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1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives, problem statement, and structure of the study

The objective of this study is to establish why a highly politically determined and committed group of nations of southern Africa were not able to delink economically from the Republic of South Africa whereas they had managed to sever political and diplomatic ties with the white-ruled Republic of South Africa. This study is designed to provide an overview of the history of the relationship between Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Republic of South Africa, to fill a gap in the literature on trade in that area. SADCC is studied within the context of its relations with the Republic. This study is premised on the hypothesis that any regional initiative that has seeds of exclusion of members within the same region is doomed to failure. This is particularly true when viewed against the background that SADCC deliberately intended to exclude the Republic.

When it was established in 1980, SADCC declared as its major objective the reduction of its economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa (RSA). This study will examine the problems the organization had experienced in achieving this objective in light of the geopolitics of the region, namely South Africa's determination to maintain regional economic and political hegemony. The similar determination of SADCC member states to reduce their dependence on the Republic will be given prominence by the study – no matter how minute those achievements could have been.

Special emphasis is placed on an analysis of the extent to which the SADCC nations have succeeded or failed in their attempts to reduce particularly their trade relations with the Republic. There were structural contrasts and contradictions that characterized and complicated trade relations between these two entities. The study covers the period between 1980 and 1989. The former is the year in which SADCC was launched, while the latter year represents the liberalization of politics in South Africa. It also marked the beginning of the liberation of Namibia. The period after 1989 saw the re-admission of South Africa within the concert of southern African nations, while the period before it was characterized by efforts to exclude her from the ranks of SADCC and other regional formations of different kinds.

The contrasts and contradictions in the trade relations between the Republic of South Africa and the independent states of southern Africa, under the umbrella of SADCC, are the objects of this study.

Relations between the Republic of South Africa and the independent states of southern Africa have attracted the attention of many historians, journalists, political scientists, and other scientists. This is precisely because these relations were marked by conflict and confrontation from both sides of the regional political spectrum. On the one hand, the Republic practised a socio-political policy of separate development that was an anathema to the independent states of southern Africa, as well as to the international community. On the other hand, the SADCC states had committed themselves to ending this system of apartheid in South Africa, as well as South African control over Namibia. In their bid to undermine apartheid and influence change in South Africa towards black majority rule, they did not only cut political and diplomatic ties with the Republic, but they also formed an economic bloc through which they wished to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic. That economic bloc is SADCC.

The emotive nature and contemporaneity of this topic has led to a proliferation of literature on the subject. However, the majority of the literature tended to focus on the conflicting nature of the relationships in the region. It was believed that SADCC's dream of ever reducing its economic dependence on the Republic was, and would remain a pipedream. Some writers challenged the viability of the organization itself. This is because they saw the Republic as indispensable to the very survival of the independent states of southern Africa. The ability of the independent states to eliminate their dependence on the Republic is seen as impossibility. More will be discussed on historiography later in the study. Within this context, it will be attempted to evaluate the successes or failures of SADCC states to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic.

This study will seek to answer the following key research questions:

To what extent did the independent states of southern Africa, namely the SADCC member states, manage to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa? What were the complicating factors?

Linked to the above question is, to what extent did the Republic of South Africa itself depend on the independent states of southern Africa? This question is premised on the hypothesis of this study, which claims that dependence is never a one-sided issue. Rather it is mutual. The study will attempt to find out to what extent, if any, did the Republic depend on the independent states of southern Africa – SADCC.

The study will attempt to evaluate the extent to which RSA and SADCC member states depended on one another and will engage theories and concepts in order to analyse the complexities of the trade relations between these states.

In attempting to answer the above questions, the preliminary hypothesis is that the realities of geography and proximity to one another, coupled with the connectedness of the economies of the southern African region (South Africa included) made it difficult for either SADCC member states or the RSA to operate independently of one another. The factors mentioned above undermined any political decisions to exclude anyone of the countries in the region. Alternatively, some of the countries could not carry out their political decisions because of their own internal systemic weaknesses. In addition, many of the countries that were expected to lead campaigns, or those that were strategically entrusted to facilitate the reduction of economic dependence on the RSA, had themselves strong trade relations dating back to the colonial period.

Dr Kamuzu Hastings Banda, the President of Malawi, summed it up when he declared to his SADCC colleagues: " My first duty is to look after the interests of 4 million people. … Being a good African does not mean cutting your economic throat. I have to be realistic. Colonial geography and history are against us. We cannot boycott South Africa, Rhodesia or Mozambique (Portuguese) – that would mean the breakdown of Malawi's economy." [1]His Botswana counterpart and former SADCC chairman, president Quett Masire, echoed similar sentiments and dilemma. He defined SADCC's dilemma as follows: " It is difficult for us to be seen championing the cause of sanctions against South Africa when in fact it is going to hurt us before it hurts South Africa." [2]

The study will employ the theoretical concept of mutuality or reciprocity, in an effort to show that relationships between the two parties were governed by interdependence. This

[1] "South Africa or SADCC, not both," in The Economist, January 22, 1983, p.60
[2]Ibid.

will be done without suggesting that the reciprocal effects were distributed equally to both the RSA and SADCC member states.

The study will further employ two additional concepts to clarify the nature of the interdependence in southern Africa. These concepts are 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability'. They will be used to demonstrate the fact that although the RSA and SADCC member states depended on each other in terms of trade, the level and effect of dependence varied tremendously, in that any punitive action or disengagement by either of the parties in a given situation, parties would not have equal means of retaliation against the other. The RSA would have an edge above SADCC member states (sensitivity). The theories will show that even in situations of interdependence, some actors (particularly SADCC member states) were more vulnerable than others (vulnerability). The theories will show that in a situation where SADCC member states were to opt for tougher action against the Republic (as they did with regard to the issue of sanctions against the Republic), and the latter retaliated, it would be the SADCC member states that would suffer greater damages than the Republic. This is because of factors such as inadequate human and physical resources, level of development, as well as other external factors.

The focus of this study is exclusively on trade relations and not on other relations between SADCC and the Republic of South Africa. This delineation does not in any way suggest the insignificance of other aspects of their interaction. Rather, it is just an attempt to focus on a manageable scope of research.

The structure of the study will be as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the problem statement of the study, puts forward research questions, and provides an introduction to the region of southern Africa. It discusses the methodologies applied in the study, as well as sources that have been consulted for purposes of the study.
Chapter 2 will review the literature on the topic. Chapter 3 gives a conceptual framework on dependencies within the context of the SADCC region. This chapter is the centrepiece of this study in that it provides a theoretical context of relationships in southern Africa.

Chapter 4 provides a factual disposition of trade between the RSA on the one hand and the independent states of southern Africa on the other. This trade relationship is analysed from a historical perspective. In other words, it is discussed and analysed as it developed over time. There is a brief outline of trade practices during pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial era of the evolution of the region of southern Africa. However, the chronology and sequence of the historical events under discussion are upset by the lack of data. Nevertheless, this limitation does not fail to allow for a better understanding of the trade during the entire decade of the 1980s – which is the focus of this study. This chapter offers details of South African trade with individual countries and a collective overview of SADCC member states. The existence of heterogeneity of SADCC necessitates this approach. SADCC members' states are treated as individuals in their trade relations with the RSA. This approach is difficult to follow with regard to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (also called the BLS countries). The problem is occasioned by the interconnectedness, almost homogeneous, of these states in their dealing with the Republic. Apart from being members of SACU, they also used the same currency with South Africa. Hence, they belonged to the so-called rand monetary area. This aspect will be dealt with in details in future chapters. Nevertheless, an attempt is being made in this study to also treat them as separate entities, because these are sovereign states with their own national boundaries and policies. They interacted with the RSA both as individual sovereign states on the one hand, and as member states of SADCC, thus justifying this dual approach.

Chapter 5 provides the merits and demerits of intra-SADCC trade, and the extent of its success and failures. The success of trade within and amongst SADCC member states constitutes the success of the SADCC initiative in that members would trade amongst themselves at the expense, and to the detriment, of the Republic. This chapter evaluates the extent to which member states have been successful in implementing the SADCC Programme of Action looking at the relationship between the SADCC member states and South Africa (regional level), and amongst SADCC member states themselves. Reasons that worked against, or promoted, intra-SADCC trade are evaluated.

Chapter 6 provides an inference on the contents of the trade between SADCC member states over time. The title of the chapter is " Intra-SADCC Trade". It summarises the implications of interdependency relationships as well as how they benefit countries involved. In this chapter, the outcome of the analyses of the previous chapters, are given and summarised.

The reader will note that two of the SADCC states, Angola and Tanzania, have been mentioned relatively briefly in comparison to the other states. This is because they have had very little, if any, trade with the Republic of South Africa.

1.2. Methodology, limitations and sources

The point of departure for this study is that of the state. The study treats the SADCC member states as actors in their own right in a regional theatre. In some respects, the study treats the organisation as a regional entity and actor in its own right, particularly as it related to the Republic of South Africa. This is obviously a weakness because it carries within it the erroneous assumption that these states were homogeneous groupings with a similar approach and policy towards the Republic. Yet, this approach is still valid because even if they had different approaches to the Republic, they still owed allegiance to their organisation, SADCC.

By confining the analysis to the state level, the study admittedly and additionally fails to take cognisance of other important social forces, which in the last instance determine the actions of the state. The fact that social classes and strata are only briefly alluded to does not indicate that their role is being played down. Analysis at the sub-statal level of class struggles is, of course, utterly important to a fuller understanding of the regional dynamic. However, they are beyond the scope of this study and would require major field studies.

This study is cognisant of the many facets of SADCC's existence. Apart from trade relations, SADCC and the Republic of South Africa interacted at different levels. Many citizens of SADCC countries worked in the South African mines, and their countries benefited greatly in the form of revenue accruing from these workers and the system of migrant work. These aspects are not being dealt with in this study. The limitation of this study is that it singles out trade relations from a myriad of relations between South Africa and SADCC member states. This has the potential to distort the facts because all these relations are interrelated and interwoven in the region. Nevertheless, it is proper to focus the study only on trade to give it proper attention, lest it will become cumbersome to the extent of missing its target. To this extent, this alluded limitation pales into insignificance in the face of a disciplined way of dealing with one area at a time. The internal socio-political conflicts within South Africa itself and the war in Namibia are not less important, but are also not essential for purposes of this study. Moreover, nutritional development plans and strategies to which SADCC projects were subsidiary lie outside the frame of reference. Another important element that is not dealt with is the character of the political support for the SADCC cooperation in the different member states. It is not so crucial for this particular study.

Another limitation relates to the issue of SADCC and transnational corporations in southern Africa. While this is a relevant and important subject, it too requires a separate in-depth study. The study is, however, not based on a single type of source. It is based on the use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources that have been consulted include official statistics, SADCC documents, and other documents. Secondary sources include books, reports, scientific journals, government publications, multilateral agency publications, periodicals of economic and political journalism such as Africa Economic Digest, African Business, Africa Now, etc. (see notes), journals and working papers. The majority of sources were found at the Africa Institute of South Africa. It is so detailed and easily accessible once one has become a member of this organization. Sources found at this institution are both primary and secondary. Other sources were found at the University of Pretoria and Rand Afrikaans University libraries. The staff of both the above institutions were of great help.

One of the most limiting factors in this study is the lack of a detailed breakdown of South Africa's trade with the rest of the African continent. Apparently, South Africa did not publish these statistics. Neither did most of African countries, since none of the southern African states wished to reveal their trade relations with South Africa.[3] There are, however, some statistics from South Africa, albeit with gaps. One can thus not rule out possibilities of incomplete conclusions. However, that should not prevent the use of statistical information to illustrate points of analysis and to identify overall trends. After all, the database is sufficiently good to suggest orders of magnitude and general trends.

The limited availability of accurate and comparable data on the economic development in the SADCC countries[4] could lead to errors in the study. Generally, analysis of South Africa's trade with Africa in general, and southern Africa in particular, is extremely difficult because for the period under review (particularly the mid 1980s to early 1990s) statistical information on African countries was kept secret by the states for strategic reasons, as a result of the international sanctions. Even at the time of writing this study,

[3] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A post-Nkomati Evaluation, p.60.

[4] There are many reasons for this state of affairs, the most important being the lack of an adequate system for storing information in these states.

the South African government had not begun revealing the figures in full. Nevertheless, statistics obtained from other sources like those that the Africa Institute of South Africa and the two universities mentioned above, helped fill the gaps. Thus, the general line of argument is not negatively influenced.

SADCC had its own contradictions inherent in its approach to development. The fact that SADCC attempted to reduce economic dependence on the RSA, the SADCC region increased its dependence on the advanced capitalist nations of the West. However important these contradictions are, this aspect will not be covered in this study for fear of doing injustice to it by only scratching on the surface. It too requires a separate in-depth study.

1.3. Background to the region

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established in April 1980, and consisted of nine members, namely, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It aimed primarily at coordinating the regional members' development in such areas as industry, agriculture, transport, communications, energy, and other related fields. Support for political liberation in the entire region was among its general objectives. The Lusaka Declaration document, Southern Africa: towards Economic Liberation, is a commitment by the nine independent states of southern Africa 'to pursue policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of our national economies'.[5] In order to understand its relationship with the Republic of South Africa (RSA), one needs to understand the philosophies and ideologies, which governed the two parties. These relations have been characterised by conflict, competition and cooperation.

When SADCC was established in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 by the formal signing of the Lusaka Declaration, the founding fathers set the following four development objectives:

1. The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
2. The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3. The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;

[5] A.J. Nsekela (ed): Southern Africa. Towards Economic Liberation, p.xv

4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of their strategy for economic liberation. [6]

Without any shred of doubt, the first objective was the most important in the SADCC programme. Indeed member states, and the SADCC secretariat based in Gaborone, Botswana, had become so obsessed with that particular objective that the success or failure of the organization has been built upon the attainment of the objective[7]. SADCC's motivation for embarking on this first objective was advanced by several SADCC leaders. The first president of independent Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, stated at the inaugural meeting in 1980 that our goal is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce our economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa". [8]

Although the apparent rationale behind the SADCC's formation appears to have been economic, the major driving force was undoubtedly also political. It was the overwhelming desire of member states to avoid what they perceived as a trap in South Africa's conceived regional set-up, namely the envisioned Constellation of states of southern Africa (CONSAS) as suggested by the South African government in the late 1970s, and SADCC member states' common aversion to apartheid. Some commentators viewed SADCC almost exclusively as an organization, which sought to reduce ties with South Africa. [9] Weisfelder could not have been more right in his analysis of this organization. He notes:

"To be sure SADCC is a reaction against South African racism and economic hegemony. But it is also necessary to reiterate the predominantly positive character of SADCC goals, namely the promotion of economic independence, establishment of mechanisms for equitable economic integration, mobilisation of regional resources, and solicitation of international support for these objectives" [10] The situation becomes even more clear when one recognises that the goals of economic development and dependence reduction on South Africa were inevitably entwined, and that the former could not occur without the latter.

[6] K.S. Kongwa : SADCC : Seven Years After, p.2.

[7] Ibid. p.2

[8] " SADCC, a Handbook," Gaborone, Botswana, 1984, p.3

[9] D. S. Cowie: "Regional Cooperation for Development: An analysis of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference", in Pula, vol. 4. no. 2, Nov 1984, p.26

[10] R.F. Weisfelder: "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)", in South Africa International, vol. 13, no. 2, October 1982, p.77

What was then such an anathema about South Africa the independent states disliked so much, and what was South Africa's own perception of these states?

Briefly stated, the major stand off between the independent states of southern Africa on the one hand, and the Republic of South African the other, goes back to the days of colonization. For purposes of this study, the history of these relations will be studied only from 1948 when the National Party came into power and systematised racial segregation. Since the National Party came to power in 1948, their foreign policy objective was the protection of the country's unique socio-political order from external threat[11]. The major desire of the regime of the time was to achieve international acceptance of the white minority rule, and not simply apartheid (which is just one form of white minority superiority), in the face of black South Africans' demand for black majority rule. This international threat was perceived by South Africa to emanate from four sources:

First, it was the liberation movements based in neighbouring states, particularly the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which received military training, material support and territorial sanctuaries from the host countries. Although these groups were not in a position to overthrow the South African government, with passage of time they gained popularity and were able to carry out acts of sabotage in South Africa. There was therefore the desire on the South African side to halt support for the ANC in neighbouring states. The South African government was prepared to go an extra mile in ensuring that neighbouring states cooperate, and various strategies were engaged to achieve this.

Second, was economic pressure as a gesture of disapproval of the minority government by the international community? In the wake of the Soweto uprising in 1976, the international economic threat became a reality, with the terms of its access to international capital and technology severely deteriorating. Yet, South Africa, as an export-dependent country also relied on access to Western capital and technology for industrial growth and development. South Africa saw southern Africa as its economic hinterland and a new market for its manufactured goods.

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[11] R.M. Price : "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy" in African Affairs, vol 83, No 330, 1984, pp.11-12

Third, economic chaos and deprivation because of destabilization would re-enforce the propaganda offensive that South Africa's white minority government was important for peace and prosperity in the region. Black majority rule would be discredited as chaotic and a recipe for instability.

Fourth, there was a perceived conventional threat from abroad. South Africa perceived the Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa as an expansion of communism beyond the borders of Europe. This itself presented South Africa with a premise to act against southern African states, which were communist inclined. They were thus liable to attack under the cloak of ridding southern Africa of Soviet presence and influence.[12]

Of central importance to all of the above, was South Africa's desire to force neighbouring states to remain economically dependent on her, so that they (through Accords and diplomatic relations and the CONSAS concept) could monitor activities of the liberation movements. The Republic wanted to use her neighbours as hostages to head off international sanctions, and as a useful export market in the region for South African industry, so that it could enhance its self-sufficiency in the face of sanctions.[13]

On the other hand, SADCC member states had a popular belief that they had a commonality of interests which would ensure the success of their programmes and at the same time vindicate the belief that SADCC, as a sub-system, could prosper and develop without the membership of its giant neighbour, the RSA. Although SADCC had not been created as a counter to South Africa per se, its programmes were highly influenced by its criticism of apartheid. In 1987, the executive secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, was quoted as saying that SADCC member states were "not working to reverse the current order from a purely emotional or irrational political perspective, but from logical and rational economic realities. It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine states of southern Africa, which constitute SADCC at the moment to be as dependent on South Africa as they are today. We have made it clear that the relevance and validity of the SADCC will not end the day that the people's flag is raised in Pretoria."[14]

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[12] Ibid. , pp.25-26.

[13] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, p.2

[14] The Star. Johannesburg, 6 June 1987

It is evident from the above statements that SADCC was born and grew out of conflict and confrontation between two opposing subsystems in the same region. Secondly, SADCC member nations resented the degree and nature of their dependence on South Africa. This resentment is clearly reflected in the preamble of the Lusaka Declaration at the end of the founding conference: " Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic of South Africa as a focus of transport and communications, an exporter of goods and services and an importer of goods and cheap labour. This dependence is not a natural phenomenon nor is it simply the result of a free market economy ….Not surprisingly; therefore, southern Africa is fragmented, grossly exploited and subject to economic manipulation by outsiders. Future development must aim at the reduction of economic dependence not only on the Republic of South Africa, but also on any single external state or group of states."[15]

SADCC leadership had always maintained in their summits that they would admit South Africa once it abandoned its domestic race policies; SADCC accepted Namibia as a member when it became independent.[16] The inference to be drawn from such pronouncements is that SADCC's cardinal objective stemmed from member states' opposition to apartheid rather than from any real or imagined problems of economic dependence per se. Pretoria's acceptance was to be affected and executed within the context of non-domination, until the existing dependence becomes interdependence.[17] The former President of Tanzania and founder member of SADCC, Julius Nyerere, eloquently stated in the formative years of SADCC, " our purposes are not simply greater independence from South Africa. If South Africa's apartheid ended tomorrow, there could still be a need for the states of southern Africa to cooperate, to coordinate their transport systems, to fight foot and mouth disease together, and to rationalise their industrial development."[18]

[15] S. Kongwa : "SA and SADCC countries in the 1990"s, in South Africa Foundation Review, April 1990, p.4

[16] G. Maasdorp: "The Southern African Nexus. Dependence or Interdependence", in Indicator: Economic Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4, 1986, p.6

[17] These sentiments were echoed by SADCC's Executive Secretary in 1987. See S. Kongwa's "SA and the SADCC countries in the 1990s", in South Africa Foundation Review, April 1990, p.3

[18] S. Kongwa : SA and SADCC …p.3

Despite SADCC members' intentions to reduce links with South Africa, as well as their anti-South African rhetoric, their trade, employment and transport ties had strengthened during the entire period under review, namely the decade of the 1980s. Many of the SADCC countries, with the exception of Tanzania and Angola, were deliberately incorporated into colonial structures centering in general on South Africa. Colonial masters to these member states did very little to prepare their economies for self-reliance before the completion of their decolonisation process.[19] SADCC colonial masters left a legacy of poor infrastructure for SADCC economies that were unequal in relation to South Africa.[20] What is more, the weak development of the communications network, in terms of physical infrastructure, telecommunications, air and sea links and the lack of foreign exchange in the 1980s put SADCC states in an unfavourable position in relation to the Republic. Because of this interconnectedness of SADCC member states' economies to that of the Republic, and their weak economies coupled with the latter's destabilization policy and incentives awarded to compliant members, by 1990 all SADCC states, except Tanzania, still maintained more trade with the RSA than with one another.[21]

It is evident from the above that SADCC's first objective was not motivated solely by South Africa's internal policies which were at odds with member states' moral and political concepts. The basic motivations arose from the fear of economic dominance by one country over the rest; fear of continued destabilization by the RSA against the rest; fear of economic and political blackmail by the regional power, or the centre which is South Africa, against the periphery which is SADCC member states; desire to reduce higher transport and energy costs by reverting to natural and shorter routes by a determination to correct the economic imbalance in both the direction and terms of trade between SADCC member states and South Africa.[22]

[19] SADCC energy, vol. 3, no. 9, 1985, p.21
[20] J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa. Central elements of the SADCC venture. CDR Research Report No. 14, p.49
[21] S. Kongwa : SA and SADCC …p.3
[22] Ibid, pp.3-4.

2. Historiography on SADCC

The literature on the trade relationship between South Africa and the independent nations of southern Africa, as organised under the umbrella of SADCC, is overwhelming. This is precisely because the relations between the two 'blocs' was one of the most complex, and most important in the history of southern Africa. The topic is relatively contemporary, thus making it difficult to find books, which cover all aspects of the relationship for the entire decade of the 1980s. Many of the books cover the period up to 1986, while few of them cover the entire period of this study, as well as the aspects of trade relations between the RSA and SADCC member states. Nevertheless, the countless articles written by historians and newspaper journalists who contributed substantially on the topic fill this gap. The overwhelming interest of so many historians, journalists and political consultants can be attributed to the fact that this is also an emotional theme. Its emotiveness can be attributed not only to its contemporaneity, but also to the fact that the entire era was characterised by political conflict and confrontation on the one side, and increased trade relations between South Africa and SADCC member states on the other. The study of political confrontation within a context of economic collaboration makes the whole exercise complex.

Owing to the situation described above, it is not surprising to encounter diametrically opposing views amongst historians and other writers on the situation in southern Africa. For purposes of this study only, authors on the theme of this study have been categorised into four categories. The first group of authors are referred to as pro-South African and anti-SADCC authors. The second group is anti-South African and therefore pro-SADCC. The third group represents a critical approach, which project a balanced view of the situation. The fourth and last category is called the "Dependence School". The categorisation of these views and authors should not be viewed as an attempt to 'fence' individual authors in some cages from which they are not able to move. Authors termed pro-South African in this study may be biased towards the Republic on this particular theme, but are not necessarily pro-South African at all times. Their views on the same theme in the subsequent decade of the 1990s might have changed as a result of the change in political landscapes in the southern African region and globally. This is because people are dynamic beings who influence and are influenced by the environment they inhabit. The same holds for the so-called anti-South African sources and writers.

The views of these writers are sometimes backed by sound evidence, but sometimes not. All sources are nevertheless treated in a similar critical fashion.

The last category of the sources of this study, namely the "Dependence School", is also the least controversial of all the categories. They offer theoretical explanations of situations of not only southern Africa, but even those of universal situations as well.
A combination of these categories of sources helps to enhance the quality of this study.

2.1. Pro-South African sources

Authors in this category write from a South African perspective, and are mostly South African. Their emphasis is on the dominance and indispensability of the Republic to the independent states of southern Africa. They start from the premise that whatever happened in the region was attributable to the Republic's action or inaction, and that ensuing developments in the region were reflections thereof. Key authors in this category include an academic and political scientist, Deon Geldenhuys, Gavin Maasdorp, formerly from the University of Natal, and G.M.E. Leistner of the Africa Institutte of South Africa.

Deon Geldenhuys was himself one of the foremost experts and scholars on South Africa's foreign policy particularly towards SADCC member states during the decade of the 1980s. The South African government made use of his work for policy-making purposes. Among others, he published the following on South Africa and SADCC member states: "Diplomacy of isolation. South African foreign policy making in 1984"[23] and "The Destabilisation Controversy. An analysis of a high-risk foreign policy option for South Africa in 1982.[24] While it is accepted that he is an authority on the relationship between South Africa and SADCC member states, Geldenhuys tend to lose sight of the complexity of the relationship. Obscured by the confrontational side of the relationship, he projects SADCC member states as being aggressive towards the Republic, thus provoking her to retaliate. He argued that South Africa could possibly not sit back helplessly in the face of destabilisation by SADCC member states.[25] This perspective views the Republic as a sovereign state, which reserved the right to practice domestic policies of its choice. When SADCC member states called for sanctions against South

[23] South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1984.

[24] Politikon, vol. 9, no. 2, December 1982.

[25] D. Geldenhuys: Diplomacy of Isolation. South African foreign policy making, pp.206-207.

Africa, he justifies the latter's military offensive against the former, and he suggests tactics to effect changes in the target political and economic behaviour.[26]

G.M.E. Leistner espoused similar views about SADCC member states. In his remarks in 1988 about Africa and southern Africa's call for sanctions against the Republic, Leistner called on them 'to mind their own business rather than waste their time dictating to South Africa what its domestic policies should be.[27] G.G. Maasdorp holds similar views in this regard. He believes that SADCC member states would need to transform the way they related to South Africa if they were to survive.[28]

One of the major limitations of this approach lies in the fact that SADCC member states are treated as appendages to the RSA and passive objects of its policies, whereas these states are active subjects in their own right. Both Leistner and Maasdorp's views presuppose that SADCC member states would not survive without South Africa. While this might be true to an extent, a more appropriate view is the one, which also sees SADDC member states' economies as indispensable to the South African markets, albeit to a lesser extent. Some views of authors in this category sound more propagandistic when they describe SADCC member states as puppets of communism, which are also bent on spreading Marxist ideas to South Africa. This paradigm perceives communism as a threat to the sovereignty of the RSA. This is despite the fact that only two out of nine states were Marxist-oriented.

2.2. Pro-SADCC sources, anti-South Africa

The majority of sources in this category are anti-South Africa. The group includes neo-Marxist and revisionist sources and writers who write from an exclusively economic perspective. Historians in this category interpret South Africa's actions as tantamount to a declaration of an economic war on the region, which was aimed at effecting economic

[26] See also Geldenhuys : "Destabilisation Controversy : An Analysis of a high-risk foreign policy option for South Africa", in Politikon, 9(2), December 1982, pp.17-18.

[27] G.M.E. Leistner and P. Esterhuysen (eds): South Africa in southern Africa: Economic Interaction,

[28] R.I. Rotberg and H.S. Bienen: South Africa and its neighbours. Regional security and self-interest, pp. 94-95.

results. In whatever it does, South Africa was perceived as a puppet of the capitalist world of the United States of America and the United Kingdom.[29]

According to the logic of this paradigm, South Africa's motivation of interacting with independent states of southern Africa was motivated by her interest to safeguard the international bourgeoisie in an attempt to preserve South African whites' social privileges and property rights.[30] They interpret South Africa's interaction with independent states of southern Africa as largely influenced by economic ambitions. South Africa's interaction with SADCC is interpreted as a calculated attempt to effect economic results from them.[31] South Africa's relations with its SADCC neighbours were more complex than suggested by this narrow view of regional interaction. It was a dynamic relationship, which could not be described, in simplistic terms such as either aggressive or peaceful. Apart from the instances where SADCC member states were cajoled into trading with the Republic, there were also many instances where some of these states voluntarily preferred South African goods and services to those of their sister countries in the SADCC bloc. They were attracted to dealing with the RSA not because of coercion from the latter, but because it made economic sense for them to do so.

Key authors belonging to this category include Joseph Hanlon with his Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in southern Africa. Together with H.H. Patel in "South Africa's destabilisation policy", the Zimbabwe News, volume 18, number 1, 1987[32], these authors perceived South Africa as an aggressive partner in the equation of trade relations with the independent states of southern Africa. They saw South Africa as a country at war with her neighbours. Patel described the Republic's relation to SADCC states as the one of war, albeit an undeclared war.[33] It is true that relations between South Africa and SADCC member states were not always rosy, but it is equally absurd for an author to fail to see so many positive trade relations in the region. The analysis of this paradigm is, quite erroneously, focusing more on the South African dominance and reprisals against its neighbours, while it does not take cognisance of the fact that relations in the region were reciprocal. The paradigm lost sight of the reprocity of the relationship

[29] M.M. Ncube : "The United States, South Africa, and destabilization in southern Africa", in Journal of African Marxists, no. 6, October 1986, p.40.

[30] Ibid, p.40.

[31] See John Hanlon's Apartheid's second front. South Africa's war against its neighbours, p. 2.

[32] H.H. Patel : "South Africa's destabilisation policy", in Zimbabwe News, vol. 18, no. 1, 1987, pp.19-20.

[33] Ibid. pp.19-20.

in the region. It undermined the fact that SADCC member states were regional economic role players in their own right, that South Africa ne ed them as much as they needed her – albeit not to the same degree. As Carol B. Thompson stated in "Cooperation for Survival: Western Interests versus SADCC", that even in instances where the Republic destabilized its neighbours, it paid a heavy price as well. When she sent miners home, the Republic lost the most skilled personnel who could not be replaced by the large pool of unemployed South Africans. [34] The aspect of reciprocity of relations in southern Africa will be dealt with in detail in the subsequent chapters.

M.M. Ncube in the United States, South Africa, and destabilization and Martin and Johnson's Destabilization and Dependence'. Apartheid in Crisis, fall in the same category. Peter Vale, a professor in Political Science at the University of Rhodes, described this group of writers as revisionists. The approach of these writers also exaggerate South Africa's aggressive role in the region. They see South Africa as being involved in an 'unjust war against her neighbours'. The limitation of this approach lies in the fact that it fails to consider the other non-violent interaction between the independent states of southern Africa and the Republic in the region.

Although the above group of writers are not completely off the mark by linking economic factors in their analysis of the situation in southern Africa, their approach is biased in that it does not appreciate the behaviour of other factors in the equation. This group blames South Africa for all the economic ills of economies of all SADCC member states.

2.3. Critical approaches

The third group of sources on this subject of relations between SADCC member states and the RSA is that of critical sources. Some sources within this category tend to be pro-Western but also anti-South African. Others, within the same category, are pro-South African. They are just factual. They do not only analyse the situation from an economic point of view, but they also analyse the problem from a security perspective. Although economic factors are considered in the analysis of relations, it is security reasons that are given prominence. Some of the key writers in this category include Deon Geldenhuys, K. Pottinger and R. Davies and D. O'Meara. In his 1982 publication called "The

[34] C.B. Thompson : Cooperation for survival : Western Interests v/s SADCC, in Journal of Opinion, vol. xvi, no. 1, 1987, p.34.

Destabilization Controversy: An analysis of a high-risk foreign policy option for South Africa", Geldenhuys gave an account of relations in southern Africa, but he also criticizes independent states of southern Africa for their hostile policies against the Republic. He criticises South Africa's foreign policy that was based more on coercion rather than persuasion. As a consultant for the South African government, he suggested alternative options in its dealings with independent states of southern Africa. The same can be said of "Some foreign policy implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' with particular reference to the "12 point plan"[35], in which he portrays the perspective of the South African government towards independent states of southern Africa.

In their publication "Total strategy in southern Africa: An analysis of South African regional policy since 1978", Davies and O'Meara give a balanced analysis of the multi-facetted relationship between the Republic and SADCC member states. They provide a balanced economic analysis of the origins of South Africa's idea of a Constellation of southern African States (CONSAS), as well as the critical role, which Zimbabwe had been earmarked to play. It was critical of the birth and survival of both SADCC and CONSAS.[36]

The significance of the above approach is that it reflects on both sides of the relations between the RSA and her neighbours. It serves to explain trade relations in full context. This perspective helps us to understand the two lines of policy, which were pursued by South Africa in dealing with SADCC member states. First, to expand and modernize its military forces to increase their capacity to engage in both conventional warfare and to deal with internal insurrection. Second, to seek to weaken the sources of the external threat, i.e. those of South Africa's neighbours who supported the military activities of the liberation movements as mentioned in the previous chapter. This second policy was carried on through a carrot-and-stick approach to its neighbours. The 'carrot' was in the form of offers of friendship and economic cooperation as embodied in concepts such as 'Constellation of southern African States', using Mozambique's under-utilised railways and ports, by loaning to Zimbabwe locomotives for its railways, engaging in trade and providing outlets to the sea for its exports, by maintaining a Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and by allowing them use of South Africa's extensive

[35] D. Geldenhuys : "Total strategy in southern Africa : Analysis of South African regional policy since 1978", in Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. II, No. 2, 1985, p.196.

[36] Ibid. p.196.

communications network. This group of writers have been very useful in the writing of this study because of their focus. They also explain the concept of the 'stick' very well, albeit without giving it precedence over the 'carrot' approach. In any case, this study is not about the destabilization version of South Africa's relations with its neighbours.

In the same category, there are hard-core researchers who offered balanced interpretations and historical accounts of these relations. These include Professor Sam Kongwa of the Africa Institute of South Africa. In his publications, "South Africa and the SADCC countries in the 1990s" and "SADCC – the way forward", Kongwa gives a balanced account of SADCC's political determination to downplay South Africa's economic hegemony, and points to their economic realities which render their dreams almost unattainable. He supports his arguments with empirical evidence without compromise. He alludes to realities such as individual member states' bad policies, lack of skilled labour, poor public resource management and low technological capacity as some of the factors delaying SADCC from attaining its objectives.[37]

The last group is academic studies that have been submitted in fulfilment of doctoral studies on the subject related to this one. Among these is W.J.C.M Soontie ns' Obstacles to South African Exports to Southern African Development Community. This work is on the post-1990 SADC, whereby South Africa was admitted as a member of SADCC. This period falls outside the scope of this study since trade relations between South Africa and SADCC member states were normalised because of the removal of policies of separate development in South Africa. Although these sources do not address the same problems addressed by this study, they are nevertheless important to acknowledge as they put the study in its proper context.

A number of local and international newspapers have been consulted for purposes of this study. These include The Star of Johannesburg, the Financial Mail of Johannesburg, The Citizen of Johannesburg, 1983, and the Financial Gazette of Zimbabwe of, 22 May 1987. Although most of them are South African newspapers, they nevertheless represent different views on the topic. Both The Star and Financial Mail were, and still are, independent newspapers, which were critical to the South African socio-politico-

[37] S. Kongwa : South Africa and the SADCC countries in the 1990s, in South Africa Foundation Review, p.3.

economic policies. The Financial Gazette of Zimbabwe and particularly The Citizen was the mouthpiece of their respective governments. [38]

The conflict nature of the relations between SADCC member states and the Republic, as well as the emotiveness and contemporaneity of the subject, had influenced the tone of historical writing on this topic.

2.4. "Dependence School"

This last group comprises theorists whose approaches are exclusively to provide a conceptual framework of dependency in southern Africa. This category of writers includes David A. Baldwin in "Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis", Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in "World Politics and the International Economic System," and "Power and Interdependence, World in Transition" and Sanjaya Lall's "Is 'Dependence' a Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?" Theses publications have assisted with the understanding of mutualism or reciprocity as a tool for explaining the distribution of power in the world and southern Africa. Without pronouncing whether dependence or interdependence is good or bad, these writers provided conceptual analyses, clarified and explicated the concept of dependence and related concepts such as "interdependence" and "dependency". Through these works, this study is able to understand that in the context of southern Africa, interdependence is possible. It becomes possible to understand why it was costly for both SADCC and the RSA to forgo their relations, and why the breaking of those trade ties would be more costly for SADCC member states than it would be for the RSA. SADCC member states and the RSA were interlocked into a relationship although the former was more vulnerable while the latter was more self-sufficient.[39] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye distinguish between the concepts of "vulnerability" and "sensitivity" to explain the opportunity costs of disrupting the relationship. These concepts are explained in subsequent chapters in more detail.

3. Research methodology

In this study, the researcher relied heavily on the use of journal articles and newspaper articles. This is because these sources are more recent than the secondary publications.

[38] It would be recalled that The Citizen was founded from the state monies, which were linked to the Information scandal of the late 1970s.
[39] D.A. Baldwin: "Interdependence and power: A conceptual analysis", in International Organization, p.45.

Many of the books consulted for purposes of this study covered only half the period of the study.

The approach adopted for this study is qualitative. This method is descriptive in nature, and it allows for a contextual understanding of the topic of the study. Broad reading of the complex history of the region was completed before specific issues pertaining to trade relations were singled out of the jungle. The researcher did some background reading on the role of destabilization in the region as well as other economic relations, which South Africa had with its neighbours.
As stated elsewhere in this study, there is a lack of statistics on trade between the RSA and SADCC member states. The objective of non-publication was to avoid showing which countries were active partners of RSA in the context of sanctions. However, a 'doctored' version of the statistics has been published by Customs and Excise, and is available at the Africa Institute of South Africa. The majority of sources consulted for this study were found at the Africa Institute of South Africa.

To enhance the qualitative approach to the study, the Internet was also explored particularly to supplement the lacking data. This deepened the understanding of the issues, and thus enriched the contents of this work. The researcher has also had easy access to the libraries of the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) and the University of South Africa (UNISA). These institutions were very helpful in that one was able to access many useful journals and books on the topic.

The approach in the present study is dialectical and dynamic, focussing on the changing relationships between the RSA and its neighbouring states over a period. The study is not set in simplistic dependency perspective whereby it is erroneously believed that the relationship was rigid and one-sided, or that it benefited one side of the equation. It is based on some primary sources like SADCC documents, reports, scientific journals and periodicals of economic and political journalism such as Africa Economic Digest, African Business, New African and Africa Now.

4. Dependency in southern Africa: A Conceptual Framework

In order to understand the relationships between the independent states of southern Africa and the RSA, an understanding of the concepts, dependence and interdependence, is necessary.

An attempt to analyse the above concepts, either individually or as opposing constructions, is frustrated by the conceptual confusion surrounding them. The common and scientific usage of these concepts is so varied that it is hardly possible to arrive at consensus definitions. For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to make a preliminary clarification of some of these concepts to avoid gross misunderstandings. Misunderstandings would in turn defeat the objective of this study, namely to analyse the complex relationship between the RSA and collective independent states of southern Africa as organized under the auspices of SADCC. It is, however, true that the concept of interdependence – mutual or otherwise, has sparked a lively and controversial debate in world politics. Some view it as helpful in explaining the distribution of power in the world, while others condemn it as an "unhelpful" and "misleading" analytical category.[40] Many scholars even complain about the lack of conceptual clarity, and some even claim that there is no generally accepted definition of the term.[41] The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve the controversy around the concept, but to examine the concept, to clarify it through explanation. The purpose is to explore it as an analytical and historical tool to understand the relations in southern Africa. It is important to be clear as to what this chapter is about, but it is equally important to understand what it is not about. It is not about whether dependence or interdependence is "good" or "bad" for relations between southern African states and South Africa. It does not attempt either to refute or justify the dependency theory as formulated and propagated by certain Latin American scholars and other scholars.

The aim of this chapter is to enhance the understanding of how the RSA, with its policies of separate development, continued to trade with its northern neighbours despite the fact that they had managed to sever diplomatic and political ties (with the exception of

[40] D.A. Baldwin: "Interdependence and Power. A Conceptual Analysis", in International Organization, Vol. 34, no. 4, 1980, p.471.
[41] Ibid

Malawi) with the Republic. However, and because of the uneasy relationship, the international condemnation of the system of apartheid and of the South African government, which espoused the racist ideology, which was at the root of it, made southern Africa a special case. SADCC member states perceived the RSA as a particularly vicious neighbour, with which it was impossible to have normal inter-state relations.[42]

Nevertheless, what is dependence, and how relevant is it in southern Africa? How does it enhance the understanding of trade relations between South Africa and the independent states of southern Africa?

This discussion of these concepts will provide a conceptual framework for the understanding of the context of the relationship. At the end of this chapter it would be easy to understand how both of these two blocs depended on each other. It will become clear that whatever and however minute the interdependence there was, it was still there and important.

According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces."[43] This means that dependence is a dialectical concept, which involves two or more actors, in this case South Africa and the independent states of southern Africa. A relationship of this nature does not, however, imply that the one party is totally dependent on the other, nor does it conversely denote that the latter can discard the former without any effects whatsoever on itself.[44] In as much as it may seem as though South Africa could do without the imports and exports to and from the southern African states, this concept indicates exactly the opposite. There is an element of reciprocity in this relationship. Since there is an element of relative reciprocity or mutuality in the above definition, it is therefore warranted to speak of interdependence. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as mutual dependence that, in world politics, is characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors or in different countries.[45]

[42] A. Tostensen: Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance.pp.15-16
[43] R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition,,p.8
[44] A. Tostensen: Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa. The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), p.16.
[45] Ibid.

David A. Baldwin links the concept of dependence to the distribution of power, which is also relevant in the region of southern Africa. He understands the concept of interdependence as referring to the sensitivity of economic behaviour in one country to developments or policies originating outside its own borders.[46] Adam Smith takes the debate forward by arguing that dependence was a likely consequence in the sense that exchange relationships involved benefits that satisfied mutual needs and which would, therefore, by definition be costly to forgo.[47] Mathematically, Smith argues that the influence which Country A acquires in Country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from the same trade. In this sense, interdependence once again refers to relations that would be mutually costly to forgo, and break. With regard to the southern African region, it would be correct to define a state of interdependence between two actors as entailing that the reciprocal effects are not distributed evenly to either side of the relationship, since it refers to situations of mutual benefit only.[48]

The benefits of interdependence are, according to Baldwin, simply another way of stating the opportunity costs of severing the relationship. No matter how "bad" and interdependent the relationship may be, it is presumably preferable to the most likely alternative.[49] This holds true to the region of southern Africa. The underdeveloped states of the southern African region, which is a 'third world' region, became progressively and historically incorporated into a permanent relationship with the expanding capitalist economy of the Republic of South Africa.

What the above concepts imply is that each of the two power blocs of southern Africa, namely the RSA and SADCC member states, was dependent on the other in the sense that the opportunity costs of breaking the relationship were high, and differentially high. The parties were locked up in a reciprocal but unbalanced dependence that constrained each party's behaviour with respect to the other. Baldwin summed it up when he defined this

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[46] D.A. Baldwin: "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," in International Organization, vol. 34, no. 4, 1980, p.477

[47] Ibid., p.478

[48] Keohane and Nye reject the notion that interdependence also denotes "mutual benefit". They contend, "An interdependent relationship may have such negative consequences that both parties would be quite happy to cease contact with one another". This, however and according to the author of this report, is a scenario not applicable to Southern Africa since the SADCC member states needed RSA in as much as the latter needed them in the face of biting sanctions.

[49] Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power : A Conceptual Analysis," in International Organization, vol. 34, no. 4, 1980, p.483.

kind of interdependence as a rather unpleasant " fact of life" to be endured and adjusted to rather than as a godsend to be celebrated.[50]

It is, however, important to warn against the simplistic definition of perceiving interdependent relationships as 'zero-sum' games, i.e. where one side's gain is the other side's loss. Rather, such relationships are variable-sum games, i.e. where many possible combinations of gains and losses for either side may occur. Some economists have used "dependence" to refer to contingent relations, precisely because what the actual distributional effects will be in any one interdependent relationship, is contingent upon the precise nature of such a relationship, and ultimately a matter of concrete empirical investigation.[51]

Mutual dependence is relative, though, in that interdependence does not in the least imply evenly balanced mutual dependence. The imbalances in the relationship between two power blocs like the RSA and SADCC member states is called asymmetry. Asymmetries in dependence influence actors in their dealings with one another. Asymmetries can be anything ranging from relative economic stability to unequal exchange or interactions in terms of magnitudes. Economic linkages tied the independent states of southern Africa and the RSA together. On the one hand, the RSA possessed the largest and best trained population, the most developed infrastructure and industrial plant in the region, and a highly efficient transportation system that served the entire region.[52] On the other hand, the SADCC member states were plagued by overvalued exchange rates, ineffective production, physical resources, human resources, internal class forces and political constellations which put the member states in an inferior interdependence relationships to the Republic. These factors together weaken the actors' (SADCC member states) costs as imposed by external events (RSA). This is the vulnerability dimension of interdependence.

The other dimension of the concept of interdependence is the sensitivity which, according to Keohane and Nye, "involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great

[50] Ibid. p.484.
[51] A. Tostensen : Dependence and Collective Self-reliance in southern Africa : The case of SADCC, p.16.
[52] E.J. Keller and L.A. Picard (eds): South Africa in Southern Africa. Domestic Change and International Conflict, p.203

are the cost effects. Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies. Sensitivity assumes that the framework remains unchanged."[53]

In his classic 'underdog' analogy, Karl Deutsch noted that where the players have unequal capacity, as had been the case in southern Africa between SADCC member states and the Republic, the weaker party (in this case the SADCC member states) or the "underdog" will adopt a compliant behaviour to avoid substantial and immediate losses.[54] He notes further that the 'underdog' may engage in apparently risky and irrational behaviour that entails great costs for themselves, but extract real price from the stronger party or "top dog". Following this analogy, it is clear that many of the SADCC member states were forced to capitulate to the dictates of the RSA on the barring guerrillas of the liberation movements of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) from their territories. The same states escalated their risky calls for the mandatory sanctions against the Republic, but they also intensified their economic interaction with the South African government because of, amongst others, deficiencies of their own economies.

From the above conceptual discussion, it is clear that both the independent states of southern Africa and the RSA were dependent on each other, albeit for different reasons and on a different scale, in the sense that the opportunity costs of breaking the relationship were high. This reciprocal dependency constrained each party's behaviour with respect to the other. However, the costs of severing those existing relations were lower for the relatively self-sufficient RSA than for the SADCC member states. The costs of breaking off trade with the Republic was made so high for the weak economies of these states, because of the destruction of alternative routes to the sea of the maritime member states of southern Africa.[55] The issue of power, as an influential component in the relationship, is very important.

[53] R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye: Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition, p.12
[54] E.J. Keller and L.A. Picard (eds): South Africa in Southern Africa. Domestic Change and International Conflict, p.157
[55] There is documentary evidence that the RSA had sponsored surrogate organizations in Angola and Mozambique to make it impossible for landlocked states to use these states as alternative routes to the sea. The issue is, however, not whether RSA was right or wrong in doing so. The fact of the matter is that because of destabilization of SADCC maritime states, landlocked ones were forced to continue using South African railway routes to import and export their goods.

The role of power in an interdependent relationship is also crucial to the further understanding of the fluid situation of southern Africa, yet it is a very elusive analytical concept. What does power mean?

Within the context of southern Africa, power means the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do and at an acceptable cost to the actor.[56] In southern Africa, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, it was the power resources that gave an actor, the RSA, a potential ability to gain control over the outcomes of events in the region, but also the ability to influence the pattern of outcomes.

Herbert A. Simon defined power in terms of an actual or postulated relationship between two or more actors, rather than as a property of the power wielder.[57] This definition presupposes that in a dependency relationship there is the existence of at least one other actor. It is a relative term, which, according to Baldwin, always refers to someone or another country or group of countries. According to him, when an individual is described as "dependent", it has to be qualified like "with respect to whom".[58] It is about who is trying to get whom to do what, by what means, where, when, how, at what cost, with what degree of success.[59] Lasswell and Kaplan argue that a power relation must include both scope and domain.[60] This is even more relevant in southern Africa. It implies that one actor in a relationship can be simultaneously strong and weak with respect to some scopes. Robert A. Dahl advises that any references to some states being dependent on others must clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to, otherwise it would be meaningless. When, for example, the SADCC member states were said to be dependent on the Republic, there will be a need to indicate in what respect, and to what matters. The same applies when a claim is made about the Republic having been dependent on SADCC member states. Dahl states categorically: " Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. When one hears that A is highly influential, the proper question is: Influential over what actors with respect to what matters? The failure to insist on this simple question often

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56 R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye: Power and Interdependence, p.11
57 H.A. Simon: " Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power", in Journal of Politics, 15 November 1953, p.500.
58 D.A. Baldwin: " Interdependence and Power. A conceptual Analysis", in International Organization, p.496.
59 Ibid., pp.496-7
60 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

leads political observers astray."[61] Hence, this study will attempt to show how, to what extent, and on what commodities did SADCC, member states depe nd on the Republic.

Keohane and Nye further clarify the role of power in an interdependent relationship by making a distinction between two dimensions, namely, sensitivity and vulnerability. According to them, "Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework: how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the cost effects? Not merely the volume of flows measures it across borders but also by the costly effects of changes in transactions on the societies or governments. Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies. Sensitivity assumes that the framework remains unchanged. The fact that a set of policies remains constant may reflect the difficulty in formulating new policies within a short time, or it may reflect a commitment to a certain pattern of domestic and international rules. Sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as economic."[62]

A striking illustration of sensitivity interdependence could be found in South Africa's manipulation of the special links established with Rhodesia during the UDI period.[63] When Rhodesia became independent under the premiership of Mr. Robert Mugabe in 1980[64], the Republic took punitive steps to disrupt transport and cut back on trade and migrant labour concessions, and resultantly causing general disruption of the socio-economic fabric of life in that country.[65] Given the asymmetrical trade relationship between the RSA and these countries, the latter had limited means of retaliation in a desperate attempt to induce the RSA to annul its decision. The adverse effects of the RSA's actions hit the SADCC member states disproportionately harder.[66] The reciprocity

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[61] R.A. Dahl: Modern Political Analysis, 3rd edition, p.33.

[62] Ibid. , p.12.

[63] Amongst other historical linkages, Rhodesia used to send migrant labourers to South Africa and used South African routes to the sea.

[64] The Republic did not approve of the ascendancy of Mr Mugabe and his government to power because the latter was a steadfast opponent of South Africa's policies of racial discrimination, and had made his intentions of campaigning against very clear.

[65] In order to force Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia into political and diplomatic concessions, RSA imposed an unannounced but effective embargo on goods for the three countries. The purpose was mainly to create chaos particularly in the newly independent states of Zimbabwe.

[66] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, pp.187-188.

in the above example lies in the fact that South Africa also earned, through this action, international apprehension leading to the intensification of calls for comprehensive sanctions against the Republic. Economically, the Republic also incurred costs like loss of export revenues and surplus of maize as these states represented South Africa's export market. A proportionately larger share of the losses fell on these countries.

Some of the most important political aspects of mutual dependence may be seen through the application of the concept of vulnerability. This dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors have. According to Keohane and Nye, "Vulnerability interdependence includes the strategic dimension that sensitivity interdependence omits, but this does not mean that sensitivity is politically unimportant. Rapidly rising sensitivity often leads to complaints about interdependence and political efforts to alter it, particularly in countries with pluralistic political systems. Although patterns of sensitivity may explain where the shoe pinches or the wheel squeaks, coherent policy must be based on analysis of actual and potential vulnerabilities."[67]

SADCC and the RSA had both suffered from the economic slump of the mid-1980s.[68] While they may all theoretically seem equally sensitive to economic decline, the RSA had the option to switch to its internal sources at moderate cost, while SADCC would have no such alternatives because of being under-resourced. Thus, SADCC member states would be more vulnerable than the RSA. While the South African government could circumvent sanctions through its western allies (like the USA), SADCC member states did not have such alternatives because of their inability to access harbours other than the South African ones. Vulnerability is an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events after policies have been altered. Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to changed environment over a period.[69] It focuses on the actors, which are "the definers of the ceteris paribus clause or those who can set the rules of the game".[70]

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[67] R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye : Power and Inter-dependence : World Politics in Transition , pp.15-16.
[68] SADCC member states had weak economies resulting from economic ruins resulting from destabilization, drought and so on, while the RSA was faced with the real threat of economic sanctions and internal political instability which accelerated economic decline.
[69] R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye: Power and Inter-dependence: World Politics in Transition, p. 13.
[70] Ibid, p.15.

Vulnerability is more relevant to the analysis of trade relations in southern Africa than sensitivity in analysing the relationships in southern Africa. This is due to many reasons. First, all too often a high percentage of SADCC imports came from the RSA. This is an index of vulnerability. Second, this dimension applies to socio-political and economic relationships. Third, the vulnerability of the independent states of southern Africa depended on their abilities to adjust their national policies to (withstand) deal with their giant neighbour, the RSA, and be able to reduce their dependence on it. Fourth, when South Africa reacted violently to SADCC member states' call for economic sanctions against it, they (SADCC member states) could not react accordingly. Fifth, the SADCC member states tended to be sensitive to the availability of surplus South African stocks, since its absence could lead to domestic internal political and economic instability. Sixth, the vulnerability asymmetries, however, ran strongly in favour of the RSA, since its alternatives to selling grain to SADCC were more attractive than the basic SADCC alternative to buying from the RSA. Lastly, trade could and was used as a tool in political bargaining with SADCC.

Lastly, it is important to note that in analysing interdependent relationships one needs to bear in mind that even the more powerful state, like the RSA, may be less dependent in aggregate terms, and yet be more fragmented internally and its coherence reduced by conflicts of interest and political difficulties within its own government. No wonder that despite its apparent military and economic strength, the Republic was weakened by its own internal problems of dissent in its black population which agitated for majority rule in South Africa.

5. Trade Relations and Dependencies in southern Africa, 1979-1989

Regional cooperation and integration have both politically and economically been key elements of southern African history in the 20th century. The Southern African Customs Union, SACU, was established in 1910 and had its roots even further back, as will be explained later in this chapter. The Central African Federation between the now Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe was established in the 1950s and abandoned in 1963. Tanzania was part of the seemingly promising but in the end not workable East African Community between 1967-77. In 1979, South Africa attempted in vain to weave the southern African nations into a formal net of economic cooperation and non-aggression pacts by launching the Constellation of southern African States (CONSAS).

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is different from the above in many respects. One critical way in which it differed from the rest is the fact that it was aimed at promoting intra-SADCC trade, to the exclusion of the Republic of South Africa. This chapter will show to what extent it succeeded or failed to undermine the Republic's economic influence in the southern African region.

One of the most influential factors, which compounded trade relations between SADCC member states on the one side and the Republic on the other, has been the interconnectedness of economies of both groups. Migrant workers from Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi and Rhodesia were crucial to mining companies and farming in the Republic.

Still operating within the context of the conceptual framework of the previous chapter, this chapter will attempt to measure the level of dependence and interdependence between the RSA and SADCC member states by analysing data on the trade patterns. An attempt will be made to analyse the varying degrees of vulnerability of these countries in their relationship to the Republic. The SADCC member states can be categorized into three groups according to their relations to the Republic. The first group could be termed as the totally encapsulated, which would include Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS countries). The economies of the above countries were almost integrated into that of the Republic. The second could be termed the moderately encapsulated, which include Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These states' economies were relatively integrated into that of the Republic, both directly and indirectly. The third and last category was the non-encapsulated, which embraced Angola and Tanzania.[71] The distinction made among these states should not be misconstrued to mean that the moderately encapsulated or non-encapsulated were in any very economically less dependent on the Republic. Far from it. Due mainly to the approach adopted by this study, the strengths of these states are analysed within the context of SADCC's strategy for regional cooperation and development. Within this understanding, it thus justifies to conclude that the regional economic and political turmoil of the 1980s prevented the moderately encapsulated and non-encapsulated nations from developing their own strengths.[72] Some of the countries in the latter categories were targeted for military destabilization precisely because they had no common borders and virtually no economic links with the Republic.[73] Their statuses as moderately- or non-encapsulated countries have, therefore, been undermined by those aggressive actions of their neighbour, South Africa. In creating SADCC, the nine independent regional nations rejected South Africa's idea of regional cooperation via a Constellation of southern African States (CONSAS).

CONSAS was part of South Africa's "total strategy" which was aimed at creating a network of economic, political and security relationships. South Africa hoped to persuade neighbouring states that it was in their interest to cooperate with the South African government. According to the plan of the South African Premier of the time, Mr P.W. Botha, CONSAS was designed to include white South Africa, the ten South African Bantustans and the independent nations of southern Africa. The establishment of SADCC in 1980 dealt a devastating blow to the CONSAS idea, and since then South Africa resorted to different strategies, including economic incentives and destabilisation, in an effort to force her weaker neighbours to discontinue their activities against her. The extent and various phases of South Africa's regional destabilization will not be detailed here. Nevertheless, the study will show how Angola and Mozambique were particularly singled out for destabilization.

[71] M.C. Lee: SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa, p.184.
[72] Some of these states, like Angola and Mozambique, have been singled out for intensified destabilization measures. Angola in particular, experienced conventional military occupation over along period and on a larger scale than anywhere else in the region. See also J. Hanlon's Beggar your neighbour. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, pp.188-189.
[73] P. Johnson and D. Martin: Apartheid Terrorism. The Destabilization Report, p.122.

The overwhelming majority of the interactions between South Africa and SADCC nations were characterized by extreme asymmetries, which in general terms meant that the SADCC member states were more dependent on the RSA than vice versa. It should not be forgotten that there were a considerable element of reciprocity involved, i.e. that the relationships were to some extent interdependencies. The reciprocity element of the relationships, particularly South Africa's relative dependence on the SADCC countries,[74] is an object of this study. Of even more importance would be the quantification of the successes or failures of SADCC countries' efforts to reduce economic dependence on the Republic. – however negligible that might be.[75]

5.1. Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

The Southern African Customs Union between the RSA and the encapsulated states of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (also called the BLS countries) was formed in 1910 and formalized in 1969. The countries in this category are landlocked, and were neglected by Britain during their colonial history. Following their integratedness into the South African economy, they have been dubbed by some historians as "South Africa's economic hostages".[76]

Although the progress of the High Commission Territories towards self-government and international sovereignty was significant in that it marked the end of South African demands for their incorporation, it was widely speculated after independence of the three states that the South African government would try to encapsulate them. The South African government seemed determined to implement, even if indirectly, its original plan of seeking to incorporate these states into a South African territory in terms of which the 'homelands' of South Africa would be joined to the three states – an arrangement which

[74] South Africa's relative dependence on SADCC member states is a subject that was neglected by many writers, and it is an object of this study.

[75] Many writers, because of their biased approach to this topic, always neglected any progress made by SADCC member states towards reducing economic dependence on the Republic. This bias could be attributed to the dominance of the simplistic dependency school in development thinking, which started from the premise that the RSA was the departure point for any analysis of its relations with its black independent states of southern Africa.

[76] "South Africa or SADCC, not both", in The Economist, January 22, 1983, p.60.

would have benefited its policy of separate development. These would also go a long way towards solving what South Africa termed the 'native problem' in South Africa.[77]

The SACU Treaty contained two provisions, which operated to the benefit of the BLS states. Firstly, the customs revenue payable to these smaller states was increased by 42 percent, a coefficient declared by the RSA to be "development aid" which was designed as compensation for renouncing a national customs policy and was transferred from the South African budget. Secondly, there existed an infant-industry clause, but this had not yet contributed anything towards establishing an industrial base in the BLS countries except for the construction of a brewery in Botswana. However, South African industry had managed to ensure that such investments were prevented. South Africa, for example, imposed high import duties on those items that she produced. In order to protect its textile industry, made-up clothing had an average tariff of 30 percent, with the unique exception of suits and overalls used by overhead transmission linesmen. Often a government would impose a protective tariff when a firm wished to begin production of a new product. The ripple effect of protective tariffs is that they raised the prices of goods for the SACU member states, and sometimes lowered the quality as well.[78] The South African military, for example, persuaded their government to manufacture vehicle diesel engines which vehicle makers must use despite their being of a poor quality and one-third more expensive than imported ones.[79]

The significance of the above lies in the fact that South Africa dictated the terms of the SACU union. It did not only set the rates of duties, but even the kinds of duty. The Republic, for instance, initially had a selective sales duty on luxury goods. In 1978, it replaced this with a general sales tax (GST), and the BLS countries could not do anything about it despite their dislike of the move. Similarly, in 1977 South Africa imposed a 15 percent import surcharge on all imports because of its balance of payments deficit. Naturally, this was imposed to discourage imports from the BLS countries by making them more expensive. They cut it to 12,5 percent, again to 7 percent, later abolished them, only to be re-imposed again in 1982 at 10 percent. It was abolished again in 1983, and imposed yet again in 1985. In all these instances the BLS countries were not consulted, and could not do anything about it.[80]

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[77] S.C. Nolutshungu: South in Africa, p.130; also see J. Hanlon's Beggar your neighbour…pp.81-82.

[78] J. Matthews : "South Africa's Trade Relations" in International Affairs Bulletin, (2a), vol. 4, 1980, p.95.

[79] See J. Hanlon's Beggar your neighbour…,pp.81-82.

[80] Ibid.

The customs union required from members the imposition of an external tariff, but allowed the free flow of goods internationally without any tariff hindrance.[81] Under the same agreement, Botswana received a fixed share of 0.28 percent, Lesotho 0.89 percent, Swaziland 0.15 per cent and South Africa 98.7 per cent of total customs revenue collected.[82] From the above distribution, it becomes clear that the customs union was never intended to benefit the BLS states; rather was it intended to link the then British protectorates to the newly formed Union of South Africa. When the High Commission Territories became self-governing, their political leaders hoped, in vain, that the terms of the 1910 agreement would be reviewed to take account of the new circumstances. This was, however, not to be, as South Africa expressed unwillingness to enter into negotiations to change what appeared to be a lion's share for South Africa.[83]

It was only in 1969 that the South African government relented to the request by the BLS countries to renegotiate the 1910 agreement, hence it was drawn up under different operational assumptions. In terms of the new agreement, each of the SACU members would obtain a share of the total revenue, which was proportional to its share of the value of total dutiable production consumed, and of the imports in that year.[84] To compensate for the possible losses to the smaller states, the latter's allotment were adjusted by a factor of 1.42 which translated into an extra 42 per cent for the BLS states, and which effectively came out of South Africa's share. The revenue of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was then calculated according to the following formula[85]

$$R = \frac{i + p}{I + P}(C + E + S) \times 1.42$$

Where

R = revenue received by Botswana, or Lesotho, or Swaziland

i = total value cost insurance freight (c.i.f.). at border of all imports into Botswana, or Lesotho, or Swaziland, inclusive of customs, excise and sales duties;

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[81] Ibid. , p.83.

[82] A. Tostensen: Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa. The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), p.30.

[83] S.C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa, pp.130-131.

[84] Ibid, pp.131 -132.

[85], P.M Landell-Mills: "The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement", in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 1971, pp.263-281.

I = total value cost insurance freight (c.i.f.). at border of all imports into the customs area, inclusive of customs and sales duties;

p = total value of dutiable goods produced and consumed in Botswana, or Lesotho, or Swaziland, inclusive of duties

P = total value of goods produced and consumed in the customs area, inclusive of duties;

C =total collection of customs duties within the customs area;

E = total collection of excise duties within the customs area;

S = total collection of sales duties within the customs area

By a formula the smaller territories received R17, 000,000 in 1969-70 compared to the R6, 430,000 they would have received under the old agreement.[86] This agreement of 1969 was a true reflection of the inequalities within SACU in that it gave South Africa greater economic advantage over its partners, which also reflected their great economic disparity. A union was subordinated to the overriding interest of the South African economy. As B. Turner correctly pointed out, under this agreement '...South Africa could continue its phenomenal growth without the Customs Union (although not without BLS migratory labour), but BLS would be hard pressed to go it alone'.[87] This is precisely because their trade with the Republic of South Africa accounted for about half the total of the latter's exports to the rest of Africa.[88]

The three states' weak bargaining power with South Africa arose from their poverty, geographic location,[89] and the orientation over the years of their economies towards South Africa. It was these vulnerabilities which made them, both individually and collectively, totally non-viable in their potential conflict with South Africa, or their viability was conditional upon South Africa's willingness or unwillingness to eliminate them as parties to the potential conflict.[90]

[86] P.M. Landell-Mills : "The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement", in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 1971, p.276.

[87] He has been quoted from S.C Nolutshungu's South Africa in Africa, p.135.

[88] Michael Chester: "South Africa is inextricably bound to sub-continent", in The Star, 11 October 1988.

[89] Lesotho is wholly landlocked within South Africa; Botswana was surrounded by South Africa, South West Africa (which was controlled by South Africa), and the white-ruled Rhodesia.

[90] S. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa, pp.135-136.

Due to all the factors mentioned above, each state affirmed their desire to cooperate and to maintain friendly relations with South Africa upon obtaining independence. They accepted, both individually and collectively, the fact that they would have to play a very minor role in the Pan-African campaign of coercing South Africa to abandon apartheid through policies of isolation, boycotts, and even violence. Despite all these realities and understandings, the three nations did join, much to the surprise of the world, the economically antagonistic Southern African Development Coordination Conference in 1980, and they were full members of the anti-South African Organization of African Unity (OAU). This confirms their unwavering opposition to South Africa's domestic policies despite their economic vulnerability. This was because there were equally important areas in which their freedom of action could be asserted without severe retaliation from South Africa. Such areas included the arena of domestic policies both political and economic, their external policies towards countries other than the Republic, as well as the acceptance and treatment of refugees (and not freedom fighters)- whether they were from South Africa or elsewhere. More often than not, except in extreme circumstances whereby South Africa felt its security was at stake, South Africa was restrained from interfering in the affairs of these states as it had continually affirmed its adhesion to the principle of 'non-interference' and could not, in the light of accusations that apartheid was a threat to world peace, afford to be seen openly violating the independence of these States.[91]

The one remarkable and indisputable result of the customs union was the firm integration of the BLS trade into the South African economy. The interwovenness of these economies involved transport links, electricity grids, trade relations, labour integration, investment flows, and the already mentioned memberships of the Southern African Customs Union. Let us now look at the extent of South Africa's trade relations with each of these states. Approximately R1, 8 billion or about 10 percent of South Africa's 1983 exports were sold to 47 African countries (including the BLS states), while the country imported around R4 million or 2,5 per cent of the its (South African) imports from Africa. The bulk of this trade was nevertheless with

[91] South Africa had used the 'principle of 'non-interference' to ward off international condemnation of Apartheid. Thus, she wouldn't want to be accused of herself interfering in the affairs of the three States. The BLS countries used this opportunity to formulate and pronounce unfriendly policies against South Africa, and to belong to organizations, which were by their nature antagonistic to South Africa's internal policies.

countries in the southern African region. With the sole exception of Tanzania and Angola, all SADCC member states traded with South Africa. South Africa's main exports were foodstuffs, machinery, chemical products, fuel, building materials and medical supplies.[92] Each of the three states – Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, had a gross national product (GNP) of less than US$1,000 million.

[92] The Star : South Africa is inextricably bound to sub-continent, 11 October 1988, p.9.

5.1.1. Botswana

As a member of SACU, Botswana's imports increased from slightly more than 75 percent of the total imports in 1974 to close to 88 percent in 1979, whereas the trend for exports had been the reverse.[93] About ninety five percent of Botswana's exports travelled either to or through South Africa by rail.[94] A 1988 Canadian study had found that Botswana relied on South Africa for no less than eighty percent of all its imports. These imports include food, oil, spare parts, motor vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods.[95] Lesotho's share amounted to ninety five percent, Malawi thirty nine percent, Mozambique twelve percent, Swaziland ninety percent, Zambia fifteen percent, and Zimbabwe twenty percent.[96]

In an effort to disengage from South Africa's road network, the government of Botswana announced, at the 1988 Annual SADCC Summit in Maputo during July of that year, a pledge of $3.5 million to Zimbabwe for the rehabilitation of the Limpopo railway line. A portion of this railway was running along Botswana's borders. This was the first such investment made by one SADCC country in another.[97] This move was significant and historic since it served a precedent for greater self-reliance among the member states. However, the persistent destabilization of Zimbabwe made it difficult for the two countries to sustain the initiative.

Between 1984 and 1985 Botswana imported 29 per cent of its electricity from South Africa. This figure increased to 37 per cent in 1986.[98] Yet, this figure was relatively lower when compared with other BLS countries' dependence on South African electricity in the same period. Lesotho, for example, was entirely dependent on South Africa for all her essential supplies. In fact, she obtained hundred percent of her electricity demand from South Africa.[99]

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[93] A. Tostensen : Dependence and collective self-reliance in southern Africa : The case of SADCC ,p.32.

[94] M.C. Lee : SADCC : The political economy of development in southern Africa, p.206.

[95] World Bank Annual Report 1987, p.75.

[96] The Star, 11 October 1988.

[97] "SADCC Ponders its Economic Nightmare", in Weekly Mail (SA), July 22, 1988, p.207

[98] Africa Research Bulletin, ETF Series (London), August 31, 1986.

[99] D. Singh : South Africa and Frontline States : A Study in Dependence and Destabilization, p.57.

In respect of exports, the trade of the BLS countries was more diversified. However, Lesotho and Swaziland marketed over one-third of their exports in South Africa.[100]
South Africa employed many strategies to foster the dependence of the BLS countries, and indeed all SADCC member states. One such important strategy was by forcing them to use South African railway for their exports and imports. There were, in fact, six outlets to the sea available to SADCC member states. The most important of them all was the outlet connecting the Zimbabwean capital of Harare with Mozambique's Indian Ocean Port of Beira. It is an outlet, which came to be known as the Beira Corridor, which was largely operative because of the thousands of Zimbabwean troops guarding it. More information will be given on this aspect later in this chapter. The second outlet was the Tarzara railway, which ran from Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam. This was also operative in the early 1980s, but later deteriorated badly because of a combination of factors. The one was poor maintenance by the host country, and the other was destabilization by South African and South African-backed rebel movements of Renamo and Unita of Mozambique and Angola, respectively. [101] The other four outlets were inoperative because of similar reasons, namely the frequent acts of sabotage by the South Africa-backed mercenaries. The most important of those outlets were the 1200-mile railway line running from the border of Zaire to Angola's port of Benguela. It was kept close between 1979 and 1986. [102] The other three closed routes all ran through Mozambique's port of Nacala.

The unceremonious closure of these routes impacted negatively on SADCC's vision of reducing trade and economic dependence on the Republic. As for Botswana, 80 per cent of her important imports came from South Africa while all of her beef[103] was exported through South Africa.[104] This link was used to put pressure on the government of Botswana. When Botswana made anti-South African statements in world forums like the United Nations (UN) and Organization of African Unity(OAU), the Republic would react by stopping refrigerator wagons to the abattoir for a few days, and that would disrupt economic life in Botswana. There have been fuel shortages in Botswana because of

[100] Africa Economic Research (London) April 1986, Special Report on Zimbabwe.
[101] See Ronald Dreyer's account of the costs of the destabilization of Angola and Mozambique in his 'Namibia and Angola. The Search for Independence and Regional Security, 1966-1988, p.37. Also see D. Singh: South Africa and Front-Line States: a Study in Dependence and Destabilization, p.60.
[102] D. Singh : "South Africa and Front-Line States : A Study in Dependence and Destabilization," Africa Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 1985, p.59.
[103] Note that beef is, and has always been, Botswana's second largest export, and Botswana was Africa's biggest beef exporter.
[104] M. Holman: "Counting the Cost of destabilization", in Financial Times, August 21, 1986.

shortages due to South Africa's disruption of oil deliveries, particularly in December 1980.[105]

In an attempt to respond to the threatening situation, Botswana built tanks to hold three months supply of oil products. Nevertheless, for more than a year South Africa refused to provide the fuel to fill them. The important fact is that in a situation where South Africa pressured Botswana with the view to extracting concessions, the former came out of the crisis least hurt than the latter. This is an indication of the sensitivity of the economy of Botswana in the reciprocal trade relationship it had with the Republic, and about 80 per cent of imports and exports of Lesotho and Swaziland passed through South Africa.[106]

Like with all anti-South African SADCC member states, Botswana's attempt at reducing its trade dependence on the Republic was met with threats of military attack to the extent that even the United States was deeply concerned about the increasing South African efforts to intimidate the government of Botswana.[107] When a raid was carried out in Botswana in May 1986, Dr. Chiepe, the Botswana Minister of External Affairs flew to New York to lodge a protest with the United Nations. The irony of it all is that he had to catch the flight to New York from Johannesburg.[108] This is an indication of the severity of the problem that this state, and many SADCC member states, faced in its efforts to pursue SADCC's ideals to the letter. Brian Egner, an economic consultant in Botswana remarked about the dilemma faced by his country : " we don't like them but we don't see any sense in infuriating them".[109] This statement essentially reflects the BLS countries' inability to do without the Republic despite their disquietness about the latter's domestic policies.

In an effort to respond to the intensification of sanctions, and to entrench Botswana's dependence on the Republic further, South Africa invested in the Sua Pan Project, which provided fifty two percent of the $450 million equity required. Through this project, Botswana proposed to produce soda ash (soda carbonate) from a huge salt lake at Sua Pan, in central Botswana. The main market would be South Africa, which was importing

[105] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours, p.220.
[106] Africa Economic Digest, December 20, 1986.
[107] W. Claiborne : " U.S. says South Africa threatened Botswana", in International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1987.
[108] S. Kraft: Botswana Survival on Razor's Edge, International Herald Tribune, 19 May 1986.
[109] D. Singh "South Africa and Front -Line States: A Study in Dependence and Destabilisation," in Africa Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 1985, p.61.

all its soda ash. Contrary to expectations, South Africa made use of the project to gain political concessions from Botswana. The Anglo-American chemical company, African Explosive and Chemical Industries(AECI), had a long-standing proposal to make synthetic soda ash at a very high cost. It would have made economic sense for South Africa to buy Botswana's soda ash, but every time this issue was up for discussion, she linked it to political issues such as the inclusion of South African 'homelands' into the Customs Union. Yet, she knew Botswana would have nothing to do with that question. The issue of inclusion of 'homelands' in regional organization was one of the main reasons for the failure of the Constellation of southern African States (CONSAS). Nevertheless, it made political sense for the Republic to continue seeking political acceptance of these 'homelands'. When it became clear that Botswana was adamant about having nothing to do with the 'homeland', South Africa insisted that she then signed an Nkomati-type non-aggression pact with South Africa. Botswana could not sign the pact either. Botswana could have sold its soda elsewhere, but 1980 was the time when South Africa was putting both economic and military pressure on Zimbabwe to prevent it from buying fuel elsewhere, and attacked fuel installations in Angola and Lesotho. Therefore, the Botswana government assumed that if Botswana sold or bought from somewhere, South Africa might blow up the loads.

Once the project ultimately took off and was completed, Botswana was compelled to supply South Africa with the 240, 000 tons of soda ash it needed each year for the manufacturing of glass. In this way, Botswana's dependence on the Republic was deepened. The Republic further increased Botswana's influence within the De Beers Botswana Diamond Company, which was the offspring of De Beers of South Africa. It was a creation of De Beers and owned by the Anglo-American Corporation and the Botswana government. [110]

The increase in uneasy trade relations between South Africa and Botswana caused some considerable tension in the southern African region. SADCC member states perceived the relationship as South Africa and Botswana's deliberate efforts to undermine their commitment to reducing economic dependence on the Republic. Zimbabwe reacted to this situation by announcing its intentions to suspend its Open General and Import Licences (OGIL) agreement with Botswana with effect from 31 March 1988. The reason

[110] Africa Economic Digest, 21 September 1984.

given was that Botswana was selling Zimbabwe certain goods that originated in South Africa, and the former would not tolerate that.[111]

As the London Financial Times commented, the Botswana 'economy is deeply integrated into the regional structures that are dominated, and usually administered by, South Africa. The businessmen in Botswana usually operate with an ear to their colleagues in Johannesburg.'[112]

5.1.2. Lesotho

Lesotho is the only country that is completely landlocked within the Southern African Customs Union. She was, therefore, compelled to use South Africa's transport network systems. The dilemma and predicament of the BLS countries in general and Lesotho in particular, was summed by Gerald P. Khojane, counsellor for the Permanent Mission of Lesotho to the United Nations:

" It is true that Lesotho is the most dependent of the SADCC members on South Africa. And it is true that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are members of SACU, which has certain objectives which one might say could conflict with those of SADCC …Where there are conflicting interests between SADCC and Customs Union, we would give preference to SADCC objectives. However, Lesotho would be realistic and will weigh the pros and cons of choosing SADCC objectives vis-à-vis the Customs Union."[113] These sentiments were corroborated by the words of the President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, who also defined the dilemma as follows: " It is difficult for us to be seen championing the cause of sanctions against South Africa when in fact it is going to hurt us before it hurts South Africa."[114] Indeed, Lesotho was and still is the most dependent of the SADCC members on the Republic.

The above extract shows the difficulties the BLS countries faced by belonging to SADCC while their economic lifeline rested with their linkages to the Republic. By 1988, the reality of the economic situations of particularly Lesotho and Swaziland made their withdrawal from SACU extremely difficult. A large percentage of their annual revenue came from the SACU revenue. In addition to being, members of SACU, Lesotho and Swaziland remained within the Rand Monetary Area. Thus, their currencies were tied to

[111] M.C. Lee: SADCC : The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa, p.219.
[112] Financial Times, 16 November 1983.
[113] Ibid, p.215.
[114] The Herald, 24 January 1983.

the South African Rand. In reality, they would not have a viable discretionary monetary policy. Lesotho received over ninety five percent of its total imports either from South Africa or from South African agents. Swaziland received over ninety percent. South Africa in turn, took forty percent of Lesotho's, twenty percent of Swaziland and fourteen percent of Botswana's exports.[115] Like the majority of SADCC member states, South Africa was the source of Lesotho's food supplies. It imported grain crops from the Republic, particularly maize. The BLS countries together imported 347 000 tons between 1980 and 1981.[116] By the same period, all nine SADCC member states, including Lesotho, imported 1,4 million tons of cereals from South Africa. For the duration of the period under discussion, Lesotho remained dependent on financial assistance for project development on South Africa. Lesotho imported hundred per cent of her oil and hundred per cent of her electricity from the Republic.[117]

The table below indicates the importance of South Africa as a trading partner to the nine SADCC member states. This table has not been copied verbatim; rather it has been conceptualised to reflect only the information related to trade between South Africa and SADCC member states.

Table 1: South Africa and SADCC states: Trade dependence, 1984.

Frontline (SADCC) States	Imports Originating in South Africa (% total imports)	Export marketed in South Africa (% of total exports)
Angola	-	-
Botswana	78	7
Lesotho	97	42
Malawi	40	7
Mozambique	12	-
Swaziland	90	37
Tanzania	-	-
Zambia	14	6
Zimbabwe	18	10

Source : D. Salingh : South Africa and Frontline States : A Case Study in Dependence and Destabilisation, in Africa Quarterly, vol. 1-2, 1985, p.56.

[115] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A Post – Nkomati Evaluation, p.61
[116] M. Lee : The Political Economy in Southern Africa, p.145.
[117] Ibid. , p.156

From the table above, it is clear that most of the SADCC member states, particularly the BLS states, were heavily dependent on South Africa for their imports though the routes of their exports were relatively diversified Ninety seven percent of Lesotho's imports originated in South Africa. Like in the case of Botswana, Lesotho's imports from South Africa consisted of "food, oil, spare parts, motor vehicles, machinery, and other manufactured goods".[118] Of all the independent states, and BLS countries, Lesotho was entirely dependent on South Africa for all her essential supplies. She received hundred per cent of her electricity supply from South Africa, far lower than Swaziland's sixty percent. Furthermore, hundred perce nt of its petroleum supplies were imported via South Africa.[119] Like Botswana, Lesotho marketed over one third of its exports in South Africa.

5.1.3. Swaziland

Swaziland was not substantially different from her SACU counterparts. Ideally, the majority of Swaziland's external trade could travel via the Port of Maputo. In fact, between 1981 and 1982 roughly sixty seven percent of its trade travelled through that route. SADCC projected that Swaziland would increase its use of the port of Maputo by fifty percent, and between 1983 and 1990 by another thirty three percent. Instead, by 1985 Swaziland's use of the port had dropped to thirty percent because of the destabilization of the line by South African – backed Renamo.[120]

Table 1 clearly indicated that Swaziland was largely a fragile economy. It was dependent on South Africa for its imports. Ninety percent of its imports originated in South Africa. In respect of its exports, she marketed over one-third of her exports in South Africa.[121]
It had a Gross National Product (GNP) of less than US$ 1,000 million.

[118] World Bank Annual Report, 1987, p.75.

[119] Ibid, p.75.

[120] Reportedly, the people of Swaziland have dubbed the road to Maputo a " hell run" and their authorities have warned that Swazi citizens using the road did so at their own risk. For more detailed account of the destabilization, see Pedro de Castro van Dunon's "SADCC countries have chosen to resist rather than give in to Pretoria" in SADCC Energy, vol. 1, Feb – Apr 1984, pp.189 – 191.

[121] D. Singh : "South Africa and Front-Line States: A Study in Dependence and Destabilization," in Africa Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 1985, p.57.

As a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand zone, Swaziland was heavily dependent on the Republic. Customs Union revenue accounted for two-thirds of the government budget.[122] Mainly South African businessmen owned big businesses like wholesales and retail stores. The ripple effect of this on the Swazi economy is that these businessmen tended to, quite naturally, prefer South African goods over the SADCC ones. South African companies like Kirsh Industries owned and operated the largest wholesaler, Metro Wholesalers, and the two largest shopping centres in Swaziland.[123] The largest supermarket in Swaziland, OK Bazaars, which was also a subsidiary of the South African Breweries (SAB) was controlled by Anglo American.[124]

Despite it being Africa's second largest sugar producer after South Africa, Swaziland could still not afford to avoid reliance on the Republic even on this front. All three of Swaziland's large sugar estates were owned or managed by British firms like Lornho, Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and Tate & Lyle. Lonrho used South African government export credits for its expansion.[125] The biggest and second biggest plantations in Swaziland, Usuthu and Shiselweni, were both owned by CDC and Courtaulds. Mondi, also a South African company owned Peak Timbers which was the second largest Timber Company in Swaziland. Another South African corporation, Barlow Rand bought the fourth biggest Swaziland Plantations in 1984, while the CDC and a Danish firm co-owned the citrus plantations.[126] At the same time the only Swazi brewer of beer was owned by the South African Breweries, which also bought the main soft drinks bottler in 1984.[127] Ownership was one issue, and monopoly of industries was another. Most of the South African companies, like the SAB, monopolised business in Swaziland. All Swazi citrus, for example, was marketed through the South African Cooperative Citrus Exchange.[128] Similarly, cotton prices were set by South Africa.[129]

The Republic, in evading and minimising the impact of sanctions, has also used Swaziland. South African companies based in Swaziland could export goods to foreign countries, including South Africa. The South African owned Swazi Pine exported

[122] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours..,p.98.

[123] Ibid, p.98.

[124] Business in Swaziland, Mbabane, March 1984.

[125] South African Digest, Pretoria, 14 May 1984

[126] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbour's…pp. 98-99.

[127] Ibid, pp.98-99.

[128] Times of Swaziland, Mbabane, 1 June 1983

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furniture with Swazi wood to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and South Africa.[130]

Like many SADCC member states, Swaziland had stated its commitment to the success of SADCC's vision against the Republic. In February 1982 the Prime Minister's office issued an 'Economic Review', which stated: 'There is a declared policy by the Government of Swaziland to reduce dependence on the Republic of South Africa.'[131] In an effort to translate this policy into practice, two major projects were established. First, a hydro-electricity generating station was built at Emalangeni (E40 million) to avoid buying from South Africa.[132] It doubled Swaziland's capacity to generate its own electricity. However, this Swazi generated electricity was more expensive than buying from South Africa. This very reality constitutes one of the key reasons why SADCC member states could not completely exclude the Republic as their main trade partner. Due to her determination to reduce her dependence on the Republic, Swaziland soldiered on with the project despite its unsustainability. The government of Swaziland arranged funding from West Germany, the African Development Bank(ADB), and other international agencies to make up for the shortfall emanating from the project. Nevertheless, it remained unrealistic that a project of that magnitude could survive purely on foreign funding.

Table 2: Customs Union Revenue as percentage of total government revenue, 1981-1987.

	1981-82	**1982-83**	**1983-84**	**1984-85**	**1985-86**	**1986-87**
Botswana	36.9	33.0	30.5 22.1	_	_	
Lesotho	63.7	56.9	64.7	69.7	_	50.70
Swaziland	48.3	66.6	67.1	63.7	50	Over 50

Source: M.Lee: SADCC: The Political Economy of Development, p.216.

[130] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours..,p.100.
[131] Economic Review, 1978-81, Prime Minister's Office, Mbabane, February 1982.
[132] 40 million Emalangeni are equal to R40 million.

In conclusion, the reality of the economic situation in the BLS countries made withdrawal from the SACU union difficult to contemplate. As Table 2 largely indicates, a substantial percentage of their annual revenue came from the SACU revenue-sharing formula. Their participation in the SADCC industrial sector was problematic because of their SACU relationship to South Africa.

5.2. Mozambique

Colonial Mozambique's trade relationship with the Republic was conducted through Portugal as the colonial metropolis. The two countries, Portugal and Mozambique, had a close cooperative relationship with its southern counterpart, South Africa. Due to that close relationship, a railway line was built and opened between Lorenzo Marques (now Maputo) to the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek in 1895. It carried half of the Transvaal's imports and exports. A line from Beira to Rhodesia opened in 1897, and a line from Beira to Malawi in 1922. By 1973, Mozambique handled one-fifth of South African, two-thirds of Rhodesian, half of Swazi, and all of Malawian imports. Maputo was the largest port in southern Africa, handling more cargo than any port in South Africa.[133] This shows that Mozambique's colonial economy was entwined with that of South Africa. When the South African government realized that Frelimo was going to win elections in Mozambique, it moved the cargo away. When FRELIMO rose to power under the presidency of Mr. Samora Machel in 1975, it attempted to reduce its economic dependence on the Republic. President Machel slowly and gradually attempted to lessen the country's dependence on trade with the Republic. South Africa developed and modernised the ports at Richards Bay and Durban to take traffic that would once have gone through Mozambique.

With the withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique in 1975, South Africa replaced Portugal to become Mozambique's main supplier. Basic foodstuffs, oil spare parts; motor vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods were imported from South Africa.[134] Other technical services were also ordered from South Africa, as it was only a telephone away. South Africa remained a major source of supply.

A South African electricity company, Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), received a maximum of 8 percent of its supplies from Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique.[135] In 1983, the governments of South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal signed an agreement in Cape Town for the supply of electricity by Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa[136] to ESCOM. The agreement was worth R100 million annually, and

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[133] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour ...,pp.131-132.
[134] World Bank Annual Report 1987, p.75.
[135] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A post-Nkomati Evaluation, p.74.
[136] This was a joint Portuguese-Mozambican Company controlling the dam.

offered the cheapest power available to South Africa. The significance of this agreement lies in the fact that it increased inter-dependence between South Africa and Mozambique. By 1986, Mozambique received sixty percent of her electricity requirements from South Africa. Of equal importance is the fact that by 1979 Mozambique supplied, through its Cahora Bassa dam, ten percent of South Africa's entire electricity demand.[137]

The value in absolute terms of imports from South Africa grew from US$ 50 million to US$ 94 million in 1973 and 1974 respectively, but plummeted in 1975 to US& 74 million and further to US$ 54 million US$ and US$ 55 million in the following three years. This dramatic decline was attributed to President Machel's deliberate efforts to reduce his country's economic dependence on South Africa.

As can be seen from Table 1 above, Mozambique did not have any of its exports marketed in South Africa. From 1979 until 1989, there were no laws or policies in place banning formal trade with South Africa. Nevertheless, the most influential factor, which helped to perpetuate trade with the Republic, was the colonial precedent whereby South Africa was the main supplier of goods and services.

[137] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours .p.133.

5.3. Malawi

Malawi was the only SADCC member state, which was never ashamed of its commercial and diplomatic links with white-ruled South Africa. She was the only SADCC member state to host a fully-fledged South African embassy. South African food giant, Score, had a minority holding in People's Trading Centre, which owned Kwiksave, in Malawi.

Soon after independence in 1964, President Kamuzu Banda broke with the fledgling Organization of African Unity (OAU) by advocating a policy of " contact and dialogue" with South Africa. This was followed by a trade agreement between the two states, which provided for greater market access for Malawian exports. South Africa was Malawi's largest source of imports, accounting for 35 percent of the total in 1987.[138] Fuel, fertilizers, chemicals and machinery constituted the bulk of South African imports, which in 1987 totalled about R280 million. Exports from Malawi were mainly tea, tobacco and other primary commodities, and they amounted to about R78 million. South African subsidies to Malawi had made it cheaper for Malawi to import than to grow and mill wheat at home. During the period under review, Malawi was almost totally dependent on South African transport routes. More than 80 percent of trade between Malawi and South Africa went via road and rail to and from Durban. Just like Botswana, this close relationship with Pretoria made other SADCC member states uncomfortable, but Malawian officials and traders took a pragmatic view. They argued that it made economic sense to import from and export to South Africa because " South Africa is close – it's quicker, cheaper and usually more efficient"[139] Because of this attitude, Malawi was labelled "the collaborator" by other SADCC member states, particularly because she also had diplomatic ties with the Republic.

President Banda of Malawi has been able to get from South Africa what he could not get anywhere. When he wanted to build a new capital in the centre of the country at Lilongwe, and build a new railway to connect with the line in Mozambique going to the port of Nacala, he went to Britain and other foreign donors, in vain. When he turned to South Africa, he was given a R11 million soft loan for the railway, and a R14 million soft loan for the new capital. The Republic further provided senior advisory staff to help with design of the new envisioned capital. South Africa clinched a huge part of the prestige

[138] The Star, 4 July 1989. According to Daleen Singh, South Africa accounted for forty percent of Malawian imports. See Table 1.
[139] The Star, 4 July 1989.

not because of the amount it loaned to Malawi, but for the fact that she was there when no one else was. For instance, this loan amounted to only 10 percent of the total cost of the project.[140] Further to this, South African architects were awarded prestigious projects in Malawi, including the Kamuzu Academy and the new Reserve Bank.[141]

Apart from all these linkages, Malawian middle class workers did their shopping in South Africa. Malawi's attempts to delink from the Republic in favour of pursuing trade with SADCC member states invoked the Republic's anger to the extent that the latter instituted attacks against her. From voluntary dependence of the 1970s, Malawi was forced to depend on the Republic economically.[142]

5.4. Angola: No trading links

Angola has had no trade links at all with South Africa since independence. Before the independence of Angola, there were trade relations with the Republic, that accounted for 5,8 percent of total imports before 1980. Exports for the same year came to no more than 1,1 percent of total exports.[143] After independence all trade relations were cut. The independence of Angola, and the civil war that followed, hardened attitudes on both sides, which made cooperation between them almost impossible during the period under discussion. The circumstances, which aggravated this situation, will be dealt with in this subsection.

Angola was the single southern African state, which was ever to experience South African military invasion of a conventional nature. The invasion took a long period, and happened on a larger scale than anywhere else in the region. The Republic received external political and material support for its Angolan proxy forces, particularly from Washington. All this happened despite the fact that Angola had no common border and virtually no economic links with South Africa.

Undoubtedly, Angola was a threat to South Africa. It had a considerable mineral and potentially rich economy. If allowed to succeed, she would have become a major supplier of fuel to SADCC member states, which relied on South Africa as their supplier. With economic sanctions beginning to hurt South Africa in the mid-1980s, South Africa

[140] Daily Times, Blantyre, 5 December 1980.
[141] Ibid.
[142] This is the one aspect, which will not be discussed in this study since it involved destabilization.
[143] A. Tostensen: " Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa", Research Report No 62, p.43.

could not afford to lose the southern African market to Angola. Since the economic blockades could not be applied against this country, armed force remained the only weapon against Angola.[144] As a maritime state, Angola served Zambia and Zaire through the copper-carrying Benguela railway line. An operational Benguela would greatly reduce Zambian and Zairian reliance on South African transport systems and ports for copper exports.[145] This would serve the interests of SADCC well.

Angola rendered political and other support to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). The South African military interventions into Angola well before 1978 had made the MPLA government to perceive South Africa as "the enemy". Thus, Luanda was prepared to risk granting overt military assistance to both the ANC and SWAPO. Military training camps were provided for these organisations. In doing that, Luanda felt 'politically, morally and ideologically obliged – whatever the consequences'.[146] The consequences were phenomenal. Angola was and still is Marxist-ruled and committed to socialist transformation, which would have posed a direct ideological challenge and a potential alternative to South Africa's apartheid.

Without delving much into the subject of destabilisation, it is important to note that South Africa's military intervention in one of the SADCC member states as shown above, had a lot to do with the preservation of its economic superiority over the rest of the independent states of southern Africa. The biggest operation was " Operation Protea" in which the South African Defence Force (SADF) troops occupied all the main towns in Cunene for several weeks. In 1982, Angola's only iron mine at Kassinga was attacked, and a series of raids were conducted at Lobito oil terminal, Luanda oil refinery, and Cabinda oil pipeline. Infrastructure and installations were destroyed. The destruction and damages were inflicted on factories, schools, hospitals, bridges, roads and industrial plants. The South African backed UNITA forces carried out some attacks while the South African Defence Force itself carried others out.[147] The significance of the attacks lies in the targets thereof. They were strategic and devastating.

144 P. Johnson and D. Martin: Apartheid Terrorism. The Destabilization Report, p.159.
145 K. Pottinger: " Destabilisation or Propaganda. The great Frontline debate" in Political Indicator, vol. 1, No. 1, 1983, p.19.
146 J. Marcum : "Regional Security in Southern Africa – Angola" in Survival, vol. XXX, No. 1, 1988, pp.4-5.
147 Ibid, pp. 4-5.

One of the most important outlets for SADCC was the 1200-mile railway line running from the border of Zaire to Angola's port of Benguela. It was kept closed for ten years, thus forcing the SADCC landlocked states of Zambia and Zimbabwe to depend on South African transportation network for sixty eight percent of their import-export trade.[148] Because of the destructions as outlined above, Angola has not succeeded as an alternative route and trading partner for the landlocked SADCC member states.

5.5. Tanzania : No economic links

Tanzania, like Angola, also terminated existing trading links with South immediately after independence in 1961. Unlike Angola, Tanzania had no significant economic and strategic role to play in the success of SADCC, save for President Nyerere's political leadership as co-founder of SADCC. Hence, the country was not targeted militarily. Even though it harboured ANC guerrillas, its strategic significance was watered down by its remoteness to the Republic, and the fact that the latter still enjoyed the cordon sanitaire provided by the white-rule Rhodesia and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique and Angola.

One of Nyerere's first actions after Tanzania's independence was to cut all ties with South Africa.

5.6. Zimbabwe

Trade relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) date back to the pre-colonial period. Even during this period, Britain invested capital in Zimbabwe, albeit, through South African subsidiaries. Some British companies, for example, invested in South Africa rather than in Rhodesia. The South African Breweries (SAB) transferred its headquarters from London to South Africa in 1966.[149] In 1966, the Anglo-American Corporation grouped all its interests into Anglo-American Rhodesia. During the colonial period, Rhodesia traded mainly with Europe.

The advent of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith government in 1965 damaged relations between these two countries. The rejection of UDI 's existence by the international community translated into economic sanctions against it. The role of South Africa as a major trading partner increased tremendously,

[148] A. Sparks: Southern Africa's Breathing passage, in International Herald Tribune, 2 October 1986.
[149] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours..,p.199.

precisely because South Africa was blatantly defying the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. Thus, she continued to trade openly with Rhodesia. In some instances, and as a way of evading sanctions, the Republic was used as a transit country for goods to and from Europe and North America to cover up their origin and destination. The two countries consolidated their trading relations by signing a special bilateral trade agreement. According to the latter, Rhodesia was allowed access at reduced duties to South Africa's protected market, and the latter became a key supplier of inputs and consumer goods to Rhodesia.[150]

The new majority regime of President Robert Mugabe therefore inherited a trade structure in which his country was heavily dependent on the Republic. What is more, the UDI era sanctions had left the country in economic ruins. More than ever before, it depended on the Republic for petroleum products, machinery and transport equipment, sheet steel, and a variety of consumer goods. It exported textiles, footwear and furniture, and agricultural produce and minerals to South Africa. By 1982, 33 percent of its external trade was shipped through SADCC ports, and 63 percent went through South Africa. By 1986, approximately 93 percent of its external trade was shipped through South African ports, but only seven percent went through SADCC ports.[151] This trend had begun to change in the mid-1987, with its use of South African transport system declining to less than seventy percent. She diverted her goods through to Maputo ports. By 1983, the Zimbabwean government and SADCC officials had projected that the Zimbabwean use of the port of Maputo would increase by 45 percent between 1985 and 1990, and the use of Beira by 14.2 percent.[152] Nevertheless, the disruptive activities of South African-backed Renamo made this projection difficult to reach. Between 1982 and 1985, Renamo had launched twenty-six attacks on the Beira Corridor. Seven were launched in 1982, 13 in 1984, and 6 in 1985.[153] Throughout 1986 to 1988, Renamo escalated its offensive in the Beira line, which rendered the line dysfunctional. This left Zimbabwe with Rutenga and Berthridge as the only access to the sea, and this was through South Africa.[154]

In its trade relations with Zimbabwe, South Africa managed to display to the former that it was to her disadvantage to delink from the Republic. This was displayed through the

[150] Ibid, p.185.
[151] M. Lee : SADCC : The Political Economy of Development, p.188.
[152] Ibid, p.189.
[153] Ibid.
[154] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours..,pp. 140-141.

carrot and stick strategy. In addition to the threat of discontinuing the preferential trade, agreement it had with her, who was carried out in a way, South Africa withdrew locomotives that had been loaned to the previous government of Rhodesia. This action disrupted the economic life of Zimbabwe, resulting in the loss of export earnings estimated at Z$7 million a week.[155] When President Robert Mugabe called for the mandatory imposition of sanctions against the Republic, South Africa responded by imposing transit fees and slowing down traffic from Zambia to Zimbabwe. By so doing, South Africa demonstrated its indispensability to the economy of Zimbabwe, thus dispelling the myth that the latter could cut its trade relations with Republic.

South Africa had also used incentives to sustain Zimbabwe's trade relations with her. She introduced reduced rates for Zimbabwean goods, so that it became less expensive for Zimbabwe to send goods via Durban than through Beira. This was an offer which none of the SADCC member states could match, thus it made economic sense for Zimbabwe to continue doing business with South Africa. What complicated an already complex situation is the fact that the freight-forwarding agencies that controlled the shipment of goods were owned by South African private and parastatal enterprises. Thus, neither Zimbabwe nor Mozambique was directly involved in decision-making.[156] Nevertheless, the chairperson of the Shipping and Forwarding Agents Association of Zimbabwe, Rhette Hill, reported that under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, transport costs were then going to be included in the value of the goods when duty was levied.[157] This raised the possibility of Beira competing with South Africa and its ports, thus making Mozambican routes less expensive. Renamo's unrelenting offensive against the Mozambican infrastructure like railways and ports was too overwhelming to allow that to happen. The rehabilitation of the ports was also a controversial matter in that parties were non-committal when it came to who should invest resources into the project. Neither the Mozambican-based Beira Port Advisory Committee(BPAC) nor the private sector companies were willing to invest in the port's rehabilitation.

As a member of SADCC, Zimbabwe was also expected to play a pivotal role in the realisation of SADCC objectives, particularly of reducing trade relations with the Republic. This is because of its economic, geographical and political centrality to the regional formation. Zimbabwe tried to delink and reduce its dependence on South

[155] P. Johnson and D. Martin : Destructive Engagement, pp. 68-69.
[156] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour .., pp.193-196.
[157] "Regional News", Southern Africa. Political and Economic Monthly, July 1988, p.3.

Africa. In order to achieve this objective, Zimbabwe attempted to diversify trade flows by re-establishing trade links with SADCC member states and the international community. As a way of diversifying trade flows, Zimbabwe signed the Lomè Convention on 1 March 1982. Membership of the Convention benefited Zimbabwean companies in that they could tender for contracts of European Development Fund-financed projects in all ACP – states. These opportunities enhanced Zimbabwe's scope for exports and diversification,[158] but also invoked South Africa's anxiety over losing a long trading partner. Zimbabwe also signed sugar and beef protocols, which secured her specific quotas of raw sugar and beef on the Common Market at European prices.[159] These opportunities allowed Zimbabwe also to take advantage of facilities of the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). She signed individual trade agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, Tanzania, Mozambique and Iraq.[160]

With the advent of independence and desire for economic liberation, South Africa was offended by the radicalism of the new administration in Harare. In March 1981, the South African government gave one year's notice of abrogation of the preferential trade agreement with South Africa, which had been in force for 18 years.[161] This was a special bilateral trade agreement signed between South Africa and Rhodesia.[162] In terms of the agreement, Rhodesia was allowed a limited access to South Africa's protected markets. By 1980, however, this deal took three-quarters of Zimbabwe's manufactured exports, thus making the Republic a key trade partner and supplier of inputs and consumer goods. The agreement was due to expire on 24 March 1982. Under this agreement, Zimbabwe exported Z$54 million of goods to South Africa. These included clothing, radios, and steel rod and wire, as well as small quantities of cigarettes, furniture, travel goods, exhaust systems, and pharmaceuticals.[163] These constituted 41 percent of Zimbabwe's total manufactured exports. After a hard bargaining from Zimbabwe, the agreement was provisionally extended. This was an indication that South Africa was an indispensable

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[158] The Herald, Editorial comment, 25 February 1982.

[159] A. Tostensen : Dependence and Collective self-reliance in southern Africa: The case of SADCC, p.37.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Of course, the agreement provided for the abrogation after giving a one term's notice. Hence, South Africa was within its rights to do so.

[162] The initial preferential agreement was signed in 1963, and renewed with UDI.

[163] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour ..,p.186.

trade partner of the Zimbabwean government, and an essential component for the survival of its economy.

South Africa and Zimbabwe's close trade relations were strengthened by the fact of their proximity to each other. South Africa was the nearest more industrialised country, linked by telex, telephones, modern road systems and railways, and regular flights. Key Zimbabwean companies had strong South African links, although not all were South African. The most important South African companies operating in Zimbabwe were Old Mutual, Anglo American, Barlow Rand, while British companies included Lonrho, RTZ, and Turner and Newall.[164] Of the above companies, Anglo American and Old Mutual were the most revered in terms of the economic influence they exerted in Zimbabwe. On the one hand, Anglo American Corporation was the largest single economic entity apart from the state. It controlled the assets in Zimbabwe of the former British South Africa Company, which owned Southern Rhodesian mines, farms and railways. Similarly, Old Mutual was the largest life assurance operator in Zimbabwe, with more assets than all other life insurance companies combined.[165] It is a subsidiary of Old Mutual in South Africa.

Owing to the complexity of the economic dynamics, which tied the fate of these two southern African giants together, Zimbabwe continued to find it necessary to trade with South Africa. Because of this interconnectedness between these two states, the National Railways of Zimbabwe(NRZ) was compelled to request ten locomotives from South Africa. in the latter part of 1987. The Zimbabwean government lacked the necessary foreign exchange to import spare parts to repair over half of NZR's diesel locomotives, hence it needed South Africa's assistance to cover the shortfall.[166]

[164] Ibid, pp.200-201.
[165] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour ..,pp.201-203.
[166] "Locus from South Africa" Herald, 27 October, 1987.

Table 3: Percentage distribution of Zimbabwe's external trade by route, 1981-1987.

Year	SADCC	South Africa
1981	33 %	67 %
1982	37 %	63 %
1983	24 %	76 %
1985	15 %	85 %
1986	7 %	93 %
1987	31 %	69 %

Source : M. Lee : The Political Economy of Development in southern Africa, 1989, p.190.

Table 3 above gives a summary of the trade relations between South Africa and. Zimbabwe. It shows the discrepancy that emerged between Zimbabwe's intentions to reduce its reliance on the Republic, particularly its ports, and increasing its use of SADCC ports. It is clear that Zimbabwe's trade with SADCC was far less than its reliance on the Republic. Given the fact that Zimbabwe was a key member of SADCC in economic terms, its acute reliance on the Republic did not auger well for the organization. This is because she had a strong economy which SADCC member states hoped that it would replace the Republic of South Africa.

Apart from the destabilization of the ports of Maputo and Beira, they could only handle a limited percentage of Zimbabwe's exports and imports. Those, which were handled at Maputo, in particular, first had to travel to South Africa, thus making Zimbabwe more dependent on the South African road network.

5.7. Zambia

Zambia's relationship with South Africa was the most complex and contradictory in southern Africa. Since independence in 1964, particularly after Prime Minister Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Zambia had taken some steps not only towards reducing economic dependence but also to antagonise South Africa. Since independence, she deviated her trade from Southern Rhodesia. By 1973, she closed the border with Southern Rhodesia, thereby reducing trading links with both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia drastically. These two countries were gradually replaced by the USA, Japan and Europe, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. Since October 1978, Zambia had to reopen the southern border to allow the importation of the much-needed fertilizers. This move had the ripple effect of once again increasing trade with South Africa dramatically. By 1979, trade with South had more than doubled as compared to the same period in 1978, reaching 11,2 percent of total imports, which was almost the same level as in 1973. In reality, South Africa had overtaken the USA and Germany as principal suppliers, being second only to the United Kingdom.[167] As a key member of the Front Line States, President Kenneth Kaunda was not only a critic of the South African government, but also offered the ANC sanctuary. Lusaka was the headquarters of the ANC, and SWAPO had public offices in that capital city. Despite all these, the South African government had done relatively little to destabilise Zambia. On the contrary, she became the principal source of Zambian imports.[168]

In August 1986, Zambia joined the international community in calling for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. In order to back up this political commitment, the Zambian government instructed its Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) to re-route copper through the ports of Beira and Dar-es-Salaam.[169] Before this decision, Zambia was using South African transport network. In fact, by 1986 Zambia shipped most of her copper through South Africa. Nevertheless, by 1989, none of her exports or imports went through the Republic; 84 per cent of her exports were shipped via Dar-es-Salaam and some was exported via Beira.[170] According to De Fonseca of the Beira Corridor Authority, by the end of the first six months of 1988, 68 000 tons of Zambian copper was handled at the port. This was a tremendous increase when compared with the recorded 37 000 tons which was handled at the port in 1987. It is a 34 percent increase of Zambia's use of the port. For its part, South Africa kept on luring Zambia to do business with it. The period before 1987 has seen South Africa agreeing on a special road-haulage service, which allowed Zambia to pay transport fees in Zambian Kwacha, and a flight service between Lusaka and Johannesburg begun in 1980. Zambians were offered a discount on airfreight.[171] South Africa offered Zambia credit as a bait for strengthening

[167] International Labour Office (ILO), Zambia : Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure, , p.262.
[168] Ibid.
[169] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour .., p.252.
[170] Africa Economic Digest, 27 March, 1987, p.26.
[171] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour .., p.252.

trade relations. When Zambia, for example, ran out of fuel because it could not pay for crude oil for its refinery, South Africa bailed her out by providing 5600 tonnes of diesel on credit.[172]

Zambia's increased use of the Tazara route has helped to reduce its dependence on the Republic. This was made possible by the successful upgrading of the Dar-es-Salaam Port Transport System through the implementation of a ten-year rehabilitation plan, which began in 1985. By 1988-89, Zambian imports and exports accounted for over 50 percent of Tazara's traffic.[173] Table 4 below indicates Zambia's external trade routes, which shows a negative tendency with regard to South Africa.

Table 4: Distribution of Zambia's external trade by route, 1981-1984.

Year	SADCC	South Africa
1981	64 %	36 %
1982 1983 imports exports	67 % 30 % 60 %	33 % 70 % 40 %
1984 imports exports	35 % 60-65 %	65 % 35-40 %

Source: M. Lee: SADCC – Political Economy of Development in southern Africa. p190.

In conclusion, it needs to be mentioned that the picture of extreme trade dependence as depicted in this chapter was not as one-sided as it may erroneously seemed. Dependence is never one-sided. Once again the point must be emphasised that the trade relationship between the RSA and SADCC member nations was mutual, however asymmetrical or unbalanced. As sanctions began to bite in the mid-1980s, South Africa relied increasingly on trade with SADCC member states. By 1989, SADCC countries purchased about 20 percent of South Africa's non-gold exports.

Analysts refute the fact that there was ever any reciprocity in the region. Daleen Singh, argues that South Africa had no reciprocal dependence on the SADCC member states

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[172] Ibid

[173] "Tazara to Expand Traffic", Daily News (Tanzania), 18 February 1988.

since its trade profile was so widely diversified that it exported less to the whole of Africa than it did to Switzerland or Britain, and imported from Africa an insignificant quantity of goods. Because of this, he argues further, South Africa did not bother about the rest of Africa's opinion regarding its internal policies[174]. Nothing could be further from the truth.[175] This interpretation is biased against the SADCC member states.

The reality of the situation is, particularly within the context of dependence and interdependence as discussed in chapter three, that southern Africa is and was a regional economy, with South Africa needing its neighbours. It paid a high price for its destabilization policy and not only in military expenditures. In sending miners home, for instance, South Africa lost the most skilled workers, whom the large pool of unemployed South Africans could not easily replace.[176] When the South African government threatened to send home migrants workers, as it regularly did, the mine owners protested to the government that the action would hurt production, and subsequently half were allowed to stay.[177] Consequently, South Africa could not send home all 296,000 migrant mine workers, half of whom were from Lesotho, as it had threatened. Such an exodus would have left the mines with serious productions problems particularly because since the 1970s there were more foreign mine workers that there were South African mineworkers.[178] South Africa could not afford to lose access to labour markets, including those within the periphery.

SADCC had estimated that a South African trade embargo against the region would cost South Africa over 10 percent of its market, and a loss of 2 million jobs at home. As an export economy, South Africa could not cut trade with its neighbours just when other trade was curtailed by sanctions.[179]

SADCC transport through South Africa paid about $400 million per year in rail and port fees, a source of revenue, which South Africa would not want to lose. Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, had suggested that if South Africa imposed comprehensive

[174] D. Singh : "South Africa and the Frontline States : A study in Dependence and Destabilization", in Africa Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 1985, p.60.
[175] South Africa has made concerted efforts to get southern African states, and indeed influential African statesmen, to accept (or tolerate) that South Africa was a sovereign states with its own internal policies.
[176] C.B. Thompson : Cooperation for Survival : Western Interest v/s SADCC, in Journal of Opinion, vol. Xvi/1, 1987, p.34.
[177] J.Hanlon: Beggar your Neighbours... pp.133-134.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.

sanctions, his government would stop dividend payments remitted by South African corporations as well as pension funds ($70 million).[180]

South Africa imported 250,000 tons of corn from Zimbabwe in 1986, when the latter had surplus grain production. This made Zimbabwe, and SADCC, a breadbasket for South Africa, and not the reverse. In answering the question as to how SADCC was going, to withstand the apartheid onslaught, Simba Makoni, the executive secretary of SADCC, replied, “SADCC itself is a contingency plan against South African reprisals”.[181] Professor Gavin Maasdorp, formerly Director of the Economic Research Unit of the University of Natal, shared the same view. He argued that South Africa’s possible counter-sanctions measures had the likelihood of further depressing its own industries, and jeopardizes the important formal links that the Republic had already forged with the BLS countries.[182] He stated that South Africa was dependent on other African states for political links and the efficient operation of its own economy, as its neighbours were reliant on the Republic’s massive economic infrastructure. G.M.E. Leistner seemed to share this view when he pointed out that South Africa’s own economic interest in ongoing smooth relations with neighbouring countries was quite substantial and more evenly balanced with the interest of those countries in an undisturbed relationship.[183] He concluded that all the regional powers, i.e. South Africa and SADCC member states, would not bother to maintain their relationships if they were not directly beneficial to the countries concerned. [184] Yet, this assertion is far from any insinuations by the critiques that the benefits have to be equal. They were not, and they ought not have been.

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[180] Ibid.
[181] C.B. Thompson : Cooperation..., p.34.
[182] G. Maasdorp: “The Southern African Nexus. Dependence or Interdependence?,” in Indicator : Economic Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4, 1986, p.5
[183] G.M.E. Leistner : Sanctions against South Africa in regional perspective, in Africa Institute Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 5, 1985, p.52.
[184] Ibid. This is a valid argument even if it was presented within the context of discouraging SADCC member states (by same author) from advocating mandatory sanctions against the Republic.

6. Intra-SADCC Trade

6.1. An Evaluation of Trade Relations

When SADCC was formed in April 1980, there was a popular belief among its member states that they had a commonality of interests, which would ensure the success of their programmes. There was, at the same time, an equally popular belief that as a sub-system SADCC would prosper without the membership of its giant neighbour – the Republic of South Africa. Indeed, they shared a common perception about regional security, but differed on how to achieve that. They shared a common vision of improving the standards of living of their respective people, but again differed on the ways of attaining that goal, particularly when it came to how to achieve that within the context of trading with South Africa. Realities of geography and proximity to South Africa complicated their resolves to undermine its importance to the region. They agreed on the need to end apartheid, but again differed over the means to do so.[185]

This chapter will review the SADCC strategy towards reduction of trade links with the Republic on the one hand, and progress made during the period under review on the other. A preliminary hypothesis for this chapter is that the basic problem and reason for a lack of significant progress towards the attainment of its objectives was the attempt to create congruence of interests among member states – when there was little to talk about.

In order to make a thorough assessment of SADCC's efforts, it would be useful to review one of its primary objectives. Its first objective was the reduction of economic dependence on external countries, particularly on the Republic of South Africa. This was undoubtedly the most important in the SADCC programme. The basic motivation for this objective arose from member states' fear of economic dominance by the Republic, which constrained them from pronouncing their denunciation of South Africa's racial policies. The question is, has this first objective been met?

The success or otherwise of SADCC in achieving this objective can be measured against the following programme of action:

[185] G.M.E. Leistner : Sanctions against South Africa in regional perspective, in Africa Institute Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 5, 1985, p.49.

SADCC member states were to divert their imports and exports from and to the Republic to fellow member states. To this effect, and in line with the plan, Zambia had taken a conscious decision, in 1987, to divert all its copper exports from the South African routes and port to Beira and Dar-es-Salaam. In the same year, 1987, Zambia announced her intentions to export 100 000 tons of its copper through Dar-es-Salaam port, and another 17 000 tons through Beira during the last quarter of 1986. In addition, the ZCCM (Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines) liaison office in Pretoria was closed early in 1987.[186] For a very limited period, Zambia was able to re-route its exports through Beira and Dar-es-Salaam. However, the intensification of destabilization in 1988 made it difficult for Zambia to continue using this alternative route.

Similarly, and in the same year, Botswana finalised arrangements to import electricity from Zambia and Zimbabwe, again as a deliberate effort to avoid importing it from South Africa's ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission). The Canadian Government provided R85 million for this project.[187] In order to consolidate its efforts, Botswana further built and opened the new international Gaborone Airport in April 1987. Because of this initiative, international airlines could then fly directly from Botswana to Europe without using South Africa's Jan Smuts International Airport. Air Botswana had consequently also established a direct air link between Gaborone and the Swaziland airport of Manzini, thus by-passing the Republic of South Africa.

Swaziland, on the other hand, had embarked on a project of upgrading its Manzini Airport, improved its air control tower facilities, so as to accommodate international airlines which hitherto flew via Jan Smuts Airport. This initiative enabled Swaziland, albeit to a limited extent, to obviate South Africa's economic dominance of the country. The successful upgrading of the Tazara Railway Line in Tanzania resulted from increased SADCC traffic. Consequently, its carrying capacity was increased, and Zambia could once again divert all its copper exports from the South African routes to Tazara and Beira routes in 1981. The programme took place over 10 years, and it cost $157 million to complete.[188]

The Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid Fund (also known as Africa Fund), was established by SADCC member states for assisting their organisation

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186 The Citizen, Johannesburg, 18 March 1987.
187 The Herald, Harare, 10 March 1987.
188 Ibid.

towards reducing their dependence on food imports from South Africa. This was established in 1983. Whereas SADCC member nations imported 961 000 tons of grain, of which fifteen percent came from South Africa in 1984/85, the Africa Fund stored 150 000 tons of grain in fifteen silos throughout the SADCC region.

The relative importance of intra-SADCC trade for the period 1982-1984 is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Intra-SADCC trade, 1982-1984 average (estimates).

Country	**Imports Million US Dollars**	**% of Total Imports**	**Exports Million US Dollars**	**% of Total Exports**
Angola	12	4.3	2	0.8
Botswana	51	18.5	47	19.2
Lesotho	0.3	0.1	0	0.0
Malawi	26	9.4	14	8.6
Mozambique	26	9.4	14	5.7
Swaziland	3	1.1	7	2.9
Tanzania	24	8.7	4	1.6
Zambia	48	17.4	35	14.3
Zimbabwe	86	31.2	115	46.9
Total	**276**	**100.1**	**245**	**100.0**

Source: J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation in southern Africa. Central elements of the SADCC Venture, Report no. 14.

Intra-SADCC trade was unevenly distributed among the SADCC countries. Table 5 above shows how the intra-SADCC trade was distributed among the member countries, in the period 1982-84. The table shows the dominant position of Zimbabwe, in that almost half of all intra-SADCC trade originated from there. Since another 30 percent of the trade was as imports to Zimbabwe, this means that Zimbabwe was a partner to almost 80 percent of the total intra-SADCC trade, and that only 20 percent did not in any way involve Zimbabwe – either as an exporter or importer. Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia also each represented important partners to intra-SADCC trade, while the shares of Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania were rather small. Angola has practically only been exporting petroleum, in deals with Mozambique in 1984 and Tanzania in 1985. Since the refineries in the other SADCC countries could not use Angolan crude oil, the oil had to be exchanged with other qualities on the international market.[189] Botswana exported meat to Angola between 1979 and 1980 and to Mozambique between 1981 and 1984. The export to these countries was unstable and inconsistent because of low demand from receiving countries. Botswana's exports to Zimbabwe consisted mainly of copper/nickel matte, textiles and clothing. Nevertheless, the value of these exports decreased in 1984, partly due to protectionist measures in Zimbabwe. [190] Mozambique's exports to SADCC included refined oil products. She also exported coal to Malawi, and cement to Swaziland, but all these declined to almost zero due to production problems.

Swaziland exported wood to Zambia, and wood pulp to Zimbabwe between 1981 and 1982. Tanzania exported mostly textiles and clothing to Mozambique under their trade agreement. She also exported fish to Zambia. Zambia exported almost nothing but copper to the rest of the world. She exported electric energy to Zimbabwe, and small volumes of cement to Botswana and Malawi, zinc to Tanzania and some chemicals to Zimbabwe.[191] Finally, as the largest regional exporter, Zimbabwe exported a larger variety of commodities. During the years 1981-83, she exported substantial volumes of maize to Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The need for the exports was particularly created by the drought in the importing countries, and sales were partly paid for by international emergency assistance. In 1984, stocks in Zimbabwe were depleted and could no longer afford to supply her neighbours. Zimbabwe also exported meat to Angola in 1984, sugar to Botswana, textiles to Botswana, iron and steel to Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. Its total exports to the SADCC countries reached a maximum in volumes of almost 140 million USD.

It was noted that when SADCC was established in 1980, 80 percent of the goods for international export by the six landlocked SADCC member states, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, was directed through South African

[189] SADCC Intra-Regional Trade Study, pp.11-13.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.

ports.[192] After ten years of SADCC's deliberate efforts to change the situation, 80 per cent of its traffic had been diverted away from South African ports. [193] SADCC successfully raised some funds from Western donors and the World Bank to upgrade the Beira Port Transport System and the Beira Corridor. This involved upgrading of railways, telecommunications, roads and civil aviation, rehabilitation programmes, and especially the upgrading of the Mutare to Beira Line, and the Beira port access facilities. This project had the ripple effect of doubling the tonnage of the rail traffic from about 1.1 million in 1985 to between 1.5 and 2 million tons in early 1987.[194] The improvements at Beira included an imported port access channel, that enabled ships up to 25 000 dwt to be handled, a new roll-on, roll-off terminal, improved cold storage facilities, and new port handling equipment facilities. Because of these improvements, the port could now handle up to 2.5 million tons. According to the original plan, the port was to be improved until it could handle the capacity of up to 4 million tons. Some of SADCC's two landlocked member states, Zimbabwe and Zambia benefited from these improvements since they could increase their use of the Beira Port, and consequently reduced their dependence on the South African ports. The Beira Corridor Group, a private sector company, was established in April to consolidate private sector interest in SADCC development projects. As a way of luring exporters and importers to maximise their trade linkages within SADCC through the port, the twenty percent surcharge on all freight passing through Beira was dropped, by the southern African-Europe container service. By 1989, 60 percent of the international traffic of the above six landlocked SADCC member states was directed through SADCC ports, registering a two hundred percent increase over the ten year period.[195]

The ChiqualaQquala-Maputo line was also improved. Ironically, the South African Government announced a R3 million grant to Mozambique towards the upgrading and development of the Maputo port.[196] In return, Mozambique would expel ANC insurgents from its soil. The improvements included an improved entrance channel to Maputo port and Matola terminals, a new coal-handling terminal at Matola for coal exports from Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana, two additional containers cranes and improved

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192 G.M.E. Leistner: "Sanctions against South Africa in regional perspective," in Africa Institute of South Africa, vol. 25, no. 5, 1985, pp.56-57.
193 K.S. Kongwa : "SADCC – the way forward," in South Africa Foundation Review, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 2-3.
194 Africa Concord, no. 128, 19 February 1987, p.10.
195 K.S. Kongwa : SADCC – the way forward, in South Africa Foundation Review, vol. 16, No. 10, October 1990, p.2.
196 Ibid.

handling systems.[197] This was, however, a short-lived achievement in that the RENAMO rebels with assistance from the SADF, targeted it for successful destruction.

The Nacala port had also been modernised, and reopened for commercial traffic in 1982. With the assistance of donors, SADCC was able to raise US$880 million and $645 million of which went to rehabilitate and upgrade ports and railways in Mozambique.[198] The improvements included a container terminal storage area, equipment, and were expected to cost $28 million. The line was important for Malawian trade as it saved the country $28 million per each thousand kilometres via Beira than through South African ports.[199] These renovations persuaded Malawi to reconsider its relationship with Renamo. Consequently, Malawi made a surprising[200] political decision to end its support for Renamo, and to deploy troops along the railway line in support of the Mozambican government. This was a victory for SADCC – at least in the short term. The northern corridor transport system that linked Malawi to the Tazara railway system was also improved. SADCC-based industries, like Morewear Industries, were awarded tenders to repair railways and bridges. The latter company was awarded an ECU 6.5 million EEC-funded contract to rehabilitate Zambia Railways wagons in 1982, and it later won an even larger contract to rehabilitate the Tazara railway line.[201]

With regard to trade, and in the period 1979 to 1989, very little successes had been recorded. The balance sheet is not impressive. One example of this is Zambia, which was SADCC's weakest link. Despite the Zambian government's concerted efforts to dissuade importers from buying from South African sources, more than 60 per cent of the Bank of Zambia's foreign exchange allocations for imports were given to importers who opted for South African suppliers.[202] The reasons for the preference of South African products will be discussed later in the next section.

Zimbabwe's much publicised revised trade agreement with the RSA during the 1986 Non-Aligned Summit Conference further confirms and highlights the magnitude and

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197 The Financial Gazette, Harare, 22 May 1987.

198 J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, p.132.

199 SADCC Energy IV, no. 11, 1986, p.65.

200 The decision was surprising because Malawi had cordial political and diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa.

201 J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, p. 217.

202 The Citizen, Johannesburg, 6 June 1987.

nature of the dilemma facing the SADCC collective. Zimbabwe and Zambia were the two countries with the strongest political determination to implement the first SADCC objective, namely the reduction of economic dependence on the Republic. They committed vast resources towards upgrading and rehabilitating infrastructure.

SADCC member states constitute a collection of countries with a wide variety of strategic minerals such as oil, hydroelectric power as well as a total population of 70 million and a gross annual income of US$ 25 million. During 1983 and 1984, the region produced minerals worth US$ 3.9 billion of which US$ 3.6 billion or 92 percent was exported.[203] These exports included petroleum and diamonds from Angola: diamonds, copper and nickel from Botswana, copper, cobalt and zinc from Zambia, and copper, chrome, gold, nickel, asbestos, coal and iron from Zimbabwe. The export of raw materials illustrate that limited manufacturing took place in the region. Of the nine SADCC countries, only Zimbabwe and Swaziland had manufacturing sectors contributing more than twenty percent of their respective Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[204] The small manufacturing sector depended heavily on imported raw materials, which were often in severe shortage because of a lack of foreign exchange. The limited markets within the SADCC region also accounted for the poor state of the manufacturing sector because of a lack of economies of scale. Despite the very ambitious programme of action and a comprehensive sectoral allocation, only 4.5 percent of the value of regional trade was within the SADCC region, while thirty percent of SADCC imports were from the Republic of South Africa.[205] The latter trade was worth US$ 2 billion annually. SADCC countries exported goods worth US$ 350 million, or seven percent of total SADCC region export, to South Africa annually between 1983 to 1987.[206]

6.2. Obstacles to the Attainment of Goals.

There are many reasons why SADCC made modest progress in relation to its stated objectives as articulated by its founding fathers. The other side of SADCC's intentions to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa was their plan to increase the initial 5 per cent share of intra-regional trade. This included the formulation of a SADCC Trade

[203] K.S. Kongwa: "SADCC: Seven Years after. Working Document", in Political Perspectives : Africa No. 1/1987, p.12.
[204] The Financial Gazette, Harare, 6 March 1987.
[205] K.S. Kongwa : SADCC : Seven Years After, .., p12.
[206] Ibid.

Development and Promotion strategy, the maximum utilization of the Generalized Systems of Preferences, the compilation of a SADCC Trade Directory, the creation of an Information Exchange Centre and the harmonisation of standards and certification schemes. These were difficult targets for the organisation.

As stated elsewhere in this study, the very nature of SADCC economies were shaped by colonial history which was characterised by their unequal relationship to South Africa. This constituted a serious obstacle to member states' independent standing. Because of this colonial legacy, many of these states depended on the production and export of agricultural and mineral resources to the industrialized countries. These small industrial sectors created a characteristic lack of complimentarity between their economies, which SADCC sought to achieve. Industrial specialisation and exchange that is so important for trade development had not emerged in the SADCC region for the duration of the period under review.

The SADCC region lacked specialization needed to effect economic collaboration. Member states tended to produce a similar range of manufactured goods like leather, foodstuffs, textiles, and handicrafts. Because of this they did not need to trade with one another, as they did not supply in one another's economic needs.[207] Within this context, SADCC lacked competitive industries; but they needed complimentary ones if trade amongst them was to be increased. In July 1987, Zimbabwe terminated its 28-year-old system of importing electricity from Zambia.[208] Instead of continuing to rely on Zambian electricity, she went ahead with the development of Phase II of the Hwange Project, thus eliminating her need for Zambian electricity.

The SADCC region had a weakly developed communications network in terms of physical infrastructure, telecommunications, air, and sea links. This constituted a heritage which SADCC countries, both nationally and regionally, tried to change by initiating transport and communications projects in the early 1980s. This was coupled with the lack of foreign exchange that plagued these nations during the same period. Consequently, these states were forced to minimize their imports of goods from, for example, other SADCC member states, to cut down on imports of necessary inputs to industry, and to reduce the period of export credits.

[207] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A Post-Nkomati Evaluation , p.64.

[208] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbour .., p.210.

More internal factors, which inhibited intra-regional trade within SADCC, include mistaken agricultural policies in some member states, the prolonged drought particularly in the beginning of the 1980s, the war situation in Mozambique and Angola, as well as the documented destabilisation of these states by the Republic of South Africa. The foreign currency problems have led to greater indebtedness and for some states an inability to repay their earlier loans. This has further led to the increased dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In 1986, for example, even a Z$ 360 million surplus on the trade balance was not enough for Zimbabwe to honour the loan repayments. [209] Their pricing of exports, which by far surpassed the goods of their foreign competitors, aggravated this. Their ineffective production, limited markets, choice of technology and overproduction caused this. The question of overvalued exchange rates or simply incorrect pricing policies for exports were further factors, which affected prospects for intra-SADCC trade negatively.

In their trading with one another, SADCC member states were also plagued by the element of risk – either real or imagined with respect to payments, delivery time and quality. A SADCC expert group was established to standardize and control the quality of SADCC goods. However, it did not accomplish any visible success before 1988. National Standards bodies only existed in four of the nine SADCC countries. [210] Since most of SADCC member states' production was aimed at domestic markets, the volumes were small and prices tended to be higher than for mass-made overseas imports.[211] As most goods manufactured locally had import content, shortage of foreign currency often meant erratic supply. For this reason, no regional businessman would buy SADCC's goods simply to promote intra-regional trade when he could get similar products from regular suppliers outside the region, at more competitive prices, or with delivery that is more reliable. However, even in circumstances where a SADCC manufacturer could convince an importer in the region, other hurdles made the transactions difficult such as the policy of economic protectionism and distrust. [212]

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[209] J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa. Central Elements of the SADCC Venture, p.50.

[210] J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa. General approaches and the World Bank, p. 101

[211] The Star, 4 July 1989.

[212] Ibid.

When Tanzania displayed their electric motors and transformers on a Trade Fair in 1987, Zimbabwe made its own electric motors, but not enough to meet local demand, and therefore imported transformers from overseas – but not from Tanzania. When asked about the reasons for such a strange occurrence, Mr Crispin Mwanyika of Tanzania's Pioneer Electric Machines said: " The problem is convincing Zimbabwean buyers that our transformers are just as good".[213] They would rather buy from their preferred traditional suppliers and buyers that were mostly western or South African. There were economic benefits for trading with traditional partners. South African subsidies to Malawi, for example, made it cheaper for Malawi to import than to grow and mill wheat at home. Other SADCC member states did not like the cordial trade relationship between Malawi and South Africa. Malawian officials and traders took a pragmatic view. They argued that " It makes economic sense," because " South Africa is close – it's quicker, cheaper and usually more efficient".[214] No wonder that in 1989 there was a huge South African stand at Malawi's second international trade fair, a four-day visit from South African Trade Minister Danie Steyn, and a week-long visit – the first of its kind to any African country by a group of ninety four black South African business people.[215] This was also coupled with the knowledge of trading opportunities in the other countries in the region which was generally limited, and aggravated by the administrative trade bureaucracy which was just too much to bear.

Ironically too, even if Zimbabwean buyers at the trade fair were interested in the Tanzanian-made electric motors, they knew very well that their government would not let them import the motors unless their application for an import licence was accompanied by a letter from the local manufacturer of similar equipment confirming that he was unable to supply the required equipment. Naturally, local manufacturers or suppliers tended to be unwilling to admit their incapacity to render the service, nor would they willingly accept that they could not meet the demand. The reason for this unwillingness to concede is that they would not like to lose business. The bottom line lay in the difficulty of convincing member states that it was good to trade with one another, and that their goods were just as good. [216]

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[213] The Southern African Economist, June/July 1989, p.39.

[214] The Star, 4 July 1989.

[215] Ibid.

[216] The Southern African Economist, June/July 1989, p.39.

The existence of two regional multilateral trade arrangements in which SADCC member states participated, not only weakened the impact that SADCC could have made, but it also created tensions and competition in the region. It also inhibited intended intra-SADCC trade. These include the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and southern Africa (PTA), which included all SADCC members, except Botswana, Angola and Mozambique; and SADCC. In some instances, dual memberships resulted in the deterioration of relations within and among SADCC member nations. A typical example is found in the deterioration of relations between Zimbabwe and Malawi, which did more harm than good to the intra-SADCC trade links. Since the establishment of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), in July 1984, Malawi's exports to Zimbabwe had declined drastically from MK20 million in 1981 to MK10 million in 1986, while Zimbabwe's exports to Malawi had increased from MK 19 million in 1981 to MK 29 million in 1986, thus swooping Malawi's trade balance with Zimbabwe from a surplus to a deficit.[217]

The Preferential Trade Area was initiated in 1981 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as one of three African regional organisations, the other being the Economic Commission for West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Central African States (ECOCAS). It was envisaged that the trio would eventually link up to form an African Economic Community (AEC), sometime in 2025.[218] Its aim was to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade gradually. A common list of two hundred items on which barriers were to be removed was increased to 319 commodities. However, the unwieldy size of the organization and its poor communications strategy hampered trade between the eighteen countries. By 1989 trade between these 18 countries stood at just 6 percent of the total trade. This was caused by a lack of complementarity of production and by fears that the biggest economies, like Zimbabwe and Kenya, would benefit disproportionately from the arrangement.[219] The PTA covered 51 industrial projects and established an investment bank.

Shortly after Malawi joined the PTA, its Open General Import Licence (OGIL) Agreement with Zimbabwe was terminated with immediate effect. This is because

[217] M.C. Lee : SADCC : The Political Economy .., p.221.
[218] A. Shepherd : "Three-way conflict : Regional groups lock horns in southern Africa"., in African Business, September 1992, pp.15-16.
[219] Ibid.

according to the PTA Treaty Charter, "no country may get more favourable trade terms than those accorded to member states." [220] In fact, there existed in southern Africa a great deal of controversy as a result of the existence of more than one regional economic structure, particularly the co-existence of SADCC and the PTA. The goals and objectives of the two organizations were duplicatory, and there was criticism that within the PTA Zimbabwe and Kenya , which were the largest countries, had the most goods to trade, and were the major beneficiaries of the trade agreement.[221]As such, PTA was seen as an obstacle to intra-regional trade, and the tension and competition benefited South Africa. Disgruntled members, like Malawi, looked to South Africa for cheaper products and other preferential treatment.

Within this context of competition between PTA and SADCC, and amongst SADCC member states themselves, South Africa picked whichever country she wanted to trade with – both for its own economic benefit, but also to cause more confusion. South Africa preferred Zimbabwean manufacturers of finished goods, particularly the manufacturers of clothing, textiles, and footwear.[222] The significance of South Africa's continued interest in Zimbabwean products served to defeat the very objectives of SADCC. Similarly, Zimbabwe had no option but to sell to the Republic in the light of the saturated southern African market. Countries that belonged to both SADCC and the PTA were caught in a web of confusion as to priorities between the two organizations.

Zimbabwe, a member of PTA for example, issued a notice to revoke the 1956 bilateral trade agreement with Botswana, a non-PTA member, in line with PTA Treaty, which stated that no member state could extend favourable trade agreement(s) to a non-member. If it did that, it had to accord the same agreement to all members. The incidence raised eyebrows not only of governments within the region but also the business community who saw the move as contrary to SADCC's intra-regional trade agreement. Both Botswana and Zimbabwe were SADCC members, and they both earned $70 million in currency because of the agreement. Because of the high-level talks between presidents Robert Mugabe and Ketumile Masire, the agreement was salvaged and extended by three months until June 1987.

[220] M. Lee : SADCC : The Political Economy .., p.221.
[221] Ibid.
[222] The South African confidence in these goods was generated during the period of Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith's term of office.

The question of duplication and conflict of activities between the two groups had its origins in their geo-socio-economic history. They adopted different approaches to common objectives of development. On the one hand, SADCC was a project-oriented organization, which sought to achieve its objectives through regional and national development of infrastructure and production: transportation, communications, agriculture, mining, energy and manpower. On the other hand, the PTA was a trade-oriented organization, which aimed at facilitating trade through regulations of institutional arrangements for financing trade and its related issues. Given such diverse orientation, there was a distinct probability of conflicting programmes being developed between the two organizations. To this end, some competition developed which resulted in confusion and loss of momentum of both organizations. The much-needed harmonisation of activities of both organizations was beyond reach since more than half of the PTA members were not members of SADCC. It was also difficult for the PTA to change its course from infrastructure, agricultural and industrial development because its six SADCC members pursued the same development programmes through another organization.[223] Equally unrealistic for SADCC was to toe away from increasing trade among themselves because some of its members belonged to the PTA. Mozambique, Angola and Botswana were the only SADCC states which did not belong to PTA. At the PTA summit in Uganda in 1986, Zimbabwean President Mr Mugabe voiced dissatisfaction about some members' commitment to SADCC principles and objectives.[224] The turn out and level of representation of some member states was equally embarrassing. Only 5 per cent of the Heads of State and Government attended the summit. There were also complaints of the under-utilization of the PTA facilities. Slightly above 15 percent of goods traded in the region went through the PTA Clearing House in Harare, Zimbabwe.[225]

Apart from the above trade relationships, Zimbabwe was involved in other connections outside of SADCC, which hampered free trade with SADCC member states. When South Africa threatened to terminate the 1964 Zimbabwe-South Africa trade agreement in 1982, the Zimbabwean government quickly renegotiated the extension thereof. It feared that such a decision would have negative political repercussions for the newly appointed government of President Robert Mugabe. The cancellation, if effected, would

[223] "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference enters its Seventh Year", in The Voice of SADCC/PTA, February 1987, p.9.
[224] Ibid.
[225] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbour .., pp.214-215.

have meant that Zimbabwean exports would not be given preferential tariffs, and thus would have been forced out of the South African market. She would have lost about Z$50 million annually in foreign currency. In addition, many jobs would have been lost in Zimbabwe. These were luxuries, which the Zimbabwean government could not afford at that stage, particularly because SADCC states were in a position to supply her with an alternative market. They had no economic advantages they could offer as substitute of the Zimbabwe-South African trade agreement. Thus, Zimbabwe would not at any stage consider terminating the agreement. Although the President had announced in 1986 that sanctions would take precedence over the trade agreement, he has not been able to implement them against South Africa, as it would destabilise the Zimbabwean economy.[226] This is a clear indication of its severe dependence on the Republic.

As for the BLS countries, they were constrained by the terms of SACU from developing viable industrial sectors. Although technically the SACU agreement prevented South Africa from hindering industrial growth in these nations, in reality this was not the case. In reality, South Africa did in fact take steps to prevent the establishment of a fertilizer factory in Swaziland, and a motor vehicle assembly plant in Lesotho.[227] In addition, South Africa did everything within its powers to lure investors away from BLS countries by offering attractive subsidy packages to persuade them to invest in South African Bantustans instead. In the second half of the 1980s, South Africa had undermined Botswana's attempt to develop its soda ash potential by refusing to support the Sua Pan Soda Ash Project.[228] She was quite aware that given the opportunity, Botswana was going to supply the entire sub-region with salt, soda ash, and potash for the next century. Her refusal was based on the condition that Botswana should come to an agreement with her about security.[229] Botswana was unwilling to oblige. However, this polarization within SACU has helped the industrial development of South Africa at the expense of the BLS countries. The increase in economic relations between South Africa and Botswana caused some tension in the region. Other SADCC member states interpreted the strengthening relationship as Botswana's deliberate effort towards defeating SADCC's objective of reducing trade ties with the Republic of South Africa. In reaction to these intensifying relations between the two states, President Mugabe announced Zimbabwe's intentions to suspend its Open General and Import Licences (OGIL) agreement with

[226] Africa Research Bulletin, 15 July - 14 August, 1980, p.5601
[227] G. Maasdorp : "Reassessing Economic Ties in Southern Africa", in Optima, vol. 30, 1981, p.117.
[228] M.C. Lee : SADCC : The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa, p.214.
[229] J. Johnson : Destructive Engagement.., p.158.

Botswana. The reason given was that Botswana was selling Zimbabwe certain goods that originated from South Africa. This resembled the case of a pot calling a kettle black, as Zimbabwe was herself trading with South Africa.

As Gavin Maasdorp noted, " Industry in the three states seems to have benefited little from the larger market offered by South Africa. The BLS countries have not attracted much industry because of their long distance from major markets, an inability to match South Africa's industrial decentralization incentives, their high labour costs and perceptions among industrialists of greater risks."[230] Despite all these limitations to the SACU agreement, the BLS countries were tied to it because a large percentage of their annual revenue came from the SACU revenue.

SADCC could not fully utilise two of its maritime countries namely Angola and Mozambique. They were unreliable because of South African destabilization. Industrial development in these states had been impossible. According to the 1986 SADCC Macro-economic, survey "the negative impact of destabilisation and aggression has been felt most in Mozambique and Angola, where not only have circumstances necessitated reallocation of resources away from industry, but even some of the existing industrial capacities and their supportive structures have been physically destroyed"[231]. The issue of the strategic location of Mozambique and Angola will be dealt with in more detail later. Suffice to say here that as a result of the destabilization, Angola only exported about 2.1 percent of her exports to other SADCC countries; Botswana exported 11.9 per cent; Lesotho 0.1 per cent; Malawi 9.7 per cent; Mozambique 11.6 per cent; Tanzania 0.8 per cent; Zambia 3.5 per cent, and Zimbabwe 11.5 percent.[232]

Over and above some coercive means of ensuring collaboration, South Africa also offered incentives, which benefited those SADCC members trading with her.[233] The SACU union and the Preferential Agreements with Zimbabwe are some of the incentives used to lure SADCC member states to continue trading with the Republic.[234] While SADCC member states did not provide their customers export credit, South Africa

[230] G. Maasdorp : Reassessing ties.., p.115

[231] Africa Research Bulletin, 31 August 1986, pp.8306-8307.

[232] Ibid.

[233] C. Legum : The Battlefronts of Southern Africa .., p.184.

[234] Africa Research Bulletin: August 31, 1986, p.8306.

provided the same to its SADCC trading partners.[235] This is because the international commercial banking system tended to provide credit for commodities that were well established in world markets, where the financial risk is less. South African commodities were well established in world markets, particularly European countries.[236] As late as 1988, SADCC was still grappling with this limitation by way of working on " an export pre-financing revolving fund for the region", and studies were underway regarding the possibility of establishing a regional export credit and guarantee facility, a regional stock market or a development bank.[237]

The limited development of SADCC's communications networks in terms of physical infrastructure, telecommunications, air and sea links, hampered effective interaction amongst member states. On the other hand, South Africa's modern rail and road systems were so appealing to SADCC member states as it made more economic sense to trade with the Republic than doing so amongst themselves.

The root cause of SADCC's noticeable lack of significant progress in meeting the objectives set by the founding fathers of the organisation appears to be a misconception that all member countries' interests would be served by the organizations' stated objectives. On the contrary, not all SADCC nations believed that the root cause of their problems was anything other than South Africa's destabilisation process. The salient features of this contradiction were, amongst others, the freedom member states had to belong to any other organisation over and above SADCC while they were simultaneously expected to implement the organisation's programmes. Some of the programmes were, as illustrated above, in direct conflict with the objectives and aims of SADCC. The PTA and SACU are the cases in point. Since this contradiction of dual membership and loyalty could not be resolved, the organisation could likewise not resolve the dilemma member countries had to endure in their effort to reduce SADCC objectives without hurting themselves.

The reasons given by SADCC spokespersons for advocating reduction of economic dependence upon South Africa included fears in some countries. They feared that

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[235] M. Lee : The Political Economy of Development .., p.220.

[236] It should be noted over and above trading with SADCCmember states, the Republic also had strong trading relationship with the United Kingdom and the EEC.

[237] M. Lee : SADCC : The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa, p.220.

perhaps ultimately one or two countries, particularly Zimbabwe, in SADCC might replace the Republic as the nucleus of economic and transport links in the region. Indeed, as can be seen from trade flows between SADCC member states, Zimbabwe dominated intra-regional trade between 1982-84. Only 20 per cent of the intra-regional trade did not involve Zimbabwe. The situation is reflected in the identification of the most important trade flows in the region (1982-84):[238]

Table 6: The dominance of Zimbabwe in total intra-regional trade, 1982-1984.

From		To	%
Botswana	–	Zimbabwe	10 percent
Zambia	–	Zimbabwe	10 percent
Zimbabwe	–	Botswana	10 percent
Zimbabwe	–	Zambia	10 percent
Zimbabwe	–	Malawi	10 percent

Source : J. Haarlov : Regional Cooperation. Central elements of the SADCC Venture, CDR Research Report No. 14, 1988.

The above table depicts the concentration of trade flows around Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1984, which also implied the extreme difficulty of enhanced regional trade. In other words, SADCC states traded more with Zimbabwe than amongst themselves, and this posed the real threat of Zimbabwe's economic dominance over the region. This table differs from Table 5 in that the latter indicated the extent to which SADCC member countries traded amongst themselves. Table 6 shows the dominance of Zimbabwe in intra-SADCC trade. The significance of this table lies in the fact that it depicts the threat of dominance by any country in the region. It is used here to signify the multi-dimensional nature of SADCC. SADCC member states did not only want to reduce their economic dependence on the Republics, but they also resented dominance from within their ranks. Hence, they expressed their disquietness about Zimbabwe's monopolization of trade in the region.

The fact that a SADCC spokesperson overemphasised the economic over the moral and political reasons for wanting to reduce dependence on the Republic, caused panic and unhappiness among other member states. This economic argument has had the effect of

[238] M. Lee : SADCC – The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa, p.46.

reducing enthusiasm for the SADCC programme in some member countries, which suspected that the radical advocates of the programme, irrespective of the government in South Africa, have their countries' national interests in mind.[239] Thus, the political and economic arguments submitted had rekindled a debate on the rationale for the programmes and purpose of the organisation. Extreme dependence on any other country was undesirable, regardless of its ideological orientation; for it often turns out that today's ally becomes tomorrow's foe, and therefore discretion demands that no country should burn bridges.

Perhaps the single most important weakness of SADCC is found in its inclination to ignore the diversity and conflict of interest amongst its member states. The SADCC Programme of Action was implemented as though a complete congruence of interests among all nations existed. The diversity and conflict of interest of member states were more apparent: Of the nine SADCC member states, three belonged to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). They were the BLS countries. The SADCC programme expected them to reduce dependence on the Republic. However, the economic benefits of their SACU membership very much outweighed those of belonging to SADCC. Recent studies have revealed that during the 1981 to 1984 period, the amount of customs union revenue received by each of the three countries was significant as a percentage of total government revenue.[240] This was 30.6 percent for Botswana, 64.7 percent, for Lesotho and 61.4 per cent for Swaziland.[241] In 1987, fears were expressed in the Swaziland National Assembly that "the Customs Union agreement, which contributes more than sixty percent of the annual budget, could soon be scrapped because of mounting pressure on South Africa by the international community.[242] Members of Swaziland legislature wanted to know what would become of the Swazi economy in the event of such a decision was taken by South Africa. In the event of a contradiction between national interests of member states and regional concerns, member states opted for their national interest. Logically, a decision that was contrary to a member's interest was likely to cause security problems in the form of unrests. South Africa, for instance, used its economic muscle to show Zimbabwe who is the boss, by holding up cargo and imposing an unannounced embargo, in order to extract political and

239 K.S. Kongwa : SADCC: Seven Years Later, p.12.

240 G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A Post-Nkomati Evaluation, p.61.

241 Ibid. , p.61.

242 The Times of Swaziland, Mbabane, 26 January 1987.

diplomatic concessions.[243] Between November 1980 and January 1981, there was chaos in Zimbabwe, which resulted from the squeeze, and it had the potential of leading to internal political instability for the Zimbabwean government.

There did not seem to be a substitute source of revenue for the three countries in the SADCC arrangement. The situation was particularly acute for Lesotho and Swaziland whose annual imports of the period under discussion were estimated at over ninety percent of their total trade.[244] The BLS countries accounted for about sixty six percent of total South African trade with SADCC countries. South Africa traded with all SADCC countries except Angola and Tanzania.

Five out of nine SADCC member states had trade mission representatives with South Africa. They were Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Botswana. One, Malawi, had diplomatic relations with the Republic. These trade and diplomatic ties with six out of nine SADCC countries demonstrated the diversity of interests among SADCC member states, and posed a conflict of interest in the implementation of the SADCC Programme of Action. Six out of nine SADCC members, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland are landlocked. The economic interests of landlocked countries are quite different from those with coastal outlets. Therefore, economic considerations often outweighed political and moral considerations.

Two of the nine members belonged to the Rand Monetary Area, namely Swaziland and Lesotho. This was later known as the trilateral or common monetary area involving the RSA as the third member of the grouping. The realities of geography for a country like Lesotho compelled it to continue economic association with South Africa. It would be unreasonable for Lesotho to use harbours and ports other than South African ones because of their proximity to Lesotho. The added costs to Swaziland and Lesotho of importing from Zimbabwe instead of via the Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeneging (PWV) area did not make economic sense. It is completely encircled by the Republic. Gaborone's natural and economic route to the outside world is through Durban and not Beira or any other SADCC port. Swaziland's effort to establish local power stations had proved too costly for the country. As a result, attempts were made to resume electricity

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[243] Sunday Express, 13 September 1981.

[244] K. Kiljunen(ed): Mini-Nieo: the Potential of Regional North-South Cooperation, p.84.

imports from ESCOM.[245] Again, realities of geo-politics tended to perpetuate dependence on the RSA for countries like Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique in the area of employment. The fear of retaliatory action by the RSA was also a constraining factor. [246]

In addition to diversity and conflict of interest, SADCC nations differed on a number of issues depending on their ideological inclinations. The lack of unity of purpose on certain matters of policy had proved a limiting factor. SADCC was divided on the crucial issue of imposing sanctions against South Africa. Of the nine SADCC countries, only Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Mozambique have voiced opposition to the imposition of sanctions because of the ideological perception and geopolitical considerations. Of the nine countries once again, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho had diplomatic relations with Israel, which was against the recommendations of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and contradicted SADCC's perceived view that the famous Israeli military technology was partly responsible for South Africa's advanced military power.[247] These ideological and political diversities have had the effect of inhibiting greater foreign investment.

SADCC was never a homogeneous region. Like all economic organisations, the more developed ones tend to benefit more than the less developed members. Zimbabwe, for instance, was more interested in the manufacturing and industrial sector where it was most developed, and where it could derive maximum benefits. The allocation of sectoral responsibilities to member states, on the basis of decentralization and to enable each member equal participation and responsibilities, had not tended to give SADCC programmes little priority. Some countries lacked the required skills necessary to analyse and review the technical data and present the facts; others had simply not bothered because the sector allocated had no relevance to their national interests and competence. Indeed, SADCC did not possess a single unifying characteristic, except the fear of South Africa and opposition to apartheid.

The SADCC region was divided between the ideological moderates and ideological radicals; the English and the Portuguese speaking countries; smaller countries of less than

[245] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A Post-Nkomati Evaluation, p.61.

[246] Ibid.

[247] K.S. Kongwa : SADCC: Seven Years After, p.15.

1 million people and the bigger ones of between 10 and 22 million people. It was a region manifesting different economic development criteria. The countries ranged from the radical Marxist one party dictatorship of Mozambique and Angola, to the multi-party democracies of Botswana. [248]

Its continued dependence on foreign capital and South African entrepreneurship had increased over the years rather than diminished. The dependence on western capital had rekindled old labels of neo-colonialism. It had been impossible for SADCC to chart their own independent course of development. In the second half of the 1980s, the United States and other western donors insisted in various SADCC summits that continued or increased aid to its projects would depend on its willingness to move towards the free market system. This was in direct conflict to the socialist economic systems pursued by Marxist Angola, Mozambique and, to a limited extent, Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the US Senate amended the US policy on SADCC to link the USA – SADCC aid to the condemnation of terrorism. The two Marxist-oriented states of Mozambique and Angola were subsequently made to sign the 'Berlin Clause' by West Germany before the latter would authorise economic aid for SADCC projects in those countries. Due to the intensity of the civil war during the 1980s, it would have been impossible for a western power to support Marxist-oriented countries without themselves being accused of supporting communism. The 'Berlin Clause' was meant to commit the signatories to embrace market economies and democracy as was espoused by the nations of Western Europe.

One of the major difficulties ever to confront the SADCC organisation during the period under discussion was the security issue. This prevented the organisation from completing the action programme in the vital transport and communications sector. This was particularly manifest in Angola and Mozambique where the effects of the destabilization process by Unita and Renamo had halted and delayed the programme. SADCC programmes had been linked inextricably to the sanctions issue and the politics of liberation. As a result, exporters and importers have been rather reluctant to use the Mozambique routes except for non-perishables and non-essential goods. The security problem has had the effect of slowing down the level of private capital investment in the region. The agricultural sector has also suffered as a result, particularly in Mozambique and Angola. SADCC's hope of creating a regional food security programme, which

[248] G. Maasdorp : SADCC : A Post-Nkomati Evaluation, pp.65-66.

would have catered for basic food needs, attained national food self-sufficiency, eliminated food imports and provided for emergencies and drought, could not be achieved.

In summary, the foregoing review of SADCC's programmes and progress between 1980 and 1989 tend to reveal that the organisation's primary objective of '"reducing economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa", was not successfully met. Ten years after that objective was formulated, it is estimated that eighty percent of the trade of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was still passing through South Africa. Geopolitical considerations and diversity of national interests were the primary reasons, which had militated against the attainment of this objective.

Contrary to expectations and wishes of SADCC architects, the intra-SADCC trade was still small, and by the close of the decade of the 1980s, it went even smaller. The nine countries constituting SADCC continued to produce less for one another. In fact, since SADCC was formed, with the exception of Tanzania and Angola, all member states had increased their trade with South Africa. By 1988, intra-SADCC trade represented between four to five per cent of the total external trade of the SADCC countries. By the same period, Botswana's trade with the rest of SADCC countries stood at 11,9 percent, Lesotho stood at 0,1 percent, Malawi was 9,7 percent, Mozambique was 11,6 percent; Tanzania was 0,8 percent; Zambia was 3,5 percent and Zimbabwe 11,5 percent.[249] Unlike South Africa, SADCC states were not able to provide export credit. This was because the international commercial banking system tended to provide credit for commodities to the well-established world markets, where there was less financial risk. By 1988, SADCC was still grappling with this limitation by way of working on "an export pre-financing revolving fund for the region" and studies were underway regarding the possibility of establishing a regional export credit and guarantee facility, a regional stock market, or a development bank.[250] By 1990, all SADCC member states again with the exception of Tanzania and Angola still enjoyed more trade with the Republic of South Africa than with each other.[251] Total SADCC import trade with South Africa in the same

[249] P. De Castro van Dunon : "SADCC countries have chosen to resist rather than give in to Pretoria," in SADCC Energy, vol. 1, Feb – Apr 1984, p.220.

[250] Ibid.

[251] S. Kongwa : South Africa and SADCC countries in the 1990s, p.3.

year was estimated at US$2 billion annually and represented about thirty percent of total SADCC imports. This was seven times higher than intra-SADCC trade, which was estimated at five percent. South African imports from SADCC countries were worth a mere $45 and $300 million annually.

SADCC's intention of "forging links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration" was more an expression of political intent than a serious effort towards economic integration. One of SADCC's visible successes had been the ability to mobilise resources, albeit exclusively foreign " to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies". The most important achievement has been the realisation of the fourth objective, namely the mobilisation of the international donor community for the success of their programme. However, as will be stated later in the next section, this very success backfired as they replaced dependence on South Africa by increasing dependence on western countries. Their dependence on the west in turn led to further dependence on the Republic as the former tended to prefer to deal with SADCC member states through the Republic.

In conclusion, the remarkable feature of the trade between SADCC countries was its volume in both absolute and relative terms.

Table 7: Imports and exports of SADCC and the Republic of South Africa, 1984 (percent).

	Exports to		Imports from	
	SADCC	**RSA**	**SADCC**	**RSA**
1. Angola	-	-	0.2	-
2. Botswana	4.0	8.8	8.8	78.2
3. Lesotho	-	33.3	0.2	74.3
4. Malawi	8.6	7.3	11.1	40.4
5. Mozambique	11.7	4.4	5.1	11.7
6. Swaziland	1.1	37.0	0.3	90.0
7. Tanzania	1.9	-	1.1	-
8. Zambia	4.1	0.7	7.4	21.2
9. Zimbabwe	11.3	18.3	7.0	19.3
SADCC	3.8	9.3	3.7	36.7
RSA	9.6	-	2.8	-

Source: J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in southern Africa. General Approaches, SADCC and the World Bank, Avebury, England, 1997.

The above table indicates an average of around 4 per cent of trade amongst SADCC countries in 1984. The table further confirms that Lesotho and Swaziland were, indeed, insignificant economic players on the regional scene. Tanzania's share of regional exports was likewise low, and the registered nine per cent of imports might be due to special circumstances for the years in question. This leaves the middle group of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. For them regional trade had some, although modest, importance. Their share of intra regional exports was between six and nineteen percent and for imports between nine and nineteen percent. It can be noted that nine percent of SADCC's exports went to South Africa, and thirty seven percent of their imports originated in South Africa.

7. Conclusion

Owing largely to the geopolitics of the region, the SADCC member states have not had much success in fostering regional cooperation and development which would lead to the reduction of economic dependence on their giant neighbour, the Republic of South

Africa. South Africa has adopted different tactics to make sure SADCC member states did not marginalize her economically. She made efforts to thwart that objective. Since the 1980s, South Africa intensified her strategy of regional destabilization, wreaking havoc throughout the region by targeting the very countries which threatened her domestic stability but which were central to the success of SADCC. These include particularly Angola and Mozambique. The latter two countries were targeted for their strategic location in the region.

Angola had minerals and was a potentially rich economy. The Republic realized that it represented a cornerstone for the success of SADCC since member states would import their fuel from her, thus replacing South Africa as their major trading partner. As a state, which had access to the sea, it provided access to the sea to the majority of the landlocked states. Zambia and Zaire relied on Angola to transport their copper through the Benguela railway line. If this railway line were allowed to operate undisturbed, the South African transport systems and ports would have been rendered unnecessary to the mentioned states. Thus, SADCC's major objective of seeking to reduce their economic reliance on the Republic would have been promoted.[252] An operational copper-carrying Benguela railway line would greatly reduce Zambian and Zairian reliance on South African transport systems and ports for copper exports and food imports.[253]

Furthermore, Angola also rendered political and other support to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia. On the one hand, the South African military interventions into Angola in the late 1970s had made the MPLA government to perceive South Africa as "the enemy". It was prepared to risk granting overt military assistance to the ANC of South Africa and SWAPO. It provided military training camps for the ANC and SWAPO. In doing that, Angola felt ' politically, morally and ideologically obliged to help South Africa's enemies – whatever the consequences'[254]. The consequences were extensive. On the other hand, Angola's adoption of Marxism as the basic ideology of its post-independence government, as well as its commitment to socialist transformation,

[252] P. Johnson and D. Martin: Apartheid terrorism. The Destabilisation Report, p.159

[253] K. Pottinger: "Destabilisation or Propaganda. The great frontline debate." in Political Indicator, vol. 1 No.1, 1983, p.19

[254] J. Marcum : "Regional Security in Southern Africa – Angola." in Survival, vol. XXX, No. 1, 1988, pp.4-5.

posed a direct ideological challenge and a potential alternative to apartheid. All these factors gave the Republic a reason to destabilise Angola to the extent of rendering it less useful to the objectives of SADCC. However, these states could not successfully defend the safety of the Benguela railway line because of the inadequacy of their security forces, which could not match the South African Defence Force (SADF).

In September 1980, the South African Defence Force (SADF) moved into Angola, captured and destroyed Mavinga, a town in central Cuando – Cubanco that is 250km from Namibia. The biggest operation was " Operation Protea" in which SADF troops occupied all the main towns in Cunene for several weeks. In 1982, Angola's only iron ore mine, at Kassinga, was attacked, and a series of raids were conducted at the Lobito oil terminal, the Luanda oil refinery, and the Cabinda oil pipeline. [255] From early 1982, destabilisation was set to force the ANC out of all the neighbouring states. However, in Angola, facts proved otherwise. They pointed to the fact that Angola was being targeted for its importance to the success of SADCC. Infrastructure and installations were destroyed. The destruction and damage were inflicted particularly on factories, schools, hospitals, bridges, roads and industrial plants. The onslaught was extended to production. The effect further extended to affect the social, administrative and health services. The damage was estimated at $10 billion for the period 1975 – 1982. [256] South Africa carried out some attacks – backed by Unita forces, and the South African security forces themselves carried others.

Mozambique was in a similar situation as Angola . She was an important member of SADCC, and was subjected to the same type (albeit at a relatively smaller scale as compared to Angola) of military offensive. Its ports and harbours offered the only realistic alternative to continued economic dependence on the South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC countries.[257] The Nacala railway line represented Malawi's shortest route to the sea. It also serviced the landlocked Zambia. The Beira port was a natural outlet for other trade from the landlocked Zimbabwe and Malawi. Other states like Zambia, Zaire and Botswana could also use this route if they were to avoid South African ports. The port of Maputo was the natural alternative access to the

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[255] J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, pp.159-160.

[256] H.H Patel : "South Africa's destabilisation policy" in Zimbabwe News, vol. 18, No. 1, 1987.

[257] R. Davies and D. O'Meara : "Total Strategy in Southern Africa : An analysis of South Africa's Regional Policy since 1978" in Journal of Southern African Studies , vol. 11, No. 2, April 1985, p.201.

sea for Swaziland and Zimbabwe's bulk exports like sugar and steel. Of all these ports, Beira was the largest which if properly dredged, could handle the majority of the trade from southern Africa – to the detriment of the Republic. Thus, the optimal functioning of the Beira harbour was of strategic significance to the attainment of SADCC key objective of reducing economic dependence on the Republic. However, it was of such a poor quality that it appeared risky for SADCC countries to consider using it.

Owing to these factors mentioned above, the South African government attacked SADCC's transportation system, especially the railway line from Mozambique to Zimbabwe. This strategy was effected by employing various tactics. The most effective of all the strategies included the use of surrogate forces of Renamo, and the South African Defence Force. The destruction forced Zimbabwe and other users to revert to the South African port of Durban. South African forces destroyed the strategic bridge across the Pungwe River, thus making the Beira port inaccessible. The attempts by the Mozambican government to rebuild the port were frustrated by regular Renamo and SADF operations that made the port inaccessible for any purpose. As Gavin Maasdorp argued, the success of SADCC depended on the efficient operation of sectoral responsibilities, especially transport services.[258] He further argued that SADCC's success depended also on the maintenance of political stability in member countries. In order to prevent stability from setting in, South Africa disrupted SADCC's transportation network in all SADCC's maritime countries. Davies and O'Meara agree with Maasdorp's view that SADCC's success depended on member states' internal stability. They take the point further by asserting that the whole interaction between South Africa boiled down to the latter's intense struggle to assert its hegemony over the states of southern Africa, and to become the internationally recognised regional power in southern Africa.[259] Deon Geldenhuys argued that whatever it did in its relation with SADCC member states, South Africa was merely defending herself.[260] Whatever the merits and demerits of the above arguments, it is clear that South Africa had noticed the strategic position of both Angola and Mozambique to the success of its objective. The fact that she had no trade links with Angola seemed to have justified military offensive by the

[258] G.G. Maasdorp: "Squaring up to economic dominance: Regional Patterns", in R.I. Rotberg and H.S. Bienien South Africa and its neighbours. Regional security and self-interest, p.95.

[259] R. Davies and D. O'Meara: "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An analysis of South African Regional policy since 1978," in Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 2, No. 2, 1985, p.196.

[260] D. Geldenhuys: Diplomacy of Isolation. South African foreign policy making, pp.206-207.

Republic. Hence, their political instability and related inability to make use of alternative economic facilities meant that they would continue to rely on South African amenities, thus defeating the very objective of their organisation.

The railway line linking Maputo to Zimbabwe was mined periodically by South African insurgents. On December 9, 1982 South African troops blew up thirty four oil tanks in Beira valued at more than $US 40 million.[261] These actions caused severe shortages in Zimbabwe, which is what the action was intended to do. Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries of southern Africa were accordingly dissuaded from using Beira for exporting their commodities and other work through Maputo and Beira as the Renamo rebels had extended their activities to the strategic central and southern provinces of Mozambique.[262]

On the other hand, SADCC countries themselves had adopted development strategies that proved to deter its very objectives. SADCC's political commitment to the implementation of SADCC's Programme of Action cannot be doubted. However, their equal economic commitment was suspect. The reasons for this indecisiveness include their own intra-regional competition that impeded regional cooperation and development. Consequently, Malawi also suffered severely as it relied heavily on Mozambican railways and ports. Logically, control of Mozambique gave South Africa automatic control over Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi whose lifelines passed through South Africa or Mozambique.[263]

South Africa and the rebel forces of Renamo and Unita brought to Mozambique and Angola respectively an armed aggression which hampered the ability of the two states to fulfil their mandate as SADCC signatories and maritime states. SADCC projects, which were implemented in these two states, were disrupted. At the beginning of 1983 there was so much political and economic chaos in the region that it was speculated that the Frelimo government's collapse was on the horizon. At about the same time the South African Defence Force on a scale hitherto unknown invaded Angola. The significance of

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[261] A. Isaacson : "Regional security in southern Africa – Mozambique" in Survival, vol. xxx, No. 1, 1988, p.25

[262] Ibid.

[263] K. Pottinger: "Destabilisation or Propaganda. The great Frontline debate", in Political Indicator, vol. No. 1, 1983, p.19.

this discussion lies in the fact that SADCC's dream of using the two states as alternatives to South Africa was rendered unattainable.

The loose organisational structure of SADCC had contributed to the very survival of the organisation.[264] Its organizational structure was unique in that it was highly decentralized, and it operated a participatory system of functional delegation. This was specifically designed to avoid bureaucratic and technocratic delegation. The architects of SADCC wanted, and managed, to secure the maximum involvement of all member states.[265] Consequently, member states felt equally treated and respected. Unlike other regional organizations, SADCC attempted to integrate southern African regional economies at the level of production.[266] When they developed their strategies, SADCC member states considered the question of unequal distribution of benefits. They acknowledged that their economies stood at different levels of development, especially because they had achieved independence at different times. Accordingly, member states were allocated responsibilities according to their greatest potential.

Yet, it is this very looseness of the structure that served as a constraint on the achievement of its core objective, namely the reduction of economic dependence particularly on the Republic. Member states manipulated this loose structure by embracing the SADCC principles when it was advantageous for them to do so, but not adhering to them when there were no benefits for them. To this extent, SADCC member states themselves were responsible for the organisation's failures.

Trying to reduce economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa, was like cutting their own throat, thus committing 'economic suicide'. As the first president of Botswana noted at the inception of SADCC, the reality of geography imposed himself or herself in the economic sphere.[267] Six of the nine independent states of southern Africa are landlocked. As soon as the Republic had dealt, through destabilization, with the maritime states of Angola and Mozambique, all the other landlocked states were compelled to revert to South African routes and goods. The president of Tanzania, who was also the

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[264] It would be recalled that many regional structures in Africa and elsewhere collapsed because of their rigidity and bureaucratic inclinations.

[265] J. Hanlon : Beggar your neighbours .., p.95.

[266] C. Davids: The Impact of Economic Sanctions against South Africa on the SADCC States , p.19.

[267] A.J Nsekela (ed) : Southern Africa : Toward economic liberation, p.vii.

founder member of SADCC, confirmed these dilemmas when he mentioned that ' small nations are like indecently clad women, they tempt the evil-minded'.[268]

Although one may speak of mutual dependence in the region, i.e. interdependence between the Republic and the neighbouring states, virtually all relationships were highly asymmetrical in favour of the RSA so that it was less dependent on the region than vice versa.

These remarks apply to what in the conceptual discussion was termed sensitivity dependence, that is, a kind of dependence which in a short-term perspective (and long term in some cases) may involve high costs to the actors in question if policies were not changed to redress the problems. What was termed vulnerability dependence is, however, not necessarily equally high for all SADCC-states.

Although SADCC is a regional formation, it contained within it several other political and economic groups and individual nation states. On a general level, three groups of states can be identified. The first consists of Angola and Tanzania. They had very little or zero trade with the rest of the SADCC states. The second group is made up of the SACU members Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (and South Africa). Their extensive trade with South Africa characterized them. Seventy five to ninety percent of their imports came from South Africa, and three of the countries exported twenty five to thirty seven percent of their goods to South Africa. Only Botswana exported less to South Africa since it was exporting the bulk of its diamonds to the international market. It was also the only SACU member state, which recorded above average intra-SADCC trade figures, while this trade was negligible for the others.

The last group, encompassing Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe maintained the highest intra-SADCC trade with between 4 and 12 per cent of exports, and between 5 and 11 per cent of imports within the community. The level of trade with South Africa fluctuated between the first and second country group. It ranged between 1 to 20 per cent of exports and from twelve to forty percent of imports.[269] The data suggest that in the period under review, that is the 1980s, a SADCC regional trade arrangement was most

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[268] Ibid. p.vii

[269] J. Haarlov: Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa. General approaches, SADCC and the World Bank, pp.98-99.

relevant to this last group, possibly supplemented by Botswana. Nevertheless, the group had even larger trade indices with South Africa.

In conclusion, at no stage did South Africa regard its trade with SADCC countries as negligible. The fact that South Africa consciously retained economic and political ties with all the independent states, confirms that she recognised the region as an important market for her goods. As the sanctions campaigns intensified, it became clear that South Africa was increasingly sidelined in international markets as a symbol of the rejection of its policies of separate development. Lastly, it is important to note that SADCC's objectives were difficult, almost impossible, to implement from the outset. This is largely because of the connectedness of the economies of all states in southern Africa, a situation that had been rooted in the colonial period.

SADCC member states congratulated each other, in1989, on the fact that the organisation had survived and prospered for a decade despite having operated within the most negative economic environment, and against a background of regional conflict and confrontation. This was cause for celebration because few had expected the organisation to survive. The most convincing reason at the time of its inception was the suspect viability of the project based on precedence. The organisation was formed soon after the forlorn attempt at regional cooperation in East Africa. Other critiques questioned whether a regional grouping that excluded the most powerful and dynamic economy in the region, Republic of South Africa, could take off at all, let alone survive and prosper. Within this context, survival alone constituted success amongst SADCC member nations – however modest the real tangible successes were.

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