military clothing in their possession at the time of discharge, including two blankets and other accessories such as a ground sheet, water bottle, haversack and mess tin. (60) Soldiers who had been discharged with benefits received tax-free gratuities which were seen as a personal grant and which had to be paid in full and not be set off against any indebtedness for tax or any other amount. These amounted to 5 shillings for each completed month of service, with a minimum period of six months continuous service. However, the Directorate of Demobilisation's administration of the gratuity was somewhat cumbersome. Although the War Records section had all the details of the soldiers, they still had to apply for these gratuities. This procedure applied to the 28,000 members of the NMC discharged up to November 1944—the date on which war gratuities became payable. By March 1946 18,000 (of whom the vast majority were in the rural areas) had not yet applied. The soldiers were either ignorant of this benefit or did not know the application procedure. Soldiers discharged after that date applied for their gratuities before being discharged. However, because of bureaucratic red-tape, they had to wait 4 to 6 weeks before they actually received their gratuities; this caused real hardship to many of them. (61) The DNEAS took the Directorate of Demobilisation to task for following this procedure as well as for publishing only a brief article in the Rand Daily Mail explaining the procedure:

"What particular purpose Demob. hopes to achieve by this piece of publicity it is difficult to understand for it is obvious that being in English and published in an urban publication it is for European consumption only since the vast majority of the members of the N.M.C. who are effected neither read nor write English nor do they read the publication. Why then drag the European population into the problem and so add more grist to the mill of the rising tide of criticism." (62)

It must also be stated that the addresses given by many of these ex-servicemen on discharge, proved unreliable. (63)

None of these benefits were finalised when recruitment for the NMC commenced. The provision of civilian clothing to discharged soldiers, for instance, came into effect from approximately August 1942. Only by 1945 was the discharge package complete with the result that the soldiers discharged before that date had to forfeit many of the benefits. However, all cases of soldiers discharged prior to March 1942 were investigated with a view to granting pensions and other benefits, but only to so-called "deserving cases." (64)

Furthermore, exemption from the pass laws was granted to soldiers who had been discharged with benefits after more than two years service and who had made a formal application to this effect. A similar concession would apply to those with less than two years' service but who received a military pension or had been discharged on grounds of injury or illness contracted through military service. All the applicants' civil records prior to enlistment had also to be satisfactory before exemption was granted because
"Military service should not be regarded as automatically wiping out an applicant's previous bad civil record." (65)

GRANTS AND LOANS UNDER THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEME

The Financial Assistance Scheme was designed as a special measure to help the ex-servicemen discharged with benefits or who had been taught a trade in the army or who had practiced a trade before enlistment. This was done to re-establish and adjust themselves to civilian life. They could apply for a grant of up to 100 pounds or a loan of up to 500 pounds or a combination of both but before they were entitled to these grants or loans, they had to prove that they had suffered loss as the result of their proceeding on military service. It was therefore not intended to help ex-servicemen to start entirely new and uncertain enterprises but only to help them with tools or equipment in order to resume their pre-war employment. In order to avoid delays in equipping the ex-soldiers for civilian work, the Dispersal Depot Committees had the right to make immediate cash grants up to 20 pounds (which were later increased to 40 pounds) to these ex-soldiers requiring occupational equipment. Applications for agricultural equipment were dealt with by the DSDC operating in the applicant's home area. The latter applications were the most usual as 80 per cent of the black recruits came from rural areas. (66) Cognizance was taken of the fact that some ex-servicemen might have been ignorant of their eligibility for financial assistance for re-instatement purposes; therefore, the authorities made special efforts to inform them of their rights. (67)

The applications for grants and loans reflected the diverse nature of the soldiers' needs on discharge but also that many were not yet au fait with the regulations. The majority of applications were for grants or for assistance to build houses. However, there were no provisions for such assistance unless the soldier could prove that his pre-enlistment house had been damaged or destroyed as a result of his being absent on military service. In the light of the large number of applications, the Secretary for Native Affairs made recommendations to establish such a scheme but it foundered because of practical and political reasons. Investigating individual claims of rural blacks with a view to ascertain whether or not the claims were justified, would have been virtually impossible. The political objection, however, dealt the idea a devastating blow:

"Mr. Hofmeyr ruled that...Native Military Corps ex-volunteers could not be afforded special treatment by being given grants and/or loans under the demobilisation plan as such special treatment would create dissatisfaction in the ranks of European ex-volunteers." (68)

Other applications ranged from those who wished to buy a bus, tools as a shoe maker, cattle or land for farming purposes to those who needed money to further their studies or wished to start a small business. A tongue in the cheek article in the Rand
Daily Mail reported that
"Many applications for grants for the purchase of wifes
have not been granted, the Government not regarding
the possession of wifes as essential to
rehabilitation." (69)

By the end of September 1947 33 098 black ex-volunteers had
applied for assistance of which 8 240 were not approved. (70)
That a quarter of the applications were turned down was mainly
due to the fact that, as pointed out above, many ex-soldiers were
still badly informed about the regulations governing grants and
their amendments. In October 1945, for instance, the DGD
determined that all ex-volunteers who had been discharged before
1944 were no longer eligible to apply for financial assistance
after 31 December 1945. (71) Therefore ex-servicemen who were
ignorant of this regulation but still applied for financial
assistance after this date were unsuccessful. (72)

The chairman of the DSDC, Warrenton, experienced some difficulty
in explaining to the soldiers why their applications had been
rejected. He reported their reactions as follows:
"My Committee was faced with the task of endeavouring to
explain in a manner comprehensible to the
Native mind, the nice distinctions which
determine whether a case falls within the policy of the
Directorate or not. In short, my Committee had reached the
stage where they were forced to disillusion these men who
had come home with such high hopes, and it is not
unnatural that the men are inclined to ascribe their
failure to obtain financial assistance... not to wrong
informations in the first instance, but to the
shortcomings of my Committee." (73)

Apart from the above-mentioned benefits and grants, special
grants to meet exceptional needs of the ex-servicemen were
introduced. The Special Grants Board could make financial
contributions to the amount of 15 pounds a year to ex-soldiers
who had sustained disabilities which were not directly
attributable to military service but nevertheless handicapped
them to such an extent that they were unable to find employment
and consequently became destitute. This provision applied only to
claims for pensions which had been rejected by either the
Military Pensions Board or the Military Pensions Appeal Board.
(74) The Native Affairs Department also administered a scheme for
needy ex-soldiers whose applications had been turned down by the
above-mentioned Boards. To be considered for assistance the
ex-soldier should be 60 years or older or be unable, owing to
infirmity, to undertake regular work. His income (including any
benefits in kind derived from his land or stock or support
derived from relatives) should also not exceed 39 pounds a year.
The total number of recipients of these allowances was 3 125 by
30 June 1946 and 2 356 by 30 June 1947. (75) However, according
to Major H.S. Cooke, Chairman of the CAC, the administration of
this scheme was not only too cumbersome but the provisions were
also hopelessly inadequate, leaving the ex-volunteers in a worse
position than they had been in prior to enlisting. Moreover, there was still no governmental assistance scheme, except Pauper Relief, available to dependants of deceased ex-servicemen or ex-servicemen confined to mental or leper institutions, "which it was agreed no ex-volunteer or his dependants should have to resort to." (76)

The Governor-General's National War Fund (GGNWF), however, administered a Special Temporary Allowance Scheme to aid dependants of deceased black soldiers. (77) A last resort to needy ex-soldiers was the DNEAS Central Fund which assisted only in extremely compassionate cases. (78)

The GGNWF also assisted the ex-soldiers and their dependants in a more indirect way. Grants were made to Mission Hospitals and similar institutions for the extension and improvement of medical services in areas where there was a large concentration of the black population. In this way the Jane Purse Memorial Hospital in the Sekukuniland and Nebo districts with a black population of 200,000 of which 9,597 had joined the NMC received a grant of 20,000 pounds in 1950. By June 1954 the sum of 306,101 pounds had been paid out to these institutions, proportionate, so far as possible, to the number of volunteers recruited from the areas served by each institution. (79)

Despite all these schemes, it seems as if two major problems which militated strongly against the ex-soldiers, remained unsolved: there was still no adequate provision for a soldier or his family to tide them over from the period of his discharge until he had secured steady employment and moreover, most of the ex-servicemen and their families were ignorant of the assistance available. (80) Both caused grave hardship in many cases.

**DISCHARGES WITHOUT BENEFITS**

Soldiers whose conduct during military service was marred by so many serious offences that they were discharged with ignominy, were not eligible for the same benefits received by those honourably discharged. It was, however, official policy not to discharge a man without benefits without substantial evidence of his incorrigibility. Col. Stubbbs furthermore, allayed any apprehensions that there was anything suspicious about these discharges when he categorically stated:

"Dishonourable discharge has never and will never be resorted to as a means of saving the U.D.P. the cost of awarding demobilisation privileges and in fact the policy is followed of rather giving a man these benefits than withholding them, but you will no doubt readily appreciate that if details of unsatisfactory character are released from service and given full demobilisation benefits it may act as an incentive to others to obtain their discharge by continually contravening the M.D.C." (81)

The allotments of soldiers to be discharged without benefits ceased although they might still have been on the strengths of
the Dispersal Depots. They were furthermore neither entitled to request the Government to find them employment nor to any gratuities or benefits provided by the Government for re-adjustment purposes in civilian life. On discharge they received a cash allowance of 4 pounds but no clothing or clothing allowance. (82) Again, some soldiers such as A. Pupuma, must have been ignorant of the fact that he was dishonourably discharged or of the relevant regulations; he could, for instance, not understand why he had to hand in his clothes on discharge. (83)

The following table provides the comparative numbers of soldiers discharged without benefits by the end of January 1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Discharges</th>
<th>Without benefits</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>49 164</td>
<td>4 397</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC and CC</td>
<td>17 907</td>
<td>3 386</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>29 075</td>
<td>13 327</td>
<td>47% (84)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This exceptionally high number of dishonourable discharges amongst the NMC was already a feature of the discharge pattern since August 1943 and naturally caused some eyebrows to lift. The official explanation was that the initial urgency to recruit as many blacks as possible entailed acceptance of many with criminal records. In 1943 it was decided to purge the NEAS of its "unsatisfactory elements" and therefore the ratio of discharges without benefits was so high. Moreover, the only discharges with benefits were mainly those who had been medically reclassified and were therefore unfit for further military service. (85)

Whilst the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee was likewise concerned about the large number of volunteers discharged without benefits, the South African Institute of Race Relations and the Orange Flash League were of the opinion that these discharges were effected in a highly unsatisfactory manner. They recommended that these cases be reviewed. (86) The authorities granted that the policy with regard to discharges was not always uniformly applied and that there was therefore merit in reviewing certain cases. By August 1946 9531 cases were reviewed of which 4444 only then received benefits. (87) The implementation of these reviews was a difficult matter as it was difficult to trace many of the cases, mainly due to changes of address. (88) Authority to issue clothing consisting of a suit, hat and tie amounting to 1 pound 14 shillings and 5 pence was only issued as late as September 1950. (89)

The black soldiers themselves were also highly perturbed about the large number of their comrades discharged without benefits. Not only did they feel that many discharges were unjust but also that the 4 pounds was totally inadequate to start a civilian life again. This was especially true with regard to urban ex-servicemen. Lt.-Col. E. Malherbe reported that

"Natives complain that they are not all from reserves and that many of them will have to equip themselves with clothes in the same way as anyone else who lives in a town. They are given no money to do this." (90)

There was furthermore a very real possibility that these soldiers, having been denied benefits, might resort to crime in order to survive. (91)
PROVISION FOR DISABLED SOLDIERS (92)

When the Native Ex-volunteers' Benefits Committee investigated the provisions for disabled soldiers in 1944, it found that under the War Pensions legislation, black ex-servicemen were paid gratuities when the disabilities were less than 20% and pensions when the disabilities were 20% or more. In effect many ex-servicemen who had been considerably disabled received a gratuity of as low as 5 pounds, owing to the fact that their disabilities were considered to have been merely aggravated by war service and not directly caused by it. To many discharged soldiers this was unfair as they had been under the impression that they should receive compensation irrespective of whether or not the disability, which occasioned their discharge, was existent before enlistment or aggravated by military service. (93) Even when higher pensions were awarded, the scale was based on rural conditions which made it totally inadequate to meet the cost of living in the urban areas. (94) Consequently, partially disabled black ex-servicemen found that their loss in earning capacity was much greater than the degree of disablement assessed for pension purposes. The limited provisions of community services and welfare for blacks, hampered their satisfactory re-instatement; (95) moreover, the fact that communal responsibility amongst the blacks for the maintenance of those in need had virtually disappeared in cities and towns increased their plight. To aggravate matters, employment opportunities for disabled ex-servicemen were extremely scarce.

"Employers maintaining that they do not conduct their businesses as convalescent homes" (96)

so that this avenue which could have been used to increase their meagre pensions was also closed to them.

Applications for compensation by needy disabled soldiers were frequently rejected by the Military Pensions Board because they did not meet the regulations which were evidently drafted without a full appreciation of the circumstances of these soldiers. (97) The appalling implication was that every rejected case meant a destitute soldier and family who had no other resources than the 2 pounds given on discharge. Even in cases where awards of compensation were made, there was usually a considerable interval between the date of discharge and the payment of the initial allowance which led to severe hardship for the ex-serviceman and his dependants. (98)

The fate of non-pensionable disabled soldiers and their families was even worse and to find solutions to this vexing problem very difficult. Those who were in military hospitals and required hospitalisation for an indefinite period could on eventual discharge from the hospital each receive a grant of 6 pounds per year to maintain themselves. Those who were 100% disabled but did not require further hospitalisation were treated in the same way. However, in both cases no provision was made for their families. In the event of their death the families would be left destitute. The ex-servicemen who were detained in mental hospitals were not entitled to the provisions of the Assistance to Needy Ex-Soldiers...
Scheme as it was argued that they were being maintained by the state. The families were therefore deprived of the grants which would have been awarded had the soldiers not been confined to these institutions.

It also happened that disabled soldiers were discharged before the authorities had ascertained whether such a soldiers could be sufficiently cared for and maintained in his home district. The following two examples serve as an indication of the poor conditions some of these soldiers had to face: Private Mkanazi whose compensation claim was rejected was discharged after three years' service as medically unfit for permanent employment requiring physical effort as he was suffering from corditis. He had a wife and three children but no ground for cultivation. His pre-enlistment earnings were 2 pounds 10 shillings a month. Sergeant Joale was likewise discharged after three years' service. As his left eye sight was very weak and his right eye was totally blind, he was unable to do any work. Although he received a compensation gratuity of 10 pounds 13 shillings he had to support a wife and six children but like Private Mkanazi, possessed no ground for cultivation. His pre-enlistment earnings amounted to 18 shillings a week. (99)

The following measures alleviated the hardship to a certain extent. The Department of Social Welfare introduced a Temporary Subsistence Allowance Scheme to assist disabled ex-servicemen temporarily until it was possible to make suitable permanent provision for them. However, H.P. Malan, Inspector for Social Welfare, reported that, as far as black ex-servicemen were concerned, the scheme was practically stillborn. (100) In March 1947 the Department of Native Affairs launched a survey to ascertain whether there was a need for sheltered employment projects for ex-servicemen who were, in consequence of their disability, unable to obtain and retain work in the open labour market. Applications of 120 ex-servicemen were received. However, it appears that the majority of Native Commissioners and District Surgeons did not take much trouble in carrying out the survey with the result that the need and precise number of disabled soldiers requiring sheltered employment remained unknown. Moreover, little publicity was given to the survey. (101) In addition, organisations such as the Central Advisory Committee (Native Ex-Volunteers), Springbok Legion, the South African Institute of Race Relations and the Campaign for Right and Justice made representations in this regard and pointed out the anxiety amongst ex-soldiers caused by the delay in establishing sheltered employment projects. (102) By October 1947, however, the National Board of Sheltered Employment decided that no steps would be taken to provide sheltered employment for black disabled ex-servicemen until the result of an experiment with 25 ex-servicemen in Pretoria was known. (103)

Eventually, provision was made for the settlement at Elandsdoorn near Pretoria of 10 married and 60 unmarried epileptic ex-servicemen who were not in receipt of military pensions. They also received free accomodation, medical attention and medicines
as well as the use of a small plot of land together with garden implements. In addition, the married men were paid a cash grant of 1 pound 15 shillings and the single man 1 pound a month. (104) Three black ex-servicemen were employed at a sheltered employment project in Pietermaritzburg and one at a similar scheme in East London. (105)

As no real assistance for those disabled ex-servicemen was forthcoming many resorted to their own devices to make a living. Others obtained licences as hawkers and devoted much of their time, very profitably, to begging. A number preferred to return to their homes regardless of their disability or of their future prospects. (106)

POST-WAR EMPLOYMENT

It was Government policy that no soldier who was honourably discharged would be allowed to return to civilian life until employment had been found for him. (107) However, this promise was not always honoured as far as black ex-servicemen were concerned, mainly because there had been no proper organisation under the Civil Re-employment Board to deal with discharged black soldiers and many soldiers preferred to return to their homes immediately. (108) It seems that the responsibility to find employment was to a large extent passed on to the DSDC's. Granted that some of these cases might have been ex-servicemen who had been discharged without benefits, they nevertheless had to deal with numerous applications for employment made by ex-servicemen who had no pre-enlistment employment to which to return. (109)

Government policy further stated that the post-war employment of black ex-servicemen should be

"more in keeping with the duties performed [and] more in keeping with the standard of living enjoyed by the ex-volunteers whilst members of the Union Defence Force."

(110)

This statement was in line with the general trend of thought in certain circles (amongst others J.C. Smuts) that many ex-servicemen would not be satisfied with the pay or the conditions offered to them after the war but would expect the higher standard of living and pay to which they had become accustomed to during their period of service to continue. In order to implement this policy and thus keep faith with the ex-servicemen, every effort should therefore be made to find employment other than the mines and farms where wages were notoriously low. The Senior Agricultural Officer, Pietersburg, for instance, stated that

"Most of these men are past the farm labourer stage with its long hours and low pay, and are better fitted to enter industry which is more remunerative and offers better opportunities." (111)

Some ex-servicemen also thought that they should be placed in occupations for which they were best suited or for which they had had some training. (112) J.R. Rathebe, executive secretary of the YMCA services with the NMC who had spoken to many soldiers,
remarked that

"Natives would experience a sense of frustration if called on to return to their pre-war employment, as the Army had in many cases made them fit for more skilled employment."

(113) As will be seen, in the following discussion, it seems these notions have were formed more with an eye on the ideal than the reality. The lofty aims to place them in employment had to be scaled down substantially so that they were at least not worst off than before they had enlisted: this implied that the employment would not necessarily be commensurate with their training or duties.

URBAN EMPLOYMENT

In order to effect the above-mentioned policy ex-servicemen had to be employed in skilled and semi-skilled occupations to ensure a reasonable standard of living. This necessarily implied a process of urbanisation as these occupations were only available in the large urban centres. However, the Government was also vehemently against black urbanisation and wanted to restrict the flow of rural blacks to the towns as was evident in the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. It was therefore expected that the ex-servicemen who had been recruited from the rural areas should return to their tribal life. (114) In effect, therefore, the authorities not only disqualified their own policy, but also many soldiers, from a higher standard of living. Moreover, whatever skills they acquired, it seems that the possibility of applying those skills in civilian life, was very remote as the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour was limited.

According to surveys undertaken by the Native Commissioners and the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee, there were employment opportunities in certain spheres for the ex-servicemen in urban areas. The biggest demand was for unskilled labour such as domestic servants which was not very popular. However, it could also offer opportunities to gardeners and to a limited degree to chauffeurs and chauffeur-gardeners; this was followed by municipal workers and delivery men at shops, offices, businesses, garages and hotels. To a lesser degree there were also opportunities as blacksmiths, brickmaking labourers and in the milling industry. Natal and the Cape Province followed a similar pattern. The only exceptions were that there were somewhat more opportunities (also for skilled labour) in trade and industry in places such as Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Vryheid whilst the Divisional Councils in the Cape offered employment to unskilled labourers on the roads and there were also opportunities for coaling hands and stevedoring on the docks in Cape Town. Apart from most of the above-mentioned avenues of employment, the Rand area in particular offered employment in commercial undertakings and industry. Although there were numerous vacancies in the mining industry it seems that because of the low wages and taxing working conditions, it was anathema to most ex-servicemen. Many were not prepared to work on the
mines and refused flatly even to consider the possibility. They expressed the fear that this might be the only employment offered to them and that they would therefore, in civilian life, not be able to use the skills they had acquired in the army. (115) It was seen only as a last resort as C. Cukatha vouched:

"I served as a soldier for 3 years and 11 months and when I was discharged I could not get a job and I was not able to go back to my pre-enlistment work. So in despair I came and worked here on the mine... What I want to know now, Sir, is whether or not I have still got some claim on the Government to help me obtain a suitable job."

(116)

In all these urban areas there were a fair number of job opportunities in state or semi-state organisations where the ex-servicemen could do, inter alia, clerical, messenger and hygiene work. The Police Force, Railways, Post Office, Government Garage, Public Works Department, the Native Affairs Department and Prison Services also offered employment chances for which some ex-servicemen applied and some indeed took up. Professional occupations in these areas were chiefly restricted to teaching, tailoring, shoe-making and hair-cutting, but the opportunities for trained cooks were wide open. (117)

Black labour in the building industry was confined by law mainly to unskilled work in proclaimed urban labour areas. Trained black artisans were therefore only allowed to work outside the urban areas in the smaller towns and rural districts where there was a large scope for them. Some of the skilled ex-soldiers were well aware of this state of affairs as an unidentified soldier noted:

"I am anxious to go on poultry farming as soon as I leave the army. There are only two things I can do. Also building but there is so much colour prejudice in the building trade that I am very reluctant to go back to the trade especially in the Transvaal... I could build for Africans but the big controller would crash me in the circumstances. Poultry farming seems the only alternative." (118)

Due to the colour bar in the building industry this avenue of employment in the urban areas was therefore effectively closed to most black ex-servicemen.

Many motor transport drivers, partly on the strength of promises made to them, hoped that they could profitably carry their military occupation over to civilian life and thereby secure employment in keeping with the duties performed while in the army. (119) However, employment for the bulk of 2000 fully trained transport drivers could not be found as white ex-soldiers and members of the Cape Corps were preferred to black ex-servicemen. (120) To exacerbate matters, many had to discover to their utter dismay that they were under a totally false impression when they believed that their army licences would automatically entitle them to provincial licences and also guarantee employment as civilian drivers on discharge from the army. (121) On the other hand, some were more fortunate. F.
Mlambo, J. Kgabo and E. Minnaar, acknowledged that their army training had enabled them to secure employment as drivers at respectively the Leyland company, the YMCA and a bakery in Johannesburg. (122)

RURAL EMPLOYMENT

With regard to rural employment, it was impossible to fulfil the policy that employment should be found which would provide a standard of living approximate to that enjoyed in the army. There was simply not that kind of employment available in these areas. Moreover, one of the most severe periods of drought from 1943 to 1945, particularly in the Southern Free State, Eastern Cape and Northern Transvaal, (123) made the attainment of this ideal even more remote. The most obvious (and almost only) field of employment, namely farm labour, was loathed by most ex-servicemen, mainly on account of the low wages. (124) Some ex-soldiers realised that the army had changed their lifestyle and aspirations; they had therefore no desire to return to their traditional way of living in the rural areas:

"As I am now a lorry driver I no longer relish the idea of returning to my home in the reserve, and as I want to reside in town I want my family near me." (125)

There were certain governmental schemes in the rural areas which were seen as additional employment opportunities for the ex-soldiers. The Native Trust Reclamation Scheme of which the principal purpose was the combating of cropland deterioration and veld denudation in the "native reserves" could offer employment to 500 ex-soldiers. Unskilled and semi-skilled labour was also required for the construction programme of the Department of Irrigation at Vaalhartz and Loskop. (126) An obvious field of employment was a special land settlement scheme for ex-servicemen. The line of thought that a new transformed man had emerged from the army and that he should be advantageously utilised again surfaced:

"The ex-volunteer by virtue of his Army experience has made tremendous strides in education and understanding and is far in advance of the rural civilian population. He is eager to learn and is amenable to new methods and to change and progress. What better nucleus then for the training of the African population in scientific policy of improving and modernising methods of agriculture among the African population? ...It would be a wasteful oversight to ignore the potentialities of the ex-volunteers as the first group of scientific farmers." (127)

The Department of Native Affairs actually planned such schemes as well as special agricultural training programmes and also envisaged that preference would be given to black ex-volunteers in allocating land acquired by the Native Trust. Despite repeated representations in this regard by the ex-volunteers themselves and other organisations and enquiries about delays in implementing these schemes, no special land settlement scheme, comparable in any way to schemes for whites, was instituted for...
black ex-servicemen by the end of 1947. (128) One reason given why nothing had materialised by 1947 was the strong tribal ties and affinities amongst the blacks which ruled out the settlement of blacks from different tribes in one area. However, it seems that the most important factor which had nullified all good intentions was the inability to acquire more land for the Native Trust. This process had been interrupted by the war and it was particularly difficult to resume it after the war, especially in the face of severe opposition from white farmers to the purchase of land. (129) The land settlement scheme would, of course, also have been contrary to the Government policy of keeping the reserves as a reservoir of cheap labour and thus might have been the most important reason why there was no enthusiastic support from governmental circles.

OTHER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Employment opportunities which were not necessarily restricted to either urban or rural areas offered further possibilities. A number of the ex-servicemen, as well as the authorities, hoped that they would be re-instated in their pre-enlistment civilian jobs. Despite legislation such as the Public Service (Military Service) Act 31 of 1944, which provided for the readmission of an employee who had resigned for the purpose of rendering military service, (130) there were no guarantees and employers could not be forced to re-instate these men. Some were fortunate to be re-instated (131) but disappointment awaited others. Their jobs had either been taken while they had been in the army or their former employers refused to take them back. (132)

The idea that the Non-European Army Service of which a NMC battalion could form part, be perpetuated as a portion of the peace-time UDF was not only mooted but also accepted in principle by the Smuts Government. It was thought that such a possibility could provide employment for many of the ex-soldiers. It was anticipated that NMC members at least would continue to be employed under their existing conditions until March 1949 and possibly beyond that date. (133) Moreover, numerous ex-servicemen, some of whom were not satisfied with their present jobs while others had been unable to find employment since their discharge, indicated that they were keen to rejoin the army. (134) Authority was given to retain on extended service (at least until the end of hostilities in the Far East) a number of NMC members who were desirous to become permanent soldiers against appropriate permanent force mustering, pending the publication of conditions of service. (135) The fixing of rates of pay and conditions of service for a South African Permanent Force Non-European Army Services was well under way by January 1948 and only delayed because of certain legal difficulties. However, these efforts proved to be futile in any case. The National Party won the May 1948 election and subsequently jettisoned all plans for a black section in the UDF. (136)
REGULATIONS AND ORGANISATION TO PLACE EX-VOLUNTEERS IN EMPLOYMENT

Apropos to its promise to place a soldier in employment before discharge, the Government, however, emphasised that it wished ex-volunteers to be placed in employment and become self-reliant as soon as possible. No consideration should be shown to those who tried to avoid taking of employment. (137) In order to implement this policy it laid down certain regulations of which the following were the most important. The ex-servicemen were divided into two groups: those who required employment immediately on discharge from the Dispersal Depot and those who wished to go home for a rest period. The former were entitled to remain on strength of the Depot until a suitable offer had been made to them. Employment on farms and mines which, as has been pointed out above, was loathed by many ex-servicemen, was also regarded as "suitable" employment. Nevertheless, if a suitable offer had been made and the soldier refused it, he was placed on a reduced rate of pay of 10 shillings a month if he lived in a rural area or 1 pound in an urban area. A dependant's allowance of 1 pound ten shillings in a rural area and 2 pounds 10 shillings in an urban area was also paid when the scale was reduced. A soldier was eligible to be kept on strength at these rates up to a period of four months or until a second offer was made and refused. Thereafter, his discharge would be effected within seven days and all pay and allowances stopped but he was still entitled to appeal to the Dispersal Depot Committee if he considered the offer unreasonable. In the event of a soldier losing his first or second employment within six months after discharge through no fault of his own, every endeavour would be made to find him other employment whilst assistance would be given to him on a reduced scale of pay up to a maximum period of four months. After the expiration of this period the soldier had to realise that his further maintenance and accommodation would be his own responsibility. (138)

According to the authorities the vast majority of discharged soldiers, on arrival at Dispersal Depots, first wished to go to their homes for a rest period on arrival at Dispersal Depots before they took up employment. Apparently the authorities were correct as more than 95% opted for this form of discharge. Consequently, regulations to accommodate this wish were formulated as a special concession to the NMC. It provided, inter alia, that the ex-serviceman was allowed to proceed to his home immediately on discharge for a rest period of up to six months without any obligation on him to demand benefits at the time. He was allowed to be taken back on strength at the reduced rates of pay till reasonable employment had been found for him, provided he made an application for employment within six months of discharge at the DSBC or the Native Commissioner of the district in which he resided. (139)

In practice, however, this concession did not benefit the ex-serviceman. What actually happened was that the majority did not avail themselves of the full discharge facilities available. On discharge they were asked whether they wished the Government
to find work for them or not; because the vast majority preferred to go home they signed a document stating that they did not want work. Usually, by the time they had arrived at their destinations, they had spent all their money. Moreover, finding conditions at their homes worse than they had expected, inter alia, because of the shortage of food in the rural areas caused by the drought, many ex-servicemen had to seek work much sooner than anticipated. By that time, however, apparently of their own choice, they had forfeited all claim on the service of the Government as a work-finding agency. Although they indeed retained the right to apply to the local DSAC's or Native Commissioners to find them employment, this arrangement was also unsatisfactory either because of ignorance of this facility or because their initial approaches to the DSAC's proved discouraging. This applied particularly to discharges effected up till the end of 1944. Admittedly, it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the DSAC's in the rural areas to find suitable employment for all the ex-servicemen and most Native Commissioner officers were not at all geared to this task. (140) In effect, the military authorities had thus passed the buck to the DSAC's and Native Commissioners and thereby completely eschewed their responsibility and obligation that no soldier would be discharged before employment had been found for him. The soldier thus inadvertently forfeited a major benefit.

Furthermore, in a memorandum the Campaign for Right and Justice attacked this discharge procedure by pointing out that it effectively compelled the ex-servicemen to become part of the present migrant labour system:

"The present system of demobilisation, whereby some 85 per cent of African discharges fall into the 'Desires employment after rest' category, is not a technique which deals with the problems involved, but is predominantly one which evades the basic issues. African ex-volunteers are, very understandably, anxious to rejoin their families at the termination of their army service. The fact that this involves spending a period of so called 'rest' in a reserve, and thereupon leaving it in order to earn the supplementary cash wage without which the family cannot subsist, is an outgrowth of S.A. native and economic policy which has perpetuated a system of inadequate land, overcrowded reserves and consequent migrant labour." (141)

Moreover, many of the blacks whose homes were in the urban areas actually took a rest during these six months and did not bother to find employment immediately. However, being unemployed in an urban area, landed them in a predicament: they were liable to prosecution under the Urban Areas Act if they did not find employment within two weeks after entering an urban area. Some ex-servicemen were indeed arrested. (142)

The authorities, however, realised that something had to be done about this state of affairs. Initially, there was no proper existing machinery for placing ex-servicemen in employment in
urban areas as the Department of Labour did not consider that it was its responsibility. Therefore, in order to address the employment needs of large numbers of ex-servicemen, ten Ex-volunteer Employment Bureaux were established in the main centres by the DNEAS and taken over by the Directorate of Demobilisation in 1944. Ex-servicemen who could not be placed by the DSRC's and those who elected to be discharged for a rest period but thereafter required employment, were placed by these bureaux. The bureaux not only sought the co-operation of employers in finding work by a system of advertising and personal approach but also directed the moneyless ex-soldiers to the CGNWP which, if he were discharged with benefits, could give him a small grant to tide him over until he received his first month's wages. Every ex-soldier was entitled to the bureaux's assistance in obtaining other work if he had lost the first one through no fault of his own; the bureaux were prepared to assist as often as was necessary for a period of six months. Moreover, if one bureau or DSRC was unable to place an ex-soldier it could ask another to find work for him and he was given a free rail warrant in order to interview the prospective employer or to take up verified employment away from his own area. (143)

Those who had been discharged immediately for a rest period but who were now finding their way back to the city seeking employment, arrived at these bureaux generally in a wretched condition and frame of mind. They complained that after they had been discharged, nobody cared for them anymore. They furthermore stated that they had no money to pay their rent or buy food, that they had not received their gratuity so that all they had during their leave period was the 6 pounds paid to them on discharge. (144)

The Johannesburg Employment Bureau, which was the largest of the ten bureaux, was exceptionally successful in placing ex-servicemen. In the course of its existence, it managed to find employment for on average 90 per cent of the ex-servicemen who applied, regardless of their medical condition or whether they had been discharged with or without benefits. (145) Most wished to be placed with commercial and industrial firms and even preferred pick and shovel work to domestic work. Nevertheless, despite its unpopularity, domestic service ranked high in the categories of employment taken up by the ex-servicemen after commerce, engineering, factories, motor industries, war supplies, the South African Railways and the Johannesburg Municipality. (146)

The authorities were keen to emphasise the numbers of ex-servicemen who had been placed in employment through the endeavours of these employment bureaux. Evidently, it was hoped that it would enhance the Government's image that it was indeed looking after the ex-servicemen. They had reason to boast as the statistics were quite impressive. By the end of April 1946, the Bureaux had placed 14 783 ex-servicemen in employment and by September of the same year the figure was 19 790 (147); the total number placed by the bureaux and other institutions such as the
DSDC's, till the end of 1947 was 32 753, (148) representing 43% of the total number of black soldiers recruited.

However, this is only one side of the coin. Although the sensibility to establish these bureaux and the services rendered by them cannot be denied, it is also very important to consider the type of employment offered to the ex-soldiers. It was clear that most were not finding employment commensurate with the new skills they had acquired in the army or with the new status and standard of living to which they had become accustomed. It is also equally important to consider the duration they were able to keep their work. These two factors were indeed very closely linked. Reports indicated that the unsuitable nature of the work often compelled them to look for other employment within a very short time. (149) Furthermore, numerous ex-servicemen were excluded from the services of the bureaux due to the simple fact that many lived in remote areas or to the fact that the demobilisation personnel who had to deal with the ex-soldiers were ill-informed. In Potgietersrust, Louis Trichardt and Pietersburg where there was a large concentration of ex-soldiers, the Demobilisation Staff Sergeant had, for instance, never heard of the bureaus or that free rail-warrants were available. (150)

All the bureaux were closed down by 31 March 1948 but the Department of Native Affairs gave the assurance that NMC ex-servicemen would still be able to approach local Native Commissioners for assistance in obtaining employment and that they would be given preference should they apply for employment within 180 days from the date of discharge. (151)

UNEMPLOYMENT

Despite all these efforts, unemployment remained a most pressing problem. There were conflicting views about the extent of unemployment. Almost all the Government sources maintained that there were sufficient opportunities in the urban areas and that the unemployment situation in areas such as Johannesburg was exaggerated; (152) However, organisations such as the Springbok Legion and the Ex-Servicemen's League, vehemently disputed this assumption. (153) A notable exception, in official sources, was the report by the Native Commissioner of Durban who thus described the scarcity of employment as well as the quandary in which it placed the ex-servicemen and the officials:

"Their [ex-volunteers'] story is invariably the same: they were given rail warrants to Durban... despite the fact that they do not belong to Durban and their only connection with it is that they were either attested here or were employed here at some time prior to their enlistment, and they were also told on discharge that the 'Native Commissioner must and will find them work to their liking'. An office such as this... has no machinery for placing these Natives in employment no matter how sympathetic it feels towards them... The labour market in Durban now... is more than satiated, with the result that these men cannot be placed and return to this office in a disappointed and most
truculent mood demanding the jobs which they were 'promised by the Government'". (154)

Most sources, however, agreed that the position with regard to the rural areas was extremely serious. The Springbok Legion was of the opinion that the matter was so grave that it printed and circularised petitions urging the Minister of Demobilisation to take drastic steps to alleviate the situation. (155)

It seems as if employment was particularly scarce for skilled ex-servicemen and it was practically impossible to find suitable occupational outlets for partially disabled men. (156) Likewise, it proved to be a major problem to find permanent employment for ex-servicemen who had been discharged without benefits. (157)

There were certain reasons why it was difficult to find suitable employment. Firstly, it has already been pointed out that legislation such as the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act to a large extent debarred rural blacks from seeking employment where it was most likely to be found, namely in the urban areas. (158) Other legislation not only seriously impeded but also effectively ruled out the prospects of employment. A number of ex-servicemen, for instance, had been declared illegal immigrants in terms of the Immigrants Regulation Act No. 22 of 1913 and warned to leave the Witwatersrand Labour Area within a specific time. (159)

Furthermore, it appears that the response from commerce and industry to an appeal for work for black ex-servicemen was disappointing. Although there was sympathy amongst certain employers for the black ex-servicemen, others were prejudiced and reluctant to employ them. A number was even so hostile towards these ex-soldiers that they openly discriminated against them by giving preference, when they had vacancies, to black civilians. (160) According to some of these employers, the type of ex-soldier supplied to them was unsatisfactory and this made them wary of employing others. (161) Moreover, many were of the opinion that "the natives who have served in the army have developed a high-handed attitude and will not consider many types of work" (162) whilst others were afraid to employ them "because they might have become too clever in the army." (163)

In view of this reluctance, a deputation of the Springbok Legion met H. Welsh, Deputy Director of Demobilisation, and proposed that the Soldiers and War Workers Act be invoked to compel employers of labour to engage a certain percentage of the black ex-soldiers in order to reduce the serious unemployment amongst them. Welsh, however, disagreed, believing that such action would only lead to resentment on the part of employers and consequently further discrimination against them. (164)

The prevailing drought also aggravated the unemployment situation. Some rural ex-soldiers apparently had sufficient funds
from allotments and pensions to purchase mealies and mealie meal. (165) Others, however, found it increasingly difficult to make a living from the land and they were subsequently confronted with the real threat of famine. They, together with other rural blacks, increasingly drifted to the towns, seeking employment. As the labour supply eventually outstripped the demand, many were left unemployed. (166)

A further factor which made the placement of ex-soldiers in employment difficult, was that some of them were reluctant to accept employment away from their home area and that they definitely preferred light work to other kinds of employment, thus, because of this dual preference, drastically narrowing the scope of employment. Reference has been made to the fact that most ex-soldiers disdained manual labour, for instance, on the mines and on farms and as domestic servants. (167) This fact was corroborated by the Officer Commanding of the Bantu Ex-volunteers Employment Bureau who indicated that he had a large demand for ordinary labourers, brick-makers, farm labourers, pick and shovel workers but no applications for this type of work were forthcoming. (168) Preference was expressed for work in the Police Force, factories, building industry, commerce or as clerks, garage assistants, night watchmen or drivers. (169) Ex-soldier W. Mncwabe who was employed at Crown Mines after his discharge, thus expressed his feelings about his present and desired occupation:

"I am here at Crown Mines doing underground work and is very hard to me. I shall be glad if I can get a job as a orderly in the military hospital or guarding as I use to do it before." (170)

Of course, current wages paid to ex-soldiers not only had an important bearing on their employment preferences but also on the difficulty of finding them employment. Many were not prepared to work for the wages they had received in the army, namely 2 pounds five shillings a month, so that employment which paid wages even lower than this was completely out of the question. A minimum wage of 7 pounds 14 shillings and 6 pence a month plus cost of living allowance was regarded as a reasonable wage for unskilled workers in urban areas. (171) This naturally precluded certain employment opportunities from the ex-soldiers. Wages ranged from 1 pound per month up to 10 pounds, but the most common wage paid was between 2 pounds and 3 pounds a month - a notable exception being motor drivers on the Rand who earned as much as 16 pounds a month. However, it must be taken into consideration that the area of employment, type of work and fringe benefits, inter alia, played an important role in determining wages and the whole remuneration package. (172)

Given this set of circumstances, some ex-soldiers found that, despite the authorities' promise of work after the war, they were now unable to find them employment; consequently, these men felt as if nothing was being done for them. (173) Moreover, they found it frustrating that their army training and experience did not help them to find employment. (174) Nevertheless, a number of
ex-soldiers, some of whom had not found employment since their discharge, needed work so badly that requests asking the authorities to help them in obtaining employment were still pouring in. (175) L. Sonkosi, apparently ignorant of the fact that J.C. Smuts was no longer in a position of power in 1949, in his request related how he had been humiliated during his fruitless endeavour to obtain work:

"I am kindly begging for an advise [sic] for what to do, about not getting any job... I have applied [sic] to every camp here and my applications [sic] were all in vain. Instead in the camp gates we are being laughed by the people who have never joined the army. From my unhappiness and poverty, sir, I am begging you to find for me any vacancy [sic] of work... When the people were laughing at me and asking me why I joined the war because now I can't get any job as we were promised, I thought of you because I have been trying for so long." (176)

The unemployment problem might have contributed to the Government's insistence that most ex-servicemen should return to the rural areas where previously they had been able to fend for themselves. In doing so, however, the Government again violated its promise to find employment for the ex-servicemen in keeping with the duties performed and the standard of living they enjoyed whilst members of the NMC.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

As was the case in some of the British colonies, (177) it was also deemed necessary to provide the requisite vocational training centres for ex-servicemen so that they could be usefully employed. From various quarters opinions were expressed that some of the ex-servicemen could be re-trained for their old employment, others could be given additional training in the trades they had learnt in the army to convert their skills into more marketable civilian qualifications and a number of ex-servicemen could be trained for new employment. (178) However, it was not the intention to establish special new training institutions, but to use existing ones.

Many possibilities and schemes were mooted and the necessity and urgency of training the ex-servicemen emphasised. (179) However, almost all these plans were shipwrecked mainly due to the fact that blacks were prohibited from training as artisans in fields where they might compete with whites. (180) Consequently, only two limited training schemes eventually came to fruition: a scheme for cooks and waiters and training in the building industry, the latter being implemented only after much controversy.

The special courses for cooks and waiters were conducted at Milner Park, Johannesburg and lasted six and three months respectively. After completion they served an apprenticeship of three years at leading hotels in the Union. The trainees were housed and boarded in the grounds at Milner Park and were paid 5
pounds a month of which 2 pounds 10 shillings were deducted
towards the cost of board and lodging. A further 1 pound 10
shillings was deducted from a trainee who was married or had
other dependants and paid over to them by the Native Commissioner
of the district from which the trainee had come. In addition, the
Governor-General's National War Fund added another 1 pound per
month to this dependant's allowance. (181)

Reference has been made to the antagonism towards blacks in the
building industry as manifested in the legal limitations on
prospective black builders in the urban areas. (182) Great
difficulty was therefore experienced in instituting a training
course for ex-servicemen in the building industry. The main
obstacle to such a training course was the vehement opposition by
the building trade unions to the training of blacks in the
building industry, despite the big demand for trained black
artisans. The skilled white trade unionists were extremely
apprehensive that the large-scale training of black ex-servicemen
would be a threat to their work security. They felt so strongly
about this matter that they were even prepared to resort to
strike action. (183) However, the Government was in favour of
such a training course and was of the opinion that it should
continue, regardless of the embargo placed on the scheme by the
trade unions. According to the authorities it would not be a
threat to the white artisans if operated in areas under the
jurisdiction of the South African Native Trust, townships such as
Alexandra and Lady Selborne (where no white tradesman would want
to work) or on farms. Moreover, a comprehensive training scheme
had already been prepared. (184) Consequently, in October 1946
the Directorate of Demobilisation announced that 250 black
ex-servicemen would be trained under the Central Organisation for
Technical Training scheme at Milner Park as from 31 October 1946
but that the trainees would not be allowed to do any building
work other than for blacks in the black areas. (185) However,
this apparently did not satisfy the building trade unions at all.
They opposed it except on the condition that the black labour
should be paid at the same rates as white artisans. Thereby the
trade union would have been able to forestall any competition
between the two groups. Moreover, clauses in all their
constitutions prohibited members from participating in the
training of blacks for the building industry. Letters were
subsequently sent to the instructors at Milner Park, warning them
that if they continued with the training of blacks, they would
render themselves open to expulsion from their unions. The
building unions were particularly upset about the autocratic way
the Government had planned and imposed the scheme without
consulting the trade unions. Their members feared that the
present scheme would necessarily produce a reservoir of labour
which would be used to lower the standard of living of the
whites. They therefore categorically stated that they
"were opposed to the training of natives... and objected to
the manner in which the Government had taken over
all control of the natives, both during and after training.
The trade unions had not been adequately consulted and
their hard-won privileges usurped." (186)
Due to the withdrawal of the instructors, training was temporarily suspended in December 1946 and other employment had to be found for the 50 trainees who had enrolled. After the differences had been ironed out, training was resumed as Gen. G.E. Brink noted that 197 ex-volunteers had been trained or were undergoing training by March 1948. (187)

Apart from this scheme, training of black ex-volunteers for the building industry was also done by way of building gangs formed by the Department of Native Affairs. The same department, in collaboration with the Directorate of Demobilisation, launched a similar scheme on a limited scale at villages established on trust farms in the Hammanskraal and Kingwilliamstown districts where 25 ex-servicemen were placed in each area by October 1947. This course lasted four years; accommodation for themselves and for their wives and families was provided and the trainees received 4 shillings per day for the first two years and 4 shillings 6 pence to 6 shillings 6 pence in the third and fourth years, according to the degree of skill acquired. After passing this course, the ex-volunteer was entitled to a set of tools and was given a certificate of competence. (188)

The authorities were well aware of the effect this default in providing adequate training would have on black ex-servicemen:

"Provision exists for the training of Europeans and Coloured ex-volunteers, whereas very little, in so far as training is concerned, has been done for the Native ex-volunteers. If the training now proposed does not take place, the Native ex-soldier and those interested will feel that the Government has failed to do what it should for the ex-volunteer." (189)

Training, or rather the lack of it, was thus another example of how, due to post-war priorities, policy and prejudice, the authorities were not ready to meet the challenge of re-instatement effectively. An opportunity to make better use of the militarily trained ex-servicemen in civilian life was thus allowed to slip through the fingers. Eventually only a very small number was trained.

DISILLUSIONMENT AND DISAPPOINTMENTS OF SOLDIERS RETURNING HOME

The high hopes and expectations of some discharged soldiers were soon dashed when they arrived home. Those returning to the rural areas were confronted with the devastating consequences of severe drought: there had been a very poor harvest so that many were facing starvation, many of their cattle had died and due to the scarcity of mealies, prices soared. Because of these adverse circumstances, the prevailing rampant post-war inflation became even worse. The inflation rate in the rural areas was 27% during the war. (190) The ex-soldiers soon found to their utter dismay that not only was their discharge allowances totally inadequate but also that their families had squandered their home allotments, leaving them with no security. (191) To add insult to injury, in many cases the families of ex-soldiers had been unable
to look after their farms properly whilst they were on military service and some also found their houses had broken down. (192) Others discovered that their wives had illegitimate children whilst they had been away and in some cases families broke up shortly after the return of the ex-soldier. (193) To these soldiers who had a relative sense of security in so far as the army provided for their daily means of subsistence, it must have been a shock to return to these disappointing circumstances.

It seems, therefore, that it was the inevitable destiny of many ex-servicemen to live in abject conditions after they had been discharged; they consequently became destitute and impoverished. In some instances the soldiers were worse off than they had been in the army. There were various reasons for and aspects of this phenomenon.

One was, that once the ex-soldiers had been discharged, there was no after-care. For instance, a large number of partially disabled, unqualified and unskilled ex-soldiers who had been earning a precarious living before enlistment became hawkers of vegetables or wood, using the grants under the Financial Assistance Scheme for this purpose. However, there was nobody following this up or assisting those whose undertaking was running into trouble. A large proportion who did not succeed as hawkers, disposed of their equipment and lapsed, together with their dependants, into conditions of extreme want. (194)

Furthermore, a number of ex-servicemen had the bitter experience that they were unwelcome on their return and unable to find accommodation. S.O. Dithipe of Potchefstroom was unable to procure employment and was subsequently ejected from the township by the authorities. (195) Some ex-servicemen who had come from Zululand had more or less a similar experiences. They were regarded as vagrants and after they had been rounded up by the police, sent to work for farmers at a very low rate of pay. (196) Looseboy Moneri from Wolmaransstad related how

"Today they do'nt [sic] want me here, when I come from the war. I have wounded from War, I can not work any more... I require to advice me where shall I stay... They wants [sic] to arrest me without any fault... Now I ask what is my freedom...because here Wolmaransstad they do not want native soldiers." (197)

Admittedly some were unwelcome because they were unemployed, suffered from tuberculosis or were mentally deranged (198) but the fact remains that again there was no adequate official after-care for their welfare.

The insufficient financial provision made for the black ex-servicemen, the delays in paying out pensions and gratuities as well as the difficulty of many to find employment in order to support themselves and their families were the most important aspects lying at the root of the poverty amongst them. Naturally, these problems multiplied ten-fold for those who had been discharged as medically unfit and for the disabled ex-servicemen. The following are cases in point. On 12 December 1944 the Native
Commissioner Pilgrims' Rest District, applied for financial assistance for Sinias Mabaso who had been discharged on 23 October 1942 as medically unfit, suffering from tuberculosis. Although he had been promised a pension on discharge, his application was turned down. During these two years and two months, he and his wife and two children had to live on the only money he had received - 7 pounds and 10 shillings. Although he tried to do manual labour, his illness forced him to abandon it. His only possession was one cow. (199) The secretary of the Picketsburg branch of the GGNFP, C.A. Cahill, reported how Frank Tladi, frequently requested help from them. He was unemployed, had a sick child that had to receive medical attention, he had been given only 2 pounds since his discharge and was still wearing his uniform as he had no other clothing. (200) Joseph Ngoetjana thus expressed the predicament of many:
"The most saddening thing is this: Our demobilised men are experiencing a great difficulty in connection with finance - strolling along the streets, and stating that our Native Commissioners disregard their position. Wait, wait, wait, for an indefinite time for their gratuity... Do you see that our men will soon indulge into wrong practices, e.g. theft, murder and the like, only through the distressing financial position." (201)
Of course, resorting to "wrong practices" likewise made them unpopular and unwelcome.

Not only did the authorities make insufficient provision for financial assistance to ex-servicemen but in some ways the authorities themselves also aggravated an already sad state of affairs. At Northern Command, Voortrekkerhoogte, many discharged soldiers were re-employed as unattested labourers and required to perform more or less the same duties as they had done while serving as soldiers. However, the conditions under which they now served meant a cut of one-third in the standard of living compared to that which they had enjoyed while still in the army - another third of their present wage had to be spent on bus and train fares from the township to Voortrekkerhoogte. This remarkable anomaly caused these men and their families to endure severe hardship. (202) The situation was somewhat alleviated when eventually a large number of bicycles was introduced to eliminate the transport expenses. (203)

Furthermore, according to a regulation, allotments to dependants of soldiers, discharged without benefits, ceased immediately when such soldiers were admitted to the dispersal depots. This naturally increased the hardship of dependants. In all other cases allotments ceased on discharge and dependants did not receive anything pending the finalisation of the pay accounts; this might take up to six weeks. In the meantime the dependants suffered hardship and in many instances the maintenance of the soldier was an additional burden on the families' resources towards which the ex-serviceman could only contribute the 2 pounds which he had received on discharge. (204) There were cases where the settlement of the accounts even took as long as five months. Some of these ex-volunteers lived in remote areas, far
removed from a Native Commissioner but were nevertheless forced
to travel sometimes 80 to 100 kilometers to the Commissioner only
to learn that their accounts had not been settled yet; they were
compelled to make several return visits to the Native
Commissioner's office before the soldier could ascertain the true
position with regard to his final pay. The DNEAS strongly
objected to this state of affairs (205) but apparently it was not
even solved five months later as is clear from the following
rather sad experience of C. Mokweni, poignantly described to the
Chief Paymaster by the sympathetic Native Commissioner of
Duivelskloof:

"It is most unfortunate, in dealing with natives, that
accuracy cannot be obtained. In this case the ex-soldier
came to my office to ascertain whether his good-service
gratuity had been received. I had to tell him it had not yet
arrived. A little later... I had to send for him to come in
50 odd miles to tell him that he had been overpaid 13
shillings 8 pence and to ask if he would agree to have this
amount deducted from his gratuity. As to the country
native the Government is infallible, it was with
some difficulty that the man was persuaded to agree. Now you
write that you have made another mistake and that the
overpayment is 2 pounds 13 shillings and 8 pence... I
am now asked to get the ex-soldier to walk another
100 miles to tell him that he will have no gratuity, but
must pay in 13 shillings 8 pence. This I am not prepared to
do..." (206)

One can understand their disappointment and discontent when they
learned that their account had not yet been finalised and that
they had to return again at a later stage. According to the
Paymaster no allotment was indeed paid for the portion of the
final month of service until the account had been finalised. This
was done to protect himself against any prior overpayments until
finalisation of accounts. He further ascribed the delay in
settling the accounts to the fact that the rapid rate of
discharge at the end of 1943 caused a substantial backlog. (207)
These explanations, however, did not help to alleviate the
hardship caused by red tape.

It is not surprising that, because of the difficulties some
ex-servicemen had to face and because of the treatment meted out
to them on and after demobilisation as described above, a large
number had serious grievances and complaints.

Again the expectations of these men must be kept in mind. Many
regarded themselves as heroes deserving special treatment. The
Assistant Native Commissioner of Nebo confirmed this attitude
when he reported that there was a

"tendency to demand and expect preferential treatment by
Native Commissioners, in matters where it is impossible to
give this, solely by virtue of their services to the
country. Examples are the allocation of land,
settlement of complaints and disputes involving both
Natives and Europeans, and an almost childish insistence
that Native Commissioners are able to do the impossible
in all circumstances for Native soldiers." (208)

Add to this that there were many misunderstandings about post-war assistance and benefits because these had neither been fully explained to them nor had they understood the implications. They were also strongly under the impression of real or imagined promises which had been made to them on recruitment and during their period of service. Inter alia, they claimed that they were promised land, (209) that they would be employed as truck drivers, (210) that they would receive a "sum of money to console them", (211) that the officials of the Native Affairs Department would find them employment at good wages, (212) that they could ask the Magistrates for implements and compensation for losses sustained whilst on military service (213) and that they would be helped to build houses for themselves. (214) Many were bitterly disillusioned and even rebellious when neither their expectations nor the promises materialised. (215) These unfulfilled promises were one of their most frequent complaints.

Many of the other complaints centred on money, the most frequent being that the money they had received on demobilisation as well as their pensions was hopelessly inadequate. (216) Furthermore, some alleged that the remuneration actually paid out to them was less than the amount rightfully owed to them. J. Montai, for example, complained that he was forced to take up a nine months' contract with the mines on account of the shortage of money. (217) Others alleged that the full amount due to them had not been paid out at all (218) or that it was willfully withheld from them. J. Molapo accused the Vereeniging Native Commissioner of the latter:

"I want an advice from the Government also some assistance with regard to benefits. I am also in doubt that the Native Commissioner has robbed me of 15 pounds which I know it [sic] and I want it because I have worked for it." (219)

Their complaints about money did not only involve pensions, gratuities or other demobilisation benefits but also bonuses which had supposedly been promised. One reason, why they did not receive their due emoluments, was because of delays in finalising the accounts. But this and other excuses and explanations were not acceptable to them - indeed, the delay in payment which resulted in considerable inconvenience and dissatisfaction, was a further and frequent cause of complaint (220).

It is clear that the values the authorities attached to certain benefits and the values of the ex-servicemen sometimes differed greatly. They were dissatisfied with the bicycles they had received and even refused to take them. L. Monyamane commented:

"What did I get? I got a bicycle - do you think a bicycle is worth the life of a person?"

whilst Henry Thai also complained:

"They forced me to accept a bicycle. I do not want it.
I want a wardrobe, a table, 4 chairs and a stove." (221)

Another major complaint amongst some of the soldiers was that the authorities unfairly took advantage of what seemed to these
soldiers minor offences (for example, overstaying leave for a day or two) in order to discharge them without the demobilisation benefits – for them it was indeed a case where the punishment did not fit the crime. (222) The evidence suggests that these soldiers' grievances were, in some cases, legitimate. To J.O. Cornell, the magistrate of Qumbu in the Transkei, for instance, it was somewhat anomalous that soldiers who had more than two and a half years served loyally should then suddenly be discharged on the grounds that they "were not amenable to discipline". He further commented:

"It appears that the Defence authorities at present are taking advantage of every possible excuse they can find to get rid of both Coloured and Native soldiers..."

(223)

To many black soldiers, whilst admitting minor infringements of the Military Disciplinary Code, the news of their imminent discharge came as a complete surprise to them as they were totally at a loss why they were being discharged. (224)

Not only were they upset that they were being discharged on seemingly insubstantial grounds but a number of those discharged in the ordinary manner were also highly disappointed and dissatisfied that their characters were assessed as "incorrigible", apparently due to minor offences. The DNEAS' justification for these assessments rested mainly on the following grounds: the one was the ex-soldier's conduct sheet; secondly, the Commanding Officer's personal knowledge of the soldier so that there was very little room for error in assessing a soldier's character; furthermore, he admitted that a deliberate policy of discharging those guilty of so-called "subversive activities" was carried out towards the end of September 1943 and lastly, defending the discharge without benefits of a soldier whose conduct sheet reflected only one contravention of the MDC, namely loss of kit (which the soldier had made good), he made the untenable statement that

"it is often the men who are clever enough to keep out of trouble who are the greatest danger and cause the most trouble." (225)

This remark makes all the character assessments suspect.

It seems, therefore, that they were indeed justified in maintaining that some accusations were unfair, groundless and that the stigma under which they had to suffer had not been deserved. (226) It was particularly the implications of a bad character assessment which was at the bottom of their complaints. Such an assessment meant that they were discharged without any benefits and also, due to this blot on their record, their discharges were no recommendation for future employment. (227) The following remarks by N.F. Kawusche are representative of many made by these ex-servicemen:

"It is the slur on my character more than anything else that is worrying me. I served in the UDP for 33 months in which time I committed one record (breaking barracks) for 20 minutes... Mine was a heartrending [sic] affair to a man who was prepared to see this war through... It is
now over 19 months since I was discharged from the army, I have been asking and pleading and I am pleading again today that my case be please looked into. This word indifferent is a punishment in itself what have I done to deserve it? It is a deliberate blacklist because it is well known that no European will employ anybody with that word on his discharge certificate... I am on the right and I know that the right always prevails in the end. Mistakes can happen but they can always be corrected. I want to be proud and say I have served my country... When the country called, I answered the call now it is up to those in authority to help me. I am not asking for money... I am asking for justice." (228)

On review, he was granted demobilisation benefits a year later. (229)

Of course, some of the ex-soldiers deserved this evaluation as certain soldiers were indeed bad and criminal characters. (230) However, the large number of discharges without benefits, eventually favourably reviewed, seems to prove that the original assessments were indeed suspect and complaints therefore well founded; these soldiers could justly be exonerated. (231)

The only person in authority in the rural areas whom the ex-soldier could approach about his complaints was the local Native Commissioner. Some of the ex-servicemen, however, complained that certain Native Commissioners had told them they were tired of the ex-volunteers and treated them unsympathetically when they lodged their complaints with them or enquired about their demobilisation benefits. A few, like J. Molapo, related how the Native Commissioner at Vereeniging even threatened to shoot him or throw him into the prison. (232) To these Native Commissioners the plight of the ex-soldier was only a nuisance. Naturally, the ex-serviceman lost confidence in these officials and declined to approach them in future. (233) In practice, this meant that the ex-volunteer’s last resort to improve matters was closed to him. Admittedly, as the military authorities passed the buck to the Native Commissioners to look after the welfare of the ex-volunteers, this meant a heavy extra work-load to them, especially as they were sometimes expected to pull the chestnuts out of the fire as the Native Commissioner at Taungs could vouch:

"There were cases which caused difficulty and in all those cases the details were informed that the Native Commissioner would adjust the matter when it was quite clear this could not happen. Such incidents only tend to place the Commissioner in an invidious position and give rise to the idea that the Native Commissioner is not prepared to assist." (234)

Finally, the Government’s policy of racial discrimination which was prevalent all along the demobilisation line, was another source for complaint. Indeed, the whole demobilisation scheme and benefits were designed on a racial basis with the following ratio: whites received 100%, coloureds 60% and blacks 40%. More often
than not the benefits deviated from this ratio to the detriment of the blacks, e.g. the cash and clothing allowances. This fact repudiated the official policy that no discrimination on the grounds of race was intended. It envisaged

"Equality of treatment for all volunteers limited only in the amount of gratuities and financial aid", (235)

which was in itself a contradiction in terms.

This meant that the white ex-servicemen's demobilisation benefits by far outstripped the paltry benefits of the black ex-servicemen. (236)

Sometimes this discrimination was gross. A good example of this was the fact that an honourably discharged black soldier fared much worse than a dishonourably discharged coloured. (237)

Furthermore, much more was done to re-instate white ex-servicemen through vocational training schemes and various efforts to find them employment - at least, they were not barred from employment opportunities by racially discriminatory legislation as was applicable to blacks. Moreover, they received additional benefits such as land, assistance and preference in the provision of houses and bonuses whilst the blacks had to be satisfied with "worthless medals." (238)

Trying to justify these flagrant discrepancies the demobilisation authorities smugly declared:

"The lesser amounts awarded to CC and NMC volunteers upon discharge are the result of the most careful consideration of all the special circumstances applicable to these classes of volunteers." (239)

ROLE OF VETERANS' ORGANISATIONS

Given these grievances, and for sentimental reasons as well, it was no surprise that many black ex-servicemen joined veterans' organisations. The two main existing organisations were the Springbok Legion and the South African Legion of the British Empire Service League which were both white-dominated. The former's policy with regard to black ex-servicemen, however, was that "all men are equal, irrespective of colour" (240) and therefore admitted blacks as full members on the same terms as whites. By September 1947 9 000 black ex-servicemen had become members. (241) Nevertheless, they found it necessary and practical in the Transvaal to open a section with L.D. Ncwana as organiser to attend to the needs of the black ex-servicemen. In addition they also established a Non-European Sub-Committee. (242) The South African Legion of the British Empire Service League had separate branches for whites and coloureds. There were a few specific organisations for the black ex-servicemen such as the African Ex-Servicemen's League, and the Bantu Ex-Servicemen's League and for blacks and coloureds, the Non-European Ex-Servicemen's League. It appears that most of these organisations were often working at cross-purposes with each other and run by men whose conduct was not always above board and sometimes even corrupt. They were also hampered by the fact that the Government refused to recognise them. In practice, they existed on paper only and eventually became defunct. (243)
The objectives of these organisations were to see to it that the promises made by the Government were fulfilled, that the ex-servicemen received fair treatment and (especially with regard to the Springbok Legion) that large campaigns for ex-soldiers' rights were launched. This primarily entailed agitation for benefits for ex-servicemen and their families and attempts to ensure adequate work, pay and living conditions for the ex-servicemen. The Springbok Legion sometimes vehemently criticised the demobilisation schemes for black ex-servicemen, pointing out that they offered these ex-servicemen no chance of being successfully re-instated in civilian life and actively campaigned for the rights of the black ex-servicemen. A good example of this is their attack on the demobilisation scheme announced by Minister H.G. Lawrence in April 1944:

"Our major criticism of the plan is its shoddy treatment of the native and coloured troops. Minister Lawrence says that 'the payment of a gratuity on a uniform scale is in keeping with the democratic developments in S.A.' and then cuts the native gratuity to a sixth. The people most in need of help receive the least. This is most unfair and the Legion will protest in the strongest terms against this shameful discrimination." (244)

However, the Springbok Legion's influence and powers were limited. On the one hand, the authorities were not at all enthusiastic about this organisation, mainly because of the criticism levelled against them and because they were of opinion that it interfered unnecessarily with their work. On the other hand, partly due to the non-cooperation of the authorities, the Legion found it difficult to make inroads amongst the rural black ex-servicemen as many chiefs were reluctant to assist any organisation which did not have the approval of the Native Commissioner. (245) Furthermore, most of their efforts, which they viewed as absolutely necessary to improve the circumstances of the black ex-servicemen, invariably clashed with the Government's racial laws. Consequently, they made no headway in solving the ex-servicemen's problems. (246)

The high expectations amongst the ex-servicemen about a bright and prosperous post-war world as well as the proposed grandiose demobilisation schemes, founder rather on the impracticalities of implementing these, on the shortage of funds and on the Government's racial policy. Little energy was left after the war for utopia-building. Many of the pronouncements about a better life and post-war schemes and programmes turned out to be simply propaganda. The result was that only a fraction of the initial proposals materialised and that the black ex-servicemen were not treated as generously as the other groups. Many of the programmes never evolved beyond the planning stage. The accepted schemes and benefits were not always satisfactorily carried out and sometimes created friction between the ex-servicemen and the authorities. It appears that a major reason for this was the confusion and ignorance amongst the black ex-servicemen regarding their demobilisation privileges.
To a certain extent the authorities can be blamed for being unwilling and unprepared to treat the case of the ex-servicemen with the care and urgency they deserved. Their insistence, for example, that the ex-soldiers who had been recruited in rural areas should return to those areas, militated disadvantageously against many of these ex-soldiers and indeed leaves the impression that the authorities thereby wished to wash their hands of any further responsibility. It furthermore appears that the authorities were completely satisfied with the demobilisation process:

"In the vast majority of cases the needs of Native ex-volunteers have been satisfactorily met by the benefits available under the demobilisation financial assistance scheme and their re-habilitations has presented little difficulty. For this reason, the Department [of Native Affairs] has not been called upon to do a great deal in the way of undertaking special rehabilitation schemes." (247)

The previous discussion and many ex-servicemen's experiences shows that this notion was not only false but again points to the vast differences in perceptions between the authorities and the black ex-servicemen.

However, this is only one side of the coin. There were serious attempts to re-settle the ex-servicemen satisfactorily. Schemes such as the establishment of the Bantu Ex-Volunteers' Employment Bureaux, prove this. They indicate that there was not only sympathy with the ex-serviceman's destiny but that there was also active caring.

Nevertheless, in the last analysis one cannot but agree with R.D. Pilkington Jordan, the Deputy Adjutant-General, that

"It is a curious commentary on Governments and their ways that money is always available for the infliction of death on a large scale but never for the maintenance of life on any similar scale. In the Union, it is due perhaps to no refreshing flow of blood entering and reviving the brains of responsible people..." (248)
FOOTNOTES

1. NTS Box 9738 File 852/400, SNA to Secretary, National Joint Ex-Services Committee 9/7/1947.

2. NTS Box 9326 File 94/378, Speech by Minister of Native Affairs to General Council Transkei, 1943.

3. NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, Questions to the editor, Umteteli wa Bantu accompanying letter, Secretary Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20/10/1941.


6. AG (3)154/181/4/1 Box 259, AG to Director of Recruiting, 22/2/1942. See also SAIRR Papers, J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 109, D.L. Smit to J.D.R. Jones, 3/10/141.


10. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1 ADD (L and R) to Liaison Officer NMC, 4/9/1945.

11. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers Benefits Committee, pp. 19 and 30. See also further discussion on post-war employment, infra, p. 345-356.


13. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Assistant NC, Nebo to SNA, 15/6/1943 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, SNA to DNEAS, 7/9/1943.

14. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, ADD (L and R) to Liaison Officer NMC, 4/9/1945; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Additional NC, Sekukuniland to SNA, 14/6/1943; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2,
Additional NC, Pilgrims' Rest District to SNA, 13/9/1943 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, SNA to DNEAS, 7/9/1943.


16. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Additional NC, Sibasa to SNA, 21/6/1943. See also NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Assistant NC Premier Mine, Cullinan to SNA, 22/6/1943 and interview with S. Koza, 6/2/1986.


18. AG (3)2054/5 Vol. II Box 260, Unsigned letter, 23/9/1948 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 20th meeting of the Central Advisory Committee, 19/4/1945.

19. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 20th meeting of the Central Advisory Committee, 19/4/1945 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Chairman DSDC Zastron to DGD, 1/9/1945.

20. NEAS Paper Clippings, Umtemeli wa Bantu, 1/8/1942.


22. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Additional NC, Sekukuniland to SNA, 14/6/1943 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Additional NC, Sibasa to SNA, 21/6/1943.

23. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1, Letter from B.Z. Skosana, 30/6/1947; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Chairman DSDC, Zastron to DGD, 1/9/1945; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, Letter from J. Segoalela, 9/1/1946 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, Letter from J. Kgaffela, 24/4/1946.


25. DNEAS NAS 3/7/13/A Box 9, M. Lekitta to DNEAS, 24/7/1945; DNEAS NAS 3/21/D Box 14, A.D. Kweza to "Bantu Soldiers' Friend" column Indhlovu Tlou, appended in DNEAS to Bantu Press, 27/1/1944; NTS Box 7558 File 825/327, CNC Pietersburg to General Secretary, Springbok Legion, 25/1/1948; SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 108, W. Mhini to J.D.R.
Jones, 25/10/1943 and DNEAS NAS 3/21/D Box 14, A. Nomgogo to "Bantu Soldiers' Friend" column Indhlovu Tlou, undated.

26. NMC NAS 3/21/ A 5 Box 19, News form 68 Air School, undated.

27. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, DGD to Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, 9/3/1944 and WR 93/6 Box 181, SNA to Secretary, Civil Re-employment Board, 9/2/1943.

28. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 107, J.D.R. Jones to P.G. van der Byl, 21/7/1941.


31. See NTS Box 9726 File 837/400, DSDC Circular No. 18 By DGD, 3/4/1945 for other functions of this committee.

32. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Central Advisory Committee, 19/12/1944. See also NMC ETS/PERS B 11 Box 56, H.G. Lawrence to E.T. Stubbs, 15/12/1944.

33. NTS Box 9679 File 635/400, Minute No. 64 of UTTGC, accompanying letter SNA to DGD, 8/8/1946. See also NTS Box 9729 File 837/400/1, Memorandum on the demobilisation of Non-European volunteers by R.E. Phillips, July 1945. By June 1945 5 478 black ex-volunteers had applied for assistance at the DSDC's (UWH PS 9631/44 Box 94, Demobilisation Contact letter No. 8, 10/7/1945).


35. Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", p. 80. See also AG (3)154/181/4 Box 259, DNEAS to DAG (O), 8/3/1944 and NTS Box 9123 File 68/363/11, DNEAS to SNA, 13/3/1941. See the following for lists of soldiers discharged in this way: NMC NAS 3/41/4 A 3 Box 43, Welfare Officer NMC Personnel attached MT Pollsmoor Section to OC No. 11 MT Sub Depot, Cape Town, 20/1/1943; CGS (2) 137/1 Vol. 5 Box 69, DNEAS to DCS 3/3/1942; DNEAS NAS 8/4/4 Box 29, DNEAS to DGD, 11/12/1945 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, DNEAS to SNA, 17/6/1944.

36. AG (3)154/X/1097 Box 121, AG to CC Cape Command, 28/1/1946 and CGS 32/5 Vol. II, R.E. Ross to CGS, 28/3/1945.

37. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6 Box 20, DNEAS to AG, 25/6/1945.

38. CGS 32/22, CGS to AG, 12/3/1945.

39. CGS (War) 32/5, Extract from Staff Conference No. 134, 29/3/1945 and DNEAS NAS 3/1/1/(Q) Box 1, AG to DNEAS, 6/4/1945.
40. CGS (War) 32/3, Extract from Staff Conference No. 100, 5/1/1944; AG (3) 154/X/986 Box 102, DAG (O) to AG (WR), 6/1/1944 and DNEAS NAS 8/4/4 Box 29, H.S. Mockford to Heads of Sections, 30/6/1945.


42. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6 Box 20, DNEAS to TAC, 12/7/1945. See also NMC NAS 3/30/6 B 10 Box 53, Acting Area Commandant NMC Training Area to all depots, 19/4/1945 with regard to general discharge policy.

43. DNEAS NAS 3/3/D Box 45, G. Mokeman to Company Commander NMC Detachment, Voortrekkerhoogte, 13/11/1944; DNEAS NAS 3/4/12/4 A Box 6, J. Kleinbooi to OC HQ Company Recruits Reception Depot NMC, Driefontein, 7/11/1945; DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, M. Sibiy to DNEAS, 3/10/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/30/6 Box 20, Statement by J. Mtombeni, undated; NTS Box 9116 File 6B/363/2, Letter from A. Morudu, 7/12/1943 and DNEAS NAS 343/RM Box 46 for numerous applications in this regard.

44. See the following for numerous applications along these lines DNEAS NAS 343/RM Box 46.

45. See the following for applications: DNEAS NAS 90/D Box 43 and DNEAS NAS 626/RM Box 50, Statement by D. Congskea, 4/12/1945 and also DNEAS NAS 592/D Box 49, Director Wm. Spilhaus and Company, Cape Town to The Fire Commander, Saldanha Bay Defences, 16/11/1945; DNEAS NAS 714/D Box 52, Statement by F. Tongene, 3/4/1945 and DNEAS NAS 807/D Box 53, Shell Company of South Africa to OC NMC 2 AS Detachment Rand Air Port, Germiston, undated.


47. DNEAS NAS 714/D Box 52, OC Northern Command to DNEAS, 12/4/1945.


49. NMC NAS 3/21/E A 2 Box 17, P. Ngciki to C.V. Rodseth, 11/2/1944.


51. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, E. Letlalo to DHQ, 11/11/1946 and DNEAS NAS 859/RM Box 54, Statement by P. Phalatsi, 19/9/1945. See also discussion in Chapter 7.
52. DNEAS NAS 3/1/7 Box 2, T. Nsele to M. Nsele as appended in DNEAS to TAC, 1/3/1945. See also NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Statement by S. Moekoa, 27/12/1943, who also stated that his family was in dire straits and he wished therefore to be released. He was even prepared to waive his discharge benefits. His claim was, however, refuted by his mother.

53. See Chapter 7.

54. DNEAS NAS 3/10 Box 10, DNEAS to AG, 16/7/1945; G.E. Brink Collection Accessions Box 54, DGD to Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, 29/8/1944; DNEAS NAS 8/4/4 Box 29, OC Native War Records to DNEAS, 25/9/1945 and Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", p. 197.

55. DNEAS NAS 8/4/4 Box 29, DNEAS to AG, 30/8/1945 and AG (3)154/X/1235/1 Box 139, Dechief to AG, 21/1/1946.

56. DGD Box 248 File 414/3/1, OC Dispersal Depot, Pretoria to DGD, 14/7/1945. See also NMC NAS 3/21 D A 2 Box 16, Letter from A. Thomo, undated and DNEAS NAS 3/4/12/2, DNEAS to Unidef, 29/11/1944.

57. UWH PS 9631/44 Box 94, Progress Report issued by Information and Intelligence Section, Directorate of Demobilisation, 1/8/1945.


59. UWH Box 45, Demobilisation Contact Letter No. 6, 30/4/1945; NEAS Paper Clippings, Cape Standard, 28/8/1945; A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 450906c, Memorandum on the demobilisation of African Volunteers by the SAIRR, 6/9/1945; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1 Secretary CAC to DGD, 19/4/1945 and Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", p. 196. This benefit was more or less on a par with the clothing allowance the West African Forces received. (WO 32/10822 XC/A 43328 Appendix "A", Report of the Standing Joint Demobilisation and Resettlement Committee. See also WO 178/79, 203 United Kingdom Military Liaison Mission, Pretoria. Pioneer and Labour Branch. War Diary, 19/2/1945).


61. DC 503 Box 2054, Handbook for Native Volunteers to be discharged; NTS Box 10203 File 1/423, DGD to SNA, 8/4/1945; H.G. Lawrence Papers BC 640 E 4.38, Quaterly Report of Directorate of Demobilisation, 1/10/1946 - 31/12/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.)

62. NMC NAS 3/30/6 B 10 Box 53, DNEAS to AG, 13/4/1945.

63. NTS Box 9123 File 68/363/11, AG to SNA, 22/3/1946.

64. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 108, SNA to J.D.R. Jones, 19/4/1943; Records of the Joint Council of Europeans and Africans AD 1433 CJ 7 File 17.7.14, Honorary Secretary Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans to DNEAS, 31/8/1942 and UWH Box 45, Demobilisation Contact Letter No. 6, 30/4/1945.

65. DNEAS NAS 3/24 Box 17, General Circular No. 1 of 1945 by the Minister of Native Affairs, 9/1/1945. See also M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 1.1.28, article by M. Ballinger titled, "The African ex-volunteer: his prospects and his achievements", 23/7/1946.


68. NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/37, DGD to Minister of Social Welfare and Demobilisation, 15/3/1947. See also NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/37, SNA to I. Walker, 13/11/1946; NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/37, Memorandum, Native Affairs Department, 5/3/1948; NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/37, Letter from M. Marokane, 2/12/1946 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, Letter from J. Kgaffela, 24/4/1946.

69. UWH Box 263 BI:19, Paper Clippings, Rand Daily Mail, 6/10/1945. See also NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, J. Bowayi to Native Affairs Office, 14/9/1944; DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/3 Box 21, J. Goliath to AG, undated; DNEAS NAS 3/7/13/A, M. Lekitta to DNEAS, 24/7/1945; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, P. Sehitiro to Minister of Defence, 1/4/1948; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 51.5, J.P. Tutu to J.D.R. Jones, 25/4/1945; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box), B.A. Mogagane to Secretary Institute of Race Relations, 20/8/1945; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box), Letter from J. Gezane, 13/9/1945; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box), A. Gumede to Secretary, 25/1/1946 and DNEAS NAS 3/21/D Box


71. SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 51.5, Honorary Secretary DSDC, Smithfield to E. Makilele, 28/10/1946.

72. SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, DGD to E. Bye Bye, 19/8/1946; NTS Box 9654 File 520/400/11, DGD to W. Montsoe, 20/11/1948 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, SNA to J. Madokoda, 19/12/1947.


74. DNEAS NAS 3/12 Box 11 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, General Circular No. 6 of 1943 by SNA, 19/4/1943. See NTS Box 9136 File 7136/21-97 for list of applications by needy ex-members of the NMC.


76. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 19th meeting of the CAC, 26/3/1945.


78. DNEAS NAS 3/7/13A Box 9, DNEAS to QMG, 13/4/1945; DNEAS NAS 3/14 Box 12, DNEAS to GOA UDF Admin. HQ (Rear) MEP, 19/12/1944.


81. AG (3)154/181/4 Box 259, DNEAS to DGS, 4/1/1944. See also AG (3)154/181/4, DNEAS to DAG (O), 8/3/1944.

82. NMC NAS P/33 A 10 Box 22, AG to DAG (O), 8/3/1944; NMC NAS 3/36/1 B 4 Box 54, Secretary Civil Re-employment Board to SNA, 16/5/1942; UWH Box 289, Paper Clippings and NEAS Paper Clippings, Rand Daily Mail, 29/3/1945; UWH Box 45, Demobilisation Contact Letter No. 6, 30/4/1945 and AG (3)154/X/1014/3 Box 104, CGS to AG, 24/1/1944.

84. WR 123 Box 242, OC War Records to DAG (O), 5/2/1945.

85. AG (3)154/181/4 Box 259, DNEAS to DAG (O), 8/3/1944; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, SNA to DNEAS, 9/12/1943 and AG (3)154/X/1014/3 Box 104, AG to Secretary for Defence, 31/1/1944.

86. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee, p. 43; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 15.7.2, SAIRR Meeting of Executive Committee, 5-7 July 1944, Memoranda and Minutes and DNEAS NAS 3/22/9 Box 16, Secretary Orange Flash League to DNEAS, 5/12/1944.

87. UWH PS 9631/44 Box 94 and NTS Box 9726 File 837/400, Demobilisation Contact Letter No. 14, 7/9/1946.

88. NTS Box 9123 File 68/363/11, DGD to SNA, 2/4/1946.

89. AG (3)404/6 Box 29, AG to Secretary for Defence, 26/9/1950.

90. AG (3)154/181/4 Box 259 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, E. Malherbe to DNEAS, 2/3/1944.


92. By the term "disabled soldier" is understood a soldier who has been discharged from the army on the ground of physical or mental disability. (DC 1955/1 Box 3263, "The functions and powers of the National Readjustment Board for Disabled Soldiers", p. 1).

93. NTS Box 9130 File 96/363, NC, Pietermaritzburg to CNC Natal, 18/9/1942.

94. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee, 21/7/1944, p. 38.


96. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 15.7.2, SAIRR Meeting of Executive Committee, 5-7 July, 1944, Memoranda and minutes.


98. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.14.14 File 3 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, H.S. Cooke to Private Secretary, Minister of
Welfare and Demobilisation, 3/3/1944. See also Chapter 4 on pension benefits.

99. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum by CAC titled "Provision for certain Native ex-volunteers suffering from disability and for their dependants", 19/4/1945. See also NMC NAS 3/12 C 8 Box 54, SNA to DNEAS, 27/5/1943.

100. DC 1955/1 Box 3263, "The functions and powers of the National Readjustment Board for Disabled Soldiers", p. 22; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Circular No. 27 of 1943 by Secretary for Social Welfare, 20/9/1943; ARB Box 1777 File 1612/1/17-12, Circular No. 15 of 1943 by Secretary for Social Welfare, 12/6/1943 and ARB Box 1777 File 1612/1/17-12, R.P. Malan to Secretary, 13/12/1943. The monthly scales were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Towns</th>
<th>Other Urban Areas</th>
<th>Rural Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>1 pound 17/6</td>
<td>1 pound 5/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>1 pound</td>
<td>15/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each child</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1 and ARB Box 1777 File 1612/1/17-10D/3, R.W. Kirk to Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, 11/8/1947.

102. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of the meeting of the Non-European Sub-Committee, 7/5/1946; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20, Meeting of the Executive Committee of the SAIRR, 5-7 July, 1944, Memoranda and Minutes; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum on Rehabilitation of African Ex-Volunteers submitted by the Campaign for Right and Justice, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 8/3/1946 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 105, Memorandum by CAC, 17/2/1945.

103. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 39th meeting of the CAC, 14/10/1947.

104. DC 1955/1 Box 3263, "The functions and powers of the National Readjustment Board for Disabled Soldiers", p. 13.

105. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum submitted by the Ex-Servicemen's League (NMC) on the demobilisation of African Volunteers, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 1/4/1946.

106. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 105, Memorandum by CAC, 17/2/1945.

107. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee, p. 4 and ARB Vol. 1719 File 1612/1/17, Paper Clipping, Rand Daily Mail, 15/9/1942. See also statistics of employment situation of black South Africans in various economic
activities by 1946 in M. Horrell, South Africa's Non-White Workers, pp. 99-105.

108. See discussion of this aspect, supra, p. 334.

109. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of a meeting of the committee of Northern Areas EX-Servicemen's Branch of the Springbok Legion, 8/3/1944; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.14.14 File 3, Note by H.S. Cooke, 28/1/1944; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 15.7.2, SAIRR Meeting of Executive Committee, 5-7 July 1944, Memoranda and minutes; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Chairman DSDC, Matatiele to SNA, 8/2/1946 and DC 1516/1 Box 3115, Memorandum of meeting between Prime Minister and MP's representing blacks, 29/1/1942.


111. NTS Box 7558 File 825/327, Senior Agricultural Officer, Pietersburg to NC Pietersburg, 6/10/1944; J.C. Smuts Papers A 1 Vol. 26 No. 198, J.C. Smuts to M.C. and A.B. Gillett, 13/1/1943 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 43.7.1, Minutes of 4th meeting of Bantu Soldiers Sub-Committee of the GGNWF, 19/6/1941. A similar line of thought was followed in the Colonial Office (CO 820/49 File 36018, Draft of circular despatch about demobilisation, accompanying letter W.J. Bigg to A.J.K. Pigott, 26/3/1943).


114. UWH Box 45, Annual Report of the Civil Re-employment Board, 1942, p. 4; WR 93/6 Box 181, SNA to Secretary Civil Re-employment Board, 9/2/1943 and WR 93/6 Box 181, Note titled "Procedure laid down by the Government in connection with the re-absorption into civil life of Native Volunteers", undated.

115. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 20th meeting of the CAC, 19/4/1945; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, NC Port Elizabeth to SNA, 11/11/1949 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Chairman DSDC Matatiele to SNA, 8/2/1946.

116. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, Letter from C. Cukatha, 27/12/1946. See also AG (3)2054/5 Vol. II Box 560, Letter from W. Mncwabe, 15/8/1948; DNEAS NAS 3/7/6 Box 8, J. Montsi to DNEAS, undated and interview with P. Sexwale who had a similar experience, 6/2/1986.

117. For this whole section see DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, "Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee" pp. 15, 17, 26 and 34; Interviews with R. Moloi, L. Mahloana, J. Theledi, A. Mogale,