

THE FUTURE OF WESTERN ALLIANCES

by

JOSIEL MOTUMISI TAWANA

Mini-Dissertation

submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

in

POLITICAL STUDIES



in the **UNIVERSITY**
OF
FACULTY OF ARTS
LYMPPO

at the

RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY

SUPERVISOR: PROF D GELDENHUYS
CO-SUPERVISOR: MRS M M E VAN AARDT

April 1997

Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om die toekoms van Westerse alliansies te ondersoek. Die klem val op die rol en invloed van die Noord-Atlantiese Verdragsorganisasie (NAVO) en die Wes-Europese Unie (WEU).

Die eerste gedeelte van die studie handel oor teorieë van alliansies en sekuriteit. In Deel II word NAVO bespreek teen die agtergrond van die einde van die Koue Oorlog en die verdwyning van NAVO se tradisionele vyand, die Warschau Verdragsorganisasie. Wat is NAVO se toekomstige rol in die post-Koue Oorlog-era?

Deel III ondersoek die WEU se rol as 'n instelling vir Europese veiligheid. Die kwessie is veral belangrik gesien die gevaar of werklikheid van onstabiliteit in Sentraal- en Oos-Europese state. Daar word voorts aandag geskenk aan die rol van die Organisasie vir Veiligheid en Samewerking in Europa (OVSE). Hierdie liggaam is veronderstel om as 'n alles-omvattende veiligheidstruktuur vir die hele Europa te dien.

Die finale gedeelte van die verhandeling bied 'n samevatting van die bevindinge van die voorafgaande gedeeltes. Tekortkominge in teorieë van alliansies - wat blyk uit NAVO se voortbestaan in die afwesigheid van 'n duidelike bedreiging - word onder meer geïdentifiseer en verduidelik.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to:

Professor Deon Geldenhuys and Mrs Maxi Van Aardt for your support, advice, reviews and constructive criticism.

Petro Pietersen, Yolanda Gouws and Tiny Dolamo for unwavering support, time and cheerful typing.

My friends, for their encouragement.

My parents and family for their love, understanding and support.



INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Soviet Union, the reunion of Germany and the subsequent disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) signified a remarkable transformation of Europe's security and political relationships. These changes in Europe's strategic landscape impacted greatly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as the suddenly preponderant alliance. The profound events that took place between 1989 and 1991, left analysts and politicians wondering whether NATO would have a future in the absence of its rival the WTO (Gumbi,1994:12). Can NATO survive the post-Cold War era? Will NATO continue its strategies of forward defence and nuclear deterrence? Is the Soviet Union's heir (Russia) and its former republics going to engage in co-operative security arrangements with the Alliance (NATO)?

Although countries like France earlier argued strongly for a European defence structure which would be independent of NATO sources, others such as Britain opposed such a proposal. The agreement was finally in favour of enhancing the European "pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance (Steinberg, 1988:43). France had for a long time been unhappy with dominance of NATO by the US. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the French an opportunity to argue for a strong European defence structure, which in time, could rival and supplant NATO. The French have of late developed much faith in NATO as they have decided to return to its integrated command structure after withdrawing in 1966. Mr. de Charette, the French Foreign Minister, said in Brussels in October 1995 that his country would like to "participate actively in the renewal of the Alliance" (Keesings,1995:40882).

The future of Western alliances is inextricably linked to the unfolding security environment in the whole of Europe. The evolving developments in terms of the security of the Atlantic area, will largely determine the Alliance's relevance and contribution in this context. NATO's force level, force posture (defensive or offensive), military doctrine and reliance on nuclear or conventional deterrence will determine its contribution towards reassurance, stability and peace. NATO finds itself faced with the mentioned questions against the background of the absence of its former rival, the WTO.

The momentous changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, have without a doubt, a direct bearing on defence and security perspectives. The Alliance and its former foes were happy to engage in measures that shifted their aggressive defence postures to those that curtail large arms arsenals which contributed largely to the arms race and threatening force postures. Defence planning began to be redefined in view of the changed geo-strategic security changes. New patterns of security co-operation began to emerge which symbolically blurred the East-West political division, that resulted from the Cold War. As a result of the strategic changes, national security planners began to

undertake major reassessments of defence structure and logistical support networks designed to meet the new challenges of this era. Huge military cutbacks became the logical outcome as a result of public pressure in favour of reduced defence spending (Davies, 1994:79).

Despite the end of bipolarity (US and Soviet dominance) which was characterised by tense relations between the Alliance and the former Soviet Union, the new context has not been tranquil. The situation contains numerous security dangers. These problems range from ethnic troubles in Eastern and Central Europe to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa by rogue states. These security problems call on the Alliance and other regional and international organisations, to engage in co-operative ventures and to structure their forces for specialised activities like peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Davies, 1994:80).

The relevance of structures like NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is of concern to scholars, politicians and defence analysts as the world is in a changed context of co-operation and increased interstate dialogue. International relations since the end of bipolarity have lacked a power comparable to the former Soviet Union.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this essay is to focus attention on the future of Western alliances, with primary emphasis on the roles of NATO and the WEU. In the light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and absence of the threat of communist domination, should NATO still exist? At a time when the European Union (EU) states want to develop the WEU into a strong European defence arm, is NATO still needed in Europe? Now that the world order has ushered in a unipolar world with former foes having assumed co-operative relations, of what relevance are military alliances? Does the alliance system contribute towards the enhancement of better relations between states, notably NATO member states and the former WTO states?

This essay will highlight the contradiction which the Alliance (NATO) represents in a post-Cold War world. It probes what the absence of a rival to NATO or a threat to European security can cause. It will also explore alternatives to alliance formation. It seeks to clarify the logic of NATO's retention and its role in the current context as a deterrent despite the absence of a clear threat. The Cold War era resulted in situations of international tension indicating a battle for world dominance between NATO and the WTO. Each alliance worked hard to outsmart the other in terms of arms production, nuclear weapons, support for liberation movements, influencing countries of the world politically and economically.

When the Soviet empire fell, there was euphoria in the West, with leaders assuming that free markets and democratic politics would quickly set Russia on the road to becoming a model of Western democracy. The belief was that Russia would be a stable country which would not threaten Western interests, an ally that agrees with the US on world and regional issues. The reality is that Western expectations about Russia have not materialised. The country is struggling economically, its government is not a stable one and it faces rampant secessionist violence in for instance Chechnya. Due to the Soviet Union's collapse, having been a union of fifteen republics, its heir became Russia. The Russian economy is incomparably weaker than the Soviet Union economy ever was and its military forces have lost ground to the West in recent years. The country's state of affairs is such that the US and other Western governments are unwilling to embrace it within NATO (Mead, 1994:1-4). The uncertain state of affairs in Eastern and Central Europe, which is characterised by weak economies and ethnic tension, makes the situation much more difficult for the WEU, OSCE and NATO. The West would like to stay alert so as to keep the situation in check in terms of being ready to respond to whatever crisis that might erupt.

This essay is divided into four parts. The first part explores factors that influence alliance formation and retention as well as circumstances that lead to their collapse. The second part outlines the role NATO has played and is playing to ensure Europe's security. It looks into such questions due to the need for the US and Russia to work together within the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, and other bodies especially as regards world peace and stability. The third part looks into the Western European Union, its structure, function and the role it could play in the security of Europe. It also discusses the role of the OSCE in Europe. The final part revisits all the others and questions the continued existence of military alliances in a post-Cold War era.

PART 1

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

1.1 An Alliance

This part discusses the theoretical aspects of alliances. Plano and Olton (1988:169) define an alliance as an agreement by states to help each other in the event of an attack on any member, or to advance their mutual interests. They argue that an alliance may be secret or open, bilateral or multilateral, simple or highly organised, and may be aimed at preventing or winning a war. They further say that alliances may contribute to a sense of security and deter aggression, they may also lead to international tension and formation of counter-alliances. They maintain that rivalries caused by alliances tend to produce arms races, frequent crises, and occasionally, wars. In contrast with the above argument that an alliance leads to crises and wars, Holsti (1988:106) argues that the purpose of an alliance is to prevent crises and to increase diplomatic influence.

An alliance is a formal or informal relationship of security co-operation between two or more states. It entails mutual expectations regarding security policy co-ordination in the future. Neither the levels of commitment nor the specific form of policy co-ordination nor conditions under which it would take place need to be explicit (Barnett and Levy, 1991:370).

The formation of alliances is widely believed to be a result of expediency rather than principle. Their primary motivation is seen as the realisation of state security in the face of some immediate or future external threat. Matters of ideology and domestic interests are of secondary concern. This simply means that states align to tilt the military balance in their favour. Their primary aim is the deterrence of those that may threaten their security (Snyder, 1990:105-107).

Alliance formation has perhaps been the most effective state strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or diminishing threats to a state's national security. Mutual fear appears to be the most solid basis upon which an alliance is organised. When countries perceive a common threat, they are likely to engage in various types of military collaboration, like provision of arms, exchange of information or forming an alliance (Holsti,1992:89).

The realist approach to international politics has been instructive in understanding strategic studies. It has been influential in shaping foreign and security policies of states during bipolarity. Realism sees international politics as a sphere of power relations. Politics is the sphere of survival rather than progress. To understand international politics, necessity rather than freedom is the starting point. The balance of power is the best strategy for attaining order in

the international system. Anarchy does not mean disorder, confusion and chaos, it simply means the absence of government. The balance of power is the key in the realm of continual struggles for power and security among states (Griffiths, 1992:ix). Morgenthau argues that the goal of each state is to maximise its power, either as an end in itself or means to an end. The essence of international politics is power, nations should not necessarily aim at balancing power but must seek to be superior (Griffiths, 1992:60).

Classical realism links the existence of an alliance to the prevalence of a clear threat. The argument is that if there is no threat to an alliance, then the alliance has no future. In order for an alliance to persist, it must be a counterweight to a threat. This is necessary for the purpose of alliance cohesion and relevance. If the threat is great, the alliance will be much more cohesive. Should the threat disappear, the alliance will be weakened and will collapse. External threats and dangers are pivotal to the persistence or demise of an alliance (McCalla, 1996:45).

Realists see security as arising from military capability or strength. This has manifested itself in the Cold War era in the form of nuclear deterrence. Realists strongly favour multilateral, not unilateral arms reduction. They reject disarmament as an effective approach to peace. In order for stability and order to prevail, states engage in skilful manipulation of flexible alliance systems. States do not look up to the "authoritative force" of international law or organisation. Formation of alliances is the manifestation of states' determination to be in charge of their destinies in the international system. The prevalence of conflict and competition leads to potent military postures by states for the purpose of winning wars and deterrence of aggression. States are essentially guided by self-interest in international relations. They only engage in activities that are in their national interest like co-operation (Solomon, 1996:17).

The commitments of alliances differ according to the type of responses and responsibilities required when the situation warranting action develops. The Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of 1948 provided that if one of the parties is "drawn into military activities" the other will immediately give... military and other aid by all means at its disposal". In contrast, other treaties vaguely state the type of responses the treaty partners will make. The renewed Japanese-American security treaty of 1960 provides only for "consultation" between the two if Japan gets attacked. Responsibilities with regard to an alliance may be mutual or one-sided. In terms of the principles of NATO and the former Warsaw treaties, an attack on any of the signatories is to be considered an attack on all. The signatories will be required to help the victim of aggression (Holsti, 1992:89).

States have other options to consider in ensuring that they can deter those who are security threats. A state may choose to expand its security preparedness by means of mobilising its military resources rather than through external alliances.

This will result in a trade-off or substitution effect between armaments and alliances in the security policies of countries (Barnett and Levy, 1991:372).

Since alliance membership has a direct effect on state autonomy, those that join should know of this implication. It also impacts on the economy of a country; a country which cannot feel secure owing to its defence vulnerabilities may feel compelled to align so as to be secure from a threat. An alliance is geared to securing member states against adversaries and as a result no alliance can be formed without considering other security policies nor apart from the enmity and rivalries to which they respond.

An alliance agreement like NATO's is strictly a joint declaration, an undertaking to take certain steps in specified future circumstances. Snyder also maintains that alliances have to be placed within the context of system and process. Should there be a threat to international security, a stimulus for an alliance will arise. The distribution of military potential among major states impacts chiefly on the system of alliances and the politics of alliances (Snyder, 1990:107).

Alliances create tension for some states not included. This may cause insecurity and lead to counter-alliances. Those that are not allied may see themselves as enemies to the alliance and may feel threatened. The important features of alliance are: Precision, obligation and reciprocity. Allied states expect each of the members to contribute effectively whenever necessary, whether in military or financial terms. These states are also legally and morally obliged to act according to the alliance contract (Snyder, 1990:109). Reciprocity entails the obligation of allied states to support each other. This aspect is one of the strengths of a vibrant alliance. An alliance that has no commitment from its members is nothing but a talkshop.

An alliance needs to be managed in terms of the coordination of foreign policy especially towards the enemy or the coordination of military plans, allocating preparedness burdens and collaboration during adversarial crises. There may be areas of agreement by alliance members and also of disagreement. The cardinal issue concerning an alliance is its unity of purpose (Snyder, 1990:112-113).

Alliances tend to suffer greatly once an adversary collapses or is weakened. Its member states may see no reason to continue aligning against a weakened rival. In a bipolar world the process of alliance formation is much easier compared to a multipolar world. Superpowers see no need to align and as a result they align with weaker ones. The reality of such alliance is that it amounts to a unilateral guarantee, as weak states will not reciprocate what the superpower can achieve. There will be states that see no need to align as they do not fear any attack from the superpowers. The impact of alliances is much greater in a

multipolar world as this scenario has a lot of possible aggressors due to the absence of an authoritarian power (Snyder, 1990:117).

Alliances are characterised by a greater degree of military force integration. Member states contribute their national forces to an allied command structure for the purpose of military coordination. Today, alliances also have permanent headquarters, continuous political and military consultations, countless meetings of senior personnel and experts and endless memoranda, staff studies and research (Holsti, 1992:91).

There are times when alliances fail to serve as effective deterrents. When a lack of political coherence or quarrels and political disagreement occur, an alliance undergoes strains. It is only effective when it is capable of launching an attack when necessary. An alliance whose internal problems are insurmountable will not be an effective deterrent. When two or more parties have divergent objectives, the alliance may weaken. The existence of a common threat or enemy is most likely to withstand alliance divisions that may be caused by ideological and political differences (Holsti, 1992:93).

Alliance formation is largely influenced by an environment of distrust and hostilities, as opposed to friendly and co-operative international relations. The existence of one or more powerful states that aim(s) at dominance of other sovereign states often leads to instability and alignments. An alliance is constituted in such a way that it has the strongest forces drawn from its member states, for the purpose of a posture that has a deterring or war-winning capability. The forces are under an integrated command structure for the purpose of collective action. It expects an armed attack from non-member states that have aggressive intentions. Alliances are usually selective in their composition, they are not collective structures which encompass all states of a region for instance. Their exclusive nature often leads to counter-alliances (Bennett,1988:367).

Alliance-type organisations are inherently unstable. Conditions of power relations undergo change over time. Should a threat which used to prevail diminish, an alliance initially remains premised on the earlier threat. Once the situation changes, the reasons which led to the sustenance of an alliance become less credible and the unity of its membership becomes fragile. Doubts begin to surface about the continuation of an alliance which faces no credible threat. The commitment of its members becomes questionable in terms of honouring their mutual obligations as no threat to their national interests exists. Major problems are caused by the tendency of the main powers within an alliance to take unilateral action in changing foreign policy irrespective of the opinion of junior powers (Bennett, 1988:369).

1.2 Deterrence.

Central to the formation of an alliance is the power to deter aggression. Deterrence implies a situation of alliance posture which threatens possible aggressors. It is the circle of military build-up and an emphasis on war fighting for the preservation of national interests. It rarely aims at removing or reducing the size and potential use of conventional and nuclear weapons, but aims for supremacy or a level of safety that cannot be matched by another state or alliance (Buzan,1987:18).

Deterrence is seen by its proponents as contributing to stability, as it lessens the possibility of aggression. It also leads to greater caution by allowing the party that deters to resist nuclear intimidation and avoid the brink of war. In order for deterrence to be effective, adversaries would have to achieve and maintain a military equilibrium, including a strategic balance, wherein the adversary would be assured by a collaborative weapons posture by the enemy against an unprovoked attack (Buzan, 1987:87).

When nuclear powers threaten each other, it has less to do with territorial gain or preservation than the vulnerability of the population. Nuclear deterrence is far different from a conventional approach as it does not depend on amassing thousands of troops and armoury to match the adversary, but entails the projection of delivery vehicles towards the enemy's territory. In this case delivery vehicles would be artillery like intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. (Freedman, 1987:16).

Since the development of nuclear capabilities, a clear distinction developed between defence and deterrence. Posen sees defence as the denial of the aggressor's objectives and deterrence as the likely punishment of aggression (Newnham,1990:86).

The problem of making a contingent threat sufficiently powerful, is referred to as the problem of credibility. It is the process whereby threats are operationally feasible. The threat must be capable of depriving the target (aggressor) of scarce values which he would wish to retain. If a state fails to deter (frighten) the aggressor, deterrence loses its credibility (Evans and Newnham, 1990:86-87).

1.3 Common Security

The concept of common security is noble and relevant in this era. It recognises the futility of war, especially nuclear annihilation. Because the world is interdependent, there must be unity among nations to avoid war. This approach urges the creation and organisation of security policies by states through co-operation. It regards peaceful relations, national restraint and an end to arms

paces as central to avoiding war between states. Although common security recognises every state's right to security, it nevertheless rejects military force as an instrument for resolving disputes. It calls for a high level of restraint in the expression of national policy, it rejects acquisition of military superiority for purposes of security enhancement, it argues for force reduction and qualitative limitations for the purpose of common security and also for separation of arms control negotiations from political events (Booth, 1991:334).

This concept does not reject the notion of state military power, but it sees military strength as only one dimension in the security arena. It also seeks the organisation of doctrines, postures and military capabilities for the purpose of maximising mutual, rather than unilateral security. This concept therefore emphasises defensiveness, transparency, reciprocity, crisis stability, arms restraint and confidence building. It opposes offensive postures and capabilities, surprise attack potential, and retaliation strategies. It sees security as a non-provocative matter, one which should not be attained at the expense of other states (Booth, 1991:344). It rejects threatening force postures, calls for zero or limited nuclear weapons and urges war prevention through co-operation between all states.

Common security seeks to end asymmetries in terms of military power. It will create a transformed security environment from the current one, as threatening force postures and doctrines will disappear and there will be significant arms reduction and manpower down-sizing (military personnel). These reductions are far-reaching as they need to affect defence postures, which have to be non-provocative. Common security ties military restructuring to arms control, crisis stability and non-provocation in peace. Common security needs to be backed by confidence building. The advances in international communication, economics and culture, especially in the northern hemisphere will have a major impact on improving relations and perceptions between former enemies. The transparent manner in which military planning and other security issues are dealt with enhances confidence and security building. A pertinent example of confidence and security building is the 53 member-state OSCE (Booth, 1991:362).

1.4 Comprehensive Security

For security and stability to be realities, they have to be linked to economic development and environmental, scientific and technical co-operation. The fact is that security has many facets which are indivisible; it cannot be divorced from the rule of law, plural democracy and human rights. Cilliers (1995:4) argues that the politics of pluralism are linked to the functioning of the social market economy and also that the stability of democratic societies depends largely on co-operation in the "war" against terrorism, internationally organised crime and drug trafficking. He further maintains that security implies linkage from individual, to

community, to national, to subregional (like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and global levels (UN).

Comprehensive security should be the underlying principle for the post-Cold War era. The idea of co-operative security assumes that war is not unavoidable, and that commitment to prevention can be indefinitely effective. A fully fledged co-operative security system would still have to include provision for collective security, like arrangements for deterrence of aggression, which will provide residual agreements for its members. Comprehensive security emphasises transparency, confidence building mechanisms and co-operative engagement with neighbouring countries. This notion aims at forming an inclusive international and regional security arrangement (Cilliers, 1995:4).

Comprehensive security views the central strategic problem everywhere not to be deterrence as in the Cold War era, but reassurance. The idea of reassurance as opposed to deterrence, demands reliable, normative and institutional structures. It stresses that security must be co-operative, that no country's security should be improved at the expense of other states. Security, as a result, should not lie in confrontation but must arise from collaboration. Comprehensive security arrangements will be attractive to all states, as they are based on consent and not on impositions or threat of force. All countries, that conform to the rules should be eligible to join. The spirit of co-operative security encourages all countries to belong and to conform (Cilliers, 1995:4).

1.5 Collective Security

The theory of collective security as an approach to peace, assumes that all nations of the world share an interest in the maintenance of peace. It argues that peace is indivisible and as a result all states must be involved in peace efforts. All states need to commit themselves to prompt and effective action so that procedures for collective security are available to deal with any threat. Collective security does not discriminate on the basis of friendly or unfriendly states, it is directed at any country that poses a threat to peace. There has to be consensus by states to act in concert regarding collective action. There has to be an agreement as to what or who threatens peace (Bennett,1988:135).

Collective security can be effective if it has international membership. Limited membership may adversely affect the strength and amount of resources for action against aggression. A structure with limited members can be easily defied as its collective power is unlikely to be a deterrent. Membership of powerful states is essential towards a favorable power balance and collective victory. With regard to regions, collective security is seen as possible by many scholars. In order for it to succeed, there needs to be consensus and commitment to peace and a resolve to respond collectively. Most of the regional states must belong to the arrangement.

PART 2

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

The formation of NATO after the end of the Second World War was meant to deter the Soviet Union, which threatened Western democracies. NATO's formation was guided by the need to make Western democracies secure against the threat of communism. It has always been dedicated to upholding the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The security guarantee provided by the US to relatively weak states essentially strengthened the loyalty of Alliance members. The US has shouldered the Alliance's burden for decades and is still intent on continuing as the Alliance's main power. It has however reduced its troops to 100 000 in Europe, in keeping with the changed context. It has to accept aspirations towards greater European integration without harming the vital trans-Atlantic partnership which has been the cornerstone of Western security for over 40 years (Cahen, 1989:xi).

2.1 NATO's structure

NATO comprises 16 member states, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland; Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Britain, the Netherlands, and the US. Its key concept since its inception has been collective defence. It has operated as a transatlantic military structure and as a military alliance. In terms of NATO's article 5, an armed attack on any of its members will be considered an attack on all its members. Such an attack would warrant NATO's armed response to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (Jordan, 1990:173).

Its military forces consist of three interlocking elements that are referred to as the NATO Triad. They are as follows:

1. Conventional forces with a capacity to resist and repel a conventional attack on a limited scale and to sustain a conventional defence of its frontiers against massive conventional attack.
2. Intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces to enhance deterrence and, if necessary, the ability of NATO's conventional forces to act against a conventional attack to deter and defend against an attack with nuclear forces of the same kind, and to provide a link with the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. The forces will be strong enough to frighten any possible aggressor.
3. The US and UK strategic nuclear forces that provide the ultimate deterrent. NATO's strategic nuclear forces consist of three elements:

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers (Rengger, 1990:182).

Its Triad effectively counters the possibility of abandonment in the event a clear threat disappears, something which the alliance theory predicts. The problem of abandonment has negatively affected previous alliances. It is only NATO of all alliances which has mechanisms that prevent abandonment. It has four significant guarantees which also find expression in the triad framework. They are;

First, the deployment of US and British forces in Europe, that have effectively served to reduce the possibility of armed aggression from the then Soviet Union. Secondly, the forward-deployment of US nuclear weapons blurred the distinction between local and global war. Thirdly, the positioning of multinational forces along areas of likely attack. Fourthly, the rigorous integration of Alliance forces under a single command (Joffe, 1992:43).

The Alliance, together with the US, continues to rely on nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence. This was reaffirmed by the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture Review in 1994, which made no departure from the nuclear arms policies of previous US leaders. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons served the strategic purpose of defence for the US and the Soviet Union. The US and the Alliance faced a formidable foe which was armed with massive conventional weapons and thousands of nuclear warheads. These weapons can be credited with preserving the "long peace" between the US and Soviet Union since the Second World War. Both parties relied on deterring nuclear weapons and conventional forces. The Alliance and the WTO's force levels and deterrent capabilities led to greater restraint between them during international crises (Arnett, 1996:120).

In this post-Cold War era, are nuclear weapons still needed for deterrence? On the strength of the Alliance's conventional capabilities alone, a deterrent exists to potential regional aggressors and it would be central in defeating aggression from whatever quarter. Given that the US and the Alliance's conventional capabilities are potent enough for the purpose of deterrence, what becomes of nuclear weapons? The US and the Alliance have clearly no option but to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons and as a result must change their nuclear posture. The Alliance has to dispense with its nuclear capability as its traditional nuclear posture is unfavourable in a changed context. This would discourage nuclear based deterrence and nuclear weapons proliferation by non-nuclear weapons states. The US, as the Alliance leader and chief nuclear weapons possessor, has to lead the campaign towards elimination of nuclear weapons and set forth an agenda that would make that goal achievable over a period of time.

NATO's emphasis on nuclear deterrence, throughout bipolarity, was in keeping with the need to balance its power in relation to the WTO's massive conventional capabilities. For the Alliance to balance its military capability, it threatened to use its main source of strength (nuclear weapons). NATO at a conventional level was weak as opposed to the WTO's overwhelming offensive conventional capability. The threat of nuclear first use by NATO was sufficient to deter Soviet (WTO) conventional attacks. This example is instructive, in that it shows the power of military capability to prevent crises and attack. NATO's conventional weakness would have invited WTO attack if it had not been underpinned by nuclear deterrence.

NATO has the strongest forces that can crush whoever disturbs Western European security. That, however, is due to the absence of a determined rival. NATO has adapted well to this era, as it continues to redefine its role in this changed context. It needs to have a high level of military readiness so as to remain a reliable deterrent in this era of uncertainties in Eastern Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty does not provide any clear structural arrangements for the functioning of NATO. The only provision in this regard is Article 9 that establishes a Council. The Council is the highest authority within NATO. It consists of representatives of NATO member states. It is in session continuously, its meetings are generally attended by defence and foreign ministers. Though at the ministerial level the Council meets twice or three times a year, at the level of permanent representatives it meets once or twice a week. Between 1949 and 1950 NATO's Council of Ministers established several organs as "subsidiary bodies" that are authorised under Article 9 of the Treaty. NATO's Council is assisted by 18 Committees, among them the Political Committee, the Economic Committee, the Defence Review Committee, the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC) and the Security Council (Degenhard, 1986:204).

The Secretary-general of NATO is the chairman of the Council, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC which consists of all nations participating in the integrated military structure of NATO), NDAC (composed of all states except France, Iceland and Luxembourg), and the Nuclear Planning Group (comprising seven or eight nations selected from among the NDAC members). The Secretary-general of NATO is assisted by a deputy and an international staff. The Defence Ministers of member states, sitting as the NATO Council, constitute the DPC. The DPC deals with military policies like defence strategies and military negotiations with NATO members or non-members. It is the political decision-making counterpart to the Military Committee that deals with purely military matters as approved by the DPC and the NATO Council (Jordan, 1990:174).

NATO's unified military structure consists of the Military Committee that is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of each member state except Iceland.

has no military force and is represented by a civilian. France which withdrew from NATO's integrated military command in 1966 returned to the structure in 1995. The Military Committee is permanently in session, and its task is the provision of military advice to NATO's Council and its Committees. The DPC coordinates the role of the major NATO commanders, looks after the implementation of military plans and policies of NATO, and directs the activities of several agencies and organisations of NATO (Jordan, 1990:22).

NATO has a structure that can be used to deal with any threat to European security. It has both the military will to ensure European security and the means to deal with aggression or instability. NATO's focus on the Atlantic area, however, makes it a body that is not international in scope, but one concerned primarily with the Northern Atlantic area, which excludes Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's formation and deterrent posture, indicates clearly that it is a product of hostile international relations. It came into being at a time of aggressive Soviet Union activities. Its founding was meant to address the threat presented by the Soviet Union. It had to present a military posture which was in keeping with the atmosphere of distrust, hostility and arms race, so as to offset the Soviet Union's threat of dominance throughout Europe.

The formation of NATO in 1949, remarkably enhanced security and stability in Europe as the vulnerable Western European states received extended security guarantees from the US-dominated NATO. The membership of the Alliance by Western European states shifted the balance of power in Europe and countered the would-be preponderance of the Soviet Union. Without NATO membership, the entire Western Europe ran the risk of Soviet annexation or communist domination. The decision by these states to form a defensive Alliance (the WEU) and to join NATO was in their best interest as they did not have military capabilities that could offset Soviet aggression. They rightfully bought the embrace of a potent US military for their protection and self-interests.

The provision of article 5 still stands despite the absence of the WTO. The sixteen states are still committed to assisting each other in the event of an attack on any of them. This commitment which remains in the absence of a threat the Alliance was formed to counter, clearly confounds the neorealist position. Neorealism and the general alliance theory maintain that such a commitment would disappear once a clear threat has been removed. What happens in the absence of a threat to an alliance, is the loss of cohesion and the eventual collapse of such an alliance. At the core of NATO's persistence, lies the US's determination to stay within the Alliance, at a time when its traditional counterpart and adversary (the Soviet Union) no longer exists. The US has not seen fit to end its extended deterrent capability in NATO.

2.2 NATO in an era of peace

NATO is certainly a kind of alliance which the Western powers had to present against aggression. Its posture and guarantee to counter aggression against its member states' sovereignty went a long way towards effective deterrence. It has an integrated military structure, comprising of armed forces from almost all its member states. The forces could be deployed to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. It was without doubt formed to counter and out-manoeuvre Soviet imperial aims. It was effectively a foe to the WTO which also guaranteed protection to its member states. Its composition reflects a broad, though selective membership. It is by no means a collective structure simply formed for friendly and collaborative purposes.

It is selective and highly organised for the purpose of protection of member states and the deterrence of military threats. Its sixteen members present a bulwark against aggression and could be used effectively to prevent or win a war. It provides a strong sense of security as its members are assured of protection in the event of an attack.

It is a fact that when NATO was formed it was a virtual security guarantee, as the US was the most powerful member state, the others being very weak, militarily, economically or both. This impacted on burden sharing, as the US had to foot the bill of maintaining the Alliance. The threat which faced the Western European states which joined NATO was strong enough to make them combine regardless of US dominance. The Alliance was certainly formed to respond to threatening situations; the severity of the situation could not be underestimated. NATO was definitely formed because of real threats to Western security.

It is undeniable that alliances lead to crises, tension and instability. The Cold War era too displayed these, for example, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The problems which alliances caused did not however result in a third world war. Both alliances realised the fatal consequences an inter-alliance war or military conflict between them could have. These alliances prevented the hostilities between themselves from escalating into an all-out war due to their very strong postures and military capabilities. The restraint that prevailed during the Cold War era underscored the logic of deterrence.

Now that the Cold War is over, the world order has changed significantly. International relations are no longer disturbed by East-West tension and hostilities. Yet there is NATO, a full-fledged alliance despite the collapse of the WTO. NATO's place and role are under much scrutiny, as it exists in the

absence of a counter-alliance. NATO is still a selective security structure, despite the changed world context. It has not broadened its membership to reflect the changes following the end of the Cold War. The world order is characterised by extensive co-operation and collaboration between the former arch-foes, the US and the former Soviet Union's heir, Russia. There exists a lot of goodwill and collaboration to rid the world of crises and conflict. The level of multilateral co-operation is unsurpassed since the end of the Cold War.

In June 1990, NATO declared an end to the Cold War. This declaration was made amidst the successful Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's troops from Afghanistan, agreement on the curtailment of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union (McCalla, 1996:451). These profound changes remarkably transformed the bipolar strategic situation and resulted in the balance of power being overwhelmingly in the favour of NATO.

This strategic environment was not favourable to NATO's persistence, as it was expected to turn obsolete and close shop. This prediction is consonant with alliance theory, which maintains that traditional alliances have tended to lose cohesion once an adversary has ceased to exist. It is now seven years since the fall of the Soviet Union but nothing that fits the theory's prediction has materialised. The Alliance is still sixteen nations strong and no major quarrels or disagreements leading to its loss of cohesion have taken place. European states which joined together in 1949, at a time when they were vulnerable to Soviet annexation, see no need to leave the Alliance. Even France which left NATO's integrated command structure in 1966, has returned to NATO, at a time when the Alliance has lost its traditional foe.

Although a threat from the East (the former Soviet Union) remains a possibility, it represents the least likely occurrence. The military forces of Eastern European states are virtually incapable of starting a war and sustaining it. This does not mean however, that NATO should be complacent and have no doctrine and forces to deal with possible threats. At the same time the Alliance's orientation should shift from an overwhelming Eastern oriented planning and look at security threats in a global framework. Its outlook should include an emphasis on regional stability, confidence building, the ability to deal with threats from outside Europe and nuclear disarmament. The Alliance should use its resources to ensure that its forces become rapidly deployable and that they have the ability to carry out peaceful missions like the one in Bosnia (Davies, 1994:82).

2.2.1 The Eurocorps: The issue of European security within or outside NATO has long been divisive, with France having been opposed to a close NATO link while Britain favours Europe's partnership with NATO (European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance). Europeans are well aware of the reality that the US might

withdraw from Europe sometime in the future due to the absence of an adversary to NATO and financial constraints (Clarke, 1993:26).

In May 1992, the French and Germans drawing on the agreements reached at the EU and NATO in late 1991, decided to develop a "European pillar" to NATO and construct a European defence identity (the Eurocorps). The force would initially consist of between 35 000 and 40 000 troops, The Eurocorps were declared operational in November 1995 at the end of an exercise by 10 000 of its soldiers (US Today, May 1994:65). The Eurocorps has three missions, namely: action within the joint defence framework of the allies in accordance with the WEU treaty, action aimed at preserving peace, and action aimed at providing humanitarian assistance.

As a means of averting disagreements between Britain and France as to what role European security forces are to play, the Eurocorps will be open to all WEU members. The force will not rely on the WEU as an institution for headquarters or other planning or staff functions. The facilities will be located separately in France. Countries that join the EU will be encouraged to join both the WEU and the Eurocorps. The underlying reason for the Eurocorps is to establish a European force capable of carrying out military missions with or without NATO's help. Observers were quick to point out that the Eurocorps means that the future EU will not only be a common market, but also a political union and a security alliance. Eurocorps is seen by the French and Germans as "the process of building European unity that will include, eventually, a policy of common defence" (US Today, May 1994:65).

The Eurocorps may be a timely development for Europe which is still in search of a defence identity that can secure its own future outside the NATO framework. It will eventually help the US in terms of removing the military and financial burden entailed by NATO involvement. Unlike the previous Bush policy, the Clinton Administration's policy welcomes the move towards a European defence and security identity. Furthermore, in January 1993, France and Germany secured an agreement from NATO's supreme commander John Shalikashvili to provide NATO troops to Eurocorps in the event of a crisis (Clarke, 1993:26).

European security was further enhanced by NATO when a command mechanism enabling European member states to act militarily on their own, using Alliance assets autonomously, was created. It is referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which will operate outside NATO's integrated command structure. It is a welcome development for European security as it is expected to strengthen the WEU. The CJTF can also be regarded as the defence arm of the EU. The command initiative aims to resolve the old dispute between France and the US over how to give European states a separate and distinct identity within NATO without necessarily discarding the Alliance or undercutting its unity. The issue has become very important as

Western Europe seeks broad political, economic and monetary union (Aviation Week, 17 January 1994:21).

European states will, as a result of the command initiative be, able to use NATO assets like command and control, intelligence and logistics. The continent will be able to meet security crises which directly affect European defence interests — but not those of the US or NATO as a whole which requires prior NATO consultation. US forces may also be used in the task force, since many of the NATO assets that would be made available to the CJTF are manned by the US. The WEU's move to Brussels has and will greatly contribute to enhancing interaction and close daily working relations between NATO and the WEU. This will help to ensure that the new command operates smoothly (US State Dispatch, 21 June 1993:453).

The idea of creating a new trans-Atlantic co-operation community was mooted in February 1995 by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Britain, Germany and France. They made statements to the effect that there must be a European-American pact. Germany called for a "new wider transatlantic contract" which would emphasise the significance of military, political and economic co-operation on behalf of Western economic interests and democratic values. Britain supported the German idea and added that "defence issues alone do not offer a broad foundation for the edifice we need". The French idea espoused by Mr. Alain Juppe called for a new transatlantic charter which would contribute to international stability in all its dimensions. The suggested community could provide a new foundation for co-operation which is required for the post-Cold War era. Its aim would be to encompass NATO and not to replace it. NATO would still remain a framework for transatlantic defence co-operation (Sloan,1995:230-231). The mooted arrangement regrettably is not premised on inclusivity. It is not suggested as an inclusive framework which would, for instance, include Russia. It is a selective structure for Western powers alone, which have been rivals to Russia's predecessor (the Soviet Union).

2.3 The Partnership for Peace

NATO decided in January 1994 to develop the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as the first step in building a new relationship with its former Warsaw Pact (WTO) adversaries. It was designed to promote military co-operation between NATO countries and the new democracies, as a way of preparing them for eventual NATO membership. The PFP has so far been the principal forum in constructing a new security order in Europe (Kupchan, 1994:112). It is broadly representative of over twenty six states and is primarily concerned with peace and security in concert with NATO states. It is however not a military alliance as it offers no assistance in the event of an attack, it is essentially a loose arrangement that fosters East-West co-operation.

The PFP's formation was guided by five suppositions which are:

1. The recognition that Europe's uncertain strategic landscape requires a policy which is sufficiently flexible to adapt to ongoing change;
2. The need to avoid dividing Europe into blocs;
3. 'The West must try to integrate the new democracies into its security community without undermining NATO's military efficiency';
4. 'The activities resulting from NATO's outreach to the East must demonstrably bolster democratic reform' ;
5. 'NATO should design the PFP so as to enhance Western leverage over when and how Russia uses force in the post-USSR republics' (Kupchan, 1994:112-113).

The PFP was formed as an interim means of adapting to the uncertainties of the post-Cold War period. It was meant to help NATO bring closer those states of Europe that belonged to the now defunct Warsaw Pact. It aims at allowing for the admission of states into NATO, whose market-orientated reforms and democracies have succeeded. It was designed to divert questions of formal enlargement and NATO's role in the post Cold War Europe (Kupchan,1994:113). It assists greatly in the improvement of security relations between old foes and in laying the foundation for a pan-European security order. Its openness to all the former Warsaw Pact states could in time lead to its members playing an effective role once the cause of European security is clear.

The PFP is open to all former Warsaw Pact members on an equal basis. The equality of all states was opposed by the Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) which had hoped for some form of distinction between themselves and the states further east. They wanted a differentiation that would signify their exit from the Warsaw Pact and speedy entry into NATO. Partly as a result of the Visegrad countries' concerns, NATO considered specifying criteria for its membership by outlining a timetable for enlargement and identifying which countries would be first in line (Dunay, 1994:127).

2.3.1 Integration and military efficiency: It is a fact that NATO managed to keep the Soviet Union out of Western Europe, it performed an important integrative function by embedding Germany in the West, engaging the US in European security, and creating a common Western defence establishment that was multinational in character and outlook. The PFP was designed to replicate this integrative approach in Europe's east. There would also be socialisation of soldiers through interaction with each other, which will boost co-operation and trust. The integration of new democracies into a common security community

needs to be balanced by the need to preserve NATO's military efficiency (Kupchan, 1994:114).

For the PFP to achieve a balancing act, it was structured such that political and military bodies created to oversee it constituted only an extension or additional layer of existing NATO bodies. It is intended to allow the process of integration to proceed without jeopardising NATO's decision-making apparatus or the integrity of its military structure.

2.3.2 Bolstering reform: The PFP was also designed to counter the wave of internal instability (secessionist violence) in Eastern Europe that threatens new democracies. This would be achieved in four principal ways. First, states belonging to the PFP would agree to make public their defence budgets and establish democratic control over their defence establishments. This would encourage military accountability and transparency. It would also lead to civilian awareness and control of the armed forces.

Second, the PFP would bolster Western-inspired democratic reformers in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union by visibly demonstrating NATO's willingness to become involved in that region and its intention to enlarge membership. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia was of concern to NATO as it suggested NATO was powerless to act. Joint exercises were held by NATO and Eastern and Central European states and former Soviet republics. The measures had a symbolic impact of showing readiness to take action to help the processes of reform (Kupchan, 1994:115).

Third, although the architects of PFP decided to avoid differentiating countries in terms of status, the structure was designed to encourage differentiation in practice. Though countries sign the same paper, they can determine by themselves their level of involvement. Those wishing for greater involvement could develop a closer relationship with NATO than others. The level of involvement would affect the amount a country contributes. Those that are delivering on promises like democratic and economic reforms stand a chance of quicker admission into NATO structures. This is believed to have the effect of bolstering the reform process (Kupchan, 1994:115).

Fourthly, the PFP was formed to increase trans-Atlantic socialisation. Participation in NATO's councils could help new members of the PFP to become acquainted with the running of Council affairs (consensus building). Constant interaction between military and civilian personnel of member states and NATO counterparts would professionalise the military and bureaucratic establishments of new countries. The participation of new democracies in the PFP and prospects of intensified co-operation within NATO, were to serve as an overall incentive to stay on the democratic reform track and uphold standards that would facilitate their full integration into NATO (Kupchan, 1994:115).

2.3.3 Leverage over Russia: Critics maintain that the PFP is nothing but an appeasement of Russia by the US. The fact is that decision makers were well aware of the need not to alienate President Boris Yeltsin from Russian ultra-conservatives. The PFP was designed to ensure that Russia was engaged and not alienated. It is a way of drawing Russia into Western security structures. It is aimed at allaying fears by Russia that NATO continues to see it as a potential foe rather than a friend. The PFP is geared to enhance trust and co-operation between the former adversaries.

NATO is still planning to expand its membership to former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe. This was reiterated by ministers of NATO member countries on 30 May 1995, in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. On the following day, Russia's then foreign minister Mr. Kosyrev, expressed his country's opposition to NATO's eastward expansion. He called for the transformation of NATO from a military to a political organisation "to become part of a pan-European security system" (Keesings, 1995:40578).

The PFP is a remarkable achievement within the context of alliances. Alliance theory does not predict a situation in which former adversaries engage in evolutionary steps towards security co-operation, which could eventually result in erstwhile rivals (former Soviet satellite states) joining their traditional enemy (enlargement into NATO). Instead, it predicts the fall of the remaining alliance rather than the Alliance growing (enlargement) and redefining its mission. In contrast to what alliance theory postulates, that an alliance may heighten tension, lead to crises and produce arms races, NATO has evolved into an open and transparent alliance. It has played a key role in concert with the former Soviet Union, in negotiating arms reduction, instilling confidence and instituting security building measures and has contributed to the enhancement of co-operative security as evidenced in the formation of the PFP. The PFP has symbolically blurred the traditional East-West divide and it involves a great deal of security information sharing, planning and joint training exercises between the former sworn enemies.

The PFP is broadly representative of over 26 countries and is concerned with security and peace. It is, however, not an alliance. It offers no guarantees to its members in the form of defence in the event of an attack on any of them. It is a simple or loose arrangement which has the potential of fostering security co-operation between the former arch-foes (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states). It is not a structure for deterrence but it is meant for greater collaboration between the former adversaries. It provides a framework for joint consultation, discussion and military co-operation.

2.3.4 Enlargement: NATO is still determined to seek enlargement. It had preparatory talks with potential members in October 1995, in order to approve the "how and why" document on enlargement in December 1995. A thirty page document on enlargement was released in the first week of October 1995, and it had enraged the Russians (TIME, 9 October 1995:18-19). At a time when the PFP has attracted former Warsaw Pact states into NATO's framework, why does NATO insist on expansion?

For the sake of its continued influence and relevance, NATO decided to proceed with its plans to expand into Eastern Europe. Boris Yeltsin said that expansion could light "the flame of war". Russia sees the plan as a form of neo-containment and finds it confrontational. The Russians still remain opposed to NATO's expansion plan, even though NATO has promised close consultation with Russia. NATO maintains that it "will remain a purely defensive Alliance" and that if it gets larger, "it will threaten no one", according to Willy Claes, NATO's former Secretary-general (TIME, 9 October 1995:18).

The debate on enlargement was also joined by one of the foremost strategists, Mr. Henry Kissinger, who proposed a two track approach to the enlargement issue. He said that while Russian concerns were understood, NATO should not equivocate on its plan. It should admit leading candidates within its fold. On the other hand, it should assuage Russian concerns by making a security treaty with it, one which would commit NATO to security co-operation and not confrontation (Sloan, 1995:224). The suggested treaty would definitely go a long way towards security co-operation, if it includes a greater degree of security co-operation between the two parties.

NATO argues that its expansion will foster stability among fledgling Eastern and Central European states. It will also give impetus to the transition from communism to civilian-controlled armed forces with free market economies and help these states to solve ethnic and regional disputes peacefully. Paul Cornish of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London says, "NATO without expansion is nothing". He also cautions against expansion that does not have Russia's consent, something that he sees as unwise. It appears that the rationale behind expansion is to give NATO a reason to exist in the post-Cold War era and in so doing to keep the US engaged in Europe. This observation is made by sceptics and academics as they ponder NATO's role and relevance in a changed world (TIME, 9 October 1995:19).

The logical alternative to NATO's eastward expansion appears to be the strengthening of the OSCE's role in dealing with countries outside NATO. The second option lies in employing the PFP to remedy economic, political and

security problems in Eastern Europe. NATO's plans to expand clearly infuriate the Russians and could potentially strain relations between Russia and NATO. The PFP can facilitate joint peacekeeping, training of armed forces and the strengthening of bonds between its members and NATO's full membership. NATO needs to give the PFP a chance to play a prominent role that transcends the Cold War divide. The use of the PFP or OSCE can reassure Russia that the West has finally dropped its neo-containment approach towards European security. It could lead to greater co-operation and mutual trust between Russia and NATO (Economist,30 September, 1995:20).

As today's principal alliance, NATO has lost its traditional enemy and sole reason for existence. It may have to close shop or redefine its position. It has to define its role as a strategic deterrent to aggression. In this post-Cold War era, NATO will have to look at violent secessionism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, militant Islamic fundamentalism and the uncertainties in Eastern and Central Europe. The task of NATO, specifically, lies in adapting to the post-Cold War era or risk irrelevance.

Ethnic conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe undoubtedly represent major security risks to Europe as a whole. Should any of the conflicts spill over, like the one that occurred before the First World War in Sarajevo, Europe's security could be jeopardised. The retention of a deterrent NATO does certainly address such possible scenarios. It provides a security framework that can contain conflicts as shown by its successful engagement in Bosnia. Its experience in organising the defence of its members and the level of its military readiness makes it the best institutional framework to deal with the instabilities in the region. NATO does, without doubt, foster regional stability and guarantee intolerance of conflict escalation (Duffield,1994:769).

2.4 The role of NATO in European security

"Even if American forces remain in Europe for some time to come, NATO will move toward where it began in 1948, becoming more a security guarantee and less a military alliance" (Treverton, 1991:107). This opinion is consistent with the direction in which NATO is heading. NATO has no determined antagonist and it cannot take responsibility for the transition of Eastern and Central European states alone. In its declaration of Rome in 1991, NATO indicated that challenges of a new order in Europe cannot be addressed by one institution alone. It stated that it would work towards a European security architecture in which NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other (Joffe, 1992:49).

The Rome Declaration spelt out NATO's direction clearly. It published the 'New Strategic Concept'(NSC) which affirmed NATO's continuing role as a security

guarantee for a post-Cold War Europe. NATO committed itself to four core security functions, which are:

- a. 'to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe';
- b. 'to serve ... as a Trans-Atlantic forum for Allied consultations';
- c. 'to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state'; and
- d. 'to preserve the strategic balance within Europe'.

There is consensus within NATO itself that the continuing uncertainty and instability in Eastern Europe makes it more important than ever to retain the Alliance. NATO's retention is considered necessary even if its political role and military structure must be transformed. Other observers feel that the end of the Cold War means that the role of NATO is essentially played out (Mortimer, 1992:49). Despite the fall of the Warsaw Pact, there are still dangers around the borders of NATO's members in Europe. The problem of ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central Europe may lead to instability in that region. There are still security and political uncertainties in Russia, such as a possible resurgence of communist parties and growth of ultra-nationalism.

The Rome declaration acknowledges that despite immense changes that have transformed the world's political landscape, Europe is still in need of a strong political-military relationship with the US. The relationship would be different from the earlier one, the forces being leaner and meaner and much more flexible than before. They will be designed to respond to a multitude of unpredictable threats that could arise. The US will remain dominant in the Alliance, while the Europeans will provide a larger share of troops and exercise increasing influence in NATO's decision-making process. The fact that NATO has already de-emphasised the role of nuclear weapons in its strategy and withdrew all the US nuclear warheads for artillery and missiles from Europe, is indicative of NATO's ability to adapt. The Alliance is engaged in drastic reduction of the number of foreign forces and embarked on restricting the training and exercise of troops in Germany. These steps will definitely reduce the cost of maintaining the Alliance and help to make NATO's posture less offensive (Duffield, 1994:784).

In order for NATO to deal with the rapidly changing world, its leaders approved a detailed new plan called the "strategic concept" in November 1991. It sanctioned the exchange of views and information on security policy matters as a factor that will improve co-operation, transparency and predictability. It replaced the Cold War principles of "forward defence" and "graduated response" with a doctrine

based on sharply reduced forces that are flexible and quickly deployable. It sees the Alliance as purely defensive in purpose (Gants and Roper, 1993:129).

The New Strategic Concept is based primarily on four likely risks:

The conventional forces of the then Soviet Union, which were significantly larger than those of any European state, and its large nuclear arsenal balanced only by the US in that respect. Though the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, to a certain extent the Russian Federation and other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) still represent a risk).

- The problem of secession and territorial disputes confronting many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

- Threats to the stability and peace of other countries on the southern tip of Europe which are of vital importance to the security of the Alliance. The flow of significant resources could be disrupted in that area, especially in the Middle East.

- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In this regard the build-up of military power in the countries of the southern Mediterranean and Middle East is frightening (Gants and Roper, 1993:128).

The NSC states that "the primary role of the Alliance's military forces remains unchanged" (paragraph 41). It also states that "the Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence". In terms of paragraph 36 the Alliance aims at contributing towards peace and stability in Europe. Paragraph 37 states that "the presence of North American conventional and US nuclear weapons in Europe remains vital for the security of Europe." The importance of the development of European structures and their contribution to the Alliance is also recognised (Gants and Roper, 1993:129).

The role of armed forces during risk situations is enunciated in paragraph 42. The armed forces can "contribute to dialogue and co-operation in confidence-building activities." It also includes the verification of arms control agreements. NATO forces could also be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing military aid for United Nations peacekeeping missions (Gants and Roper, 1993:129).

NATO's mission and role in the region, as a result, must ensure that conflicts like Bosnia's are given sufficient attention even before they explode. The other areas of likely threats are North Africa, the Middle East, the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide and the spread of technology for producing weapons and missiles of mass destruction. Without the retention of NATO these

threats will not have a strong counterweight, the world's security as a result will be vulnerable (Duffield, 1994:769).

It is clear that during this period of adjustment and uncertainty in Europe, NATO will continue to play an important role. It will do so as it is the strongest of the two alliances and it is one with a capacity to act. NATO still provides the best framework for consultation between the US and its European allies. The aim of the consultations should be to find ways to arrange the orderly construction of the new co-operative avenues between NATO and the former Soviet Union states to replace the old.

The goal would be to seek:

- a) The preservation of NATO as an essential safety instrument until the future course of former Soviet Union states and satellites become much clearer than it is currently.
- b) Agreement on a strengthened OSCE framework as the umbrella for a more co-operative European security system that, under the right circumstances, could evolve into a true collective security framework for the future and also help to address the just concerns of Russian security and the democratisation of Eastern Europe.
- c) A routine and institutionalised relationship between the US and the EU, in order to serve as an open channel for the resolution of trade and economic issues and consultation on foreign policy issues (Sloan, 1990:511).

It is evident that the course of European security lies in greater involvement of NATO, for if NATO is forced out of Europe there will be no credible security structure to replace it. The WEU and the OSCE do not have the means or strength. Structures like the OSCE and the WEU still need to be strengthened and until such time, European security must be guaranteed by NATO. NATO has to strengthen its link with both the OSCE and the WEU as Europe can best be secured by the co-operation of these three structures. European involvement is extremely crucial as Europe has to ultimately shape its own destiny.

When talking of a new security order in Europe, it is important that the purposes of that order be clear. Among other things, the order has to achieve:

- a) Ensuring Central and Western European security against coercion by any force that could be aggressive.
- b) Provision of the same security for Eastern Europeans.

- c) Avoidance of US dominance.
- d) Acceptance by Moscow. European security will never be stable if any country feels alienated or forced to accept imposition by others (Treverton, 1991:95).

Furthermore the order should result in Central and Eastern Europe becoming fully part of one Europe, economically, politically and socially. It also has to ensure that former Soviet Union states or allies determine their own destinies without any fear. It may be argued that NATO should be a transitional arrangement whose relevance lies in organising arms control negotiations which will lead to a non-confrontational and collaborative European peace order, in which military threat plays no part (Cortier, 1991:27).

NATO should redefine its mission in terms of article 12 which provides for the revision of its role as regards matters of peace and security in the North Atlantic area. It does, however, play a significant role as a security stabiliser and a deterrent against potential dangers. NATO's decision to deploy its forces outside the borders of its members is a bold move which sees the Alliance taking tactical steps towards its own institutional adaptation to the current context. Its historic deployment for peacekeeping in Bosnia is a significant step in ensuring that the Alliance is responsive to Europe's security landscape.

Collective security offers no reliable deterrent to aggression. It does not involve any degree of military readiness whereas an effective and reliable arrangement like NATO, involves a high level of military readiness and force integration. Collective security is also ambiguous when it comes to identifying the aggressor. It does not categorically state what sort of act constitutes aggression but merely assumes that states will act collectively to crush aggression. The reality is that an effective arrangement must include a structure which has a deterrent capability, with rules of engagement and provision for collective defence in case of an attack on member states. If security was to be left as an international arrangement, as collective security postulates, the world would be without peace and security as no structure with a deterrent capability would be in place. States should rather join an alliance which has specific goals and security guarantees than be at the mercy of the international community.

There are still nuclear weapons in the Eastern European area. Russia possesses such weapons to a degree sufficient to destabilise Europe as a whole. It also has a mammoth conventional military capability. The fall of the Soviet Union has compounded the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons in that its former constituent states (Belarus and Kazakhstan) have inherited hundreds of them. The fact that these states are not classified as nuclear weapons states suggests that they will dispense with them.

2.4.1 Military doctrine: NATO no longer has a doctrine of area defence and its forces have been structured into true multinational units. The new strategic concept of 1991 resolved to end NATO's military planning which until then was to counter the WTO. It began to broaden its role by seeing its primary purpose as crisis managing and the promotion of international stability. This change in outlook was enhanced by the transformed security realities which required a move from threat assessment to risk assessment. The Alliance also began to consider enlargement of its membership, engagement of non-NATO states into the PFP and involvement in the Bosnian peace effort (McCalla,1996;449). The transformation of NATO's role is remarkable. It has become much more valuable as a guarantor of peace in this era of turbulence in Eastern Europe without necessarily being a threat to security. It fosters security (common security), encourages military transparency and the four Visegrad states could soon join it.

Alliance theory and neorealism do not foresee such far-reaching alliance functions in a changed context. They simply see no future for an alliance that has lost its reason to be. They predict the weakening of the alliance rather than the assumption of new and significant tasks in a changed context. The expansion of an alliance is out of the question, as the absence of a threat should result in the collapse of an alliance. NATO is in a dilemma, as to when it should expand without enraging Russia: it is not held back by the expected loss of internal cohesion. NATO is likely to persist for a long time as it is not limited to a specific military function as alliance theory would have expected. It is a very formal arrangement that goes beyond mutual defence whereas other alliances have tended to be ad hoc and limited. Alliance limitations will usually serve to explain their collapse. An adaptable and unlimited arrangement like NATO can continue its operations as long as its members need it.

NATO has undertaken new and important tasks, much to the surprise of alliance theory. It coordinated efforts such as the provision of its forces to Turkey and provided logistical support during the Persian Gulf war in 1991 (McCalla,1996:446). Its invitation of the former WTO states into the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and its harmonisation of East-West relations, have ensured that its previous military image is transformed and becomes more of a political arrangement in line with the need to use non-military approaches to problems of this era. This adaptability also ensures that the Alliance does not become obsolete but continues to play a vital role in crisis management and war prevention.

NATO's flank countries such as Norway and Turkey could face Russia's massive conventional forces on their borders. The use of Russia's military might cannot

be ruled out as the country is characterised by political and ethnic troubles. In 1993, the Russian parliamentary building for instance was besieged. This security landscape no doubt calls for the retention of NATO as it is the only effective military counterweight to what the potential troubles could bring about. It surely serves the strategic purpose of neutralising the residual threat of Russian military power. It is a security guarantor for its members against the spread of ethnic conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe (Duffield, 1994:768).

2.4.2 Arms control: Arms Control measures at conventional arms level were ratified in 1992 through the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) which were initially agreed to in 1986 under the OSCE auspices. Among the chief functions that NATO has to perform, is the ensurance of the successful conclusion of arms control. As the remaining Cold War alliance, it has to enhance security co-operation by means of maintaining a high level of involvement in arms control arrangements and disarmament efforts. Without effective arms control measures, there could be a proliferation of dangerous weapons, threatening force postures by states, less confidence and security and huge military budgets (McCausland, 1996:3).

Arms control is not a result of altruism and a desire for peace, it is guided by self-interest and the wish for enhanced security. It is an illustration of the realist argument that states seek to maximise their power by engaging in co-operative efforts which boost their own interests. Whenever a certain course of action negates their national interests, they will not participate in it. When states join a military alliance, it is because of perceived gains in terms of national power and interests rather than for reasons of morality and good intentions. Essentially they seek to enhance their power and avoid being invaded. When states are sufficiently armed, they may see no need to be involved in arms control as it could mean reduction of military power. Statecraft is all about national survival in a hostile and anarchic world so that arms control, when it is not in the national interests, will be out of the question. Clinging to these weapons constitutes a way to maintain a state's military capability.

NATO used its diplomatic bargaining power during arms control talks to ensure that it achieves the advantage of denying the East (former Warsaw Pact states) offensive conventional power. Throughout bipolarity, the WTO had the strongest offensive capability at the conventional level while NATO's strength lay with its nuclear deterrence. Arms control measures were pursued by the Alliance to achieve some level of conventional parity. Today the Alliance, as a result of the CFE, has much greater leverage while Russia is severely restricted in terms of positioning its forces around its own borders. NATO states therefore have maximised their military power and reduced that of the former Soviet Union.

2.4.3 The strategic vision: NATO's evolving relationship with Eastern European states is likely to move in one of four basic directions. The first direction lies in a scenario where Russia's reform fails and an enlarged NATO continues to function as a military alliance directed against a potential Russian threat. In that case NATO does not have to worry about its mission and future (Kupchan,1994:118). Russia continues to be plagued by political and security uncertainty. The communists are gradually regaining ground and ultra-nationalist leaders are getting support during elections. These developments, coupled with the siege of the Russian Parliamentary building in 1992, are cause for concern to NATO as they demonstrate the extent to which Russian internal stability is lacking.

The second direction can be followed if Russia's reform proceeds smoothly or, at least, is not reversed. With the absence of a dominant threat from the East, a future security order would require a complex role for NATO. NATO will then expand into Eastern and Central Europe under specific conditions. These states' admission would dovetail with their joining the EU. This approach's shortcoming lies in the continuation of the status quo whereby Europe is divided into two blocs (Western democracies and former Soviet satellite states). Even if Russia is offered a special relationship by NATO and makes efforts to co-operate, the dynamics of the balance of power are likely to lead to the reconstitution of a Russian-dominated zone in the former Soviet Union area. NATO may enlarge its membership but find itself threatened by a hostile bloc to the East (Kupchan, 1994:119). The problem is presented by Russia's bitter opposition to enlargement as it stands to lose its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe.

The third scenario would entail an unrestricted expansion of NATO also beyond Central and Eastern Europe. Expansion would take place once there is stability and certainty in Eastern and Central Europe. All PFP member states would be entitled to full NATO membership once they have reached a certain level of military preparedness and have consolidated their transformation to market economies and democratic governance. This path would ultimately change NATO "from a military alliance into a nascent collective security organisation". The goal would be to create a pan-European military structure to complement the OSCE. NATO would be concerned with military aspects (planning and execution). "The OSCE would continue to focus on preventative diplomacy, peace monitoring and other missions which are not of a military nature".

This strategic vision would prevail in Europe's new security structure given greater control over the evolution of new arrangements, thus taking advantage of NATO's existing decision-making apparatus and military structure. This outlook capitalises on a historic opportunity to rid Europe of East-West tension and division, and to build a pan-European security community in which the US would participate (Kupchan, 1994:119). Should NATO embark upon eastward

expansion, this would require transformation of the Alliance - one which would call into question its credibility and integrity as a military confederation directed at a common enemy. NATO could survive if it becomes a provider of collective security rather than selective defence.

The fourth strategy relates to the development of a pan-European structure without necessarily expanding NATO to achieve it. NATO would remain a military alliance with its existing members, offering them security guarantees. The PFP would on the other hand orchestrate military co-operation among interested countries not preparing for NATO membership. NATO would still exist within the PFP as a regional subgroup, lending its backing through experience, technical expertise and when necessary military capability to nurture and support other regional groups that would evolve gradually in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Kupchan, 1994:120).

There is a truism in the realist contention that threats to security occur when a state or a group of nations become militarily strong. Once the balance of power becomes disproportionate, weaker states feel compelled to increase their military power. During bipolarity, weak states in Europe (Turkey, Norway, Britain and the other European NATO members) joined the US-led alliance for the purpose of securing their self-interests, in the sense of avoidance of Soviet annexation. The Second World War had rendered these states very weak and vulnerable and the Soviet Union by contrast held the preponderance of power.

The realist argument still holds true today, as the Visegrad states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) want to expeditiously join NATO. They feel vulnerable to a possible Russian hegemony and as a result they see NATO membership as in their best interest. These states stand no chance of withstanding a residual Russian hegemony, should it seek to crush them. True to the realist tradition, the Visegrad states hope to enhance their power through NATO membership. They would not be seeking NATO membership if they had credible deterrent capabilities. If their military balance was symmetrical in relation to that of Russia, they would not be vulnerable. States since time immemorial have realised that power grows through the barrel of a gun; without credible military capabilities, they are push-overs in a world of power politics. This succinctly explains the proneness to alliance formation by weaker states.

NATO and Russia must work out a strategic way to deal with this changed post-Cold War era. They must work hand in hand by means of consulting each other and operate within agreed limits on world and European matters. NATO's expansion towards the East should occur in sufficient consultation with Russia. Should the West (NATO) provide economic assistance in the form of a Marshall Plan to Russia, a better, peaceful and orderly transition in the East could emerge. If technological, scientific, developmental and military aid is given to Russia, the West (NATO) may not have to fear a hostile and resurgent Russia.

If the central strategic threat is Russia, in the form of radical nationalists seeking to restore the old Soviet Union at all costs, then a solution cannot be military (military expansion to the East). The solution could lie in the following:

1. The West (NATO) must not treat Russia like a junior partner or outsider as regards decisions on European security. NATO must halt its expansionist aims, which evoke Russian mistrust and concerns. It must assure Russia, rather than deter it.
2. The West must, in concert with Russia and Central and Eastern European countries explore ways and means of economic upliftment of those areas. A massive financial aid package must be given to these countries so as to ensure economic, political and social progress.
3. Since the institutions of governance in most of the areas are newly adopted (democratic), they need to be strengthened significantly. There must be rule of law, regular elections and transparent (answerable) governments.
4. There must be improved civil-military relations in the East, for the purpose of regional stability.

The realities of the situation, indicate that the magnitude of dangers and uncertainties in Eastern and Central Europe cannot be dealt with by socio-economic means alone. A collective defence structure (alliance) remains necessary to act as a counter-weight to potential dangers. The continued existence of NATO is premised on using it as an extended transition strategy that goes well beyond a post-Cold War period. The idea is to use it as a security insurance during the current era of uncertainties in and around Russia. The transition strategy will assess future change and as soon as there is relative peace and stability, NATO should reevaluate its position. NATO can secure Europe from potential wars, at a very limited cost. It has an integrated operational structure and is cohesive with regard to security policies and decision making (Glaser, 1993:24). The recognition by NATO members that the situation is fraught with dangers has given the concept of alliance a new role as compared to the traditional outlook which limits it to an era of counter-alliances.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the Alliance remains relevant due to the following factors: a) In contrast to alliance theory's prediction, NATO is a transparent alliance whose intentions cannot be misinterpreted or be misunderstood. b) NATO does not aim to conquer or attack other states. c) The Alliance has successfully denationalised security among its members. Its members rely on its multinational airborne early warning force and the integrated air defence system. The returns from the Alliance therefore make individual defence posturing by members a luxury. Its members do not have to individually

engage in total defence or any expensive defence frameworks. d) It also serves an intra-alliance function by ensuring common security. Members like France and Germany do not fear each other any more like they did before the Second World War. All members therefore enjoy greater internal stability (Duffield,1994:775).

2.5 NATO's forces in Bosnia

The end of 1995 became a hallmark period for NATO when it began to send up to 60 000 of its forces outside Western Europe for the first time in its history. The deployment was in terms of the Dayton agreement which was made on the 14th of December 1995. The agreement was entered into by the Serb, Croat and Bosnian leadership. It is aimed at monitoring the implementation of the October 1995 cease-fire agreement in Bosnia. The international implementation force (IFOR), which is under NATO command, would man the Bosnia disengagement area for twelve months, with the US paying up to 81.5 billion dollars. The deployment is seen by scholars as a test case for NATO's role in a post-Cold War era and a major test to alliance theory's contention that an alliance loses its rationale and internal cohesion once its main rival collapses (Time,1996:16).

The deployment has had far reaching results as countries in Eastern and Central Europe have also contributed their forces and facilities to the peace effort. The Alliance forces took over operations from the multinational UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in January 1996. The operation has included ground level co-operation between US and Russian forces in the Posavina corridor. All these developments represent giant leaps and vital steps towards institutionalising a relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union states. Since the arrival of the IFOR the war in Bosnia has effectively ended (King,1996:34).

2.6 Conclusion

The deployment of NATO's forces outside Western Europe for peace operations, represents a remarkable turning point in NATO's history and treaty. Its treaty makes no provision for peacemaking or peace operations. This event represents a significant milestone in international security. The involvement of the two former arch rivals in security matters are developments which could eventually see comprehensive solutions being sought on security matters in Europe and the world by the US and Russia. Although NATO's future cannot be guaranteed, it will continue to serve vital security functions for its members and neighbouring states as evidenced in the Bosnia peace engagement. Its institutional adaptation enables it to perform vital security functions even in a changed context. Its highly adaptable structure has enabled it to persist in this era, which is characterised by the absence of a clear threat.

Military tensions do not result from the Alliance's existence. No wars take place between the Alliance and its former enemies. This also held true during the Cold War. The Alliance system contributed to an era of non-military confrontation between NATO and the WTO. The alliances realised that war between them would have disastrous and untold results. War between the two alliances during bipolarity would have contradicted the power maximising principle of realism. Both alliances would have annihilated each other by means of nuclear weapons instead of increasing their power.



PART 3

THE WEU AND THE OSCE

This part focuses on the WEU and the OSCE, which are vital pan-European security structures. The two bodies were largely overshadowed by NATO during the era of bipolarity, but are likely to play important roles in the post-Cold War era.

3.1 The Western European Union

The WEU was formed following the signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948. Its immediate concern was the security of Western European states. The WEU and NATO have been closely linked from the very beginning. The treaties that led to their establishment, the Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty, stem from the same international context, and envision similar tasks and ideals. The treaties were signed when the threat of communism faced the whole of Europe (Cahen, 1989:1).

The defeat of Germany and its allies during the Second World War, led to renewed hope for peace and stability in Europe. The formation of the United Nations in 1945 also supported that hope. Global relations soon changed when the Soviet Union embarked on hostile activities against its neighbours. The Cold War had started. Many European states were economically crippled by the war and as such were vulnerable to communist domination (Soviet inspired). The process of rebuilding Europe was jeopardised as the Soviet Union set out to exploit the situation (Cahen, 1989:1).

France and Britain therefore entered into a defensive alliance in Dunkirk on 4 March 1947. The agreement became a starting point for a wide association as its preamble allowed membership for other states. The treaty soon led to the inclusion of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Benelux). Britain espoused the idea of a union of European states centred around itself, France and the Benelux countries. On the 17th of March 1948, after the signature of the Brussels Treaty, the WEU was formed (Cahen, 1989:1).

Article IX of the Brussels Treaty empowers the Council of the WEU to make annual reports to an Assembly on its activities and in particular on the control of armaments. In terms of Article 1 of its Charter, the Assembly could discuss any matter arising out of the modified Brussels Treaty. It could also discuss military and civil technological and scientific co-operation and start dialogue with the Ministerial Council on European political co-operation. The Assembly has also transmitted recommendations to the Council concerning the means for ensuring European security. The Assembly sees its role in security matters as significant

since it was to be the most competent European body on defence matters (Cahen, 1989:32).

The WEU's membership is stipulated in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. Its members include Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Its creation was linked to the European idea that some kind of democratic representative institutions as in the national frameworks should be formed. Its Assembly is composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, that is Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom (Cahen, 1989:31-32).

The signing of the Rome Declaration in October 1984, which marked the 30th anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty, was attended by Foreign and Defence Ministers of the seven member states of the WEU. The Ministers stressed the importance of the Treaty and their attachment to its goals. The goals were:

- i) to strengthen peace and security
- ii) to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe, and
- iii) to co-operate more closely both among member states and other European organisations (Cahen, 1989:83).

Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework so as to increase co-operation between member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus. They were conscious of the fact that the Atlantic Alliance had preserved peace on the European continent for 35 years. They were convinced that a better use of the WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also lead to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Alliance.

The Ministers also decided to make fuller use of the institutions of the WEU and accordingly, to bring the existing institutions into line with the organisation's changed tasks. They regard the activation of the Council as a central element in the efforts to make greater use of the WEU. In conforming with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which allows the Council to decide on the organisation of its work and to consult and set up subsidiary bodies, the Ministers decided:

1. In future the Council would meet twice a year at ministerial level. The meetings would bring together the Foreign and Defence Ministers.

2. The Council Presidency would be held by each member state for a one-year term. Council meetings would, in principle, be held in the country holding the Presidency.
3. The work of the Permanent Council was intensified in line with the Increased activities of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council was mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions.
4. The Secretariat-general was adapted to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council (Cahen, 1989:85).

In 1987 and 1990, the WEU coordinated naval operations in the Gulf. The manoeuvres were seen as necessary steps towards the task of developing the WEU as the European dimension in the field of defence. The WEU Ministers agreed in June 1992, at Petersburg (near Bonn), to make arrangements for availing forces to the WEU that would be under its auspices. The forces will engage in humanitarian operations, rescue missions, peacekeeping and crisis management. They also agreed to establish a military planning cell to prepare for contingency measures for the WEU operations (Heath-Coat, 1994:133).

3.1.1 The Berlin conference: The recent North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Berlin on 3 and 4 June 1996, resulted in significant agreements regarding NATO's future management in Europe. As a result of this landmark decision NATO will give European nations a greater role within NATO. NATO's foreign ministers agreed to identify a European component within the Alliance as a step towards transforming and enabling it to engage in new missions from peacekeeping to management. The ministers gave military experts the power to start the "nuts and bolts work" that will put the decision into practice when necessary. The significance of the decision lies in the fact that Europe will at last be entitled to full access to NATO's assets for military operations. This decision has greatly elated the French who described it as "a great success for Europe" (Citizen, 1996:6). A European dimension has been a bone of contention within the Alliance, with the French having left the Alliance in 1966 due to the US domination of NATO.

The Berlin conference will, in the long run, lead to a self-reliant Western European defence framework. This will assuage the long held fear or concern that without US leadership of NATO, the Alliance will collapse. It will give European states (NATO members) a chance to lead and take care of European security without any fear of an American withdrawal from NATO. This decision and its eventual implementation will stabilise and bolster confidence within the

Alliance. It sends a message that even without a dominant US leadership in Europe, the Alliance will remain in operation for years to come if necessary. The WEU is certainly not a military arrangement capable of preventing or winning a war. It cannot inflict "unacceptable damage" on a determined aggressor. Just like NATO, the WEU is a selective arrangement. It consists of members who are democracies and aligned to the US, and as such it is ideologically inclined. The WEU has always lacked clear leadership and a powerful member state that can carry its burden (financial and military). There have always been disagreements between France and Britain regarding organisational direction. Its weaknesses have led to it being reduced to a junior security arrangement, while its members show much faith in NATO. Its near fatal weaknesses eventually led to its collapse in the 1960's, before it was revived in 1984.

The WEU, unlike a well organised alliance, cannot cause crises, tension and instability in its current form. It cannot coerce an aggressor into changing a course of action. It is not a structure to depend upon. Its organisational weakness was evidenced during the former Yugoslav civil war. The EU, which is often described as the WEU's political and economic structure could not even call on the WEU to attempt to end the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. The WEU, unlike NATO is not a highly organised structure. It is a Council for the coordination of defence policy. Its treaty clearly limits it to fostering peace, unity and co-operation.

The concept of a European pillar of the Alliance was nothing but a call for Europe's own ability to defend itself and to maximise its military capability. The recent NAC decision to give European Alliance members access to NATO facilities may well lead to a strengthened WEU. Should this happen European will at last have its own defence capability. Their yearning for the use of NATO assets will become a reality once the agreement is implemented. The arrangement will definitely see the growth of power through the barrel of a gun for European NATO members. European states will have the capability to truly deal with "European problems", as they proudly proclaimed when the former Yugoslav civil war occurred. This time around they will have the full capability to engage in future trouble spots, as they could not with an impotent WEU.

The future of the WEU looks bright, as European states want to have a definite regional (European) alliance which will serve European interests. A strong WEU could also help fulfill the EU's goal of a common foreign and security policy. A vibrant and potent WEU, coupled with NATO assets will augment European (WEU members) security and reduce European dependence on the US dominated NATO. It will enable European states to be secure and capable of withstanding future threats and dangers to their security.

The absence of a clear threat to European security has not led to the disappearance of the WEU or to profound disagreements that could weaken it. It has become stronger at a time when a threat to its states has collapsed. Its members do not see its role as strictly limited to specific threats but want it for the purpose of common security and the ability to secure themselves in future, without relying on the US. The WEU's membership is that of a politically and ideologically united camp since the member states are Western democracies which share a common destiny.

The end of the Cold War has seen the opening of a Pandora's box of intra-state conflicts, border and ethnic troubles. The strengthening of a strong European pillar would surely be a welcome development for the security of Europe. New security missions will have to be led by Europeans themselves as they become necessary.

The WEU's military doctrine should address the changed geo-strategic landscape of Europe. It should look at Europe's security within the context of the new thinking on security. It should not see itself or its member states as facing military threats from Eastern Europe (alone) as this possibility is the least likely security threat. It needs to focus on security in a holistic manner by seeing it as having political, social, economic, military and technological dimensions which may lead to instability and retard the development of Europe as a whole. The WEU's rebuilding should not be influenced by militaristic thinking but by the new realities of today. It has to ensure that it is able to address Europe's plethora of security threats ranging from the Bosnian civil war, countering the threats of arms proliferation, having its own capacity to deploy its forces for peacekeeping and peacemaking-and instituting the confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).

There is a definite need for a credible military arrangement that is also a multilateral forum to deal with Europe's own regional problems. While the WEU will have to be militarily strong, it will have to realise that it does not guarantee stability and peace by means of the barrel of the gun alone. It has to engage in co-operative endeavours with all European states, with a view towards building a European security architecture by consultation and dialogue. The WEU has to ensure that its force posture is non-provocative but geared to defensive operations. It has to be modest and cost-effective while being able to be deployed for a myriad of security problems. It has to reassure non-member states and engage in collaborative security efforts with regional states.

Although plans are afoot within the WEU to strengthen it, it will be interesting to see if it becomes as strong as NATO. The WEU lacks an internal balancer and a stabiliser like the US. The US is the Alliance's source of strength due to its immense military, financial, and leadership contribution to NATO. The WEU lacks such a premier power within its fold, it is to the US that everyone looks for

leadership and global security, including the European states (Duffield,1994:781). European allies have been too dependent on US leadership and NATO's integrated command structure to contemplate complete withdrawal in favour of developing the WEU. The WEU does not have a fully fledged national planning and command capability above the corps level. The presence and leadership of US in Europe is due to its membership of NATO and this has the effect of stabilising the region and maintenance of the balance of power in favour of the Alliance. The WEU on its own cannot bring about what NATO achieves through the US presence (Duffield,1994:777).

Adoption by the WEU, NATO and other powerful states, of minimal deterrent strategies for the purpose of encouraging arms reduction and reduced military spending is necessary. Military planning should aim to address the full spectrum of security threats without avoiding issues of defence. All states have to adopt defensive non-nuclear postures in order to enhance stability and predictability. Joint training of forces by regional states and transparent military planning have to be in place in order to enhance security co-operation and stability. Security can best be attained by strengthening regional defence frameworks for the purpose of being able to prevent conflicts or crises from getting worse.

3.2 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE, unlike NATO and the WEU is not a military alliance as it is not premised on the need for deterrence. It is a structure which is best suited to this context of non-adversarial relations. It is the best framework at this juncture for the purpose of co-operative security because it is broadly representative and it seeks non-military solutions to security issues. It encourages states to deepen security and their co-operation without attaining it at the expense of any particular country. It is a structure which brings about what military alliances fail to achieve, namely, greater trust, reduction of tension, negotiated solutions to disputes and transparency. This era of East-West co-operation is, however, characterised by continued mistrust and the retention of military alliances like NATO and the WEU. Countries still continue to keep large conventional forces, something which is indicative of uncertainty and mistrust.

3.2.1 Origins and structure of the OSCE: The OSCE is often seen by European governments as a possible framework for the future of European security. The post-Cold War Europe will possibly be a patchwork of institutions, wherein the OSCE could serve as the embryo of a pan-European security structure and NATO as the residual insurance. The fact that the OSCE comprises of 53 states, namely, NATO members, the former WTO and neutral European and non-aligned countries, is seen as a strong point for the OSCE to be a key part in future European security arrangements (Sloan,1990:504). The OSCE was formed in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act. It has become an important multilateral forum and decision making forum for Eastern and Western European

security and co-operation. It was formed for the purpose of providing security in Europe, within the context of East-West co-operation based on the overriding principle of non-violent resolution of conflicts (Lucas, 1990:224).

3.2.2 OSCE functions: The organisation's work is divided into four main areas known as "baskets". The first deals with security, confidence-building measures and détente based on the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The second basket relates to co-operation in the field of the economy, science, technology and the protection of the environment. Basket three covers trans-Atlantic relations, including travel and immigration rights, the free flow of information, human rights, East-West cultural co-operation, research and foreign language teaching. The fourth basket relates to follow-up conferences that evaluate general progress in all spheres of the OSCE's meetings. Its follow-up conferences monitor the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, they approve follow-up resolutions and oversee many multilateral projects that have been passed by various expert groups (Lucas, 1990:224).

In order for the OSCE to play a constructive role in this era, it surely had to undergo some transformation in order to overcome its shortcomings. The changing of the Final Act of Helsinki into a treaty and the establishment of a practical relationship between the OSCE framework and other European organisations, can guarantee the body an effective role in European security, and possibly, the strengthening of the US's political support for its security arrangements (Sloan, 1990:505).

In November 1990, the OSCE adopted the Paris Charter. The Charter became a short celebratory document with limited goals in mind. It reiterates the principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, market economies and the creation of permanent institutions for the organisation. It stated Europe's foundation to be peace, democracy and unity (Heraclides, 1993:15).

The Charter provides for five institutions with provision being made for a sixth (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly). The five bodies are as follows:

1. The Council, comprising of foreign ministers who meet at least once annually to discuss relevant OSCE issues and to prepare meetings of heads of states or government.
2. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) whose meetings are meant for the preparation of Council meetings.
3. The OSCE Secretariat is based in Prague with purely administrative tasks such as support for the Council and CSO meetings.

4. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), based in Vienna, whose task is to assist the implementation of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). It will constitute a secretariat and a consultative committee composed of representatives of all participating states.
5. The Office for Free Elections (OFE), which is based in Warsaw, for facilitating contacts and exchange of information on elections in participating states. It was renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR).

The success of co-operative security hinges on the strengthening of inclusive security structures, the effective handling of disputes and hostilities. The increased level of co-operation between the former adversaries (Western democracies and former communist states) reflects a changed world order. The Charter states that OSCE follow-up meetings will take place every two years, will be attended by heads of states and last up to three months. It proposed the development of an emergency mechanism, networks for peaceful resolution of problems and the expansion of the Vienna human rights mechanism (Heraclides, 1993:15-16).

3.2.3 The role of the OSCE in European security: Whilst NATO has not yet extended its membership to Central and Eastern European states, the OSCE has done so. The OSCE provides a broad pan-European framework for security dialogue and co-operation. The OSCE also supplements its security dialogue by its economic and human rights provisions. It could embrace all the various European countries that have so far been unable to work out common interests, purposes and institutions (Zielonka, 1992:63).

The OSCE is also best suited to developing a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes, protection of minority rights, provision of good treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. In 1991, It created a procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Valletta mechanism) which constitutes a compulsory procedure for dispute resolution. Such activities could help to legitimise the OSCE's involvement in possible disputes in terms of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. The main advantage of the OSCE lies in it being a regional organisation with the capacity to act as envisaged by Article 52 of the UN Charter.

It has a vital role to play in preventative diplomacy. Europe's security and stability can be enhanced by the OSCE's prevention of conflicts. The fact that the structure has strengthened its operational capabilities through structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary-general, augurs well for NATO's involvement and co-operation in its work (US-State Dispatch, 1993:453).

The OSCE has changed its unanimity provision to one which operates below the consensus level. The unanimity system had been its main weakness as it made it ineffective in dealing with crisis situations. The mechanism agreed to in Moscow in 1992 allows member countries to call for the deployment of reporting or monitoring missions in an area of concern without the consent of the parties involved in a dispute (Clarke, 1993:36).

There are arguments that OSCE needs to be strengthened by means of a rotating presidency. That would ensure that the organisation has a leadership that reacts and acts when necessary. It is also argued that there is a need for an expansion of its responsibilities to include operations like joint planning, coordinated exercises, and common procurement policies. These tasks would require an international military staff along the lines of NATO (Clarke, 1993:37). Once there is an increasingly powerful executive agency, there might be a need for the creation of forces that are answerable to the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

NATO has already offered its military for OSCE use. The next step would be to enhance and empower the OSCE Secretariat to act directly rather than through a subsidiary which leaves out other OSCE members (Clarke, 1993:37). These suggestions do not mean to duplicate the role of NATO. Nor do they suggest making the OSCE into a war machine to the detriment of its main mission of conflict prevention and resolution. Rather, it aims at giving the Council of Foreign Ministers a weapon or tool to back-up its resolutions, as a last resort. With the suggested changes the OSCE could have a strong position when mediating and when involved in peace efforts (Clarke, 1993:37).

The fact that the OSCE comprises of countries that were divided by East-West rivalry (the WTO and NATO), is in itself a major advantage. The OSCE can also play a meaningful role in dealing with the problems that have emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union, these are mainly economic and could lead to subnationalism or secessionism in Eastern and Central Europe. The OSCE cannot, however deter aggression or crush occurrences like the one that took place in the former Yugoslavia. It can only succeed as, among other things, a platform for conflict resolution, discussion and consultation.

The OSCE cannot be a key security guarantor in Europe without the involvement or co-operation of NATO and the WEU. The new era in European security surely relies on the co-operation of these structures and each should supplement the other. This era requires commitment to comprehensive security, as comprehensive security maintains that although war is not unavoidable, commitment to its prevention can be indefinitely effective. The fact that it encourages collective efforts regarding security and co-operation makes it attractive in this context. The OSCE approaches security and co-operation in an inclusive manner. It recognises that security is indivisible, addresses complex

issues of peaceful resolution to disputes and links simpler matters like human rights to security (Gumbi,1994:16). The OSCE offers the best institutional framework for the much needed outlook of co-operative security which is premised on reassurance, not deterrence which is the guarantee of security at the expense of non-aligned states.

The OSCE may in time become a pillar of strength for European security, given its unique aims and composition. It seeks to resolve security issues by non-violent means and provides a very broad framework for consultation, discussion and deliberations on European matters. It concerns itself with issues that may lead to instability or conflict (like the rights of minorities and human rights) and also provides mechanisms for their resolution.

In the changed post-Cold War context, the OSCE will play a unifying and crucial role in reflecting on European and world matters. The OSCE's conflict prevention plans, once they become effective, will complement the role of NATO. The OSCE is a structure that can lead to greater reassurance that world or European peace can become a reality once states co-operate on almost all matters. If states do not use deterrence to threaten others but reassure each other in trust and confidence, the OSCE will grow in stature. Its aim of ensuring co-operation between states by non-military means will then become a reality.

The Helsinki agreements of the 10th June 1992, which deal with the "challenge of change" go a long way towards co-operative security and security checks and balances within the context of East-West European relations. Far-reaching agreements were made ranging from commitments to disarmament and confidence and security building measures. These also entailed strengthening inclusive arrangements and giving fresh impetus to arms control, security co-operation and conflict prevention for the purpose of strengthening security and establishing a just and lasting peace within the OSCE states (Walker, 1994:161).

3.3 Conclusion

Efforts aimed at strengthening the WEU, take place in a changed world. It is an era which is unfavourable to alliances but favourable to security co-operation. Even if the WEU were to be as strong as NATO, it would have no definite opponent to contend with. The new European security architecture should dispel fears that it is perhaps premised on the need to strengthen security at the expense of states that fall outside the WEU and NATO. The Russians for instance are not being considered for membership of either NATO or the WEU. As matters of security are not divisible, it is disturbing that at a time when Europe's security architecture needs collective involvement, the WEU is strengthened as a selective structure. There must be an inclusive approach to the planning of Europe's security for the purpose of regional and world stability.

The WEU does not identify with certainty what or who presents a major threat to its members. Its reactivation occurs in an era which has no stimuli for alliances. This era is characterised by greater economic, political, military (PFP), security (OSCE) and technological co-operation between former adversaries. There is no clear threat to European security. The WEU should not duplicate NATO's task of European security but it could facilitate the provision of a European framework for peaceful settlement of disputes, preventative diplomacy and deployment of its troops for peacekeeping operations.

The OSCE cannot guarantee its member states any military protection should they be attacked. It works tenaciously to ensure co-operation and trust among European states on issues that have a bearing on security. It is well placed to rid Europe of the fear, insecurity, tension and mistrust which comes with alliances. Its strengthening through Helsinki II could usher in a new era of co-operation in Europe. There is a truism in the Rome Declaration (1990) that the challenges of this era cannot be effectively dealt with by one institution alone and hence moves were made towards a new security framework in which NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Despite what European states settle upon as the best security system, they will need a collective defence structure. Such a framework ensures reliable deterrence to all sorts of security dangers and uncertainties.

It is an ideal organisation in this non-adversarial context in which states seek to co-operate on matters of security, human rights, economy and conflict resolution. Its composition is collective as opposed to being a selective military structure. It encourages a broad spectrum of countries, including Russia, to be involved in inclusive security and co-operation arrangements. It can gradually ensure confidence building between NATO countries and Russia within its structures and strengthen the bond between them. The OSCE cannot take over NATO's security obligations, as it exists in a non-military capacity. It remains however an ideal pan-European organisation for dialogue and co-operation.

PART 4

CONCLUSION

This essay sought to probe the future of Western alliances since the end of the Cold War. It enquired into the implications of the changed world order for alliances given the fact that Western military alliances are now, basically, counter-weights to unknown enemies. The contradiction that is inherent in the continuation of military alliances lies in the fact that alliance theory predicts the collapse of an alliance once an aggressor or threat to security ceases to exist. Despite the absence of a threat comparable to the former Soviet Union, it would be unwise for NATO members to close shop, due to uncertainties and potential dangers in Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of conflicts and instabilities but has led to an unsettled situation in Europe. New kinds of problems causing crises and civil wars have occurred. Ethnic tensions, secessionism and quarrels over borders have replaced the Cold War.

The future of Western alliances has not been easy to study, as alliance theory has neglected to detail what happens once an alliance loses its foe. Few written works are available on factors that lead to alliance persistence. The theory is dismissive of an alliance once it loses its adversary. This theoretical shortcoming has been illustrated by NATO's continued existence after the fall of the Soviet Union seven years ago. This treatise will hopefully contribute towards filling the void that exists in detailing what happens when an alliance (NATO) loses its foe.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of NATO's erstwhile foe, the WTO, brought about high expectations for a new era. The changes were likely to lead to an era of peace and greater security. Observers and analysts have argued that NATO should close shop as a result of the end of the Cold War. They see NATO as irrelevant in this context of non-adversarial relations. Such calls clearly misconstrue the central requirement for peace and security, which is the need to use a structure such as NATO to prevent wars and crises. NATO has not become obsolete because threats to European security and global security have not died. Prospects of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation still lurk throughout the world.

The post-Cold War era is not one that is predictable and safe from potential wars. Should NATO disband, Europe and the entire North Atlantic area will be without a stabiliser and a credible deterrent to potential wars. There will be no credible structure to deal with potential threats to European security. Time is certainly not ripe for NATO to close shop. It may become irrelevant when nuclear weapons are under strict control and limited among nuclear weapons states only and when it loses its ability to adapt to geo-strategic changes. It may have to disband when security matters are much more predictable, when democratisation and stability in Eastern and Central Europe proceed apace.

The persistence of NATO in this context has clearly confounded alliance theorists who proclaimed that an alliance is only relevant until the end of hostilities. NATO has clearly brought to light aspects of an alliance, which traditional alliance theory ignores. The submission that an alliance has a specific purpose and lifespan, after which it eventually dies, has not proven true in the case of NATO due to NATO's remarkable ability to adapt to changing contexts without necessarily becoming weak.

The survival of NATO, seven years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the transformation of Europe's security situation is remarkable indeed. NATO should be history according to alliance theory, as an alliance has a specific purpose after which it will close shop. It is a fact that the theory is vague when it comes to a post-threat scenario. There are minimal writings on the factors that influence alliance persistence in the absence of a threat. Why then has NATO persisted? Alliance theorists made their predictions based on analysing previous alliances which were products of expediency, which were ad hoc and limited to specific military objectives. NATO has military objectives and a political dimension. It is its dual role that keeps it intact. Its formal nature which is not ad hoc and its operational adaptability which makes it more than a regular alliance, allow it to persist meaningfully.

It has evolved from being a product of threats and the balance of power politics to a model arrangement of security and co-operation. It sees security as a concern of all European states, rather than selectively. It has engaged former adversaries in co-operative endeavours (PFP) and the IFOR arrangement in Bosnia, as shown by its dispute resolution, coordination of foreign and military policies and consultation with structures like the OSCE and the WEU. It has transformed itself without losing coherence.

The assertion that an alliance collapses or loses cohesion in the absence of a clear threat, has been proven wrong by the continued existence of NATO. Research on alliance persistence, is necessary in order to bolster alliance theory's predictive power. More scholars have to focus attention on what makes an alliance survive and prosper in the absence of a foe. The theory should look at arrangements (alliances) which are more formal and not limited to military purposes alone. This will enhance the theory's predictive power and help in the analysis of alliances like NATO, a model alliance. Alliance theory also has to focus on an alliance's non-military function and not see alliances in a restrictive sense only.

The profound changes that took place in Europe, notably the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Warsaw Pact did not render NATO and the WEU obsolete. There are no major signs that suggest that the WEU has become irrelevant; it is, instead, bound to be strong as it will soon have access to NATO's

assets. NATO has assumed important new political tasks such as engagement in peace efforts and war prevention measures. It has deployed troops in Bosnia and invited the former WTO states into the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) for the purpose of CSBMs.

Post-Cold War Europe needs structures with both mission and means. Structures such as the WEU, NATO and the OSCE therefore face a huge task: the ensurance of peace and stability in Europe. These bodies may have to assist Eastern and Central European states in their transition to democracy. The search for security should not be limited to the two alliances separately: it has to be inclusive. The current context makes it a rule rather than an exception to engage in inclusive security arrangements. Inclusive approaches can best guarantee lasting peace and security co-operation. Reliance on co-operative security will assist in reducing crises and misunderstandings, as it seeks to resolve problems by peaceful means. It aims at stability by means of reassurance and non-coercive means. The fact that the OSCE uses preventative diplomacy as its tool to deal with crises and conflicts, greatly enhances its credibility in this era of co-operative security relations.

The OSCE is likely to continue to be the main forum for discussing security concerns common to Europe as a whole, with the participation of Russia and the US. It is a very useful structure for all of Europe as it represents former Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. It has come to represent Europe's aspiration of achieving a "just and lasting peaceful order in Europe", which NATO declared to be its goal in 1967. The end of the Cold War has led to the OSCE being central to security and co-operation. It is well suited to this context of non-adversarial relations and co-operation. Co-operation, just like the indivisibility of security is vital for the purpose of stability. In order for the OSCE to play a meaningful role in terms of European peace and security, it must develop its machinery not only for the verification of arms control agreements and other confidence building measures, but also for the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration, the protection of minority rights, the humane treatment of migrants and asylum seekers, and possibly also the provision of peacekeeping forces.

Increased levels of co-operation between the former adversaries (US and Eastern European states) reflects the changed world order and it must be deepened through co-operative security structures like the OSCE. The world requires collective approaches in securing peace and co-operation. Reliance on collective structures is the key to comprehensive security (Gumbi,1994:15).

The fact that the WEU and NATO see each other as partners and not rivals augurs well for European security. The WEU is the defence component of the EU and the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Western Europe has relied upon NATO for the purpose of security for over four decades. They will continue to need it until such time when European security

structures are strong enough to ensure or guarantee peace and stability in Europe. NATO's membership will broaden in the near future to include the Visegrad states. It will, however, remain vital to securing Europe from uncertainties. It is undeniable that the influence of alliances on international affairs has significantly declined while on the other hand they have not become irrelevant. NATO and the WEU continue to serve their essential roles as regional stabilisers and security insurers for the sake of their member states.

NATO's adaptation to new situations clearly vindicates the decision to retain it. It has undertaken important new tasks like enforcing the no flight zone in Bosnia and, of late, crushing the internecine war in Bosnia. It is without a doubt becoming a stabiliser and a security guarantor for not only its members but also a peacemaker for the region at large. Its activities and vision make it a possible key to the UN goal of saving the world from the scourge of war. It has succeeded where the UN peacekeepers have failed (Bosnia) and could, as a result, be called upon to keep the peace in other troubled states in Europe.

The three European structures (WEU, OSCE and NATO) constitute an interlocking network of institutions that keep Europe strong. Each plays an important role in shaping Europe's future and will continue to do so. Their co-operation ensures that all European allies participate fully in decisions that affect their security without hindering the other's efforts. Each structure specialises on specific matters, for instance NATO deals with security matters while the OSCE deals with the peaceful resolution of conflicts through its broad framework that encompasses Eastern and Western European states.

The task that lies ahead for Western security structures is that of ensuring that greater security co-operation and reassurance exists throughout Europe and the world. Peace needs to be a global rather than a regional reality. Co-operation on security matters has to be deepened in order to lay the foundation for a pan-European security order which will transcend the former Cold War rivalries. The prediction made by alliance theory that an alliance will die once it loses its enemy has not materialised. Europe's strategic landscape faces new dangers and uncertainties.

Military capabilities of states have to foster regional and global security rather than threaten other states. Common security is necessary in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO should lead the drive towards common security, by ensuring that militarily weak European states, which share borders with Russia, improve their military capabilities. Common security is likely to allay concerns about a residual Russian hegemony. It must occur with the involvement of Russia and other European states. Common security and confidence and security building measures, should occur globally as the whole world needs peace and the avoidance of war. It is not in NATO and the WEU's interest to have a peaceful and stable Europe, while a plethora of threats and

security dangers abound throughout the world. Common security has to be a global phenomenon for the purpose of saving the world from the scourge of war.

NATO and the WEU will continue to exist in the foreseeable future as security insurance policies and deterrents to dangers which could emerge. The two bodies do not in this changed context necessarily threaten peace and lead to counter-alliances. These alliances will simply keep the security order in check until the vacuum left by the Soviet Union translates into stability and greater co-operation. This context as such redefines a new role which alliances can effectively play. They will greatly assist in the construction of a new security order by keeping the situation in check. The Dayton agreement has produced a significant pointer in terms of possible security roles for the Alliance. The fact that the Alliance has deployed thousands of its forces outside Western Europe, for non-defensive but peacemaking operations; marks a significant milestone in the role of military alliances in this era. The move is a giant step away from the traditional role of an alliance which is to seek selective security for its members alone. The Alliance is likely to engage in peacekeeping operations wherever possible within the context of international agreements, as witness the case of Bosnia. Even though deployment took place in a single European country, it could be a significant test case for NATO as a possible peacemaker in this era.



UNIVERSITY
OF
JOHANNESBURG

REFERENCES

Alford, J. and Hunt, K, **Europe in the Western Alliance: Towards a European Defence Entity?** St. Martins Press, New York, 1988.

Allan, P. and Goldmann, K, **The end of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations.** Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 1992.

Allen, D. and Smith, M, "The European Community in the New Europe: beating the burden of Change". **International Journal**, vol. XLVII(1)1991-92.

Arnett, E, **Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation.** SIPRI, New York, 1996.

Baldwin, D.A, **NeoRealism and NeoLiberalism: The Contemporary Debate.** Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

Baldwin, D.A, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War". **World Politics**. vol 48(1)1995.

Barnett, M.N. and Levy, J.S, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt". **International Organization**, vol. 45(1) Winter 1991.

Bennet, A.L, **International Organization: Principles and Issues.** Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988.

Bonnart, F, "The need for Vision". **NATO's Sixteen Nations(a)** vol. 37(5)1992.

Bonnart, F, "NATO's Common Purpose". **NATO's Sixteen Nations (b)** vol. 37(6)1992.

Booth, K, **New Thinking About Strategy and International Security.** Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991.

Boyer, M.A, "A Simple but Untraditional Analysis of Western Alliance Burden Sharing". **Defence Economics**, vol. 1(3) 1990.

Buzan, B, **The International Politics of Deterrence.** Frances Pinter (Publishers), London, 1987.

Cahen, A, **Building a European Defence Identity Within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity.** Brassey's, UK, 1989.

Chernoff, F, "Arms Control, European Security and the Future of the Western Alliance". **Strategic Review**, vol. XX(10) 1992.

Cilliers, J, "Towards A South African Conventional Arms Trade Policy". **African Security Review (a)**, vol. 4,(4) 1995.

Cilliers, J, "The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa". **African Security Review(b)**, vol. 4(5) 1995.

Cortier, P, "Transforming the Atlantic Alliance". **The Washington Quarterly**, Centre For Strategic and International Studies, vol.14(1) Winter 1991.

Davies, J.K, "Restructuring Military Forces in Europe". **Adelphi Paper**, 284, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

Degenhardt, H.W, **Treaties and Alliances of the World**. Longman Group Limited, Essex, 1986.

Duffield, J.S, "NATO's function after the Cold War". **The Political Science Quarterly**, vol.105(5)1995.

Dunay, P, "NATO and the East: A Sea of Mysteries". **World Policy Journal**, vol.11(3) 1994.

Dunn, L.A, "Containing Nuclear Proliferation". **Adelphi Paper**, 263, International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1991.

Edwards, A.J.C, **Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, The Quest for Peace**. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1986.

Elliot, B.J, **Western Europe after Hitler**. Longman Group Limited, Essex, 1981.

Evans, G. and Newnham.J, **Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions**. Harvester Wheatsleaf, New York, 1990.

Feltman, R.G, **Diplomatic Handbook**. Longman UK Goup Limited, London,1993.

Gants, N. and Roper, J, **Towards a New Partnership: US-European relations in the post-Cold War era**. Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris, 1993.

Glaser, C.L, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe". **International Security**. vol. 18(1)1995.

Goldstein, A, "Disconverting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Post-War World". **International Organization**, vol. 49(1) Winter 1995.

Griffiths, M, **"Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation"**. Routledge, New York, 1992.

Gumbi, L. "European Security and Co-operation: Lessons for Southern Africa? ". **African Defence Review**, Issue 18, August 1994.

Heathcoat-Amory, D, "The next step for WEU: A British view". **The World Today**, vol. 50 (7)1994.

Heisburg, F, "NATO: The Military Balance". **International Institute for Strategic Survey**, 1992-3.

Heraclides, A, **Helsinki - II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organisation**. Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1993.

Holsti, K.J, **International Politics: A Framework for Analysis**. Prentice Hall Inc, New Jersey, 1992.

Holsti, K.J, **International Politics: A Framework for Analysis**. Prentice Hall Inc, New Jersey, 1995.

Huntley, J.R, **Uniting the Democracies: Institutions of the Emerging Atlantic Pacific System**. New York University Press, New York, 1980.

Imai, R, "The many Phases of Nuclear Energy". **Policy Paper**, 132E, Institute for International Policy Studies, 1994.

Joffe, J, "Collective Security and the future of Europe: failed dreams and dead ends". **Survival: The IISS Quarterly**, vol. 34(1) 1992.

Jordan, R.S, **Alliance Strategy and Navies**. Pinter Publishers Limited, London, 1990.

Keesings Record of World Events (a), "NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting". Catermill Publishing, vol. 41 (5) 1995.

Keesings Record of World Events (b), "NATO Defence Ministers' Meeting". Catermill Publishing, vol. 41 (6)1995.

King, C, "Waiting for Signals From Bosnia". **The World Today**. vol.51(2) 1996.

Kupchan, C.A, "Strategic Visions". **World Policy Journal**, vol. 11(3) 1994.

Lieven, A, "Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion". **The World Today**, vol. 51 (10) 1995.

Lucas, M. R, **The Western Alliance after INF: Redefining US Policy Toward Europe and the Soviet Union.** Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., London,1990.

McCalla, R.B, "Why NATO Survives". **International Organization**, vol. 50(3)1996.

McCausland, J.D, "Conventional Arms Control and European Security". **Adelphi Paper**, 301, International Institute for Strategic Studies,1996.

McCloskey, R.J. and Dusk, D, "Reflections on Alliances". **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Inaugural Issue. Fall 1989.

Mead, W.R, "No Cold War Two: The United States and the Russian Federation". **World Policy Journal**, vol. 11(2) 1994.

Motumi, T, "South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." **African Security Review**, vol. 4(2) 1995.

Mortimer, E, "European Security after the Cold War". **Adelphi Paper** 271, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,1992.

Nhara, W.G, "Early Warning and Conflict in Africa". **Institute for Defence Policy Papers**, No. 1 February 1996.

Nye, J.R, "American Strategy after Bipolarity". **International Affairs Journal**, vol. 66(3)1990.

Oren, I, "The War Proneness of Alliances". **Journal of Conflict Resolution**. vol. 34(2) 1990.

Orgorkiewicz, R.M, "The Present and Future of Armour". **Institute for Defence Policy**, Monograph Series, No. 2. March 1996.

Plano, J.C. and Olton, R, **The International Relations Dictionary.** Longman Publishers, Essex,1988.

Rengger, N, **Treaties and Alliances of the World.** Longman Group Limited, Essex, 1990.

Roberts, B, Chemical Disarmament and International Security. **Adelphi Paper**, 267, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,1992.

Rühler, M. and Williams, N, "NATO Enlargement and the European Union". **The World Today**, vol. 51(5) 1995.

Schuman M.H. and Harvey, H, **Security without War: A Post Cold War Foreign Policy**. Westview press, Inc. Oxford, 1993.

Seidman,S. and Wagner, D.G, **Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate Over General Theory**. Blackwell, Inc, Massachusetts, 1992.

Sharp, J.M.O, "Tasks for NATO I: Move East and Revise CFE". **The World Today**, vol. 51 (4) 1995.

Sherr,J, "Doomed to Remain Great". **The World Today**, vol 52 (1)1996.

Sloan, S. R, "New Designs on NATO: US Perspectives on NATO's Future". **The World Today**, vol. 71(2) April 1995.

Snyder, G.H, "Alliances, Balance and Stability". **International Organization**, Winter 1991.

Snyder, G.H, "Alliance Theory: A Neo-Realist First Cut". **Journal of International Affairs**, vol. 44(2) 1990.

Sobell,V, "NATO, Russia and Yugoslavia War". **The World Today**, vol 51(11) 1995.

Solomon, H, "Population Movements into South Africa: Trends, Outlook, Policies". **FGD Occasional Paper**, Series 2,1995.

Solomon,H, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist". **African Security Review**, vol 5(2) 1996.

Sorrokin, G.L, "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: a Game Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel". **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, vol. 38 June 1994.

Sullivan, S, "NATO Trims Down". **Newsweek(a)**, vol. CXVII(23) 1991.

Sullivan, S, "The Birth of a New NATO". **Newsweek (b)**, vol. CXVIII(21) 1991.

Sunley, J, "Tasks for NATO II: Improve the Partnership for Peace". **The World Today**, vol. 51(1) 1995.

Walker,J, **Security and Arms Control in Post Confrontation Europe**. Oxford University Press, New York,1994.

Walt, S.M, **The Origins of Alliances**. Cornell University Press, London, 1987.

Walt, S.M, "Alliance in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" **Journal of International Affairs**, vol. 43(1) Summer-Fall 1989.

Waltz, K.N, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better". **Adelphi Paper** 171, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981.

Wells, N.&H (ed), "The New European: Revolution in East-West Relations". **The Academy of Political Science**, vol. 38(1) 1991.

Zielonka, J, "Security in Central Europe". **Adelphi Paper**, 272, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1992.

Economist, 3 June 1995, vol. 335 (7917).

Economist, 30 September 1995, vol. 336 (7934).

Newsweek, 12 June 1995, vol. cxxv (24).

The Citizen, 4 June, 1996.

Time, 9 October 1995, vol. 146 (15).

Time, 23 October 1995, vol. 146 (17).

Time, 12 February 1996, vol. 147(7).

Time, 22 April 1996, vol. 147 (17).

Time, 20 May 1996, vol 147(21).

USA Today, May 1994, vol.122 (588).

USA Today, September 1994, vol.123 (592).

US Department of State Dispatch, 14 February 1994, vol. 5(7).

US Department of State Dispatch, 10 January 1994, vol. 5(2).

US News and World Report, 12 September 1994, vol. 117(10).

US Department of State Dispatch, 20 June 1994, vol. 5(25).

US Department of State Dispatch, 21 June 1993, vol. 4(25).

US News and World Report, 21 November 1994, vol. 117(20).

