modernity". Malcolm denied the Western philosophy that any black history other than the knowledge spread by former slavers and colonial masters was a fallacy. In fact, Malcolm held strongly the conviction that "our history did not begin with slavery and that armed with the knowledge of [our] past, [we] can with confidence charter a new course for our future" (Malcolm, 1992: 53-54). He, therefore, promulgated Pan-Africanism as a vibrant philosophical asset to revamp black history with the belief that the study of history and culture, among other things, plays a central part in emancipating Africans and Africa from the bondage of slavery and colonialism. Universities became centres for the deliberation of Afrocentric political thinking as they took on the role to shape and preserve the ideal of "oneness of Africa". Studies of ancient African cultural renaissance, development, science, art and psychology were at the centre of concentration (Malcolm, 1992: 53-56). The Pan-African stance of Malcolm X attracted admiration from many scholars. Smallwood (2005: 49) was satisfied that Malcolm X represented one of the finest precursors of "Black Studies disciplines, his call for the reevaluation of the curriculum to reflect Black achievements". Similarly, Dunayevskaya (1982: 38-49) credited Malcolm X for transforming and permeating into Africans in the diaspora the culture of anti-Western thinking and empowering them with "Blackness" as a weapon of universal revolution and consciousness against white supremacy. Asante (1999: 66) praised Malcolm X for rebranding the concept of Pan-Africanism through his creation of different Pan-African philosophies wherein Africans worldwide were influenced to picture "life and history in an Afrocentric view". Asante went
further to rank Malcolm X in the same class as Du Bois whose intellectual capacity fought to address the "regeneration of the quest of better and meaningful humanity by looking at the world through Pan-Africanism". For his part, Monteiro (2000: 37) recognised Du Bois as the first black philosopher and scholar to probe into racial and capitalism problems and the challenges faced by Africans worldwide from an Afrocentric point of view.

Wa Thiongo (2009: 3) argues that the "Berlin Conference of 1884 literally fragmented and reconstituted Africa into British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian, and Spanish Africa". Also called the conference of the partition of Africa, Africa did not only have its resources stolen in billions of pounds but had the entire continent geographically destroyed as the nation, Africa became pseudo-states" to be controlled by key European nations using a foreign brutal system of rule. This type of rule brutally erased Africa's political belief and ideology, its traditional customs, style of governance as well as altering the continent's unique history, identity and any hopes of the reunification of the many landmasses of weak nation-states (Wa Thiongo, 2009: 3-5).

There was the need for Africa to recover its misplaced splendour, there was the need for the resurgence of its original ideology. This was made possible through Pan-Africanism: a political ideology that had existed long before the 1950s (Geisse, 1976: 13). The philosophy of Pan-Africanism unveiled itself through two main factors: the resistance and protest against the slave trade and slavery and the huge desire to return to the "motherland" of Africa (Geiss, 1967: 10). Apparently, Africans who were shipped off to Europe and the New World (USA) through the transatlantic slave trade began agitating to be returned home. The 18th and the 19th century witnessed the first successful voluntary repatriation of African former slaves to West Africa (Sierra Leone and Liberia) from the New World (Blyden, 1967: 96; Du Bois 1973: 64). Jamaica and the Caribbean islands later became homes for other African former slaves (Walker, 1976: 34). In situations where physical repatriation of Africans to the motherland proved a daunting task, the constant dogma of "Africa as home" was literally kept alive by leading Pan-Africanists from the diaspora like Du Bois, Sylvester Williams and Marcus Garvey (Padmore, 1956: 77). In
many ways, Pan-Africanism grew faster as a political philosophy and restored a greater sense of unity and belonging among people of colour worldwide (Lake, 1995: 33; Tsomondo, 1975: 24).

The returned African men and women made it their mission to "advance Africa" by means of restoring what was good before colonialism as well as to transfer to Africa "new things" in the form of governance, law and order, commerce and religion (West, 2005: 64-66). According to Crummell (1996: 40), Africa would be transformed with the implementation and utilisation of a combination of capitalism and Anglophilia or Christianity. Pan-Africanism was the instrument and political ideal that would adequately put these all together for the proper and ultimate rebirth and renewal of a continent that had thoroughly suffered from European slavery and colonialism.

Pan-Africanism, therefore, became the distinctive political thought, weapon and socio-cultural ideology that laid the foundation to African unity. The search for an instantaneous integration of the continent's social, economic and political roots led to the founding of the OAU on 25 May 1963, after the USAF agenda differed. This was subsequently replaced in May 2001 by the AU. Also, Soyinka and Edozie (2010: 14-23) explain that Pan-Africanism thus offers great hope that the continent will one day unite as one nation and abandon its state of balkanisation as a result of the 1884 Berlin Conference. William (1992: 17) and Emerson (1962: 26) added that the history of the continent of Africa did not start with the European raid on Africa for slaves. Contrary to Western scholars and books, Africa had modern kingdoms and great empires (Emerson, 1962: 19). This study will elaborate on this in chapter three when it discusses the ideology of Pan-Africanism from the 1900s.

3.9 Negritude political ideology

The aim here is to situate Negritude’s role within the ambits of Pan-Africanism and how it seriously pushed the ideas of African liberation through revolutionary scholarly writings, poetry and arts of the African diaspora based in France, in particular. Negritude can be simply understood as “the opposition to the French policy of assimilation” (Senghor, 1965: 155) and the
expression against the history of French colonialism, imperialism, exploitation, domination and racism of African states and people (Cesaire, 2005: 3-4). It was a concept of "one's inner and outer essence, informed, defined by one's race". He argued that Africans share similar and inborn characteristics, ideals and artistic culture that should be respected by the while dominant race. Pan-Africanism and Negritude both emerged from the days of slavery and slave trade; however, in terms of organisation and self-conscious movements, Pan-Africanism took the upper hand and moved faster than Negritude. Negritude later gained momentum in France in the late 1920s as a cultural movement that reasserted the political ideology of Africa through art and writings.

This was largely depicted in the works of many French-born Africans like Leon-Gontran Damas, Paulette Nadal, Aime Cesaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor. Their works were seen through elucidation of the rich and vast African cultural values, heritage, traditions and social lifestyles. For example, in 1939 the West Indian poet and politician, Aime Cesaire published in Paris, France an Afrocentric autobiographic document titled *Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (A Return to the Native Land or Journal of a Homecoming)*. This meant a clarion call for the people of Africa enslaved and dehumanised all over Europe and America to be set free and returned to the motherland: Africa. Returning would have led to families reuniting, cultures being rebuilt, political, economic and socio-cultural revival (Cesaire, 1939: 5).

This publication became a masterpiece to the black world entirely because it aimed at dispelling humiliating stereotypes associated with Africans and Africa. Negritude was crafted to celebrate the black race and black identity and simultaneously condemn colonialism and the marginalisation of Africans in all forms. Rabaka (2015: 43-44) scrutinises the words of one of its chief founders Aime Cesaire, who was born in Africa, grew up and studied in French Martinique, Negritude was real resistance to the politics of assimilation…. European despised everything about Africa and in France, people spoke of a civilised world and a barbaric world. The barbaric world was Africa and the civilised world was Europe. Therefore, the best thing one could do with an African was to assimilate him: the ideal way to turn him into a Frenchman with black skin (Cesaire, 1972: 72-73).
Gradually, because the perpetrators of Negritude were not deterred by Western intimidation, imprisonment and threats of imprisonment and even death, their Pan-Africanist stance became a unique subfield within the sector of ‘Francophone African cultural studies and literary critiques' which gave rise to an enormous amount of anti-slavery, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist writings. At the end of Aime Cesaire’s life, he was puzzled that the questions left unanswered in his lifelong battle against Western inhumane treatment of Africans as slaves, the colonialised and lesser humans were: “Who am I? Who are we? What are we in this world? What are we in this white world?” “That’s quite a problem” (Cesaire, 2005: 3-6).

Like Cesaire, Leon-Gontran views the French culture of racism and downgrading of black Africans as futile and despicable. He called for a continental rejection and rebellion against white-European racial superiority and dubious capitalism in Africa (Rabaka, 2015: 94). Generally, the black community as a whole listen to the "far beating of the nocturnal heart, rhythm and blood of the drum and let the black blood flow into your blood" (Senghor, 1965: 155-157). Paulette Nardal, one of the last important proponents of Negritude, originated from the French colony of Martinique in 1896. She pictured Negritude as a "Pan-African movement that embodied the shared beliefs of the black diaspora, criticising the effects of assimilation" (Sharpley-Whiting, 2002: 17).

In conclusion, the question of Negritude attempts to puts to bed doubts that it did not play a critical part in the promotion of Pan-Africanism vis-à-vis Afrocentric ideologies. Negritude therefore arose to challenge Eurocentrism and white philosophy that did not recognise black thought. Cesaire (2005: 3-4) aligns the thoughts of Pan-Africanism and Negritude to have fought a similar ‘enemy'; racism, slavery, colonialism, exploitation, inequality and imperialism. To him therefore, Negritude’s legacy should not be undermined as it strongly stood for “self-determination of black peoples” or affirmation of the values of civilisation of something defined as “the black world".
3.10 Framework of the study: methodologies

i. Constructivism

According to the first constructivist belief, nations will prefer to keep or to boost their global standing within the context of social norms of suitability in negotiations with rival and powerful states. According to the second constructivist belief, the expectation here is for states to implement an approach of norm-based arguments and enticement during negotiations. The last constructivist prediction, in connection to negotiation, expects settlements among nations to replicate existing international standards. For instance, Van Wyk (2004) and Geldenhuys (2012) argue that global expectations warrant SA as the ‘African inspiration' for democracy and human rights to take a leadership role in persuading other African states to follow suit. Hence, the reason Pretoria uses this tool in her foreign policy. Likewise, Bach (2007) and Ogunmola (2017) hold that Nigeria prides herself as ‘the protector' of West Africa and the ‘representative of black Africa’ which is a key factor in directing Abuja's IR.

On its part, Libya’s negotiation tactics, though relatively new in African diplomacy, constituted a constructivist norm. At the turn of the millennium, Gaddafi’s comparatively new curiosity in becoming a pillar in black African politics and continental affairs saw the brother leader placed within the continent as a ‘champion of African diplomacy’ (Hogan, 2019: 201). Gaddafi’s crusade placed his rivals within the continent as ‘lackeys of the West’ (Munusamy and Makhanya, 2002). Nevertheless, Gaddafi did not drop the ball totally with his rivals (SA’s Mbeki and Nigeria’s Obasanjo) on the diplomatic stage; he still maintained a respectful attitude towards the decisions of the majority of the AU assembly. When Gaddafi’s USAF position was defeated following the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, though disappointed, the Libyan leader’s remarks after the summit were as follows: “It’s a victory for Africa. I am proud because I still have a grand ambition for the African continent” (BBC News Online, 2000).
ii. Neorealism

Neorealists predict that nations will prioritise relative rather than absolute wins in negotiations and will engage in a scheme of threatened penalties and assured rewards to achieve their desired results. According to the neorealist, therefore, negotiation feedbacks take into consideration interests of super-power states with huge economic might. Hogan (2019: 191) argues that, "the first prediction seems to be only a partially accurate reflection of the priorities of the most prominent states involved". On his part, Hopmann (1995: 49) says "to characterise global negotiation analysis, states would be better accurately described as being of a problem solving than bargaining nature". Hopmann's assertion is substantiated by the confession of a senior SA diplomat at the AU:

> We were dealing with issues of what needs to be done on a particular matter. It would not have been a ‘You get this; I get that’ type of thing. It was always about looking at the general good of the organisation as a whole (Hogan 2019).

Against this backdrop, participants are more often promised incentives for their roles in portraying negotiations in retrospect. These claims according to Hogan (2019: 191) seem reasonable, because negotiations did not consider the "divisions of spoils or responsibilities but rather the establishment of a framework for cooperation". Gumede (2007: 34) argues that despite the claims of Hogan and Hopmann above, it does not mean the AU Assembly's negotiations were collegial. For example, the contentions between Mbeki and Obasanjo on the one hand and Gaddafi on the other were often highly antagonistic. Within this atmosphere, states could be seen taking decisive stands and backing either parties, hence, Mbeki's 'Like-Minded Five' SA, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Mali's Alpha Oumar Konare. The Like-Minded Five battled with the Gaddafi alliance supported by Togo’s Gnassingbe Eyadema and Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore (Ali, 2001: 18). Similarly, Gumede added that states in their individual capacity were motivated to pick sides as a result of their personal interest and benefits. While the Like-Minded Five perceived the Gaddafi alliance’s USAF visions of ‘a continental parliament in Sirte, an African army, a single currency, single
market and route and a common African passport’ as being too radical for the continent and more of ‘a Gaddafi’s agenda’ to become ‘king and dictator of Africa’, the latter saw it as a powerful move towards achieving a continental hegemony, consolidating the African economic strength and building an anti-imperial wall.

The next chapter discusses Thabo Mbeki, the ‘Renaissance-Pan-Africanist’ whose new lens of Pan-Africanism will be analysed as well as his ideology captured.
Thabo Mbeki’s upbringing and education led him in the footsteps of his father, Govan Mbeki, despite the fact that he turned out to become more of a ‘prodigal son’, courtesy of the ANC (Gervisser, 2009: 12). In April 1997, Mbeki addressed the Corporate Council on Africa in Chantilly, USA which consisted of an audience of 470 representatives in the fields of academia, politics as well as business. It was on this occasion that Mbeki formally introduced the term African Renaissance (Mbeki, 1998).

The following year, in Johannesburg, Mbeki made a keynote speech that challenged Africans and emphasised the following: African identity in the global community, Africa wants to go, and "how to formulate practical strategies and solutions for future action that benefits the African masses" (Malegapuru, 1999: 1). Mbeki from the outset knew where his political goals lay and worked out a strategy to reach them despite the fact that he was stepping into the shoes of Nelson Mandela, one of the world's most renowned statesmen. On 15 December 1997, addressing the ANC as the new leader of SA’s ruling party, Mbeki replied to his predecessor, when the issues of ‘big shoes to fill' was raised. This of course came as no surprise to his followers:

“I will never, ever be seen dead in your shoes, because you always wear ugly shoes…”

This statement meant that he would find his own socio-economic and political path separate from Mandela, whose leadership shoes were too big to fill (Gumede, 2007: 63). Following the June 1999 second post-apartheid elections in SA, Mbeki secured overwhelming support from the ANC as well as from the majority of South Africans across racial lines (van Nieuwkerk and le Pere, 2006: 30-32). His foreign policy strategy and Pan-African ideals were championed by a great sense of reason and vision. Mbeki’s cabinet endorsed an inventive integrated planning structure that guided his leadership objectives. The structure was adopted from the South African Heads of Missions conference of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in February 2001. Mbeki’s focus was on strategic planning, IR and peace and security (le Pere and Alden, 2003: 31). By the end of the conference, Mbeki’s government had pinpointed four major foreign policy themes and among them was the African Renaissance agenda.
Before Mbeki’s rise to power, the idea of African Renaissance had been used by African independence leaders of the 1960s: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Tanzania’s Julius Kambarg Nyerere, Kenneth Kuanda of Zambia (Masseko and Vale, 1998: 286) and President Nelson Mandela in his speech in Tunisia after he became SA’s first black president in 1994 (Gervisser, 2009: 10). In addition to this trio, Algeria’s Abdoulazzi Bouteflika, Muammar Gaddafi and Abdoulaye Wade had recorded their blueprints for building a ‘new Africa’.

However, Lodge (1999: 96) advanced that it was Mbeki’s efforts that brought the concept of the African Renaissance to the global stage. His June 1997 address to the South African parliament as the then, deputy president, left a message of

the obligation to contribute towards a common and positive African continental goal, the establishment of stable democracies, put an end to human rights violations, end violence and conflict within the continent and create a better life for the African people as a whole.

After Mbeki replaced Mandela as president of SA in 1999, he prioritised the African Renaissance as key among items on his foreign policy agenda. Schraeder (2001: 233) emphasises that Mbeki’s foreign policy principle placed the African continent at a central focal point while SA played the intermediary role between the African continent and the rest of the world.

4.2 Tracing the roots of African Renaissance

The first time the term African Renaissance was seen disseminated and applied in academic literature was from 1946-1960. This appeared in Cheikh Anta Diop’s essay series titled, *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development* where he argued that it was time and Africa was poised for a renaissance (Diop, 1960: 22). It has become quite a norm in
contemporary research studies and discourses like African Renaissance to begin by exploring a summary of the concept’s origin and historical background. Questions begin to arise such as: ‘where did the concept originate from? What factors motivated its existence? Why did Africa feel a need for an African Renaissance? What purposes and aims characterise an African revival? What key ideologies are bequeathed on the movement and what are the theological challenges? Finally, what core impediments prohibit the spread and understanding of a rejuvenation of Africa? Answers to such questions are vital to the understanding of the enthusiastic audience that greatly value the concept of African Renaissance.

Attempting to answer these questions, Matthews (2002), Louw (2002), Lotter (2007) and Czegledy (2008) raise the following logical arguments. The concept of renaissance "instills hope in the hearts of Africans" with dreams of an African rebirth but have for a long time been met with disappointments (Matthews, 2000: 2). Louw (2002: 69-87) contends that African Renaissance was much more of "a plea and an attempt from politicians to exploit the notion of an African spirituality”. By this means politicians will strongly canvas for propaganda politics: economic, social change and transformation of the conditions of the masses; an agenda and "philosophical endeavour to empower the citizenry to relocate from lives of poverty and deprivation to that of dignity (significance) and identity (recognition)". Similarly, Nkuhlu (2017: 14) states that contemporary Africans embrace African Renaissance as "a belief that the beginning of their rebirth must lie in their own discovery of the African soil". This "soil", according to Lotter has been stolen and captured by aliens and Africans needed to take back their Afro-cultural identity. This was either represented through the “Egyptian pyramids or were destroyed; the Zimbabwean Carthage ruins, the San rock paintings and the African mask artistry and stone sculptures of absolute uniqueness”. Lastly, Czegledy (2008: 284) likewise agrees that indeed the African Renaissance “foregrounds the prospects of indigenous empowerment and cultural re-appropriation”.

Nevertheless, it has not been easy to trace the roots of an African Renaissance as the concept has become subject to much debate internationally. Cossa (2009: 9-10) describes the African
Renaissance as “a political concept modeled on the European Renaissance”. He argues that while it was political domination, economic exploitation and social discrimination by Europe’s aristocratic class and the corrupt church that inspired European Renaissance, the African Renaissance arose under similar circumstances: an anti-white agenda that strived to beat the white superiority complex over black Africa. Uchem (2001: 1-23) takes it further when he says that it was the zeal of Africans to bring an ultimate end to slavery in Africa, stop colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism across the continent that laid the foundation for an African Renaissance. Maloka (2000: 13) puts forward that, the African Renaissance should be perceived “within the framework of the long history for the “reawakening” of the continent, and must be based on the historical and cultural heritage of Africa”.

Cossa (2009: 10-11) further explains that for the success of an African Renaissance philosophy, Africans and not Europeans or Americans need to be at the centre to drive the agenda forward. Cossa continues that, the set agenda begins with first of all finding out who actually can be termed ‘a true African’. Only under such precise and evident conditions can one therefore be able to proceed in unfolding what the term ‘African’ means within the broader context of the term African Renaissance. Cossa defines ‘Africans’ as “those individuals, and things related to them, who are indigenous to Africa and can in one way or the other, but not necessarily by genealogy, trace their roots to indigenous African people-groups”. This definition is important within the context of the African Renaissance as it clarifies the assertion that individuals, things and subjects associated to them are what constitute ‘Africa’. Therefore, other phenomena that cannot be traced from indigenous Africa do not meet the criteria as Africans.

According to Okumu (2002: 18), ‘Renaissance’ comes from a Latin word called ‘renascor’ meaning “to be born again”. To him, renaissance in the European context primarily refers to “culture”. Van Niekerk (1999: 70) agrees with Okumu on the European concept as he too refers to renaissance as “the period of cultural and intellectual achievement that followed the era of late scholasticism” in Europe. Estep (1986: 4) for his part, defines the term renaissance as “a classical excellence in the political, social, economic and religious realm” characterised by political,
social and economic emancipation and the rise of thought, identity and culture. Estep argues that in Africa, leaders and scholars alike limited the African Renaissance to the process of reclaiming and retaining the continent’s values, dignity and place within an international space. Meanwhile Pixley (1906: 44) explained that

African Renaissance is the regeneration of Africa, a new and unique civilisation in the world. A time of African creations: of ivory, of copper and of gold, fine, plated willow-ware and weapons of superior workmanship; a new seed that sprouts in variety and shall be thoroughly spiritual and humanistic to become regeneration moral and eternal.

The ideology of African Renaissance was first seen in Cheikh Anta Diop’s writings in the 1940s where he argued that ‘Africa was more than ready for a renaissance’. His series of essays on African Culture and Development, published between 1946 and 1960, highlighted the glory of a renewed Africa (Bongmba, 291-316). At the OAU Summit in Tunisia in June 1994, SA’s first democratic president, Nelson Mandela underlined the key significance to the African Renaissance concept in his speech (Zeleza, 2009: 155). He stated that, “The time has come for Africa to take full responsibility for the woes and use the immense collective wisdom it possesses to make a reality of the ideal of the African Renaissance, whose time has come” (Mandela, 1997). The concept later expands with Mbeki when he promulgated it as a renewed social imperative as well as a vital module of change and revival on the continent (Zeleza, 2009: 155-170). Cossa (2009: 1-2) goes on to state that while Mbeki was not actually the architect behind the term African Renaissance, it was a demonstration of his political shrewdness, careful negotiation skills, charming diplomacy and tactful whims and caprices coupled with his contemporary initiatives and refined processes during his time as president that rebranded the understanding of African Renaissance vis-à-vis Pan-Africanism.

Mbeki’s stance in Mbeki (1999: 211) reshaped the continent’s place in the world at the turn of the 21st century as well as marking a turning point in SA’s foreign policy; from a sharply
isolationist and closed pre-democracy apartheid SA to a free and more open society post-
democratic era (Cossa, 2009: 2). To establish what Mbeki might have been thinking when he
decided to rebrand the concept of African Renaissance, Cossa (2009: 3) further explains that
perhaps one has to go back to the term renaissance from the times of ancient Europe,
characterised by insightful reconfigurations of global power.

Lopes (2013: 32) adds that despite the fact that credit has been given to Pan-Africanism as the
main force behind the construction of African organisations, it was the African Renaissance
philosophy that clearly carved a specific model of governance for the continent to pursue.
African Renaissance therefore transformed Africa in the 21st century by giving the continent the
instruments and strategy for institution-building. Lopes emphasises that the instruments and
strategies checked the excesses of government and maintenance of political stability, ensured the
enhancement of living standards, freedom from economic stagnation, and promoted continental
and regional integration.

4.3 African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism: the conceptualisation

This part of the dissertation is preoccupied in outlining as well as analysing the link between
African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism. Long before Mbeki ever became president of South
Africa in 1999, African scholars and political advocates had been using the concepts of African
Renaissance and Pan-Africanism. The use of these concepts was to debunk white superiority in
Africa and to Africans across the world, enslavement, exploitation of the continent through
colonisation, condemnation of intimidation and domination, anti-humanism and general racism.
In this light therefore, Africans coined and published Afrocentric theories that would challenge
Eurocentrism in all forms. Concepts like ‘black liberation’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘Africa’s rejuvenation
and rebirth’, ‘reengineering’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘redemption’ and ‘revitalisation’ were adopted by
black thought leaders across the world (Geiss, 1976). The motive here was to take back as well
as restore ‘the value of the African race and identity’ worldwide. These values remain the same
across time within the Pan-African ideology, be it the times of Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah and Thomas Sankara or Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi. Nkrumah’s 1963 speech qualifies the above assertion:

No independent African state today by itself has a chance to follow an independent course of economic development, and many of us who have tried to do this have been almost ruined or have had to return to the fold of the former colonial rulers. This position will not change unless we have a unified policy working at the continental level (Nkrumah, 1963).

The years from 1950-1990 in Africa witnessed a lot of talks on the concepts of ‘Political liberation of Africa’ and ‘Africa for Africans’. These were the times when the philosophy of Pan-Africanism had reached centre stage across the continent. From 1994 to 2008, the philosophy of African Renaissance took over; yet again, loud echoes were heard on new concepts like ‘African solutions to African problems’ and ‘African common market’. Just like Pan-Africanism drew massive support from the continent and from the Africans in the diaspora in the 20th century, so did African Renaissance in the 21st century. The general calls for liberation and independence in the 20th century by Nkrumah for instance, can be linked to the general call for economic liberation and unity of the continent in the 21st century by Mbeki (Appiah, 1992: 20). Also, the challenges faced by Pan-Africanism in Africa already mentioned like the failure to unite on Nkrumah’s USAF ticket could be compared to Mbeki’s challenges where numerous African leaders transformed into dictators who portrayed themselves as ‘slave masters’ and ‘African colonisers’ of their own people. Mbeki’s efforts of unity at least economically were generally pushed aside. Abegunrin (2009: 15) describes how African dictators fell cheaply into the hands of globalisation and SAPs. Such myopic steps crippled the indigenous markets of the continent and led to more crashes of small businesses vis-à-vis poverty. More so, a critical link to both concepts can be identified in the formation of continental organisations: the OAU and the AU. The 20th century Pan-Africanists in Africa gave birth to the OAU on 25 May 1963 while the African Renaissance of today successfully delivered the AU on 9 July 2002.
Furthermore, the African Renaissance’s shared vision for Africa’s renewal can be best understood as a continuation of Pan-Africanism within an international framework. According to Obonye (2012: 2), the concept of African Renaissance has come to replace that of Pan-Africanism and has matured into a vital vocabulary used by scholars, politicians, economists and schools of thought globally. The presence of the Renaissance has invigorated Pan-Africanism, this time to build its economy as well as fighting challenges of human rights abuses, bad governance, unsustainable development, poverty, climate change, among others. Nevertheless, Obonye (2012: 3) does not imply that with Mbeki’s African Renaissance upheld, this means Pan-Africanism has been buried. He argues that the Renaissance should be understood more as a continuation of Pan-Africanism and not its replacement. Therefore, Africans are bound to accept both concepts and see in them a bond that breeds a forward-thinking, responsive, thoughtful and creative philosophy.

As part of the work of the Renaissance, Obonye (2012: 4) concludes that the rebirth of Africa should be fought through proper understanding of the continent’s present challenges including the effects of civil strife, destruction of artificial borders for free trade, political insecurity, constitutional delinquency, military coups, unemployment and mass illegal migration, extreme poverty, corruption, mismanagement and embezzlement of state funds; all these and more to finally reflect the continent’s ‘Agenda 2063 vision of the AU’ which strives for ‘the Africa We Want’.

Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the philosophies of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance can together free the black continent and transform it into a force to be reckoned with within the global space. Such a union of ideology will combat the current influx of imperialistic projects that have again risen as a continuation of Western domination. These include globalisation, international trade liberalisation, economic and market deregulation, discriminatory public procurement processes like TiSA constituting what Cossa (2009: 2-4) describes as a ‘unique slave-type capitalist driven agenda’. The research did observe as well that
though corporate imperialism and globalisation impacted Africa’s economic growth hard and rendered it vulnerable, ironically, European and American economies grew bigger and richer. The continuous implementation, enforcement and practise of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance ideals remain strong.

4.4 Mbeki’s foreign policy and African Renaissance

The foreign policy (FP) of states in IR is expected to avail a warm atmosphere to its citizens at both the national and international levels (Spence, 2001: 9). Mbeki inherited the number one office in SA as President on 16 June 1999, three years after the ‘transition miracle’ of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of 1996 that witnessed both victims and perpetrators of violence and human crimes in dialogue to carve a way forward for a peaceful and united ‘rainbow nation’. At this juncture, the inescapable reality for SA rested on three major factors: national reconstruction and rapid economic growth, state security and political stability and a resurrection of SA’s global profile which ought to achieve substantial material goals.

Evans (1999: 621-622) captures this well when he highlights that while socio-economic disparities between blacks and whites, lack of jobs, housing, education, health, and crime were the matters that South Africans cared most about, it had become a critical moment in the country that “global economic enmeshing had proceeded at such a pace that what goes on outside the territorial boundaries of the state often conditions what can be achieved within them”. Therefore, in an attempt to trace the progress of Mbeki’s ruling party, the ANC from its creation in 1912 up to the first democratic elections in SA in 1994, Evans (1999: 622) concluded that Mbeki’s government had limited choice but to accept the ‘repertoire of realpolitik’; a realist approach to foreign policy that rewards material benefits. Nevertheless, as a shrewd politician, Pan-Africanist and ‘British-style’ thinker and philosopher, Mbeki had other FP agendas which this study will explore.
Mbeki's cabinet went straight ahead and approved an innovative and incorporated development framework. He created a structure that was aimed at planning and guiding key state affairs that went a long way to bolster peace, security, tactical plans and global relations. Alden and Le Pere (2003: 31-32) argue that SA’s DFA Head of Missions conference of February 2001 was credited for the strategic document. Under Mbeki's watch, the DFA highlighted four fundamental interests: the promotion of a southern agenda, SA’s home interests, the development of equitable world systems, and the goals of the African Renaissance. Among the four above, Vale and Maseko (1998: 286) pinpoint that Mbeki's FP seemed to be piloted by the African Renaissance philosophy, a decision that was not different from earlier Pan-African statesmen like Nkrumah (Ghana), Nyerere (Tanzania) and Kaunda (Zambia). In June 1997, when Mbeki was still the deputy president under Mandela, he prompted South Africans on

the need to contribute to the common African continental effort, at last; to achieve an African Renaissance, an end to violent conflicts, promote peace in Africa, the development of strong democracies and a better life for all peoples of Africa (Lodge, 1999: 96).

Schraeder (2001: 233) added that, Mbeki emphasised the importance of SA at that time playing a leading role as "intermediary" between the continent of Africa and the rest of the world. He continued that with SA promoting the continent's FP agenda, it in one way or another benefits domestically from the perspectives of diplomacy, advantageous trade deals and development, greater investments, strong economic growth and a boost in bilateral and multilateral relations.

Alden and Le Pere (2003: 32) went further to state that president Mbeki included in his FP the following major concerns: the overhaul of the OAU for a new African organ characterised with contemporary solutions to the problems of Africa (the AU). The restructuring and refurbishment of both regional and world organisations like SADC, the World Bank, the Commonwealth of Nations, the UN, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Simultaneously, Mbeki stressed his country’s relationship with the selective group of Western
states called the G8 (USA, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Italy and Russia). He planned to emulate these groups to create Africa’s ‘G8 of the South’ where leading ‘African economic and political superpowers’ like SA, Egypt, Libya, Rwanda and Nigeria would converge and create a new economic, social and political path for the continent’s future.

Nevertheless, for Mbeki to be successful in his FP as outlined, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2006: 289-290) maintain that his government's FP initiators had to carve out a unique model of comprehension concerning decision-making. In other words, the Mbeki administration was bound to present a convincing as well as a vivid picture of SA’s evolution, a procedure and mechanisms by which the country could be best understood and welcomed into the international community. This was an important clause especially when SA only entered the democratic playing field as late as 27 April 1994 with the collapse of apartheid (a brutal system of institutionalised racism and segregation that existed since 1948 until the early 1990s) (Mills, 2000: 300). To this end, Mbeki persevered and enacted a series of changes to his FP which Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2006: 289) termed, “the president's official foreign policy of centralization”. Such modifications in FP decisions by a political figure could be best described as ‘a realist principle' according to Hlela, Huges, Williams and Butler (2004: 156-158). Butler goes a step further to confirm that it was president Mbeki who spoke out that the dominant challenge to Africa's growth lies in its increasing marginalisation by the Western economic giants. In Mbeki's words,

> economic development elsewhere had lifted hundreds of millions out of the despair of poverty in the past two decades...China, India and Latin America, African leaders had to adopt policies that could help them participate in this economic order, to attract investments, trade, and to become part of the value-adding chains that make up the international economy.

Therefore, Mbeki's FP actions take into consideration SA’s essential character, that of its interests and business. This implies that for this study, SA’s FP from 1999 with Mbeki as the driver was in line with the world pattern, the chasing of a nation's interests which ultimately brings to the table the advancement of regional and continental core values and expectations.
4.4.1 Mbeki’s motivation and ideologies

It is not easy to situate exactly where Mbeki inherited his motivation to contribute to Pan-Africanism through the African Renaissance philosophy. For centuries, the concept of a ‘European Renaissance’ became well established within Europe despite the fact that it became quite a subject of debate among European historians and political scientists. The debate arose from the fact that different schools of thought established different theories that argued about it being the masses or particular individuals who championed the renaissance. In addition, in the USA, what was termed the ‘Harlem Renaissance movement’ was responsible for influencing the black minority in their fight against racial inequality. Diop (2000: 33) advances that the Harlem Renaissance movement was originally championed by the African-American fathers of Pan-Africanism like WEB Du Bois. Diop’s article, published in 1948, titled When will we be able to speak of an African Renaissance, was also a strong inspiration for Mbeki.

Similarly, Maloka (2000: 19) explains how a number of historical and political analysts have concluded that Mbeki’s works can be divided into two ideological reasons: profound individual reasons and conformity towards a political principle. Within this dispensation, Maloka (2000: 20) emphasises the fact that Mbeki’s decision to combine both reasons was more because he wanted Africa to join other continents in reshaping the continent’s economic, political and social space within the world at large. Maloka (2000: 20-21) further argues that other contrary views held that Mbeki embraced the African Renaissance concept because he wanted to claim an ‘African position’ within the dispensation of European Renaissance. This assertion is further defended by The Economist (2013), which revealed how Renaissance artists and writers in the diaspora such as the American Joaneath Spicer were greatly influenced and fascinated by the African continent. A typical example was the 2012 Walters Art-Museum exhibition hosted by the warden of Baroque and Renaissance Art. Mbeki’s Renaissance therefore is about affirming Africa’s role within the international community. Maloka (2000: 22) describes it as “a renaissance that is militant and political in nature”, a somewhat globalist social construct with capable institutions that are pragmatic enough to stand the test of time.
Maloka further argues that Mbeki’s Renaissance was an agenda aimed at the complete political and economic renewal of the African continent. He further identifies two additional viewpoints to illustrate Mbeki’s renaissance philosophy: the Pan-African viewpoint and the “return to the roots” viewpoint. The former is attributed to Chris Landsberg and Kornegay Francis who propounded the philosophy of “African solutions for African problems” (Pax Africa or Pax Pretoriana) (Landsberg and Kornegay, 2002: 3). This was under the custodianship of Mbeki. The latter on the other hand was championed by the political movement stretching across centuries by diverse blocs of Pan-African leaders.

In the same vein, Mbeki’s long stay in exile put him in a situation where his globalist views were well formed as well as properly articulated. An example of this is his contribution to the *Southern Africa Strategic Review on Pan-Africanism*, as documented by Carlos (2013: 51), on Mbeki’s 133 debates in the diaspora. Moreover, in May 1996, Mbeki made an impactful political speech that challenged the minds of Africans and left indelible memories across the continent, and across the academic as well as the political corridors. The “I Am an African” speech in 1996 took centre stage as it created a new form of Pan-Africanism, one that pushed for the ultimate overhaul and establishment of continental institutions driven by the need for unity and collective efforts to combat the numerous challenges in Africa. This insinuation was summarised by Wiseman Nkuhlu, one of the architects of the APRM, when he said, “the African Renaissance was based on the need to find African solutions to African problems” (Wiseman, 2017: 14).

Mbeki’s speech clearly revealed the challenges Africa and Africans face in the 21st century and proposed potential solutions to tackle them. Mbeki quoted “Western imperialism and capitalism” to be among the gravest challenges holding Africa back. His proposals to the challenges were twofold: the creation of a continental inertia towards Western demands and a declaration of what he terms “cold war Africa”. Furthermore, in 2013, when the OAU marked its 50th anniversary, Mbeki distributed a write-up that was titled *Africa, my beginning, Africa, my ending* (Mbeki, 2013). This like his 1996 speech hails Mbeki as a unifier and champion of Africa’s unity and an
economic strategist. He seems to be a fascinating and dedicated Pan-African political figure possessing exceptional personality skills to advance the philosophy of African Renaissance which he helped revamp.

Mbeki was also motivated by the Pan-African works of Ethiopia’s emperor Haile Selassie (Stremlau, 1999: 101). He followed a combined policy of stealth and reconciliation to pursue the final steps of creating the AU as well as the various sub-organs like NEPAD and the APRM. Mbeki also drew inspiration from the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah whose radical stance to push for the USAF drove the Pan-African spirit of the continent to great heights (Mills, 2002: 2-3). Whereas Nkrumah almost single-handedly pushed for the formation of the OAU, Mbeki’s enormous contribution towards the creation of the AU cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, the comparisons between the two Pan-Africanists and statesmen should not stand in the way of key contradictory factors between them. First, the historical times were different as well as the international contexts; Nkrumah operated in the 1960s, and made history by championing the race for independence in 1957 for his country, the Gold Coast (Ghana). On the other hand, Mbeki’s situation was rather the opposite. Mbeki came after Mandela as South Africa’s second democratically elected president to lead one of the last African countries to achieve independence (Mills, 2002: 4).

Similarly, Mbeki’s partnership with Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi became an elementary instrument that empowered Mbeki to go ahead and influence the formation of the AU and the subsequent institutionalisation of its subsidiary bodies. Mkgobe (1999: 102) depicts a strategy that encouraged Mbeki in his Pan-African quest. This was the same strategy used by foreign institutions like the EU. The strategy was that of economic growth within member states that ensured all the EU signatories enjoyed a buoyant economy as well as free trade and duty-free trade. This economic strategy greatly inspired Mbeki to quickly adopt it as part of the African Renaissance agenda. Similarly, during the G8 summit in 2000 held in Okinawa, Japan, Mbeki embraced the ‘good governance’ demand for developing countries in exchange for aid (Ohiorheman, 2002: 8-9). At this juncture, Mbeki’s immediate response was the
configuration of the APRM which was modelled on Europe’s Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee. Mbeki’s intuitiveness and hard work awarded him a diplomatic victory for the continent in Okinawa as it was due to his shrewd negotiation skills that Africa received official representation and a seat at the G8 in 2000 in the first place. The mechanism imitates the principles applied by the OECD Assistance Committee in peer-reviewing the use of official development assistance, even though it expands the concept considerably. Developments at Okinawa were a big diplomatic victory for Mbeki, since it was as a result of his negotiations that Africa had an official strategy and representation in the meeting for the first time.

4.4.2 Mbeki’s command of the concept of African Renaissance vs Gaddafi’s USAF

Mbeki and Gaddafi were purposefully chosen by this dissertation to highlight the ideal of the New Lens of Pan-Africanism. After Shaka, Asantewaa, Du Bois, Garvey and Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism as an African philosophy seemingly collapsed. This was because no African leader or political revolutionary in the diaspora came close to fitting into the shoes of the monumental Pan-Africanists. It was only in the late 1990s when Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi appeared and picked up the shackles of Pan-Africanism, hence African Renaissance and the USAF. Thompson (1995: 163) expresses some degree of certainty with the entry of the duo especially their roles in the formation of the AU in 2002. He held firm that the 21st century barely witnessed Mbeki and Gaddafi as the Pan-African pillars who laid enough groundwork for the reincarnation of the Pan-African Renaissance and revolutionary doctrine. Thompson defines renaissance as "the revival of art and literature under the influence of classical models in the 14th and 16th century".
He reiterates that, the period marked a time of great culture, architecture and style in Europe and emphasises that all similar revivals are indeed ‘renaissance’. He concludes that African Renaissance therefore means

a revival of an African continent of hope and prosperity, positive image of democracy, peace and market-oriented platform attracting international investments as well as aids. It will also mean a repatriation of billions of pounds of African’s capital flight from abroad as well as millions of African talents that contribute to growth overseas (Thompson 1995: 1164).

Stremlau (1999: 60-61) argues that renaissance calls from an African perspective will first of all, “encourage all Africans to confront the harsh realities” of poverty, conflict, dictatorship, and military coups ravaging the continent. He notes a difference of tone between Mbeki and Gaddafi who according to him reflect the current Pan-Africanists of the 21st century: “It is a time for Africa to embrace hope and courage to be able to reverse the terrible realities holding the continent hostage.” On the second note, Stremlau discusses his strategy where he offers a substitute solution to the ‘Western concept of, and structures for, African and world order’.

According to him, while Mbeki was subtle and diplomatic about his renaissance Pan-African ideal of a continent with ‘a more global human rights, good governance, economic unity, building a strong African economy by states with sovereign rights’, Gaddafi on the other hand, had a Pan-African ideal that Stremlau terms ‘assertive’ based on one of his statements where he iterated that he would continue to insist that only a sovereign African USAF would achieve the goals of continental development and overcome the hurdles holding the continent down. These Pan-Africanist perspectives helped form the ideas of Stremlau who defined Mbeki’s renaissance as “a community of nations, not an alliance of states” that should form “the basis for advancing peace and prosperity across the African continent and for enhancing Africa’s influence in world affairs” (Stremlau, 1999: 60-61).
Barrell (2000: 83) describes how Mbeki’s encapsulation of the inspiration of “reawakening” of the African continent into an African Renaissance vision and his belief that the 21st century is truly "an African century", ultimately promotes the concept and understanding of renaissance. Barrell presents Mbeki not only as the key driver behind Africa's Renaissance agenda but as "an institutionaliser, an enforcer and an international crusader" of the concept with focus on good governance, government policy and programmes. Moeletsi Mbeki, one of South Africa's leading economists and brother to Thabo Mbeki, explains how Mbeki's understanding of the concept of African Renaissance was less of a government policy than the continent's political prescription, rather, he described it as "a description of the coming epoch of Africa's history and of the emerging socio-economic conditions that will bring the epoch about" (Mbeki, 1999: 211). Moeletsi explains that Mbeki's idea of an African Renaissance was a general concept that "draws its inspiration from the rich and diverse history and cultures of Africa". While his idea takes into consideration the African continent as the birthplace of humanity, it simultaneously provides a "framework for the modern Africa to re-emerge as a significant partner in the new world order".

Moeletsi's work was corroborated by the July 2000 document of the DFA that went ahead to lay a conceptual framework for the African Renaissance. The document highlighted key areas of African Renaissance which were usurped by Mbeki as President of SA at the time. The areas of human endeavour, politics, economic, environment, culture and security were key problem sectors across Africa that needed sustainable solutions. Mbeki was convinced that the African Renaissance machinery would afford reliable and lasting solutions to these African problems as well as "defend the gains that have been achieved" (DFA South Africa, Working document, 17 July 2000).

Thompson (1995: 163-65) reveals how Mbeki embarked on a strategy that maintained that African countries move in the same direction,
according to which the people shall govern, and to enhance the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity to act as an effective instrument for peace and the promotion of human and people’s rights which we are committed.

Mbeki understood that the African Renaissance was the “third moment” of the continent’s contemporary historical cycle that dates from the 1950s, beginning with the independence of the first African country, Ghana. According to Mbeki, the “first moment” of Africa’s historical cycle was the time of Africa’s reincarnation after decades of colonial rule and exploitation by the West. A period characterised by numerous African struggles for independence against Western colonial powers that led to eventual political freedom for some African states (Mbeki, 1999: 212). The “second moment” of Africa’s historical cycle began from the Cold War period that saw the fall of the USSR. This turning-point event in history marked what Mbeki termed “the resurgence of more open political and economic interaction on a world scale…and manifest itself in campaigns for democratisation in independent African countries” (Mbeki, 1999: 212-213).

Moeletsi concludes that Mbeki's Pan-Africanist ego was geared towards the realisation of the goals of African Renaissance he set for himself. Africa needed some sort of a messiah to fix its political, economic as well as the socio-cultural challenges. Mbeki's intellectual fitness therefore made this possible when he ascended to "South Africa's political throne" as deputy president in 1994 and his subsequent rise to power as head of state on 14 June 1999. While Mbeki was in a better position to reshape the "Dark Continent" as he saw fit, more importantly, his African Renaissance philosophy was based on the idea of “growing a sustainable Pan-Africanist economy that is capable of guarantying adequate and sustainable food security, contribute to and take advantage of the real flows of economic activities around the world" (Mbeki, 1999: 210-211).

Similarly, Thompson (1995: 913) underlines that Mbeki’s African Renaissance agenda should therefore portray the following: the empowerment of the people of Africa towards self-rule and
simultaneously cutting off completely from the colonial and neocolonial legacies; and “the use of economic, political, or other pressures to control or influence other countries, especially former dependencies”. Moreover, Africans should also be seen on the world stage as equal and respectable donors to, and beneficiaries of, the entire benefits of human civilisation. Nevertheless, York (2001: 23) criticises Mbeki’s failure to work with Gaddafi towards developing a unique model for the continent’s future. He emphasises that for the New Lens of Pan-Africanism to have been better shaped, better managed and better understood, both Gaddafi and Mbeki should have reached a middle ground. Although at the end of their period as heads of states, Mbeki seemed to have successfully won a majority of the African states, while Gaddafi’s USAF ideal fell aside; this dissertation challenges the AU, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and other key institutions within the Pan-African circle to look critically into issues of African Renaissance and the USAF respectively.

4.4.3 African Renaissance as a success

The success of the African Renaissance required a number of factors as well as preconditions. Moeletsi (1999: 212) paints a vivid picture of an enlarged continental economic recovery project, the formation of a continental political democracy, the passion to stop neocolonial roots between Africa and the West, the opportunity to mobilise Africans to seize back their destiny; hence, stopping the continent from global exploitation geopolitically as well as strategically. Mbeki’s African Renaissance brought the need to drive rapid economic development within Africa that is focused on a people-driven and people-centred model with the goal of meeting the fundamental necessities of all African people. Going forward, Mbeki mentioned that for these successes to come to fruition, there was a need for “the emergence of a new, unionised ‘proletariat class’ concerned with the ownership and enterprise management as well as the plight of Africa’s
workers and wages” (Mbeki, 1999: 210). Mbeki insisted on a new continent that would groom a generation of “an enlarged urban professional and entrepreneurial middle class that yields economic power and its own wealth and property that will constitute the backbone of Africa’s growth”. He was convinced that formulating a practical programme of action aimed at achieving the African Renaissance would include good governance, the creation of a culture of human rights, the building of Africa’s language and cultural rights in multicultural societies, the recognition of the deficiencies of neocolonialism across the continent, and promulgating a shift of power on the continent through empowering of the middle-class to soften the powers of the political and bourgeoisie classes for a new level of Africa’s globalisation process (Mbeki, 1999: 210-212).

Botha (2000: 2) refers to Mbeki’s strategy as “the main pillar of South Africa’s international policy relating to Africa and global relations”. Barrell (2000: 84-85) adds that, Mbeki also pushed for women’s emancipation in Africa, and called for “Africa’s creative past”; the encouragement of artistic endeavours, the assessment and advancing of science and technology and a new sense of “genuine independence” of all countries in Africa that would paint a very strong picture of Africa’s power within the global community.

Landsberg (2000: 10) depicts how Mbeki strongly suggested that Africans scattered all over the diaspora as well as people of African descent be ploughed back into the continent to reconstruct the continent from its colonial demise. Mbeki termed it as adding to the “African pool of brain power” where African people ask questions, and find solutions for the many problems the continent endures. Africans need to “open African economic and knowledge doors to the entire world (and) to elevate Africa’s place within the universe of research, the formation of knowledge, education and information”. Without these inputs from African intellectuals, Mbeki insists, the struggle against poverty, disease, backwardness and ignorance will remain entrenched on the continent for a long time to come.
4.4.4 Testing the African Renaissance model: the case of sub-Saharan Africa

Within SSA Pan-Africanism played a monumental role in shaping its economic, socio-cultural and political stance of following Mbeki’s African Renaissance philosophy. Mbeki introduced a strategy of “return to the roots” which planted a strong conviction that the people of Africa have reached a moment of rejuvenation (Mbeki, 1998: 299-300). Such a rebirth could be achieved through a system of “participatory action and brotherhood” with the zeal to transform the idea of the African Renaissance into reality. Sub-Saharan Africans will have to become the corner-stone of their own economic liberation in particular and rid the continent of the global negative ideology that “Sub-Saharan Africa is a highly poverty-stricken and malady-stricken part of Africa with no ideas towards human upliftment”. Mbeki’s African Renaissance philosophy therefore was successful to an extent as it planted the ideology of unity for the achievement of economic development. However, the challenge to this part of Africa is to transform themselves into soldiers of self-discovery and the restoration of Africa’s self-esteem (Mbeki, 1998: 300).

Mbeki concluded that for SSA to revive itself, there needed to be a clarion call for mass revolution against what he refers to as “tyrants and dictators, those who seek to corrupt our societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people”. Mbeki’s call also challenges sub-Saharan Africans to “rebel against the ordinary criminals who murder, rape and rob,” and finally, a plea to “conduct war against poverty, ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa” (Mbeki, 1998: 300).

4.4.5 The challenges of African Renaissance

Mbeki's prominence among African leaders dominated discussions in the corridors of the AU, the UN and international conferences alike. His pressing and substantial inputs in ensuring sustainability of the African economy as well as fair trade and foreign loans transactions to the
continent in a way presented him as "a dictator in foreign policy debate" (Siko, 2014: 1-2). Siko continues that Mbeki's views were predominant and strong, and usually stemmed from his concrete argumentation technique and knowledge as opposed to bullying as described by ‘Francophonie’ African countries particularly. Mbeki again realised that, failure to engage fiercely in foreign policy outside national interest of states, risks being left out in key international decisions.

Botha (2000: 2) pinpoints a number of challenges which have affected the African Renaissance philosophy. He argues first, the concept’s meaning has been the subject of continued debate and disagreement among African scholars, politicians and journalists. Therefore, this gives rise to different views of the concept, thereby leading to misconstruction, confrontation and skepticism. Second, the African Renaissance embraced theories which according to Botha (2000: 2-3) were incompatible with the weak economic realities of the continent. He describes these theories as “globalism and structuralism paradigm of international relations theory” underpinned by “Third Worldism” or a new idea wherein Africa is perceived as a “South-perspective of the world”. In this regard, Moeletsi (1999: 216) reiterates that Mbeki’s African Renaissance could be described as “a period of spiritual liberation…” for Africa and being “of great optimism”.

Mbeki was trying to emulate the European Renaissance of the 16th and 17th centuries, which was unfortunately marked by wars. Moeletsi therefore suggests that an African Renaissance will as well pave the way for an era of “great ethnic, religious and class struggles”, the likes of which have been seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Libya. Moeletsi (1999: 216-217) argues that post-renaissance conflicts lead to spillovers in the entire region as refugees flood across borders, stretching the economies of neighbouring countries.

Moeletsi (1999: 213-214) further argued that the African Renaissance had another great challenge: a lack of continental leadership and the practice of feet-dragging by African leaders
and states to pivot the continent towards the African Renaissance agenda. Then US President Bill Clinton had challenged South Africa to play the lead role concerning efforts to transform the continent's dreams into reality. President Clinton was joined by Mbeki in echoing this position, however, the political dynamics of SA at the time meant it was premature for the country to ascend to the leading role. Nevertheless, Africa did not seem inclined to following SA or any other country or its leader towards a path of unity from an African Renaissance perspective. In 1999 (213-215) Moeletsi warned that Mbeki's African Renaissance philosophy stood the risk of seeing SA isolated by the entire continent because post-colonial Africa holds history linked to its colonial-masters vis-à-vis their politico-economic and socio-cultural roadmaps, and that would be difficult to change.

Any attempt by Mbeki to terminate the "abusive relationship founded under of colonial underpinnings" risked bringing SA into a diplomatic war with many African countries especially within SSA. Examples include: SA’s call for Western sanctions on Nigeria when its military executed opposition leader Ken Saro-Wiwa even though Mbeki used diplomatic channels and his presidential capacity to try to stop the execution; the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan after 1994, a breakaway region from China not recognised by the UN (Mbeki, 1999: 213-214).

A separate constraint has been that of an unstoppable conflict of ideas along regional lines among the different African continental blocs, subject to their leadership. Moeletsi Mbeki highlighted how these blocs blocked Mbeki's efforts towards delivering a Pan-African styled leadership role that would drag the continent from high rates of economic independence on the West to allowing African states to depend on other African countries for goods and services (Lopez, 2013: 132). In his words, Moeletsi argued that the rest of Africa could not "entrust South Africa with a sharp object", hence, Mbeki's bid to get SA supported by the rest of the continent as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) collapsed before it could even be started. The continent has therefore failed to stand together and influence a fundamental policymaking decision for its own interest. Barell (2000: 85-87) describes this disunity among
African leaders *vis-à-vis* the continent as a stumbling block to African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism, noting "African governments have a history of lack of commitment to plan and execute projects that benefit the continent". In July 2000 the *Pretoria News* referred to a lack of commitment by the continent through the "abandoned Lagos Plan of Action" of 1980. The economic plan that was poised to enforce economic unity and boost trade on the continent collapsed because it was drawn up by "outsiders and accepted by signatories only in order to win aid".

Globalisation and its impact remained another stumbling block to Mbeki’s African Renaissance agenda. The overnight transformation of the world into a global village meant one thing for Africa: “the destruction of its originality” (Cossa, 2009: 36). The global connection of the world through Western technology, the massive rush for scarce resources, the abuse of trade borders by the super-powers over the poor nations through tariff waivers, plus the gross levels of foreign influence in decision-making by African leaders, remains a major blow to the African Renaissance philosophy. Moeletsi argues that globalisation was a strong Western economic weapon that forced the African leaders to dislodge any form of real unity and become resigned to the foreign ideology that “Africans are not capable, in the foreseeable future, to run the economies of their countries and to control and manage technology”. In addition, the continuous pursuit of neoliberal ideologies by African states seemed to propose that contemporary African statesmen do not align themselves as important mechanisms for economic and social changes on the continent *vis-à-vis* African Renaissance (Mbeki, 1999: 216-217). Therefore, any success of Mbeki’s African Renaissance philosophy would be promoted by Africa’s emerging social tenets like non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional organisations, trade unions, universities and the intellectual class, and local private corporations.

Moeletsi warned that it would be such change of society’s leadership forces from the political class to the ordinary citizens that could guarantee the livelihood of African Renaissance. Nevertheless, this was not seen to be an easy battle, as society’s new leadership would have to destroy the Western umbilical cords that have tied African politicians down. Barell (2000: 85-86)
adds that the African Renaissance agenda under the citizen’s leadership can only succeed if it does not end up as a ‘grand slogan’ under which leaders can barely mobilise private socio-economic projects for selfish purposes rather than actually delivering results that change Africa. He goes on to challenge Mbeki’s concept that “democracy was intrinsic to African cultures” and that it was “common to all African traditions that the people must govern”.

4.5 The concept of NEPAD, 2001

At the meeting of the G7+Russia in 1999, three African leaders, Mbeki of SA, Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria by virtue of their leadership positions as heads of three key global organisations: Mbeki- head of the Non-Aligned Movement, Obasanjo- chairperson of the G77+1 (China) and Bouteflika- chairman of the OAU. The fundamental objective of these leaders was to meet with key world powers (US, EU) to articulate Africa’s most challenging economic woes and to plan for the continent’s economic future (Hogan, 2019: 178). Unfortunately for the trio, they were given a blind ear, described by Obasanjo as, “an apparent lack of interest shown by the G7+Russia leaders in the African agenda”.

They met us briefly in Tokyo, they dismissed us as African leaders within 30 minutes or so. The three of us went back to our hotel and said, ‘Look, if they had asked us what is Africa’s programme, we would have had nothing to put on the table’. So there and then, we decided that we had to do something tangible and that was the beginning of NEPAD (Obasanjo, O. 2016).

NEPAD represents an economic and developmental programme for the African continent. It is a Pan-African project of the AU that was approved during the 37th session of the Assembly of African leaders and their governments in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia (NEPAD, 2005: Internet). In October 2001, NEPAD’s policy framework was completed and it harnessed the following key objectives: the eradication of poverty; the elevation of African states into economic positions of sustainability; accelerating growth and development across the continent; the destruction of...
Western marginalisation of Africans and Africa through the process of globalisation; enhancing Africa’s economic potential into the global market; and speeding up a steady economic emancipation and empowerment of the people of the African continent as a whole.

Jacques and Lesetedi (2005: 17) illustrate that NEPAD's foundation was first of all based on a "common vision and a firm and shared conviction to eradicate poverty in Africa both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development". Second, NEPAD paved the way for the continent to play an active role in the global stage of ‘the politics of the economy’ (Lesetedi, 2005: 18). Third, NEPAD enabled trusting partnerships between Africa on the one hand and the international community on the other, especially the highly industrialised countries like the USA and China, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations. One can comfortably argue that, in Mbeki's vision of the "African Renaissance doctrine", special emphasis was laid on what he called "Africa's centrality of development through continental integration, sovereignty, regionalism, political stability and self-determination based on a united economic growth, development and socio-cultural regeneration".

In addition, Meagan (2004: 1) states that even within NEPAD's governance instrument, the APRM, Mbeki's African Renaissance emblem could not be undermined. It stood as a harbinger of a brighter and better future for Africa based on the African principle of human dignity. According to Meagan, this implied that the people of Africa should be able to express themselves freely and realise themselves as "people through people" meaning; only Africans can save Africa from the daily challenges facing the continent. Meagan (2004: 1-2) underlines how Mbeki used the South African term ‘Ubuntu' to drive unity on the African continent across political, economic, social and cultural spheres. Therefore, Mbeki is described as the architect of NEPAD vis-à-vis the APRM for his contributions towards showcasing "governance and democracy, good governance for development" as central tenets to Africa's search for political, economic and social renewal (Muchie et al, 2012:317- 318).
4.6 Mbeki’s Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP)

This chapter wraps up with the examination of Mbeki’s concept of the MAP. Mbeki termed MAP “a call to conduct war against poverty, ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa…to achieve an African renewal in politics, in economics, in social life and culture” (Mbeki, 1998: 300). Nkuhlu (2001: 1-2) describes MAP as a development mechanism that seeks to bring about a coherent, strategic and focused programme of action that, when carefully implemented, will bring about positive, significant changes in the economy of Africa. Mbeki’s main challenge was how to convince and at the same time force the government leaders on the continent to be imaginative enough and commit to the respect of democracy, human rights and freedoms; in his own words, Mbeki called attention to that *raison d'être* that the citizens of Africa should be the paramount interest of their government and leaders and that the states should put an end to domestic conflicts, engage in dialogue and restore peace to pave the way for integrated development to match the level of the global system (Mbeki, 1998: 301).

MAP upheld: investment in the African people; an improvement in the quality of the life of Africans; the exportation of goods through value adding and the upgrading of trade rules and regulations; an investment in transport; tax-free system among African countries in trade; open border understanding across Africa; greater investment in energy, water resources and sanitation; sizable investment in information and communication technologies to easily access knowledge and gain proper control of the African economy; and instituting a debt management and financial tracking system that avoids corruption and the embezzlement of funds within African states and the continent at large (Nkuhlu, 2001: 1-3).

For MAP to be recorded as successful, Mbeki (1998: 300) reiterated there was a need for a candid sustainable commitment and freedoms of all sectors (executive, legislative and judiciary) of the African states *vis-à-vis* the African continent. Therefore, African leaders and their governments would have to ensure free and fair elections, the respect of human rights and the
rule of law, fight corruption and embezzlement of state funds, and enforce laws against them. They would also have to ensure the maintenance of strong partnerships among all African countries, characterised by a resolution to respect the terms and agreement of contracts, open avenues for continuous dialogue and negotiation and by extension, joint negotiation with the outside world, developing and developed states and bodies, as well as international and multinational organisations.

4.7 Conclusion

In concluding this chapter, Mbeki’s notion of African Renaissance marked a turning point in the economic affairs of the continent in particular. Though he spent most of his life in exile in the UK, Mbeki nonetheless used the time to carve out his political views, which were later metamorphosed into major global economic philosophies of NEPAD, APRM and MAP. As the second democratic president of South Africa, his zeal to unite Africa from South Africa vis-à-vis the zeal to rekindle the Pan-African spirit on the continent left reverberating nostalgia to the days of Kwame Nkrumah. This could be seen in two areas: restructuring and opening up of South Africa’s DFA’s mission and vision statements towards the rest of Africa and through his thorough attempts to bring all African states’ leaders on board one economic ship. The said ship is characterised by free continental trade deals, anti-corruption strategies, clean audits, unanimity in striking continental deals to guarantee Africa’s interest and pride internationally.

Mbeki’s 1996 speech, ‘I am an African’ on the occasion of the inauguration of South Africa’s second democratic constitution consolidated his agenda to reignite Africa towards picking up itself once more and uniting for a brighter future (Mbeki, 1996). Second, Mbeki accentuated genuine attempts and well thought out strategy to thwart the cause of conflict on the continent. Conflicts were to be replaced with refined instruments of dialogue, peace and stability. To Mbeki, the concept of African Renaissance was the ultimate solution for 21st century Africa; a force multiplier that could guarantee permanent peace and stability, especially in SSA. Third,
Mbeki's African Renaissance approach could be termed radical at times by other schools of thought. For example, Lopes (2016: 132) called it "political and militant".

Lopes concludes that the concept was challenging to Africa as it was asserting the continent's position globally and served as a political mechanism to test the strength of Africa's institutions politically and economically. Fourth, Maloka (2000: 24) describes Mbeki's Renaissance views as "globalist", wherein his political and economic masterpieces became the centerpiece of what Africa should reflect in the 21st century. Maloka identifies two more viewpoints to demonstrate Mbeki’s African Renaissance philosophy: the first is “the Pan-African perspective” which Landsberg and Kornegay call ‘Pax Pretoriana’ or ‘African solutions for African Problems’, and the second is “the reminiscent perspective” illustrated as “the return to roots” movement which has been promoted over decades by various Pan-African leaders.

Lastly, Mbeki remained convinced that Africa is increasingly faced by new Western ‘imperialism’, which should be stopped by African leaders and states together. Imperialism, according to him, did not only deprive the continent its rightful place in the international space but pushed it back as far as development is concerned. Mbeki suggested that a more united Africa could defeat apathy and what he terms ‘cold war Africa’ that holds the continent back from rapid growth and development. In May 2013, when the AU celebrated the 50th anniversary of the OAU, Mbeki wrote and circulated the text entitled *Africa, my beginning, Africa, my ending* wherein he confirmed his distinctive plan to carry forth the African Renaissance philosophy which he played a major role in creating.

The following chapter dwells on Muammar Gaddafi who is described as the ‘Grand-Pan-Africanist’. The chapter will comparatively analyse and demonstrate Gaddafi’s contribution and how he shapes his New Lens of Pan-Africanism as well as investigating his ideology.
CHAPTER FIVE

MUAMMAR GADDAFI: THE GRAND PAN-AFRICANIST

5.1 Introduction

I am a soldier for Africa…for Africa, the matter is to be or not to be, my vision is to wake up the African leaders to unify our continent…if the African masses are enlightened and aware and take the right decision, then Africa will come into being (Muammar Gaddafi, 30 June 2007).

To better understand the basis of, as well as to evaluate Gaddafi’s Pan-Africanist ideals, contributions and political philosophy towards the new lens of Pan-Africanism, from 1994-2008, it necessitates the thesis to dwell keenly on the following four programmes: Gaddafi’s USAF agenda with a centralised government system, a single African currency and army, inspired by Kwame Nkrumah’s ideology in the 1960s; Gaddafi’s ideal economic contributions and investments in Africa for a complete financial independence of the African continent away from Western economic instruments of globalisation, neocolonialism, imperialism, capitalism; Gaddafi’s programme of de-dollarisation in Africa; and his role in the creation of the AU in 2001. In order to successfully understand this part of the dissertation, there is a strong need to contextualise the following arguments: a brief background of Muammar Gaddafi and his sudden political move from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Africanism; this will enable us to understand where it all began. Lastly, throughout this section, the thesis highlights and discusses the weaknesses of Gaddafi. Though one of Africa’s greatest Pan-Africanists of the 21st century, Gaddafi was no saint during his time in power in Libya.
5.2 A brief background of Muammar Gaddafi

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi or ‘the African brother-leader’ as he was popularly referred to by African leaders and African politicians, was born in the Sirte District of Libya called Qasr Abu Hadi on 7 June 1942 (Blundy, David and Lycett, 1987: 19). Gaddafi was born in a Bedouin tent to the al-Qadhafah family and at the time of his birth, Libya was an Italian colony which later achieved independence in 1951 under King Idris (Blundy, David and Lycett, 1987: 19-20). In 1961, Gaddafi enrolled at the Libyan military college in Benghazi from where he was sent to the UK to receive further military training (Bruce, Ronald, 2012: 147). After graduating at the age of 27, he joined and later led the youthful Free Officer's Movement that would overthrow Western support for King Idris I in a bloodless coup (al-Fateh Revolution) on 1 September 1969 (Fetini, 2009: 1-2). Gaddafi speedily eradicated traces of Italian colonialism by embarking on a cultural revolution. Muammar Gaddafi was strongly influenced by two key political structures: Libya's Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the philosophies of the Egyptian president, Abdel Nasser. Gaddafi became the new ruler of Libya, the commander-in-chief of the army and the head of Libya's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (ibid, 147-149).

Gaddafi maintained a strong anti-West style of rule and embarked on plans to educate Libyans against Western policies. He drove Libya towards a pro-Middle East and pro-African style of rule and in the 1980s and 1990s, Gaddafi sent the Libyan military to assist in liberation and independence struggles in some African countries like SA’s ANC movement and the Western Sahara liberation movement (Polisario Front), Chad and Sudan (Genugten, Saskia, 2016: 139). Gaddafi's political philosophy was published in the first volume of the ‘Green Book' in 1975. The Green Book is an anti-West version of democracy and governance, composed of three sections: “The Solution to the Problem of Democracy (The Authority of the People); The Solution of the Economic Problem (Socialism); and The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory” (Libyan Council of Foreign Relations, 2010).
Under Gaddafi’s rule, Libya was transformed from a struggling economy to super-rich state overnight. Gaddafi nationalised all state resources in 1973 and raised oil export prices which led to considerable economic improvements and significant changes in Libya. Billions of US dollars in oil revenue were pumped into the building of Libya's economy changing the face of its social structure and the lives of ordinary Libyans (Blundy, David and Lycett, 1987: 105-107). Gaddafi made it a political policy for Libyans worldwide to invest in Libya to grow the economy. He created a classless society by the introduction of numerous reforms: young men and women were offered free education from primary to university; this led to a dramatic rise in Libya's literacy levels, making history for Gaddafi and Libya for the first time since independence. Gaddafi introduced free medical aid to combat seasonal diseases like cholera and typhoid and his government hugely subsidised ailments like cancer. Unemployment allowances were introduced, pension funds increased, and young Libyan couples compensated financially by the government. These moves greatly lifted life expectancy in Libya, improved the wealth of the ordinary Libyans, and raised their living standards to those of the UK and Germany (Blundy, David and Lycett, 1987: 106-107).

The great strides made in the Libyan economy by Gaddafi later benefitted many states on the African continent through his Pan-African ideals. Blundy, David and Lycett (1987: 107), describe how Gaddafi’s first years as head of Libya generated the sum of US$1 billion in revenues from the country’s oil industry. Libya’s GDP for the first time in the country's history increased from US$3.8 billion in 1969 to US$13.7 billion in 1974. These growths were channelled towards construction and social reform programmes especially within the most remote areas in Libya, lifting millions of poor Libyans into middle-class status. By Gaddafi’s 10th anniversary as Libyan leader, the country’s per capita income rose from US$40 between 1920-1951 to US$1.018 in 1969 up to 2011, well above those of Italy and the UK respectively (IMF Report, 2018).

Muammar Gaddafi, therefore, represented a ‘giant figure’ (Genugten, Saskia, 2016: 140) within the dynamics of Libyan domestic economic policy, particularly. Moreover, his charitable policy
towards SSA hails him as one of the few polemic statesmen of the second half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century due to Gaddafi’s powerful influence along the political, social and economic life of the African continent as a whole from 1970 until his assassination in 2011.

5.2.1 Muammar Gaddafi’s domestic policy

Recknagel (2011) opines that Muammar Gaddafi’s rule was characterised as ‘comical, eccentric and brutal’. In fact, he went ahead to quote the former US president Ronald Regan who in an interview called Gaddafi “mad dog of the Middle East” claiming he clung to power for more than four decades. In four decades, Gaddafi had been able to watch the rise and departure of six UN secretary generals, eight presidents of the USA and eight British prime ministers, making him an abuser of domestic power and ‘the King of Kings”’ (Recknagel 2011). Nevertheless, West (2011: 2) argues that the question of longevity in power has been a traditional practice in the Middle East, therefore, Gaddafi should not be held responsible for hijacking the Libyan democracy since he simply joined a system of rule that had become the norm. In Tunisia, Ben Ali ruled with an iron fist for 23 years, in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak held power for 30 years, in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled for 33 years while in Syria, the Assad family turned the country into a monarchy in 1970. Schlumberger (2010: 237-238) puts Gaddafi’s domestic policy into two categories: Gaddafi’s State-Society Relations and Democracy and Gaddafi’s Military-Style rule.

i. Gaddafi’s state-society relations and democracy

As Libyan leader, Gaddafi drafted a policy that specifically spelt out the place of the Libyan state and its citizens, the level of interactions between the state and the people as well as between the state, political opposition parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) (Heydemann, 2004: 33-
In his argument, Heydemann states that like the authoritarian leaders in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya, Gaddafi shaped the political landscape of Libya into formal and informal modes of governance whereby the former (key state decisions) were handled from his office directly whereas, the later (less pressing state matters) were left to be discussed by parliament. This according to the Gaddafi-led regime maintained peace, security, stability, growth and good governance. Heydemann called this type of political system ‘non-democratic and authoritarian’ that ruled out any form of democracy, institutionalised political parties, political opposition, Human Rights Associations, NGOs and CSOs (Heydemann, 2004: 37).

Gaddafi’s use of the Green Book was also a subject of criticism by Heydemann as a guideline to democratic principles. According to him, Gaddafi’s style of parliament did not meet the 20th century Western model because of the following principles inherent in the book: “parliament in the modern traditional democracies are undemocratic, that political parties are dictatorial instruments of power and that political opposition have a negative impact on society due to their undermining the ruling government”. Heydemann’s critique is corroborated by Schlumberger (2010: 238) when he wrote that if ‘The Green Book’ vis-à-vis his ‘Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ should be taken seriously, then Gaddafi had pushed out the ideology of institutionalised political opposition, blocked all spaces for political contestation and apparently planted the seed for future revolution.

While noting the above arguments of Heydemann and Schlumberger respectively, the dissertation holds that Gaddafi’s ideology of the Green Book and his model of democracy succeeded greatly in uplifting the socio-economic and political lifestyle of Libyans as has been discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. While the so-called modern models of democracy in the USA, France and Great Britain still show cracks and discrimination between the lifestyles of the super-rich capitalists as against the poor middle class, Gaddafi’s Libyans’ per capita and living standards were generally better off. In Africa, Gaddafi stood tall economically, funded the bills of other African states, was a lender of millions of dollars at very little or no interest rates to African states, funded the AU as well as investing hugely within the continent.
With this being said, Gaddafi’s ‘New Lens of Pan-Africanism’ of bringing the entire continent to enjoy the fruits of their labour as Libya flourished put Gaddafi into the limelight as one of Africa’s greatest Pan-Africanists.

ii. Gaddafi’s military-style rule

Gaddafi was similarly criticised for constantly using military rule against Libyan civilians for demonstrating against his political ideology of the Green Book, his stay in power, and against some because they were backed by the West to push for power to overthrow him. Droz-Vintcent (2007: 199) was quick to describe Gaddafi’s use of the military in Libya particularly and the rest of Africa generally, as ‘an act of strengthening authoritarianism and building authoritarian regimes’. Gaddafi used the Libyan military to hijack the Libyan economy, control its interior management and exert huge influence on the political system. Droz-Vintcent continued that the military therefore became the backbone of law in the state described as an ‘Arab authoritarian regime’ (2007: 199-203). By this measure, Gaddafi as commander-in-chief of the army endorsed a project of democratisation that eventually maintained the might of the army rather than that of the citizens. Salama (2011) added that even at that, Gaddafi was smart enough to maintain discipline within the army for his protection and that of his family by fielding family members into top military positions and ministries handling the army.

More so, Gaddafi ensured ‘the regular army’, the majority of the military unit, stayed weaker than his personally built militias and entrusted units under the command of his immediate family for the continuous maintenance of his power. While the above analysis reveals Gaddafi’s stern and ‘un-Western’ style of rule, this dissertation also brings to the understanding that Gaddafi chose to do so for a purpose. First, Libya needed a stable, peaceful state and stern leader to ensure the national growth and development which we saw above. Gaddafi had to put these measures in place especially when Libya’s future was threatened by sympathisers of the dethroned King Idris, whose monarchical dictatorship had plunged the country into deep political
backwardness and economic disaster for decades. Second, Toby (2014) narrates that because Libya suffered from the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism that greatly threatened the stability of a peaceful Libya under Gaddafi, he had to put in place capable military strategy and modalities that ensured constant peace and security in Libya and across the region of North Africa and the Middle East. A case is point is the al-Qaeda militant organisation that funded, supported and united with the Libyan Islamic military to attack the USA in September, 2001.

Last, Sawani (2014) describes how Gaddafi’s turn from ‘a military style ruler’ to a Western style democrat was for two reasons: to stabilise political relations with powerful Western countries that breathed heavily on his neck to relax his grip on power, and to negotiate new economic ties to enrich Libya since more oil reserves discovered needed to be sold. These perspectives showed that Gaddafi was a flexible politician who could very well play the ‘political ball’ for the betterment of Libya in particular and Africa as a whole.

5.3 Gaddafi’s foreign policy: Africa and international

This section of the dissertation attempts to answer the question of how to arrive at an objective approach to the analysis of Gaddafi’s FP. During the reign of King Idris I, Libya was a pro-Western Arab state that had close ties with the UK and USA. During this time, Libya's growth and poverty were among a third of the Libyan population (Allison, 2011: 10). When Gaddafi overthrew the king in 1969, he quickly turned things around and immersed Libya into new levels of FP. Allison iterates that Libya began experiencing for the first time in history “partial sovereignty” whereby freedoms slowly became the norm. The flow of oil and gas increased exponentially; financing the lame socio-economic structures of Libya's infrastructure, health systems, education, unemployment, high mortality and low birth rates. The World Bank 2006 figures placed the Libyan Human Development Index by 1980 higher than any in North Africa, the Middle East and some European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (The World Bank, July 2016).
The Bank further ranked Libya above many oil-producing states in terms of the per capita GDP. Education indicators became better than the regional average of 14 per cent and illiteracy of 34 per cent. Health care became one of the best in the Middle East befitting Euro-American standards; while on the issue of gender equality, Libya was recorded highest in North Africa and the Middle East with Gaddafi himself preferring female bodyguards rather than males.

Libya ultimately transformed into a billion-pound economy and its leader became a new force to be reckoned with, wherein the FP was bound to take new shapes that would sway and attract the world at large towards the shores of Libya (Berween, 2013: 14).

The second half of the 20th and the early years of the 21st century, therefore, witnessed several distinct arguments, investigations and research carried out concerning Muammar Gaddafi. These were mainly done to satisfy the desire of the discipline of social science that an objective approach existed and was used by Gaddafi at the state level which had a far-reaching impact at both the continental and international levels. Beyond this circumstance, the Libyan leader had both the characteristics of a polemic and popular personality for a number of reasons wherein, each sustained an asymmetrical friendship with the other. On the one hand, Gaddafi solidly configured a systemic structure of leadership that saw him wielding political ideologies with attributes of a bipolar world framework (Allison, 2011: 11). He played a vital role in maintaining the balance of economic and political power in Africa and the Middle East.

This can be well understood when one examines Gaddafi's personality as a philanthropist, a billionaire, and the intellectual statesman who excelled in political and literary works. It is this that established the Libyan and empowered him to display his FP. Similarly, Berween (2003: 1) explains that Gaddafi's approach to FP could be best understood when aligned to his policies at the state level because it is at the level of the state that he made major decisions that impacted decision-making on the continent and in the world at large. As a protagonist of economic
equality, cultural balance and social diversification in Libya, Gaddafi transferred these qualities across SSA hence, his position as AU chairperson from 2009-2010. According to John and Gerhart (2013: 43), Gaddafi impacted international geopolitics through his participation in the world political game. His philosophy and actions influenced political bodies in Africa, Europe and the Middle East and Asian countries as he exercised his business, buying and investment powers in the 1970s and 1980s. SSA countries like Mali, Cameroon, Nigeria; France, Italy and Russia; China in Asia; and Pakistan and Palestine in the Middle East; all benefitted from Gaddafi's billions of US dollars' FP policy projects. In the first and second halves of the 20th century, Gaddafi’s FP became crucial as his influence was greatly felt in the “revolutionary” acts (Ekaterina, 2008: 99-102). He embarked on sponsoring the Pan-Arabic minority social, nationalists and political movements against majority dictatorial regimes.

Egypt, Latin America and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were beneficiaries backed by Gaddafi against powerful regimes. He provided them with potentials: expert trainers, armaments, directives, social and economic capital (Boyle, 2013: 153). The successes of Gaddafi in this area of influence and what he termed the subsequent “end of Pan-Arabism”, bolstered his FP agenda towards the greater part of SSA.

Although many scholars have concluded 1969-2011 in Libya was a dire and totalitarian period for Libyans under the dictatorship of Gaddafi, this study has so far revealed that these years in the history of the country have stood out to be the best since 1969. This assertion takes strongly into consideration the monarchy of King Idris I where Libya was poor and controlled, to post-1969 when the country became a powerful and respectable state and its FP could be deeply felt internationally. Gaddafi invested billions of US dollars on projects across the continent and his influence, role and respect flourished; hence, so did his FP.

5.4 Gaddafi’s political philosophy: from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Africanism
From the 1990s to late 2000, Gaddafi completely moved his political philosophy towards Pan-Africanism. He intensified efforts to support the African economy through his interest-free loans, restore peace and security, mediation, peacemaking as well as regional collaboration (Tamura, 2008: 17-18). Under Gaddafi’s political philosophy of Pan-Arabism, he wanted to form a unique Arab Islamic state federation that started from the Sahara Desert and Sudan, stretching to the Arab nations in the Middle East, Palestine and Europe; encircling 100 million Muslims. His role as an Arab unifier and ardent promoter of Arab nationalism led him to propose an Arab federation between Libya, Syria, Egypt, Chad, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Sudan (Tamura, 2008: 17). A related concern to Gaddafi was his zeal to aid poorer and war-torn Arab and African states with Libya's petrodollar income (Reuters, 2010).

Nonetheless, Gaddafi progressively began to reject Arab nationalism for Pan-Africanism because of the following underlying factors: first, the lack of support by Arab states for his vision of uniting the Arab nations; second, Gaddafi’s realisation of the geopolitical complexities of the Arab nations and how they constantly relied on Western influence rather than using their common interest as Muslims. He also elucidated that Libya was indeed an ‘African state’ in the north of Africa that had to begin playing a key role in the affairs of the African continent as a whole. Unlike its North African neighbours, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, Gaddafi found huge interest in SSA in particular (Sinden, 2011: 3-5). Sinden continues and presents an argument that Gaddafi matched his words with action and that is why from 1999, he involved the Libyan state in signing numerous treaties and agreements with states on the continent. Among such African states were Algeria, Morocco, Chad, Sudan, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Mozambique, Uganda, Cameroon and SA.

Testimony to Gaddafi’s Pan-Africanist ideals could be seen in the personal relationships he established with African states. In Algeria, Gaddafi softened relations and both countries became close and shared similar revolutionary agendas and economic plans on oil exploitation (Libyan-Maghreb Relations, 2010). In Morocco, Gaddafi extended a hand of economic partnership and re-established diplomatic talks. In Tunisia, Gaddafi paid a visit to the Tunisian leader and
publicly suggested a merger between the two countries, a concept was reached termed ‘the North African Unification’. In Sudan, as he did in Ethiopia and Yemen, Gaddafi extended diplomatic olive branches and recommended economic and political unions to be signed. He gave aid to these weak and poor states especially to President Nimeiry of Sudan, who benefitted from Gaddafi's support during his political ventures. In Chad, Gaddafi reopened diplomatic relations in August 1988 with Chadian President Hissene Habre. In SA, Gaddafi supported the ANC revolutionary body as well as other anti-apartheid movements that fought against the apartheid racist government. This led to Mandela, the first democratically elected black president of South Africa visiting Libya in 1990 to express his thanks. Relations improved greatly between both countries and strong bilateral trade relations were established (Libyan-Maghreb Relations, 2010).

Gaddafi also brought Libya to host Africa’s key political institution, the OAU in 1982 and went further to create the Community of the Sahel-Saharan State in 1999 (Pike, 2016: 26). In June 2005, Libya became a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; a free trade area involving 20 African nations that stretched from the very tip of Africa (Libya) to Swaziland, the bottom tip. Through his humanitarian gestures extended to greater parts of SSA’s people and his strong allegiance to African culture of chieftaincy and traditional Kingdoms, Gaddafi earned the right of bearing the name "King of Kings", a title conferred on him in Addis Ababa in 2008 by hundreds of African traditional chiefs and kings on behalf of the Committee of African traditional leaders (Sinden, 2011: 6).

In 2009, Gaddafi made an open statement where he blamed Europe for the injustices of slavery, colonialism and the continuous exploitation of the African continent by the Western powers in general. This statement was reiterated yet again in 2009 when Gaddafi, alongside Hugo Chavez the Cuban leader; openly called for the construction of a strong anti-imperialist front across Africa and Latin America. This duo's statement was followed by a proposal by Gaddafi for the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Alliance (SATA) to challenge the NATO of the West (Sinden, 2011: 6-7). On 23 September 2009, when Gaddafi had the chance to address the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, he gave a 100-minute address that castigated the
UNGA as a hypocritical and racist organisation that only mattered when developed nations of the West were in danger and needed to push their agendas. Gaddafi revealed the UNGA's discriminative policies when dealing with poor African states. Gaddafi concluded his address by demanding from Europe in particular and the West in general US$7.7 trillion in direct compensation for ravages caused by colonisation and imperialism in Africa (The Guardian, UK, 2009).

Therefore, the above strides made by Gaddafi placed him in an exceptional position to fuel his ambitions for a united government of Africa and an eventual USAF under one leader, a single military unit, a common continental passport, open trade borders and visa-free movements of Africans; one flag and one currency. These were the ideals championed by Gaddafi that inevitably drummed up maximum support for his appointment as the AU chairperson in 2009.

5.5 Gaddafi: the modern day Nkrumah

It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world (Kwame Nkrumah).

I shall continue to insist that our sovereign countries work to achieve the United States of Africa…we are still independent states. It is our decision to respond to the call for unity, to push forward towards the United States of Africa (Muammar Gaddafi).

Muammar Gaddafi in the 1990s, like Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, struggled to address Africa's fundamental and structural constraints. The two unique, radical and astute Pan-Africanists and statesmen in their own right vigorously pushed for Africa's amalgamation, solidarity and unity with the aim at addressing Africa's challenges at state, regional, continental and global political and socio-economic relations. In fact, Ali Mazrui (2009: 32) puts forward a
solid argument that Gaddafi was "the timely heir to Nkrumah's legacy of Pan-Africanism". Nkrumah's attributes of statesmanship, wittiness and outstanding leadership qualities could be perceived in Gaddafi as the latter heralded the former's ideals of the USAF (Mazrui, 2009: 33). Nkrumah's policy had begun way back in 1957 when Ghana achieved independence. In his opening address, Nkrumah clearly indicated in the phrase that, "Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent" (Hannah, 1967; 203).

Six years later, Nkrumah launched his book, *Africa Must Unite*, his bid for an African government in 1963, coinciding with the birth of the OAU. Similarly, when the OAU was launched on 25 May 1963, he had contributed immensely towards its formation as head of the radical ‘Casablanca Group' (Quarm, 1973: 1-2). The group strongly advocated for an immediate unification of the continent of Africa and was officially launched on 7 January 1961 with membership consisting of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Morocco (the conservative kingdom) and the provisional government of Algeria. It was unfortunate that the Casablanca Group did not succeed in pushing its agenda into the OAU. Rather, it was the weak Monrovia Group led by Nigeria, Ethiopia and Senegal who promoted a gradualist doctrine that saw its ideology enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. The Monrovia Group was backed by the ‘Brazzaville Group', another loose club of mostly French colonies who mainly protected their sovereignty and their one seat at the UN. When Nkrumah realised the OAU could not buy his ideals, and was rather a loose bunch of leaders, taking directives from the colonial offices, he went ahead and embarked on the formation of political unions with Guinea's Ahmed Sekou Toure and Mali's Modibo Keita, hoping that more Pan-Africanist statesmen would tag along. Unfortunately for Nkrumah, his ideology seemed ‘too radical' to the greater majority of African leaders who preferred ‘a gradual process' towards continental unity.

In strong opposition to Nkrumah was the leader of another West African nation, Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Erongot, 2011: 1). He was particularly critical of Nkrumah's
philosophy and convinced a larger group of undecided African leaders to block Nkrumah's ideology. Together, they enforced in the Charter of the OAU the clause: "non-interference in the internal affairs of states" (Erongot, 2011: 1-2). Erongot further raises the argument that it was president Boigny who plotted with the West to overthrow Nkrumah and completely kill his USAF agenda; hence, a regime change in Ghana was inevitable in 1966. Nevertheless, Nkrumah's disappointment did not stop him serving as the third chairperson of the OAU from 21 October 1965.

Gaddafi finally won the right to host the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya. This became known as the ‘Sirte Declaration' of 8-9 September. Article II of the Declaration was inspired by the "Founding Fathers of our Organisation and Generation of Pan-Africanist in their resolve to forge unity, solidarity and cohesion, as well as co-operation between African peoples and among African states" (OAU Online, 1999). The Sirte Summit ultimately laid the foundations for the birth of the AU which was embedded with the mandate to amend the Charter of the OAU to "increase the efficiency and effectiveness" of the organisation. The Sirte Declaration resolved to address Africa's challenges and set the pace for renewed political, economic and socio-cultural realities on the continent. Gaddafi's continuous influence finally paid off as on 26 May 2001, the AU came into fruition. He was elected chairman of the organisation on 2 February 2009, at the 12th session of the Organisation of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Prior to that, Gaddafi had been factitiously opinionated about the urgency of a USAF and the fact that the power of the continent lay in its unity (Erongot, 2011: 1-2). Like Nkrumah, he consolidated his stance on the subject and upon acceptance of his role as AU leader, he said: "I shall continue to insist that our sovereign countries work to achieve the united states of Africa". Gaddafi envisaged "a single military force, a single currency, and a single passport for the Africans to move freely around the continent" (Elisabeth Blunt, BBC News Online, 2009).
Adekeye Adebajo (2010, 11) also attempts to justify the programme of action undertaken by Gaddafi and Nkrumah respectively. In 1982, Gaddafi hosted an OAU summit in Tripoli, Libya as a sign of good faith after his military intervention in Chad; widely criticised across the members of the OAU. Like Nkrumah, Gaddafi’s military endeavours on the continent in defence of minority groups were not welcomed by fellow statesmen in the same way Nkrumah’s unconditional backing of dissident minorities against neocolonial regimes on the continent had been dismissed. While both Pan-Africanists sacrificed for a USAF, the question remains: to what extent is the overwhelming rejection of their ideology and onward isolation related to the tactical and strategic subjects of pursuing the political, economic and socio-economic goals of the continent as a whole? (Makgetlaneng, 2010: 2). When the rest of the African leaders (the gradualists) come up with answers to the above question, the consistent fights and discrediting tendencies towards progressive continental statesmen, should become a thing of the past.

Gaddafi’s like Nkrumah's tireless efforts and agenda to unite and transform the continent should rather be supported as well as advanced in all forums. Erongot (2011: 1) further corroborates Makgetlaneng's point by highlighting a series of events wherein Gaddafi actually rekindled Nkrumah’s approach and philosophy of a free, integrated USAF. Nkrumah hosted in Ghana in November 1958, the pioneering ‘All Africa Conference' the nucleus towards a proposed union for all African states. Eight independent African nations were in attendance (Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic) among other observers, revolutionaries (Patrice Lumumba, Franz Fanon), political groups, labour unions, and political freedom fighters, fighting colonisation. In April 1969, Nkrumah founded the Union of African States (UAS), the first practical attempt towards a transitional African state made up of Ghana-Guinea-Mali (Nkrumah, 1963: 141). However, with nationalism supported over Pan-Africanism and autonomy and non-interference thriving over amalgamation and union government in Africa, Nkrumah's dream collapsed and he was indeed heartbroken.
Still, like the case of Nkrumah, Gaddafi was disappointed with the newly formed AU as it did not deliver on its terms nor did it meet his expectations of a radical union with the agenda of "a political union of one government and United States of Africa" (Erongot, 2011: 2-3). At the AU Summit in Accra, Ghana of 2009, Gaddafi again reiterated that the AU was failing the continent and he did not care who was at the helm inasmuch as it met the philosophies of uniting the continent; one army, one passport, one flag, one market and one president. He was met with strong confrontation from the ‘gradualists' yet again. Instead, the Accra Summit resulted in the formation of committees to navigate the AU. After Gaddafi's failure to convince the AU he engaged in a not so popular scheme, that of soliciting the backing of continental chiefs. His aim was to perhaps empower himself with easy access to the African people, bypassing the political system that did not adhere to the USAF agenda. This too would fail as the chiefs were either too weak to galvanise their people towards an understanding of Gaddafi's vision or paid their allegiance to the political system. Like the fate of Nkrumah, Gaddafi's reign and philosophy of the USAF was cut short when France and the USA championed a Western plot to eliminate him on 20 October 2011 in his home in Sirte, Libya (Erongot, 2011: 4). On this note, this dissertation therefore remarks that the battle for African integration is marred on its ideological front by properly orchestrated predispositions to destroy and distort Nkrumah and Gaddafi's viewpoints on key structural instruments for the attainment of the USAF, in order to address and solve Africa's political, economic and socio-cultural problems that place the continent in dire situations.

This argument cannot be conclusive without the study throwing some light on the reactions of pundits from the other side. For instance, the Pan-African scholar Yao Graham (2009: 15-18) was not particularly comfortable with Gaddafi being a suitable comparison to the Pan-African legend, Nkrumah and his election as AU chairperson in 2009. He argued vehemently that Pan-Africanists should not be fooled and confuse Nkrumah's well carved out Pan-African philosophy and dreams with Gaddafi's opportunism and grandiloquence. He continued by quoting David's Rooney's Critical Biography, on Nkrumah being a shrewd politician and scholar whose, "hopes were encapsulated in his ultimate goal of a united Africa in which its rich natural resources would benefit its people and not the capitalist system and other exploiters". Whether Gaddafi
merited or did not merit Nkrumah's genuine unionist agenda, Yao insists that it was ineluctably fundamental that he should not be classified in the same league as Nkrumah (Yao, 2009: 19).

5.6 Strategic building blocks towards the formation of the African Union: Gaddafi’s influence

There is no denying that Gaddafi’s reign was marred by opulence in his daily political affairs, his inelastic, iron-fist style of rule, his dictatorship, extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of political opponents as recorded by international human rights bodies like Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2012). While this dissertation does not recognise him as a saint, it, however, will not hesitate in this section to continue to throw light on the changes the Libyan leader contributed towards Pan-Africanism. Babarinde (2007: 2-6) criticised how even the OAU charter "passed a blind eye on Gaddafi, a despot who ruled Libya for 42 years" and accepted both his financial support and philosophy of “a new united Africa”, independent and self-governed. Gaddafi unequivocally played an instrumental role in the formation of the AU as this study has revealed in the previous chapters. Gaddafi foresaw that the coming of the AU would speed up the challenges holding back the continent vis-à-vis exposing it to Western exploitation.

The new realities of globalisation had to be squashed, at the same time promoting Africa's development and trade, especially with the 15 landlocked countries in SSA. Gaddafi lamented the high cost of inter-trade within Africa, a constraint that has greatly impacted the regional trading in Africa and has hugely pushed the continent into the doldrums of poverty (Akanda,
2010: 23). Against this backdrop, therefore, Gaddafi ensured that his interest was felt financially and ideologically in the seven important continental strategic meetings. He iterated that we are approaching the formation of the African Authority, and each time we solve African problems and also move in the direction of peace and unity. We deal with problems step by step. We are continuing to do that… (Reuters, Online 2010).

This was ultimately the Libyan leader's way in the start-up process in unifying the bodies that would ultimately be transformed into the USAF. The Monrovia Declaration of 1979 was the implementation of sectoral developmental policies across Africa such as: environmental dilapidation, urbanisation and improvement in family life, combatting alien lifestyles, general economic development, increase in population growth especially women and rural groups, health, high birthrate and diminishing high death rate and "locking in" to overseas dependence (Monrovia Declaration Development Strategy for Africa, 1979). The Lagos Plan of Action on 28-29 April 1980 in Lagos, Nigeria focused on the development of priority sectors in Africa encapsulating the policies of the Monrovia document as it approached the 21st century. It recognised and improved African skills, training and participation; developed priority sectors and key economic institutions at the national, sub-regional, regional and continental levels.

The Abuja Treaty adopted in Nigeria on 3 June 1991, in Abuja, Nigeria was aimed at establishing a new African supreme body a Pan-African and continental economic hub the AEC. The AEC fostered economic and socio-cultural integration on the continent through the creation of regional economic confederacies such as the EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, West African Economic Commission for Africa (UEMOA) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (African Union Commission, 2013). Also, the Sirte Extraordinary Session of 1999 (the decision to establish the AU); the Lomé Summit of 2000 (the decision to adopt the Constitutive Act of the Union); the Lusaka Summit of 2001 (the road map for the implementation of the AU); and the Durban Summit of 2002 (the launch of the AU and convention of the first Assembly of the AU
heads of states). Building on the Abuja Treaty, it follows that Gaddafi’s vision of the USAF and an AU government became inevitable.

5.7 Gaddafi’s vision of a United States of Africa Vs Mbeki’s African Renaissance

"I shall continue to insist that our sovereign countries work to achieve the United States of Africa". These were the words of Muammar Gaddafi when he accepted the position as AU Chairperson in 2009 (York, 2011: 22). Like Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech, which replenished the ideology of an African Renaissance, Gaddafi’s speech echoed a proposal for a USAF not much different from the opinions of Nkrumah and his Casablanca group more than five decades before. However, when compared to Mbeki’s African Renaissance vision, it turned out to be rather too advanced and superficial for Mbeki and his Renaissance cronies to comprehend (Gaddafi, 1997). Gaddafi meticulously re-echoed the vision of a speedy and complete integration of Africa through a single government system for the continent with the required institutional bodies. These bodies and institutions would include the constitution of the government of the USAF; a central governance hub with a unique defence commission and military force, described by Nkrumah as "African High Command"; a structural foreign policy and diplomacy; an African currency with a continental monetary district; a central banking unit; a single market and trading route with open borders and limited or no tariff system; an African passport and citizenship (Landsberg, 2007: 3). Against this backdrop, ‘supra-nationalism' takes centre stage while ‘sovereignty' is sacrificed.
Unfortunately, it is at this juncture where Gaddafí and Mbeki differed since Mbeki’s African Renaissance ideal was not packaged ready for the ultimate sacrifice of national sovereignty; a need Gaddafí did all to see succeed, since according to him and Libya, without Africa becoming one, and united states, Pan-Africanism would remain a mere shadow of itself. Landsberg refers to what unfolds thereafter as a “continental federation of supra-nationals”, "nations of nations" or "states of states". With the above policies in place, the USAF would go ahead to fulfil the long-awaited dreams of the people of Africa and people of black descent worldwide.

Ultimately, there would be a host of shared African infrastructure, involved with the smooth operation of both Africa's regional and trans-African highways, the free movement of Africans, their goods and services through the USAF passport. As to how the USAF should be financed and managed daily, key mineral and natural resources generated from all states under the union government would be utilised for the continent's programmes and projects across the board.

In the same vein, another Pan-African scholar, Grant (2008: 74) argues that the name United States of Africa was used first by Marcus Garvey more than 80 years ago in the USA when he wrote the poem "Hail! United States of Africa- Free! Hail! Motherland...United...Mighty thou shalt ever be". In the 1960s, Kwame Nkrumah took over the Pan-Africanist relay batten and strongly pushed for a united Africa in his statement:

> We all want a united Africa, united not only in our concept of what unity connotes but united in our common desire to move forward together...a common market, a single currency, an African Central bank, a common foreign policy, a common defence system, a common citizenship... (Banienuba, 2013: 18).

Nkrumah recapped that anything short of the above would open gates for deeper Western exploitation, manipulation, poverty, decadence, neocolonialism as well as a futureless African people with zero voice within the global space (Ekweelor, 2018: 25-39). Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the DRC added his voice in the 1960s when he called for a united Africa
as the only real weapon to fight Western imperialism. Lumumba's call emphasised the economic power which Africa would enjoy out of unity as it would punch above its political and economic weight globally and would be able to hold its own in future (Lumumba, 2017: 88). Banienuba (2013: 22) went further to suggest that “the survival of the African continent [which] lies on her ability to compete within a realistic and emulous international system depends greatly on her capability to unite”. Therefore, a lack of such unity by African states, where trade, for instance, becomes one of the paramount interests; allows for prolonged backwardness in Africa (Gwaambuka 2016: 29-31). Gwaambuka also states that if trade on the African continent does not increase from the minuscule position of its 12 per cent range as compared to North America's 40 per cent and Europe's 60 per cent, development on the continent will stall as it is as a result of trade boundaries within Africa that free trade is thwarted as well as imposing unnecessary tariffs and trade penalties on the continent.

The above arguments are corroborated by Munya (1999: 45) and Mazui (1967: 56) who state that the continued dwindling of inter-African trade levels make room for continental backwardness, under-development, poverty, despotic leaders; all as a result of Western neocolonialism and imperialism in Africa. Through neocolonialism and imperialism, therefore, African trade channels become trapped and suffocated as the movement of people, goods and services become problematic.

Ramutsindela, (2009: 91) as well contends that more than 40 years after Gaddafi resurrected the USAF debate and reignited the fight against Western imperialism as well as neocolonialism across Africa, the rest of the continent still drags its feet towards the achievement of this ideal. Gaddafi's views were clear and precise on this subject; "that Africa's power lies in the unity of all its states under a strong government with a powerful international voice" (Totolo, 2017: 60). According to Gaddafi, the USAF would become "a federation of states with a single government, a single currency and a single army". Like Nkrumah in the 1960s, Gaddafi pictured an African continent that "owns a singular identity" and would only need to carry one unique passport that would enable Africans to travel the continent visa-free; a borderless continent in essence.
Gaddafi saw the need to eradicate conflicts in Africa through a united continent and people; as conflicts were the result of the massive division of Africa along arbitrary colonial borders (Totolo, 2017: 61). He insisted that Africans under the USAF agenda serve as "an opportunity to tap back to the African roots", a platform for Africans to reconcile their differences as well as embrace diversity of other African peoples while staying united. This will eventually collapse all colonial boundaries drawn along geographic lines that completely destroy the African traditional and ethnic similarities transcending these physical borders. Gaddafi emphasised "the reincarnation of African freedom and dignity", without which Africans and their generation will continue to live in "imperial bondages and Western manipulation" for centuries to come. Eventually, in February 2009, Gaddafi's stance yielded results when he was overwhelmingly elected as the chairperson of the AU (Gwaambuka, 2016: 4). His statement was crystal clear on the subject; “Africa must Unite or Die” (Gaddafi, 2009). He reiterated that for the continent to flourish economically and challenge the political domination of the West, it must move towards “a Political Union”. By assuming this Pan-Africanist position, Gaddafi somehow declared a war of ideology against France and the US in particular that economically controlled African resources and manipulated the continent’s leaders to their imperial advantage. Therefore, Gaddafi re-opened a can of worms which was not entertained by Western governments like France and the US; a popular African debate of ‘continentalism as against regionalism’ (Farmer, 2012: 1).

5.7.1 The United States of Africa and the African Union Summit of 2007

At the 2000 AU Summit in Lome Togo, Gaddafi pushed through the USAF ideology deep into the night. This proposal was backed by the Soviet Union’s style of Socialist Republic that was united and at the same time functional (Gwaambuka, 2016: 1-2). Gaddafi presented his USAF master plan in Conakry, Guinea in June 2007 and in Addis Abba, Ethiopia in 2009 during the AU Summits respectively. However, it was particularly in the 2007 Summit that Gaddafi’s outstanding contributions to the AU also helped to spin and push the USAF plans in the right
direction. The US *Wall Street Journal* quoted Gwaambuka’s (2016: 1) argument that it was “Colonel Gaddafi at one point bankrolled African Union expenses by providing at least 15% of the African Union membership fees and helping nations in arrears like Chad, Niger, and Malawi clear their balances”. The Summit was pregnant with the paramount subject of the modalities, procedures and strategies to “deepen and implement effective continental integration” (Landsberg, 2007: 4-5).

Landsberg (2007: 5-8) explains that just like the "Grand Debate" of the 1960s that witnessed three different opinions on the formation of the OAU (Monrovia, Casablanca and Brazzaville blocs), the 2007 AU Summit as well struggled to have a common voice, the result was a three-way divide: the conservatives, the progressive continentalists and the radical Pan-Africans.

The conservatives were the group of countries mostly from the Francophone part of Africa like Cameroon, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mali who preferred the existing status quo of the AU's agenda and its Constitutive Act since its creation. This group argued that the current state of the AU in no small way allows it to step out of its spheres of influence to deepen and execute a continental integration agenda. The leaders of these countries are very strongly attached to their sovereignty and would not let go for the sake of a USAF ideology within the AU corridors. According to them, it is a waste of time, resources and energy as the AU has no clearly demarcated plan as well as powers to implement issues of continental integration. Moreover, the conservatives reject a visa-free system among Africans and would not welcome the AU's intervention when it comes to human rights violations in these countries. They put forward a strong argument that the AU should focus on deepening regional rather than continental integration, a philosophy that would instead neutralise further the drive towards a USAF. Unfortunately for the AU and the dream of the USAF, the conservatives do very little or nothing about the contributions to the AU: financial and human resources alike, for the effectiveness of the AU.
The progressive continentalists include Nigeria, Zimbabwe and SA. It holds the opinion that the AU's integrationist policy should be associated to strengthen, harmonise and finalise the organ's institutions. In this light, the progressive continentalists support the formation of a continental government ‘an AU government’ to serve as a provisional makeshift model. This stance of advocating for a makeshift model for the AU meant planting the pillars for a government of the AU, and a USAF in the future. This action, therefore, puts the progressive continentalists in a forthright position, unlike the conservative group. Nonetheless, critics of this gradualist group like Meredith (2008: 22) pronounce that unlike ‘the radical Pan-Africanists', they totally avoid what is described as ‘Mono-Casual or Zero-Sum' decisions. In this context, this entails continuous sustainability of an AU government and institutions at the regional levels while simultaneously sidelining the desires to move towards a united continent and USAF philosophy. They indirectly implant blockades of continental infrastructural development: road, rail and air linkages, trade ties in Africa, the exchange of information technology and security information, open borders and change of rigid migration policies.

Meredith (2008: 23) regards this ideology as ‘sovereignty driven' even though the progressive continentalists defend this by arguing that the sovereignty situation could be re-examined in peculiar instances wherein African leaders would be convinced to cede some bits of their power for the sake of strengthening the AU and its continental entities. Landsberg (2007: 6) reveals that just like the conservative group, the progressive continentalists pay only tiny financial contributions to the AU, hence, they are guilty of impeding the growth of the institution, therefore the goal of the USAF. Landsberg concludes that if enough financial levies and donations are met by the gradualist group, the AU would inevitably be empowered and driven to secure continental integration on a broader scale and Africa would become united and be under a single government by the end of the 21st century.

The radicals for a USAF were led by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya who emphasised the need for one continental body characterised by a unique federalist prototype (Gago, 2007: 2). Their philosophy of a USAF was consolidated mainly on a supra-national nation of nations, and state
of states basis. In this light, ‘supranationalism’ holds that only the presence of a continental organisation like the USAF, bigger than the regional African bodies and continental nation-states, will save the continent from its numerous socio-economic and political crises and challenges. The said body will, therefore, be able to exert its powers and prowess on 54 countries on the continent. The usurpation of the philosophy of ‘African continental federalism’ would be employed to necessitate the actual running of the USAF, where power is alternatively shared between the principal authority in charge of the continent and the outlying states (Landsberg, 2007: 5). By this, the radicals of the USAF had already modified a current and immediate master plan that would guarantee the smooth transition of an AU government into the USAF. The proponents of this group contribute their levies accurately and donate fabulous sums of billions of US dollars to the construction and consolidation of the AU, its institutions, the union government and ultimately the USAF.

They hold strongly that only a federation of African states will succeed in fixing the problems of civil wars, conflicts, instability and poverty, misery, underdevelopment and backwardness hovering all over Africa. Critics of the radicals of the USAF like Adebajo (2016: 2) were quick to point out that advocates of the USAF paid little attention to reality as well as towards the fact that such an enormous continental project demands time, absolute planning, preparedness and a mammoth budget to pull it through. Also, that Gaddafi and his group failed to foresee the tension and possible violence that is bound to erupt when the USAF comes to fruition; as some states, believers of conservatism and gradualism, would resist the USAF.

All in all, Gaddafi’s radical vision was not welcomed by a majority of African leaders like Egypt, Algeria, SA, Zambia, Nigeria and Kenya, who described it as “too radical and a challenge to state’s sovereignty”. These countries maintained that ‘African unity’ was a vital concept but at the same time, they failed to welcome Gaddafi’s fast-track vision of a USAF. For his part, Gaddafi completely rejected the ‘gradualist’ policy of deepening regional integration as opposed to rapid continental unity (Gaddafi, 2000).
5.8 Gaddafi’s policy of de-dollarisation

De-dollarisation is the intent and decision taken by nations to trade dominantly in domestic currency (Elisabeth, 2015: 1). Balino, Adam and Eduardo (1999: 7-8) define dollarisation as “the holding by residents or state of their assets, in the form of overseas currency-denominated assets”. Dollarisation is usually differentiated between de jure (official) and de facto (unofficial) wherein, the former represents a case in which overseas currency is given legal tender status. This means that foreign currency is utilised for reasons a currency may have, this includes units of accounts for public contracts. De facto dollarisation involves the representation of foreign money side by side with the domestic currency as legal tender or asset substitution. Against this backdrop, Jimenez (1993:19) portrays how dollarisation blocked the development of secondary markets in developing countries throughout the 1890s and early 1990s. Jimenez emphasised how Africa experienced a very weak legal support system to be able to adjust income payments (indexation) through price index to determine and maintain states’ purchasing power after inflation hits. Inflation and SAPs also helped kill limping African economies due to dollarisation.

Gaddafi, therefore, ushered in a new era of prosperity in Africa as a result of huge oil exports as well as his financial reserves that made it possible for him to create “an Africa sovereign wealth fund” in 2006 (Bawden and Hooper, 2011: 5). Bawden and Hooper (2011) argue that when the UN lifted economic sanctions on Libya in 2004, Gaddafi moved to form the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP). These were huge funding bodies that had one key objective: facilitate development on the continent. According to Gago (2007: 2), Gaddafi personally supervised LIA and LAP and endeavoured for them to manage chains of companies that operated across Africa and which funded most African governments on interest-free loans (Gago, 2007: 2-3).

These companies included Oil Libya, Sahel-Saharan Investment and Trade Bank, Afriqiyah Airways, the Libyan Arab Investment Trade company, LAP Green Networks and LAP Suisse.
Generally, Gaddafi's economic spheres of influence on the African continent encapsulated African financial markets, telecommunications services and industries, tourist centres and resorts, industrial factories, agricultural holdings, oil production and exploration, gas and connected services, engineering, mining, imports and exports, transport and real estate developments (Gago, 2007: 3). Bakata (2011: 4) describes how Gaddafi's economic projects in Africa benefitted countries including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Togo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania, Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Chad, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria, Niger, Zimbabwe and SA. Gago (2007: 5) highlights that Gaddafi's LAP hugely invested multimillions of US dollars across Africa on development projects especially in SSA where poor countries abound. Such Pan-Africanist steps undertaken by Gaddafi are described by Gago (2007: 8) as "genuine Pan-African" which economic and development projects in Africa rescued the continent from foreign debt, manipulation and control while simultaneously ushering in a reliable source of cheap capital vis-à-vis investment; a challenge that has held Africa back for many decades. Gaddafi's technique was both emulated and admired by some African states such as post-genocide Rwanda and those who admired Gaddafi named significant state buildings and public arenas after him.

Therefore, Gaddafi's USAF philosophy had to become the driving force behind his de-dollarisation programme. Like many shrewd leaders and policymakers, Gaddafi wanted to address key challenges faced by the African continent in the formulation and conducting of his monetary policy (Pougala, 2011: 12).

5.9 Muammar Gaddafi’s instruments of de-dollarisation versus Mbeki’s MAP

Gaddafi was bent on reshaping Africa into a continent that would successfully reverse the trend of dollarisation; a capitalist market system often used by Western economies to manipulate developing and less developed states by imposing the dollar currency. Pougala, (2011: 15-16) argues that Gaddafi championed this initiative to rally African states towards adopting a single
currency for the continent as well as strengthening its unity and promoting its development. According to Gaddafi, adopting a single currency by Africa and its people was a strong message to the world that Africa was ready to totally revamp its distressed economic situation for a sustainable one; otherwise, the continent would simply remain un-united, underdeveloped and super-controlled by foreign superpowers for a long time. Pougala's argument is backed by Vogt (2002: 33) and Tanguy (2003: 29) as they advance that the division of Africa along colonial artificial borderlines has been a major cause of Africa's economic backwardness vis-a-vis dollarisation. Pougala (2012: 13) further underlines that Gaddafi was the first African leader from the 1990s to kick-start the financial revolution towards the policy of de-dollarisation.

As the Libyan leader and AU chairperson, Gaddafi contributed an annual lease of US$500 million to Europe for Africa's renting of satellite technology, for instance, Intelsat. Ekwealor (2013: 5) says that when Europe together with the IMF rejected Africa's 14-year bid for a loan of US$400 million for projects in telecommunication, Gaddafi moved to donate the sum of US$300 million to the AU to purchase its first satellite in communication in December 2007. Hence, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria and SA launched their satellites and in 2010, Gaddafi again pushed for a second main African satellite to be launched, this gesture, restricted the West from any profits on loans if the money was borrowed from the IMF or World Bank (Ekwealor, 2013: 15). These steps towards de-dollarisation taken by Gaddafi as AU chair provoked both Western powers and financial donors, hence in 2010 the US froze the sum of US$30 billion, money that belonged to the Libyan Central bank. The frozen money had been earmarked by Gaddafi for the construction of a number of African giant projects across the continent, including the African Monetary Fund (AMF) in Cameroon, Central Africa, the African Central Bank (ACB) in Nigeria, West Africa and the African Investment Bank (AIB) in Libya, North Africa (Pougali, 2011: 14).

Nevertheless, the decision by the USA to freeze Gaddafi's finances overseas did not stop him from going ahead to convince African heads of states to finally welcome the de-dollarisation implementation plan. The plan was geared towards breaking Africa away from heavy dependence on Western loans that came with extremely high interest rates (Ekwealor, 2013: 18).
Gaddafi named the single African currency ‘AFRO’ which was to be backed by the Libyan Gold Dinar (Pougali, 2011: 18). Alex Knyazev, a Russian professor of International Law describes this process as one that would create a new African economic system, an entirely new banking system away from Western Central banks...backed and dominated by African currencies, free from the USA dollar. He wanted to protect Africa's vast resources from Western looting. The imperialists eliminated him (Koenig, 2017: 1).

The AFRO was later approved in 1991 in Addis Ababa and would eventually come into effect in 2028. The African pipeline that would cut across all the regions of the continent and eventually link them was also one of Gaddafi's visible projects as chair of the AU. He wanted to consolidate the philosophy of bankrolling, bearing in mind that the African continent would only gain respect from the international community and be recognised as a force if together African states worked in synergy to override Western imperial influence and its power to divide and rule the continent (Pougali, 2011: 22).

Gaddafi's increasing economic control of Africa and his passion to completely free the continent from the control of Europe and the US unleashed a series of retaliations from them. In his own words, Knyazev states that “Gaddafi's assassination by the West was not for humanitarian reasons but because he wanted to empower Africa”. France under Sarkozy as President and the USA under Obama as President with his Secretary of State Hilary Clinton used NATO to wage war against Gaddafi until his ultimate assassination on 20 October 2011. “We came, we saw, he died” were the infamous words of Clinton reacting to Gaddafi’s tragic end (Koenig, 2017: 1).

5.10 Gaddafi’s Open-Cheque-Book diplomacy vs Mbeki’s economic insight
Gaddafi began contributing towards the formation of the AU by hosting the AU Summit in Libya in 2005. During his welcome address, Gaddafi for the first time called for a USAF, a single African passport, a sole African defence force, and the single African currency to be called the AFRO to create a strong economy to challenge imperialist's domination. Upon his appointment as chairperson of the AU on 2 February 2009 during the AU’s 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, Gaddafi strongly projected the question of ‘unity’ and a ‘strong government’ as the sole instrument that would rescue the continent from a political, economic and social Waterloo (Bram, 2011: 11). When the AU replaced the OAU in 2002, Gaddafi was among the top five funders of the organisation’s running budget. In the words of Jang Ping, the then AU President of the Commission of the AU, “five African countries supply almost 15% of the organisation's annual operational budget, which helps pay for peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects, etc…” (African News, 2011). Du Plessis (2006: 1) highlights that the rest of the AU’s 76 per cent budget is funded by outside bodies like China and the EU or what “we euphemistically call partners”.

In addition, Gaddafi appropriated large chunks of Libya’s government budget to cover the AU levy and pay up the dues of poorer and smaller African nations like Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Uganda, who could not afford to pay the 0.2 per cent of their individual import levies to the AU for it to move closer to “a step of dignity” (York, 2011: 33). Gaddafi’s actions gave him credibility to be overwhelmingly appointed the AU chairperson in 2009; it also paved the way for him to gather considerable influence to push his Pan-Africanist ideals of USAF and de-dollarisation vis-à-vis African unity, dignity and freedom (Zachary, 2011: 10). As chair of the AU, Gaddafi also fought for a symbolic launch of a unique African passport (visa-free access to all 54 African states), a single African military force, a single African market and trade route to increase trade on the continent from the minute 13 per cent as against trade with Europe and the USA at 43 per cent to 83 per cent (African Research Bulletin, 2016: 2).

5.11 Conclusion
This chapter illustrated that though Mbeki’s stands on African Renaissance spelt a cautious and slow trajectory, on his part, Gaddafi made some suggestions to rapidly turn around the continent’s geopolitical and economic present and improve its future. Hence, his contributions towards a new lens of Pan-Africanism from 1994-2008. With the political and economic actions of the brother-leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Africa seemed to have regained some international pride as a result of his USAF agenda, his single currency and one army proposals, his de-dollarisation programme, his enormous contribution in the creation of the AU and his position as a financier on the continent fuelled by the zeal to continue the Pan-African ideals started by Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah before him.

When Gaddafi bankrolled Africa and the AU, one could argue that he somehow pushed out and frustrated Western aid that came with strings attached, IMF and World Bank loans with huge interest rates and imperial control of Africa's resources through Western-backed Multinational Companies (MNCs) and the manipulation of the continent's leaders as a whole. Meanwhile, schools of thought like York’s (2011: 26) bemoaned that Gaddafi was "a symbol of extremes" whose followers, sometimes described as 'mere beggars' showed him maximum loyalty, whereas his enemies acrimoniously scorned him. He was often referred to by other African leaders who did not buy into his USAF agenda as "erratic, cruel, insensible, arrogant, vain, unpredictable, despotic, a fool and his USAF agenda, a utopia" (Pratiksha, 2011: 3).

Gaddafi was accused of frequent human rights abuses in Libya including torture, disappearance and murder of opposition politicians and journalists. It was Gaddafi's strong opposition to Western powers, applauded by far and near that earned him tremendous global respect and made him a public enemy of Western governments like France and the US, hence, his ultimate death in 2011. All in all, Gaddafi's Pan-Africanist ideal was greatly felt in Africa and his contributions towards the new lens of Pan-Africanism can be comfortably matched with the ideals of Nkrumah. It goes without saying that much of the research on the subject of Muammar Gaddafi has been negative as focus has been mostly on his domestic legacy as an authoritarian dictator
and his foreign policy painted as either a sponsor of terrorism, crimes against humanity or simply as a man and confused statesman drunk with power and soaked in wealth; such is a Western perspective that has dominated literature on Gaddafi for decades. Fortunately for research, this study uncovers the loophole and imbalanced analysis of the subject's legacy. It argues that the subject's legacy from the social, state, foreign policy structures and his intellectual capacity based on his shrewdness and willingness to contribute willingly to the betterment of mankind cannot be underestimated.

One, therefore, concludes that the dissertation has simply added some literature to the many works out there that tell the story of Gaddafi’s Grand Pan-Africanist ideals despite his blind political side as has been mentioned above. There is more room for alternative research methods that will open up thoughtful perceptions of Gaddafi’s legacy, ideology and philosophy. The following final chapter is the conclusion. Some light will be shed on this section as well.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion

After reading through five chapters of this dissertation, one could be tempted to ask the question: do the philosophies of Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance or a United state of Africa actually work for Africa? If yes, why is the continent still disunited, insecure, poor and in an unending economic catastrophe? If not, then what should be done? The study cannot boast to answer these questions, however, it can state that the three philosophies mentioned resonate strongly within the people of Africa wherever they find themselves. If one takes the global agenda of Pan-Africanism seriously, WEB Du Bois and Marcus Garvey informed the West of Africa’s contempt at their inhumane treatment of the black race and fought hard to restore, reinstate and resuscitate the pride of the African people.

If one is led by the national agenda, Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi’s injunctions: African Renaissance and USAF respectively inspired viable and creative options of collective self-reliance of a people. Besides, 1994-2008 witnessed how the two Pan-African leaders acknowledged the fact that Africa needed to move away from constant foreign marginalisation, imperialism, globalisation and manipulation, likewise addressing the fact that Africa as 54 states must unite economically and politically. While Mbeki became the architect of NEPAD which was ultimately adopted as the key mechanism of Africa's economic development, Gaddafi advocated for greater continental unity under a unity government and several important union agencies. Generally, the future of Pan-Africanism should be seen to be more inclusive and participatory, led by heads of states and their governments. Such a Pan-Africanist task should not be seen as arithmetical but that of aggregation wherein frameworks arise for the provision of portable solutions for local, national and continental agendas. Against this backdrop, African leaders and governments must endeavour to cherry-pick the thread for weaving one
comprehensive tapestry among the continent’s rich socio-cultural diversity. Enormous efforts should be made to utilise opportunities presented by continent-wide initiatives like the youthful AU, NEPAD, APRM, the (PAP), among others.

With that said, chapter six proceeds with the display of a way forward based on twin methodologies towards rapid economic expansion and continental unison by both Mbeki and Gaddafi. The chapter summarises the preceding chapters and based on the findings, responds to the question asked in chapter one, section 1.4 of the study: “What new contributions and ideologies constituting a new lens of Pan-Africanism were introduced by Thabo Mbeki and Muammar Gaddafi towards Pan-Africanism during their term as statesmen of South Africa and Libya respectively between the years, 1994-2008?”

6.1.2 Analysing the research question

The thesis has satisfactorily answered the research question of whether Mbeki and Gaddafi actually contributed new ideologies and ideals of Pan-Africanism that can constitute or be considered “a new lens of Pan-Africanism”. Objectively, the study assessed the significant progress undertaken by their Pan-African ideology and argues that from its origin, the ideal of Pan-Africanism was characterised by moral values and political aspirations. These characteristics were grounded on the aspiration to overturn the dominant views of African inferiority. The objectives are threefold: first, to offer knowledge that helps in the construction of an understanding of all the ideational and practical actions of Mbeki and Gaddafi on the continent from 1994-2008.

Second, to assess at the ideational level, how both leaders actually introduced a new lens to Pan-Africanism through the raising of Pan-African and African Renaissance flags respectively. Third, the study examined the practical level and investigated the two leaders’ contributions to implementing their ideals of Pan-Africanism highlighted above.
Discussing the framework that guided the thesis, constructivism and neoliberalism were used to test the ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi respectively in relation to their Pan-Africanist objectives. Realism stipulates that cooperation hardly works because state leaders are disinclined to relinquish power and sovereignty to a universal authority like the AU and they are highly suspicious of the agendas of leaders leading the universal agenda like Gaddafi's USAF or Mbeki's African Renaissance. According to Krasner (1982: 185-205), realists face two main challenges when it comes to issues of continental and international cooperation: "state concerns about cheating and state concerns about the relative achievement of gains".

Krasner further outlines four constraints that states face when dealing with continental or international organisations: (1) political power, (2) economic growth, (3) aggregate national income, and (4) social stability. Concerning idealism, the study as well dealt with four vital principles related to ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi. Held (2010: 34) explains four steps the study targeted in dealing with realism: (1) states' respect of international law allows room for national stability, (2) states’ foreign policy should abide with the catalogue of morality, (3) the respect of international law remains a significant instrument of maintaining lasting peace, and (4) states should take upon themselves the responsibility of ensuring greater developments, unity and peace within the international community.

Consequently, chapters two, three, four and five discussed at length, analysed and answered the main question of this research which seeks to ascertain whether Mbeki and Gaddafi introduced the new lens of Pan-Africanism from 1994-2008 (Shepperson, 1962). The study has indeed demonstrated, given the facts analysed, an obvious conclusion that Mbeki of South Africa and Gaddafi of Libya contributed significantly to Pan-Africanism through their ideals and contributions.
6.1.3 Evaluation

Human history and civilisation across time such as Greek, Pharaonic, Napoleon’s France, Hitler's Germany and the USSR eventually collapsed not because of lack of human and material resources but as a result of what Shepperson (1962: 346) identifies as ‘natural consequence' through popular uprising by the majority of humans who had endured untold persecution from the ruling minority class. The constant dominion of men over men because of class and status quo often came with injustices and oppression, this eventually led to solidarity among the oppressed to fight back. The uniting factors include culture, ethnicity, religion, language, ancestry and skin colour. Concerning the people of African descent (black people), the white man and white race had represented the oppressor for centuries due to the institutionalisation of ‘master-servant' status quo through slavery and slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and globalisation (Gibson, 1903: 17-51).

Pan-Africanism was, therefore, the solution to put an end to centuries of prejudices, tyranny, humiliation, miseries, exploitation and persecution of the black race. The black man needed to redress his status in the society from an ‘inferior race', ‘less human' and slave whose role was to ‘enrich' his master through hard work amid injustices and torture. While physically building the white man's prosperity through plantation labour and construction, the black man could be disposed of by his white master like an ordinary commodity under his whims and caprices (Gibson, 1903: 52). Since individual activities to overturn white superiority failed consistently, a unification of the efforts of the African people worldwide became the ultimate solution, hence Pan-Africanism.

Pan-Africanism was geared towards achieving tremendous gains and contributions in the struggle to free the continent from Western domination and control. The ideology itself is diffuse and can be interpreted differently by different schools of thought. Nevertheless, the concept has
been generally understood to mean “unity of the people of African descent in the struggle against racism, imperialism, for the abolition of the remnants of colonial rule, the fight for political independence, economic control and socio-cultural liberation” (Potekhin, 1964: 48).

Africa’s earliest entries are three key activists whose journeys could be traced back to the 18th century struggle against slavery and racism. They were Toussaint L'Ouverture, leader of St Dominique who championed a slave revolution and granted Haiti independence; Olaudah Equiano, who pioneered the writings of slave narratives; and Ottobah Duggan, who influenced the abolitionist cause and hailed the African humanity narrative (Hakim and Sherwood, 2003: 1). By the 19th century, legal slavery and the trading of African people ensued in almost all parts of Europe and the Americas. While in Africa itself, slavery slowly gave way to ‘colonial scramble and partition' of the continent hence, the onset of Western imperialism. For most Pan-African activists in this Pan-African history like Mbeki and Gaddafi of SA and Libya respectively, the battle to ‘liberate and vindicate the race' and simultaneously refuting “foreign, racist philosophies and pseudo-scientific narratives of African inferiority” became a central theme in their activism, ideals and contributions to Pan-Africanism (Hakim and Sherwood, 2003: 2). The beginning of the 21st century overlapped an energetic increase in Pan-African action, the utmost example being the formation of the AU influenced by Mbeki and Gaddafi, largely as a keen retaliation to the opposing challenges of globalisation.

Nevertheless, as of 2018, the AU's results have been very unsatisfactory towards the vision of a united Africa. Wachiri (2007: 3) notes that the AU and the regional economic blocs in Africa altogether have failed to commit politically and economically to salvage Africa from the unnecessary chaos, instability and confusion faced as a result of lack of unity resulting in lack of direction. For the continent to drift away from its current chaotic and horrific state there is the need for an ‘African unity mechanism' that will be based on the total involvement of member-states who have a reason beyond compromising their states' sovereignty. It is therefore only after this giant step that Africa will begin removing itself from the situation of insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment. Slaughter (2011: 21) refers to such a situation as ‘realist perspective' towards a common goal. Landsberg (2012: 2), however, argues that
such a powerful Pan-African step of sacrificing the sovereignty for a single state of Africa remains a myth because realists insist that the place of states and their power within Africa remains a dominant factor that stands in the way of continental unity.

Nonetheless, all is not gloom and doom because the very reason that Africa is moving towards some sort of stability together with political harmony on the part of the statesmen remains a vital step towards achieving a USAF within the 21st century. Therefore, the dissertation has successfully answered the research question following discussions and detailed analyses in chapters two, three and four. While highlighting the new lens of Pan-Africanism exhibited by both Mbeki and Gaddafi of SA and Libya respectively, the dissertation as well covered some history of colonial rule in Africa, economic challenges and political drawbacks. The research further answered the looming question about the stagnating nature of Africa towards achieving continental unity. It depicted the economic and political shortcomings as internal problems against the USAF whereas colonialism, neocolonialism and continuous imperialism remain the key external factors.

Throughout this study, it was difficult to identify the exact inspirations from Pan-Africanists because of either deeper individual motives or allegiance to a mutual political philosophy. This period began from the mid-19th century, spanning the years 1812 to 1885 of Delany Martin; 1887 to 1940 of Marcus Garvey; 1832 to 1912 of Edward W Blyden; 1855 to 1954 of John Locke; 1869 to 1911 of Henry Sylvester Williams to the end of the 19th century with WEB Du Bois (1868-1963). Then came the five Pan-African Congresses beginning from the 20th century with Paris 1919; London, Brussels 1921; Paris 1923; London and Lisbon 1927 and New York and Manchester 1945 (Campbell, 1975: 50). The 20th century shaped Pan-Africanism with the emergence of WWI and WWII. Thousands of Africans from mainland Africa and from the diaspora were trained and employed by imperial Europe (France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany) to fight alongside them during the war. It is here that Africans saw firsthand the weakness of the white race who supposedly is a superior-human being and could not be seen in pain and dying from bullets like the inferior black race (Matera, 2005: 14).
Pan-Africanism after WWII and post-colonialism marked a watershed in African internationalist undertakings across the Atlantic Ocean and earmarked critical thought on the concept of rights of the black race. This period also inspired the likes of ‘motherland Pan-Africanists”; Nkrumah of Ghana, Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenyatta of Kenya from 1909-1972 (Nkrumah, 1961). The active involvement of Nkrumah in the Pan-Africanist doctrine under the wing of Du Bois earned him the position of deputy secretary and joint secretary of the Pan-African Congress in Manchester 1945. Nkrumah demonstrated a superb ability between his nationalist goals (Ghanaian independence) and his Pan-Africanist ideals (the political unity of Africa). He consolidated both objectives and hosted Pan-African congresses on the Gold Coast even before independence in 1957.

It was Nkrumah who ignited the concept of a USAF when he addressed independent Ghana and highlighted that the independence of Ghana remained "incomplete without the independence of all of Africa" (Campbell, 2008: 3). After the Congress, Pan-African activities hit the roof and sprinkled across African colonies of the Caribbean and SSA in particular. Nkrumah seized the period and in 1957, he marched the then Gold Coast (Ghana) out from under the British colonial yoke to independence. In 1958, he hosted the first Pan-Africanist (All-Africa People’s conference) in Accra inviting top Pan-Africanist leaders like Patrice Lumumba (DRC), Sekou Toure (Guinea) Samora Machel (Mozambique), Modibo Keita (Mali), Haile Selassie (Ethiopia) and Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso). This conference led to the birth of the first Pan-African organisation with the aim of uniting the peoples of Africa, the OAU, in 1963 (Esedebe, 1994: 42).

Pan-Africanism in the 21st century saw the entry of Mbeki and Gaddafi with clearer impetus to continue with the work started by their predecessors from the mid-19th century. Mbeki was Mandela’s deputy from 1994 to 1999 and was later inaugurated as the second democratic president of South Africa in June 1999 (Landsberg, 2004). His key Pan-African tool was termed the African Renaissance which Maloka (2000: 29) refers to as both “political and militant”. Vale
and Maseko (1998: 271-288) describe it as two distinct approaches: “globalist and Africanist”. Therefore, the African Renaissance became Mbeki’s ideal ideology and paramount contribution to Pan-Africanism that indeed laid the foundation for restructuring Africa economically. The APRM and NEPAD rose from the Renaissance programme and became the economic pillars of the AU whose existence could be greatly attributed to the contributions by Mbeki from 1994-2008.

For his part, Gaddafi too contributed immensely through his Pan-African ideals of a new African economic system; the de-dollarisation project where a new African currency AFRO would be backed by the Gold Dinar rather than the US dollar that keeps usurping the continent's natural resources, particularly, oil and minerals. His USAF philosophy; a single African passport and one army as well as huge charitable works, investments and donations across Africa were significant contributions to Pan-Africanism in the 21st century (Maloka, 2000: 30). Nevertheless, a series of challenges hindered the new ideals of Mbeki and Gaddafi. These were not different from the obstacles faced by Nkrumah and Nyerere during the 1960s. To be precise, African leaders refused to understand the concept of ‘unity’ and would not let go of their privileges and power (sovereignty). Nyerere’s statement almost six decades ago justifies the reasons why African statesmen would not commit to either Mbeki’s African Renaissance or Gaddafi’s USAF ideals;

…multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats at the United Nations, and individuals entitled to 21-gun salutes, not to speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers, and envoys, you will have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised (Kodjo, Edem and Chanaiwa, 1993).

6.1.4 Recommendations

This dissertation has provided an evaluation of a key concept: the New Lens of Pan-Africanism of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader from 1994-
2008. The recommendations below concern expectations from African stakeholders like the AU, African states and leaders of these states to renew themselves and find solutions to the Pan-African challenges the continent faces daily.

The AU and all its arms of governance, as well as integrative organs, are responsible for uniting the African continent. Their role is to educate and take necessary actions to bring the continent together politically, economically and socio-economically. Political, means spreading the ideology and preaching the philosophy of a united continent and removing all colonial (artificial) borders across the entire continent. Pan-Africanist debates should be encouraged and the 54 African leaders should work towards becoming united as one nation; following the examples of the USA. Africa should have one flag, a single passport, anthem and code of arms that will pave the way for an increase in diplomatic relations. Economically, African states should endeavour to increase trade within Africa to a maximum as opposed to trading with other continents. Tariffs among African states should be eradicated, borders opened while road and rail should link the whole continent for easy movements of persons and goods from the North, South, East, West and centre of the continent. The EU style is a remarkable example of how Africa could be in the near future; single currency, a union flag, open borders, little or no tariffs on import and exports of goods and services.

Socially and culturally, steps should be taken by all African states towards embracing diversity among the different nations. Continental social programmes and cultural ceremonies should be slated annually and opened to all 54 African states and independent minority groups to showcase their rich background and at the same time educating the continent. In this light, the AU’s role will be to coordinate all-inclusive dialogues and supervise the programmes to ensure there is participation by all nations and unrecognised minority groups and nation-states like Somaliland, the Southern Cameroon and Western Sahara (Gumede, no date). The AU should as well promote public participation through the inclusion of NGOs and CSOs in such unity programmes. This would be done successfully if ordinary citizens of states scrutinised the institution's programmes and plans through a referendum. Under such circumstances, key Pan-Africanist concepts of Ubuntu and Ujamaa become norms as building a USAF begins with the possession of strong
moral and civil instruments of freedom, equality and unity. When the voice of the ordinary Pan-African overshadows that of the glorified dictators and the bourgeoisie class, there will be hope for a refined and united society and continent that is built on the foundation of truth, solidarity, peace, understanding, respect and fair play (Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003: 61-62).

Moreover, if not for Pan-Africanism Mbeki and Gaddafi would not have had the opportunity to demonstrate their ideas and showcase their contributions towards the new lens of Pan-Africanism. Nevertheless, today, the ideology of Pan-Africanism has speedily vanished especially because African states conduct their IR from individual perspectives rather than as a united group under the umbrella of the AU as they ought to. This stance by the African states leaves them highly dependent on international aid with strings attached as well as vulnerable to loans with tremendous payment conditions. Be it as it may, Pan-Africanism is achievable and it needs proper planning and devotion by all the leaders of Africa. Its goal to advance the political, economic and socio-cultural emancipation on the African continent has definitely not been achieved. Furthermore, a Pan-African state demands not just talks in the corridors and halls of congresses, conferences, meetings at national and international summits; but a concrete framework and Pan-African minds that think alike to pursue the project and achieve it within the target time frame.

There should be an inclusion of CSOs, the learned and intellectual groups and citizens of all walks of life as Pan-Africanism is an ambitious and long-term process which obviously will fail if it is left solely in the hands of politicians and a few sophisticated elites and business giants. A new Africa will remain a dream whereas poverty, conflict, dictatorship, economic backwardness, dependency on Western aid with strings attached and loans with mammoth interest rates will leave the continent of Africa politically unstable, economically exploited, backward and socio-culturally dominated.

Mbeki and Gaddafi were certainly influenced and inspired by the earlier Pan-Africanists, Pan-African movements, congresses and the general ideology of liberation, dignity, independence
and resistance to imperialism. These obviously shaped them to carry forward the Pan-African torch and become the new lens of Pan-Africanism in their own right. Nevertheless, there is much room for further studies in this field. Research remains inadequate on the Pan-African works of Mbeki and Gaddafi, in particular, and how both leaders used their mandates and political ideologies to ensure rapid economic growth in Africa as well as pushing the continent towards unity. More room remains for greater research to obtain potential results on the studies of Pan-Africanism as a whole and a united African continent in particular.

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