

DECLARATION

I, Victoria L. Graham, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.



ABSTRACT

Diplomacy is the most widely used instrument of foreign policy. The changing international environment, brought about by the end of the Cold War and the increasingly popular doctrine of humanitarian intervention, has altered the nature of diplomacy. “Quiet diplomacy” has progressively become the *bon mot* of international relations. However, quiet diplomacy is a loose term that is bandied about in reference to many kinds of “soft” diplomatic approaches. This study is an attempt to provide some clarity on the conceptualisation of quiet diplomacy, through the comparative analysis of its use by two successive South African Presidents - Mandela and Mbeki - in two African crises.

The study proposes a set of indicators of quiet diplomacy, namely: personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or government or senior officials; little (or no) media involvement; the appearance of limited action or even inaction; calm and tactful but persistent negotiation or dialogue in a non-threatening atmosphere; constructive engagement with the target country in an effort to solve the problems as quietly as possible; and finally, diplomacy often carried out in the context of bilateral or multilateral efforts. These indicators are operationalised during the course of the study by applying them to Mandela’s use of these tactics in the Nigerian crisis in 1995 and then Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwean government in 2000-2004.

The new South Africa was instantly placed under enormous pressure to assume responsibility, both economically and politically, for the revitalisation of the African continent. In addition Mandela was regarded as a supreme symbol of peace and reconciliation and the international community looked to him to resolve Nigeria’s woes. Mbeki’s soft approach to Mugabe has been the target of international speculation and criticism, especially in light of Mbeki’s stated commitment to the African Renaissance and good governance in Africa.

The successes and failures of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy in these two situations are discussed. Notable findings are Mandela’s shift from quiet to coercive diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis and the negative consequences of that decision. The implications of this undertaking are considerable because it was South Africa’s use of coercion and its subsequent failure in Nigeria that prompted Mbeki’s government to pursue only quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe.

OPSOMMING

Diplomasie is die mees toegepaste instrument van buitelandse beleid. Die veranderde internasionale omgewing wat meegebring is deur die einde van die Koue Oorlog en die toenemende populariteit van die doktrine van humanitêre intervensie het die aard van diplomاسie verander. Tesame hiermee het “stille diplomاسie” geleidelik die *bon mot* van internasionale betrekkinge geword. Stille diplomاسie is egter ‘n losse term wat maklik rondgegooi word om te verwys na menige soorte “sagte” diplomatieke benaderings. Hierdie studie is ‘n poging om meer duidelikheid te verskaf in die konseptualisering van stille diplomاسie, deur middel van ‘n vergelykende analise van die gebruik van die konsep deur twee Suid-Afrikaanse Presidenten—Mandela en Mbeki—tydens twee Afrika-krisisse.

Die studie stel ‘n stel indikatore van stille diplomاسie voor, naamlik: persoonlike of direkte diplomاسie tussen staats- of regeringshoofde of senior amptenare; geen (of min) inmenging deur die media; die voorkoms van min ingryping of selfs geen aksie; kalm en taktvolle maar volgehoue onderhandeling of dialoog in ‘n nie-dreigende atmosfeer; konstruktiewe interaksie met die teikenstaat in ‘n poging om probleme so stil as moontlik op te los; en laastens, diplomاسie wat dikwels uitgevoer word in die konteks van bilaterale of multilaterale pogings. Hierdie indikatore word geoperasionaliseer in die loop van die studie deur hul toepassing in die geval van Mandela se gebruik daarvan tydens die Nigeriese krisis in 1995, en dan Mbeki se stille diplomاسie met betrekking tot die Zimbabwe regering in 2000-2004.

Die nuwe Suid-Afrika is spoedig onder enorme druk geplaas om polities en ekonomies verantwoordelikheid te neem vir die heropbou van die Afrika-kontinent. Voorts is Mandela ook beskou as die hoogste simbool van vrede en versoening, en die internasionale gemeenskap het van hom verwag om die Nigeriese krisis op te los. Mbeki se sagte benadering tot Mugabe het die onderwerp van geweldige internasionale spekulاسie en kritiek geword, veral in die lig van Mbeki se wyd-gepubliseerde toewyding tot die Afrika Renaissance en goeie regering in Afrika.

Die suksesse en gebreke van Suid-Afrika se stille diplomاسie in hierdie twee gevalle word bespreek. Noemenswaardige gevolgtrekkings sluit in Mandela se skuif van stille na meer dreigende diplomاسie tydens die Nigeriese krisis, en die negatiewe gevolge van daardie besluit. Die implikasies hiervan was belangrik, aangesien dit die eerste keer was dat die nuwe Suid-Afrika dwang gebruik het, en die

gevolglike mislukking daarvan het Mbeki genoop om slegs stille diplomاسie met betrekking tot Zimbabwe te gebruik.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following people for their continuous support, interest and commitment to keeping me sane:

- My supervisor Mr Pieter Fourie and my co-supervisor Professor Deon Geldenhuys – thank you for the constant inspiration
- My twin sister, Suzy, my mom Carole and dad Richard and my brothers, Antony and Richard
- Jim Chadwick
- Rebecca



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of tables	ix
Abbreviations	x
Chapter 1 - Introduction to the study: motivation, methodology and structure	
Introduction	1
1.1. The concept of “diplomacy”	3
1.2. Purpose of the study	5
1.3. Literature review	6
1.4. Research method	7
1.5. Research structure	7
Chapter 2 - Conceptualising diplomacy	
Introduction	9
2.1. The instruments of foreign policy	9
2.2. Conceptualising diplomacy	11
2.3. The relationship between power and diplomacy	15
2.4. The changing nature of diplomacy	18
2.5. A typology of diplomacy	21
2.5.1. Quiet diplomacy	23
Conclusion	30
Chapter 3 - South Africa’s relations with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Nigeria, 1960-1993	
Introduction	31
3.1. Apartheid South Africa’s outward policy (regional and continental)	31
3.1.1. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and UDI: 1965-1980	32
3.1.2. CONSAS and SADCC	39
3.1.3. Nigeria’s relations with South Africa, 1960-1966	41
3.1.4. The Biafran Civil War and South Africa’s involvement, 1967-1970	43
3.2. South Africa’s coercive diplomacy: regional destabilisation	45



3.3. Zimbabwe's and Nigeria's anti-apartheid stance	48
3.3.1. Mugabe and South Africa, 1980-1989	48
3.3.2. Nigeria's anti-apartheid activity	50
3.3.2.1. UN actions against apartheid	52
3.3.2.2. Military rule in Nigeria and response to apartheid	55
3.3.2.3. The Eminent Persons Group	58
3.4. South Africa's transitional period and changing relationships, 1990-1994	62
Conclusion	65
Chapter 4 - South Africa's quiet diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis, 1995-1996	
Introduction	68
4.1. Nelson Mandela: South Africa's miracle man	68
4.2. The South African context: a new African policy	70
4.3. The Nigerian context: oil and the Ogoni uprising	76
4.4. South Africa's quiet diplomacy in the Nigerian crisis	85
4.4.1. Personal or direct diplomacy, persistent dialogue and constructive engagement	86
4.4.2. The appearance of limited action or even inaction and media involvement	90
4.4.3. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to handle the Nigerian crisis	93
4.5. Loud diplomacy: South Africa's use of economic "sticks"	100
Conclusion	102
Chapter 5 - South Africa's quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, 1999-2004	
Introduction	106
5.1. Thabo Mbeki: assuming the mantle	106
5.2. South Africa's southern African policy	108
5.3. The Zimbabwean context	113
5.3.1. The land issue	113
5.3.2. The economic crisis	120
5.3.3. A lack of democracy	121
5.4. South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe	124
5.4.1. Personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or senior officials	125
5.4.2. The appearance of limited action or even inaction and media involvement	129
5.4.3. Constructive engagement through persistent negotiations	135
5.4.4. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to resolve the Zimbabwean situation	138

5.5. Mbeki steers clear of sanctions	143
Conclusion	146
Chapter 6 – Conclusion: summary of principal findings, comparative results and further research	
Summary of main findings	151
Comparative analysis	155
An agenda for further research	166
Bibliography	168



LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1. South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis	102
Table 2. South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy during the Zimbabwean crisis	146
Table 3. South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy towards Nigeria (1995-1996) and Zimbabwe (2000-2004)	156



ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AG	Action Group
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BLS	Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CDHR	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFMSA	Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa
CFU	Commercial Farmers' Union
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMAG	Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
CNN	Cable News Network
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DP	Democratic Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMIROAF	Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
FMG	Federal Military Government
Frelimo	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
Frolizi	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product

IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRI	International Republican Institute
JEC	Joint Economic Committee
LHC	Lancaster House Constitution
MD	Managing Director
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NCNC	National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDSC	National Defence and Security Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NP	National Party
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NYCOP	National Youth Council of Ogoni People
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PF	Patriotic Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
Renamo/MNR	<i>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana</i>
RF	Rhodesian Front
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDSG	South Africa-Nigeria Democratic Support Group
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Corporation
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
UANC	United African National Council
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCERD	UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

“One of the lessons of history is that *nothing* is often a good thing to do and always a clever thing to say”

Will Durant

“What no leader must ever do is suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck”

Henry Kissinger

“Let us remember there can be no bright future for the world, no new international order that is sustainable, without Africa occupying a dignified place, a rightful place, in the temple of humanity and in the consults of human decision-making”

Jerry Rawlings



