free to continue their recruiting as in the past. (120)

When comparing recruitment for the mines with that for the NMC, it is immediately evident that the recruitment machinery and organisation for the mines was more sophisticated and on a far larger scale. There was also a rapid turnover, necessitating continuous recruiting to maintain the required labour strength. The number of blacks recruited in 1941, for example, was 311,000. The numbers in employment on mines and other employment avenues on the Witwatersrand, Vereeniging, Klerksdorp, Northern Natal and Kimberley areas in May 1942 were respectively 417, 412 and 227, 556. (121) Furthermore, the mines not only offered better incentives and conditions of service than the army but also applied better recruiting methods: a certain Mr Joubert of Sekukuniland, for instance, reported that while the army recruiters experienced serious problems with the transport of recruits,

"the labour agents [for the mines] just snap up the Natives. These agents have buses running right through the district." (122)

It is therefore no surprise that whilst it was imperative for the army to obtain more recruits and the recruiters for the NMC battled to fill their quotas, the blacks employed on the mines reached record figures in 1941. (123) In addition, it is important to note that the mines drew the younger able-bodied men so that the UDF sometimes had to be satisfied to enlist those rejected by the mines. (124) There is, however, also evidence that some of the labourers who had completed their contracts on the mines, joined the NMC. (125)

Moreover, adverse farming conditions brought about by a serious drought in the summer rainfall area and unusually heavy rains and floods in the winter rainfall area had a dual effect on recruitment: on the one hand, because of crop failures, the blacks considered joining the army; but on the other hand, the women discouraged them as they were afraid they might be left without support. (126)

Fear and apprehension also played a part in their disinclination to enlist. The blacks still retained vivid memories of the sinking of the "S.S. Mendi" during the First World War in which 615 people (including a large contingent of South African blacks) lost their lives. Consequently, when told that they would be required to travel by sea, many refused to enlist. Their fear was dramatically justified after the fall of Tobruk when many South Africans were captured or lost their lives and when the "Nova Scotia" sank off the Natal coast and nearly 300 badly mutilated bodies washed ashore. These events reminded the blacks of the "Mendi" disaster and had a very bad effect on recruiting. (127) This fear was aggravated by descriptions of enemy torture if blacks fell into their hands. (128) Furthermore, the prospect of being armed with only a knobkerrie and assegai in the face of rifle fire and the menacing destructive power of aeroplanes was
indeed awesome and their fear understandable. In addition, some blacks, who might have considered enlistment, feared possible harassment and reprisals from that section of the white population which did not support the war effort. (129)

A lack of information contributed to their reluctance to enlist and added to their apprehensions. Many blacks were not informed of the exact nature of the duties they would be required to perform in the army and this consequently created false impressions. There were, for instance, blacks who thought that it would be expected of them to operate modern weapons, even aeroplanes. (130) This instilled a grave sense of fear. Some were also suspicious of the procedure whereby they would be sent to the East Rand and housed in compounds there. (131) The parallel with mine recruitment and the ignominious connotation of ill-treatment attached to these compounds were sufficient to raise suspicions.

The authorities advanced so-called "subversive" propaganda as another reason why the blacks did not enlist. They were inclined to regard anything not in keeping with their policy as "subversive" propaganda. Therefore, remarks by blacks that "it was a white man's war and did not concern them", (132) genuine activities by Germans exhorting blacks not to enlist, (133) evidence of pro-Japanese propaganda among blacks on the grounds of so-called kinship, (134) threats that the names of those blacks who had enlisted would be given to Germans when they invade South Africa (135) and a strong anti-war feeling amongst literate blacks (136) were all indiscriminately construed as "subversive" propaganda. Capt. G. Suttor, Adjutant of the 21st Field Regiment South African Artillery, thought that "questions, which in the opinion of those closely and intimately acquainted with the Zulus over many years could never emanate from the native mind" (137) were asked everywhere, were sure proof of "subversive" activities. Such a remark bears out the gross underestimation by the authorities of blacks' ability and desire to be well informed before enlisting and clearly indicates how nebulous the term "subversive" became.

On the whole, it indeed seems that because white interests persistently dictated the nature of the recruiting campaign, they also effectively had an inhibiting effect, as B.G. Paver aptly remarked:

"Recruiting has been undertaken with one eye on the political field and another on the mining and farming interests." (138)

RECRUITING AMONGST THE ZULUS

Particularly disappointing to the authorities and confounding
certain presumptions among them, was the poor response from the Zulu. In keeping with colonial thinking in the rest of Africa, (139) the Zulu was regarded as an outstanding "martial race" and, it was argued, therefore likely to enlist. (140) Their failure to do so, effectively demonstrated the myth of the "martial race". A. Kirk-Greene provided a comprehensive exposition on the history of this myth in colonial Africa. He points out:

"For the first, it seems that, while all military qualities were desirable, in the final analysis reliability, loyalty and discipline had precedence over valour, fearlessness and fighting skills in the determination of who was the 'good' soldier. As for a martial race, there is some support for the argument that one of the criteria was to have fought against the British - perhaps a reformulation of the British tradition of admiring a plucky loser as much as a clear winner." (141)

On the other hand, so-called "non-martial races" frequently also manifested the above conditions of military prowess. (142) J. Bayo Adekson indeed noted that this cliche is an unworkable concept as it fails to explain why these "martial races" in spite of being considered so war-like, contributed far less to the colonial forces than the "less martial races". (145) The validity of this popular notion seems therefore utterly suspect because judgements about martial worth, loyalty and disloyalty, the amenability of one group of people rather than another to military discipline were often subjective and superficial. However, these popular nineteenth century myths that "climate determined warlike characteristics, the alleged military superiority of...mountaineers to lowlanders, the alleged innate inequality of racial and ethnic types on physical differentiation as between 'white', 'yellow', 'brown' and 'black', certain white supremacist ideas and the rationalization of Darwin's notion of the 'survival of the fittest!'", (144) spilled over into the twentieth century and persisted in many a military mind.

As far as South Africa was concerned, throughout most of the recruiting campaign, the notion that the Zulu was a race of fighters, disciplined and well equipped both physically and in temperament for military service and that they were proud of their heritage and traditions persisted. (145) This was either based on the somewhat subjective observance "that the average raw Zulu...is full of martial ardour and takes naturally to soldiering, as anyone can testify who has witnessed tribal fights or attended large war dances in the Reserves" (146) or history was conveniently (but out of context) invoked to substantiate this claim:

"This district [Nongoma] bred many of the old Zulu warriors who, years ago, overran a great portion of South
Africa, subduing other Native tribes and making a brave stand against the Europeans in the country", (147) echoing A. Kirk-Greene's comments on British admiration. After it had been decided to recruit blacks for the war and in view of this mental attitude it was no surprise that the recruitment policy immediately and keenly targeted on the Zulus. (148)

But the "martial race" bubble burst when the anticipated rallying of thousands of Zulus to the flag failed to materialise. The "disgustingly poor response" (149) was obviously a major disillusionment and anti-climax to the authorities:

"The response from Natal has been most disappointing. It was hoped that the Zulus, who do not patronise the gold mines to any great extent, would readily enlist in the Native Military Corps, but experience has proved the contrary to be the case." (150)

As the Zulus had adopted the same attitude during the First World War, (151) it might have prompted Col. Stubbs to remark laconically that

"In the history of Natal, eminent Native Administrators have found to their sorrow that they have been completely misled and have failed to understand the Zulu mentality and psychological reactions." (152)

After two and a half years of intensive recruiting only 803 had enlisted. (153) In a futile and almost absurd ironic fashion, the myth of the "martial race" was brought home to the Magistrate of Richmond who reported, after persistent endeavours to enlist Zulus, that only "two old boys of between 65 and 70 said they would like to go to wash dishes." (154) The martial ideal was indeed in the minds of the European recruiters rather than in the innate quality of the men they recruited.

Though the response was poor it seems that the authorities tenaciously clung to the idea of the Zulus as a "martial race" and tried to prove that they were not wrong after all:

"We should do everything to return the goodwill of our Zulus and not close the door against them because they have been slow in coming forward. I...think that they should be given every chance." (155)

Apart from the usual methods of recruiting described above, (156) throughout the recruiting campaign the authorities virtually strained every nerve and resorted to special methods to stimulate response amongst the Zulu. Recruiting battalions were formed, officers of the NEAS were stationed in principal centres of Natal, high-ranking officers such as Col. H.C. Lugg and Col. B.W. Martin toured the province extensively, special recruitment meetings were held and, perhaps, most important of all, was the establishment of a recruitment and artillery camp at Eshowe where prospective recruits were to be trained for the 21st Field Regiment. When the expected results, despite these efforts, were
not forthcoming, it seems that the authorities became somewhat impatient and fell back on the age-old expedient of comparing the still poor response to the more ready response from blacks from other parts of South Africa, perhaps in order to "play on the Zulus' sentiments". In his address to the Zulus at Nongoma in June 1941, Col. Reitz said that

"Our efforts to secure recruits for the NMC from amongst you Zulus have been most disappointing. On the other hand, the response from tribes in the other provinces has been most encouraging. I cannot understand why a nation like you Zulus, which has the reputation of being the most war-like in this sub-continent should be so backward in coming to the assistance of your King...". (157)

It is clear that the authorities were baffled by the Zulus' attitude and sought explanations. Extensive attention has already been given to the general reasons why the blacks refrained from enlisting; (158) most of these reasons are also applicable to the Zulus. Only the most important reasons pertaining to the Zulus specifically will therefore be dealt with here.

Some Zulus did not trust many of the officials of the Native Affairs Department who were responsible for recruiting. Others, especially those partaking in or remembering the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906, manifested open disloyalty and eschewed any efforts to enlist them. (159) Furthermore, the Zulus were also, like the other blacks in South Africa, fairly apathetic to the whole recruiting effort. A major reason for this was that they had been deprived of large parts of Zululand through European settlement; therefore there was no sense in fighting if this encroachment process were to continue. (160) Some of the authorities also realised that the prevailing policy of not arming the blacks with fire-arms, seriously militated against a warlike spirit amongst the blacks whom they considered to be "martial races":

"How was it possible to work up the spirit of the offensive among natives if the only training given to them was that of watchdogs, patrolling a fence with assegais and at the sign of danger being ordered to withdraw? If the natives were given arms and trained as soldiers a different story would be told." (161)

The authorities thus effectively undermined their own idea of a "martial race".

Finally, the Acting Paramount Chief of the Zulus, Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinizulu's role in the recruiting campaign needs further elaboration because it was thought that he held the key to a better response from the Zulus. With this in mind, he was pampered by inter alia being provided with an ornate uniform, complete with a Sam Browne belt, gloves and all accoutrements and
a monthly allowance but not any rank. Chief Mshiyeni agreed to co-operate and together with some other Zulu chiefs professed their loyalty to the Government and the British Commonwealth. (162) When the expected rush to enlist was not forthcoming, the authorities cast doubts on Mshiyeni's loyalty and were puzzled to know exactly what his attitude was. (163) This mistrust increased when Chief Mshiyeni published a manifesto in which he tried to redress the major obstacle to Zulu enlistment, namely their not being armed:

"I desire to have established a Zulu Military Regiment trained in the manipulation of Big Guns, war tanks, armoured vehicles, motor cycles - all for combatting the armed forces of the enemy. All necessary weapons and vehicles will be made available."

He clearly resented the fact that the Zulus were called cowards for not enlisting:

"Nothing else can wipe out the slur which has been cast upon us - cowards at all times have been despised."

Continuing, he called the Zulus to join his "own personal Regiment - the 'Impumalanga'" ("The Rising Sun") which would have been formed at a meeting to be held in Pietermaritzburg on 14th June 1941 and attended by "Zulu soldiers who have had training in the use of big and other arms." (164)

With this manifesto which was indeed an overt criticism of Government policy, Chief Mshiyeni evoked a confrontation with the authorities. It caused a considerable flutter in the dovecote as it gave the impression that the blacks were to be armed. Col. Stubbs was particularly upset and it seems that this manifesto, judging by this and his later remarks, was the nail in the coffin of his mistrust in Mshiyeni:

"Now the unfortunate situation has arisen whereby an unauthorised person...is misrepresenting the policy of the Government to the Zulu people which may well have embarrassing repercussions so far as the C-in-C and the Government are concerned." (165)

H.C. Lugg, however, saw no harm in the manifesto for, to him, Mshiyeni merely expressed his "desire" to have Zulus armed. He further explained Mshiyeni's reference to his Regiment "Impumalanga" as only

"symbolic of the fact that up to the present he has only perceived its rays, and now lives in hope of seeing the sun itself." (166)

However, despite Lugg's explanations, the Secretary of Native Affairs took immediate steps to withdraw the manifesto summarily and so the die was cast for fairly strained relations with Mshiyeni.

To add insult to injury, when he moreover did not fulfill his promises to provide recruits, his own bona fides were gravely
doubted. Somewhat scornfully, a certain Maj. Franklin commented:
"I am very sceptical of Mshiyeni's airy promises to provide 'thousands'. So far he has been unable or unwilling to provide even 'hundreds' and in spite of having been lavishly entertained by Defence, a special platoon and band having been sent on tour through his domain at his own request...the Acting Paramount Chief has been unable to implement his grandiloquent promises to provide Zulus by the 'thousands' for the NMC." (167)

There were, however, officials who did not doubt Mshiyeni's loyalty. (168) They regarded his emphasis on providing fire-arms to the Zulus as an effort to see the black people of South Africa placed on equality with those in other parts of Africa. They felt that it was a mistake to ascribe the poor response solely to a supposedly disloyal Mshiyeni; there were also other, more convincing, reasons. A major cause was political and originated not from the blacks but the whites. Years of repressive legislation and colour bar discrimination effectively antagonised the blacks. "Getting at' Mshiyeni therefore can do little good without converting his people." (169)

Another important reason which Mshiyeni himself admitted, was that he did not wield that influence over the Zulus with which he was credited. His authority extended as far as Nongoma and if he entered another chief's territory he had no jurisdiction over them. Although Mshiyeni was accorded the title of Acting Paramount Chief this was done merely by reason of his standing and did not confer special powers on him. He was therefore merely the acting chief of the Usutu tribe and as such did not differ from the other approximately 300 chiefs. (170)

Mshiyeni thus found himself more or less in the same ambiguous position as one of his predecessors, Solomon ka Dinizulu. (171) He could only claim limited support amongst the Zulu people; moreover, there was also a widespread feeling amongst them that he had been bought. (172) The issuing of this manifesto can therefore be viewed as an attempt to rectify this and assert his independence. By exhorting the Zulus in his own way to enlist, he endeavoured to show that he was not a mere Government collaborator. But in doing so, he seriously antagonised the Government on whose goodwill he was to a large extent dependent for his position.

In some quarters it eventually dawned upon the authorities that their idea of the Zulus being a "martial race" and that therefore they would ipso facto enlist, was misplaced; they were compelled to consider other sources of recruitment:
"Mr. Smit does not feel too sanguine about obtaining from Zululand the men required for the Artillery and he considers that Basutoland may supply the key to the situation." (173)
Expediency thus forces the Government to abandon their policy towards the Zulus. The war helped to change that attitude. G.J. Grubb bluntly asserted that

"Whatever the Zulu may have been in the past, my short experience make me conclude that he has now developed a cowardly nature, especially amongst the educated type." (174)

Grubb apparently did not realise that there were more important reasons than cowardice which had influenced the Zulus.

CONCERNS AND GRIEVANCES

From reports of recruitment meetings and from questions asked at these meetings and elsewhere, it is clear that prospective recruits did not rush in headlong to enlist. There was a strong desire first to know what they were letting themselves in for and, probably most important of all, what benefit they would derive by joining up. (175) This is understandable as the idea of entering the world of the military was a totally strange and new experience to them and must have filled them with apprehension if not trepidation. W.M. Seymour pointed out that "They are an unenlightened people and want 'preaching' to". He continued that they wanted information on

"what their duties, conditions and work are in the army itself, where they are expected to go to in the army, how they will be taken there and what risks they run; ...how the war arose and what it is all about and how is it going and generally why is it better for them to take part in the war rather than to stand aside." (176)

They furthermore desired that a definite time and place of service be stipulated (177) and were especially concerned about what would happen to their families in the event of their disablement or death. (178)

Another problem on which they required clarification was whether there were any guarantees for re-employment after the war. Their minds could be set at ease with respect to all but the last issue. The law only guaranteed the employment of soldiers who were compelled by law to go on active service and therefore did not apply to the blacks joining the NMC. (179)

Before enlisting, they wanted facts not promises, particularly with regard to post-war benefits. They expected the Government to indicate whether their position would be altered as a result of their war effort and what steps the Government was prepared to take in that direction. (180) Although the Government did not commit itself at all on this score, it is an indication of the aspirations some blacks had and rewards they expected for partaking in the war effort.

The recruiting campaign of course offered the voteless blacks an opportunity to air their views and grievances. It was similar to the proverbial "band-wagon" on which everyone with an axe to grind, climbed. These resentments ranged from civilian issues
such as pass laws, poll tax, lack of education facilities, the
industrial colour bar, poor housing conditions and lack of
political rights, to military issues such as inequalities between
whites and blacks in the army, absence of a re-employment scheme
for discharged black soldiers and pensions for veterans of the
Anglo-Boer War and the First World War. (181) As some viewed
these grievances as conditions which first had to be fulfilled
before considering supporting the war effort, it also had,
together with the concern of prospective recruits, a detrimental
effect on recruiting.

REASONS FOR ENLISTING

If there were so many adverse conditions inhibiting blacks from
enlisting, the question arises why 76,000 eventually attested.
Was it pressure or cajoling from their chiefs who hoped to win
favours from the authorities? Was it simply a spirit of
adventure combined with a desire to acquire a steady income? Was
it loyalty to the South African and the British Governments? Was
it an understanding of the issues involved? Whilst all these
factors played a part, it appears unequivocally clear that the
foremost reason for their enlisting was the economic factor. It
is appropriate, therefore, to examine the participation of blacks
in the UDF in terms of economic "push/pull" factors - not
dissimilar to those pertaining to migratory labour. In this
respect Kenneth W. Grundy noted:

"A decision to enlist is always a product of a highly
personal perception of one's overall career and social
prospects in the context of a particular set of
situational determinants. Black recruitment is a two-way
process involving the absence of opportunity in civil
society and the attraction of the armed forces." (182)

This becomes clear when considering the position of those blacks
in the Transvaal who enlisted - they constituted more than half
of the total number of recruits. Particularly in the Northern
Transvaal, where the meagre crop was extremely poor due to a
severe infestation of "streak disease" and a plague of so-called
"army-worms", there were few escape routes for blacks. In
addition to these adverse agricultural conditions, the northern
parts of the country during 1941-1943 were stricken by a
devastating drought which resulted in large-scale crop failures.
This effectively deprived many blacks of a livelihood so that
many families suffered extreme privation and famine. (183) A
further consequence of the drought was that many farmers
summarily dismissed their black employees adding to the number of
unemployed. (184) Moreover, the general trend towards
proletarianisation of labour tenants and squatters continued,
forcing large numbers off the land. No wonder that R. Fyfe King
callously remarked that "the best recruiting districts both for
the Army and the Mines, are those which reap little." (185) These
harsh economic conditions were exacerbated by the higher prices
of the strictest necessities of life, mainly brought about by the
war and the fact that many blacks could not find employment. To
some, the army at least provided a job. (186) And, of course,
laws such as the Land Act of 1913, which were used to augment the supply of labour to farms and mines from overcrowded "reserves", were now also applied to supply labour for the army. (187) The upshot was that many blacks were forced to join the army in order to alleviate their destitute situation — a classical example of economic "push/pull" factors determining a choice of employment.

Albeit inadequate, the army at least provided a regular pay, (188) free food, clothing, housing, medical care and allotments to soldiers' dependants. It was a question of relative poverty and improvement.

Many farm labourers who generally received poor wages therefore preferred to join the NMC where they were better remunerated. A recruit from a farm near Groot Marico, for example, received a monthly wage of 15/- plus mealie meal and his wife worked for the farmer's household at 6/- per month plus food. It seemed only natural that he joined the army where he could earn three pounds seven and six pence with food, clothing, etc. (189) Some farmers were unwilling and others unable to improve their labourers' conditions of service; thereby they actually forced them to enlist. For those who had no tenant obligations this must have been a welcome escape route.

Furthermore, although evidence in this regard is scant, it appears that some joined in the hope of learning a trade and others regarded it as an educative and prestigious experience. Thus B.W. Mcanyangwa applied to enlist as late as January 1945 so that he

"would be the only African teacher that has joined up in Aliwal North out of African male teachers." (190)

In addition it seems that some blacks were motivated to enlist by their loyalty and patriotism to South Africa, the King and the British Empire. Because an enemy threatened South Africa, they deemed it their duty to defend the country. Sergeant R. Moloi thus described his reason for enlisting:

"Because I did not want to be a slave in this country; because these people told us that this enemy is a very bad enemy — he is a bad man - Hitler - when he can win this war we would be slaves, especially we black people... We cannot allow this man to come here and give us a certain rule that we don't know — rather live under present Government than Hitler's Government - the devil you know is better than the devil you do not know." (191)

But this was not an unqualified expression of loyalty as J. Sephiphi remarked:

"We wanted to go and fight for the country thinking that maybe we'd get a better life when we came back." (192)

CLASS AND AGE OF RECRUITS

It would appear that the attractions offered by the army did not, however, particularly appeal to the type of recruits the
authorities had in mind. They wanted blacks who were, with training and experience, likely to make good non-commissioned officers. According to them, the blacks from the urban areas would have been the ideal recruits because they were generally more literate than the rural blacks and more experienced in handling tools and machinery which would have facilitated their military training. (193) But the insufficient pay offered by the army and the official policy to avoid prejudicing white employers of labour, in most cases effectively drew a line between the literate urban black and the illiterate rural black. (194) Z.K. Matthews and D.D.T. Jabavu realised the effect remuneration had on the type of man recruited:

"While pay is by no means attractive even for the 'mine-boy' type of recruit it is positively discouraging to the 'superior' type of recruit." (195)

The result was that about 80 per cent of the blacks recruited came from the rural areas, where, as indicated above, their conditions were generally inferior to those offered by the army. This meant that the majority consisted of illiterate farm labourers or peasants. (196)

It was also a noteworthy feature of recruiting that there was a lack of response from those between 20 and 30 years of age. These men preferred to work on the mines - the main contenders with which the army had to vie. The result was that while the blacks employed on the mines reached record figures in 1941, the army had to be contented with older men. (197)

However, there were also literates and semi-literates who enlisted, especially teachers, ministers of religion, clerks and interpreters who regarded it as their duty. (198) As an anti-war feeling among the literates was rife, they were more the exception than the rule. For example there was a number of volunteers amongst the black intelligentsia who were well educated and who held responsible positions in civilian life. One was Sgt. Doyle Mochingotla who was not only a professional builder, but was also an ex-serviceman from the First World War and politically active during the interwar years. (199) The frequently harsh treatment meted out to the Native Labour Contingent during the First World War apparently did not prevent some of its members from re-enlisting. Stanford Wauchope, the son of Rev. I. Wauchope who was drowned in the "Mendi" disaster, also enlisted although he was the headmaster of an Anglican School in Germiston prior to enlistment. (200) The son of the renowned Sol Plaatje, Halley Plaatje, who boasted with several credentials to his name, inter alia, holding a teacher's certificate, ex-General Secretary to the ANC, former General Secretary to the South African Bantu Rugby Football Board, and a "licensed driver without a blemish" also offered his services. (201)
RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE

The volunteer had to adhere to the following procedure: he had to report to any Native Commissioner or Magistrate who attested him provisionally; then a preliminary medical examination was carried out by the district surgeon. Thereafter recruits were assembled at each magistracy and held there pending instructions from Defence Headquarters permitting the Magistrate or Native Commissioner to send them in batches under a responsible foreman to Driefontein Reception Depot where they were finally medically accepted or rejected. Those accepted were registered, vaccinated and received a block number, pay book, metal wrist band and red identity disc as well as their army kit. (202) Recruits rejected at the final medical examinations were paid for the period up to final medical rejection at usual NMC pay rates and thereafter returned to the original recruitment centre, rail and rations free. (203)

On the Contract and Attestation forms, recruits had to agree to serve anywhere in Africa for the duration of the war and under the conditions of service (204) decided upon by the Department of Defence. They further had to agree under oath to be faithful and bear allegiance to King George VI and subject themselves to the provisions of the Union Military Disciplinary Code. (205)

The recruitment procedure was, however, not always plain sailing; several problems, mostly of an administrative nature, cropped up. Although provision was made whereby Native Commissioners were authorised to supply rations to prospective recruits waiting to be attested as well as to those waiting to be sent off to the Reception Depot, this was not always adhered to. Some received only a loaf of dry bread while others, receiving nothing, simply disappeared never to return. (206) Furthermore, passless volunteers were not accepted but told to report to their home districts for their passes. In most cases these men were penniless and had no trainfare to go to their homes in order to obtain the necessary passes. (207) When intending recruits could not produce their tax receipts, they were also not attested. Young blacks who had reached the age of 18 but had not yet paid taxes were ordered to bring their parents along. In the majority of cases it required bringing their parents over long distances and many were not prepared to incur that expense. (208) A serious problem for the authorities in Cape Town was that many blacks posed as coloureds in order to avoid paying the general poll tax. Another problem affecting the recruits in Cape Town, was that they had to walk a distance of 4 miles from the office of the Department of Native Affairs to the Castle where they had to be medically examined and go back again. The Assistant Native Commissioner, A.A. Burge, dismissed this as a problem, stating that

"a native who cannot walk such a...distance would be useless in the Army." (209) It was precisely this somewhat unsympathetic treatment by officials that also lead to problems. There is evidence of
several cases where volunteers were turned away, told to come some other day or kept waiting for days before attended to because these officials were too busy. One prospective recruit thus noted his experience:

"I applied at the Drill Hall for my service, they gave me a form to fill in and after filling the form in, they told me to take it to the Labour berow [sic]... When I reached the place they told me to go to the pass office [sic]. Then I went to the pass office [sic]... they told me there is no depot here. Then I went back to the Drill Hall and asked one of the military [sic] police... and he told me to return to the colour [sic] exservice men office [sic]. Then I were told that they dont [sic] take native on in there [sic] regiment [sic]. So I like to know... were [sic] am I to go." (210)

In other cases the magistrates were simply and completely ignorant of the recruiting procedures. (211)

The supposition of an article in The Star that "Native Commissioners smooth over difficulties in the way of enlistment" (212) can therefore not be accepted at face value. Whilst it might have been true in most instances, there were also cases proving the contrary. A fairly serious obstruction in the smooth running of the recruitment operation was that some district surgeons not only treated recruits unsympathetically but also dissuaded them from enlisting; others refused point-blank to examine blacks with the result that recruiting had to be discontinued temporarily in those areas. (213) The effect of these problems was that many eventually did not enlist because they must have felt that the army was not too keen on employing them.

REQUIREMENTS

A further important aspect of the recruitment drive related to the requirements laid down by the authorities for recruits. Barring the specific medical requirements, the other requirements were fairly vague: they had to be hard-picked and likely, with training and experience, to make good non-commissioned officers, dependable, intelligent, of good character and fit for the duties of a soldier. (214) Initially, only men between the ages of 18 and 40 were accepted. After numerous representations, in which it was pointed out that men above 40 were generally more responsible and, particularly, that the middle-aged men were more willing to enlist than the young men, instructions were issued that, if they were physically fit, men up to the age of 50 could be accepted. (215) In December 1940, Col. D. Horwich, the Medical Inspector of Recruits, however, overruled this instruction and reverted the age limit to 40. (216) Nevertheless, it appears that the DNEAS was still prepared to relax the age restriction if older recruits were robust and healthy. (217)

The minimum height, chest and weight measurements, the three basic determinants of the physique of recruits, were respectively
5,5 feet (minimum), 33,5 inches fully expanded and 125 pounds (minimum). Due to the fact that recruits were required to perform various duties, some less strenuous than others, it was no longer feasible to adhere too strictly to the high and uniform standard first stipulated for enlistment in the "Native Military Police". The minimum height was then reduced to 5 feet and the weight to 108 pounds. (218) The lowering of the standard can perhaps also be ascribed to the urgency with which recruits were needed; it was thought that many were underfed as a result of the drought, but that this would vastly improve after a period of army feeding, medical attention and exercise. (219) Furthermore, recruits were divided into different medical categories for the different duties they had to perform: Class A.1 for stretcher-bearers, Class B.1 for motor transport drivers (with the special minimum visual standard) and Class C.1 for other duties. (220)

Most of the rejections at the Reception Depot were on grounds of poor health and physical development, i.e. not complying with the minimum standards of height and weight. In a break down into the various medical categories on which the recruits were rejected, "defective physique" ranked the highest followed by "defective teeth", "disorder and injuries of locomotor system", venereal diseases and cracked feet. (221)

Some of the officers were of the opinion that recruits were unnecessarily rejected for minor defects such as cracked feet and defective teeth. It was, after all, an accepted fact that people who did not wear footwear had cracked feet and that defective teeth could be rectified. The DGMS, however, considered the dental standard already very low, and was not prepared to revise it. (222)

The somewhat ridiculous situation where illiterate recruits were rejected because of bad vision, but in reality they were unable to read the sight testing cards, was soon rectified when a simple chart of drawings was introduced. (223) One recruit, Elijah Mbangela, was blind of the left eye but so eager that he was willing to enlist for half the wages! His application was approved. (224)

The percentages rejected varied according to the period and the place when and where recruitment was undertaken. In November 1940, for instance, the rejection rate was as high as 70 per cent in Kimberley but in June 1942 in Cape Town, it reached the low of 1 per cent. Considering the overall figures of recruits examined at the Driefontein Reception Depot, the percentage rejected for the six months from January to June 1941 was fairly high - 23,4 per cent. (225) This figure more or less stabilised at 14 per cent for the period August 1941 to September 1943 but picked up again sharply to 42,3 per cent at the end of the recruitment period, September to February 1944. (226)

Understandably, prospective recruits were greatly discouraged in
areas where the rejection rate was high. To the recruit it must have been a great step when he decided to enlist but a major disappointment to be medically rejected. The young men especially, gave this as a reason for not signing on. (227)

CESSATION OF RECRUITMENT

Except for a few categories such as medical orderlies, instructions were issued that recruiting was to be discontinued peremptorily as from 1st March 1943. This instruction upset Col. Stubbs because it was at a time when the whole recruiting organisation was in full swing. He pointed out that, while recruitment for whites, coloureds and Indians was continuing, an avenue of employment for blacks was closed. Moreover, this sudden cessation of recruiting caught the NEAS on the wrong foot. He felt that the Government was making fools of chiefs who had, at his request, sent out specially printed appeals to their people to join the army just a month previously. (228). However, this decision was final.

RATE AND AREAS OF RECRUITING

The rate at which recruitment took place as well as the areas whence the recruits came, now needs consideration. Recruitment began relatively slowly but reached 30 390 in September 1941, almost a year after commencement. Then the numbers recruited more than doubled to reach a high of 70 101 in January 1942, falling to 48 895 in July 1942 only picking up again to 61 969 in April 1943 more or less at the same time that recruitment ceased. (229)

Different figures are given for the total number of blacks who enlisted in the NMC but it seems the figure of 80 469 (including recruits from the High Commission Territories and South West Africa) is the most accurate one. This figure excludes the large numbers of prospective recruits who were rejected. The figure of 80 469 represents approximately 1,3 per cent of the total black population of South Africa and the High Commissioner Territories. The significance of this figure is evident when one considers that it constituted almost a third of the total number of South Africans who volunteered to serve in the army. (230) Of these 1 513 lost their lives on active service during the war. (231)

The areas where the response to recruitment was the worst were in Natal and Zululand as well as in the Transkei and Ciskei. According to the already mentioned agreement with the Chamber of Mines, indeed no active recruitment took place in the latter areas until April 1941; but even after that date, the response was still very poor. (232) On the other hand, the response from the Transvaal, especially the Northern Transvaal, was much better. (233) This can probably be attributed to the severe drought and consequent famine; because the other areas did not match expectations, the authorities tended to concentrate increasingly on this regions.
The following figures give an indication of how the number of recruits who enlisted in the different provinces, compare with the approximate blacks available for labour (234) and the total black population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruits</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Available labour</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53 037</td>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>409 000</td>
<td>2 708 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 355</td>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>522 000</td>
<td>2 157 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 766</td>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>340 000</td>
<td>1 668 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 521</td>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>133 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 648</td>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>- (235)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>542</td>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (236)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tribal response statistics corroborate the fact that by far the majority of recruits came from the Transvaal as these comparative figures show:

- Bacca: 172
- Pondo: 958
- Swazi: 3 395
- Zulus: 6 315
- Shangaan: 7 486
- Pedi: 10 679
- Tswana: 17 742
- Venda: 8 849
- Mandebele: 6 754
- Sotho: 5 932
- Xhosa: 5 102
- Hlubi: 1 013
- Pingo: 716 (237)

Initially recruitment of blacks in urban areas was restricted but this decision was lifted a few months later. Nevertheless, approximately 20 per cent of NMC recruits came from urban areas though frequently in a greater proportion to their population than those in the rural areas as the following figures reveal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruits</th>
<th>Metropolitan area</th>
<th>Total black population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 251</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>229 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 610</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>45 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>14 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>544</td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>45 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 909</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>68 698 (238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The phenomenon that most of the recruits came from rural areas can possibly be ascribed to the fact that their avenues of employment were to a large degree limited in contrast to those of the urban black man. The latter could therefore to a certain extent (in any case more than the rural black) sell his labour at a higher price. The remuneration of the army as an inducement to enlist was not as attractive to him as it might have been to the rural recruit. Of course, the mines were still by far a more attractive proposition, employing approximately 417 412 blacks against the 50 000 in the NMC by May 1942. (239)

With these figures in mind, it is somewhat difficult to see how the authorities in their evaluation of the recruitment effort, were generally of the opinion that the results were "eminently
satisfactory", (240) "excellent" (241) and "magnificent" (242) and that they gave this as an explanation why recruiting ceased in February 1943. Of course, these officials were intensely involved in the effort and had to keep up appearances. But those not so intimately involved held other views. Gen. Smuts, for instance, toned down his superlatives in the face of reality. He changed his initial draft for a broadcast from "Non-European citizens are coming forward in satisfactory numbers" to "fair numbers" (243) while Col. Reitz made no bones: "Recruitment amongst the natives is going very badly." (244)

Blacks could therefore not easily be persuaded, in the light of South Africa's social, political and economic structure to enlist. Various reasons may be adduced but mainly the poor response boils down to their feeling that it was a white man's war and whites in the past had not always treated them fairly; so they felt they had no stake in the outcome of the struggle. On the other hand, a number of reasons account for black participation. Contrary to white expectations and rhetoric, these were mainly, although not exclusively, unrelated to notions of patriotism and loyalty. Those blacks who did enlist, were more concerned about survival in a hostile world than "lofty" considerations; to them military life, even with its attendant dangers and hardships, provided a temporary shelter.
FOOTNOTES

1. NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63 and CGS 32/10 V. I, B.W. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940. See also Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", pp. 3-4 and J.M. Tinley, The Native labour problem of South Africa, pp. 28-29.

2. NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63 and CGS 32/10 V. I, B.M. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 B 7 Box 1, QMG to CGS, 19/5/1940 and CGS 32/5 V. I, C.H. Malcomes to J.C. Smuts, 17/9/1940.

3. DC 1631 Box 3152 and UWH MS 50 Box 90, CGS to Secretary for Defence, 25/7/1940 and NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63, B.W. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940.

4. NMC NAS 3P/4/1 B 7 Box 1, C.H. Blaine to Authorities Committee, 27/6/1940 and CGS (War) 32/5, CGS to AG, 16/8/1940.

5. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Note on a meeting held on 15/11/1940 to discuss recruiting of natives from the HCT for service with Union Forces; NMC NAS 3T/4 A 4 Box 6, E.T. Stubbs to H.E. Priestman, undated; CGS (War) 32/3, DNEAS to CGS, 11/12/1940 and NTS Box 9118 File 68/363/4, E.T. Stubbs to AG, 7/3/1941.

6. NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4 D.L. Smit to R. Fyfe King, 30/5/1941 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DAG (O) to DNEAS, 23/1/1943.

7. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, SNA to DNEAS, 11/3/1941, Resume of Department's activities.

8. AG (3)154/667 Box 504 G.C.G. Werdmuller to DNEAS, 3/12/1941 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DNEAS to AG, 27/1/1942.

9. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, DNEAS to AG, 1/7/1942.

10. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Notes on Native Recruiting Propaganda by 2/Lt. J.B. Bruce, undated.

11. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Notes on Native Recruiting Propaganda by 2/Lt. J.B. Bruce, undated.

12. NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, DNEAS to DAG, 27/12/1941.

13. NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 15, Notes on draft synopsis of a film, 31/12/1941.


15. DNEAS NAS 8/21 Box 34, DNEAS to recruiting officer, NEAS,


18. AG (3) 154/667 Box 504, Resume of a meeting called by Brig. Daniel to afford Col. Stubbs an opportunity to discuss with leading influential men the problems in connection with native recruiting in Natal, 1/3/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 1 A Box 2 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942.


20. NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, Additional NC, Rustenburg to H. Rogers, 11/3/1942.

21. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, J.H. Dugard, Inspector of Schools Engcobo to Director of Information, Non-European Section, 25/7/1942.

22. NMC NAS 3/21/C A 4 Box 15, Secretary for Defence to AG, 5/8/1943.

23. DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Appeals from the following chiefs: Paswane Mphaphili (Vendeland); Mangope (Bahurutshe and Batsoana); Mshiyeni (Zululand); Abraham Moiloa (Bahrain); Albert John Lutuli (Umvoti Mission Reserve); J.K. Mankuroane (Batlhaping); NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Scanlen N. Lehane (Batlokoe tribe), accompanying letter DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 22/9/1942; Jeremiah Moshesh (Basuto), accompanying letter DNEAS to Editor Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

24. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Recruiting Conference held at the Director's Office, 25.6.1941 and H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 3/3/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, T.G. Schmidt, NC Mtunzini to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 23/10/1941.


26. NMC NAS 3/4/13 A 6 Box 51 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Capt. Rodseth to DNEAS, Report on visit of NMC Detachment to Nongoma, 7/7/1942.
27. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 2, H.S. Mockford to OC's 1-8 BN. NMC, 27/2/1942 and OC 3rd BN. NMC to DNEAS, 15/4/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, OC 4th BN. NMC to DNEAS, 20/4/1942.

28. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, DNEAS to DAG, 2/3/1942.


30. NMC NAS 3/1/7 A 3 Box 28, Statement by Motwana Kantolo, 23/10/1941.


32. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, OC 3rd BN. NMC to DNEAS, 15/4/1942. See also NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 9 Box 4, DNEAS to SNA, 19/5/1942.

33. NMC NAS 3/21/L A 6 Box 19, "Mobilisation of Manpower" by H. Maxwell, undated. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 2 Box 3 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Report by W.M. Seymour to Magistrate Matatiele, accompanying letter, SNA to DNEAS, 16/1/1942.

34. M. Roth, "Black Involvement", p. 94.

35. DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Appeal by Chief Abraham Moiloa of Bahurutshe, Linokana, undated.

36. NMC NAS 3/4/1-L B 3 Box 5, Speech by Chief L.M. Mangope during a visit to the NMC Camps, 21/12/1942.

37. My italics.

38. NMC NAS 3/21/A Box 15, News of the War, Statement No. 131 for week ending 22/8/1942.


41. NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, R. Fyfe King to D.L. Smit, 12/8/1940.

42. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to SNA, 27/9/1941.

43. NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, W.M. Seymour to Magistrate Matatiele, 26/8/1946.

44. NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/22 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 3 Box 4, SNA to Secretary for Finance, 9/6/1943. See also DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Secretary for Defence to Secretary for Finance, 7/5/1943 and NTS Box 9656 File 520/400, SNA to Managing Director, The Bantu Press, 20/2/1947.

45. NTS Box 9129 file 68/363/36, Memorandum by D.L. Smit, 19/11/1946. Rifles had indeed been issued in some deserving cases after the First World War but the Minister of Native Affairs thought it impolitic to issue rifles after the Second World War as there were many white farmers, whose rifles had been commandeered and who had not received re-issues. (NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, Memorandum by D.L. Smit, 19/11/1946.)

46. NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, Schedule of blacks recruited by Chiefs of the Northern Areas, accompanying letter, CNC Northern Areas to SNA, 13/9/1946.


49. NMC NAS 3/4/2 A 1 Box 1 P. ka I. Seke to B.W. Martin, 10/9/1940.

50. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, J.B. Dugard to Director of Information, Non-European Section, 25/7/1942. See also NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/18, Report on contents of letters dealing with Non-Europeans, 5/9/1942.

51. DNEAS NAS 3/4/13 Box 6 Suggestions of the OC of the Native Motor Transport Training Centre (henceforth NMTTC) for a recruiting tour, undated; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, CNC Kingwilliamstown to SNA, 9/7/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, SNA to DNEAS, 11/7/1941 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/18, Secretary, Sub-Committee for Non-European Propaganda: Report on contents of a letter dealing with Non-Europeans, 5/9/1942.

53. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, Area Commandant NMC Training Areas Welgedacht to DNEAS, 23/5/1942 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Acting Assistant NC, Pinetown, G.V. Essery, Report on a visit by Chief Mshiyeni to Pinetown, 5/9/1940


55. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, Report on recruiting meetings held at Bloemfontein Township on 30/3/1942, at No. 2 Township Kimberley on 31/3/1942 and at Green Point Township Beaconsfield on 1/4/1942.


58. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.14.14 File 3, M.B. Mulandzi to M. Ballinger, 21/3/1944. P. Sexwale also stated that they had joined out of respect for their Chief – in this sense there was subtle pressure. (Interview with P. Sexwale, 6/2/1986).
59. NTS Box 6813 File 28/318, Minutes of a quarterly meeting held at Moshedio, 10/12/1940 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting held in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.

60. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 19/9/1942.

61. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting held in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.

62. This term was used by D. Killingray with regard to recruiting in Ghana for the Second World War. (D. Killingray, "The colonial army in the Gold Coast", p. 298.


65. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford. See also NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, OC Palmietkull South Training Depot (Medical) to DNEAS 12/6/1941, Suggestions for recruiting posters; NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

66. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford; NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of soldiers who had enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Managing Director Bantu Press, 16/7/1942; NMC NAS B 2 Box 66, Oorlogsnuus Verklaring No. 126 for week ending 18/7/1942; NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 12, K. Maxwell to T. Gutsche (Film Adviser) The Bureau of Information, 7/5/1942.

67. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford; NMC NAS 3/4/13 A 6 Box 51, Opening address at Northern Zululand Native Show by C.P. Alport, CNC, 24/7/1942 and NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of "Native Great War Heroes" who re-enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, The Sunday Times, 17/7/1942.

69. NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of "Native Great War Heroes" who re-enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, The Sunday Times, 17/7/1942 and NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

70. CGS (2) G 137/1 Vol. IV Box 69, DNEAS to DCS (DPAAT), 15/7/1942; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 Vol. II B 6 Box 1, B.W. Martin to DNEAS, 1/10/1940 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/20, Minutes of Recruiting Conference, 10/6/1941.

71. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 3 Box 4 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363(20), W.M. Seymour to D.L. Smit, 25/6/1943; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 Vol. II B 6 Box 1, B.W. Martin to DNEAS, 1/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Lt. Col. B. Nicholson OC 4th Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 24/12/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, DNEAS to OC Natal Command, 21/10/1941 and interview with J. Lesiba, 27/4/1941.


73. NMC NAS 3/4/5 B 4 Box 4, Appeal for Native Drivers, undated.


75. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, DNEAS to OC 2nd Bn. NMC, 14/7/1942. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Memorandum for DNEAS, 6/9/1940; NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, DNEAS to OC Natal Command, 14/5/1941; Hallack "Record of the NEAS", pp. 40 and 99; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, Acting NC Estcourt to DNEAS, 27/8/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Umbumbulu to C.P. Alport, CNC Natal, 16/9/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G.J. Grubb to CNC Natal, 17/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, D.L. Smit to DNEAS, 11/7/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, Minutes of 1942 Session of the UTTC, accompanying letter SNA to DNEAS, 19/8/1942. (See further discussion on areas where recruits came from, infra, p. 85-86)

77. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Paper Clipping from Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1942.

78. Z.K. Matthews Papers BZA 78/9-78/13 B 4.34, Manuscript titled "Africans and the War" by Z.K. Matthews for publication in Commonsense, 1942.


80. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Umzinto to CNC Natal, 17/9/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Greytown to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 15/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Conference at Bushbuckridge on 24/10/1941; AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan (AG) to DCS, 20/12/1941 and NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, Report of a meeting at NC's Office, Eshowe, 5/2/1941.


83. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan to DCS, 20/12/1941 and NMC NAS 3/1/7 A 3 Box 28, S/Sgt. V. Seymour to Adjutant, 9th Bn. NMC, 4/8/1942.


85. CGS 32/7 V I, Capt. G. Sutter for OC 21st Field Regiment SAA to DPAAT, 5/8/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 R. Fyfe King to J.H. Dugard, 24/9/1942.

86. NMC NAS 3/21/A Box 14, Undated pamphlet issued by the Non-European United Front (Transvaal).

88. AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DCS to AG, 24/2/1942.

89. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Ingwavuma to C.P. Alport, 28/9/1942.

90. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan to DCS, 20/12/1941.

91. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, OC 3rd Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 15/4/1942;
NMC NAS 3/26/15 A 1 Box 48, Capt. R.H. Reynolds to D. Reitz,
19/8/1942 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/21, Paper clipping from
Rand Daily Mail, 5/8/1941.

92. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, J. Erasmus NC Bergville to CNC,
26/9/1942.

93. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843
Box 109, L.M. Sediela to J.D.R. Jones, 14/12/1941. G.M. Tuta, a
clerk and interpreter in an attorney's office in Mount Frere also
stated that he would have joined the NMC but the low pay made it
impossible for him to do so. (NMC NAS 3/21/D A 3 Box 16, G.M.
Tuta to The Editor, Umteteli Wa Bantu, 27/7/1942).

94. NMC NAS 3/1/1 A 4 Box 39, DNEAS to SNA, 10/2/1943.

95. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843,
Pte. C. Makaluza to J.D.R. Jones, 10/11/1941 and NMC NAS 3/21 A 4
Box 12, DNEAS to Deputy Director of Military Intelligence,
17/12/1941.

96. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 420304b, The ANC Deputation at Cape
Town, 4/3/1942.

97. AG (3)154/51/658/2, P. van Ryneveld to Gen. Cunningham,
25/1/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, E. Lewis, Grahamstown to Col.
Werdmuller, 15/8/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate
Richmond, Natal to C.P. Alport, 15/9/1942; NTS Box 9629 File
511/400, G. 'Ngayi to a friend, 24/12/1939.

98. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Notes on a conference held at Louis
Trichardt, 22/10/1941; NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Report on
recruiting by W.M. Seymour, accompanying letter, Magistrate
Matabile to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 22/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/20 B
8 Box 7, S/Sgt. R.E. Symons to OC 2nd Bn. NMC, 20/7/1942; SAIRR
Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 109 and
NMC NAS 3/1/8 A 4 Box 21, J.D.R. Jones to E. Harding, 9/9/1940;
NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Record of an interview with Chief
Mshiweni by NC Nongoma, 23/7/1940 and S. Horwitz, "The
Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 538.

99. NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Capt. Rodseth to SNA,
13/11/1940; NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, S. Young to SNA,
1/11/1940 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, Resume of a meeting called by Brig.
Daniel to afford Col. Stubbs an opportunity to discuss with

100. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G. Whittaker, NC Bulwer to CNC Natal, 18/9/1942.

101. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 13, Draft of SNA, undated; NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, Hon. Secretary Communist Party of South Africa to SNA, 19/6/1942. See also NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Verulam to C.P. Alport, 16/9/1942. See also further discussion, infra, p. 83.

102. This anomalous position was only remedied as late as June 1942. (CGS 32/14, Memorandum of a meeting held in the office of the Financial Adviser, 30/6/1942.


105. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Sgt. G. Sabela to Capt. Franz, 24/6/1941.

106. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Statement by the Minister of Native Affairs, August 1939; NTS Box 2207 File 354/280, Precis of report on farm labourers committee, undated, and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 10.4, Address by the Minister of Native Affairs to the South African Agricultural Union Conference, 15/9/1941.

107. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Acting SNA to Magistrate Edinburgh, 7/1/1941; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, SNA to Manager B. Barach Poultry Farm Klipheuvel, 28/11/1942; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, SNA to P.J. Smit, "Brandkop", District Kuruman, 19/6/1939; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Magistrate Humanadorp to CNC Kingwilliamstown, 10/7/1943 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection J. Labour 4.2 Farm Labour, L.S. Makutle, Secretary Delmas Native Affairs Board to J.D.R. Jones, 6/11/1937; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 10.4, Address by the Minister of Native Affairs to the South African Agricultural Union Conference, 15/9/1941.

108. NTS Box 9254 File 2/371, SNA to Secretary Cape Province
Agricultural Association, 17/12/1941; NTS Box 9263 File 37/371, Memorandum on interview between SNA and National Woolgrowers Association, 22/6/1942 and J.C. Smuts Papers A 1 Vol. 154 No. 27, Circular Minute on Native Farm Labour, accompanying letter SNA to Private Secretary Prime Minister, 6/9/1943.


110. DC 1473/32 Vol. 1 Box 3090 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Magistrate Winburg to SNA, 21/3/1941; DC 1473/32 Vol. 1 Box 3090 Hon. Sectionary Federation of Langkloof Farmers' Association to Secretary for Defence, 20/8/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 P.W.A. Pieterse, Senekal, to Minister of Defence, 7/8/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/27, D.T. van Niekirk to J.C. Smuts, 22/9/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/6 A 2 Box 2, H. v.V. Kotze, Stofberg to P.J. Bosman appended in SNA to Magistrate Middelburg, Transvaal, 24/2/1942.

111. NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 9 Box 4 and NMC NAS 3/20/1C A 4 Box 31, DNEAS to SNA, 4/6/1942.

112. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Acting SNA to Magistrate Edinburgh, 7/1/1941.


114. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Statement by Minister of Native Affairs, August 1939; NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, Circular by SNA to Native Commissioners, 28/10/1940; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Notes for an interview with the Deputation from the National Woolgrowers Association of South Africa, 15/6/1942 and DC 1473/32, Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to Secretary for Defence, 8/12/1942.

115. DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to Secretary for Defence, 8/12/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Vol. II Box N1, DNEAS to Director of Recruiting, 25/3/1941; DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090, Requests from Kenhardt, Touw's River, Winburg, Vereeniging, Langkloof, Louterwater and Riversdale not to recruit in their areas; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Magistrate Winburg to SNA, 21/3/1941 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Howick to CNC Natal, 15/9/1942.

116. NTS Box 2095 File 222/280, DNEAS to SNA, 8/6/1943.

117. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Babanango to C.P. Alport, 19/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/6 A 2 Box 21, NC Lydenburg to
Director-General of Recruiting, 16/6/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, undated draft on recruiting by SNA.

118. NTS Box 9254 File 2/371 SNA to Secretary Cape Province Agricultural Association, 17/12/1941.

119. NTS Box 9114 File 67/363, Note of interview with Col. Stubbs and Messrs. Gemmill and Wellbeloved of the Chamber of Mines, 29/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Minutes of a conference at Defence headquarters with regard to recruitment for NMC, 29/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, SNA to Chief Magistrate Umtata and CNC Kingwilliamstown, 30/10/1940 and NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, D.L. Smit to C.H. Blaine, 14/11/1940.

120. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, DNEAS to The President, Chamber of Mines, 28/4/1941. See also marginal note by H. Rogers on copy of the same letter; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 2 Box 2, DNEAS to OC 9th Bn. NMC, 10/11/1942 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on a meeting in regard to recruiting for NMC, 10/6/1941.


122. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on a meeting in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.


125. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, A.G. Walker, NC, Middeldrift to CNC Kingwilliamstown, 26/8/1941.

126. UWH Box 1, J.W. Moll, "Corsig van die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Wereldoorlog op landbougebied, 1952-1953" and NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, Additional NC, Louis Trichardt to H. Rogers 5/3/1942.

127. NMC NAS 3/4/20/1 B 9 Box 5, OC NMC Recruiting Natal and Zululand to DNEAS, 18/12/1942 and NTS Box 9128 File 68/363/20,
laws such as the Land Act of 1913, which were used to augment the supply of labour to farms and mines from overcrowded "reserves", were now also applied to supply labour for the army. (187) The upshot was that many blacks were forced to join the army in order to alleviate their destitute situation - a classical example of economic "push/pull" factors determining a choice of employment.

Albeit inadequate, the army at least provided a regular pay, (188) free food, clothing, housing, medical care and allotments to soldiers' dependants. It was a question of relative poverty and improvement.

Many farm labourers who generally received poor wages therefore preferred to join the NMC where they were better remunerated. A recruit from a farm near Groot Marico, for example, received a monthly wage of 15/- plus mealie meal and his wife worked for the farmer's household at 6/- per month plus food. It seemed only natural that he joined the army where he could earn three pounds seven and six pence with food, clothing, etc. (189) Some farmers were unwilling and others unable to improve their labourers' conditions of service; thereby they actually forced them to enlist. For those who had no tenant obligations this must have been a welcome escape route.

Furthermore, although evidence in this regard is scant, it appears that some joined in the hope of learning a trade and others regarded it as an educative and prestigious experience. Thus B.W. Mcanyangwa applied to enlist as late as January 1945 so that he

"would be the only African teacher that has joined up in Aliwal North out of African male teachers." (190)

In addition it seems that some blacks were motivated to enlist by their loyalty and patriotism to South Africa, the King and the British Empire. Because an enemy threatened South Africa, they deemed it their duty to defend the country. Sergeant R. Moloi thus described his reason for enlisting:

"Because I did not want to be a slave in this country; because these people told us that this enemy is a very bad enemy - he is a bad man - Hitler - when he can win this war we would be slaves, especially we black people... We cannot allow this man to come here and give us a certain rule that we don't know - rather live under present Government than Hitler's Government - the devil you know is better than the devil you do not know." (191)

But this was not an unqualified expression of loyalty as J. Sephihi remarked:

"We wanted to go and fight for the country thinking that maybe we'd get a better life when we came back." (192)

CLASS AND AGE OF RECRUITS

It would appear that the attractions offered by the army did not, however, particularly appeal to the type of recruits the
authorities had in mind. They wanted blacks who were, with training and experience, likely to make good non-commissioned officers. According to them, the blacks from the urban areas would have been the ideal recruits because they were generally more literate than the rural blacks and more experienced in handling tools and machinery which would have facilitated their military training. (193) But the insufficient pay offered by the army and the official policy to avoid prejudicing white employers of labour, in most cases effectively drew a line between the literate urban black and the illiterate rural black. (194) Z.K. Matthews and D.D.T. Jabavu realised the effect remuneration had on the type of man recruited:

"While pay is by no means attractive even for the 'mine-boy' type of recruit it is positively discouraging to the 'superior' type of recruit." (195) The result was that about 80 per cent of the blacks recruited came from the rural areas, where, as indicated above, their conditions were generally inferior to those offered by the army. This meant that the majority consisted of illiterate farm labourers or peasants. (196)

It was also a noteworthy feature of recruiting that there was a lack of response from those between 20 and 30 years of age. These men preferred to work on the mines – the main contenders with which the army had to vie. The result was that while the blacks employed on the mines reached record figures in 1941, the army had to be contented with older men. (197)

However, there were also literates and semi-literate who enlisted, especially teachers, ministers of religion, clerks and interpreters who regarded it as their duty. (198) As an anti-war feeling among the literates was rife, they were more the exception than the rule. For example there was a number of volunteers amongst the black intelligentsia who were well educated and who held responsible positions in civilian life. One was Sgt. Doyle Modigotla who was not only a professional builder, but was also an ex-serviceman from the First World War and politically active during the interwar years. (199) The frequently harsh treatment meted out to the Native Labour Contingent during the First World War apparently did not prevent some of its members from re-enlisting. Stanford Wauchope, the son of Rev. I. Wauchope who was drowned in the "Mendi" disaster, also enlisted although he was the headmaster of an Anglican School in Germiston prior to enlistment. (200) The son of the renowned Sol Plaatje, Halley Plaatje, who boasted with several credentials to his name, inter alia, holding a teacher's certificate, ex-General Secretary to the ANC, former General Secretary to the South African Bantu Rugby Football Board, and a "licensed driver without a blemish" also offered his services. (201)
RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE

The volunteer had to adhere to the following procedure: he had to report to any Native Commissioner or Magistrate who attested him provisionally; then a preliminary medical examination was carried out by the district surgeon. Thereafter recruits were assembled at each magistracy and held there pending instructions from Defence Headquarters permitting the Magistrate or Native Commissioner to send them in batches under a responsible foreman to Driefontein Reception Depot where they were finally medically accepted or rejected. Those accepted were registered, vaccinated and received a block number, pay book, metal wrist band and red identity disc as well as their army kit. (202) Recruits rejected at the final medical examinations were paid for the period up to final medical rejection at usual NMC pay rates and thereafter returned to the original recruitment centre, rail and rations free. (203)

On the Contract and Attestation forms, recruits had to agree to serve anywhere in Africa for the duration of the war and under the conditions of service (204) decided upon by the Department of Defence. They further had to agree under oath to be faithful and bear allegiance to King George VI and subject themselves to the provisions of the Union Military Disciplinary Code. (205)

The recruitment procedure was, however, not always plain sailing: several problems, mostly of an administrative nature, cropped up. Although provision was made whereby Native Commissioners were authorised to supply rations to prospective recruits waiting to be attested as well as to those waiting to be sent off to the Reception Depot, this was not always adhered to. Some received only a loaf of dry bread while others, receiving nothing, simply disappeared never to return. (206) Furthermore, passless volunteers were not accepted but told to report to their home districts for their passes. In most cases these men were penniless and had no trainfare to go to their homes in order to obtain the necessary passes. (207) When intending recruits could not produce their tax receipts, they were also not attested. Young blacks who had reached the age of 18 but had not yet paid taxes were ordered to bring their parents along. In the majority of cases it required bringing their parents over long distances and many were not prepared to incur that expense. (208) A serious problem for the authorities in Cape Town was that many blacks posed as coloureds in order to avoid paying the general poll tax. Another problem affecting the recruits in Cape Town, was that they had to walk a distance of 4 miles from the office of the Department of Native Affairs to the Castle where they had to be medically examined and go back again. The Assistant Native Commissioner, A.A. Burge, dismissed this as a problem, stating that

"a native who cannot walk such a...distance would be useless in the Army." (209)

It was precisely this somewhat unsympathetic treatment by officials that also lead to problems. There is evidence of
several cases where volunteers were turned away, told to come some other day or kept waiting for days before attended to because these officials were too busy. One prospective recruit thus noted his experience: 

"I applied at the Drill Hall for my service, they gave me a form to fill in and after filling the form in, they told me to take it to the Labour berow [sic]... When I reached the place they told me to go to the pass office [sic]. Then I went to the pass office [sic]...they told me there is no depot there. Then I went back to the Drill Hall and asked one of the military [sic] police...and he told me to return to the colourd [sic] exservice men office [sic], Then I were told that they dont [sic] take native on in there [sic] regiment [sic]. So I like to know...were [sic] am I to go." (210)

In other cases the magistrates were simply and completely ignorant of the recruiting procedures. (211)

The supposition of an article in The Star that "Native Commissioners smooth over difficulties in the way of enlistment" (212) can therefore not be accepted at face value. Whilst it might have been true in most instances, there were also cases proving the contrary. A fairly serious obstruction in the smooth running of the recruitment operation was that some district surgeons not only treated recruits unsympathetically but also dissuaded them from enlisting; others refused point-blank to examine blacks with the result that recruiting had to be discontinued temporarily in those areas. (213) The effect of these problems was that many eventually did not enlist because they must have felt that the army was not too keen on employing them.

REQUIREMENTS

A further important aspect of the recruitment drive related to the requirements laid down by the authorities for recruits. Barring the specific medical requirements, the other requirements were fairly vague: they had to be hand-picked and likely, with training and experience, to make good non-commissioned officers, dependable, intelligent, of good character and fit for the duties of a soldier. (214) Initially, only men between the ages of 18 and 40 were accepted. After numerous representations, in which it was pointed out that men above 40 were generally more responsible and, particularly, that the middle-aged men were more willing to enlist than the young men, instructions were issued that, if they were physically fit, men up to the age of 50 could be accepted. (215) In December 1940, Col. D. Horwich, the Medical Inspector of Recruits, however, overruled this instruction and reverted the age limit to 40. (216) Nevertheless, it appears that the DNEAS was still prepared to relax the age restriction if older recruits were robust and healthy. (217)

The minimum height, chest and weight measurements, the three basic determinants of the physique of recruits, were respectively
5,5 feet (minimum), 33,5 inches fully expanded and 125 pounds (minimum). Due to the fact that recruits were required to perform various duties, some less strenuous than others, it was no longer feasible to adhere too strictly to the high and uniform standard first stipulated for enlistment in the "Native Military Police". The minimum height was then reduced to 5 feet and the weight to 108 pounds. (218) The lowering of the standard can perhaps also be ascribed to the urgency with which recruits were needed; it was thought that many were underfed as a result of the drought, but that this would vastly improve after a period of army feeding, medical attention and exercise. (219) Furthermore, recruits were divided into different medical categories for the different duties they had to perform: Class A.1 for stretcher-bearers, Class B.1 for motor transport drivers (with the special minimum visual standard) and Class C.1 for other duties. (220)

Most of the rejections at the Reception Depot were on grounds of poor health and physical development, i.e. not complying with the minimum standards of height and weight. In a break down into the various medical categories on which the recruits were rejected, "defective physique" ranked the highest followed by "defective teeth", "disorder and injuries of locomotor system", venereal diseases and cracked feet. (221)

Some of the officers were of the opinion that recruits were unnecessarily rejected for minor defects such as cracked feet and defective teeth. It was, after all, an accepted fact that people who did not wear footwear had cracked feet and that defective teeth could be rectified. The DGMS, however, considered the dental standard already very low, and was not prepared to revise it. (222)

The somewhat ridiculous situation where illiterate recruits were rejected because of bad vision, but in reality they were unable to read the sight testing cards, was soon rectified when a simple chart of drawings was introduced. (223) One recruit, Elijah Mbanga, was blind of the left eye but so eager that he was willing to enlist for half the wages! His application was approved. (224)

The percentages rejected varied according to the period and the place where and where recruitment was undertaken. In November 1940, for instance, the rejection rate was as high as 70 per cent in Kimberley but in June 1942 in Cape Town, it reached the low of 1 per cent. Considering the overall figures of recruits examined at the Driefontein Reception Depot, the percentage rejected for the six months from January to June 1941 was fairly high - 23,4 per cent. (225) This figure more or less stabilised at 14 per cent for the period August 1941 to September 1943 but picked up again sharply to 42,3 per cent at the end of the recruitment period, September to February 1944. (226)

Understandably, prospective recruits were greatly discouraged in
areas where the rejection rate was high. To the recruit it must have been a great step when he decided to enlist but a major disappointment to be medically rejected. The young men especially, gave this as a reason for not signing on. (227)

CESSATION OF RECRUITMENT

Except for a few categories such as medical orderlies, instructions were issued that recruiting was to be discontinued peremptorily as from 1st March 1943. This instruction upset Col. Stubbs because it was at a time when the whole recruiting organisation was in full swing. He pointed out that, while recruitment for whites, coloureds and Indians was continuing, an avenue of employment for blacks was closed. Moreover, this sudden cessation of recruiting caught the NEAS on the wrong foot. He felt that the Government was making fools of chiefs who had, at his request, sent out specially printed appeals to their people to join the army just a month previously. (228). However, this decision was final.

RATE AND AREAS OF RECRUITING

The rate at which recruitment took place as well as the areas whence the recruits came, now needs consideration. Recruitment began relatively slowly but reached 30,390 in September 1941, almost a year after commencement. Then the numbers recruited more than doubled to reach a high of 70,101 in January 1942, falling to 48,895 in July 1942 only picking up again to 61,969 in April 1943 more or less at the same time that recruitment ceased. (229)

Different figures are given for the total number of blacks who enlisted in the NMC but it seems the figure of 80,469 (including recruits from the High Commission Territories and South West Africa) is the most accurate one. This figure excludes the large numbers of prospective recruits who were rejected. The figure of 80,469 represents approximately 1.3 per cent of the total black population of South Africa and the High Commissioner Territories. The significance of this figure is evident when one considers that it constituted almost a third of the total number of South Africans who volunteered to serve in the army. (230) Of these 1513 lost their lives on active service during the war. (231)

The areas where the response to recruitment was the worst were in Natal and Zululand as well as in the Transkei and Ciskei. According to the already mentioned agreement with the Chamber of Mines, indeed no active recruitment took place in the latter areas until April 1941; but even after that date, the response was still very poor. (232) On the other hand, the response from the Transvaal, especially the Northern Transvaal, was much better. (233) This can probably be attributed to the severe drought and consequent famine; because the other areas did not match expectations, the authorities tended to concentrate increasingly on this regions.
The following figures give an indication of how the number of recruits who enlisted in the different provinces, compare with the approximate blacks available for labour (234) and the total black population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Available labour</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>409 000</td>
<td>2 708 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>522 000</td>
<td>2 157 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>340 000</td>
<td>1 668 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>133 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>- (235)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>- (236)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tribal response statistics corroborate the fact that by far the majority of recruits came from the Transvaal as these comparative figures show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bacca</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pondo</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>3 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulus</td>
<td>6 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangaan</td>
<td>7 486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedi</td>
<td>10 679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>17 742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>8 849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandebele</td>
<td>6 754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho</td>
<td>5 932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>5 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlubi</td>
<td>1 013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingo</td>
<td>716 (237)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially recruitment of blacks in urban areas was restricted but this decision was lifted a few months later. Nevertheless, approximately 20 per cent of NMC recruits came from urban areas though frequently in a greater proportion to their population than those in the rural areas as the following figures reveal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan area</th>
<th>Total black population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>229 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>45 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>14 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>45 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>68 698 (238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The phenomenon that most of the recruits came from rural areas can possibly be ascribed to the fact that their avenues of employment were to a large degree limited in contrast to those of the urban black man. The latter could therefore to a certain extent (in any case more than the rural black) sell his labour at a higher price. The remuneration of the army as an inducement to enlist was not so attractive to him as it might have been to the rural recruit. Of course, the mines were still by far a more attractive proposition, employing approximately 417 412 blacks against the 50 000 in the NMC by May 1942. (239)

With these figures in mind, it is somewhat difficult to see how the authorities in their evaluation of the recruitment effort, were generally of the opinion that the results were "eminently
satisfactory", (240) "excellent" (241) and "magnificent" (242) and that they gave this as an explanation why recruiting ceased in February 1943. Of course, these officials were intensely involved in the effort and had to keep up appearances. But those not so intimately involved held other views. Gen. Smuts, for instance, toned down his superlatives in the face of reality. He changed his initial draft for a broadcast from "Non-European citizens are coming forward in satisfactory numbers" to "fair numbers" (243) while Col. Reitz made no bones: "Recruitment amongst the natives is going very badly." (244)

Blacks could therefore not easily be persuaded, in the light of South Africa's social, political and economic structure to enlist. Various reasons may be adduced but mainly the poor response boils down to their feeling that it was a white man's war and whites in the past had not always treated them fairly; so they felt they had no stake in the outcome of the struggle. On the other hand, a number of reasons account for black participation. Contrary to white expectations and rhetoric, these were mainly, although not exclusively, unrelated to notions of patriotism and loyalty. Those blacks who did enlist, were more concerned about survival in a hostile world than "lofty" considerations; to them military life, even with its attendant dangers and hardships, provided a temporary shelter.
FOOTNOTES

1. NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63 and CGS 32/10 V. I, B.W. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940. See also Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", pp. 3-4 and J.M. Tinley, The Native labour problem of South Africa, pp. 28-29.

2. NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63 and CGS 32/10 V. I, B.M. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 B 7 Box 1, QMG to CGS, 19/5/1940 and CGS 32/5 V. I, C.H. Malcomess to J.C. Smuts, 17/9/1940.

3. DC 1631 Box 3152 and UWH MS 50 Box 90, CGS to Secretary for Defence, 25/7/1940 and NMC NAS O (M) 14/1 A 5 Box 63, B.W. Martin to QMG, 15/5/1940.

4. NMC NAS 3P/4/1 B 7 Box 1, C.H. Blaine to Authorities Committee, 27/6/1940 and CGS (War) 32/5, CGS to AG, 16/8/1940.

5. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Note on a meeting held on 15/11/1940 to discuss recruiting of natives from the HCT for service with Union Forces; NMC NAS 3T/4 A 4 Box 6, E.T. Stubbs to H.E. Priestman, undated; CGS (War) 32/3, DNEAS to CGS, 11/12/1940 and NTS Box 9118 File 68/363/4, E.T. Stubbs to AG, 7/3/1941.

6. NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4 D.L. Smit to R. Fyfe King, 30/5/1941 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DAG (O) to DNEAS, 23/1/1943.

7. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, SNA to DNEAS, 11/3/1941, Resume of Department's activities.

8. AG (3)154/667 Box 504 G.C.G. Werdmuller to DNEAS, 3/12/1941 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DNEAS to AG, 27/1/1942.

9. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, DNEAS to AG, 1/7/1942.

10. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Notes on Native Recruiting Propaganda by 2/Lt. J.B. Bruce, undated.

11. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Notes on Native Recruiting Propaganda by 2/Lt. J.B. Bruce, undated.

12. NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, DNEAS to DAG, 27/12/1941.

13. NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 15, Notes on draft synopsis of a film, 31/12/1941.


15. DNEAS NAS 8/21 Box 34, DNEAS to recruiting officer, NEAS,


18. AG (3) 154/667 Box 504, Resume of a meeting called by Brig. Daniel to afford Col. Stubbs an opportunity to discuss with leading influential men the problems in connection with native recruiting in Natal, 1/3/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 1 A Box 2 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942.


20. NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, Additional NC, Rustenburg to H. Rogers, 11/3/1942.

21. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, J.H. Dugard, Inspector of Schools Engcobo to Director of Information, Non-European Section, 25/7/1942.

22. NMC NAS 3/21/C A 4 Box 15, Secretary for Defence to AG, 5/8/1943

23. DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Appeals from the following chiefs: Paswane Mphaphili (Vendaland); Mangope (Bahurutshe and Batsoanoa); Mshiyeni (Zululand); Abraham Molloa (Bahurutshe); Albert John Lutuli (Umvoti Mission Reserve); J.K. Mankuroane (Batlhaping); NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Scanlen N. Lehane (Batlokoe tribe), accompanying letter DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 22/9/1942; Jeremiah Moshesh (Basuto), accompanying letter DNEAS to Editor Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

24. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Recruiting Conference held at the Director's Office, 25.6.1941 and H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 3/3/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, T.G. Schmidt, NC Mtunzini to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 23/10/1941.


26. NMC NAS 3/4/13 A 6 Box 51 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Capt. Rodseth to DNEAS, Report on visit of NMC Detachment to Nongoma, 7/7/1942.
27. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 2, H.S. Mockford to OC's 1-8 Bn. NMC, 27/2/1942 and OC 3rd Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 15/4/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, OC 4th Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 20/4/1942.

28. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, DNEAS to DAG, 2/3/1942.


30. NMC NAS 3/1/7 A 3 Box 28, Statement by Motwana Kantolo, 23/10/1941.


32. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, OC 3rd Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 15/4/1942. See also NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 9 Box 4, DNEAS to SNA, 19/5/1942.

33. NMC NAS 3/21/L A 6 Box 19, "Mobilisation of Manpower" by H. Maxwell, undated. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 2 Box 3 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Report by W.M. Seymour to Magistrate Matatiele, accompanying letter, SNA to DNEAS, 16/1/1942.

34. M. Roth, "Black Involvement", p. 94.

35. DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Appeal by Chief Abraham Moiloa of Bahurutse, Linokana, undated.

36. NMC NAS 3/4/1-L B 3 Box 5, Speech by Chief L.M. Mangope during a visit to the NMC Camps, 21/12/1942.

37. My italics.

38. NMC NAS 3/21/A Box 15, News of the War, Statement No. 131 for week ending 22/8/1942.


41. NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, R. Fyfe King to D.L. Smit, 12/8/1940.

42. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to SNA, 27/9/1941.

43. NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, W.M. Seymour to Magistrate Matatiele, 26/8/1946.

44. NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/22 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 3 Box 4, SNA to Secretary for Finance, 9/6/1943. See also DC 1473/32 Box 3090, Secretary for Defence to Secretary for Finance, 7/5/1943 and NTS Box 9656 File 520/400, SNA to Managing Director, The Bantu Press, 20/2/1947.

45. NTS Box 9129 file 68/363/36, Memorandum by D.L. Smit, 19/11/1946. Rifles had indeed been issued in some deserving cases after the First World War but the Minister of Native Affairs thought it impolitic to issue rifles after the Second World War as there were many white farmers, whose rifles had been commandeered and who had not received re-issues. (NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, Memorandum by D.L. Smit, 19/11/1946.)

46. NTS Box 9129 File 68/363/36, Schedule of blacks recruited by Chiefs of the Northern Areas, accompanying letter, CNC Northern Areas to SNA, 13/9/1946.


49. NMC NAS 3/4/2 A 1 Box 1 P. ka I. Seeme to B.W. Martin, 10/9/1940.

50. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, J.H. Dugard to Director of Information, Non-European Section, 25/7/1942. See also NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/18, Report on contents of letters dealing with Non-Europeans, 5/9/1942.

51. DNEAS NAS 3/4/13 Box 6 Suggestions of the OC of the Native Motor Transport Training Centre (henceforth NMTTC) for a recruiting tour, undated; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, CNC Kingwilliamstown to SNA, 9/7/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, SNA to DNEAS, 11/7/1941 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/18, Secretary, Sub-Committee for Non-European Propaganda : Report on contents of a letter dealing with Non-Europeans, 5/9/1942.

53. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, Area Commandant NMC Training Areas Welgedacht to DNEAS, 23/5/1942 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Acting Assistant NC, Pinetown, G.V. Essery, Report on a visit by Chief Mshiyeni to Pinetown, 5/9/1940.


55. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, Report on recruiting meetings held at Bloemfontein Township on 30/3/1942, at No. 2 Township Kimberley on 31/3/1942 and at Green Point Township Beaconsfield on 1/4/1942.


58. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.14.14 File 3, M.B. Mulandzi to M. Ballinger, 21/3/1944. P. Sexwale also stated that they had joined out of respect for their Chief - in this sense there was subtle pressure. (Interview with P. Sexwale, 6/2/1986).
59. NTS Box 6813 File 28/318, Minutes of a quarterly meeting held at Mosheedi, 10/12/1940 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting held in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.

60. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 19/9/1942.

61. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of a meeting held in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.

62. This term was used by D. Killingray with regard to recruiting in Ghana for the Second World War. (D. Killingray, "The colonial army in the Gold Coast", p. 298.


65. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford. See also NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, OC Palmietkull South Training Depot (Medical) to DNEAS 12/6/1941, Suggestions for recruiting posters; NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Jeremiah Mosheedi, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

66. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford; NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of soldiers who had enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Managing Director Bantu Press, 16/7/1942; NMC NAS B 2 Box 66, Oorlogsnuus Verklaring No. 126 for week ending 18/7/1942; NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 12, K. Maxwell to T. Gutsche (Film Adviser) The Bureau of Information, 7/5/1942.

67. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Recruiting address, undated, presumably by H.S. Mockford; NMC NAS 3/4/13 A 6 Box 51, Opening address at Northern Zululand Native Show by C.P. Alport, CNC, 24/7/1942 and NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of "Native Great War Heroes" who re-enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, The Sunday Times, 17/7/1942.

69. NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18, Descriptions of "Native Great War Heroes" who re-enlisted, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, The Sunday Times, 17/7/1942 and NMC NAS 3/21 A 6 Box 12, Appeal by Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, accompanying letter, DNEAS to Editor, Bantu Press, 4/12/1942.

70. CGS (2) G 137/1 Vol. IV Box 69, DNEAS to DCS (DPAAT), 15/7/1942; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 Vol. II B 6 Box 1, B.W. Martin to DNEAS, 1/10/1940 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1 and NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/20; Minutes of Recruiting Conference, 10/6/1941.

71. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 3 Box 4 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363(20), W.M. Seymour to D.L. Smit, 25/6/1943; NMC NAS 3P/4/1 Vol. II B 6 Box 1, B.W. Martin to DNEAS, 1/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Lt.Col. B. Nicholson OC 4th Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 24/12/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, DNEAS to OC Natal Command, 21/10/1941 and interview with J. Lesiba, 27/4/1981.


73. NMC NAS 3/4/5 B 4 Box 4, Appeal for Native Drivers, undated.


75. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, DNEAS to OC 2nd Bn. NMC, 14/7/1942. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Memorandum for DNEAS, 6/9/1940; NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, DNEAS to OC Natal Command, 14/5/1941; Hallack "Record of the NEAS", pp. 40 and 99; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, Acting NC Estcourt to DNEAS, 27/8/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Umbumbulu to C.P. Alport, CNC Natal, 16/9/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G.J. Grubb to CNC Natal, 17/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, D.L. Smit to DNEAS, 11/7/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, Minutes of 1942 Session of the UTTC, accompanying letter SNA to DNEAS, 19/8/1942. (See further discussion on areas where recruits came from, infra, p. 85-86).

77. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Paper Clipping from Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1942.

78. Z.K. Matthews Papers BZA 78/9-78/13 B 4.34, Manuscript titled "Africans and the War" by Z.K. Matthews for publication in Commonsense, 1942.


80. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Umzinto to CNC Natal, 17/9/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Greytown to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 15/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Conference at Bushbuckridge on 24/10/1941; AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan (AG) to DCS, 20/12/1941 and NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, Report of a meeting at NC's Office, Eshowe, 5/2/1941.


83. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan to DCS, 20/12/1941 and NMC NAS 3/1/7 A 3 Box 28, S/Sgt. V. Seymour to Adjutant, 9th Bn. NMC, 4/8/1942.


85. CGS 32/7 V I, Capt. G. Sutter for OC 21st Field Regiment SAA to DPAAT, 5/8/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 R. Fyfe King to J.H. Bugard, 24/9/1942.

86. NMC NAS 3/21/A Box 14, Undated pamphlet issued by the Non-European United Front (Transvaal).

88. AG (3)154/667 Box 504, DCS to AG, 24/2/1942.

89. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Ingwavuma to C.P. Alport, 28/9/1942.

90. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan to DCS, 20/12/1941.


92. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, J. Erasmus NC Bergville to CNC, 26/9/1942.

93. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 109, L.M. Sedieela to J.D.R. Jones, 14/12/1941. G.M. Tuta, a clerk and interpreter in an attorney's office in Mount Frere also stated that he would have joined the NMC but the low pay made it impossible for him to do so. (NMC NAS 3/21/D A 3 Box 16, G.M. Tuta to The Editor, Umteteli Wa Bantu, 27/7/1942).

94. NMC NAS 3/1/1 A 4 Box 39, DNEAS to SNA, 10/2/1943.

95. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843, Pte. C. Makaluza to J.D.R. Jones, 10/1/1941 and NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, DNEAS to Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, 17/12/1941.


97. AG (3)154/51/658/2, P. van Ryneveld to Gen. Cunningham, 25/1/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, E. Lewis, Grahamstown to Col. Werdmuller, 15/8/1942; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Richmond, Natal to C.P. Alport, 15/9/1942; NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, G. 'Ngayi to a friend, 24/12/1939.


99. NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Capt. Rodseth to SNA, 13/11/1940; NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, S. Young to SNA, 1/11/1940 and AG (3)154/667 Box 504, Resume of a meeting called by Brig. Daniel to afford Col. Stubbs an opportunity to discuss with

100. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G. Whittaker, NC Mulwer to CNC Natal, 18/9/1942.

101. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 13, Draft of SNA, undated; NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, Hon. Secretary Communist Party of South Africa to SNA, 19/6/1942. See also NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Verulam to C.P. Alport, 16/9/1942. See also further discussion, infra, p. 83.

102. This anomalous position was only remedied as late as June 1942. (CGS 32/14, Memorandum of a meeting held in the office of the Financial Adviser, 30/6/1942.


105. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Sgt. G. Sabela to Capt. Franz, 24/6/1941.

106. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Statement by the Minister of Native Affairs, August 1939; NTS Box 2207 File 354/280, Precis of report on farm labourers committee, undated, and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 10.4, Address by the Minister of Native Affairs to the South African Agricultural Union Conference, 15/9/1941.

107. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Acting SNA to Magistrate Edinburgh, 7/1/1941; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, SNA to Manager B. Barach Poultry Farm Klipheuvel, 28/11/1942; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, SNA to P.J. Smit, "Brandkop", District Kuruman, 19/6/1939; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Magistrate Humanadorp to CNC Kingwilliamstown, 10/7/1943 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection J. Labour 4.2 Farm Labour, L.S. Makutule, Secretary Delmas Native Affairs Board to J.D.R. Jones, 6/11/1937; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 10.4, Address by the Minister of Native Affairs to the South African Agricultural Union Conference, 15/9/1941.

108. NTS Box 9254 File 2/371, SNA to Secretary Cape Province
Agricultural Association, 17/12/1941; NTS Box 9263 File 37/371, Memorandum on interview between SNA and National Woolgrowers Association, 22/6/1942 and J.C. Smuts Papers A 1 Vol. 154 No. 27, Circular Minute on Native Farm Labour, accompanying letter SNA to Private Secretary Prime Minister, 6/9/1943.

109. CGS 32/11 V I, Deputy Controller of Food Supplies to Secretary to the Prime Minister, 7/5/1942; NMC NAS 3/1/1 A 4 Box 39, Report of the Interdepartmental Farm Labour Committee, undated; NTS Nox 2094 File 222/280, Acting SNA to Magistrate Edinburgh, 7/1/1941; SAIRR Papers "B" Box B 38.6.2. A labour and manpower survey of the Transkeian Territories by Dr. E. Jokl, 1943 and J.M. Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture, p. 48.

110. DC 1473/32 Vol. 1 Box 3090 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Magistrate Winburg to SNA, 21/3/1941; DC 1473/32 Vol. 1 Box 3090 Hon. Secretary Federation of Langkloof Farmers' Association to Secretary for Defence, 20/8/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 P.W.A. Pieterse, Senekal, to Minister of Defence, 7/8/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1 and NTS Nox 9127 File 68/363/27, D.T. van Niekerk to J.C. Smuts, 22/9/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/6 A 2 Box 2, H. v.V. Kotze, Stofberg to P.J. Bosman appended in SNA to Magistrate Middelburg, Transvaal, 24/2/1942.

111. NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 9 Box 4 and NMC NAS 3/20/1 C A 4 Box 31, DNEAS to SNA, 4/6/1942.

112. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Acting SNA to Magistrate Edinburgh, 7/1/1941.


114. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Statement by Minister of Native Affairs, August 1939; NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, Circular by SNA to Native Commissioners, 28/10/1940; NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Notes for an interview with the Deputation from the National Woolgrowers Association of South Africa, 15/6/1942 and DC 1473/32, Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to Secretary for Defence, 8/12/1942.

115. DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to Secretary for Defence, 8/12/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Vol. 11 Box N1, DNEAS to Director of Recruiting, 25/3/1941; DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090, Requests from Kenhardt, Touw's River, Winburg, Vereeniging, Langkloof, Louterwater and Riversdale not to recruit in their areas; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 1, Magistrate Winburg to SNA, 21/3/1941 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Howick to CNC Natal, 15/9/1942.

116. NTS Box 2095 File 222/280, DNEAS to SNA, 8/6/1943.

117. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Babanango to C.P. Alport, 19/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/6 A 2 Box 21, NC Lydenburg to
Director-General of Recruiting, 16/6/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, undated draft on recruiting by SNA.

118. NTS Box 9254 File 2/371 SNA to Secretary Cape Province Agricultural Association, 17/12/1941.

119. NTS Box 9114 File 67/363, Note of interview with Col. Stubbs and Messrs. Gemmill and Wellbeloved of the Chamber of Mines, 29/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Minutes of a conference at Defence headquarters with regard to recruitment for NMC, 29/10/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, SNA to Chief Magistrate Umtata and CNC Kingwilliamstown, 30/10/1940 and NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, D.L. Smit to C.H. Blaine, 14/11/1940.

120. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, DNEAS to The President, Chamber of Mines, 28/4/1941. See also marginal note by H. Rogers on copy of the same letter; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 2 Box 2, DNEAS to OC 9th Bn. NMC, 10/11/1942 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on a meeting in regard to recruiting for NMC, 10/6/1941.


122. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on a meeting in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.


125. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, A.G. Walker, NC, Middeldrift to CNC Kingwilliamstown, 26/8/1941.

126. UWH Box 1, J.W. Moll, "Oorsig van die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op landbougebied, 1952-1953" and NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, Additional NC, Louis Trichardt to H. Rogers 5/3/1942.

127. NMC NAS 3/4/20/1 B 9 Box 5, OC NMC Recruiting Natal and Zululand to DNEAS, 18/12/1942 and NTS Box 9128 File 68/363/20,
S/Sgt. R.E. Symons to OC 2nd Bn. NMC, 20/7/1942.

128. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, J.O. Cornell, Magistrate Qumbu to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 25/11/1941; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Greytown to CNC Natal, 15/9/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/20 B 8 Box 7, Extract from a report by S/Sgt. R.E. Symons, recruiting in Xandhla, Zululand, undated. Because of the possible fear aeroplanes could generate, it was omitted from any pictorial, photographic or visual propaganda. (NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 12, J. Kreft, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence to Secretary for Defence, 13/2/1942).


131. NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Minutes of a recruiting conference at DNEAS's office, 26/6/1941.

132. AG (3)154/33/0 Box 154, R.D. Pilkington Jordan to DCS, 20/12/1941.


134. NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/18, Minutes of an official meeting of departments dealing with propaganda, 12/6/1942.

135. NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, R.A. Midgley, Assistant NC Groot Spelonken to Additional NC Pietersburg, 9/7/1941.


137. CGS 32/7 V 1, Capt. G. Sutter to DFAAT, 5/8/1941.

138. NMC NAS 3/21 A 4 Box 12, B.G. Paver to Director of Information, 19/12/1941.

139. In most African colonies a stereotyped pattern was laid down whereby only ethnic groups who were regarded as possessing martial qualities were recruited - the Kalenjin, Kamba, Nandi, Elgeyo, Luo and Kakwa into the King's African Rifles; in Uganda the Acholi, Langi, Nubi and Teso were believed to possess martial characteristics and in Tanganjika the Nyamwezi, Luo, Kina, Sukuma Ngoni and Hehe were the most popular tribes being recruited; the Lingala speakers were recruited into the Force Publique; the

140. NTS Box 9323 File 80/378, Draft speech by the Minister of Native Affairs, Nongoma, 19/6/1941 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Speech by D.L. Smit to the Zulus of Pietermaritzburg, 14/6/1941.


142. Ibid., p. 408.


144. Ibid., p. 156.

145. NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56 Director of Information's remarks during a meeting at Eshowe, 5/2/1941. See also NTS Box 9323 File 80/378, Paper clipping, The Natal Mercury, 21/6/1941.


147. NMC NAS 3/21 B 3 Box 18; Letter No. 22 by Ndabazabantu, 27/6/1942. See also NTS Box 9323 File 80/378, Draft Speech by the Minister of Native Affairs, Nongoma, 19/6/1941.

148. CGS 32/4 V I and CGS Group 2 G2/1/9/1 Box 1, P. van Rhneveld to DC5GS, AG, QMG and DGMS, 25/6/1940; CGS 32/4/ V I, D.L. Smit to H.C. Lugg, 26/6/1940 and NMC NAS 3/21 C 7 Box 54, Director of Non-European Labour to QMG, 21/6/1940.

149. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Umbumbulu to C.P. Alport,
16/9/1942.

150. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, SNA to DNEAS, 11/3/1941, Résumé of Department's activities. See also NTS Box 1796 File 98/276, Speech by the Minister of Native Affairs to be delivered at the Chiefs' Conference Nongoma, 3/11/1943; NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 4/10/1940 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Sen. E.H. Brookes to SNA, 17/6/1941.


152. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, E.T. Stubbs to AG, 14/5/1941.


154. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Magistrate Richmond, Natal to C.P. Alport, 15/9/1942.


156. See supra, pp. 55-62.

157. NTS Box 9323 File 80/378, Draft speech by the Minister of Native Affairs at Nongoma, 19/6/1941. See also AG (3)154/667 Box 504, Memorandum by S.W.O.I. Johnson and D.G. Shepstone on recruiting of natives in Zululand and Natal for military service, 10/3/1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/13 A 6 Box 51, Opening address at Northern Zululand Native Show by C.P. Alport, 24/6/1942.

158. See supra, pp. 63-69.

159. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, NC Nkandhla to CNC Pietermaritzburg, 25/11/1940.


161. CGS 32/3 V I File 1640, Extract from MP's Conference no. 11 of 18/11/1942.


163. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 2 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942 and NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, Remarks by NC Eshowe during a meeting at Eshowe, 5/2/1941.

164. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363 and NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56,
Manifesto by Chief Mshiyeni, 8/5/1941.

165. NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, E.T. Stubbs to AG, 29/5/1941.

166. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 30/5/1941.

167. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363 and NMC 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, E.T. Stubbs to AG, 14/5/1941. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 2, E.T. Stubbs to D.L. Smit, 31/3/1942. C.P. Alport pointed out that the officials who believed Mshiyeni to be disloyal seized upon rumours as excuses for failing to obtain recruits. They claimed to "know the Zulus 'inside out', and...had hopes, when starting off on their recruiting campaigns, that they would be able to persuade the Natives to join up." (NMC NAS 3/4/1, C.P. Alport to D.L. Smit, 14/9/1942).


169. AG (3)154/667 Box 504, Memorandum on propaganda, undated, Addendum to OC Natal Command to CGS, 20/3/1942.

170. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 10/5/1942. It was noted that Mshiyeni received a hostile reception at one of the recruitment meetings from the crowd of about 2 000; this did not augur well for his stand in the Zulu community. (NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, 5/9/1940).


172. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes on a meeting held in the Drill Hall Durban, 2/3/1942.


174. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G.J. Grubb to CNC Pietermaritzburg, 17/9/1942.


176. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 2 Box 3, Memorandum by W.M. Seymour to
Magistrate Matatiele, accompanying letter, SNA to DNEAS, 16/1/1943.

177. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, Minutes of a round table conference at Defence Headquarters, 29/10/1940 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, CNC Natal to SNA, 23/9/1940.

178. NTS Box 9120 File 69/363, Record of an interview with Chief Mshiuyen, 23/7/1940.

179. NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, Notes of a meeting held at the office of the NC Durban, 27/11/1940, accompanying letter, NC Durban to CNC Pietermaritzburg, 7/12/1940. See also SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 109, J.D.R. Jones to SNA, 25/11/1940 and M. Ballinger Papers A 410 D. Press clippings, Umteleti Wa Bantu, 12/7/1941.


181. NTS Box 9127 file 68/363/18, Report on contents of letters dealing with Non-Europeans by Secretary Sub-committee for Non-European Propaganda, 5/9/1942; NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/19, Report on recruiting by W.M. Seymour, accompanying letter, Magistrate Matatiele to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 22/9/1942 and NTS Box 9315 File 40/378, Statement read by Rabulela at a meeting with the Minister of Native Affairs, 10/9/1942


184. NTS Box 7852 File 53/336, Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry to SNA, 24/1/1942.

186. SAIRR J.D.R. Jones Collection S. 2 Senatorial Correspondence Box 4, Address by Urban and Rural Natives of the Bulfontein Area to J.D.R. Jones, 17/11/1940 and T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 12. See also interviews with S. Koza, D. Masuku, J. Kgabo and F. Sexwale, 6/2/1986.


188. The NC of Port Elizabeth noted that blacks from smaller towns were eager to enlist due to the fact that in these areas they were much more lowly paid than in the cities. (NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, NC Port Elizabeth to C.C. Stubbs, Umtata, 22/9/1941).

189. NTS Box 9127 File 68/363/27, W.O.H. Menge, Assistant NC Zeerust to Magistrate, Zeerust, 13/8/1941. See also NTS Box 1959 File 301/278, G. Daly, NC Waterberg District, General Report: Native Tribal Matters, 21/6/1941; NTS Box 1959 File 301/278, Extract from Justice Annual Report, 1941 and NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Magistrate Humansdorp to CNC Kingwilliamstown, 10/7/1943.

190. DNEAS NAS 3/4/3 Box 5, B.W. Mncanyanga to J.C. Smuts, 29/1/1945.


193. NTS Box 9114 File 68/36, Telegram from SNA to Chief Magistrate Umtata, Pietermaritzburg and Kingwilliamstown, 7/8/1940 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 43.7.2, Memorandum on pay and allowances of Non-European soldiers with special reference to the African soldiers presented to the Secretary for Defence by the Home Front League of the Springbok Legion, August 1942.


196. See also further discussion on areas where recruits came from, infra, p. 86.


200. Ibid.


202. See annexure B for a very romanticised description of the first day of a recruit in the army.

203. SADF Archives Box 14 Pamphlet 265, Handbook and Regulations for Non-European Army Services, pp. 15-16; DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090 and UWH MS 50 Box 90, DNEAS to all attesting officers, 9/7/1940 and CGS 32/4/ V I, D.L. Smit to H.C. Lugg, 26/5/1940.

204. See Chapter 4.

205. AG (3)154/51/658/0 Box 224, AG to Secretary for Defence, 28/2/1941.

206. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 and A 1 Box 3, Recruiting members of NEAS to DNEAS, July 1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2, District Liaison officer Lichtenburg to Director of Recruiting, 29/8/1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Statements by J. Nholovu and C. Nkosi, 13/11/1941, accompanying letter NC Pieternmaritzburg to DNEAS, 20/11/1941.

207. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 and A 1 Box 3, Recruiting members of the NEAS to DNEAS, July 1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Draft by SNA on recruiting, undated.

208. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 3 Box 2 and A 1 Box 3, Recruiting members of the NEAS to DNEAS, July 1942 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 1 Box 3, Draft by SNA on recruiting, undated.

209. NMC NAS 3/4/2 A 1 Box 1 A.A. Burge to D.L. Smit, 20/11/1940. See also NMC NAS 3/4/2 A 1 Box 1, A. Miller, Commissioner of
Oaths, Cape Town to DNEAS, 5/11/1940.

210. NMC NAS 3P/4/3 A 3 Box 3; J. Matzin to Col. Martin, undated. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 2 Box 3; J. Barker, recruiting officer White River to Chief recruiting officer, 18/2/1943.

211. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Assistant DNEAS to H.C. Lugg, 15/1/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, statements by J. Ndlovu and C. Nhosi, 13/11/1941, accompanying letter NC Pietermaritzburg to DNEAS, 20/11/1941; NMC AS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, C. Malcomess to Col. Stubbs, 21/10/1940 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5 Box 2, G.K. MacKenzie, OC 2nd Bn. NMC to DNEAS, 27/4/1942.

212. UWH Box 300 B I : 45, Paper clipping from The Star, 27/7/1942.

213. DNEAS NAS Box 6, report on recruitment by Lt. S. Horwitz, 26/11/1942 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, notes on meeting in regard to recruiting for NMC, 10/6/1941. In one such case in the Groot Spelken Area a woman doctor was the only one available to do the examination but the SNA found it highly "undesirable that the recruits should be examined by a woman... I must urge that other arrangements be made as soon as possible." (NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, SNA to DNEAS, 25/6/1941).

214. NTS Box 9125 File 68/363/15, SNA to Additional NC Bushbuckridge, 14/8/1940; NTS Box 9114 File 68/363, SNA to NC Kimberley; CGS 32/4, V. I., D.L. Smit to H.C. Lugg, 26/6/1940 and UWH MS 50 Box 90 and DC 1473/32 Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to all attesting officers, 9/7/1940.

215. UWH MS 50 Box 90 and DC Chapter I Box 3090, DNEAS to all attesting officers, 9/7/1940; NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, DNEAS to DGMS, 26/11/1940 and NTS Box 9125 File 68/363/15, Chief Magistrate Transkeian Territories to All Magistrates Transkeian Territories, Circular no. 23 of 1940, 19/8/1940.


217. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, DNEAS to NC Port Shepstone, 31/12/1940 and NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, DNEAS to NC Grahamstown, 24/12/1940.

218. NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, DNEAS to DGMS, 26/11/1940 and NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5 DNEAS to SNA, 13/3/1941. H.S. Plaatje was very disappointed when he was initially turned down because he was a few inches short "because of an accident of eugenics". Eventually, however, he was accepted. (NMC NAS 3P/4/3 A 3 Box 3, H.S. Plaatje, Kimberley to J.C. Smuts, 16/7/1940).

219. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Minutes of a conference at Bushbuckridge, 24/10/1941.

220. NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, D. Horwich to DGMS, 5/12/1940 and E.T. Stubbs and H.S. Mockford, "A plan for the development of
manpower", p. 35.

221. CGS Group 2 G/1019/79A Box 645, M. Montgomery, Medical Officer NMC to Area Commandant Welgedacht, 17/11/1941: NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, DGMS to DNEAS, 24/11/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/15B 4 Box 5, Memorandum on certain disabilities of the feet occurring in recruits for the NMC, 22/12/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, Medical officer Reception Depot NMC to OC Reception Depot NMC Driefontein, 6/8/1941. See also Annexure C for detailed analysis of rejections.

222. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 2 Box 2 OC Recruiting NMC Natal and Zululand to DNEAS, 8/10/1942; NMC NAS 3/4/1, B 5 Box 1, Recruiting Conference, 10/6/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, DGMS to AG, 3/11/1941; NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5 DGMS to ADMS Natal Command, 23/12/1941; NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on meeting with regard to recruiting for NMC, 10/6/1941.

223. NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5 DNEAS to DGMS 22/7/1941 and NMC NAS 3/4/15 B 4 Box 5, DGMS to DNEAS, 19/12/1941.

224. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, E. Mbangela to NC Kimberley, 31/10/1940.

225. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 8 Box 1, NC Kimberley to SNA, 21/11/1940 and CGS 32/14, memorandum of meeting held in the office of the Financial Adviser, 30/6/1942. See also the following for other percentage returns : CGS Group 2 G/1019/79A Box 645, Training Inspectorate Report on NMC. General Summary. East Rand Area, 13-19/3/1941 and DNEAS NAS 3/4/3 Box 5, NMC Reception Depot Driefontein, return of recruits, attestations and rejects, 9/10/1943 - 15/7/1944.


227. NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, conference at Bushbuckridge, 24/10/1941; NMC NAS 3/14/13 B 9 Box 4, Lt. L.J. Pullman Alex Camp Kimberley to OC 7th Bn. NMC Bloemfontein, 13/5/1942; NMC NAS 3/21 A 7 Box 12, S/Sgt R.E. Symons to OC 2nd Bn. NMC Oribi Camp, 27/7/1942 and NTS Box 9125 File 68/363/15 Additional NC Zoutpansberg to NC Zoutpansberg, 30/1/1941.

228. NMC NAS 3/4/1 A 2 Box 3, DNEAS to AG, 24/2/1943. This does not tally with his comments after the war : "So successful were these efforts that recruitment for the NMC ceased on 23 February 1943." (E.T. Stubbs and H.S. Mockford, "A plan for the development of manpower", p. 32).

229. See Annexure D for table of blacks recruited into the UDF during World War Two. Cumulative Numbers. It seems that the
figures quoted by K.W. Grundy are totally wrong. (K.W. Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 76.)


232. Only 834 out of 1,250,000 enlisted voluntarily up to April 1941. (NMC NAS 3/21 A 7 Box 12, K.A. Hobart-Houghton to Director of Information, 28/7/1942). See also NMC NAS 3/4/13 B 10 Box 4, SNA to DNEAS, 11/7/1941. The following examples give an indication of the poor response which could be regarded as representative for Natal and Zululand until July 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Recruits</th>
<th>Number of taxpayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umzinto</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheid</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>10,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>9,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>14,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>10,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estcourt</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndwele</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impendle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 4 Box 2, DNEAS to OC 2nd Bn. NMC, 14/7/1942 and NTS Box 9130 File 69/363, G.J. Grubb to CNC Pietermaritzburg, 17/9/1942). By December 1939 the Cape Province provided by far the greater number of black labourers to the Transvaal mines - 33.9% against 7.8% from the Transvaal. (S.T. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, p. 217).

233. NMC NAS 3/28/15 A 5 Box 56, Minutes of a secret meeting held at NC's Office Eshowe, 5/2/1941; NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes of meeting in regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941; NTS Box 1775 File 70/276, Activities of the Department of Native Affairs, 1946, Report of the CNC (Northern Areas); NTS Box 1801 File 116/276 and NTS Box 2224 File 442/280, meeting of NC's of the Northern Areas, 26/5/1943 and NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, SNA to DNEAS, 11/3/1941.

234. These figures are based on the estimates the Native Farm Labour Committee (1937-1939) made available in 1937. (J.M.

235. No figures available.

236. AG (3)154/X/1235/7 Box 139 and DC 1689/1 Box 3174, AG to Dechief, 5/2/1946; R. Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", pp. 174-175 and J.M. Tinley, *The Native labour problem of South Africa*, p. 30.


238. R. Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", pp. 174-175. See also S. Horwitz, "The Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 553 and NTS Box 9726 File 837/400, G. Mears to H.P. Smit, Chairman War Pensions Advisory Committee, 27/4/1948. See annexure E for a schedule of the number of recruits from every district in the Union.


240. CGS Group 2 G/2/1/9/1 Vol. II Box 1, Notes on a meeting held at Welgedacht Office of Area Commandant, 21/6/1941.


242. DNEAS NAS 3/21 Box 13, Letter to "Tembani Times" by E.T. Stubbs, undated. See also NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 9 Box 1, Notes on a conference held at Louis Trichardt, 22/10/1941 and NMC NAS 3/16/4 A 11 Box 40, Notes on a meeting with regard to recruiting for the NMC, 10/6/1941.

243. J.C. Smuts Papers A 1 Box 303 No. 145, Draft for broadcast, 15/12/1941.

CHAPTER 4

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

As some soldiers joined the army because of economic reasons, one important issue which will be examined in this chapter is whether the remuneration they received made their enlistment indeed worth while. Other aspects concern the possibility of promotion in the army and to what extent provision was made for the welfare of the soldiers and their dependants in terms of allotments and pensions. Finally, attention is also paid to the soldiers' living conditions and recreation facilities.

When one considers the conditions of service in the UDP, one is immediately confronted by the question whether there would be sharp lines of discrimination between blacks and whites, that is, in how far would the colour bar as practised in the Union generally ipso facto be applied to the army. A moment's reflection compels one to admit that this was a potential mine field; in practice it proved to be so. This manifests itself particularly when the question of granting ranks as well as the respect for and acknowledgment of rank between whites and blacks are considered.

RANKS

That only white men were deemed sufficiently qualified to command was a general axiom. Blacks were barred from becoming officers not mainly because they lacked the educational or technical requirements but because white status might thereby be eroded. (1) Thus the highest rank to which blacks could initially rise was that of Sergeant. (2) To the authorities it was also important that the right type of man be appointed. Experience with the Native Labour Contingent during the First World War proved that men of good social status, previous military or police training, character and intelligence should be taken into consideration when recommendations for granting ranks were made. (3)

In January 1942 white Parliamentary representatives of the blacks made representations to Gen. J.C. Smuts that this regulation be revised as "There was no outlet for educated and intelligent natives." Smuts responded by saying that "he did not want anything done which would hurt their pride...now that natives had been receiving training for some time there must be many who were capable. When native Non-Commissioned Officers (henceforth NCO) are competent to fill the higher ranks, such ranks should be open to them..." (4) Consequently, the policy was revised but not significantly - the highest rank now was that of Staff-Sergeant. (5)

Only whites were considered to be capable of leadership and to
have skills and organisation ability; bearing this in mind and taking white public opinion in South Africa into consideration, it was accepted without question that blacks would be forbidden to command whites and that whites were deemed to be superior in rank to any black soldier, irrespective of the rank held by the latter. (6) This assumption was challenged when a black corporal was charged with disobeying a command given by a white corporal. The corporal contended that he was actually superior in rank to the white corporal. For the authorities this anomalous situation was untenable and they pressed for an urgent revision of the Military Discipline Code. (7) Six months later a similar incident took place when Sgt. Clement Makaluza of Pool Company WRTD, Welgedacht, was given instructions by the Regimental Sergeant-Major that the orderly room was out of bounds to black troops. A white corporal, however, ordered him to go to the orderly room but he refused on the grounds of the Sergeant-Major's instructions. The corporal reported him on a charge of insubordination, he was found guilty and demoted to the rank of Private. (8) Understandably Sgt. Makaluza whose military record was excellent, was highly upset because his demotion also involved a serious loss in pay. He, furthermore, felt that blacks were deliberately made to feel inferior in the Army; to him pronouncements like the following confirmed this: "You are only boys and must regard every European irrespective of rank your baa's". (9) The fact that white corporals were regarded as being superior in rank to a black corporal not only placed the whites in a very invidious position, but also created discontent and resentment which could lead to potentially serious trouble amongst black soldiers. (10) A decision to avoid any misunderstanding had become urgent.

The authorities tried different solutions to overcome the dilemma of whites holding lower ranks than blacks. One proposal was to issue special armlets to white NCO's (11); another was to raise the lowest rank of a white in any NMC unit to that of Staff Sergeant. (12) Eventually, the following instructions were promulgated as War Measure No. 5 of 1942:

"Notwithstanding anything in any law contained with regard to the relation between European and Non-European personnel of the Union Defence Force:

a) Non-European non-commissioned officers shall hold rank as such within the Non-European Army Services only and shall not exercise any command or authority over European members of the Forces.

b) European personnel will exercise command over members of the Non-European Army Services by virtue of superior rank or having been placed in command of such Non-European personnel, provided that in the event of an emergency the senior European non-commissioned officer or private present, shall be deemed to have been placed in command of the Non-European personnel, irrespective of rank." (13)

G.W. Xala from Nigel was shocked that a black NCO was regarded inferior to a white private (14) while it was incomprehensible to
Pte. A.H. Majela of the Vryburg District as both black and white Staff-Sergeants, for instance, held the same rank, the same qualification, "and all Soldiers of the King." (15) An anonymous soldier, writing under the non-de-plume of "Africa", could not understand why power was given "to irresponsible white men to tear them [ranks] off whenever it suits them"; he pitied those who made this decision:

"We laugh secretly at the queer workings of your highly civilized minds but we also pray for the forgiveness of your falsities." (16)

Evidently this measure created dissatisfaction within and outside the NMC. The Cape Central Committee on Race Contacts inquired about the reason for such an unprecedented order. (17) The Adjutant General admitted that the order was solely a political one

"and was no doubt based on the colour bar which, whether liked or disliked, is a fact in the Union. The measure was designed to obviate the possibility of a Non-European NCO giving an instruction to a European junior to himself in rank. Were this to occur relations between European and Non-European troops would be strained almost to breaking point." (18)

Despite this measure, incidents where black NCO's refused to obey orders from white NCO's of similar or lower rank, still occurred. (19)

Although there was therefore officially no obstacle for blacks to rise to the rank of Staff-Sergeant - indeed efforts were made to train them for the more responsible duties in the higher ranks and even to fill white NCO posts - the authorities remained adamant that blacks would not be permitted to exercise command over whites of any rank. (20)

While granting commissions in the UDF was based on a colour bar, there was, officially at least, no racial discrimination within the French and British armies. This implied that Africans in these forces could serve as officers. (21) While most white officers were not openly hostile to the idea, (22) the following remarks indicate that this policy was accepted only with reservations:

"under white leadership the African is a good soldier, but will not only be completely ineffective, but will take no action at all, unless he has white officers or NCO's to lead him." (23)

and

"It was unreasonable to require white troops to serve under native officers." (24)

Although the principle was accepted, only a few blacks were granted commissions in the British army and even this was done slowly. The explanation of General Giffard, Inspector General of the African Colonial Forces, was that

"suitable material was simply not available in the forces, the reason being that Africans with suitable
educational qualifications to carry the responsibilities of commissioned officers did not want to fight and those who did want to fight did not reach the educational standard required of commissioned officers."

(25)

R. Headrick, however, emphasised that the colonial administrators might have been wary of the political implications of training an African officer corps, (26) while D. Killingray agrees that the Colonial Office and the War Office applied this policy with great caution. (27)

In East Africa the authorities regarded the black soldiers unsuitable to be commissioned as officers. But they fought well and were also able to train the troops well in platoons; consequently, a new senior warrant officer class was created to provide a body of African platoon commanders. They were only to command Africans. (28)

The French were more generous than the British in granting commissions to blacks. Long before the war, they already had black officers although the highest rank open to them was that of captain. Almost all Non-European officers in the French army were from the West Indies, North Africa or Indochina. (29)

When the issue of granting ranks to the black chaplains in the NMC cropped up, the basic South African principle that blacks would under no circumstances be placed on an equal level with whites, prevailed again. From various quarters requests and recommendations were made to appoint the chaplains as officers or at least as Warrant Officers or even sergeants. It was felt that the chaplains belonged to a higher social and intellectual class and that it was not only a disgrace to withhold commissions from them but, if they were privates, the soldiers would not pay them due respect. The DNEAS, however, anticipated insurmountable difficulties in this regard. If the chaplains received warrant rank, they would be receiving a white Warrant Officer's pay which, according to the DNEAS, was far too high for black chaplains. It would also create friction with other black soldiers who received less pay. Moreover, if a protective rank of 2nd Lieutenant were granted, whites, blacks and coloureds would resent it: it would create animosity amongst both white troops and the civilian population towards these black chaplains; black and coloured troops would be offended if commissioned ranks were given to non-combatant chaplains while they were restricted to NCO's rank. The DNEAS viewed this matter in such a serious light, that he even expected open riot if he acceded to the request. (31)

Therefore, black chaplains in the NMC were appointed without rank but received the same privileges as those enjoyed by the highest rank to which NMC members were promoted. They were also allowed to wear a special uniform which neither coloured nor black troops were allowed to wear, and also the recognised chaplain badges and collar. Furthermore, the NMC chaplains had to perform their duties only under the supervision of white chaplains.
The Transvaal Interdenominational African Ministers Association was dissatisfied with this arrangement. The lack of a defined status undermined the respect they enjoyed in civilian life and made their service ineffective. To them this explained the shortage of black ministers who offered themselves as chaplains. (32) However, their representations were of no avail.

The DNEAS raised the same political objections when certain chiefs recruiting their followers for the NMC, naturally looked for promotion and expected that they would receive commissioned rank. They did not want ranks so that they could be saluted by whites but to enhance their status amongst their own people and thereby ensuring the success of the recruiting campaign. (33) The chiefs, being only privates, felt they could not carry much weight during recruiting campaigns. D.L. Smit gave them the following somewhat feeble and unconvincing explanation why they should not be granted ranks:

"The rank of a Chief was such that it could not be said to him, you are going to be made a Lieutenant, a Major or a Sergeant Major... The King is the Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces but he does not hold any rank [sic]. It was felt that it was not dignified to give a Chief any rank." (34)

As consolation they were given military uniforms and insignia.

The chiefs were only one section of the black community which was dissatisfied with the policy of granting ranks on the assumption that whites were superior to blacks, thereby also excluding blacks from commissioned ranks. H.S. Nkabeni vehemently protested that black NCO's were subordinate to white privates and NCO's, "because of their superior knowledge. Superior knowledge to what? Theology? for we have chaplains. Teaching? for there are many teachers in the army. Military affairs? Who said that we blacks could not master the course? Were we given a trial? It is nothing but the ugly head of Imperialism and white superiority showing itself - and we are dissatisfied."

He would have preferred an own black army. (35).

Their dissatisfaction and humiliation increased when they compared themselves with the position in the Cape Corps and with other soldiers. Some blacks felt the Government was giving them a cold shoulder because coloureds could rise to the rank of WO 1, while the latter were not doing more service than the blacks in the war and both fell under the same Code of Discipline. (36) Others noticed that soldiers in the Imperial and colonial forces even received commissioned ranks. (37) It was therefore no surprise that demands were made not only to rescind the regulation whereby in the event of an emergency non-white soldiers (irrespective of rank) were placed under orders even of a white private, but also to allow blacks to rise to the highest ranks in the army. (38) As is evident from the above discussion, these demands were, however, futile. The DNEAS was uncompromising. The appointment of blacks to commissioned ranks
would have to be deferred until they proved their ability in senior NCO posts and had gained sufficient experience in those ranks. (39) But given the South African context this was never on the cards. A broad gulf whether of class or race had to be maintained so that the mystique of white superiority could be maintained and fostered.

PROMOTION

Closely linked to the question of granting ranks to black soldiers was the issue of promotion. The DNEAS indicated that promotion would be encouraged and that, in certain posts such as clerks, it could be effected rapidly. (40) The official requirements for promotion were that candidates had completed NCO courses, possessed a clean military record and that there were vacancies; seniority was also an important consideration. Although they could neither read nor write, elderly, tribal men were sometimes preferred to educated young men as the former were regarded to be better disciplinarians. (41)

Promotions were carried out along those lines, but there were also numerous instances where, despite the availability of qualified candidates, promotions were not carried out. (42) The standard explanation was that promotions could only be made against authorised posts on each unit's War Establishment Table. (43) Furthermore, a higher rank than a Sergeant could only be granted in a battalion, not a depot. (44) After the war no blacks were promoted, pending their future in the UDP. (45) Finally, some officers simply believed that the quality of the black soldiers was too poor to promote them. According to the OC East London Fortress, this was mainly due

"to the fact that the upbringing and environment of natives in civil life does not fit them for the duties of NCO's, and with few exceptions, they lack entirely any sense of responsibility." (46)

It seems as if the reluctance to promote black soldiers and the fact that there was no promotion beyond the rank of Staff-Sergeant, eventually developed into a vicious circle: because the possibility of promotion was not too favourable, it did not encourage the "right type" to enlist; lesser promotions therefore took place which in turn discouraged the better classes to join the forces. (47)

Dissatisfaction with the policy of promotion reverberated inside and outside the NMC. Not only was M. Ballinger asked to raise the matter in Parliament but Councillor C.K. Sakwe of the UTTGC also declared that this state of affairs was completely unsatisfactorily:

"What surprises me is that in the corps stationed at Umtata there is not a single Native who is staff sergeants. [sic] Even when a vacancy occurs, no Native is promoted to that position. When a man joins up...he has an ambition to be promoted...It is a matter of pride perhaps, but the Native people would like to see Natives occupying some of
these important posts. The Natives too are fighting
for kith, kin and country." (48)

In order to redress this policy, proposals were made that white
NCO's in NMC units be reduced so that their posts could be filled
by black soldiers (49) and that all black soldiers be given the
right to promotion and advancement on the same basis as whites.
(50)

It was, however, not these demands which temporarily lead to more
promotions but again the exigencies of war. Due to the shortage
of white instructors, black soldiers with a fairly high
educational standard were to be trained as instructors from June
1942. A number of Sergeant and Staff-Sergeant posts filled by
whites were consequently vacated for these specially trained
blacks. (51) As has been pointed out above, this policy was
rescinded in November 1942.

REMUNERATION

The remuneration package for members of the NMC consisted of
various benefits such as pay, allowances, deferred pay,
allowments and extra duty allowances. From the inception of the
NMC in July 1940, the basic pay privates received was 1/6 per
day. If they had dependants, and allotted one half of their pay
to them, a further allowance of 9 d. per day was made, bringing
the total to 2/3 per day, of which 1/6 per day or two pounds five
shillings per month was the family's total income. (53) In
addition they were entitled to free rations (or 9 d. per day in
lieu thereof if no rations were provided), free quarters,
uniform, medical attention and dental attention for themselves
only. (54) Comparing these scales with those of whites, they
again reveal the Government's insistence on fighting the war on a
colour bar basis.

From various quarters, the basic pay was considered inadequate.
(55) Some soldiers pointed out that their military pay was far
less than their civil pay with the result that they were unable
to support their families. D.L. Maruti of No. 203 SARMT UDF for
instance, felt they were getting a raw deal:

"It is clear that the Government is not interested in
Africans; because their colour is black, does [sic] not get
sufficient wages. I am asking you to get the Government to
discharge me from the army so that I may be able to work
for my parents before they die of starvation." (56)

As may be expected, requests were submitted not only to increase
the basic pay and make sufficient provision for the soldiers'
dependants, but it was also considered "fair and just that men
who face the same perils and death, from the same bullets, on the
same battle-fields should, irrespective of race or colour enjoy
the same pay, rights and privileges." (57)

Not necessarily in response to these requests, a Parliamentary
Select Committee was appointed in February 1943 to investigate
the remuneration of all soldiers. On 26 February A.B. Xuma again
pleaded before the Committee that the principle of equal pay and
therefore a rise in black soldiers' pay should be accepted. (58) It appears that these pleas had little effect. The Government accepted the Committee's recommendations that the rates of pay for black privates be increased by 3 d. per day from July 1943 but his family received no additional benefit whatsoever. This stood in stark contrast to the substantial increases for whites and coloureds: a white private received an extra 2/6, his wife an extra 9 d. and each child an extra 1 shilling per day; the coloured private received an extra 6 d. and his family, if there were children, an extra 1 shilling only per day. The whites' basic pay was further increased after six and again after eighteen months' service. The maximum basic daily rates for single privates were thus as follows: blacks: 1/9; coloureds: 3/- and whites: 7/-. (59) Of course, this niggardly increase for blacks again called forth protests and a deep sense of disappointment. With a general election in the offing, it was the enfranchised whites who received by far the largest increases. This apparent political ploy did not escape A.B. Xuma - he emphasised the influence of the white vote which "had strength and influence in the pending election and they got all they wanted because they could help support or defeat the government and your African soldier, having no vote, no one need pay attention to him." (60)

A soldier using the non-de-plume "Africa", was highly disappointed. He felt that their services were not appreciated at all, but that they were only considered "a lot of cheap living kafirs" who were so inferior "to be worth no more than a quarter of his white comrade and a third of his coloured and Malay brothers." (61)

When the regulations with regard to basic pay were laid down, provision was also made for deferred pay which was a general practice in wage-earning spheres. If a soldier had not made an allotment, 9 d. per day of his pay, if he were a private and 1 shilling 6 pence per day if he were a non-commissioned officer, was deferred to be paid to him on discharge. The intention was to provide them with funds for re-absorption into civil life after their discharge; it was acknowledged that the majority, as a result of the low wages they received, could not set aside anything and were compelled to spend every penny of their pay. (62) This of course exonerated the Government from the obligation of paying gratuities on discharge, the total amount of the deferred pay being a substitute for a gratuity. It may well also have been, as D. Killinray pointed out in the case of the Gold Coast Regiment, (63) a deterrent to desertion.

There was also dissatisfaction that they were not allowed to invest these sums in Union Loan Certificates, thereby earning interest. Rumours were rife that the Government used the accumulated sum of deferred funds interest free. The official explanations were that there were insuperable difficulties in making such interest-earning investments and that it was the intention to protect the soldiers against themselves and not as an investment for the purpose of accruing interest on their
behalf. To the soldiers these explanations were highly unsatisfactorily and did not assuage the dissatisfaction and rumours. (64)

The scheme of deferred pay, already viewed with some suspicion, led a few discharged soldiers to believe that they were being cheated and deprived of their money because their accumulated deferred pay had not been paid out to them. (65) This notion was enhanced by the Chief Paymaster's extreme reluctance to ratify advances on deferred pay prior to discharge, as provided for in the regulations. (66) It was common practice in labour spheres to allow withdrawals on deferred pay for the maintenance of a labourer's family. (67) The soldiers returning from North Africa found themselves and their families in such distressing circumstances that urgent representations were made to alleviate their destitution. The dissatisfaction amongst these soldiers of the 1st SA Division was so grave that the regulations were relaxed; a soldier from North Africa could now apply to be paid one-third of the amount standing to his credit in his deferred pay account up to a maximum of 10 pounds. (68) The other soldiers who had not served outside South Africa and who also had good reasons for drawing on their deferred pay, could not understand this discrimination. Consequently, this relaxation was, in exceptional instances, extended to all soldiers after due investigation of the relevant circumstances. (69)

Another aspect of the remuneration package offered to prospective black soldiers was that of allotments and allowances. In order to determine the allotment, the regulations made provision for two basic rates of pay - one for black soldiers with dependants (receiving 2 shillings 3 pence per day) and one for those without (receiving 1 shilling 6 pence per day). Soldiers with dependants had to allot 1 shilling 6 pence of their basic pay in order to qualify for the higher rate. (70) The Government regarded the difference between the two rates of pay (9 d.) as its contribution to a dependants' allowance although it preferred to view the 2 shillings 3 pence per day as basic pay of which 1 shilling per day was deducted for dependants. Technically, blacks thus received no dependants' allowance - their families received a share of their basic pay. (71).

In addition, a cost of living allowance became payable with effect from 1 January 1941 to those soldiers who allotted half of their pay provided it was made to a female dependant. The latter provision was later revised to include a male dependant who was genuinely dependent on the soldier claiming the allowances. This was done because many male allottees were old decrepit men supported by the soldiers. Moreover, many soldiers with mothers and wives had nominated male allottees to draw the money to save the women walking long distances to draw the allotments or because they did not trust the women with the money. This allowance was paid to the soldier's wife or dependant together with the allotment and dependants' allowance. The rates were determined on a percentage basis and revised periodically. (72) A long time elapsed, however, before the principles and procedures
to streamline payment could be established; the first payments at
the rate of 3 d. per day for privates and Lance Corporals
and 7 d. per day for Corporals and Sergeants were only made in
September 1942 after which the arrears were systematically paid
retrospectively in certain cases. The two main obstacles in
implementing payment was the problem of establishing dependancy
and the difficulty in identifying female dependants, as in a
large number of cases the name known by was no indication of sex.
It is apparent that it was impossible for Native Commissioners to
investigate each case thoroughly. At long last, as pointed out
above, the authorities realised that the sex of the dependant did
not necessarily have any bearing on the needs at home.
Consequently a cost of living allowance could be made to any
allottee. (73)

The question of the need to establish dependency was also closely
related to the payment of allotments and a tougher nut to crack.
Lack of clarity on the procedures in establishing the bona fides
of allottees, confused matters further. Initially allotments were
paid provided that Native Commissioners could confirm that
dependency actually existed. The Native Commissioners had
tremendous difficulties in the practical application of this
qualification. In some districts more than 2000 soldiers had
been recruited which made the task of the Commissioner to
investigate each case to obtain confirmation of dependancy, an
impossible one. Moreover, great dissatisfaction was caused in
cases where payments of allotments and allowances were withheld
because confirmation of dependency had not yet been established.
(74) Matters were simplified and many difficulties ironed out
when the Defence Authorities Committee approved the proposal on
13 November 1941 that, provided a soldier was willing to make an
allotment of one-half of his pay, it would be accepted as prima
facie proof of the dependency of those nominated by him. (75)
However, when the new rates of pay were introduced in June 1943,
the Defence Authorities Committee again required that proof of
dependency be furnished. (76)

Various aspects of allotments and allowances created
dissatisfaction amongst the black soldiers and amongst their
allottees. A major grievance was that the allotment of 2 pounds 5
shillings plus 7/6 cost of living allowance was inadequate.
According to Senator J.D. Rheinallt Jones, Director of the SAIRR,
there were not complaints in the rural areas that the allowances
were too low; but he made an important distinction between rural
and urban dependants. (77) It was particularly amongst the latter
that the pinch was most acutely felt. Official estimates put the
minimum living expenses of an urban black family of five at 7
pounds 14 shillings and 6 pence per month. The soldiers'
allotment plus a rent-grant from the Governor-General's National
War Fund (henceforth GGWNF) of 1 pound amounted to only 3 pounds
5 shillings per month. (78) This made it almost impossible for
them to make ends meet. Moreover, they could not sustain
themselves from the land as rural blacks' dependants could. Even
in the latter case, Z.K. Matthews pointed out, a large number of
black soldiers had no land to supplement their income. They had
been drawn largely from the class that depended entirely upon their cash wage for a living. Those who did own land did not get enough leave to cultivate it properly while on active service. (79) This situation was confirmed by the Transkeian members of “C” Company of the 3rd Battalion NMC Wynberg in a letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs:

“We have been out of our homes for... two years... During that time our lands have not been ploughed or those that have been ploughed have not received the proper care necessary for normal crop production... the prices of everything have risen considerably making the earnings we get in the army fall considerably short in meeting the needs of our families. We request that during the ploughing season we should be given a chance to go and till our lands... as our families are in a state of destitution through inadequacy of crops.” (80)

Thus, it was no surprise that requests from various sectors were lodged to increase dependant’s allowances. (81) These were chiefly based on the appeal that the dependants of black soldiers be paid on a basis commensurate with the number of children in the family as was the case with other members of the UDF. A memorandum from Durban delegates to J.C. Smuts stated as follows:

"Since children, irrespective of race or colour, all need the same amount of nutritive food for healthy development, we would urge on you, Sir, the provision of a similar allowance of 1/- per child per day over and above the amount of the present wife's allowance." (82)

It was indeed this discrepancy between the allowances paid to black soldiers' dependants on the one hand and coloured and white soldiers' dependants on the other hand, which led to concern and discontent. (83) Several black soldiers could not understand why the already privileged European soldier received further generous dependants' allowances. They also wanted to be placed on the same footing with at least the coloured soldiers' allowances.

There were diverse views on the effect of these allowances on soldiers' dependants. When the regulations were laid down, the opinion was held in certain quarters that a sum of 2 pounds 5 shillings per month for the maintenance of dependants was in excess of their requirements. Some soldiers indeed disliked the large sums which accrued to their wives. Because the dependants were regarded as careless and incompetent to handle their money wisely, the money would be dissipated so that the soldier would have nothing on his return. (85) Later events bore this out. In some areas dependants had never been so well off in their lives. They indulged in drink and luxuries which were otherwise beyond their reach. E.F. Hillary, Social Welfare Officer in Cape Town, reported that a serious degradation had set in amongst soldiers' dependants. She found mothers with two or three small children completely drunk a day or two after pay day without any money left for food for the rest of the month. Otherwise the money was spent on expensive coats, dresses and furniture. (86) In the Northern Transvaal the money was almost invariably used to purchase cattle which the contributing soldier intended for a
wife or more wives. Thus, despite the influx of thousands of pounds per month, it did not raise the standard of living of this rural population. (87) In the light of the above, it is somewhat hard to believe the other view expressed by Native Commissioners who were requested to report on the way the soldiers' dependants spent their allowances. They replied
"that in very few cases has there been careless squandering...generally speaking the money is being carefully expended and in some cases the dependants are actually saving a portion of their monthly allotments." (88)

Problems with the method of payment to allottees lead to widespread complaints and dissatisfaction amongst the soldiers and their dependants. Because allotments and allowances were paid through the Magistrates in the various districts, dependants often had to walk long distances, some as far as 100 miles, to receive payment. In one instance an allottee had to incur 5/- expense every month in taxi fares and because she was old and in a hurry, requiring an escort to accompany her, a further cost of 5/- was involved. Not infrequently allottees, having taken all this trouble, were told to return and come back at another time because money for payment had not yet arrived. (89) Some allottees, furthermore, had to wait a considerable time—in some instances more than a day—in long queues to draw their allowances. (90) In the Johannesburg area where the Native Commissioner had an acute shortage of staff, approximately 3 000 pounds were paid out to 1 500 dependants each month. To eliminate congestion payments were spread over three days of the second week of the month only, each allottee being allocated a certain day to receive payment. Should an allottee be validly prevented from attending on that specific day, pay was deferred to the following month leaving the allottee without money for the month. (91) Frequent delays in payments were another cause of resentment as rents, inter alia, had to be paid in advance; this naturally gave rise to hardships. (92) It also happened that payments were made only once every two months, thus aggravating the situation. (93) Another cause for ill-feeling amongst the allottees occurred when a soldier for some reason or other (such as absence without leave) had some pay forfeiture which meant that the allottee also lost money. As the reason for this was not recorded, allottees could only be informed that there was no money for them or paid a reduced amount without any adequate explanation being given. (94) As one may expect, these problems sometimes led to friction between the soldiers and their dependants. (95) The soldiers and allottees themselves were sometimes also responsible for this friction. Some of them changed allottees at will with the result that the former allottee was left in dire straits. Others fathered children with women who were not their wives. These women then claimed compulsory allotments from such a soldier. In another instance a soldier nominated his aunt as his allottee, although she was not dependent on him. It was a connivance to receive allotments illegally. This soldier was hoist by his own petard: on his discharge he asked his aunt for the accumulated allotments but she repudiated any obligation. Needless to say, he
was extremely furious. (96)

The authorities denied allegations that it was their method of payment that was at fault. It was emphasised that the NMC Paymaster was helpful in clearing up complaints. One way of doing this was to allocate a white NCO at the main Native Commissioners’ offices to see that dependants received their allotments timeously. (97) But at the same time they admitted shortages in staff and the fact that they were overburdened with work. (98) They therefore had to carry some responsibility for this state of affairs.

Finally, the remuneration package also consisted of an Extra Duty Allowance which came into effect from 1st November 1941 and could be awarded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandsmen</td>
<td>3 d. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Transport Instructors</td>
<td>6 d. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks : Sergeants</td>
<td>12 d. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals</td>
<td>9 d. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance Corporals and Privates</td>
<td>6 d. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td>12 d. per day (99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Various requests were made to extend this allowance to other specialised mustering such as cooks, South African Air Force (henceforth SAAF) refuelers, motor transport drivers and hygiene personnel. As blacks were not entitled to proficiency pay, further appeals were made to grant extra duty allowances to all posts held by qualified black soldiers; normally such posts would have been filled by whites and would have entitled them to proficiency pay. (100) Sergeant L. Ncwana was particularly upset that educational qualifications and the ability to do more responsible work were not taken into account. He compared the pay of black chaplains (17 pounds 10 shillings per month) with that of other educated black soldiers such as teachers and felt it was most unfair that the latter “should be boiled down to 3 pounds per month in order to keep level with the masses.” (101)

Apart from the grievances blacks lodged about specific aspects of the remuneration package, there were also other aspects which caused dissatisfaction. Throughout the war, there was widespread resentment about the discrimination made between blacks and other members of the UDF, especially the coloureds. A coloured private without dependants was paid 2/6 per day while his black counterpart received 1/6 per day. This disparity was worse with regard to dependants’ allowances. Whilst the total allotment of the black soldier to his family was 1/6 per day the coloured soldier allotted 1/6 per day of his pay to which the state added a marriage allowance of 3/6 making a total of 5/- per day. (102) Thus the family of the coloured soldier received more than three times the amount paid to the black soldier’s family. Evidence reveals that resentment was indeed extensive about this discriminatory practice where the value of the labour had no relation to the wages paid, but that it was the race of the labourer that was decisive in fixing remuneration. From grass roots level where Sgt. Solomon Madiga could not understand

“why is the Government so repressive on us Africans
and yet we perform heavy and important duties than [sic!] right through to black organisations and councils like the ANC and the Native Representative Council, where there was grave suspicion that it was the intention of the Government to keep the blacks down and allow the coloureds and Indians to go ahead of them, the feeling was unanimous: they fiercely objected to their being treated differently. While others could accept no differentiation in the pay of soldiers, (104) Councillor Moroka of the Native Representative Council could still accept the difference in pay between black and white soldiers but emphasised that "the coloured people and the Indians are no better than we are." (105)

The authorities offered various explanations how the rates of pay of blacks and coloureds were determined and why the discrepancy was unavoidable. They claimed that, after careful consideration and examination, they reached the conclusion that the living standards of each group had to be taken into consideration. As the living standard of coloureds was generally higher than that of blacks, and the intention in determining the rates of pay was that the income of all soldiers and their dependants should be on a level not lower than that to which they were normally accustomed, the coloureds necessarily had to receive more. (106) While agreeing that in practice the pay of black soldiers was not always commensurate with their previous living standards, the DNEAS presumed that the GGNWF would make up the shortfall. (107) Smuts was of the opinion that the Fund indeed existed to meet special conditions which could not be met by the army - in this case the discrepancy between remuneration of coloureds and blacks. (108) This was totally unacceptable to E.H. Brookes who maintained that the Fund "should be used to meet individual cases of hardship, and not to remedy the neglect of the Defence Department to provide adequately..." (109)

One of the most important considerations in determining the military wages of black soldiers was that it had to be fixed at levels which would not disrupt the industry and labour market of the country. The surmised potential danger that higher military wages would drain labour from the mines, for instance, had to be avoided at all costs. The opinion that the urban dependants of the soldiers might receive higher allowances due to a higher cost of living in the cities, was therefore summarily dismissed. The fear was expressed that it would only foster migration to the cities, thereby disturbing the labour position there and in the rural areas. (110)

Further justifications for the rates of pay were that there was no labour shortage - sufficient blacks to meet the Union's military requirements could be obtained even at 1/- per day. The Southern Rhodesian Government already paid their black soldiers 1/- per day. The authorities anticipated "serious repercussions" with other African forces if their pay of 1/- per day for their privates were directly compared to the South African blacks' flat
rate of 2/3 per day. This potential bone of contention was, of course, obviated by the fact that the South African black soldier effectively received only 9 d. per day - the rest was regarded as either deferred pay or an allotment to dependants. (111)

The authorities were therefore generally satisfied that the remuneration package was adequate. More than eighty per cent of the black soldiers came from rural areas where their families enjoyed larger incomes than before the soldiers' enlistment. Of the twenty per cent urban recruits, only a minority received higher wages before enlistment; obviously, it would have been difficult to remunerate them with their pre-enlistment pay and so create further discrepancies. (112)

Another area where racial discrimination in the Army had its effect on financial matters was the pay stoppages which took effect when the soldiers were punished inter alia by detention or automatic forfeiture of pay due to absence without leave. This militated very strongly against the dependants of these soldiers by virtue of the fact that any pay penalty involved all their earnings, including the portion allotted to dependants. Such a portion in the case of white soldiers was regarded as an allowance and was therefore not involved in any punishment.

Furthermore, in some instances the punishments entailed amounts which were out of all proportion to the soldiers' rate of pay - in a way a comment on the low rates of pay blacks received. The absurdity of the situation is illustrated by the following: P. Kgomo of 20th Field Ambulance, Zonderwater, was placed under stoppage of pay of 77 pounds 18 shillings and 3 pence. If his pay was stopped completely and his allotment left unaffected, it would have taken him almost six years to clear his debt. It would have been no surprise if he deserted, leaving a large unsettled balance to be written off. (113)

The authorities, however, realised the seriousness of the situation, especially with regard to the hardship it would cause the dependants of soldiers affected in this way. The regulations were revised so that the 9 d. of the allotted amount would no longer be deemed as pay but regarded as allowances and be paid out to the allottee regardless of the soldiers' punishment. In effect, such a soldier and his allottee would then each lose 9 d. per day. (114)

More or less the same problem cropped up when drivers were expected to pay the damages to vehicles involved in accidents due to negligence on the part of the driver. Section 138 of the Military Disciplinary Code determined that
"penal deductions shall be made from the ordinary pay of a soldier for loss occasioned by the commission of an offence." (115)

This regulation applied to whites and blacks alike but, due to the fact that blacks' remuneration was far lower than that of whites, they were more severely penalised. From a legal point of view there was therefore no alternative. According to the OC
Voortrekkerhoogte and Transvaal Command, this provision had a salutary effect: since the drivers realised that they had to pay for damage brought about by their negligence, the accident rate decreased by 50 per cent. (116) Generally, these amounts for repairs were far beyond the capacity of the soldiers to pay, some running as high as 55 pounds. (117) The result was that the soldiers began to dislike and avoid motor transport work and some who had been involved in accidents even absconded. (118)

The soldiers themselves protested against this provision which seemed to them quite unfair. O.M. Khathali of the 221 Res. MT Coy., Surprise Camp, Pinetown, pointed out that in civilian life, if a driver worked for an employer, the liability for damages incurred by accidents rested solely with the employer. He could therefore not understand why he should pay in case of an accident or with what he should pay seeing that his pay was so low. (119)

The DNEAS appreciated that it was not only impossible for the soldiers to pay these amounts but that the number of cases of wilful damage were almost negligible. Moreover, it was very difficult to determine whether the accidents were due to inexperience, inefficiency or to negligence. (120) Therefore, exceptionally high fines were remitted and provisions were made for the reduction or entire waiving of fines for damage to UDF vehicles. By June 1944 Lt. A.V. Bruton, Welfare Officer of the NEAS, No. 2 MT Sub Depot, Hector Norris Park, was still of the opinion that it was unfair to expect drivers to pay for damages sustained in accidents. He realised that remissions were granted but suggested that charging NEAS soldiers for damages should be entirely abolished. (121) This suggestion was not accepted. The regulations thus remained as they had been framed in December 1943:

"The Officer Commanding may impose a stoppage of pay for full amount of the damage, but in cases where it is established that damage was not caused willfully, damages should be limited to an amount not exceeding 14 days pay." (122)

Another sore point was the payment of taxes. Apart from the general poll tax, blacks were also liable for a Special African Tax under the Native Development and Taxation Act of 1925. Money generated by the latter tax was mostly used for welfare and education amongst black communities. The soldiers' tax (including arrears which might have accumulated) was recovered by instalments from the allotments to their dependants. In some cases this practice caused considerable hardship. The authorities were not prepared to support the request that taxes should not be deducted from allotments. (123) Although D.L. Smit was of the opinion in September 1942 that the hardship was not extensive, as "the Native women are drawing dependant's allowances have never been so well off in their lives", (124) he was apparently forced to change his view drastically because his assumption proved fallacious by November 1942. It had come to his notice that a number of women from whose allotments tax deductions were made, were in such dire circumstances, that they found it necessary to
apply to the GG/NWF for assistance. He deemed it totally unacceptable that the Fund should be called upon to make good deficiencies in income caused by deductions made for the purpose of payment of taxes. The previous regulation in this regard made provision that a month's notice be given of the intention to deduct, allowing a month or two to elapse between each deduction of 1 pound or 10 shillings and that deductions only be effected in the season of the year when dependants were least likely to suffer want. As these provisions were clearly inadequate, he issued the following new instructions:

"Where it is clear that a woman, whose husband or other supporter has signed a stop order on her allotment, will suffer want by reason of the high cost of living in the area where she resides, of the size of her family, or other reason, no deductions at all should be made on that stop order. In such a case it should be left to the man to settle the amount of taxes outstanding, on his return from active service, unless the Native Commissioner should find at a later stage that further deductions can be made from the woman's allotment without causing hardship to her. Notwithstanding the fact that stop orders may be for amounts of 1 pound or 10 shillings, the deduction made in future from any one month's allotment should in no circumstances exceed 5 shillings..."

He further strongly urged his officers to treat allottees sympathetically so that hardship could be avoided. (125)

On the issue of total exemption from tax the authorities refused point-blank to budge. The various requests and representations in this regard were therefore fruitless. (126) The authorities were extremely reluctant because they argued that it would have a detrimental effect on the services to blacks which the taxes financed and that the soldiers should generally find little difficulty in paying these taxes as they were well paid. D.L. Smit felt so strongly about this that he instructed special parades be held to explain this to the black soldiers. (127)

Amongst some black soldiers there was considerable dissatisfaction about the refusal to exempt them from taxes. They claimed that certain recruiting officials promised them that they would not have to pay taxes while they were doing military service. D.L. Smit admitted that this took place in certain instances but immediately added that these promises were totally false. (128) Of course, this acknowledgement was no comfort to the soldiers.

What incensed other soldiers even more was the fact that on discharge some had to pay taxes in arrears, in certain cases taxes which were allowed to be four years in arrears. Although it was explained to recruits that they would continue to be liable for taxes while on military service and if they wished they could sign stop orders for deductions from their monthly pay, this arrangement was not too widely publicised. The option was open to postpone tax payment until the day of their discharge. In consequence, because of this low-keyed approach, the majority of
the NMC volunteers were totally ignorant of the fact that they were even liable for taxes while on service. One can imagine the surprise and utter disillusionment when they had to pay arrear taxes on discharge. (129)

There were also a few general queries from the soldiers that they did not receive all the payments they assumed were due to them. Although there were, in most cases, perfectly valid explanations why the money had not been paid out, the soldiers frequently did not understand these explanations which were based on complicated army regulations. (130) In effect, therefore, they naturally remained dissatisfied.

Contradictory pronouncements with regard to the adequacy or inadequacy of the soldiers' pay were made. On the one hand, the cash wage and the other benefits were considered so good that it could challenge any remuneration package private employment could offer. (131) On the other hand, statements were made that civilians received more than the soldiers and that pay of the latter had been fixed to correspond with the lowest rate of daily cash wages received by black workers in civil life, namely black mine workers. (132) In order to clarify the issue and also to determine whether dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the remuneration was realistic, a norm had to be set. Therefore the average pay in South Africa during the war needs investigation. It is extremely difficult to lay down an exact norm as the circumstances were sometimes vastly different and there were many variables. For instance, the following differences have to be borne in mind: the kind of employment, whether the employment is in a rural or urban area, increases granted during the war and other benefits over and above the cash remuneration such as cost of living allowances, rations, accommodation and free medical services. The following table attempts to determine an approximate average norm of the cash wages in the most important vocations in order to compare it with the soldiers' pay. As the majority of soldiers performed unskilled work in the army, only the pay of unskilled labourers is reflected in the table. Furthermore, because of the difference between urban and rural remuneration, separate tables for each were compiled:

Daily wage rates for unskilled labour in urban areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of employment</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industries</td>
<td>3/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (underground)</td>
<td>2/3 (increased to 2/5 in 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(surface)</td>
<td>2/1 (increased to 2/2 in 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and Harbours</td>
<td>3/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>3/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal workers</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal Steel Pressing Syndicate</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattested labourers in army camps</td>
<td>4/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Daily wage rates for unskilled labour in rural areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of employment</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm labour</td>
<td>1/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and Harbours</td>
<td>2/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat Trade</td>
<td>3/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>3/- (133)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these figures it is indeed clear that, in the urban areas at least, the 2/3 per day (or 4 pounds 5 shillings per month, including cost of living allowance) black soldiers received was, together with the mine wages, the lowest of all the wages. Even if the 1 pound monthly contribution from the GGNWF is added, it is still 1 pound 5 shillings short of the 6 pounds 10 shillings regarded as the absolute minimum needed not to live below the breadline in the urban areas. (134) Compared with the wages in the rural areas, the soldiers were better paid than farm labourers but less than in the other avenues of employment. It seems also that the statement that the soldiers' pay was commensurate with that paid in the private sector was somewhat unwarranted and that the dissatisfaction lodged by the soldiers was therefore justified.

Comparing the pay of members of the NMC to that of black soldiers in the rest of Africa, the former was considerably higher. The low rates paid to these soldiers were determined by the rates paid for labour in those territories. Thus in East Africa the KAR and the EAMLS as well as the black Rhodesian soldiers received 1/- per day. The West African soldiers also received 1/- per day and those serving in the Middle East 1/6 per day. The daily pay for the Bechuanaland troops without dependants was 1/6 and those with dependants 2/3. The High Commission Territories thus adopted the same rates paid to the NMC. (135) As 1/6 of the 2/3 paid to the NMC was either deferred or paid to dependants, the soldier actually received only 9d. - 36. less than his African counterpart. But, of course, the latter did not have the benefit of deferred pay or family allowances on the same scale as the NMC.

WELFARE OF SOLDIERS AND THEIR DEPENDANTS

Closely linked to the remuneration soldiers received, is the issue of the anxiety of the soldiers for their own needs and the welfare their dependants. Attention will therefore firstly focus on these anxieties and then on the assistance rendered by Government and other bodies.

A major concern for many soldiers was the welfare of their families while they were on military service. Some of the soldiers lost their wives during their absence leaving the children destitute or others received word of illness in their families; the houses of others desperately needed repair; and there was also, in certain instances, no one to plough or look after the cattle - sometimes the cattle were even sold without the consent of the soldier. Most of the soldiers were illiterate.
and therefore found it very difficult to maintain satisfactory
domestic correspondence. This meant that domestic problems were
invariably magnified in the eyes of the illiterates, mainly
because they could not obtain clear information or give personal
advice in respect of their domestic problems. This was
particularly true in the case of soldiers who served in North
Africa. It prompted some soldiers to apply for discharge from
the army in order to attend to their personal interests. In most
cases the application for discharge was not granted but the
soldier was allowed leave without pay to return home. (136) Other
soldiers applied for a transfer to be nearer to their homes but
as there were not always NMC units nearby, this could not be
effected. (137)

A matter which was particularly upsetting to the soldiers was the
eviction of their families from their homes in certain townships
or from farms. This was done because township regulations
stipulated that husbands had to reside with their wives before
they could occupy a house. In the case of wives being evicted
from farms, farmers did not see their way clear to accommodate
families of menfolk who had previously worked for them but were
now rendering military service. One farmer in the Witbank area,
P.J. Steenkamp, even threatened to institute legal proceedings
against a soldier’s wife and threw her in jail if she did not
leave his farm. In some cases the authorities could find
alternative accommodation but in other cases nothing could be done
to alleviate their predicament. (138)

Some of the soldiers also sought advice on personal matters: it
varied from C. Mangcotywa who requested that land should be
obtained for him (139) to Cpl. S. Sofika who wanted to know how
he could stop his wife from wasting the monthly allowance (140)
and M.C. Mohlopi who needed advice on his wife who was “too loose
in her behaviour.” (141) There were indeed cases where the
soldiers’ wives were unfaithful to them, expecting children from
other men or absconding with new lovers as well as the soldiers’
belongings. In pursuit of their new romances some of the women
abandoned their children. As can well be imagined, this state of
affairs caused great anxiety to the soldiers involved. (142)

Then there were also the ever present requests for financial
assistance. Various applications were, inter alia, made to pay
for repair of damaged houses, to purchase stands, to use as
dowry or to pay for the children’s education. (143)

The Army authorities had indeed become more conscious of their
welfare role and thoroughly realised the importance of the prompt
investigation and possible redressing of the soldiers’ domestic
complaints in order to maintain morale. (144) Subsequently, a
fairly elaborate welfare organisation attending to the needs of
the soldiers and their families developed.

Provision of military pensions for the soldiers and their
families was a major aspect of the Army’s involvement in the
welfare of the soldiers. The Defence Special Pensions and