Chapter 2


The impact of the exile experience on the functioning of liberation movements in Southern Africa is a broad and complex subject. As a result, this chapter does not provide full details, but extrapolates, instead, from the vast information, generalisations which constitute a paradigm within which the exile experience of the PAC should be understood. In the following chapters the issues raised about the exile environment and experience are not resuscitated and linked to the internal conflict in the PAC because that does not constitute the main purpose of the study. Only in isolated instances are such connections made. The study rather focuses on an examination of relations within the PAC. The significance of this chapter in relation to the chapters that follow, is that it provides a background, context and state of affairs in the entire Southern African region during the period when liberation movements were in exile. It seeks to outline the main contextual developments in the region in order to underline the argument it advances. The argument is that the exile environment was precarious and hostile but presented, at the same time, opportunities for liberation movements, which even though marginal, would have been otherwise unavailable in their home countries. The chapter defines the frontiers of conflict, the diplomatic maneuvers and also examines profiles of countries at the center stage of the conflict. It concludes that all these factors accounted for the exile experience of liberation movements. At the core of this experience was the imperative to operate discretely, intervention in internal party affairs by the OAU-Africa Liberation Committee (the main funder), pressure from the OAU and Frontline States that liberation movements should fight the ‘enemy’ or negotiate political settlements, a contestation among liberation movements (e.g. between the PAC and ANC of South Africa) for a hegemonic terrain and authentic status before the OAU, host countries and the United Nations. On the whole, fear, pressure, uncertainty, competition and in-party rivalries which attracted interference by the host countries, characterised the exile experience of liberation movements but the preponderance, intensity and impact of these factors varied
over historical periods. It should be noted that the vastness of the issues dealt with in this chapter disrupts, in a way, the logical flow of the narrative, hence the discussion is divided into sub-headings. A clearly defined periodisation has also been framed in order to develop more intelligible categories of issues and events

**Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.**

Among the problems underlying the analysis in this chapter, are issues of conceptual meaning. They relate, firstly, to the use of the concept “experience” as an analytical category. The question which immediately arises “is how experience itself can be conceptualised and understood as a constituent in the production of historical meanings”.¹ Experience as an analytical category is slippery and elusive, hence this chapter chooses to establish a working definition which befits the context of the discussion. At one level experience can be conceptualised as a process and at another level as an object, i.e. “the cumulative body of knowledge associated with it”.² On the second level, experience refers “to lived experience of the past not so much in itself, but rather in terms of the congealed knowledge that is derived from it, both individually and collectively. It consists as well, though always contentiously, in the lessons of the past”.³ Without engaging in extensive essentialist debates about the meaning of ‘experience’, this chapter uses the concept to describe and analyse the lived collective experiences of individual liberation movements that went into exile within the borders of Southern Africa during the period 1960 to 1994.

The second issue is about the meaning of “exile” or exile liberation movement. “Scholars have conceptualised and theorised about the exile phenomenon in different ways”.⁴ Some have adopted a “legal definition of political exiles as refugees”, as contained in the United Nation’s Convention of 1951 which stated that:

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³ *Ibid*.
“a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his (her) nationality and is unable owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself (herself) of the protection of the country, or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.  

Studies conducted by Leon and Rebecca Grinberg on “Psychoanalytic perspectives on migration and exile” and Egon Kunz’s “The refugee in flight: kinetic models and forms of displacement”, conspicuously lack reference to the exiles political activities, which was “the essence of exile life as opposed to that of other groups of refugees”. The political activities of exiles were an expression of their self-understanding and mission in exile. The most revealing definition of political exiles, which is adopted in this research is advanced by Y. Shain in his article, “Who is a political exile? Defining a field of study for political science”. Shain describes a political exile as an expatriate who engages in political activities directed against the political system in the home regime and the activities are intended to create conditions or circumstances that will be favourable to his or her return. Flowing from this definition, it is clear that individuals who were members of organisations which pursued these goals constituted an exile liberation movement.

Very little attempt is made in academic research and popular literature on exile liberation movements to relate exile experience to how it affected the functioning of liberation movements. Nathan Shamyrira’s work ‘Liberation Movements in Southern Africa’, for example, does not examine either the exile experience of liberation movements in Southern Africa nor the impact of such experience on the functioning of the liberation movements. His work focuses, instead, on broad theoretical questions such as the ‘nationalist or class’ character of the liberation movement in Southern Africa, the nature of imperialism in Southern Africa and the problems of liberation organisations in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. However, the most informative aspect of

6 S. Fiken: “Exile and Return”, p. 3.
his work is on ‘the liberation strategy of Frontline States’. He investigates the role of the Frontline states in the liberation of Southern Africa and their efforts to encourage unity among liberation movements. In addition he outlines issues of political-economy which were fundamental to the many problems emerging states in Southern Africa had to contend with in the 1970’s. These problems fostered a relationship of partial dependence on Apartheid South Africa and the West. Andrew Prior’s work on “South African Exile Politics” also displays problems identified in Shamyrira’s work. He does not survey the exile environment or identify the kind of problems exile liberation movements had to deal with. Instead, he examines the history of the ideological relationship between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). He did not indicate how this relationship was actually affected by conditions of exile. Tom Lodge’s analysis of the exile experience of the PAC and ANC (1960 – 1975), the ANC (1976-1986) lacked detail of the actual experience of exile; it is a descriptive rendition of the exile environment and explains the theoretical categories into which the problems of exile liberation movements could be classified. While this is significant in so far as it sheds light on what the exile environment was like during the period 1960-1975, it also raises more questions than it answers. One of these questions is what would be the typical exile experience of a liberation movement in Southern Africa? Would such experiences vary over time or would there be generic elements which transcend historical periods?

The gaps in the literature about the exile experience of liberation movements attest to the tendency to examine the exile experiences of liberation movements as isolated incidents. This approach portrays the experience of exile movements as discrete and fragmented; as though it was devoid of connecting threads. It also highlights the failure to identify, examine and integrate common features which are typical of the experience of exile. In addition to this no analysis has been done on how exile liberation movements, functioned in general and how their common experiences impacted on their operations. John

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Marcum’s work “The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness” is the only essay which attempts to survey the environment of exile and examines the technical and existential problems of liberation movements in Southern Africa. Marcum’s work, even though widely celebrated, is also general. It is weak on sources because sources available today were unavailable at the time of his research. The veil of secrecy around the functioning of liberation movements and conditions of exile had not been lifted. Hence his analysis of the role of South Africa in the destabilisation of neighbouring states, for instance, hardly went beyond the analysis of media reports. Besides that the views of historical actors during this important period were lacking and did not inform his analysis.

This chapter seeks to respond to these issues as it examines the broad experience of exile liberation movements and shows how they impacted on their functioning. The chapter demonstrates that exile experience possesses a comprehensible structure which is intelligible. This was done by defining the connecting threads which weave together the seemingly discrete and seamless elements of exile experience into an intelligible whole. Firstly, it examines the nature of the exile environment, but focuses on Southern Africa. Secondly, the common experiences of liberation movements, their reactions and adaptation to the exile environment are analysed. Lastly, an overview of the impact of exile experience on the functioning of these movements is offered which provides a background to the analysis of how the PAC dealt with the experiences of exile during this period.

2.2. The Exile Environment: An Overview.

By ‘exile environment’ reference is made to the Southern African socio-political and economic environment. It infers the totality of circumstances which defined the nature of life in the host countries where outlawed political movements for national liberation operated in order to continue the liberation struggles against unpopular regimes in their

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home countries. The way various liberation movements dealt with the circumstances of exile constituted their experiences of exile.

The exile environment was characterised by threats, opportunities and challenges which were the result of the interaction of a variety of factors both internal and external to the host countries. This framework informs the understanding and analysis of exile experiences of liberation movements in Southern Africa discussed in this chapter.

For the exile liberation movements, the Southern Africa environment was generally precarious, dynamic and unstable. These characteristics manifested themselves over time. The dialectic of continuity and change defines the generic factors which characterised this environment in a trans-historical fashion, despite historical specificity and peculiarities of experience.

The exile environment in which Southern African liberation movements operated during the period 1960 to 1990 was characterised first and foremost by a pervasive counter-insurgency war which caused devastation across the Southern African continent.\(^{13}\) Simultaneously, the face of Southern Africa was rapidly changing, as one after the other, country on the continent obtained independence. Counter-insurgency was nonetheless also mounting. It was led and fed by the Portuguese occupied territories of Angola and Mozambique until 1975, Rhodesia until 1980 and Apartheid South Africa until 1994. As a result “no neighbouring state” was “able or willing to provide secure rear base for guerrilla infiltration into South Africa, and none seemed likely to do so openly” until 1994.\(^{14}\)

There are three periods which make the analysis of the exile environment intelligible, i.e. the period 1960 to 1968; 1969 to 1976 and 1977 to 1990. What informs this periodisation are the events which occurred in Southern Africa which profoundly impacted on the region and changed the dimensions of unfolding events. The period 1960 to 1968, was a period of the establishment of the ‘first generation’ of independent states.


in Southern Africa. During this period, Tanzania became independent in 1961, in Kenya the Mau Mau insurrection was over and Kenya became independent in 1962. Malawi and Zambia followed in 1964. Botswana and Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland became independent in 1968. These developments generated a mood of optimism among the colonised peoples of Southern Africa. Hence the ‘winds of change’ statement of Harold MacMillan captured the nature and trend of developments in Africa during this period. At the same time, counter-insurgency was on the rise. The South African government began to establish its apparatus of counter-insurgency in the three former British Protectorates. The police mobile units (PMUs) were set up in Lesotho and Swaziland in 1963. “The PMU was a paramilitary, formed ostensibly for border security”, but in reality it was a South African police agent which served the role of alerting South Africa about the presence of PAC, ANC and SWAPO guerrillas in Lesotho. In 1965 the white government in Rhodesia declared a ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence’ and the South African government announced in 1967 that the SA police would fight together with Rhodesian security forces to combat acts of terrorism against Rhodesia and South Africa. Hence in May 1968, the first counter-insurgency group called the ‘Hunters’ was formed inside South Africa. It was initially constituted by members of the South African Irish Regiment, a citizenry force which was part of the South African Defence Force (SADF). The same year the SADF leadership had decided to concentrate on Special Force warfare and counter-insurgency, rather than conventional warfare. This set the tone for the developments which characterised the period 1969 to 1976.

From the late 1960’s to 1976, the optimism of this period contested the mounting intransigence of the remaining colonised states such as Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. The role of Lesotho, 

18 B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania, p. 183.
20 P. Stiff: The Silent War, p. 62.
Swaziland and Botswana as locations of counter-insurgency activities increased to varying degrees. From 1971 to 1976, the South African government, through its intelligence wing called BOSS (Bureau of Security Service), launched an initiative aimed at the destabilisation of Zambia, the home of the ANC and the initiative was code named ‘Operation Dingo’.  This marked the beginning of a proliferation of similar covert operations against neighbouring states as will be examined later in the chapter. Between the years 1975 to 1976, South Africa was involved in the war in Angola. The Angolan war had a significant impact on the political developments in Southern Africa and heightened the level of tensions between the communist East (represented by the former Soviet Union) and the capitalist West (represented by the United States of America). The independence of Mozambique in 1975 and Angola in 1976 and the socialist inclination of the regimes in these territories heightened the tensions in the regions.

The following period, 1977 to 1994, was dominated by a ‘silent war’ waged by the South African government in collaboration with Rhodesian security forces (initially between 1977 and 1980 and with ex-Rhodesian soldiers and intelligence group from 1980 to 1994) against the Frontline States.  In essence, this involved a covert and tacit war against liberation movements in the countries which hosted them.

Alongside the tacit wars, strategic and diplomatic initiatives by the South African government culminated in bilateral agreements, an example of which was the ‘Nkomati Accord’ between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984.  These developments forced liberation organisations such as the ANC, to shift the focus of their military and political strategies. They decided to wage war inside the borders of South Africa hence the uprisings of 1984 to 1986 in various parts of South Africa. Even in the PAC during this period, the emphasis was on the ‘home-going’ program, a strategy designed to make

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the revolution assume an internal character, hence their notion of a people’s war. As a result, the period was characterised by increased mass mobilisation against Apartheid inside the South African boarders. Uprisings which occurred from June 16 1976 and again from March 1985 were important landmarks showing the changes of strategy and attempts to revive the liberation struggle within the borders of South Africa. At the same time more space for the operation of liberation movements such as SWAPO, the ANC and the PAC was opened outside South Africa following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. In other words, the period was essentially an era of despair and hope for the peoples of Southern Africa. Hope was generated by the fact that the majority of Southern African states had gained their independence. The independence of Zimbabwe and the commitment of the new government in Zimbabwe to support the liberation movements served as a source of hope. 24 There was despair in the sense that the Communist block, which was a major support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa, was on the brink of collapse. The economies of would-be socialist governments such Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola and Zambia, were not strong enough to sustain support for South African exiles for much longer. On the other hand, the role of the Frontline States as beacons of hope for freedom, was beginning to intensify. These issues will be examined, though not in detail, in the later sections of this chapter in order to explain the broad context of the exile conditions. This will involve an examination of the socio-political and economic conditions of the ‘Frontline States’ (which included Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola with Zimbabwe joining in 1980), the role of the OAU, the former British Protectorates (which included Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana), and the super-powers (such as the US) and lastly the roles of the governments of Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa during this period. All this is intended to frame the context of exile experience and to outline the environment of exile liberation movements in Southern Africa.

2.2.1. The Frontline States and the OAU in the Southern African Conflict.

An analysis of the exile environment in Southern Africa which ignores the role of the OAU and Frontline States is incomplete and provides a distorted picture. The two organisations were critical actors in Southern Africa and on the entire African continent during the period focused on by this study. The Organisation of Africa Unity, formed in 1963, was the umbrella organisation of all African states. The Frontline States emerged in the context of the broad mandate of the OAU as stated in the OAU Charter. The OAU Charter committed all member states to a fight for the eradication of colonialism in its different forms.\(^{25}\)

2.2.1.1. The Emergence of ‘the Frontline States’ Phenomenon.

The Frontline States can therefore be defined as a grouping of independent Southern African states such as Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana, which shared a common vision about the political and economic developments in Southern Africa and had common policies towards South Africa based on their adherence to the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration of 1975.\(^{26}\)

The Frontline States (FLS) began as an informal consultation forum between the Tanzanian President, Julias Nyerere and Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda in the mid-1960s. What precipitated the negotiations between the two heads of states, was their concern about “the institutional paralysis that characterised the formulation of African positions on Southern Africa by the OAU”.\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\) Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Preamble and Article II (1) (d); D. Venter: *Africa and the Comity of Nations*, p. 1.


to evolve a regional framework addressing problems relating to liberation movements and the future of Southern Africa in general. The OAU’s most important contribution towards this end was to situate the Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam. This essentially gave Tanzania a head-start in making significant contributions to the course of liberation. It also enabled Nyerere to weave an elaborate set of friendships with potential leaders of independent states in Southern Africa”.  

As Nyerere explained

“long before the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia started, the only real FLS were Tanzania and Zambia. Kaunda and I decided that we should invite representatives of liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola. The two of us should not be discussing strategies for liberation without them. This is how we began to invite the leaders of Mozambique and Angola to our meetings. At that stage Tanzania and Zambia provided guerrilla camps. We would receive recruits, train them and equip them with arms to go out and fight. I used to tell them that after independence we needed a liberated zone of independent states in Southern Africa. Once we had these independent countries stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic that would be a really powerful challenge to South Africa. We all agreed to this”.  

The informal consultation between Nyerere and Kaunda gradually developed and was broadened to involve Zaire, Kenya, Uganda and Botswana, following the independence of the latter in 1966. The consultation forums which took place afterwards, resulted in the formulation of the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969. Zaire, Kenya and Uganda were soon out of the process because of their ambivalent positions with regard to the support of the liberation movements and their internal political problems which made it difficult to commit to the Lusaka Manifesto. The consultation forum evolved into a larger close-knit group after 1975 when Mozambique and Angola were included following their independence. The perception of a distinct sub-regional system in Southern Africa began to be more and more attractive to the heads of states.

Since 1975, the context in which the FLS were born was characterised, by the expansion of geographical and political boundaries of decolonisation following the liberation of Mozambique in 1975 and Angola in 1976. This provided an opportunity to establish a

framework for collaboration in order to resolve regional conflicts. The independence of Angola “bequeathed a legacy of extra-regional intervention in Southern Africa” which had a significant impact on the process of political change which occurred after 1976.\(^{30}\)

The context, on the other hand, was characterised by the threat and resistance of white minority ruled regimes in Southern Africa, especially before 1976. The informal alliance which included South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia was arrayed against independent Africa. With the strong backing of South Africa, the informal tripartite alliance was instrumental in not only blunting the wave of decolonisation that was sweeping over much of Southern Africa, but also undermining the independence of liberated former Colonies.\(^{31}\) The perimeter of white redoubt was made more impregnable by the unwillingness of “external powers to seek greater involvement in the region.

Considerable stakes in economic arrangements with South Africa, Portuguese presence in NATO and a general ambivalence towards national liberation characterised Western attitudes towards the region”.\(^{32}\) Given this background, one would understand why great powers could not display a sense of urgency with regard to the need to alter the situation in Southern Africa. The involvement of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba in the Angolan war was the only instance which precipitated the great powers to act swiftly. It underlined the significance of the war in Southern Africa to global peace and the balance of power.

The Frontline States were recognised by the OAU as champions of Southern African affairs in the OAU during the period under discussion. One of the main tasks of the OAU, from its inception, was to formulate an “African strategy with regard to the problems in Southern Africa”.\(^{33}\) With the formation of the FLS, this activity became a shared one between the two organisations. Active opposition to minority rule in Southern Africa and support for the liberation movements became criteria used after 1975 to determine the

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\(^{30}\) G.M. Khadiagala: **Allies in Adversity**, p. 20.


eligibility of a state to be part of the Frontline States or not. The liberation of Southern Africa became the major reason for the existence of the Frontline States.

Towards the end of the 1970’s, the activities of the FLS went beyond the promotion of regional conflict resolution and began to encompass issues of regional economic development. Hence, in 1980, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference emerged as an offshoot of the various initiatives of the Frontline States to address issues of regional economic development. Whereas the Frontline States facilitated political liberation through diplomatic initiatives and political support for liberation movements, the SADCC’s role was to support economic liberation ‘through coordinated development initiatives’. One of the major goals of the SADCC was to rebuild the shattered economies of member states (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe) and reduce economic dependence, particularly on South Africa. Unlike the association of Frontline States, the SADCC charter was based on the international recognition of independent states within Southern Africa. Ideological difference, especially between Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi on the one hand (with Botswana sitting uncomfortably in the middle) and the Frontline States, was put aside and emphasis was placed on those issues which united them as Southern African states. It was realised that their economies needed to be liberated from excessive dependence on the Republic of South Africa. They needed to “overcome the imposed economic fragmentation” and coordinate efforts towards regional and national economic development. The SADCC relied on foreign donors for project funding and on collective efforts aimed at getting the supplies of products from member states rather than from South Africa. The strategy of the new organisation emphasised the common ground among members and avoided tensions which might result in divisions.

What is important to note is that relationships, whether good or bad, generated among member states in these structures, were an issue to be dealt with carefully by the exile liberation movements. It was important for the latter to do a balancing diplomatic exercise in order to preserve sanctuaries already acquired and maintain goodwill from all Southern African states. To the PAC and the ANC this was critical, not only for the material support they needed, but also for infiltration routes into South Africa.

2.2.1.1.2. Profiles Of The Frontline States.

This section provides an overview of some of the outstanding aspects of the states which constituted the Frontline States of Southern Africa. This provides an explanation of why liberation movements were afforded certain treatment in certain countries and not in others.

The Frontline States can be grouped in the following manner:
Tanzania and Zambia constitute one category because they were the first to obtain independence, were the founder members of the FLS movement and were the home of liberation movements such as the ANC, SWAPO, ZANU, PAC and BCM. The second group is the ‘BLS’ states (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) which were former British protectorates. The third category is the former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique and lastly Zimbabwe.36

Tanzania and Zambia.

The two countries obtained their independence in the early 1960s, Tanzania in 1961 and Zambia in 1964. Both economies were primarily producers of raw material during the colonial era. After independence they had to deal with the legacy of underdevelopment which increased their dependence on South Africa and foreign investment.

Zambia was economically dependent on South Africa. In 1984 for instance, Zambia ran a trade deficit totaling over US$100 million\(^{37}\). Zambia’s dependency on South Africa was worsened by the fact that the country is land-locked without access to a port and harbour facilities. Her dependent economic status was aggravated by the decline in copper prices since 1975. Zambia’s dependence on copper was the root cause of many economic problems during this period. “The high price of oil and the low price of copper had combined to throw a series of positive balance of payments into deficit; since 1975, Zambia has had a positive balance of payments except in 1979, when the value of copper and cobalt rose momentarily. Between 1974 and 1978, Zambia’s terms of trade deteriorated by 52 percent. From a peak in 1974, copper prices fell by 40 percent in 1975, while import prices rose by an average 16 percent per year”.\(^{38}\) The economic difficulties the country was facing provoked political discontent which resulted in two failed attempts to overthrow President Kaunda, firstly in October 1980 and in June 1981.\(^{39}\)

Trade Union strikes and political unrest in the townships resulted in a repressive and defensive stance by the government. President Kaunda defended his one-party polity and would not tolerate criticism. Because of the economic and internal political pressures, the President of Zambia was often forced to enter into negotiations which sacrificed his stand as a member of the Frontline States and was constantly in conflict with other members who could not understand his departure from a principled position.

Tanzania placed itself in an equally dismal position as Zambia. Three years after the formation of the state of Tanzania, President Nyerere announced, at the Arusha Conference in October 1967, a policy for the reconstruction and development of Tanzania based on socialist principles. This came to be known as ‘African Socialism’. The broad policy objectives of the new economic approach were social equity, self-reliance, and transformation in all spheres of life to eliminate poverty.\(^{40}\) The manner in


which the new approach to socialism was implemented created hostilities among the rural population who were forced to leave their villages to occupy the ‘Ujamaa’ villages. By the early 1980’s the total failure of Ujamaa caused people to drift back to the lands they had left and were hostile to the government. The Tanzanian socialist policy served to isolate the country from Western countries, some of which were keen to support Tanzanian development. Besides that, the policy was forced upon rural people who were skeptical from the very beginning.

Domestic problems were not only limited to the economic policies of Nyerere. “There had been some Zanzibari discontent, especially since 1988, with the continuing union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania”. The debate around the viability of one-partyism and prospects for political pluralism, given the developments in Eastern Europe also surfaced in Tanzania during this period.

In both countries, a threat of domestic instability loomed due to a combination of economic and political factors outlined above. Internal political dissatisfaction was caused by the intolerance of the ruling parties to political pluralism. Nonetheless, the two countries never relented on their commitment and support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Hence both Zambia and Tanzania, continued until 1990 to provide a haven for the ANC, PAC, BCM and other elements of the liberation movement.

The BLS States - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

The three former British territories obtained independence in the 1960’s with Botswana and Lesotho in September and October 1966, respectively and Swaziland in 1968. From the outset the three new independent states had to deal with the reality of dependence on

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41 Ibid., pp. 3-58; P Esterhuysen: Africa A-Z, Continental and Country Profiles, p. 343.
43 Ibid.
South Africa. Hence Sir Seretse Khama, the new Prime Minister of Botswana said at his inaugural ceremony,

“we fully appreciate that it is wholly in our interests to preserve neighbourly relations with the Republic of South Africa. Our economic links with South Africa are virtually indissoluble. We are tied directly to South Africa – communications, for markets, for our beef, for labour in the mines, and in many other respects”\(^44\).

This utterance was echoed by Leabua Jonathan at Lesotho’s independence celebrations in October 1966. He emphasized the importance of peaceful co-existence between South Africa and Lesotho because Lesotho could not grow and prosper in isolation. When Swaziland obtained her independence in September 1968, Mr Sukuti, the deputy Prime Minister remarked that “South Africa is most important to us and we realize that without its help and co-operation we would be in a difficult position – independence or no independence”.\(^45\)

Venter was not exaggerating the situation when he asserted that “at the most extreme were the BLS states which, as members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), were firmly integrated into South Africa’s trading orbit”.\(^46\) All the BLS states had economic links with South Africa and were heavily dependent on these links since their internal resources were underdeveloped. They were merely exporters of raw material and labour to Europe and South Africa. This continued unabated after independence. By 1984 each one of the BLS countries ran a trade deficit in excess of US$100 million with South Africa.\(^47\)

The position of the BLS countries was exacerbated by the fact that geographically they are land-locked and had no useable port and harbour facilities, hence their dependence on South Africa for both ports and efficiently run railways. In addition, they also depended

\(^{44}\) G.M. Cockram: Vorster’s Foreign Policy, p. 124.
\(^{46}\) D. Venter: South Africa and the Comity of Nations, p. 11.
on South Africa for employment of the majority of their labour force. It was estimated that in 1984 Lesotho had 140,000, Swaziland 20,000 and Botswana 25,000 of their labour force working in South Africa. In 1984, it was estimated that the remittances from Lesotho migrant workers “amounted to M507 million as compared to a gross domestic product (GDP) of M401 million in Lesotho”. In other words, besides the economic dependence perpetuated by the sabotage and military raids by the South African defence force in the mid 1980’s, the BLS countries already had a history of dependence on South Africa. As a result of these circumstances, these countries were less overt in the condemnation of South Africa among the Frontline States. “It was readily accepted by all parties in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland prior to independence that they would have to play a very minor role in the Pan-African campaign of coercing South Africa to abandon apartheid by isolation, boycotts and even violence. Experience had also clearly indicated, in the run-up to independence, that South Africa would never allow them to harbour people suspected of revolutionary political activities in South Africa”.

Therefore, the relations between the BLS countries and South Africa represented a delicate balancing act reflecting the fact that geography and economic dependency made any confrontational stance unviable. Even though they supported the liberation movement and were members of SADCC and the Frontline States, they never allowed liberation movements such as the ANC and the PAC to establish military bases in their countries or to use their territory as an infiltration corridor into South Africa. At a Lusaka meeting of non-aligned states, Seretse Khama of Botswana underscored this when he emphasised that “there is a limit beyond which our contributions cannot go without endangering our very independence”. Botswana alone insisted that she would accommodate only refugees recognised in terms of the country’s law and international law whether South Africa agreed with it or not. The other two countries, Lesotho and Swaziland followed suit and as a result, the ANC and the PAC could not maintain

48 D. Venter: South Africa and the Comity of Nations, p. 12.
49 Ibid.
guerrilla camps in these countries. Political refugees escaping South Africa’s police networks had to leave the BLS countries, especially after the 1985 SADF raid into Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. Despite this situation, members of the liberation movement still enjoyed support in the BLS countries because these countries were fully supportive of the struggles against colonialism and racism.

**Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe.**

The two Portuguese territories were liberated in 1975 and 1976 respectively whereas Zimbabwe was liberated in 1980. The three countries obtained more than half of their imports from South Africa. Besides, that South Africa had invested in the physical infrastructure in those countries, e.g. the Cahora Bassa scheme in Mozambique and the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme in Angola.  

Zimbabwe’s labour force employed in South Africa in 1984 was estimated at 7000 and the Mozambican labour force totalled to 60,000. Zimbabwe had to reconcile her rejection of Apartheid South Africa with the realities of pragmatic economics. South Africa was Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner and in 1980, over half of Zimbabwe’s total capital stock was foreign owned, with South African interests holding about 25 per cent. By late 1987, almost 90 per cent of Zimbabwe’s external trade and fuel supplies depended on South African transportation networks. This level of dependence on South Africa was exposed in 1987 when South Africa imposed selective oil and trade embargoes as a retaliatory move against Zimbabwe for her involvement in the economic sanctions campaign against South Africa. Zimbabwe was forced to extend a preferential trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe and open a trade mission in Johannesburg in 1987.

Angola was the only one of the three countries without clear and stable economic links with South Africa because of the state of war in the country during this period. Similar to

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52 D. Venter: *South Africa and the African Comity of Nations*, p. 11.
56 D. Venter: *South Africa and the African Comity of nations*, p. 23.
Mozambique which was affected by war against the South African sponsored RENAMO, Angola did not have peace since independence because of the civil war between Unita and the MPLA government. “Nevertheless, Angola provided five military training camps to the ANC”. The question of the hosting of liberation movements had to be reconsidered following the peace agreements Angola signed with South Africa in order to end the involvement of outside forces in that country. The first one of these agreements was the 1984 Lusaka Accord, which committed both South Africa and Angola to a ceasefire agreement and withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. In 1988 another agreement was signed between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, in New York. This paved the way for the final withdrawal of South African troops and the finalisation of talks for the independence of Namibia. This had serious implications for the presence of ANC guerrilla forces in Angola who had to be expelled from the country in 1989.

During the same period, developments in Mozambique were also unfavourable to the liberation movements, particularly, the ANC and to a lesser extent the PAC (which had no camps in Mozambique but used the country for transit purposes into South Africa). Since independence Mozambique suffered repeated military attacks from RENAMO. From 1980 RENAMO received support from South Africa. The impact of the attacks was so profound that the country was pulverized into a condition of famine and destruction. As a result of these conditions Mozambique entered into a non-aggression pact called the Nkomati Accord, designed to halt SADF support for RENAMO in exchange for Mozambique denying military bases to the ANC. This represented a major setback for the liberation movement because ANC military operations were terminated and its cadres flown out of Mozambique as a sign of commitment by the Mozambican government to the signed peace accord. The Nkomati Accord failed because of the covert operations by South African military intelligence which continued even after the signing of the agreement. This is covered in the sections below.


2.1.1.3. The South African Offensive.

During the period 1960 – 1990, South Africa was at the center of the conflict in Southern Africa. This can be attributed to her military and economic power. The lack of will from major Western powers to support the liberation movements in Southern Africa due to their anti-communist ideological orientation, tipped the balance of forces in the conflict in South Africa’s favour. South Africa adjusted her strategy regularly, but it nevertheless displayed some elements of continuity during the following periods; 1961-1975 and 1977 to 1990. The initial period was characterised by ‘assertive incorporation’ and dialogue whereas the latter was dominated by the ‘carrot and a stick’ approach in dealing with independent neighbouring Southern African states. 59 During the period 1961-1975, South Africa tried to incorporate her neighbouring states into a South Africa dominated economic union, “a constellation of states”, hoping that more economic co-operation and dependent political co-existence with South Africa could be forged. 60 When this failed South Africa had to embark on a multilateral strategy characterised by economic and technological support for co-operating governments and military attacks on those states suspected of harbouring ANC and PAC militants. After 1976, following the independence of Mozambique, the geo-political and security situation changed and South Africa felt more vulnerable to the perceived communist onslaught from the north. Hence South Africa’s new ‘forward defense’ strategy which involved military attacks across international borders against ANC camps, individuals and groups located within neighbouring states. 61 It involved, on the one hand, attempts to diminish the hostility of the neighbours by offering economic support, while on the other hand, it sought to destabilise the regimes by means of economic and military pressure. 62

60 Ibid. 174-186; D. Venter: South Africa and the African Comity of Nations, pp. 1-72;
L. Kapungu: Southern Africa and the role of SADCC, pp. 43-51.
The cross-border raids by South Africa, ostensibly targeted at ANC and PAC exiles had a negative effect on most states in Southern Africa. As Venter puts it, “first, given the economic situation of most states in Southern Africa, the diversion of scarce resources to military uses jeopardised, if not devastated, all efforts at economic development. Secondly, it also exacted a heavy political toll within those states by revealing them as defenseless in the face of foreign military attack and as unable to protect their own citizens. Pretoria’s anti-ANC raids had the effect of undermining the credibility of Black African governments”. This characterised the destabilisation which aggravated the economic problems of independent African states in Southern Africa.

The ‘carrot and stick’ approach affected Southern African states in various ways. Mozambique was supported by South Africa through the use of its underutilised railways and ports. Zimbabwe borrowed locomotives for its railways and outlets to the sea provided for her exports. The Customs Union with the BLS was maintained. To reduce the cycle of dependence on South Africa, the Frontline States responded by forming the SADCC in 1980 which included the BLS states, Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and later Namibia in 1990. This created the potential to remove the attraction of the ‘carrot’ as more interdependence among the SADCC countries could potentially reduce their dependence on South Africa. The South African government thus stepped up its counter activities in the 1980’s; the loaned locomotives to Zimbabwe were withdrawn.

The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo), an opposition movement to the FRELIMO government, was allowed to have its headquarters in the Northern Transvaal, its clandestine ‘freedom radio’ was operated from South Africa and the government’s military intelligence cooperated closely with Renamo. As a result during the 1980’s subversive activities by Renamo escalated inside Mozambique. In the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa maintained a training camp in the Northern Transvaal for former supporters of Bishop Muzorewa, (an opponent of Mugabe’s government) and members of

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Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts (a counter-insurgency military group which supported Ian Smith in the war against ZANU and ZAPU).\textsuperscript{65}

The period 1961 to 1976 was also characterised by South Africa’s attempts to break from isolation in order to play a ‘constructive’ role in Africa. Hence Mr Vorster’s slogan “friendly co-existence and co-operation with countries of Africa”.\textsuperscript{66} The détente period could not be sustained for much longer. ‘The involvement of the South African defense force in Angola ended any prospects of enduring co-operation between South Africa and the Frontline States. The domestic events in South Africa which followed the Soweto student uprisings in June 1976, the death in detention of the Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko and the introduction of strict internal security measures to quell the situation, marked the end of détente and the ushering in of a new approach.

P.W. Botha’s presidency from 1978 ushered in a new approach to the Southern African conflict. He continued with the idea of economic co-operation inherited from his predecessor B.J. Vorster via the constellation of Southern African States (the idea of the Commonwealth of Southern African states started with Verwoed in 1960’s) but the priority for him was the military defense of South Africa against every possible external interference. Hence, his first priority was to set up the State Security Council (SCC which later became BOSS) which in effect became the locus of foreign policy making and execution.\textsuperscript{67} The attempts to enhance South Africa’s hegemonic position through the constellation of states failed because the idea of a constellation led by South Africa was rejected by the BLS states and the formation of SADCC posed a direct alternative for them. South Africa was therefore left with the hard interventionist component of its policy during the 1980s. Joseph Hanlon summarised the aggressive initiatives of South Africa during this period when he enunciated the following incidents:

- The hit and run strikes of three capitals (Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique) and four other countries, (Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia)

Attempts to assassinate two prime Ministers (Lesotho and Zimbabwe)

Backing of dissident groups that have brought chaos to two countries (Angola and Mozambique) and less serious disorder in two others (Lesotho and Zimbabwe)

Disruption of the oil supplies of six countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) and

Attacking the railways providing the normal import and export routes of seven countries (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe). 68

This situation impacted negatively on the liberation movements. This determined even more clandestine operations. Botswana and Swaziland, for example, became firm during this period, in refusing to allow any facilities to armed guerrillas. Nevertheless, their willingness to admit political exiles from S.A. to take sanctuary in their countries made clandestine operations possible. 69 To the liberation movements this meant that they had no safe haven in most Southern African countries (except in Tanzania) and had to be even more vigilant because of the possibility that the enemy might be among them.

1.3. Superpowers And The Conflict In Southern Africa.

An understanding of the role of the superpowers (i.e. US, USSR, People’s Republic of China) is important for an assessment of extra-regional factors ‘especially the interests and activities of dominant global actors such as major states and corporations affecting intra-regional relations and vice versa’. 70 This dialectical relationship, shaped and conditioned the exile environment and eventually moulded the experience of exile liberation movements in Southern Africa. As Larry Bowman observed “for far too long, events in Southern Africa have been viewed in a discrete manner, with little consideration

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given to the interaction of the countries concerned”.

The role performed by superpowers as a point of interaction with Southern Africa remains an aspect of Southern African political history which is ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes difficult to comprehend. The involvement of superpowers was largely determined by the ideological dispositions of their ruling parties and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa. When the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan was in power in the United States of America, a new commitment to Southern Africa, different from that of the Democratic Party, was implemented. The policy of constructive engagement which meant that the US would support UNITA rebels against the MPLA government, adopt a non-confrontational attitude towards South Africa as opposed to the OAU’s attempts to isolate South Africa, was effected. These policies were favourably received by the National Party government. This approach was later modified by the Reagan administration taking into account the realities of advancing independence and majority rule throughout the region. The attitude to Southern Africa changed once again under the leadership of the Democratic Party.

From the early 1960s, the superpowers played an important role in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Before the PAC was banned in April 1960, two of its leaders, Nana Mahomo and Peter Molosti were sent to the USA to mobilise political support and to raise funds in order to establish the PAC external mission. The same was done by the ANC when O.R. Tambo was sent abroad to establish the ANC’s external diplomatic mission and also raise funds for the organisation. Both organisations approached the USA, Western European countries as well as the Soviet Union, (in the case of the ANC), while the PAC also approached China. The superpowers were individually involved in the Southern African liberation struggle, initially by giving financial support, to finance the logistics of ANC and PAC exiles in Tanzania and Zambia. During the initial phase, 1961-1975, the support came largely from non-governmental organisations and other

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72 T. Lodge: Black politics in South Africa since 1945: Interview with M. Gqobose, Port Elizabeth, 28 July 1996.
elements of civil society which supported the Anti-Apartheid movement and not from governments. The role of governments became prominent as from 1976.

Support from non-governmental organisations was not unconditional. Conditions set by these organisations tended to superimpose ideological cleavages, for example, Soviet-American, Sino-Soviet and Arab-Israeli splits, which reinforced internecine rivalries among liberation movements. The Soviet sponsored liberation movements tended to be political allies, e.g. ANC, SWAPO, ZAPU and FRELIMO; on the other hand the Chinese sponsored movements were also allies e.g. ZANU, PAC, UNITA. Unfortunately it is not within the scope of this to cover this important aspect about the nature of alliances among liberation movements.

Until 1976, the superpowers only exercised an indirect, but significant, political influence on the developments in Southern Africa. As far back as 1964, the USA, Britain and France vetoed attempts to oust South Africa from the United Nations. Again in 1975, the same countries exercised their veto rights in the UN Security Council in order to prevent an arms boycott of South Africa. In other words, during this period, even though relations with South Africa were certainly ‘undesirable’ to some superpowers at the level of intergovernmental relations, at the level of transnational interactions, South Africa was still recognised and well-integrated into the world system. ‘Corporate links, gold sales, diamond trading and uranium production are all salient aspects of this external orientation and incorporation’. This relationship changed in the late 1970’s and especially in the 1980’s. The independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, not only changed the balance of political forces in Southern Africa but convinced the USA and Britain about the importance of negotiated majority rule as a solution to the South African and the Namibian situations.

73 J. Marcum: ‘Exile Conditions and Revolutionary Effectiveness’ in Southern Africa in Perspective, p. 222; the point is also made by D.A.B. Mahlangu: ‘From South Africa to Azania’, p. 51.
74 O. Geyser: Détente Southern Africa, p. 28.
What led to direct superpower involvement in the conflict in Southern Africa was the war in Angola. The Angolan war resulted in the shaping of alliances and nearly threatened to internationalise the Southern African conflict. South Africa, USA, Britain and France supported UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola) led opposition under Jonas Savimbi. Their aim was to overthrow the MPLA (Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led socialist government. Besides that the rich mineral resources of Angola, concerned the American government. The Soviet Block and Cuban troops also intervened on the side of the MPLA and China supported the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). The FNLA led by Holden Roberto was the only liberation movement of Angola recognised by the OAU on grounds of it being the most active. This view was maintained until 1971.\footnote{P. Stiff: The Silent War, p. 97.} The war which ensued during the period 1975 to 1976 in Angola was among the bloodiest wars, following the Biafran war and Algerian war, (1954-1962), on the continent of Africa. The guerrillas of the ANC of South Africa found themselves directly involved in the war in support of the MPLA, whereas the PAC, in line with its alliance with China supported UNITA. The unfortunate choice of alliances during the Angolan war created grounds for mistrust among members of the liberation movement.\footnote{T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, pp. 316-317.} The ANC, for instance, alleged that the exiled PAC of South Africa worked hand in glove with the CIA (United States Central Intelligence Agency) and the National Party government.\footnote{ANC Archives, Fort Hare: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress: Whom does it serve?’ no date.} It added to the hostile perceptions and poor relations which already existed between the PAC and the ANC in exile.

The defeat of UNITA and FLNA by the MPLA resulted in talks which led to a peace settlement at the end of 1976. The talks paved the way for the negotiation of a settlement on the Namibian question, hence the Botha led South African government accepted proposals for a settlement in 1982. From this period the attitudes of the superpowers towards liberation movements in Southern Africa improved. The President of the ANC, O.R. Tambo then visited the White House for the first time to discuss a solution to the South African problem. This marked the beginning of recognition of South African liberation movements by the superpowers (especially USA and Western Europe) as
partners in the process of finding a solution to the South African problem. From 1982, the same kind of negotiations were started with the leaders of SWAPO of Namibia. Even though they recognised the role of exile liberation movements, the superpowers continued to renounce violence as a strategy towards a solution.

2.1.1.5. The Experience of Liberation Movements.

The common experience of exile liberation movements in Southern Africa across the complete time span indicated in this research, was that of pervasive insecurity, competition for limited resources and recognition as “the most logical alternatives to existing regimes they sought to overthrow”, interference by the OAU and intra-organisational disunity.  

The unusually precarious exile environment was in some ways a political rite of passage for liberation movements, from ‘boyhood’ to ‘manhood’ as it separated the politically astute and stable organisations from those that were not. Lodge described the exile experience as “a rite of passage which could corrode the internal integrity of the nationalist and revolutionary organization”. This section will outline the experiences of liberation movements such as SWAPO, ANC, ZANU, FRELIMO and MPLA in order to reveal common areas of experience as referred to above. The exile experience of the PAC will be examined in the following chapters in greater depth since it is the focus of this research.

The problems and difficulties which confronted all liberation movements in Southern Africa involved the following: how to maintain and sustain organisational coherence and unity, keep sound relations with the government of the host country, (i.e. its allies and its native inhabitants), how to maintain good relations with all sources of funding and also how to remain politically effective in terms of programs and activities inside the country to be liberated as well as outside. This was a very difficult task. The more active the

80 T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 296.
liberation movement became inside its country of origin, the more problems it invited for the host countries and the greater the likelihood that its facilities would be closed inside the host countries because of threats and pressure from South Africa. The more inactive a liberation movement was, the more pressure was exercised by the OAU Liberation Committee and the greater the chances that funding would be terminated and possible derecognition as a liberation movement was also a possibility. This was the predicament of liberation movements during this period. Between 1960 and the early 1970’s, reactivating internal political activity on the part of liberation movements was very difficult. In the case of the South African liberation movements (ANC and PAC), the problem was that South Africa was “protected by a cordon sanitaire of colonial territories themselves engaged in extensive counter-insurgent operations. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, though all independent states by the end of 1968, were nevertheless economically reliant on South Africa to provide secure bases for exile South African organisations”.  

This was worsened by the fact that ‘only small areas of South Africa lent themselves to the classical African pattern of rural based, bush warfare waged by guerrillas. “In the absence of rewarding mobilisation activity” as Lodge puts it, “political energy could focus itself around hairsplitting doctrinal disputes. Removed from the arena of real conflict, internal dissent and opposition to factions and personalities within the movement could serve as a substitute for externally-oriented aggression”.

SWAPO of Namibia experienced the exact problems indicated by Lodge during its exile period from 1966 to 1990. SWAPO had camps in Zambia, Tanzania and Angola. Internal conflict within SWAPO which had been simmering for a long time surfaced in 1968, 1974 and in the 1980s. “The major crises included the Kongwa crisis of 1968, the 1974 rebellion, and the spy drama of the 1980s. The Kongwa and 1976 crises were suppressed with the help of host states”. The conflict of 1976 erupted between the SWAPO Youth League and the leadership of SWAPO. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO and the leadership of the organization, were accused for ‘corruption and 

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83 T. Lodge: *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*, p. 296.
84 S. Fiken: *Exile and Return: The Politics of Namibia’s “Returnees”*, p. 3.
incompetence’. The youth was also frustrated because the leadership would not release them to wage guerrilla attacks inside Namibia. The leadership insisted on a planned guerrilla strategy which, at that stage, was not well-understood by the youth. Early in 1976, the dissidents mainly from the SWAPO Youth League (which enjoyed the support of the army called PLAN) took over SWAPO’s central base in Zambia. The guerrilla army of SWAPO assisted the dissidents. OAU officials in Zambia intervened. The Zambian defence force was deployed to quell the uprising and members of the dissident group were detained.

Besides this incident, during the first period of its existence in exile, 1966 to 1968, SWAPO was troubled by divisions on the question of strategy to be followed by the liberation movement, i.e. whether the armed struggle was the right approach or not. This resulted in the emergence of factions along ideological lines (moderates versus radicals) within the same organisation. From 1974 to 1990 the organisation had to clean from within its ranks, South African agents who took advantage of internal divisions and infiltrated the army and membership in the late 1960’s.

This explains the high number of people expelled from the organisation. In the case of SWAPO, the internal enemy syndrome was not as pervasive as in the case of the ANC and PAC of South Africa and therefore the clean-up campaign was short-lived. The organisation did not sustain any further divisions.

The FRELIMO of Mozambique also had similar experiences. As Newitt puts it, “FRELIMO was deeply divided, splits were appearing every month and ethnic hostility to FRELIMO seemed to have been aroused in various parts of the country”. FRELIMO was rocked by internal divisions as early as 1964. Initially the divisions were about strategy in the armed struggle. “Few believed in low-intensity war and prolonged guerrilla campaign”. In 1965 defectors from FRELIMO formed a rival organisation called COREMO. It was militarily active for a short period until 1971 but remained an

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85 D. Herbernstein and J. Evenson: The Devils are Among Us: The War for Namibia, p. 56.
86 Ibid.
88 M. Newitt: History of Mozambique, p. 525.
89 Ibid, p. 523.
alternative focus of nationalist sentiment throughout the exile period. Ideological and ethnic tensions also exploded in 1968-1969. These were resolved with little intervention by the host countries. Certain individuals were expelled from the organisation, e.g. Nkavandame, a member of the executive committee of FRELIMO, was stripped of his party membership and he later defected to the Portuguese in 1969.\(^9^0\) Again in 1969, after the death of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO was embroiled in a leadership struggle. A triumvirate headed by Joaquim Chissano, the current President of Mozambique, was tasked to lead the organisation until the appointment of Samora Machel as President of the organisation in 1971. He led the organisation until liberation in 1975. Infiltration by the Portuguese was also a problem for FRELIMO in the 1970’s, but under the leadership of Machel, the organisation was able to emerge strong, united and successful.

In the case of the MPLA of Angola the situation was similar but the level of internal conflict was deeper. This became explicit between June 1974 and 1975. The MPLA was formed in 1956 and since their 1961 uprising inside Angola, the organisation had limited military success. The organisation was torn apart by leadership divisions.\(^9^1\) It was under pressure to unite with the FNLA which the OAU recognised on the grounds of its military activities inside Angola. In 1973, the Soviet Union also suspended its military aid to the MPLA as a strategy to pressurise the leadership of the organisation to sort out the internal problems. The period from June 1974 to January 1975, was the worst for the MPLA. “It had split into three factions, each with its own charismatic leader. There was “Agostinho Neto’s True MPLA, Daniel Chipenda’s Easter Rebellion Group MPLA and Mario de Adrande’s Active Rebellion Group”.\(^9^2\) Again leaders of the OAU, i.e. Tanzania and Zambia intervened and pressurised the MPLA to resolve its problems. This happened eventually in 1975. The resolution of the internal problems paved the way for the resumption of military aid from the Soviet Union from August 1975. With the renewed support of the Soviet Union and the intervention of Cuban instructors, the MPLA was able to successfully wage the war against its competitors, the FNLA (China backed).

\(^{90}\) M. Newitt: *History of Mozambique*, p. 525.
\(^{91}\) P. Stiff: *The Silent War*, p. 97.
\(^{92}\) *Ibid*, p. 100.
UNITA (South Africa, USA and Western Europe supported) and finally introduced the first MPLA led independent government of Angola in 1976.

The situation of liberation movements during the Rhodesian war was slightly different. Two major liberation movements were active in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. These were ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) formed in 1961 and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) formed on the 8th of August 1963 by ZAPU members who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, the president of ZAPU. Both organisations had camps in Zambia, Tanzania and later in Mozambique. After the guerrilla attacks against Rhodesia on the 28th April 1966, ZANU became more widely known inside and outside Zimbabwe. On the 28th of April 1966, seven members of ZANLA (the military wing of ZANU) died in action against the Rhodesian forces. The day is still commemorated in Zimbabwe as the Chumurenga Day the start of the armed struggle against the Rhodesian forces. 93 Since that date ZANU was on the forefront of the military struggle against the Rhodesians. As an organisation, ZANU also had its own internal problems. These started in 1974, worsened in 1975 after the assassination of ZANU president, Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka, Zambia. In 1974, the Rhodesian government was persuaded by Kaunda of Zambia and Vorster of South Africa, as part of the détente scenario, to enter into negotiations with the leaders of ZAPU such as Joshua Nkomo, David Chikerama and church leaders such as Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Smith released all political prisoners, revoked death sentences imposed on guerrillas and lifted the ban on ZANU and ZAPU. 94 The Frontline States also intervened in December 1974. They influenced Zimbabwean political movements to forge unity amongst themselves. Hence, an umbrella body for all Zimbabwean nationalist movements was formed in exile, called the African Nationalist Council and its president was Bishop Abel Muzorewa. “To strengthen the Council’s position, the Dar-es-Salaam based OAU Liberation Committee withdrew its support for ZANU and ZAPU”. 95 These developments precipitated internal divisions within ZANU on issues of strategy and the

95 Ibid. p. 28; Times of Zambia, 9, December, 1974.
way forward. The confusion was exacerbated by the assassination of Herbert Chitepo in 1975. ZANU was left without a leader and was run by a committee until 1976 when Robert Mugabe, an ex-political prisoner, was unanimously elected as the leader of ZANU. Mugabe’s decisive leadership gave a fresh turn to the events. He united his party, rejected the leadership of Muzorewa, convinced the Frontline States that Smith was never genuinely interested in majority rule in Zimbabwe and renewed the attacks against the Rhodesians from three fronts: Tete, Manica and Gaza. ZANU was supported by China in their new military offensive. They infiltrated the villages and used spirit mediums as a source of support and popular mobilisation. At a Commonwealth summit held in Lusaka in 1979, Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of Britain, agreed to host a constitutional conference which paved the way for ZANU success in British supervised elections.

The ANC of South Africa also experienced serious problems during the exile period. Unlike the PAC, whose legal existence was short-lived inside South Africa, the ANC (which is the oldest liberation movement in Southern Africa) before it was banned, had developed internal systems which made it possible to withstand the challenges of exile. The movement had “self-consciously constructed a broad ‘national liberation alliance’, uniting different ideological tendencies within its ranks around two main lodestars, the Freedom Charter and Strategy and Tactics”. In anticipation of being banned, the ANC had dispatched Oliver Tambo, its deputy President to London. “He was a good choice, a skillful negotiator and strong personality, who like Nelson Mandela, had managed to avoid being strongly identified with either the Communist left or the radical Africanists”. Oliver Tambo, Tennyson Makiwane, Yusuf Dadoo and later Moses Kotane and Duma Nokwe, all laid the foundation for sound networks even before the ANC went into exile in 1960.

The exiled ANC established its headquarters in Morogoro, Tanzania. ANC guerrilla camps were spread in Tanzania in the following areas, Kongwa, Mbeya, Bogamoyo and

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97 Ibid.
99 Ibid, 55.
also in Morogoro. The first incidence in which ANC guerrillas were deployed in a military campaign was in 1967 in the now infamous Wankie battle. A number of ZAPU and ANC guerrillas as well as Rhodesian soldiers were killed. Both sides claimed victory but none of the claims have been verified till today. In the internal conflict which occurred in the ANC in 1968, some members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC’s military wing) complained about the Wankie battle. They claimed that it was an instance of miscalculation on the part of the leadership of the ANC. In 1968, the Umkhonto defectors also alleged that there was widespread dissatisfaction within the camps. They accused their commanders of extravagant living and ethnic favorism. These and other complaints led to the summoning of the Morogoro Consultative Conference. At this conference, the ANC leadership admitted its mistakes and resigned en masse only to be reconstituted in the light of the recommendations of the conference. Numerous internal reforms were made and a code of conduct and oath of allegiance were formulated as recommendations of the conference. The Morogoro conference revived confidence in the leadership of the organisation and helped restore a degree of unity. This did not put an end to internal conflicts. In 1975, another group led by Tennyson Makiwane was expelled from the organisation. The Makiwane group was concerned about the role of white communists in the ANC. The dissident group led by Makiwane argued that “the SACP white leadership who opposed the political philosophy embodied in the concept of African nationalism and who oppose the African image of the ANC reflect their social and class roots as petit-bourgeois white – roots firmly fixed in the historically-conditioned modes of thought that characterize white superior attitudes towards Blacks in South Africa”.

The impact of the two breakaways which occurred firstly in 1959 (PAC split) and later in 1975, and the bitter internal conflicts which occurred after 1969 following the consultative conference in Tanzania were resolved internally by the organisation. “The relative maturity of the ANC leadership – both in prison and in exile – was a major factor.

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100 T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 298.
101 Ibid, p. 300.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid, p. 303.
contributing to its survival during these crises. Throughout these bitter conflicts, the ANC was able to retain a degree of continuity and bedrock political unity – to such a degree that it was the envy of a number of liberation movements elsewhere. Within its own structure, the ANC tended to concentrate on the mechanics of organisation and specialisation in its ranks. Diplomatically, it sought international support from governments which opposed Apartheid, whether ‘capitalist’ or ‘socialist’ and attempted to avoid being ‘instrumentalised in East-West power struggles”.

In summary, even though this chapter does not provide the details about the impact of exile experience on the functioning of liberation movements, it extrapolates, from the vast information, generalisations which constitute a paradigm which informs the exile experiences of the PAC. The key issues which emerge from the discussion, are that the situation in exile was precarious and it affected liberation movements differently. They all coped in various ways. Some emerged weak but others came out strong because of a determined and skilful leadership and also the ability to manipulate the exile environment in favour of the organisation. One can not blame it all on exile conditions because that absolves the organisations of responsibility for what happened to them. Internal divisions, ethnic conflicts, divisions between the political elites and rank-and-file members, limited resources and outside interference were problems which all liberation movements had to deal with. The exile experience of other liberation movements, e.g. FRELIMO, ZANU and SWAPO confirm the fact that internal divisions with liberation organisations were common. These needed a respected leadership and clear organisational systems to be resolved. The following chapters will analyse, in detail, how the PAC dealt with these problems and the impact they had on the organisation as a whole during the period 1960 to 1990.

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2.2. The PAC: Formation, Banishment and Road to Exile

This section provides the background to the study of intra-PAC relations during the exile period. It examines three important aspects in the history of the PAC. These include the factors which led to the birth of an ‘Africanist’ tendency within the ANC hence the formation of the PAC; the circumstances which led to the banning of the organisation by the National Party government of South Africa and how the PAC eventually landed in exile. A brief overview of international African politics and how they affected developments within the ANC of South Africa will be a starting point. An analysis of the internal politics of the ANC will also be done because as Peter Raboroko (a National Executive Committee Member of the PAC in 1959) argued “most of the foundation members of the PAC are former members of the League and these were all ex-officio members of the ANC”. In other words, one cannot understand the formation of the PAC without understanding the internal dynamics of the ANC.

The formation of the PAC was a long drawn-out process. It began with ideological debates within the ANC and particularly, the ANC Youth League. This led to the formation of an ‘Africanist’ faction within the ANC. This faction gradually consolidated itself over the years following the 1949 ANC Programme of Action and was eventually launched on the 6th of April 1959 in Orlando Township, Johannesburg, its official formation, the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa. It was only in 1968, when the organisation was in exile that it adopted the name ‘Azania’ instead of South Africa and then called itself the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. This chapter traces, in detail, the ideological influences which stimulated the birth of Pan Africanism inside South Africa’s ANC and especially in the ANC Youth League and hence the formation of the PAC. This will provide an understanding of the theoretical basis and goals upon which the official PAC structure was formed.

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2.2.1. Factors which led to the formation of the PAC

2.2.1.1. International ideological influences

Between the years 1900-1965 African politics outside South Africa were dominated by the rise of Pan Africanist ideas. During this period, Pan Africanist ideas and organisations started among African, West Indian and African Americans residing principally in Europe and the United States. In other words, it is from these countries that a Pan Africanist ideological tendency was born and spread to Africa.

Geis in his book, The Pan African Movement, defines Pan-Africanism in a manner which posits a ‘narrower/broader’ dichotomy which is useful for interpretation. In the narrower sense, he defines Pan-Africanism as the political movement for the unification of the African continent and in the broader sense as political and cultural movements aimed at wider solidarity, i.e. anti-colonial solidarity or Afro-Asianism.106 Peter Molotsi, a member of the exiled PAC, summarily defined Pan Africanism as “the beginning of a new consciousness” among Africans and people of African descent which solidified into movements which “sought to cast relationships between Africans and non-Africans on a footing of mutual respect”.107 Whereas John Crutcher defines it as an “interpretation of African history, prescriptions as to what is to be done now, and predictions concerning Africa’s destiny”.108 Of course, definitions are usually delimitations of completely fluid concepts. The issue which the above outlined definitions try to underscore is that Pan Africanism, in broad terms, embodies heuristic conceptions of historical materialism as understood and articulated from the point of view of Africans.

“Three identifiable and interlinked historical factors gave rise to Pan Africanism before it

found an expression in Africa”. These include “slave trade, European imperialism and colonialism in Africa as well as racism and racial consciousness resulting from the first two factors combined”. The early ideas of Pan Africanism, which dominated the period 1900-1965, reflected influences which stem from a combination of these factors. Early Pan Africanist ideas “included expressions of feelings of rejection and exile from the African ‘homeland’, ‘Negro’ solidarity in the face of White influence, a sense of a ‘lost’ past, and a belief in the existence of a distinct ‘African personality’ and common destiny, and in “Africa for the Africans”. These ideas, sometimes referred to as “Proto-Pan Africanism” are characteristic of the embryonic phase of the Pan African Movement. The early phase can be divided into two periods, 1900 to 1918, and 1919 to 1945. The period 1919 to 1945 differs from the earlier one in that a relatively well developed Pan African philosophy came into existence and its leading proponents were W.E.B. du Bois and Marcus Garvey. It was during the 1920’s that the Garveyist movement made significant impact on the ideology of Pan Africanism. Ideas about ‘Negritude’ and ‘African Personality’ were contributions of the Garveyist movement. The two concepts, though different, emphasised the ‘oneness or the sameness’ of Black people, ‘everywhere and at all times’. The essence of the Pan African ideology centered around these ideas during the entire period beginning early 1900 to 1962. This was the formative period of Pan Africanism internationally. Numerous Pan African congresses took place during this formative period. The first one of these, which marked the beginning of the movement was held in London in 1900. It was organised by a Trinidad lawyer H. Sylvester-Williams and its aim was to register protest against European occupation of African lands. The congress was attended by Dr W.E.B. du Bois, who later became a leading theoretician and ideologue within the international Pan African movement. The significance of this conference was that it generated numerous other Pan African conferences from 1919 onwards. The 1919 Pan African conference was particularly

significant because it highlighted the plight of Africans in colonised parts of Africa and brought it to the attention of the League of Nations during its meeting in Paris. From 1937 onwards, the participation of African leaders from various parts of Africa in Pan African Conferences became noticeable. This was the result of the formation of the International African Service Bureau which brought together all types of Pan African movements. African leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta (future President of Kenya) and Dr N. Azikiwe, (future President of Nigeria) began to play a role during this period.

In 1945, a major Pan African conference was held in Manchester and the largest-ever delegation from Africa attended the conference. The declarations of this conference set the tone for the ideological model of South Africa’s Pan Africanism. One of the resolutions affirmed by the conference made reference to the right of all colonial people to control their own destiny. It proceeded to state that “all colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic. The struggle for political power by colonial and subject people is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to, complete social, economic and political emancipation”. These ideas were elaborated and sealed at the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra (Ghana) in April 1958 just after the independence of Ghana in March 1957. The deliberations of this conference influenced the formation of the PAC the following year. The conference was widely covered in South Africa’s Drum magazine, a leading Africanist magazine at the time. Drum magazine representatives attended the conference. An article in the Drum magazine entitled ‘Vison of a Happy Africa’ gave a detailed portrayal of the deliberations at the conference. Henceforth, the president of Ghana, Dr Kwame Nkrumah became the leading champion of Pan Africanism in Africa and was also a source of inspiration to many young Africanists within the African National Congress of South Africa. Among the key deliberations of this conference was that independence dates be set for each territory in Africa. After the Accra conference of Independent African States, a declaration of a ‘community of African states’ was drawn

117 Interview with Mr Madasa, Langa Township, Cape Town, 11 February1987.
up by Dr Nkrumah in 1959. The declaration was submitted to the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States held in 1963. The declaration contained principles upon which the organisation of African Unity was founded in 1963.

The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in May 1963 marked the beginning of another phase in the development of Pan Africanism. An Africa-focused interpretation of the Pan Africanist ideology informed by the realities of Africa started during this period. The approach was reality focused in the sense that it articulated responses to the new challenges and tasks of post-colonial independence. These included building government institutions and establishing political authority for the newly independent states. The Pan Africanism of this period also emphasised support for decolonisation initiatives and struggles in other parts of Africa. The basic tenets were unity and co-operation in the political and economic spheres. It was during the OAU conference at Addis Ababa that the idea of an African parliament was mooted for the first time.

The significance of these developments lies in how they influenced the thinking within the ANC of South Africa and especially the ANC Youth League. As Mahlangu rightly pointed out, “the nationalist fervour sweeping through the continent” of Africa had captured the imagination of the “small but growing number of Africanists” in the ANC, as from the late 1950’s. The independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, the independence of Ghana the following year and the promise of independence for other British colonies within the foreseeable future, generated a mood of optimism which engulfed the continent of Africa and provided a basis for Pan Africanist optimism. The rise of the PAC of South Africa can definitely not be viewed in isolation from these events. From the broader Pan African movements outside South Africa, the ‘Africanist’ in the ANC appropriated the meaning of ideas such as ‘self-determination for the Africans’, ‘Africa’s cause’ and ‘African personality’. These became the core ideological

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tenets of the PAC.

2.2.1.2. Local factors which led to the formation of the PAC.

The broader political context in South Africa as well as the bitter and drawn-out political debate within the ANC are the immediate factors which led to the formation of the PAC. The debate was more about the strategies to be used in the struggle against white supremacy and Apartheid than about a liberated South Africa. At the centre of the debate was the longstanding and much older ANC Christian Liberal tradition, which emphasised non-violence, multi-racialism and universal suffrage along the lines of British democracy. It was challenged by an emerging youth-spoused tendency towards radical Pan Africanism. The role of whites and especially communists in the struggle for liberation, were among the issues debated. The debate and internal wranglings consumed the better part of the period after the 1952 Defiance campaign. Between the years 1957 to 1958, just before the final Africanist split, the debate assumed the character of an ideological civil war within the ANC. Hence Davies concludes “throughout 1957 and 1958 the ANC was more preoccupied with a civil war over its own ideological future than any mass anti-Apartheid campaign”. The Africanists and the members of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) by that time called South African Communist Party, (SACP) both wanted to take over the ANC, hence the ideological civil war. This continued until 1958, the year when a group of young Africanists decided that they have finally reached the parting of ways with their comrades in the ANC.

Ideological debate and conflict within the ANC predates the period 1952 – 1958. It can be traced as far back as the early 1940’s. In fact even before the formation of the Youth League in 1944, debates were prevalent among the ANC youth. They criticised, for instance, the approaches of the ANC to the South African political situation. The youth criticised the conciliatory stance of the ANC during the 1920 African mine worker’s strike and the 1922 Rand revolt. The formation of the Industrial and Commercial

119 S.M. Davis: Apartheid Rebels, p.11.
120 B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania, pp. 119-120; S.M. Davis: Apartheid Rebels, pp. 1-11.
Workers Union (ICU), (propelled by Garveyist Pan Africanist influences), whose membership overlapped with that of the ANC, and its links with the International Socialist League (ISL), all brought in a new radical element which found greater appeal to the ANC youth. A more intellectually structured political debate started with the formation of the Youth League in 1944. In its national executive committee, the Youth League had personalities such as A.M. Lembede (who became its chairman), O.R. Tambo (secretary), W.M. Sisulu (treasurer), A.P. Mda and N.R. Mandela. The leading ideologue and theoretician in the Youth League was Mziwakhe Lembede, a young attorney from Natal. Immediately after it was formed, the Youth League adopted the Congress Youth League Manifesto, a document which expounded a conception of the South African liberation struggle radically different from that expressed in the ANC’s original and early documents, such as the Constitution and the “Africans Claims”.

This document was formulated by Mziwakhe Lembede with the assistance of A.P. Mda, who later became one of the founder members of the PAC.

The Youth League Manifesto laid the basis for South Africa’s Pan Africanism. It provided theoretical foundations which Mr Mangaliso Sobukwe, the founding President of the PAC, developed further. The Manifesto declared that, “for the African, without exception, self-determination is the philosophy of life which will save him from the disaster he clearly sees on his way”. It further stated that “the goal of all our struggles is Africanism and our motto is Africa’s cause must triumph”. A Pan Africanist outlook and the need to encourage the achievement of “African unity” were well-articulated and encouraged in the document. On the subject of African unity, the document stated that “we believe in the unity of all Africans from the Mediterranean sea in the North to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the South and that Africans must speak with one voice”.

It also encouraged self-reliance among Africans as it emphasised that the National liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves. The document further

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.
emphasised a rejection of foreign leadership of Africa. The rejection of foreign leadership went hand in hand with the rejection of foreign ideologies, especially communism, hence the debate ensued later about the role of communists in the ANC. Whilst accepting socialist economic principles, Lembede and his group in the Youth League strongly “believed that the sole purpose of communists within the congress was to undermine the ideology of African nationalism”.

The views, enshrined in the Youth League Manifesto, characterised what later became known as the “Lembede tradition” of which the PAC, after its formation, claimed to be the sole custodian of. This tradition, especially its militant undertones, and its assertion of principles of self-determination of the oppressed African majority, openly conflicted with “traditional ANC policy of liberal reformism” and led to long-lasting debates which laid a foundation for a lasting split. The Lembede tradition was later developed and further radicalised by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe. After the death of Lembede, the latter assumed the position of an ideologue and intellectual giant within the Youth League. In his inaugural speech at the launch of the PAC in 1959, he clearly defined the ideological tenets of the new movement, especially on issues such as racialism and multiracialism as will be shown later.

It would be folly to conclude that it had only been issues of a theoretical nature which laid the grounds for the birth of the PAC. The deteriorating material circumstances of the majority of Africans, marked by a shortage of land in rural areas, industrial colour bar, pass laws, high taxation levels and a sharp increase in living costs (which characterised the country’s post-World War II economy), all added up to justification for a radical Africanist ideological strategy. In other words, concrete life and material conditions inside the country, the political squabbles within the ANC and the influences from Pan African movements outside South Africa, all contributed to the birth of a Pan Africanist

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126 T. Kono: Marxism and Black Nationalism in South Africa, p. 54; M. Benson: The Struggle for a Birthright, pp. 84-88; Interview with Mnqojana, Umtata, 21 December 2002.
ideology and movement inside the country.

2.2.1.3. Internal conflicts within the ANC and the inauguration of the PAC.

As already indicated, the seed for the birth of the PAC germinated from within the ANC. Stephen Davies sums up the internal situation in the ANC by saying that “radically different perceptions of the white race characterised the debate within post-war ANC between Africanists, who considered anti-Apartheid protest a Blacks-only affair, and multiracialists, who had faith in achieving change in alliance with philosophically compatible whites”. This is contrary to the view expressed by one of the informants during the research. He argued that the protest against Apartheid was never made “a Blacks-only thing” but was for everyone, including progressive whites who the Africanists encouraged to stage the protests in their communities, rather than coming to lead Black communities against Apartheid.

From the internal debates in the ANC, the Congress Youth League came up with the 1949 Programme of Action. The Programme of Action asserted among other things, the right of African people to self-determination, rejection of segregation, Apartheid, trusteeship or white leadership over Blacks and political independence. Political divisions and tensions ensued over the implementation of the provisions of the rather militant Programme of Action which did not command the support of the ANC leadership. “Thus instead of launching a campaign of positive action in accordance with the provisions of the Programme of Action, the leadership together with its multi-racial allies organised a campaign of passive resistance”. In other words, the Defiance Campaign of 1951-52 was itself not a result of consensus of opinion in the ANC, especially in the Youth League; nonetheless, it was carried out. “When the ANC joined with the South African Indian Congress in the Defiance Campaign and later linked up with whites, coloureds and Indians in the Congress Alliance, Africanists feared that the canons of Lembedism were

129 Interview with M. Dyan, Cape Town, 11 September 2000.
being violated”.\textsuperscript{131}

The suspension of the campaign by the ANC leadership in 1953 increased existing dissatisfaction and political tensions. When the leadership called off the campaign, they argued that the Defiance Campaign “as a sensible form of the struggle” had to come to an end because the people of South Africa had made their mark and had shown white people that they could be militant.\textsuperscript{132} This aroused anger and frustration among many Youth League members who, in turn, argued that the aim of the campaign was not simply to make a mark, but to liberate Africans from oppression and racial domination. The youth in the ANC was also outraged by the fact that the campaign was called off at a point when it was “gaining momentum, spreading throughout the country”.\textsuperscript{133}

From 1952, Africanists within the ANC started organising themselves into tightly organised groups spread all over the country. The inner circle of the Africanist group officially launched the Bureau of African Nationalism which operated in all the four provinces of South Africa but was more active in the Eastern Cape. During the Defiance Campaign, the Bureau of African Nationalism “circulated pamphlets urging resisters not to allow the campaign to be taken over by minority interests, but to keep faith with the resolutions of the Program of Action. The writers of the pamphlets were R Sobukwe, A.P. Mda, T.T. Letlaka, C.J. Fazzie, and J.N. Pokela (who later became leaders of the PAC) and their work was distributed to ANC Youth League members throughout the Union”.\textsuperscript{134} The Bureau of African Nationalism was, in essence, a secret watchdog of ANC policy. Africanists also founded, in November 1954, a newspaper which became their mouthpiece, called the ‘Africanist’. It was issued by the “Bureaux of African Affairs” based in East London led by A.P. Mda.\textsuperscript{135} To further consolidate themselves

\textsuperscript{131} S.M Davis: \textit{Apartheid Rebels}, p. 10; Also corroborated in an interview conducted by Walter Toboti with T.M. Ntantala, Harare, 1984.


\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Mr M. Gqobose, Port Elizabeth, 28 July 1996; Interview with N. Raboroko, Soweto, 3 July 2000; Interview with Malcom Dyan, Cape Town, 20 December 2000.

\textsuperscript{134} B. Leeman: \textit{Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania}, pp. 121-123.

\textsuperscript{135} Interview with M. Gqobose, Port Elizabeth, 1996; Interview with Malcom Dyan, Cape Town, 2000; Interview with Elliot Mfaxa, King Williams Town, 22 July 1998.
within the ANC, **Africanist** also established a covert Africanist Central Committee called ‘Cencom’ and its main purpose was to agitate and recruit from within the ANC. ‘Cencom’ was constituted by people such as R. Sobukwe, A.P. Mda, P.K. Leballo, J.N. Pokela, S. Ngendane, P. Molotsi and V. Sifora, most of who became executive committee members of the PAC when it was formed in 1959.\(^\text{136}\)

The period towards the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 was not only marked by increasing tensions, but also political infighting resulting from the insubordination of Africanists in the various branches of the ANC nationally. The adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 by the Congress Alliance added fuel to the fire. To the Africanists, the Freedom Charter was a “Charter of Slavery”, “a political bluff”, a “charade” representing a barricade to resist the transfer of effective political power to the African people and to make sure that political control remains in the hands of whites.\(^\text{137}\) They had serious problems with the statement on the preamble of the Charter which indicated that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it Black and White.”\(^\text{138}\) To the Africanists, South Africa belongs by right to original African inhabitants. Besides that “co-operation with democratic organisations from other racial groups”, led the Africanist leaders to believe that “the ANC had lost its identity as a purely Africanist revolutionary organisation and had surrendered its leadership to non-African sections of the liberation movement”.\(^\text{139}\)

From 1956 to 1958 the longstanding ideological feud within the ANC had become so bitter that it was clear that the organisation was heading for a major split. Finally, this occurred at the Transvaal ANC Congress in November 2, 1958. Selby Ngendane, one of the leading Africanists, submitted a document to the ANC with a list of resignations and a written submission which stated that Africanists were “launching out openly; on their own as custodians of ANC policy as formulated in 1912, reviewed in 1944 and pursued up to the time of the birth of liberal multi-racial alliance with the popular Programme of

\(^{136}\) B. Leeman: *Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania*, p. 128.


\(^{139}\) Pan Africanist Congress: *National Mandate*, p. 51.
Action of 1949 as their basic starting point”. Africanists in other parts of the country also followed and broke away from the ANC in the various regions. In Natal, the secession was announced “without fanfare at the annual conference in Durban in mid-December by A.B. Ngcobo, a Natal Youth League leader and former treason trialist”. The Cape and Free State provinces followed later but in the latter province, Africanist grassroots support was initially slender compared to the other provinces. The Free State province is where the ANC was formed and was therefore regarded by people in the province as the home of the Congress tradition.

2.2.1.4. Some highlights of the day of the inauguration of the PAC.

The first national meeting of the Africanist Movement was held at the Orlando Community Hall, from the 4th to the 6th of April 1959 and was called the “Africanist Liberation Congress”. This happened over the Van Riebeeck Day holiday weekend. “Placards carrying nationalist and Pan Africanist slogans lined the walls of the hall: “Africa for Africans, Cape to Cairo, Morocco to Madagascar”, “Imperialists Quit Africa”, “Forward to the United States of Africa” and “Izwe Lethu I Afrika” (“Africa, our land”). The meeting was attended by approximately four hundred delegates from all over South Africa. Out of that four hundred, there were only fifteen women and the Transvaal membership dominated the conference in terms of representation.

Mr Zephania Mothopeng, a member of the National Working Committee of Africanists which prepared for the inaugural conference of the PAC, was elected to chair the conference proceedings. It was the same National Working Committee which planned and directed the anti-pass campaign on the 21st March 1960.

There were allegations that two police spies were also among the many people who

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attended the conference. They were Municipal policemen, ‘Mr Isaac (NA64150) and Mr David (NA642141)’. They were instructed by the Acting Senior Superintendent of Orlando police station to attend the conference and record its proceedings. Mr Isaac was able to be admitted to the conference on the 4th and the morning of the 5th but was excluded on the last day because he was not in possession of a membership card. Mr David was able to negotiate his way through on the last two days of the conference. PAC leaders, interviewed in this research and who attended the inauguration of the PAC in 1959 expressed strong doubts about the possibility of ‘spies’ being present.

Oral evidence shows that at the meeting of the Convention “like in any other political organisation, there was obvious jockeying for positions in the National Executive”. A certain Dr Peter Ntsele, for example, had his hopes pinned on the position of becoming President of the organisation but was disappointed by the results of the elections. He immediately broke away to form his own party which came to be known as the Pan African Freedom Movement which ceased after his death in 1960. Serious divisions dominated the conference, during the elections of National Executive Committee members. The division was between the ‘party intelligentsia’ and the ‘non intellectuals’. The former faction was embodied in the charismatic personality of Mangaliso Sobukwe and the latter was represented by Mr Josias Madzunya from Alexandra Township in Johannesburg. The former faction triumphed and therefore the leadership of the PAC became dominated by the educated elite. This underlying schism created problems for the organisation from the very beginning, hence the number of people who were expelled from it within the first few months of its formation. One could take the case of Madzunya as an example. Initially, he stood as candidate for the position of treasurer in the party, but another party intellectual by the name of Abednego Ngcobo won. This is said to have disgruntled Mr Mazdunya to the extent that he influenced the bulk of his following from Alexandra township not to participate in the 21st March 1960 anti-pass campaign. The above scenario indicates the longstanding disagreement in the PAC even before the

147 Interview with M Gqobose, Port Elizabeth, 29 July 1996.
149 D.A.B. Mahlangu: From South Africa to Azania, p. 82; B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania, pp. 155-160.
organisation was banned. Police infiltration of the organisation since the early stages is a possibility which cannot be ruled out. The semblance of unity which the organisation displayed before exile was attributable largely to the personality and leadership style of Mangaliso Sobukwe.\textsuperscript{150}

One of the key issues on the agenda was the name of the new organisation. Among the names which were mooted were “Africanist Liberation Congress, the All African Congress, the Africanist Congress and the Africanist Revolutionary Party”.\textsuperscript{151} The feeling of most Africanists was that the term “Congress” had to be retained for sentimental reasons. It was almost at 3 a.m on the morning of April 6, that the name Pan Africanist Congress was eventually adopted as the name of the organisation. The leadership of the movement was also elected on the last day of the Convention. The National Executive of the PAC comprised the following elected people:

National President: Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe
National Secretary: Potlake Kitchener Leballo
National Treasurer: Abednego Ngcobo
National Organiser: Elliot Mfaxa
Secretary for Pan African Affairs: Peter Molotsi
Secretary for Foreign Affairs: Selby Ngendane
Secretary for Publicity and Information: ZB Molete
Secretary for Education: Peter Raboroko
Secretary for Culture: Nana Mahomo
Secretary for Labour: Jacob D. Nyaose
Secretary for Finance and Economic Development: Hughes Hlatswayo
Additional members: Zephania Motopeng
Howard S Ngcobo
C.J. Fazzie

One of the major puzzles of the elections of the PAC leadership was that the main intellectual giant behind Africanism, Mr A.P. Mda, was not elected to the National Executive Committee. The argument by Leeman that it was strategic to have him out of the power politics so that he could be the “party’s eminence grise” and have him concentrate on refining ideological positions of the PAC and questions of strategy, “behind curtains”, still remains unconvincing. One would probably concur if the rationale had been that it was his choice not to take an official position because of his very shy character and lack of confidence in the sustainability of the new movement.

The Convention finalised four documents, which became basic policy documents, i.e. the PAC Manifesto, the Constitution, the Disciplinary Code and Oath of Allegiance. The fifth document was the opening speech by the President of the Congress. It will be important to examine these document briefly because they outline not only the ideological standpoint of the PAC but also the reasoning behind the strategies of the organisation.

Principles and Strategies enshrined in the organisation’s basic documents.

The Pan Africanist Manifesto was, by and large, the product of A.P. Mda and R.M. Sobukwe’s efforts. The Pan Africanist Manifesto is broadly formulated and as a result can be interpreted in many ways. In essence it explains historical relations between Africa and Europe, focusing mainly on imperialism, colonisation, de-colonisation and independence in various parts of Africa. It provides a theoretical framework which links the situation or conditions of oppression and exploitation in South Africa, with global socio-economic and political forces. At a more specific level, it describes the situation in South Africa and portrays a picture of a racially polarised country, riddled with

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153 B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania, p. 156.
154 The interview with Mchitheka, Gugulethu, Cape Town, 2000, indicates that AP Mda was a shy person, who believed in small group or one-on-one conversations. He was also opposed to the idea of forming a new organisation outside the ANC but was persuaded by his colleagues in the Africanist inner circle to tender his resignation from the ANC and join the new organisation.
155 Ibid. p. 315.
irreconcilable contradictions mainly between Blacks and Whites. Pan Africanist terminology such as “the white exploiters” and “African exploited”, “the foreign oppressor” and the “indigenous oppressed” appear frequently throughout the Manifesto. The Manifesto describes Africans as “subject peoples who are criminally oppressed, ruthlessly exploited and inhumanly degraded” and their interests are depicted as “in sharp conflict and in pointed contradiction with those of the White ruling class”. The Manifesto posits the final triumph of Africans over white domination in “the militant progressive forces of African nationalism” which are “bound to crush the reactionary forces of white domination”.

Other crucial issues covered by the Manifesto included the PAC position on the question of race as well as the “historic task” of the organisation. On race, the Manifesto stated that “African people are very much proud of their race - the human race. They recognise no inescapable fundamental differences among members of the three main branches of that race: the Caucasoids, Mongoloids and Afrinoids”. In line with this view, the PAC regarded itself as a non-racial movement, despite the fact that it did not have whites as members of the organisation. In its view, multi-racialism, which was what the ANC and Congress alliance were associated with, was “racialism multiplied”.

The Africanist position on the question of race was summed up in Sobukwe’s inaugural address. He stated that “in Africa the myth of race has been propounded and propagated by imperialists and colonialists from Europe, in order to facilitate and justify their inhuman exploitation of the indigenous people of the land. It is from this myth of race with its attendant claims of cultural superiority that the doctrine of white supremacy stems”. Sobukwe’s emphasis on the oneness of mankind characterised the

158 Ibid, p. 78.
160 Ibid, pp. 34.
humanitarian aspect of South Africa’s Pan Africanism. His inaugural address at the launch of the PAC provided a body of thought which constituted the fundamental character of the ideology of the PAC. These ideas were further inscribed in the PAC Manifesto. The events which followed after the Sharpville massacre and the incidence of ‘Poqo’, in particular, which resulted in the murder of white civilians and children undermined the humanitarian expressions of the PAC’s Manifesto.\textsuperscript{162} As a result, the organisation was faced with a challenge to prove in practical terms that it was not a ‘racist’ movement and that it had room for all South Africans “at the rendezvous of victory”.\textsuperscript{163} The Africanist outlook of the PAC as outlined in the Manifesto was not formulated in line with any broad strategy. Its theory of non-racialism was not matched by practice because the organisation did not have white members, with the exception of Patrick Duncan, who joined the exile PAC in 1963. In addition to this, its avowed militancy alienated not only white South Africans, but the whole white world. Hence, the PAC did not enjoy the same financial support from the international community, as the ANC did.\textsuperscript{164}

The PAC’s Disciplinary Code is another document which also needs scrutiny. It is more specific and outlined policies and procedures to be followed to ensure order and discipline within the organisation. Paradoxically, it also provided the opportunity for leadership autocracy and abuse of power. Autocratic powers which the PAC acting President, Mr Potlake Leballo invoked in exile were in line with what the Disciplinary Code stipulated.

The Disciplinary Code was a statement of the code of conduct for PAC members. It sought to ensure disciplined and co-ordinated goal-directed activity within the PAC. The Code was to be administered by a Disciplinary Tribunal of Justice which consisted of three members appointed by the National Executive Committee. The Tribunal of Justice was tasked to enforce the provisions of the Disciplinary Code. Expression of ideas,

\textsuperscript{162} In the Race Relations Journal, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1963, it is stated that five whites including children were killed by Poqo operatives as they lay sleeping at the roadside near Bashee, in Transkei.


\textsuperscript{164} H. Barrel: The Outlawed South African Liberation Movements, pp. 52-93.
spreading of ideas or release of certain information, especially to the media, acquisition of knowledge, personal habits and relations with other liberation movements were all to be governed by the Disciplinary Code. The last two sections of the Code related to “Democratic Centralism” and “factionalism”. They were problematic in the sense that, they provided a loophole for the abuse of power by PAC leaders. As will be shown later, the leadership invoked disciplinary procedures to deal with political power contestations and ideological dissent. This occurred frequently during the reign of Potlake Leballo (1962-1979).

“Democratic centrism” was defined as follows: “that the power of directing the Pan Africanist Congress is centralised in the National Executive Committee which acts through the President who wields unquestioned power as long as he acts within the grounds laid down by the decisions of the organisation which must have been democratically arrived at. The President shall have emergency powers, which he may delegate, to suspend the entire Constitution of the Pan Africanist Congress so as to ensure that the movement emerges intact through a crisis. At that time he directs the Movement by decree, and is answerable for his action to the National Conference”. The definition of crisis is not explicit in the Constitution and as a result this clause of the disciplinary code was invoked rather opportunistically by the PAC leadership as a convenience to get away with dictatorial and corrupt agendas.

On “factionalism” the Code stipulated that “where normal processes of free discussion fail to curb factional tendencies, then firm iron discipline should come into play, and factional elements, no matter how important, should be chopped off without ceremony”. This was practised frequently by the embattled PAC leadership, during all the full periods of the conflict. Hence the numerous expulsions which occurred during the exile period.

The PAC Oath of Allegiance was a sworn statement which PAC members had to sign. It

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166 Ibid. p. 92.
is not clear whether it was indeed sworn by all PAC members but the ‘old guard’ who joined in 1959 and 1960 before the organisation was banned had to take an oath before joining the organisation. Point 2 of the Oath stated that “I will irrevocably obey and act upon the orders, commands, instructions and directions of the N.E.C. of the Pan Africanist Congress” and point 5 stated that “I accept the leadership of the Pan Africanist Congress. Should I fail to honour this Oath, I will accept death as Punishment.” It is only when one examines what happened within the PAC during the exile period that it is possible to indicate the extent to which some of these undertakings were exercised to the letter. Unfortunately the PAC Constitution (before it was amended after the unbanning of the PAC) did not make the necessary provisions to guard against possible abuse of the Disciplinary Code and Oath of Allegiance. The Constitution dealt more with the structure of the organisation, financial management and the levels of authority within the PAC bureaucracy.

**Banishment and the road to exile.**

From the day the PAC was founded, there was a passionate pledge by its founders to, among other things, “unite and rally the African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism”, overthrow “white, racist, settler colonial domination” in order to establish and maintain “the right of self-determination of African people for a unitary, non-racial democracy”.

According to Peter Raboroko (a member of the PAC), the ruling National Party, described the formation of the PAC as “a hot-bed of the most dangerous and poisonous agitators in the country”. To the Africanist, this meant that they were noted by the Apartheid government as a threat and were therefore more dangerous than the ANC.

An unfolding programme of action which would lead to ‘total independence’ in 1963, as was decided at the All-African People’s Congress in Ghana in 1958, was launched by the

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168 *Pan Africanist Congress: Constitution*, p. 2.
169 P.N. Raboroko: *Congress and the Africanists: The Africanist Case*, p. 27.
PAC and this resulted in the banishment of the organisation and exile. On the other hand, it put the PAC and the South African struggle for liberation on the map of world politics. The activities of the PAC, during the short period of legal existence inside the country, especially the anti-pass campaign of 1960, led to the banishment of the PAC. The “Positive Action Campaign” of 21 March, 1960 which culminated in the Sharpeville massacre and the incidence of Poqo in 1961 were interrelated events. The former led to the banishment of the PAC hence the road to exile and the latter signalled the manifestations of underground PAC activity inside the country.

A non-violent positive action campaign launched by the PAC on March 21, 1960 demanded the scrapping of notorious Pass Laws and a living wage for African workers which had been 34 pounds three shillings and four pennies minimum wages for the average African worker per annum. Thousands of PAC supporters, especially from the Southern Transvaal and the Western Cape responded to the PAC’s call. They marched to the police stations demanding arrest for not carrying passes. “They left their wives at home to look after children”. With their leaders in front, (including Mangaliso Sobukwe), they marched under the slogan “no bail no defence, no fine”. This was supposedly, the test of readiness to “serve, sacrifice and suffer”, as the PAC motto stipulates, “for the cause of liberation”. According to Saul Dubow, the PAC’s “campaigning slogan, ‘No bail, no defence, no fine’ signalled a style of politics that was altogether more confrontational and uncompromising than that of the ANC”.

In the Cape Times, dated March 22, 1960, it was reported that “an unknown number of Africans were shot dead, seven buildings including two schools, were destroyed by fire, and many Africans were wounded, according to the first reliable reports of rioting last night. The Minister of Justice, Mr Erasmus, who visited Langa, told Cape Times reporter

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171 Interview with M. Mgxashe, Cape Town, 1998 ; Interview between Malcom Dyan and A. Mahlangu, Cape Town, October, 1990.
172 Interview with M. Mgxashe, Cape Town, March 1988.
173 Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe 1949-1959, pp. 48-79
that it was impossible to give accurate figure of the casualties”. The report came from a Cape Times reporter and two of his colleagues who were at Langa police station. They were besieged for more than two hours by an angry mob of Africans following a police shoot-out which left at least twelve people seriously injured. The Cape Times car was set alight by the mob and its driver was killed. According to the Cape Argus, dated March 23, 1960, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd argued in parliament that the “native disturbances” were simply “a periodic phenomena” which could have something to do with “poverty and low wages”. He said that if the disturbances were seen against the background of a global pattern, “then it would be realised that they did not have anything to do with any South African government policy. They had nothing to do with the reference books against which the Pan Africanist Congress campaign was supposed to be aimed...During the past month similar trouble has occurred in the Belgian Congo, in the Cameroons, in Nyasaland and in other countries”. In other words, according to Verwoerd, the revolt was not a result of the government’s oppressive policies as such, it was just an uprising which could happen in any country.

A state of emergency was subsequently declared in about 80 districts on the 30th of March 1960 and thousands of activists from various organisations were arrested. This precipitated a march by approximately 30 000 people from Langa and Nyanga townships and the marchers were led by Ata Kgosa, a student from the University of Cape Town. Similar marches occurred in Durban, in White City, Johannesburg and Simonstown in the Western Cape. People demanded the release of their leaders from prison. In Cape Town, the march was dismissed after top police officers promised the leaders of the march to set up an appointment with the Minister of Justice to discuss grievances. The meeting never took place. Instead, five PAC leaders who were instrumental in organising and leading the march, including Mr Kgosa, were arrested and later charged for inciting political unrest.

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175 Cape Times, 22 March 1960.
176 Cape Argus, 23 March 1960.
The ruthless reaction of the South African government to the PAC’s mass action created a number of unforeseen problems for the eleven-months-old organisation. Its top leadership was imprisoned and Sobukwe, the leader, was sentenced to three years imprisonment and his colleagues in the national executive, to two years in prison. Others in the lower echelons of the organisation were given 18 months prison sentences. To make matters worse, both the ANC and the PAC were formally banned on April 8, 1960. For the PAC, this created problems of leadership and continuity. The early termination of its legal existence meant that the organisation could not develop “a tried and tested leadership”, fine-tune its analyses and theoretical formulations, “or test the efficacy of its founding documents” which were designed for political organisations operating under conditions of legality.\(^{177}\)

This orchestrated a mood of violent confrontation with the government. The overall impact of the PAC message of “Izwe Lethu” (our land) had captured the imagination not only of those who could relate directly with the land, the landless migrant workers from the barren countryside, but also many African youth whose lives were suddenly ‘turned around by the political crisis South Africa found itself caught up in’.\(^{178}\) All the same, the events of 21 March, 1960, put the PAC on the lime-light of South African politics, which was a significant achievement for a young organisation.

It needs to be highlighted that the March 21, 1960 anti-pass campaign was still a contentious issue between the ANC and the PAC. From the perspective of the ANC, the PAC hijacked a programme that was not of its making. The ANC had agreed at its annual conference in December 1959 that there should be a nation-wide campaign of active mass resistance against the regime in Pretoria. “The planned forms of mass resistance were to be national stoppages of work, banning of passes and later sabotage against the oppressors vital installations. By March 1960, the ANC’s massive campaign was already underway throughout the length and breadth of South Africa. Thus the masses of the oppressed people were successfully mobilised for March 31st Anti-Pass national
However, these plans were disturbed, according to the viewpoint of the ANC, by the call made by the PAC to the people of South Africa, that they should not carry passes and that they should go and surrender themselves at the nearest police stations. According to the PAC sources, the campaign was planned by the organisation at its inaugural Convention and was not at all intended to disturb the ANC’s plan of action. It was intended, instead, to assert the new organisation’s role in the unfolding of the political struggle.

Nonetheless, the masses of the people responded to the PAC’s call and this was demonstrated by huge turnouts in the Western Cape and Southern Transvaal regions. As a result of the campaign, 69 people died in Sharpeville and two people died in Langa, Cape Town and many others were wounded in various parts of the country.

The events of March 21, 1960 were widely publicised and constituted a crisis the South African government never anticipated. There was widespread panic among white South Africans and increasing pressure from the international community. Panic among white South Africans manifested itself in various ways. “In Cape Town and the Transvaal gun shops sold out their stocks within days to panicky whites, and inquiries about emigration inundated the offices of Canadian and Australian diplomatic representatives”. 180 The international community, for the first time, directly responded to the situation in South Africa. On March 22, 1960, the American State Department, in a statement released, directly condemned the South African government but on the other hand called upon Africans to “obtain redress for their legitimate grievances by peaceful means”. 181 The United Nations totally condemned the South African Government for the Sharpeville massacre and called upon it to “initiate measures aimed at racial harmony based on equity”. 182

The National Party government, in spite of threats and pleas, remained unchanged in its

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179 ANC Archives, Fort Hare: ‘The PAC of South Africa - Whom does it represent?, n.d.
182 Ibid.
policies and laws affecting the Black majority. The only concession it made was to declare a moratorium on pass arrests. At the same time, police patrols around the clock, in African locations, were increased. Meetings were outlawed, raids, road blocks and arrests became the order of the day. On March 30, 1960, the government, declared a state of emergency “and assumed all powers to act against all form of alleged subversion, including the powers to detain indefinitely any person suspected of anti-government activity”.\(^{183}\) This precipitated widespread reaction from African communities who were immediately affected as a result of the implementation of the emergency regulations. In Cape Town, for instance, where the police started to round-up suspected PAC activists, beating and arresting people in Langa and Nyanga townships, this led to a march to the city which involved over 30 000 people. Unrest also spread to Durban, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein.

Instead of introducing reforms, the government proceeded and introduced on April 18, 1960, the Unlawful Organisations Act No. 18 of 1960, which effectively banned the PAC and the ANC. “Besides empowering the government to ban the ANC and the PAC, and any other organisations attempting to further their aims, the Act provided that persons found guilty of intimidating others to stay away from work or to commit any offence by way of protest against a law, would be liable to a maximum penalty of a 500 pounds fine, or five years imprisonment, or 10 strokes or a combination of any of these”.\(^{184}\) As a result of this legislation all layers of PAC leadership were affected. In fact, many of them were placed behind bars and the Johannesburg office of the organisation was closed down. The organisation was thrown into a state of complete disarray and had to survive under conditions for which it had never prepared itself.

The PAC leadership, as though in anticipation of these events, had on the 20\(^{th}\) March 1960 instructed Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi, to leave the country in order to make the PAC’s case known to the international community and the rest of Africa and also establish contacts. Mahomo and Molotsi laid the foundations for the establishment of


\(^{184}\) *Ibid*, p. 375.
new PAC bases outside South Africa and raised funds for the creation of the first PAC rudimentary infrastructure in Maseru, Lesotho and PAC missions in Accra (Ghana), London (England) and in Cairo (Egypt). The Lesotho office of the PAC was officially opened in Bonhomme House in Maseru in 1962 when P.K. Leballo arrived from South Africa, after serving a two-year prison sentence for his role in the anti-pass campaign, to take over as acting President of the exiled PAC. The ANC as well, before Sharpeville, had sent its deputy president, Oliver Tambo, “out of the country to represent it in Africa and abroad. These men were joined later by a few activists who left South Africa for Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland during the emergency”. What happened in exile will be examined in the chapters that follow.

As a result of the government’s reaction to the political turmoil which reigned thereafter, the PAC and the ANC went underground and re-emerged with a declaration that they were not to walk along the non-violent path of yesteryears. The ANC founded Umkhonto we Sizwe in December, 16, 1961. The PAC, also resurfaced in 1961 inside the country, bearing the name Poqo, which was described as the PAC’s military wing.

In summary, the formation of the PAC is better understood in the context of what happened internationally, from 1900-1960 and also the long-drawn and bitter ideological debate and wrangling within the ANC. The rise of Pan African movements outside the continent of Africa and the participation of African leaders in these movements resulted in the appropriation of Pan Africanist ideas by Africans in the various countries of Africa. Pan Africanist ideas were articulated to fit the specific conditions of colonialism in Africa and the leading ideologue in Africa was Dr Nkruma of Ghana. The 1960s were a period when many dramatic changes and developments took place in Africa. Many colonial states were liberated from their colonial masters. These events generated a mood of optimism which influenced the development of Pan Africanist ideas in South Africa, hence the formation of the PAC in 1959, just a year after the All-African People’s

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Conference held in Ghana, in 1958.

The ideology of the PAC embodied external Africanist influences as well as South African experiences. This is clearly illustrated in the basic documents of the organisation, e.g. the Pan Africanist Manifesto, PAC Disciplinary Code, the Constitution, Oath of Allegiance and most importantly, Sobukwe’s inaugural address. These documents show how the Africanists conceived of the South African struggle as part of the broader struggle of the peoples of Africa against colonialism, imperialism and white domination.

Developments in South Africa, especially within the ANC also laid the grounds for the formation of the PAC. The ANC was involved in an ideological war within itself. The debates which divided the ANC centred more on questions of strategy than substantive details about what a future South African state should look like. The Africanist faction within the ANC, and especially in the Youth League, grew steadily following the aftermath of the Defiance Campaign until the final split in 1958. In April 1959 the Africanists launched the Pan Africanist Congress on their own.

The formation and ideological genesis of the PAC needs to be analysed against the backdrop of the general trend of decolonisation in Africa, especially during the 1960s. The tendency to link the birth of the PAC to emerging tendencies and conflicts within the ANC needs to be carefully avoided as it circumscribes a broad and complex phenomenon. Of course the radicalisation of the Youth League does form an important point of departure but has been over-emphasised in existing literature.

The ideology of the PAC, if carefully examined, straddles the divide which separates the ‘derived’ ideology from ‘inherent’ ideology. It combines heavily crucial elements of both. It is derived in the sense that it draws heavily from outside influences as it was first articulated by Africans in America, the West Indies and other parts of Europe. In other words, as a body of thought, Pan Africanism was brought into South Africa, and the rest of Africa, from outside. Pan Africanism is also an inherent ideology in the sense that it combines and expresses shared historical experiences of peoples of African descent from
anywhere in the world. It presupposes an African mode of existence which it then casts as an ontological phenomenon.

In the context of this background it is clear that the PAC was bound to stumble, especially in exile. Firstly, the organisation had not fully interrogated its ideological underpinnings. It had not effected a smooth transition from the broad descriptions of Pan Africanism to an elaborately South African version of Pan Africanism. In addition to this their ideology did not inform or was not informed by any clear and well-thought out strategy and experience. This will become clear in the chapters that follow in which the PAC in exile is examined in detail.