
118. DNEAS NAS 3/1/7A Box 2, Confidential extracts from service mail, accompanying letter, DCS to DGD and DNEAS, 20/12/1944. See further discussion infra, p. 357-358.


120. ARB Vol. 1814 File 1612/1/17-20C Part I, Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Soldiers and War Workers Employment Board, 2/8/1945; DNEAS NAS 3/20/5 Box 13, DGD to AG, 7/12/1945 and Horwitz, "The Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 554.

121. DNEAS NAS 3/20/5 Box 13, DNEAS to GOA UDF Admin. HQ (Rear) MEF, 8/11/1945 and DNEAS NAS 3/20/5 Box 13, DGD to AG, 7/12/1945 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 105, R. Raynes to E. Hellmann, 7/12/1942.


124. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Chairman DSDC, Matatiele to SNA, 8/2/1946; NTS Box 9257 File 3/371, Departmental Circular No. 22 of 1945 by SNA, 16/10/1945; DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, "Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee", p. 20 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, NC, Port Elizabeth to SNA, 11/11/1949.

125. NMC NAS 3/21K A 5 Box 19, News from 68 Air School, undated.

127. NTS Box 9738 File 852/400, Honorary Secretary National Joint Ex-Services Committee to SNA, 9/6/1947.

128. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of a meeting of the Non-European Sub-Committee, 7/5/1946; Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans Papers AD 1433, Minutes of meeting, 8/9/1947; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum on "Rehabilitation of African Ex-Volunteers" by Campaign for Right and Justice, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 8/3/1946; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum on "Demobilisation of African Volunteers" by Ex-Servicemen's League, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 30/3/1946.


130. ARB Box 1766 File 1612/17-5/45, Secretary for Labour to Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 21/3/1946.

131. Interview with R. Moloi, 6/2/1986. From March 1945 to March 1946 4 032 of the 42 627 black soldiers at that stage in the UDF returned to pre-enlistment employment or to employment they found themselves. (NTS Box 9726 File 837/400, Statement by H.G. Lawrence in the House of Assembly, 14/5/1946).

132. Interview with J. Theledi, 6/2/1986; DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, Letter from G. Cukatha, 27/12/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/1/7A Box 2, Letter from J. Monime appended in DCS to DGD, 1/12/1944; UWH Box 300 B1:45, Paper Clipping from Rand Daily Mail, 9/9/1942; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 51.5, Q Whyte to M. Mobeo, 22/4/1947; ARB Box 1766 File 1612/1/17-5/45, Secretary for Labour to Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 21/3/1946.


135. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, AG to All Heads of Sections, 22/10/1946.
136. AG (3)2054/5 Vol. II Box 260, AG to Chairman, DSDC, 2/6/1948; DNEAS NAS 3/30/1, DNEAS to Z.H.S. Molelengeane, 8/2/1946; AG (3)2054/5 Vol. I Box 260, Telex from Deagen to Dechief, 19/1/1948 and Horwitz, "The Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 555. See further discussion Chapter 9.

137. CGS 28/10 Vol. I, NTS Box 9726 File 837/400, BNS Box 1/1/208 File 153/72 and WR 93/6 Box 181, DSDC Circular No. 13 by DGD, 6/2/1945.

138. DC 503 Box 2054, "Handbook for Native Volunteers to be discharged"; NMC NAS 3/21D A 3 Box 16, General Circular No. 57 of 1941 by Acting SNA, 30/12/1941; UWH Box 263 BI:19, Paper Clippings, Rand Daily Mail, 6/10/1945; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 21st meeting of the CAC, 24/4/1945 and DC 2214/27 Box 3361, Proclamation under War Measure No. 32 of 1946, 12/6/1946.


141. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, "Memorandum on Rehabilitation of African Ex-Volunteers" submitted by the campaign for Right and Justice, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 8/3/1946.

142. SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, J.R. Altman to J.D.R. Jones, 21/2/1946; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 51.5, Chairman, Non-European Sub-Committee of Springbok Legion to Secretary SAIRR, 13/7/1946 and Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of a meeting of the Non-European Sub-Committee, 7/5/1946.

143. UWH FS 9631/44 Box 94, Demobilisation Contact letter No. 12, 30/11/1945; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 D, Press Clippings, The Star, 30/3/1945; UWH Box 263 BI:19, Rand Daily Mail, 6/10/1945; DC 2214/27/1 Box 3361, Draft letter, Secretary for Defence to DGD, undated and NTS Box 10203 File 1/423, DGD to SNA, 5/4/1945.

144. DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20; OC Bantu Ex-Volunteers Employment Bureau to OC Dispersal Depot, Modder Bee, 25/10/1945.
145. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 1.1.28 Paper Clippings Umteteli wa Bantu, 27/7/1946; AG (3)154/365/22/1 Box 488, DNEAS to DAG (C), 29/8/1944; DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20, OC Bantu Ex-Volunteers Employment Bureau to OC Dispersal Depot, Modder Bee, 25/10/1945 and M. Ballinger Papers A 410 D. Paper Clippings Umteteli wa Bantu, 18/8/1945.

146. DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20, Report on Bantu Soldiers' Employment Bureau, Johannesburg, 6/7/1944 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Chairman CAC to DGD, 3/2/1945.


148. G.E. Brink Collection Accessions Box 50, Copy of a speech to be delivered in the House of Assembly which Gen. Brink prepared for Min. H.G. Lawrence, March 1948. The following is the analysis of discharge categories of black ex-servicemen from 1 May 1945 to 31 October 1947:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Sufficient sources and not requiring immediate assistance</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Returned to pre-enlistment employment</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Required employment and placed in dispersal depots</td>
<td>3622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Required employment after a period of rest</td>
<td>35995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 41036

(of whom 27 487 were subsequently placed in employment by the BBBB's. The remainder did not apply) (Horwitz, "The Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 554).


150. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Non-European Sub-Committee Minutes, Interviews with DGD representatives, 30/8/1946.

151. NTS Box 9654 File 520/400/11, SNA to Chief Native Commissioners, 22/12/1947.

152. UWH Box 263 BI:29 Paper Clippings, Rand Daily Mail, 10/8/1945; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, DGD to Acting National Secretary British Empire Services Legion, June 1945; Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Report on the National Advisory Council on Demobilisation's 4th meeting, 18/10/1945 tabled at a meeting of the National Executive Council, 3/11/1945; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 21st meeting of the CAC, 24/4/1945 and Hallack, "Record of the NEAS", p. 194.

154. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, NC, Durban to CNC, Pietermaritzburg, 25/5/1944.


157. AG (3)154/365/22/1 Box 488, DNEAS to DAG (0), 29/8/1944.

158. See supra, p. 346-348. See also NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Memorandum on the Demobilisation of Non-European Volunteers by SAIRR, accompanying letter, J.D.R. Jones to P. Rodseth, 11/6/1945.

159. DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20, OC Bantu Soldiers' Employment Bureau to DNEAS, 26/8/1944; Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans Papers AD 1433 C J 2.3.c, Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans, Minutes of meeting, 11/11/1946.


161. DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20, DNEAS to TAC, 22/3/1945.


163. UWH Box 263 BI:19, Paper Clippings and NEAS Paper Clippings, Rand Daily Mail, 10/9/1945.
164. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Action Committee report tabled at a meeting of the National Executive Committee, 2/2/1946.

165. NTS Box 7848 File 45/336, NC, Louis Trichtardt to SNA, 16/3/1945.

166. See the following for reports on the drought and its effect: NTS Box 7842 File 24/336, F. Rodseth to SNA, 12/3/1946; NTS Box 7842 File 36/336, NC, Kuruman to SNA, 5/3/1946; NTS Box 7842 File 40/336, S. Marais, Agricultural Officer, Pietersburg, to SNA, 28/8/1945 and NTS Box 7556 File 821/327, Note on crop estimates for Ciskei, February 1944, accompanying letter CNC, Kingwilliamstown to SNA, 21/4/1944.


168. DNEAS NAS 3/30/3 (Emp.) Box 20, OC Bantu Ex-Volunteers Employment Bureau to OC Dispersal Depot, Modder Bee, 25/10/1945.


170. AG (3)2054/5 Vol. II Box 260, Letter from W. Mncwabe, 18/8/1948.


172. NTS Box 2094 File 222/280, Summary of reports from NC's re employment available to blacks in Northern Areas, Rand, Natal and Cape, undated.


175. See for instance, DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, Letter from T. Madondile, 21/11/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, Letter from M. Nakwa, undated; AG (3)2054/5 Vol. I Box 260, M. Mokhela to DNEAS, undated; AG (3)2054/5 Vol. I Box 260, L. Lechaba to OC, Voortrekkershoogte, 5/5/1948; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.5.37, J. Mbilini to M. Ballinger, 17/8/1944; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/12 A. Banda to CNC, Pretoria, 18/6/1945; SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 51.5, Letter from M. Manaka, 7/4/1946 and SAIRR ("B" Box)
51.5. P. Thema to Director SAIRR, undated.

176. NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, L. Sonkosi to J.C. Smuts, 19/10/1946.


178. ARB Vol. 1814 File 1612/1/17-20C (Part I), Minutes of the third meeting of the Soldiers and War Workers Employment Board, 2/8/1945; M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20, SAIRR Meeting of the Executive Committee, 5-7 July, Memoranda and minutes; NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, "Memorandum on Rehabilitation of African Ex-Volunteers" submitted by the Campaign for Right and Justice, accompanying letter, Secretary CAC to F. Rodseth, 8/3/1946.

179. ARB Vol. 1720 File 1617/1/17 (Part III), DGD Circular, 16/4/1946 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, H.S. Cooke to A.G. Strachan, 18/9/1945.

180. NTS Box 9735 File 851/400, DGD to Minister of Social Welfare and Demobilisation, 18/5/1946.


182. See Supra, p. 347.


185. NTS Box 9735 File 851/400 and NTS Box 1675 File 300/275, DGD Circular, 5/10/1946.

186. NTS Box 9735 File 851/400, Paper Clipping, Rand Daily Mail, 5/12/1946. See also Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of Non-European Committee meeting, 22/1/1947 and Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfield", p. 116.

187. G.E. Brink Collection Accessions Box 50, Copy of a speech to be delivered in the House of Assembly which Gen. Brink prepared for Minister H.G. Lawrence, March 1948.
188. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 D. Press Clippings Rand Daily Mail, 12/7/1946; NTS Box 9654 File 520/400/11, "Memorandum by the Native Affairs Department on the re-instatement of the Native Ex-Volunteer", 15/8/1947 and NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Minutes of the 39th meeting of the CAC, 14/10/1947.

189. NTS Box 9735 File 851/400, Notes on a confidential conference, 6/9/1946.


191. DC 1593/4 Box 3134, Honorary Secretary Defence Force Liaison Committee to Regional Officer, 8/6/1942 and DNEAS NAS 3/1/7 A Box 2, B. Mochesane to J. Knebe appended in ADCS to DNEAS, 4/6/1945.

192. NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, M. Mohapi to SNA, 16/8/1946; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/2, NC, Pretoria to CNC, Pretoria, 30/11/1944 and DNEAS NAS 3/1/7 A Box 2, I. Majoro to Assistant Commissioner, Hlotse appended in ADCS to DNEAS, 4/6/1945.

193. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/3 Box 21, Letter from A. September, 20/1/1947 and DNEAS NAS 3/1/7 A Box 2, I. Majoro to Assistant Commissioner, Hlotse appended in ADCS to DNEAS, 4/6/1945.

194. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) 15.7.2, SAIRR Meeting of Executive Committee, 5-7 July 1944, Memoranda and minutes.

195. SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 51.5, S.O. Dithipe to J.R. Altman, undated.


197. DNEAS NAS 3/4/4 Box 5, L. Moneri to Native Affairs Department, undated. See also DNEAS NAS 3/1/7A Box 2, Letter from J. Mosame, appended in DSC to DGD, 1/12/1944 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, A.E. Majola to Minister of Justice, 16/4/1947.

198. DNEAS NAS 3/5/3 Box 6, Town Clerk, Bultfontein to Secretary for Defence, 18/1/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/4/4 Box 5, D.D. Malan, Lydenburg to Minister of Defence, 6/10/1945 and NTS Box 9138 File
7/363/31, Statement by S. Dlamani, undated.

199. NTS Box 9136 File 71/363/22, NC, Pelgrims' Rest District to SNA, 12/12/1944.

200. NMC NAS 3/12 C 8 Box 54, C.A. Cahill to OC, Native War Records, 2/2/1943.

201. NMC NAS 3/21K A 5 Box 19, Translated letter from J. Ngcetjana, undated. See also the following for similar cases: NTS Box 9125 File 68/363/16, M. Mohapi to SNA, 22/7/1946; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, P. Seithi to Minister of Defence, 1/4/1948; NTS Box 9139 File 71/363/42, Letter from M. Makodi, 18/6/1946 and SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection C, World War II AD B43 Box 103, R. Raynes to E. Hellmann, 7/12/1942.

202. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of Action Committee meeting, 11/1/1945; CGS 32/18, F. Careson, Non-European Organiser, Springbok Legion to Minister of Defence, 21/1/1946 and DGD Box 248 File 414/2, "Memorandum on wages and conditions of Ex-Servicemen employed as unattested labourers by Northern Command", accompanying letter, Non-European Organiser, Springbok Legion to DGD, 23/1/1946.

203. DGD Box 248 File 414/2, DGD to Assistant Native Secretary, Springbok Legion, 28/6/1946.


205. NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, DNEAS to Chief Paymaster, 14/2/1944 and NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, DNEAS to DAG (O), 12/2/1944. See also NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, OC NMC Recruiting, Louis Trichardt to DNEAS, 27/1/1944; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Additional NC, Sekukuniland to SNA, 14/6/1943 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, "Representations from NC's in regard to members of the NMC", accompanying letter, SNA to DNEAS, 7/9/1943.

206. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, NC Duivelskloof to Chief Paymaster, 3/7/1944.

207. NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, Chief Paymaster to DNEAS, 22/2/1944.

208. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Assistant NC, Nebo to SNA, 15/6/1943.

209. Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Minutes of a meeting of the National Executive Committee, 8/10/1947: NTS Box 7558 File 825/327, CNC, Pietersburg to General Secretary Springbok Legion,


211. NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, P. Mabogoane to Union Secretary, 16/7/1952 and interview with D. Masuku, 6/2/1986.


213. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Statement by E. Ntusabantu, 1/8/1945.


217. DNEAS NAS 3/7/6 Box 8, J. Montsi to DNEAS, undated; DNEAS NAS 3/4/4 Box 5, G. Bulu to DNEAS, 31/5/1946; DNEAS NAS 3/7/6 Box 8, P.K. Molapile to DNEAS, 22/11/1946; GG Box 1460 File 50/1831, Secretary to Governor-General to A. Mogashoa, 2/10/1947; DNEAS NAS 3/4/4 Box 5, L. Monari to Native Affairs Department, undated; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Statement by N. Ntiyo, 11/7/1950; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Translated letter from J. Nodokola, 18/8/1947 and DNEAS NAS 3/4/4 Box 5, M. Mtombo to Director of Labour, 26/3/1946.

218. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 Box 19, A. Ndlovu to Head Headquarters Military Police, 18/4/1947; NTS Box 9124 File 68/363/12, J. Phakoe to SNA, 15/2/1944; GG Box 1458 File 150/1712, G. Risimate to Governor-General's Office, 21/4/1946 and SAI RR Papers ("B"
219. DNEAS NAS 3/7/6 Box 8, Letter from J. Molapo, 27/5/1946. See also NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Acting CNC, Western Areas to Welfare Officer, Springbok Legion, 1/5/1952.

220. DNEAS NAS 3/12 Box 11, P. Motau to Springbok Legion, appended in Deputy Director of Military Intelligence to Senior Army Education Officer and DNEAS, 17/11/1944; NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, DNEAS to Chief Paymaster, 12/2/1944; NTS Box 9125 File 68/363/16, Letter from S. Mofokeng, appended in SNA to DNEAS, 19/6/1943; NMC NAS P/3 A 10 Box 22, Extract from minute No. 2/8/2 from Magistrate Omaruru, 15/11/1943 and Horwitz, "The Non-European War Record in South Africa", p. 551.


222. AG (3)154/181/4 Box 259, DCS to DNEAS, 31/12/1943 and DNEAS NAS 3/30/1 B Box 19, S. Tshabalala to AG, 13/4/1945.

223. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, J.O. Cornell to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 3/1/1944. See also NTS Box 1801 File 116/276, Minutes of a meeting of the NC's of the Northern Areas, 26/5/1943; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, W.H. Wakeford, Magistrate Butterworth to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 23/12/1943 and Chapter 7.


226. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, A.S. Modise to OC Native War Records, 27/4/1945; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories to SNA, 23/12/1943; NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, DCS to DNEAS and SNA, 2/3/1944 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, Statement by D. Madolo, 19/11/1943.

227. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, I. Mtingane to NC Ngqeleni, 5/12/1943.

228. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, Letter from N.P. Kausche, 16/3/1945.

229. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, DGD to DNEAS, 11/4/1946.
230. DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, F. Rodseth to Capt. Smuts, 26/4/1945 and DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, DNEAS to NC, Kimberley, 16/10/1944.

231. The DNEAS admitted that the policy of discharges was not always uniformly applied throughout the war. (DNEAS NAS 3/30/1B Box 19, DNEAS to OC Native War Records, 2/5/1945).

232. DNEAS NAS 3/7/6 Box 8, Letter from J. Molapo, 27/5/1946. See also M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 2.20 and SAIRR Papers ("B" Box) B 15.7.2, SAIRR meeting of Executive Committee 5-7 July, 1944. Memoranda and minutes; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Letter from N. Ntiyo, undated and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, CNC, Western Areas to Welfare Officer Springbok Legion, 1/5/1952.

233. NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, ADD (L and R) to Liaison Officer, NMC, 4/9/1945.

234. NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, NC, Taungs to SNA, 13/7/1943. See also NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, NC, Sekukuniland to SNA, 14/6/1943 and NTS Box 9116 File 68/363/2, NC, Lusikisiki to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 2/8/1945 and Supra, p.361.

235. DNEAS NAS 3/30/6/1, Report of the Native Ex-Volunteers' Benefits Committee, p. 3. See also NTS Box 9727 File 837/400/1, Chairman CAC (Native Ex-Volunteers) to DGD, 30/3/1946 and WR 93/6 Box 181, DAG (O) to OC, War Records, 5/4/1943.

236. See annexure K.


239. UWH PS 9631/44 Box 94, Progress report for the period ending 31/7/1945 by Information and Intelligence Section, Directorate of Demobilisation, 1/8/1945.


241. DNEAS NAS 3/22/9 Box 16, J. Morley to all Areas and Branches, appended in DCS to DNEAS, 11/9/1944 and Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Memorandum by Non-European Sub-Committee, Springbok Legion, 7/6/1946.

243. Springbok Legioon Papers A 617, Minutes of a meeting of the Non-European Sub-Committee, 23/9/1946; NTS Box 7257 File 312/326,
Report by E.F. Kieser, Acting General Inspector, on Ex-Servicemen's League (NMC), 24/1/1946 and NTS Box 7257 File 312/326, NC, Johannesburg to Director of Native Labour, 2/1/1946.

244. AG (3)154/696 Box 504, M. Konig, Assistant National Secretary, Springbok Legion to A.L. Gavshon, appended in DCS to AG, 8/6/1944. See also Springbok Legion Papers A 617, Summary of work done by Actions Committee of Springbok Legion, tabled at National Executive Committee meeting, 28/7/1945 and 11/8/1945.


247. NTS Box 9654 File 520/400/1 and NTS Box 7558 File 825/327, Memorandum by the Native Affairs Department on the re-instatement of the Native Ex-Volunteer by SNA, 15/8/1947.

CHAPTER 9

MODERNISING AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE

War is not only a supreme test of a country's military, economic, political and social institutions but can also be a potent agency to reform or change these institutions. This was recently emphasised by David Killingray and Richard Rathbone when they discussed the effect of the Second World War on Africa. (1) It can also have a particularly deep effect on soldiers who actively participate in it. In an earlier work concerning Africa and the First World War, Richard Rathbone indeed pointedly referred to the role of these ex-servicemen, "some of whom do appear to have been significant modernizers. They also appear to have been an importantly disappointed group whose inducements to serve were seldom honoured. The political consciousness was to be significant in the history of nationalism in the following three decades." (2)

This chapter will investigate whether this view also holds for the 76 000 black South African soldiers who participated in the Second World War. The ex-soldiers' reactions to the following two major and overlapping areas will therefore be highlighted: the issue of the modernising influence of the war as well as the effect the War had on the ideological level, especially the political awareness and post-war political involvement of these black soldiers. Finally, brief attention will be paid to Government policy on blacks in the post-war army and to the welfare and fortunes of these ex-servicemen some time after they had been demobilised.

MODERNISING INFLUENCE

The term modernisation can be criticised for its ambiguities and its hidden value assumptions, but it remains a useful catch-all concept for some of the changes that affected the black soldiers during the war. Immediately after the war, the process of modernisation which included Westernisation and detribalisation was taken for granted by certain army officials. It was even expected that the black soldiers' army experience would have a beneficial and continuous effect. After all, according to Captain Knoetze,

"They have learnt the value of discipline, the futility of crime and the reward of good service. They have also learnt how to live cleanly, occupy themselves beneficially during leisure hours and acquired skills in many useful trades and occupations. They will therefore... be more useful citizens." (3)

In addition, they enjoyed physical and mental health and development; they were sometimes obliged to change or even break their traditional habits and taboos by wearing European clothes and eating European food and thriving on the latter, thus disproving the myth that they were only fit to eat maize porridge
and meat; and they became acquainted with to them new, modern and strange places, commodities, machines, ideas and peoples, especially outside South Africa and thus developed new tastes. It was therefore no surprise that C.M. Maramjane who was attached to 102 S.A. Combined General Hospital, UDF CMF, tried to smuggle in snapshots of blacks who had associated with "strong white girls here" (4) or when Fine Mlambo remarked that his army experience had prompted him to "want something better" after the war (5) while Titus Nala enquired about the price of "a decent modern house comprising three bedrooms, dining room, sitting room and verandah." (6)

The DNEAS, whilst being well aware of this process, was also somewhat cautious about it:
"There is the fact to be borne in mind that it is inadvisable to inculcate, more than is necessary, habits which the individual may be unable to satisfy on his return to civil life." (7)

Moreover, the educational spin-off from the whole training process and army experience must also be borne in mind. For instance, in chapter 4 mention was made of the establishment of newspapers, specifically aimed at the black soldier and the limited effort of teaching these soldiers during evening classes. This provided a considerable number of men an opportunity to read and write which would not normally have been available to them. (8) Furthermore, a large number of soldiers received training which would have been beyond the reach of most of them before the war. The following quotation graphically makes the point that some aspects of their involvement in the war indeed rubbed off:
"Where last year they drove the ox-waggon, today they drive motor-lorries... Where a few months back they ran to their witch-doctors for medical assistance they are now trained as first aid workers and stretcher-bearers; and where in their homes before the war they lived in dirty surroundings they are now experts in hygiene and sanitation." (9)

Of course, the real crux of the matter is not so much the fact that there was a modernising influence due to the army experience, education and training but rather the quality of the training and its consequent long-term effect. After the war there was only a very small number of prominent ex-soldiers (10); their prominence can in any case not be attributed solely to their army service. Moreover, after a few years most ex-servicemen were indistinguishable from their contemporaries who did not participate in the war - both groups, for example, being employed in the same occupations. These facts make the modernising influence of the war open to conjecture and cautions one not to exaggerate its influence. (11) Whilst these influences cannot be denied, it is, therefore, very difficult to gauge precisely the modernising influence of the war on the black soldiers and, in turn, even more difficult to assess the modernising impact these returned men had on their societies.
It seems that the vast majority returned to their pre-war life and life styles and were fairly quickly reabsorbed into their traditional societies. Any long-term influence was thereby lost. E.P.A. Schleis's comment with regard to Ghana and Uganda also seems to ring true for the black South African ex-soldiers: "Colonial officials often expressed disappointment that the returned men had so little modernising impact on their societies; in effect, the government may have been too successful in its reabsorption efforts." (12)

The explanation for this lies in the fact that the primary task of the army was simply that of a war machine. Everything was geared to accomplish victory. The army was therefore not an educational institution; any learning process or training which had a long-term effect was merely incidental because the overriding aim was to expedite a successful conclusion to the war. This meant that army training in modern equipment was often only adequate as a makeshift short-term exercise to accomplish a specific task. More thorough training was necessary to prepare the soldiers to carry on the same occupation in civilian life. For example, as pointed out in the previous chapter, (13) the motor transport drivers were severely disillusioned when they discovered that their army licences were not recognised as adequate to be exchanged for civilian licences. Many were not willing or could not afford to undergo additional training and returned instead to agriculture, thereby forfeiting their army training and losing the modernising influence it might have had. Even some of the authorities had their reservations about the value of the motor transport training. When there was a shortage of drivers in 1946 the Director-General of Demobilisation for instance recommended that NMC drivers should only be used as a last resort. (14) Very few ex-soldiers could therefore meet E.P.A. Schleis's composite ideal of a modernised "ex-serviceman who had minimal pre-service education and came from a rural, agricultural background, yet who after demobilisation, was demonstrably politically aware, moved into an urban area, and engaged in a service-taught occupation." (15)

It therefore seems that the most dramatic modernising influence of the war ironically occurred outside the narrow confines of the army. Some of the black soldiers became modernised when they became part of the overall rapid industrialisation process which the war unleashed and which caused many blacks to flock to the cities and industries during and after the war. (16) The modernising effect of their military training and experience was thus secondary to this larger process.

It is also important to gauge the impact of military service on individual soldiers. This varied considerably, depending mostly on the individual soldier's temperament and attitude, the way he was treated and the different experiences he had. From the ex-soldiers' comments after the war, mainly two opposite views on the value of military experience manifest themselves. On the one hand, relatively satisfied ex-soldiers not only enjoyed the
experience but also thought it was definitely worthwhile. The benefits were quite substantial although it was offset in varying degrees by dissatisfaction with some of the army's racial practices. Nevertheless, they had no regrets about having enlisted. (17)

On the other hand, for some ex-soldiers participation in the war was a negative experience and especially the way the Government treated them after the war a disillusionment. Ex-Soldier Joshua Sephiphi is a case in point. He joined in 1941 and served as a driver in a transport unit until a truck overturned, injuring him seriously. It was months before he could return to duty. He was granted a social pension on the grounds of his disability as well as a veterans' grant. In 1979 this amounted to R 42 per month - totally inadequate to provide for himself his wife and seven children. He enlisted, thinking that he would have a better life on his return but today he doubts whether it was worth risking his life. (18) Robert Sisolo thus described his feelings about promises which were not fulfilled and so led to his disillusionment:

"When you say to a person, go and catch that man, bring him here and once you do it I will give you something, it becomes a bit bad when the man is brought to you and you do not give what you had promised. This was also the case with the army." (19)

Even in the thick of war a few thought that they would enjoy a better life outside the army. (20) Others felt bitter about the whole military experience like Frank Sexwale who resented it that he had joined because

"There was nothing of importance that I had experienced that I could use out in civilian life - nothing! It was just a time-wasting experience - that was why I wanted to forget about it." (21)

Likewise, for Ephraim Leolokwe, military service did not benefit him at all but was rather a liability and embarrassment. (22)

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

There is a popular notion that the war was a potent agency not only in making the soldiers politically aware but also transforming them into political activists. R. Headrick aptly describes this perception:

"The image of African soldiers, maddened by racial discrimination and enlightened by the followers of Gandhi, then coming home to agitate for the right to run their own affairs, is pleasing to both historians sensitive to ideological motivation and to African nationalists, equally sensitive to ideology." (23)

The following discussion will, therefore, explore the important issue whether there was a link between military service and the development of a political consciousness.

It is important to place the attitudes and aspirations of the black soldiers within the context of South African politics.
Therefore a brief outline of the political and economic tendencies during the war is necessary in order to understand whatever political awareness developed and why, on the other hand, there was to a large degree political apathy.

The war caused a rapid inflow of rural blacks to the urban industries. The percentage of blacks in towns rose from 16.4 in 1936 to 23.7 in 1946, an increase of over half a million people whilst the numbers employed in industrial occupations grew from about 270 000 in 1936 to 457 000 in 1946. (24) These economic changes provided a more favourable basis for African nationalism. But this is only one side of the coin. They also enlarged the areas of interracial interdependence and afforded greater opportunities for interracial association. The latter indeed came to fruition in organisations such as the Joint Councils for Europeans and Africans set up in many parts of the country.

During the war it seemed at times that the war itself might act as a catalyst of progressive change because it dramatically highlighted the social and economic changes taking place in South Africa. On this score the Government's policies and pronouncements which wavered considerably during the war were not totally unrelated to the war fortunes. Initially, there were signs from the Government that it might begin to reverse its policy of segregation. For instance, during the war, promises of black trade union recognition were made in exchange for support for the war effort. (25) From the end of 1941 and during 1942 when the prospect of victory for the Allies was extremely dark, General Smuts made a number of statements (26) and delivered a series of important speeches at inter alia the United Party Congress, before the South African Institute of Race Relations and the Social and Economic Planning Council. (27) In these pronouncements he declared that the war had not only contributed to the mutual respect which had grown up between white and black troops in the North but had also brought the different race groups in South Africa closer to one another through industrialisation and urbanisation. Consequently, the policy of strict segregation had proved to be a failure. He also emphasised the dire need for the better treatment of blacks, for improving their health, for furthering their education and for giving them a fair share in the industrial and general economic life of South Africa. From a letter written shortly after the speech before the SAIRR to M.C. and A.B. Gillett, it is clear that he had indeed grasped some of the fundamental changes taking place in the South African society:

"I could point to the barrenness of the old dispute, and the wider African horizons now opening out before us, the migration of the African which has the dimensions of a great revolution and which is giving rise to quite a new economic and social situation, full of perplexing and dangerous problems if allowed to drift... The dropping of the old political shibboleths had become necessary, and the time had come for positive action... Hertzog's Segregation policy has proved barren and has created more problems than it promised to solve. Of course everybody
in this country is agreed that European and African should live apart and preserve their own respective cultures. But much more than that is called for today in the new Africa."

(28)

These pronouncements together with other similar progressive statements from influential figures such as J.H. Hofmeyr (29), D. Reitz (30), D.L. Smut (31) and F.H. Theron (32) seemed to indicate that the war might perhaps bring about social change. Blacks might benefit and white South Africans might be prompted to recognise the need for the abolition of discriminatory and repressive legislation such as the pass laws, influx control and the ban on black trade unions so that it might fit in with contemporary industrial realities. Whilst segregation was still officially in force there was indeed flexibility and a degree of laissez-faire. Influx control was, for instance, suspended briefly between 1942 and 1943. But as Tom Lodge has pointed out, there were also ulterior motives behind this and other more lenient measures:

"taken by the authorities in the early stages of the war so as to avoid confrontation and maintain African political quiescence. Other measures included school feeding schemes, pensions for certain categories of African employees and increased educational expenditure. All these tied in with manufacturing's requirement of a stable, urbanised, and relatively well educated industrial labour force." (33)

Other strong forces were, however, vehemently opposed to any progressive change in the status quo. It was particularly the intransigence of white politics which militated strongly against any fundamental changes as Smuts noted in January 1943:

"I saw a very influential deputation of the Churches who urged me to hurry on the good work, and the necessary reforms in social and political conditions. This is easier urged than done, and the proximity of the elections makes the situation still more awkward. I am going to do whatever is politically possible and may even exceed the limits of political expediency. But I dare not do anything which will outpace public opinion too much just on the eve of an election which may be the most important ever held in this country... I shall do as much of the right thing as possible, but always keep before me the paramount necessity of winning the election!" (34)

Moreover, as the war news changed in the favour of the Allies, it made the possible dependence on black support, loyalty and quiescence less pressing. The rigid political separation which had continued to lurk in the back, could therefore contrast itself even more dramatically with the changing social and economic patterns of association and hence stimulate a conflicting pattern of race relations. By the end of the war, the Government paid tribute to the loyalty of the black population during the war but was ominously silent about changes concerning the policy towards blacks. (35) Proclamations such as the Prohibition of Gatherings or Assemblies of Natives No. 31 of 1945, legislation such as the Industrial Conciliation (Natives)
Bill of 1947 which denied blacks full trade union rights, the steady tightening of the pass laws, the emergency regulation giving the Railways power to refuse tickets to blacks in the Ciskei and Transkei wishing to travel to the Cape unless they can produce proof that they are taking up specific jobs (36) as well as the vacillation in Government circles about the future of blacks in the military, left no doubt that the Government was extremely sensitive to the opposition of the majority of white public opinion to the mixing of races. Consequently it would not countenance any fundamental changes in the status quo. This was confirmed in an address to the Empire Parliamentary Association, London, by one who should know, Minister P. Van der Byl, Minister of Native Affairs. Adopting a very paternalistic and superior attitude, he said that

"Whilst there is a very small minority of highly educated natives with very good brains, the fact... to keep in mind is that the majority of the native people are just emerging from barbarism. That is a point to keep in mind, because - politically and in other ways compared with the European - they are still largely children... If the native was to have the same franchise right as the... European, he would in a short while completely swamp the European and would be in political control of the country... I am not so concerned about the natives' political rights as I am concerned in making the native a healthy, strong, educated individual. I am much more concerned with his education, with his social and economic status, with his wages, his health and his housing, and the question of what becomes of him when he comes into the big towns and into industry." (37)

The hope and prospect of change as a result of the contributions of black South Africans to the war effort evinced by early wartime hints, promises and statements was therefore dashed at the end of the war. The Government refused to change the basic policy of segregation which denied rights even while it granted charity.

Furthermore, it is important to address the question of what the authorities anticipated the effect of the war would be on the blacks. This will give an indication whether the authorities allowed any scope for the development of political consciousness. They were anxious to create the image that the whole exercise was an unqualified success (38) and, to quell any white fears that the black soldiers might have acquired ideas which might threaten the whites' privileged position, they sounded various warnings. Welcoming back the first batch of released black Prisoners-of-War Col. Stubbins remarked:

"You have been in strange lands. You have seen strange things, and even found yourselves in positions different from those found in the Union, therefore do not try to be a European Gentleman, but instead be a gentleman according to your customs and culture..." (39)

Likewise, in an address to the members of the NMC "Up North", the Secretary for Native Affairs succinctly cautioned these soldiers:
"Don't do anything which would spoil your good name." (40)

One can conclude from the foregoing that there was never any real doubt about the Government's policy relating to black soldiers and politics. It was unequivocally clear during and immediately after the war: these soldiers had to be prevented from engaging in any political activity that might challenge white rule; a body of urban malcontents whose economic goals had not been met should also be avoided. Particularly since 1944 when the authorities became increasingly conscious of, to them, "subversive" political activities amongst the blacks, (41) the possibility of the black soldiers also being politically influenced should be prevented. This was an important reason why the Government not only deliberately kept the ex-soldiers out of the limelight after the war (42) but also preferred that they should preferably return to the reserves on discharge or demobilisation. (43) The chances of their becoming a political threat in these areas were far slimmer than in the urban areas where dissatisfied soldiers could easier be mobilised.

Moreover, from earlier discussion it has become clear that the army itself was never really a catalyst for political and social change. Its primary mission was to fight and not to try and reform or improve the social customs of the country. Ignoring the custom of segregation in the army might well have decreased the fighting potential because of white soldiers who would strenuously have objected to live, work, eat and fight with blacks. Therefore, given the Government's policy during and particularly at the end and after the war as well as the restrictions within the army itself, lack of strong political leadership amongst the soldiers and the fact that, due to the policy of dilution, black soldiers were scattered in small groups throughout the whole army organisation, thereby neutralising the potential solidarity amongst the soldiers to develop into a significant political factor, it is evident that the chances for developing a political consciousness and becoming politically active were very remote. Moreover, the fact that black civilian organisations such as the ANC and trade unions were already politically active, left individual ex-soldiers who wished to express their political concerns with no choice but to join these existing organisations. As will be pointed out below, (44) this does not mean that no political awareness developed during the war but it must be borne in mind that the effect of their participation in the war differed from one individual to another. Some indeed became politically aware and despite the above-mentioned limitations, expressed their political views; others might have had the same awareness and also might have had the wish to express it but because of the formidable power of the state, preferred to remain silent; but for the vast majority, the main effect was on their physique and not on their minds. Military service in itself as well as factors such as grievances about treatment which might have prompted them into political action were not sufficient. Written evidence on this is thin but oral evidence seems to substantiate this. F. Sexwale, for instance, remarked that
"I only became politically aware in the 1950's. The army did not contribute to that. When we came back from the army we were just back at square one. We had no leverage to push the Government." (45)

One can safely assume that the soldiers' main concern evolved rather around their immediate economic and social needs than any highfalutin liberation doctrine. They consequently remained politically apathetic and eventually became indistinguishable from the men who had not served. (46)

The war experience lifted a number of black soldiers out of provincialism. For them it was a type of worldly experience unobtainable in any other way. It provided the opportunity to widen their horizons, to alter ideas about themselves and their world and, in the process, develop a greater self-esteem, increased self-confidence and a less submissive attitude towards whites. For example, an unidentified member of the NMC twice threatened a prominent farmer in the Rustenburg district that "something drastic will happen to him" if the soldier's father who had worked many years for the farmer did not receive a pension of 8 pounds a month. (47) The degree of this development and the way it manifested itself, of course, depended on each individual's temperament, personality and pre-war socio-political awareness.

Enquiries from black soldiers about their rights as voters (48) and about the activities and achievements of black political institutions, (49) support for the African National Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa, (50) calls for the abolition of pass laws (51) all point to a political awareness amongst a number of soldiers. Of course, to what extent their war experience directly contributed to this consciousness is difficult to gauge. This becomes clear when one reads an appeal from J. Setshego who blamed his forefathers for being too docile:

"Through the kindness of our fore Africans we have become the nation's ladder. They made things heavy for us by being sympathetic [sic]. It is the same thing today if we cannot raise ourselves to a higher level nobody will do it for us. My fellow men should cease making trivial distinctions and watch what the white people are doing with us. I am looking forward to a day when there will be an African to free us. I know there are highly educated Africans and these [sic] their duty is : to bring their people from darkness to light." (52)

However, from a prize-winning essay for Non-European soldiers in the South African National Eisteddfod written by W.S. M'Cwabeni a clear link between his military experiences and political consciousness can be detected:

"The African's greatest need after this war is not paternalism, but freedom to develop initiative and independence and thus become self-respecting. His cry will always be, 'Remember Sidi Rezaq - do not forget Tobruk!' There we suffered and died side by side for the perpetuation of the same ideals... The fight for
liberty will soon be over - it would be a moral wrong if
the subversive elements... should have more benefits from
the Allied victory than the African who suffered and
died up North. The lead will have to be taken by the
Springboks who saw the African as an indispensable associate
and not as a 'boy'. We are both indispensable to South
Africa. The African now wishes to see the words of Cecil
John Rhodes bear fruit: "Equal rights for all civilised
men south of the equator." (53)
Admittedly this was written with effect in mind, but nevertheless
expresses quite a high level of political awareness. Furthermore,
evidently had not yet come to grips with the reality that
"civilised" in South African society was synonymous with "white".

However, despite a heightened political consciousness amongst
some of the soldiers, there was never any possibility that this
would be transformed into concerted political action. Disunity
amongst the soldiers themselves, (54) and the limitations imposed
by the state which have already been mentioned were the main
factors militating against such a possibility. It can therefore
safely be assumed that ex-soldiers made no impact as a group but
only as individuals after the war. This notion is substantiated
when one examines the post-war lives of some prominent
individuals who had been members of the NMC. Again, it must be
stressed that most of these men had already been politically
aware before they had enlisted and that it is therefore difficult
to assess the relationship between their military service and
political activity. For every example of such a prominent
personality who had seen military service it is not difficult to
find an example of one who did not. Other factors such as pre-war
experience, education and status in their societies were more
important in moulding them politically than their military
experience. (55)

The most prominent ex-soldier who had been politically active on
a large scale after the war was the flamboyant and grandiloquent
Potlako Kitchener Lebello. He was born in 1924 near Mafeteng,
Lesotho, the son of an Anglican minister. He enrolled as a
student at Lovedale College in 1940. Just then J.H. Hofmeyr on a
recruiting tour was addressing the students on the issues at
stake in the war. Being a fervent hater of racial oppression, he
decided to enlist. He succeeded in concealing his age and joined
a transport unit of the army. He served in North Africa where he
led an army mutiny against the racially discriminatory
regulations in the army. (56) After the war, he took up his
studies again and became organiser for the African National
Congress Youth League at Lovedale College. However, after a
student strike he was expelled but nevertheless completed his
studies at Evaton Wilberforce Institute. He moved to Johannesburg
to take up teaching but was dismissed after being convicted of
fraud. Thereupon worked as an insurance salesman. During these
occupational vicissitudes he still remained active in the Youth
League, seizing the leadership of the Youth League in the Orlando
East Branch. Being an excellent and colourful orator, he used
both speeches and the journal, The Africanist which he had
established in November 1953, to launch scathing attacks on the ANC's leadership. As part of the vanguard of the Africanist group within the ANC, he criticised the leaders for deviating from the principles of the Programme of Action and that they were increasingly influenced by non-African organisations and foreign ideologies. This action led to several expulsions from the ANC but also subsequent reinstatements. However, Leballo finally broke his connections with the ANC when the Pan Africanist Congress was formed in Orlando in 1959; he became its first national secretary. Following the serious clash between the police and blacks at Sharpeville in March 1960, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. On his release, the government banished him to Natal but he submitted a successful appeal to leave South Africa on the grounds that he was born in Lesotho. In Maseru he began to reconstruct the PAC again on the strength of a letter from Robert Sobukwe, designating him as acting president. Criticism from other PAC members, however, weakened his authority. The PAC planned a surprise massive uprising all over South Africa but an impatient Leballo robbed the plan of its surprise element in March 1963 when he announced at a press conference that the Pogo attacks were linked with this plan for a nation-wide uprising. Thereupon Lesotho police raided the PAC but Leballo went into hiding. When he re-surfaced again in September his position within the organisation was not sure at all. The blowing up of his house in Maseru by PAC rebels was symptomatic of this. He eventually re-established the PAC headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam in August 1964. There leadership conflicts again ensued, former PAC officials challenging his claims to leadership. The Organisation of African Unity, however, recognised him as acting head of the PAC. Amidst all the in-fighting within the PAC, Leballo nevertheless managed to survive the following fifteen years as acting president of the exiled PAC. After Sobukwe's death in 1978, he successfully asserted his claim to succession but this was short-lived. In May 1979 he was forced to resign. (57)

Another prominent ex-soldier who eventually wielded considerable political power was Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, a founder and later leader of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). He was born in Ovamboland in 1924 and enlisted as a member of the NMC, eventually being promoted to the rank of corporal. After the war, he resumed his studies, worked some time on a Witwatersrand gold mine and later as a railway policeman in Cape Town. Here he became increasingly involved in politics and distinguished himself as an organiser and leader with considerable acumen. Because of his political activities he was ordered to leave Cape Town and was placed under house arrest with a local chief in Ovamboland. Nevertheless, he continued his political activities which eventually led to the establishment of SWAPO in April 1960. He worked tirelessly to create an effective network of SWAPO committees in Ovamboland. In 1966 he was one of 37 others accused of terrorism, found guilty and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Before the court had delivered the sentence, Toivo made one of the most profound nationalistic declarations ever heard in court. In 1984, he was released, four years before the
It was not only national politics which attracted some ex-soldiers: a few individuals also became involved in ex-servicemen's organisations as has been described earlier.

As the foregoing proves that political action of ex-soldiers was limited to a few individuals it is ironic that the war seems to have caused more political stimulation among those who did not enlist than among those who had become soldiers and of whom many had seen the world. Not the ex-soldiers, but individuals and organisations outside the military hi-jacked the issues unleashed by the war and used them as a leverage to pressurise the Government and to obtain the most political mileage. After all, wars always generate hope as the people are sustained by promises of greater rights, opportunities and privileges after the successful conclusion of the war. Moreover, the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations now lent credibility to these promises.

The clamour and demands centered around the very cause for which the war had been fought - against principles of extreme racialism and oppression represented by the Nazis but which were also found in the structure of South African rule. To many blacks (and some whites) this meant that peace without political and economic freedom vitiated the purpose of fighting against Nazism. Therefore, the victory over Nazism will only be complete after all the people of South Africa possessed those rights and freedoms which had been the war aims of the Allied Forces.

The fact that they had reaped no political benefits for their loyalty during the First World War discouraged some that they would now receive political and other rights after this war. Nevertheless, they again used their participation in both wars as proof of their loyalty. Justifying their claims by emphasising their contribution, they expressed the hope that the sacrifices the black soldiers had made, would find reward and recognition in justice, freedom and liberty:

"The Non-European soldier has played a worthy part in undertaking the supreme obligation of a citizen, the defence of his country and its institutions. It is clearer than ever that such men must have a more real form of citizenship." (61)

In 1946, after the opening address at the ninth session of the Native Representative Council by Minister P.G. van der Byl, in which he had made no mention of an expected new order for South African blacks, an indignant Councillor Mosaka thus expressed the opinion of many blacks:

"The Europeans had fought in the war to preserve a freedom which they already possessed, while the African fought for a freedom which he hoped to achieve. Now that Fascism and Nazism have been rooted out, we want the political rights to which we are entitled." (62)

Claiming these rights was to be of no avail. A Recess Committee
of the Natives Representative Council recommended fundamental and far-reaching alterations to the basis of black representation as laid down in the Representation of Natives Act, 1936. But the Government had no intention of changing its policy that blacks were excluded from full citizen rights. In effect this meant that the 16 Councillors of the Native Representative Council would continue representing seven million blacks. (63)

Many felt that the cardinal principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter namely freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from oppression were not yet, but should be, applied to South Africa. A.B. Xuma pointed out that

"With police raids, mass arrests, landlessness, homelessness, low wages, pass laws, and other restrictions and disabilities, there are no such freedoms." (64)

Likewise, The All African Convention under the leadership of D.D.T. Jabaury, indicated that

"This charter can mean something great and epochal if given a close and conscientious interpretation by the rulers that be. On the other hand it may amount to nothing more than empty words." (65)

The African National Congress was convinced that these principles should be made applicable to South Africa and gave effect to this by including these principles in a memorandum entitled "The Atlantic Charter from the African's Point of View" and in a "Bill of Rights", adopted in December 1943. But it was also well aware that these claims would not be granted for the mere asking - they would have to fight for them. (66) It soon became clear that Congress' interpretation of the Atlantic Charter differed fundamentally from that of the Government when Smuts summarily rejected the claims as stated in the "Bill of Rights" in 1944. (67) Representations from inside South Africa proved futile; but the pressure the ANC could muster through its overseas links were much more successful, reaching a climax in the attack by India on the South African Government at the United Nations in 1946.

Another organisation which also clamoured for black rights and which was directly linked to the South African war effort deserves attention - the Springbok Legion. Some white soldiers became profoundly aware of the fact that white and black soldiers were fighting and dying together in the cause of democracy but that the latter did not enjoy democratic rights in South Africa. This was one of the major reasons for the formation of the Springbok Legion as a left-wing political action front for ex-servicemen. Inter alia, it believed in racial co-operation and the preservation and expansion of democracy in South Africa. It was able to organise a membership of 25 000 (of whom 9 000 were blacks) around its platform and under enthusiastic leadership; it therefore had enough influence to press for these principles and improve the welfare of the black ex-soldiers. However, as many other organisations working for the improvement of the black people of South Africa experienced, the Springbok Legion's efforts more often than not also stranded on innumerable
discriminatory laws applying to blacks. (68) Neither did the Legion itself always practice what it preached. During the National Convention of the Springbok Legion in 1947, it was decided to give two separate functions, one for white and one for black delegates! (69)

Contrary to its declared intent, the Government's post-war actions seemed more reminiscent of German methods than those of trustees, (70) as Smuts purported his Government to be. The joint secretaries of The Non-European Unity Movement thus expressed their disillusionment:

"We see that victory or no victory the process towards the complete enslavement of the Non-Europeans of South Africa is to go on without a break. Without a blush the rulers went delirious with joy at the overthrow of Nazism in Europe whilst at the same time they continue merrily to tighten the screw of oppression against us and for the rest hoped that their pious platitudes about 'freedom', 'the rights of man' etc. etc. which filled the air to harmonise with the Victory Bells would serve to obscure our view of the real situation in this country. We have nothing against Thanksgiving Services... but... these expressions of 'thankfulness' would have sounded less hollow if they were accompanied by loosening the chains which enslaved 9 000 000 Non-Europeans." (71)

This growing discrepancy between the freedoms the war had been fought for and the promises made during the war of better things to come, on the one hand, and oppressive regulations which were still applied to blacks after the war, on the other hand, bred disenchantment, loss in the good faith of the whites, frustration and eventually resulted in defiant action as tensions mounted. This feeling found expression in the sudden and unexpected miners' strike of 1946, in the decision, taken in the midst of the strike, of the Native Representative Council to adjourn indefinitely and in other boycott actions.

By the end of the war, the African Mineworkers' Union represented the majority of black mine workers. These workers were in a militant mood due to the fact that their wages had more or less remained static. During the war, the workers had realised the necessity to keep the vital industry's wheels rolling and this was one reason for refraining from strike action. After the war, this contraint had disappeared and the miners' patience was wearing thin. Moreover, they had realised their indispensability during the war and this had stimulated a new awareness of their bargaining power. Therefore, when, in August 1946, the Chamber of Mines refused even to meet mine workers' representatives to discuss pay claims, to the alarm of the Smuts Government and the Chamber of Mines more than 74 000 workers downed tools, paralysing the mines in the largest black strike in South African history. The state ruthlessly and brutally ended the strike; in the process nine men were killed and another twelve hundred were injured. Eventually, no concessions were made: the strike hardened the Government's and the Chamber of Mines' attitude. (72) This action, as well as the failure of the Government to
consult the Native Representative Council which was in session at
the time of the strike, can be regarded as the direct cause for
the Council's protest adjournment. Of course, it was not the sole
cause. It was rather the climax of the general frustration with
the infrequency and ineffectiveness of the existing consultative
procedures between the Government and the Council. For instance,
the Council was highly perturbed when the Government refused to
grant the request of the Council for the abolition of all the
discriminatory legislation of the Union. When the Council was
called again to a session on 20 November 1946 the members decided
to adjourn indefinitely as a protest against the unsatisfactory
character of the Government's reply. Councillor Mosaka thus
explained the reasons for this move:

"The reason lay in events since the cessation of the war.
The action of the Council was a condemnation of the Union's
post-war continuation of a policy of repression wholly
contrary to the United Nations Charter... It was hoped
that a recognition of the evils in Germany might lead to
self-criticism on the part of South Africa. The statement
of the war aims of the Allies in the Atlantic Charter with
its message of hope for oppressed peoples, had had an
obvious appeal for the African. A new spirit was evident in
South Africa, in the pronouncements of political
leaders, in the attitude towards African volunteers, in the
relaxation of the pass laws, in the granting of old-age
pensions to Africans. This spirit of sympathy had
disappeared with victory... and the policy of white
supremacy and segregation reaffirmed, in such ways as
a stricter enforcement of the pass laws, and reactionary
amendments to the Native Urban Areas Act... The
adjournment of the Native Representative Council was
a protest against the renewed reaction, and against the
breach of faith on the part of the Government." (73)

In Government circles the significance that this step was very
serious and meant an important stage in the realignment of black
politics during the 1940's was full well realised. J.H. Hofmeyr
wrote:

"What to my mind is even more serious is the attitude of
the Native Representative Council. It means that the
moderate intellectuals of the Professor Matthews type are
now committed to an extreme line against colour
discrimination and have carried the chiefs with them. We
can't afford to allow them to be swept into the extremist
camp, but I don't see what we can do to satisfy them which
would be tolerated by European public opinion. The Native
Representative Council was however a vital part of the
1936 Legislation, and if it cannot be made to function,
far-reaching questions will arise." (74)

This sense of frustration amongst blacks in post-war South
Africa, furthermore manifested itself in several boycott actions.
Wages were so depressed that a proposed increase of one penny in
the bus fare between Alexandra Township and Johannesburg
precipitated a boycott of the bus transport services, most of the
workers walking many miles to their places of employment. (75) The failure of municipalities to provide housing for many workers drawn into industrial employment led to a great spawning of shanty-towns. When the authorities tried to remove these people there was fierce resistance. (76)

Disillusioned at the end of the war, many blacks were sick and tired of hollow rhetoric and gestures which were totally irrelevant to the discriminatory realities they had to face daily. The following incident clearly illustrates this mood. The Johannesburg Town Council proposed to spend £200 pounds on Peace Celebrations in the townships as an appreciation of the part played by the inhabitants of the townships during the war. When this proposition was put to the people of Orlando township, the residents viewed the scheme with extreme suspicion and surprise to find "that whatever part they have played in the struggle against tyranny should be given a recognition by staging a 'Peace Celebration' in the midst of pass laws and denial of elementary democratic rights such as representation in the Council... In view of all injustices... the African people in Orlando have come to a definite conclusion that it would be mocking themselves to accept any form of Peace Celebration. As far as they are concerned, peace is as far from them as the East is from the West. They feel that if they accept a day long enjoyment of what Democracy has achieved over Fascism, they would be pronouncing curses against their future. The Peace Celebration does not impress Orlando residents who consider the whole scheme as anti-peace and as a sheer white-washed surface to cancel the deep-seated gloom cast on the African people by the retrogressive Native policy of the 'City Fathers'". (77)

Likewise it was now evident that some blacks had become totally alienated from pre-war loyalties which they had shared with the white sector of society. Thus, as a protest against the Government's policy towards the blacks, the ANC boycotted the Royal visit of the King and Queen of the British Empire to South Africa in 1947. (78)

AFTERMATH

According to some army officers, the black soldiers had acquitted themselves well enough during the war to justify the idea that the Non-European Army Service of which a NMC battalion could form part, be perpetuated as a portion of the peace-time UDF. Some serving black soldiers were also very much in favour of the idea. This was accepted in principle by the Smuts Government. At least, it was anticipated that NMC members would continue to be employed under their existing conditions until March 1949 and possibly beyond that date. (79) Moreover, it was thought that such a possibility could provide employment for many blacks as well as for the ex-soldiers. Quite a number of the latter, some of whom were not satisfied with their present jobs while others had been unable to find employment since their discharge, indeed had indicated that they were keen to rejoin the army on a permanent
basis. (80) Authority was given to retain on extended service (at least until the end of hostilities in the Far East) a number of the best type of NMC members who were desirous to become permanent soldiers against appropriate permanent force mustering pending the publication of conditions of service. The fixing of rates of pay and conditions of service for a South African Permanent Force Non-European Army Services was well under way by the end of 1947 and only delayed due to certain legal difficulties. (81)

However, these efforts proved to be futile in any case. The National Party won the May 1948 general election and subsequently, as part of their apartheid plan, jettisoned all plans for a black section in the UDF. The immediate concern was that blacks should not in any way be militarily involved. Before the National Party had assumed power, F.C. Erasmus who then became the new Minister for Defence, was vehemently against any military training of blacks, as it would endanger the maintenance of the white civilisation in South Africa. (82) This meant that no non-European was to be employed in the Union Defence Force and consequently the original intention to recruit blacks into the Permanent Force had to be abandoned. As the Nationalist Government now deemed ethnicity as the most important force on which the South African society should be structured, it was imperative that the black majority (which could be a threat to this ideology) should at all costs be excluded from access to the control mechanisms of the state. This implied that they should also be excluded from the all important security forces which were to guard the ruling white minority. During the Korean War, for example, Colonel Stubbs offered to raise 100 000 black troops for service in Korea, but the offer barely received any attention. (83)

In 1950 an investigation was even launched to transform the Department of Defence in an all-white organisation by employing whites in the three categories in which Non-Europeans were currently serving, namely the Auxiliary Services, Unattested Non-European Labour and Casual Labour. But white prejudice against and extreme reluctance to perform manual labour as well as the cost of employing whites in these categories made such an undertaking unfeasible. (84)

In October 1948 all blacks who were being employed on a full-time volunteer basis in the Union Defence Force were given notice of termination of their contracts and offered employment in the only organisation where blacks would be allowed to wear uniforms - the Essential Services Protection Corps. This was a totally separate institution from the Union Defence Force. However, not only were their uniforms to be of a distinctive non-military type and colour but their services in this Corps were also clearly and strictly defined: they should only be engaged in non-combatant duties, being that of so-called police boys, guards, fire pickets and motor transport drivers. They would receive no military training, would not be allowed to carry fire-arms and would not receive any military rank. (85) In the event of war, blacks would
form part of the Auxiliary Service which would be designated the Bantu Labour Service and would have its own regulations and disciplinary code. Members of the Auxiliary Service would not be members of the Union Defence Force. (86) Evidently, in the eyes of the new government, the contribution of the blacks during the war was not relevant. According to them the blacks were only capable of performing manual labour and should therefore be relegated to that stereotyped and inferior role. It is clear that the government was furthermore extremely sensitive that there should be no indication whatsoever that blacks might in any way be involved in military training or action in the Union Defence Force or even part of the Force.

For the leading organisations in the black communities this was a gross insult. The ANC reacted by adopting a resolution at its 38th Annual Conference that the ANC would not support a call for blacks to participate on a non-combatant basis in the event of another war. Furthermore, the ANC was determined that no South African army could launch any action without black assistance. It could therefore, with some bravado, make the following claim:

"It follows that on any attempt to mobilise an army in South Africa the general apathy and hostility of the bulk of the nation will render such attempt nugatory." (87)

By adopting this stance, the ANC had struck upon a potentially strong political leverage. But, of course, as the Government excluded blacks from the Union Defence Forces for more than thirty years, it could not be utilised.

This policy of the National Party was in line with the philosophy of apartheid but in stark contrast to the general tendency against discrimination on the grounds of colour after the war. In 1948, the same year the South African Government began the process of implementing harsher racial laws in South Africa, President Truman of the United States of America issued a Presidential Executive Order abolishing racial segregation in the armed forces. This was an impressive instance of directed social change and its full implementation was brought about in a remarkably short time for such a major institution. The Armed Services were even ahead of the rest of society in racial matters. By middle 1955 there was no official trace of segregation in the United States Army. (88)

With regard to the British Army, from the commencement of the war the War Office was dead set against any man with non-European blood being granted the King's commission or enlisting in the Regular Army. The Colonial Office, on the other hand, was adamant that any racial or colour bar should be eliminated from the armed forces. As late as December 1944 it seemed that the objections of the War Office were to carry the day. The next year a special committee investigated this aspect. It found that the racial and traditional background of non-Europeans, the undesirability of non-Europeans commanding white British troops as well as the fact that the British soldier would not readily accept a non-European as a companion and brother-in-arms, were serious objections; so it recommended that men not of European descent should not be
allowed to enlist in United Kingdom regiments or corps. In 1946
the War Office reiterated the view that enlistment of
non-Europeans in the British army could seriously undermine
discipline and the well-being of the Army and acknowledged that
"Distrust of coloured men as commanders may be a
prejudice; but this prejudice is nonetheless a fact which
cannot be ignored in assessing the fitness of the Army for
its primary duty, which is waging war." (89)
The possibility of their being granted commissions was thereby,
of course, also effectively ruled out. The Army authorities had a
very convenient escape route out of this quandary. These men
should rather be given an opportunity to serve as officers in the
Colonial Forces in which they would only be required to command
men of their own race and nationality. (90) With regard to the
latter forces then, the authorities were confident that their
training of the Africans had been successful and that Africans
could be usefully employed. It was thus not only envisaged that
African troops should continue to play an important part in
Imperial defence in post-war Africa but the door was also opened
for Africans to receive commissioned ranks if they had
sufficiently high educational qualifications and military
experience. Although this did not take place as rapidly as some
might have wished, at least there was no ideological impediment
as in the case of South Africa. (91)

It was only by the late 1970's when the internal and external
threat against the state increased, that the Nationalist
leadership was forced to dig deeper into its manpower pool.
Whilst allowing blacks to enlist, the conditions under which this
could take place was never in doubt: they would only be allowed
to serve in segregated units. Some blacks, albeit reluctantly,
again joined the army, primarily in such service posts as
stewards, drivers and cooks. (92)

Whilst the black soldiers' contribution to the war effort was
thus not recognised in the sense that those who had wished to
continue their military service were allowed to do so, there were
other forms of recognition, albeit rather few and of an ephemeral
nature. The most tangible kind of recognition was military medals
to which the ex-soldiers attached special importance.

After the First World War ex-members of the SANLC did not receive
any medals, whilst black soldiers from the High Commission
Territories were issued with war medals. The ex-members of the
SANLC regarded this treatment as extremely unfair and it remained
a long standing grievance amongst them. (93) However, the
Government assured the black soldiers who participated in the
Second World War that there would be no discrimination with
regard to the issuing of Campaign Stars and Medals. The black
soldiers would also be eligible for awards of bravery. (94) All
time soldiers received a War Medal 1939/1945, irrespective
of where they had served during the War. (95) In addition, awards
were also made to black soldiers who had distinguished themselves
through special acts of bravery. The numbers of soldiers thus
awarded are reflected in the following table:
Distinguished Conduct Medal 1
King's Medal for Bravery (Silver) 1
Military Medal 16
British Empire Medal 3
 Mentioned in Despatches 21
King's Commendation 6
King's Commendation (SA) 7
Commander-in-Chief's Commendations, Middle East 3
Certificates of good service by CGS (Union) 69

(96)

Holders of the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Military Medal received a gratuity of 20 pounds as well as an additional pension of 3d. per day if they had been discharged with pension. Furthermore, the Department of Native Affairs made a grant of 25 pounds to each member of the NMC who had received an award and a 10 pounds gratuity to each soldier who had received a mention in despatches. (97) The Campaign Stars and Medals which recognised the ordinary black soldier's contribution to the war effort, were, however, only issued in June 1951. (98)

A special ceremony was arranged at the Wanderers Grounds, Johannesburg, on 5 October 1945 where the Governor-General officiated at the investiture of medals to the members of the NMC. (99) In addition, 5 000 pounds were ear-marked by the Department of Native Affairs to organise peace celebrations at suitable points in the rural areas. The Native Commissioners of these areas were instructed to address these gatherings and explain the significance of the so-called "fight for freedom" and to express gratification for the loyalty shown by the blacks. (100) Furthermore, a NMC demonstration contingent also toured the Western Transvaal and British Bechuanaland so that the local chiefs could welcome back the soldiers who had enlisted from these areas. The soldiers and their officers also used this opportunity to show the local people the skills they had acquired during their military training. (101)

Some commentators, for example the editor of The Bantu World, thought that these celebrations and awards alone were not sufficient recognition:

"Well appreciated as they are, tender expressions and token awards alone, however, cannot be enough recognition of the services rendered by these men to their King and country. They have shown their loyalty and patriotism by deeds, and many of their comrades have lost their lives... Theirs, therefore, should not be in vain, and it is the bounden duty of the very King and country they have served so well to see that it is not so." (102)

Subsequent events proved that this appeal was indeed in vain. Black soldiers were not to receive any special post-war benefits (such as increased political rights, for instance) on the grounds of their war-time service. (103) Of course, the Government's funds were limited after the war and the notion that veterans should receive special treatment was not so strong anymore. After all, civilians had also contributed to the war effort.
Nevertheless, it must have sounded hypocritical to men who had only recently been told how vital their part had been in defeating the enemy.

Likewise, General Smuts' promise that South Africa will not forget the black soldier, (104) soon could be added to the list of numerous hollow promises. The black ex-volunteers quickly sank into oblivion and, unfortunately for some of them, this process eventually also meant loss of financial assistance. (105) Admittedly, the Governor-General's National War Fund increased its benefits to black ex-soldiers and their dependants through the years (106) but the State had refused to extend to these soldiers the social benefit of the War Veteran's Pension which was still available to whites and coloureds. The reason given for withholding such provision for old and ailing ex-servicemen was that these men were not considered as having been soldiers on active service. (107) This is indeed a far cry from the laudatory comments immediately after the war and left many black soldiers in dire straits. In 1979, for example, former Sergeant R. Moloi who holds a Military Medal for bravery in action, collected an old-age pension of R 37 and a war veterans' grant of R 5 every two months. After he had paid his rent and water bills, he had R 11,25 left every month for food, coal and clothing for himself and his daughter. (108)

While some black soldiers still had to make sacrifices even long after the war, others had already made the highest sacrifices during the war. The number of black soldiers who had died or were presumed dead outside the Union was 577 and inside the Union 946, totalling 1 523. (109)
FOOTNOTES


4. DNEAS NAS 3/1/7 A Box 2, C.M. Maranyane to L. Mosia, undated appended in DCS to DNEAS, 28/2/1945.


8. See Chapter 4.


10. See infra, p. 400-401.


13. See Chapter 4.

14. DNEAS NAS 1126/G Box 58, DGD to QMG, 8/2/1946.


26. See for instance DC 1516/1 Box 31, Minutes of a meeting between Prime Minister and deputation consisting of Senators Malcomess, Rheinallt Jones, Welsh and MP's Molteno, Hemming and Ballinger, 29/1/1942.


30. NMC NAS 3/21 A 5 Box 12, Letter No. 18 by Ndabazabantu, undated.


32. Gen. F.H. Theron Collection, Box 38, Gen. Theron to Right


35. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 1.1.117, Note by M. Ballinger on address by the Minister of Native Affairs to the Native Representative Council, undated.


39. NMC NAS 3/21 A 3 Box 14, Typescript of article to be published in all newspapers, accompanying letter, DNEAS to All European and Non-European papers, 1/2/1945.

40. NTS Box 9115 File 68/363, Message to NMC appended in SNA to H.S. Mockford, 12/9/1944. From the start D.L. Smit was apprehensive that "when our Natives come back to the Union they will have ideas which may have very far-reaching consequences." (DC 1516/2 Box 3629, D.L. Smit to C.H. Blaine, 21/8/1941).

41. NTS Box 1804 File 122/276, Notes for opening remarks of SNA at the Conference of Native Commissioners, 12/7/1944.

42. SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843 Box 105, N.A. Mitchell to Mr Lewis, 20/6/1945.

43. See Chapter 8.

44. See Infra, p. 399-402.

45. Interview with F. Sexwale, 6/2/1986. Other ex-soldiers also indicated that their military experience did not awake a political awareness in them. See interviews with J. Theledi, F. Mlambo, A. Mogale, I. Seko and W. Ngqungqa, 6/2/1986.

46. This ties in with the conclusion reached in recent research on the impact of the Second World War on the political consciousness of African servicemen. See for instance, Greenstein, "Africans in a European War", pp. 241-244 and
367-368, 372-373 and 412-415; Kiyaga-Mulindwa, "Bechuanaland
Protectorate and the Second World War", p. 49; Mokopakgosi, "The
impact of the Second World War: The case of the Kweneng", p. 18;
Schleh, "The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen in Ghana and
Uganda", pp. 208 and 216; K.P. Vickery, "Wars and rumours of wars:
Southern Rhodesian Africans and the Second World War", pp. 7-8;
Unpublished paper delivered at SOAS Conference on Africa and the
Second World War, May 1984 and Westcott, "The impact of the
Second World War on Tanganjika", p. 309.

47. NTS Box 9629 File 511/400, Additional NC, Rustenburg to H.
Rogers, 11/3/1942. See also; NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, DNEAS
to SNA, 3/8/1942 and NTS Box 9126 File 68/363/16, Acting CNC
Western Areas to Welfare Officer Springbok Legion, 1/5/1952 for
officials who interpreted the way in which black soldiers lodged
their complaints as insolent and arrogant behaviour whilst it
could well have been an indication of the self-confidence these
soldiers had acquired during their military service. See further
NMC NAS 3/36/1 A 4 Box 36, R.C. Tucker to OC's No. 1 and No. 2
NMC Garrison, 4/12/1943 for report on soldiers who scrutinised
and analysed orders.

48. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B. 2.5.54, B. Moleko to M.
Ballinger, 14/6/1946.

49. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 430920e, G.W. Xala to A.B. Xuma,
20/9/1943.

50. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 420708b, G.E.J. Mhlanza to A.B. Xuma,
8/7/1942; A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 460322b, DNEAS to
Treasurer-General ANC, 22/3/1946 and NMC NAS 3/1/7 A 5 Box 28,
Letters from M. Selabie and A. Leboka to Communist Party Office,
Johannesburg appended in DGS to DNEAS, 17/2/1943. It seems that
the ANC also tried to woo the ex-soldiers. On 5 October 1945 they
organised a function for ex-soldiers who had received awards for
heroism. (A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 450923b, A.B. Xuma to Secretary
Bantu Men's Social Centre, 23/9/1945).

51. NMC NAS 3/21/D A 3 Box 16, W.W. Mdini to "Bantu Soldiers'
Friend" column Indlouvu Tlou, 19/2/1945.

52. DNEAS NAS 3/21/D Box 14, J. Setshego to "Bantu Soldiers'
Friend" column Indlouvu Tlou, undated.

53. NEAS Paper Clippings, The Bantu World, 29/5/1943. See also
NMC NAS 3/21/A A 4 Box 14, Letter from F. Bornman appended in F.
Theron to E.T. Stubbs, 10/1/1942 and NMC NAS 3/21/K A 5 Box 19,
Manuscript by H. Mboyiya attached to DNEAS to TAC, 19/6/1945.

54. SAI RR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection O. World War II AD 843
Box 107, M.W.A. Ratlhogo to J.D.R. Jones, undated.

55. The direct political effect of participation in the Second
World War is still a controversial issue in the historiography of

56. K.W. Grundy maintains that he received his "political baptism" in this mutiny. This can, however, be disputed as there is no definite evidence that this incident directly contributed to his political development. (Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, p. 87).


59. See Chapter 8.

60. J.C. Smuts Papers A I Vol. 167 No. 57, Extracts from a report by the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, Johannesburg City Council, undated and A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 450423, Chairman ANC (Transvaal) to Secretary Transvaal Indian Congress, 23/4/1945.

61. NEAS Paper Clippings, Sun, 21/3/1943. See also A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 451217, Resolution passed at the Annual Congress, 14-17/12/1945; NEAS Paper Clippings The Bantu World, 29/5/1943 and NMC ETS/PERS B 13 Box 56, Minutes of 8th Session of the Native Representative Council, 8/8/1945.

62. M. Ballinger Papers A 410 B 1.1.32, Speech by Councillor Mosaka quoted in typescript draft of an article by M. Ballinger, 20/8/1946. See also the following references, all expressing the desire that freedom and justice would not only triumph after the war but also be applied to South Africa: A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 430209a, A.B. Xuma to C. Steyn, 9/2/1943; NTS Box 1768 File 62/276, Speech by Councillor E.T. Qamata during UTTGC Session, 1949; A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 411215b, Presidential address to ANC Annual Congress, 15/12/1941; Z.K. Matthews Papers BZA 78/9-78/13 B. 4.34, Manuscript titled "Africans and the War" by Z.K. Matthews for publication in Commonsense, 1942.

63. J.C. Smuts Papers A 1 Vol. 164 No. 45, SNA to Private Secretary, Prime Minister, 28/3/1946.

64. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 421221a, Presidential address to ANC Annual Congress, 21/12/1942. See also SAIRR Papers J.D.R. Jones Collection S. Senatorial Correspondence, Pamphlet published by Rev. M. Scott, Sophiatown, titled, "For Right and Justice"
undated; A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 450717b, A.B. Xuma to J.C. Smuts, 17/7/1945 and NTS Box 1702 File 45/276/1, Speech by Councillor G. Dana during UTTGC Session, 1945.


66. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 421221a, Presidential address to ANC Annual Congress, 21/12/1942.


69. Springbok Legion Records A 617, Minutes of a National Executive Council meeting, 5/2/1947.

70. NTS Box 7256 File 299/326, Typescript titled "A declaration to the Nations of the World" by Z.R. Mahabane, G.H. Gool and E.C. Roberts for the Non-European Unity Committee, accompanying letter I/D/Sgt C. van Schalkwyk to DCI Officer CI Department, Cape Town, 29/9/1945.


76. See A.W. Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfield" and Lodge, Black