DECLARATION

I, Victoria L. Graham, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
ABSTRACT

Diplomacy is the most widely used instrument of foreign policy. The changing international environment, brought about by the end of the Cold War and the increasingly popular doctrine of humanitarian intervention, has altered the nature of diplomacy. “Quiet diplomacy” has progressively become the **bon mot** of international relations. However, quiet diplomacy is a loose term that is bandied about in reference to many kinds of “soft” diplomatic approaches. This study is an attempt to provide some clarity on the conceptualisation of quiet diplomacy, through the comparative analysis of its use by two successive South African Presidents - Mandela and Mbeki - in two African crises.

The study proposes a set of indicators of quiet diplomacy, namely: personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or government or senior officials; little (or no) media involvement; the appearance of limited action or even inaction; calm and tactful but persistent negotiation or dialogue in a non-threatening atmosphere; constructive engagement with the target country in an effort to solve the problems as quietly as possible; and finally, diplomacy often carried out in the context of bilateral or multilateral efforts. These indicators are operationalised during the course of the study by applying them to Mandela’s use of these tactics in the Nigerian crisis in 1995 and then Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwean government in 2000-2004.

The new South Africa was instantly placed under enormous pressure to assume responsibility, both economically and politically, for the revitalisation of the African continent. In addition Mandela was regarded as a supreme symbol of peace and reconciliation and the international community looked to him to resolve Nigeria’s woes. Mbeki’s soft approach to Mugabe has been the target of international speculation and criticism, especially in light of Mbeki’s stated commitment to the African Renaissance and good governance in Africa.

The successes and failures of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy in these two situations are discussed. Notable findings are Mandela’s shift from quiet to coercive diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis and the negative consequences of that decision. The implications of this undertaking are considerable because it was South Africa’s use of coercion and its subsequent failure in Nigeria that prompted Mbeki’s government to pursue only quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe.
Diplomasie is die mees toegepaste instrument van buitelandse beleid. Die veranderde internasionale omgewing wat meegebring is deur die einde van die Koue Oorlog en die toenemende populariteit van die doktrine van humanitêre intervensie het die aard van diplomasi verander. Tesame hiermee het “stille diplomasi” geleidelik die bon mot van internasionale betrekkinge geword. Stille diplomasi is egter ‘n losse term wat maklik rondegooi word om te verwys na menige soorte “sagte” diplomatieke benaderings. Hierdie studie is ‘n poging om meer duidelikheid te verskaf in die konseptualisering van stille diplomasi, deur middel van ‘n vergelykende analyse van die gebruik van die konsep deur twee Suid-Afrikaanse Presidente—Mandela en Mbeki—tydens twee Afrika-krississe.

Die nuwe Suid-Afrika is spoedig onder enorme druk geplaas om polities en ekonomies verantwoordelikheid te neem vir die heropbou van die Afrika-kontinent. Voorts is Mandela ook beskou as die hoogste simbool van vrede en versoening, en die internasionale gemeenskap het van hom verwag om die Nigeriese krisis op te los. Mbeki se sagte benadering tot Mugabe het die onderwerp van geweldige internasionale spekulasie en kritiek geword, veral in die lig van Mbeki se wyd-gepubliseerde toewyding tot die Afrika Renaissance en goeie regering in Afrika.

Die suksesse en gebreke van Suid-Afrika se stille diplomasi in hierdie twee gevalle word bespreek. Noemenswaardige gevolgtrekkings sluit in Mandela se skuif van stille na meer dreigende diplomasi tydens die Nigeriese krisis, en die negatiewe gevolge van daardie besluit. Die implikasies hiervan was belangrik, aangesien dit die eerste keer was dat die nuwe Suid-Afrika dwang gebruik het, en die

OPSOMMING

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Die studie stel ‘n stel indikatore van stille diplomasi voor, naamlik: persoonlike of direkte diplomasi tussen staats- of regeringshoofde of senior amptenare; geen (of min) inmenging deur die media; die voorkoms van min ingryping of zelfs geen aksie; kalm en taktvolle maar volgehou onderhandeling of dialoog in ‘n nie-dreigende atmosfeer; konstruktiewe interaksie met die teikenstaat in ‘n poging om probleme so stil as moontlik op te los; en laastens, diplomasi wat dikwels uitgevoer word in die konteks van bilaterale of multilaterale pogings. Hierdie indikatore word geoperasionaliseer in die loop van die studie deur hul toepassing in die geval van Mandela se gebruik daarvan tydens die Nigeriese krisis in 1995, en dan Mbeki se stille diplomasi met betrekking tot die Zimbabwe regering in 2000-2004.

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gevolglike mislukking daarvan het Mbeki genoop om slegs stille diplomatie met betrekking tot Zimbabwe te gebruik.

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- Jim Chadwick
- Rebecca
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of tables</th>
<th>ix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 1 - Introduction to the study: motivation, methodology and structure

### Introduction

1.1. The concept of “diplomacy”  
1.2. Purpose of the study  
1.3. Literature review  
1.4. Research method  
1.5. Research structure

## Chapter 2 - Conceptualising diplomacy

### Introduction

2.1. The instruments of foreign policy  
2.2. Conceptualising diplomacy  
2.3. The relationship between power and diplomacy  
2.4. The changing nature of diplomacy  
2.5. A typology of diplomacy

#### 2.5.1. Quiet diplomacy

### Conclusion

## Chapter 3 - South Africa’s relations with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Nigeria, 1960-1993

### Introduction

3.1. Apartheid South Africa’s outward policy (regional and continental)

#### 3.1.1. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and UDI: 1965-1980

#### 3.1.2. CONSAS and SADCC

#### 3.1.3. Nigeria’s relations with South Africa, 1960-1966

#### 3.1.4. The Biafran Civil War and South Africa’s involvement, 1967-1970

### 3.2. South Africa’s coercive diplomacy: regional destabilisation
3.3. Zimbabwe’s and Nigeria’s anti-apartheid stance 48
  3.3.1. Mugabe and South Africa, 1980-1989 48
  3.3.2. Nigeria’s anti-apartheid activity 50
    3.3.2.1. UN actions against apartheid 52
    3.3.2.2. Military rule in Nigeria and response to apartheid 55
    3.3.2.3. The Eminent Persons Group 58
  3.3.2. Nigeria’s anti-apartheid activity 50
  3.4. South Africa’s transitional period and changing relationships, 1990-1994 62
Conclusion 65

Chapter 4 - South Africa’s quiet diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis, 1995-1996
Introduction 68
  4.1. Nelson Mandela: South Africa’s miracle man 68
  4.2. The South African context: a new African policy 70
  4.3. The Nigerian context: oil and the Ogoni uprising 76
  4.4. South Africa’s quiet diplomacy in the Nigerian crisis 85
    4.4.1. Personal or direct diplomacy, persistent dialogue and constructive engagement 86
    4.4.2. The appearance of limited action or even inaction and media involvement 90
    4.4.3. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to handle the Nigerian crisis 93
  4.5. Loud diplomacy: South Africa’s use of economic “sticks” 100
Conclusion 102

Chapter 5 - South Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, 1999-2004
Introduction 106
  5.1. Thabo Mbeki: assuming the mantle 106
  5.2. South Africa’s southern African policy 108
  5.3. The Zimbabwean context 113
    5.3.1. The land issue 113
    5.3.2. The economic crisis 120
    5.3.3. A lack of democracy 121
  5.4. South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe 124
    5.4.1. Personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or senior officials 125
    5.4.2. The appearance of limited action or even inaction and media involvement 129
    5.4.3. Constructive engagement through persistent negotiations 135
    5.4.4. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to resolve the Zimbabwean situation 138
5.5. Mbeki steers clear of sanctions  143
Conclusion  146

Chapter 6 – Conclusion: summary of principal findings, comparative results and further research
Summary of main findings  151
Comparative analysis  155
An agenda for further research  166

Bibliography  168
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis                     102
Table 2. South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy during the Zimbabwean crisis               146
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Ruling Council</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDHR</td>
<td>Committee for the Defence of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFMSA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFU</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAG</td>
<td>Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMIROAF</td>
<td>Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPG</td>
<td>Eminent Persons Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMG</td>
<td>Federal Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td><em>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frolizi</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IRI  International Republican Institute
JEC  Joint Economic Committee
LHC  Lancaster House Constitution
MD  Managing Director
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MNC  Multinational Corporation
MOSOP  Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MPLA  Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NCA  National Constitutional Assembly
NCNC  National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons
NDI  National Democratic Institute
NDSC  National Defence and Security Council
NEPAD  New Partnership for African Development
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
NNPC  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NP  National Party
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPC  Northern People’s Congress
NYCOP  National Youth Council of Ogoni People
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress
PF  Patriotic Front
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation
PRC  Provisional Ruling Council
Renamo/MNR  Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
RF  Rhodesian Front
SABC  South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP  South African Communist Party
SADCC  Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADC  Southern African Development Community
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDSG</td>
<td>South Africa-Nigeria Democratic Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC</td>
<td>Shell Petroleum Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPO</td>
<td>Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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</table>
“One of the lessons of history is that nothing is often a good thing to do and always a clever thing to say”

Will Durant

“What no leader must ever do is suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck”

Henry Kissinger

“Let us remember there can be no bright future for the world, no new international order that is sustainable, without Africa occupying a dignified place, a rightful place, in the temple of humanity and in the consults of human decision-making”

Jerry Rawlings