THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AROUND DAVEYTON ON THE EAST RAND, 1970-1999

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Abstract
The purpose of the study is to analyse the development of informal settlements in South Africa, with particular reference to the role of the Government in the improvement of informal settlement conditions around Daveyton, especially at the Etwatwa informal settlement.

Research has shown that there is common experience in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in as far as the development of squatter settlements or informal settlements are concerned. This strongly reflects on the South African experience. The common feature and experience is that informal settlements are the result of urbanization, which is a world-wide phenomenon.

Research in countries has shown that migration to cities is based on people’s expectation of a better quality of life in urban areas. The expectations lead people to migrate even when they know that they will be unemployed and would have to live in squatter areas for some time. The decision to migrate is based among other reasons on rational economic grounds. It depended on migration cost, the perceptions and prospects of finding a job, and wage differentials between urban and rural areas. Urban incomes were practically always higher than rural ones and migrants to cities generally seemed to do relatively well in acquiring jobs and improving their standard of living. Most of these activities are performed in informal settlements.

Like in all developing countries, South Africa is no exception when it comes to the origin and development of squatter or informal settlements. The most common reasons are that people in their quest for a better life in urban areas end up living in informal settlements because they cannot find suitable accommodation.

The rapid population growth in developing countries, for example in countries such as South Africa, has resulted in huge housing backlogs. This led to the mushrooming of informal settlements around cities, towns and townships, of people waiting for adequate housing for their families. In Daveyton specifically, the housing backlog in the late 1970s resulted in the
emergence of backyard shacks, erected by people who were either residents of Daveyton, because of natural increase of the population, or people from neighbouring townships or rural areas.

The study of Daveyton has showed that because of forceful invasion of land by people who did not have accommodation, Daveyton experienced a mushrooming of informal settlements from 1987. In 1987 the Daveyton City Council accepted in principle that squatting was a legitimate means for homeless people to provide shelter for their families and therefore established a site-and-service scheme at Etwatwa, a new section of the township, to accommodate the homeless and lower income families.

For service provision the local government divided Etwatwa into two sections, Etwatwa West and Etwatwa East. Every household at Etwatwa West was provided with water and sewerage services, but at Etwatwa East only rudimentary services were provided. With the passage of time the local government tried to integrate the inhabitants of Etwatwa into an urban environment, through the provision of essential service such as water, roads, electricity and sewerage, and amenities such as community and social centres, recreational facilities, crèches, schools, churches and clinics. The provision of services depend largely on the availability of funds, through rent payments, loans and funds allocated by the Provincial and National Governments.

Generally the inhabitants of Etwatwa are happy about the way services are provided, but there is also a general complaint about the slow rate of delivery. The majority of Etwatwa residents have opted for in situ upgrading of their residences rather than having to be relocated to low cost housing provided by the Local Government. This has been of benefit to backyard residents of Daveyton, the majority of which have relocated to the low-cost houses provided by the Local Government, the Greater Benoni City Council.
Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie studie is om die ontwikkeling van informele nedersettings in Suid-Afrika te ontleed, met spesifieke verwysing na die rol van die regering met betrekking tot die verbetering van die toestande in die informele nedersettings rondom Daveyton, veral die Etwatwa informele nedersetting.

Navorsing het getoon dat daar gemeenskaplike ervarings in die ontwikkelende lande in Afrika, Asië en Latyns-Amerika is wat die ontwikkeling van plakkersdorpe of informele nedersettings betref. Dit laat die lig sterk op die Suid-Afrikaanse ervaring val. Die gemeenskaplike kenmerk en ervaring is dat informele nedersettings die gevolg van verstedeliking is, wat ’n wêreldwyse verskynsel is.

Navorsing in lande het getoon dat migrasie na stede gegrond is op mense se verwagtinge van ’n beter kwaliteit van lewe in stedelike gebiede. Die verwagtinge laat mense migreer al weet hulle dat hulle werkloos sal wees en vir ’n ruk in plakkersdorpe sal moet bly. Die besluit om te migreer is onder andere gegrond op rasionele ekonomiese oorwegings. Dit hang af van die koste om te migreer, die persepsies en vooruitsigte om ’n werk te kry, en loonverskille tussen stedelike en plattelandse gebiede. Stedelike inkomstes is gewoonlik hoër as dié in plattelandse gebiede en verhuisers na die stede vaar relatief goed in hulle soeke na werk en die verbetering van lewenstandaarde. Die meeste van hierdie aktiwiteite vind in informele nedersettings plaas.

Soos in alle ontwikkelende lande is Suid-Afrika geen uitsondering wanneer dit kom by die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van plakkersdorpe of informele nedersettings nie. Die algemeenste redes is dat mense in hul soeke na ’n beter lewe in stedelike gebiede in informele nedersettings beland omdat hulle nie geskikte verblyf kan kry nie.

Die vinnige bevolkingsaanwas in ontwikkelende lande, byvoorbeeld in lande soos Suid-Afrika, het groot behuisingsagterstande veroorsaak. Dit het daartoe gelei dat informele nedersettings rondom stede, dorpe en townships
verrys, deur mense wat vir geskikte behuising vir hul gesinne wag. In Daveyton spesifiek, het die agterstand in behuising in die laat 1970's tot die ontstaan van agterplaashutte geleë as gevolg van die toename in die beveling, wat deur mense opgerig is wat of inwoners van Daveyton was, of uit naaburige townships of plattelandse gebiede gekom het.

Die studie van Daveyton het getoon dat as gevolg van die geweldadige besetting van grond deur mense wat nie verblyf het nie, het Daveyton sedert 1987 'n snelle uitbreiding van informele nedersettings ervaar. In 1987 het die Daveyton Stadsraad dit in beginsel goedgekeur dat om te plak 'n wettige manier is vir mense om skuiling aan hulle gesinne te voorsien en het daarom 'n terrein-en-dienekskema by Etwatwa, 'n nuwe deel van die township, gevestig om die hawelessen en gesinne met 'n lae inkomste te akkommodeer.

Ter wille van die voorsiening van dienste het die plaaslike owerheid Etwatwa in twee gedeel, naamlik Etwatwa-Wes en Etwatwa-Oos. Elke huisshouding in Etwatwa-Oos is van water en riooldienste voorsien, maar aan Etwatwa-Oos is net basiese dienste verskaf. Met verloop van tyd het die plaaslike owerheid probeer om die inwoners van Etwatwa by 'n stedelike omgewing te integrateer deur die verskaffing van noodsaaklike dienste soos water, elektrisiteit en riolering, en geriewe soos gemeenskaps- en sosiale sentra, rekreasiesfasiliteite, crèches, skole, kerke en klinieke. Die voorsiening van dienste hang grootliks af van die beskikbaarheid van fondse, deur huurgeld, lenings en fondse wat deur die Provinsiale Nasionale Regerings bewillig is.

Oor die algemeen is die inwoners van Etwatwa gelukkig oor die wyse waarop dienste verskaf word, maar daar is 'n algemene klagte oor stadige aflewering. Die meerderheid van Etwatwa inwoners het in situ-opgradering van hulle huise gekies eerder as om na laekoste-behuising te verskuif, wat deur die plaaslike owerheid verskaf word. Dit het die agterplaasinwoners van Daveyton bevoordeel, waarvan die meerderheid na die laekoste-behuising wat deur die plaaslike regering, die Groter Benoni Stadsraad, verskaf is, verhuis het.
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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Access to shelter (that is, access to land, dwelling units and basic infrastructure) in urban areas is one aspect of any socio-economic dispensation in which low income life opportunities is addressed. La Grange contends that shelter is at the same time a primary component of socio-economic policy since access to adequate shelter enables low income communities to deal with other pressing problems, such as access to employment, health and education.¹

Most of the developing countries in Asia, South America and Africa are confronted by the problem of informal settlements. This problem arises from the movement of people from rural areas to urban areas in search of work and better living conditions.

According to Maasdorp, informal settlements, squatter-settlements or shantytowns are synonymous with rapid urbanisation and urban growth in Third World cities. They superficially present a number of common characteristics, for example they provide shelter for the poor, occupy land of low value, often but not always, have peripheral location, are physically dominated by poor quality dwellings and are developed spontaneously elsewhere in the township, town or city.²

The rapid population growth in developing countries, for example in countries such as South Africa, has resulted in huge housing backlogs. This
has led to the mushrooming of informal settlements around cities, towns and townships, of people waiting for adequate housing for their families.

According to Parker, the response to the housing need has usually been to initiate housing building programmes which had a tendency to become more and more expensive and eventually less effective. The end result is that in order to maintain the cost of a housing programme, the number of units built must be reduced. This therefore results in the housing backlog, hence the mushrooming of informal settlements around cities and towns, also in South Africa.

Informal settlements in South Africa are often referred to as squatter settlements. According to Platzky and Walker, in South Africa this term is used to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser, and it may be used to describe areas of settlements which are not planned or approved by the local authorities or the state. Housing is erected by the occupants of the land themselves, generally from unorthodox materials. These areas are densely populated and generally poorly serviced. It should be noted that homeless people in the townships are officially referred to as squatters, but often these squatters have a legal right to live in the townships and some even pay monthly rentals for their shacks.

Squatter settlements, despite their relative and absolute inadequacies as residential environments, are often the most rapidly expanding sections of
townships and provide accommodation for the increasing number of township inhabitants, like Daveyton.

The term informal settlement will be used here to refer to residential development which broadly conforms to the following: residential areas that developed spontaneously, that was not the result of formal planning, consisted of dwellings which did not necessarily conform to building norms and legal standards, and were not generally part of the township, town or city's serviced area. For the sake of uniformity in this study, informal settlements and squatter settlements will be used as synonyms.

1.1 Exposition of the problem
South Africa, like most developing countries, is confronted by a huge housing backlog, which arose from the mushrooming of informal settlements all over the country. This study will determine whether South Africa is succeeding in addressing this problem in comparison to other developing countries, specifically with reference to informal settlements around Daveyton. Informal settlements emerged as a result of land invasion in major towns of South Africa during the late 1940s. The National Party government's response to subsequent squatter settlements was to formulate a shift in state policy. Despite initial beliefs to the contrary among the government officials and the White citizens, almost all the squatters were employed in urban centres around South Africa, and therefore had to be housed somewhere near.
The informal settlements in which Blacks had congregated were, however, viewed as a serious threat by the government. They were self-administered and totally out of control of the white authorities. They were seen to be unhygienic and they were consequently deemed to be both a short-term and long-term threat to social order and public health. After a painful policy reappraisal in the 1940s the government decided to accept the permanent presence of these communities in towns, and to convert them into controlled site and service camps, hence the establishment of townships, like Daveyton, throughout South Africa.

One factor that warrants attention is that one of the most powerful constituencies that carried the National Party into power in 1948, was the White farmers, who had become increasingly agitated at the draining away of the labour supply to towns. In contradiction to the old conventional wisdom on apartheid, which viewed National Party policy as attempting to turn all African urban workers into rightless temporary sojourners in the towns, the National Party Government decided to stabilise the existing urban population in family units and family accommodation and use this to provide for the town’s labour supply. This implied the provision of rudimentary housing and education for the newly settled urban Black population. Squatter movements, site and service schemes, and ultimately the scores of four and three roomed houses, coupled with stringent influx control, showed the government's success in controlling informal settlements in South Africa.
According to the White Paper on Housing published in December 1994, approximately 13.5% of all households (1.06 million) in South Africa, were living in squatter accommodation, mostly in free-standing settlements on the periphery of cities and towns and in the backyards of formal houses. The estimated number of households in South Africa in 1995 was 9.3 million. The estimated population increase was one million people per annum. Given the projected rate of population growth, an average of 200 000 new households will have to be provided for annually between 1995 and 2000 if South Africa wishes to cope with the provision of housing.

The question now is how the South African authorities dealt with informal settlements through the history of informal settlements in this country and how can current policies and actions be evaluated in terms of the international experience of informal settlements.

1.2 Aim of the study and the time frame

The aim of the study is to analyse the development of informal settlements in South Africa with particular reference to the role of the Government in facilitating informal settlements around Daveyton township on the East Rand.

The historical perspective of this study is the earlier attempts by the Government after the Second World War to address the issue of
informal settlements around South Africa as compared to other developing countries, i.e. how the South Africa government tried to control and address informal settlements.

As the purpose of this study is to analyse and assess the role of the Government in the improvement of informal settlement conditions around Daveyton, this study will focus on the period from the late 1970's when Daveyton started to experience housing shortages, to the 1990s. These shortages led to the erection of shacks in the backyards of formal houses in Daveyton and later to the forceful invasion of land around Daveyton leading to the mushrooming of squatter settlements around Daveyton.

This study will therefore examine the role the Government had played and is playing in improving conditions of the people living in informal settlements, in and around Daveyton.

1.3 **Research Methodology**

In order to devise an integrated approach to the formulation and application of a strategy for the improvement of informal settlements applicable to South Africa, it is imperative to make use of various primary, secondary and tertiary sources from different perspectives. The sources relevant for this study has been extracted as follows:
1.3.1 Primary Sources

First hand knowledge of informal settlements is an inevitable link in this study in view of the fact that the primary theoretical component is based on the adaptation of international literature to the South African context. The experience of informal settlement housing experts in South Africa has been lacking from the literature of informal housing. By means of numerous personal interviews with specialists in housing from the central, provincial and local government level, this practical experience has been extracted and adapted to formulate recommendations with regard to the informal housing process. First hand information from inhabitants of informal settlements was also obtained from site visits to various informal settlement locations, e.g. Etwatwat East, Etwatwa West, Barcelona, Chris Hani and Zenzele to mention a few. These visits were only undertaken after an in-depth study of the theoretical principles of informal settlements.

The diverse background of the experts interviewed, e.g. government, policy experts, town planners, city engineers and environmentalists, has permitted a synthesised and integrated approach to the broad parameters of housing in South Africa, especially in the context of informal settlements. Primary sources from the Benoni Municipal Archives were also consulted. Mr. Kobus Hough and Mr. De Villiers Visser made available minutes of the meetings of the Daveyton City Council from the 1980s to the era of the Greater Benoni City Council in 1994. They are both officials of the Greater Benoni City Council.
1.3.2 Secondary Sources

The most important secondary sources consulted on the study of informal housing are the following:


This study argues that because the majority of urban Blacks are too poor to afford the building of conventional houses, they had to erect "Mekhukhu", a Sotho word meaning "shack dwelling". Even in official resettlement areas, these informal settlements were likely to become cities of tomorrow. The object of the study was to look at the problem of homelessness, a problem that had become especially acute since the lifting of restrictions on migration from the designated homeland and from White farms to urban areas. This study investigates the organisation of these settlements, in order to establish with whom the government could negotiate in order to improve the living conditions in and outside these informal settlements.

(ii) **Parker, E. (1995) "Squatters as a new class of home owner".**

The study evaluated the long term effectiveness of large housing and shelter projects. The nature, extent and theoretical perspective of the housing crisis was discussed, with particular reference to developing countries such as South Africa. The study traced the development of housing policy and legislation in South Africa as well as housing
alternatives and the affordability to squatters. Finally guidelines are proposed to avoid creating more urban ghettos for the poor. The study concluded that, delivery of shelter (a serviced site and small covered area) as opposed to housing, was necessary.

(iii) Turner, JFC. (1978) "Barriers and channels for housing development in modernising countries".

This source serves to highlight the practical application of self help housing as a mechanism of upgrading informal settlements. This study highlighted the use of self help as a mechanism of alleviating the present housing backlog and permitting sectoral cohesion. Attention is given to the availability of multiple options which could be exercised for the upgrading of informal settlements, e.g. self help being one such option. By establishing a balance between formal and private involvement in the housing process, a variety of international case studies highlighted a diversity of approaches which, when adapted to the South African situation, would enable a checks and balances approach to formal/private participation in the upgrading process of informal settlements.


The primary focus of this study was on the needs, actions and capabilities of the poor with regard to the present housing backlog in
South Africa. This study concentrated primarily on global housing tendencies in the developing world. This enabled the study to develop a balanced perception of global housing tendencies based on experience and present trends in a Third World environment, in a similar context to what is at present the case in South Africa.


The study focused on solutions to housing problems which gave rise to informal settlements. It showed that solutions to housing problems differed and still differ greatly among cities and countries of the developing world. These variations might be due to adherence to unrealistically high standards for the construction of new housing and the refusal to accept existing low quality dwellings as a solution to the current housing shortage. This resulted in a cycle of construction and demolition with the result that the poor could only settle in peri-urban areas. The inappropriate housing standards, the lack of urban land and urban services, and the nature of the mortgage lending structure of financial institutions, combined with an increase in the number of slum and informal settlements in developing countries. They maintain that the best way to improve housing conditions would be the upgrading of informal settlements, site and service projects, aided self help or variants of these three approaches.

The study is acknowledged as the most comprehensive synthesized study on informal housing. The study explained the various fundamental approaches to informal housing, inter alia the Liberal and Marxist approaches. In essence, the integrated approach to informal housing was obtained from this study, which permitted an inter-disciplinary approach to informal housing, adapted specifically to suit South African circumstances.

Other reputable writers consulted include Norwood, Peil, Bonner, Sapire, Hendler and many other who worked under the banner of the Urban Foundation. A number of researches have been conducted on informal settlements around South African's major cities like Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, and on the East Rand. An in depth study on informal settlements in and around Daveyton has not been undertaken, hence the necessity of this study.

1.3.3 **Newspapers, Magazines and Chronicles**

A fundamental problem regarding the formulation of a strategy to upgrade informal settlements, was that the various theoretical models proposed were often outdated and not appropriate to the current situational context of the poor in both urban and rural context. In order to update these concepts and obtain situationally applicable data to the present situation, it was
imperative for the parameters of this study to use tertiary sources. The use of topical and up to date newspaper articles, chronicles and magazines enabled the clarification of current trends, criticism and evaluation with regard to the merit of proposed schemes of informal housing in the context of the present housing backlog and multiple options available to alleviate the problem. Newspapers, magazines and chronicles most frequently used in the study included the following: The Star, The Sunday Times, The Sowetan, Benoni City Times, South African Historical Journal, South African Geographic Journal, Journal of Southern African Studies, Journal of Historical Geography, The Opendoor and the Local Government Digest.

1.4 Historiography

Few forms of shelter have evoked as much controversy and emotions as informal housing, or to use another term, housing which is established unconventionally. Throughout the world, it has been attacked by state, private and political interests fearful of seemingly uncontrolled urban expansion and of political mobilisation of informal settlements.

Informal settlements or housing has been condemned by Lerner, Stopforth and Juppenplatz, as a vehicle for the reproduction of urban and rural poverty, and celebrated by Manging and Turner, as an expression of creativity and determination of people who do not enjoy access to formal housing. While there is a great diversity of views on the social and political role of informal settlements, there is no doubt that informal settlements are important in the lives of millions of people throughout the
developing world. Indeed in many countries, it was and still is, the dominant form of housing delivery, especially when there are numerous Third World cities where most of the population lives in some form of informal housing.

More than a decade or two ago, it was common for official attitudes towards informal settlements to be generally negative. Perceived as illegal, and often illegal by definition, informal settlement was a kind of urban cancer, something which should be overcome, eradicated or punished.\textsuperscript{13} The inhabitants tended to be blamed for causing the settlement, without much recognition being given to broader issues which lay behind their formation. Furthermore, the unhealthy and unsanitary living conditions which typified much of the settlement, were frequently perceived as a threat to the orderly growth of the city, and the improverished conditions as a source of political unrest and uprising.

The negative perception of informal settlement was reinforced by many researchers of this period. Juppenplatz in 1970 for example, described the informal settlements as "... a fungus attached to and growing out of the carapace of the city".\textsuperscript{14} In 1978, Lerner again described informal settlements as "... flotsam and jetsam who lived in tin can cities that infected the metropolitan centres of every developing country from Cairo to Manila".\textsuperscript{15}

These perceptions were reflected in official policy. Controls were sought over the movement of rural populations into the city and in the eradication and demolition of settlements which existed, the so-called bulldozer
approach described by Maasdorp in 1977.\textsuperscript{16} It may be added that official concern about informal settlements tended to focus greater attention on the extent to which it reflected a loss of control over urban development and growth, rather than concern about physical conditions in the settlements and the discomforts suffered by the inhabitants. However, eradication programmes in some instances, were combined with housing projects, which attempted to rehouse inhabitants in better quality and better serviced accommodation.\textsuperscript{17}

Gilbert, Gugler and Maasdorp maintained that it was difficult to generalise about the success of this policy, but contended that almost everywhere, the results were discouraging.\textsuperscript{18} Eradication programmes very clearly made no contribution towards improving conditions for those whose shelters were demolished. It seldom resulted in migrants returning to rural areas and often shifted the problem to some other part of the city. More significantly, the persistence and continued growth of informal settlements, indicated that the policy had done little to prevent their formation and expansion. Evidence also showed that new housing was often too expensive for those rehoused. It was costly for housing authorities, and the rate at which new housing could be built could not keep pace with the demand generated by rapid urban growth.

Informed by this reality, and the growing recognition of the futility of demolishing informal settlements without viable alternatives, a growing international re-evaluation of informal housing has been occurring since the 1960s. This realization contributed towards an important
reconceptualisation of informal settlements in developing countries (Third World) and seminal work emerged from research carried out in Latin America during the 1960s. William Manging, for example, rejected the negative attitudes which many official bodies had adopted. He demonstrated that the inhabitants of many informal settlements were not all direct rural migrants, which is the case in South Africa, but had first lived in other parts of the city. They were well organised and politically shrewd, the settlements were well laid out by inhabitants, nuclear families predominated and levels of organised and petty crimes, delinquency and prostitution were shown to be low. Indeed, Manging viewed informal settlements as a solution to the housing shortage and lack of cheap accommodation available to the poor.19

Another important researcher (also working in Latin America at that time) was John Turner. He argued that informal settlements were a consequence of rapid urbanisation and modernisation which could not be changed or prevented. He suggested that uncontrolled urban settlements were a manifestation of normal urban growth under exceptional conditions of rapid urbanisation. Comparing the inner city slums of Lima in Peru with the peripheral informal settlements, Turner demonstrated that whereas conditions in the slums tended to deteriorate, conditions in peripheral settlements of Lima improved.20 This is also applicable to South Africa, especially in the Etwatwa informal settlements around Daveyton, where the authorities have allocated the inhabitants formal sites. The inhabitants who could afford it, started building formal structures.
Turner went further to argue that the creativity displayed by the poor by providing themselves with accommodation under difficult circumstances, was the result of their "autonomy" from the constraints of conventional housing provision. They were able to build without conforming to restrictive standards and regulations and because of this, were able to produce housing better matched to their needs, within the limits of what they could afford. Housing produced in the "autonomous" manner served the interest of the poor to a much greater extent than housing produced by formal institutions.  

This conception of informal settlement, the way in which inhabitants behaved, and their needs and priorities, were translated into new policy proposals which Third World housing authorities were urged to adopt. If, as Turner argued, the autonomous settlements were essentially normal processes of urban growth, then it followed that autonomous urban settlements were both the product of, and the vehicle for, activities which were essential in the process of modernisation.

Gugler and Gilbert maintained that the eradication programmes were thus obstacles which prevented modernisation and development. What governments were supposed to do was to give recognition to the role played by informal settlements in the development process to the advantage of autonomous, self-motivated activity that produced housing better suited to the needs of the poor, and then help the poor to help themselves. Perlman summarised that advice by contenting that the inhabitants of the informal settlements had the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of
pioneers and the value of patriots, but what they did not have was the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations.\textsuperscript{24}

The most important of the new housing policies, intended specially to address the problem of informal settlements, were the so-called upgrading strategies. These involved the creation of the necessary conditions for autonomous improvement, such as secure tenure and access to finance, and the installation of services and facilities. It should be noted that arguments in favour of incorporating autonomous housing activities into formal housing programmes, provided a great deal of the rationale for the application of self-help strategies to create new housing on serviced land in what is commonly called "site-and-service" projects. This was a common occurrence in Etwatwa, the main area of this study.

The rapid adoption of upgrading and site and service strategies as a solution to the housing problems faced by authorities, was partly a consequence of an acceptance of these arguments. However, other advantages were also perceived. It offered, among other things, a solution to the housing problem caused by rapid urban growth, a more economic and feasible housing strategy, and a new way to help alleviate the plight of the poor.

Commenting on the implications, Haarhoff and Maasdorp, supported by Gilbert and Gugler, noted that in one sense there was progress in government responses to the housing situation. There was a consensus that most Third World governments were incapable of building sufficient homes
to remove informal housing and that greater reliance should be placed on some kind of self help policy.\textsuperscript{25}

Backing was quick to come from organisations like the World Bank and the United Nations. The Habitat Conference of 1976 not only demonstrated that Third World countries shared many common housing problems, but also that they were able to reach surprising agreement on urban housing policies, particularly with regard to informal settlements.\textsuperscript{26} Gugler and Gilbert in their review of housing policies in seventeen Third World countries represented at the conference, noted that squatter upgrading programmes had generally replaced demolition of squatter settlements\textsuperscript{27}, a process currently taking place in and around Daveyton informal settlements since the early 1990s.

These more positive policies, however were subjected to criticism and some doubt, and this was particularly evident in the literature of the 1980s.

Obudho and Mhlanga commented that the site and service schemes and squatter upgrading programmes had undoubtably arrived at the international scene, and represented the most important reforms in the housing policies of the developing countries in the 1970s. At the same time such a policy was not without many dangers, not least the risk that it might be turned into a universal answer to the housing problem.\textsuperscript{28}

The question that arose from these arguments was why should such strategies like upgrading and site and service projects with their emphasis
on self-help, not be the answer to the housing problems in the Third World cities? Upgrading, for example, did offer the prospect of bringing about an improvement in the quality of life experiences of the poor, through more secure tenure and access to basic services previously lacking. The answer suggested was that too little attention was paid to broader factors which might limit and condition the ability of the poor to respond autonomously as suggested by Turner.29

From a more radical perspective, Burgess and Castells argued that strategies like upgrading, which reduced state expenditure and placed greater reliance on self-help construction would fail to bring about a reduction in inequality because they were rooted in a structural condition of the capitalist mode of production. Housing strategies of that kind represented nothing less than the attempts of capital interests to lessen the housing shortage in ways that did not interfere with the effective operation of those interests.30

The doubts raised about the Turner type of conceptualisation and policy, reflected both reformist and radical perspectives in dealing with informal settlements. However, regardless of theoretical approach, there was a degree of agreement on a need to address the more structural character of the housing issues, although there were disagreements amongst researchers on what these structural issues should be.

From a policy perspective, Drakakis-Smith suggested that most discussions of Third World housing tended to examine micro-policies or policies for housing, and concentrated on methods and strategies, usually analysed in a
restricted set of programmes in a limited spatial frame. What was often lacking was a better understanding of the broader structural context which gave rise to the phenomenon in the first place.\textsuperscript{31}

The major contention was that unless those broader issues were addressed, micro-policies and strategies alone such as upgrading, would not effectively deal with the wider problems of extensive informal settlement. Upgrading could improve the quality of living in selected settlements or areas, but that did not ensure coordinated planning or development in rapidly growing cities. It would not necessarily prevent the growth and expansion of settlement, indeed, the prospect of better living conditions in urban areas could accelerate migration from rural areas where conditions were far from worse.\textsuperscript{32}

Researchers who have addressed their studies to these broader issues, have identified access to urban land, speculation, discriminatory urban and development policies, and indeed the existence of poverty itself, as being among the issues which required better understanding. All these issues were or are of a kind that informal settlement dwellers cannot resolve themselves, no matter how hard they try.

In South Africa during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, attempts were made to explain the conflict which was developing around the mushrooming of informal settlements. Several of these writers adopted a view that housing and other social questions arose inevitably due to natural migration from the countryside to the towns and cities and had been worsened by the
government's apartheid policy, which wanted to enforce racially separated residential areas. Another analyst proposed that class conflict was the major factor which contributed to the fundamental shortage and relatively high cost of housing in the residential locations. These theorists who perceived class conflict as the major factor shaping the manifestation of informal settlements were sympathetic towards what they viewed as the just aspirations of an oppressed majority for cheaper accommodation.\textsuperscript{33}

Liberal writers like Franszen, Sadie, Maasdorp, Haarhoff, Pillay, Morris, Mullins and Van der Waal, all assumed that the population explosion and rural urban migration were major causes of urbanisation and more particularly of the Black housing shortage which gave birth to informal settlements.\textsuperscript{34} These assumptions were also held by the Urban Foundation which, as an organisation, was committed to seeking a solution to the housing problem.

This study will therefore focus on the manifestation of informal settlements on the East Rand with particular reference to Daveyton. The main focus will be on how informal settlements manifested themselves around Daveyton, given the parameters of government policy and what the government did and is doing to upgrade the standard of living in the informal settlements in and around Daveyton from the 1970s to the 1990s.
1.5 The comparative international perspective on informal settlements

This section will assess the origin and development of informal settlements in developing countries. Comparisons will be made of government policies in developing countries and how informal settlements or squatters have been treated in comparable Third World environments. Comparisons will be drawn from studies specifically undertaken in Latin American countries and Africa, including South Africa.

There are two reasons why a thorough examination of this experience is urgently required. First, there is a pressing need to address the problems of existing informal settlements. Secondly, policy makers are being confronted with the reality of a massive housing backlog and a growing population that is producing thousands of new households that need new housing each year.

The phenomenon of informal settlements was and still is a highly emotive issue, with different perspectives and shifts, depending on the position of the commentator. For example, from the side of the home and property owner, squatters are feared as space invaders who devalue properties as they forcefully invade every available piece of land at their disposal. On the other hand, squatters move in on a piece of land with a mixture of frustration and desperation. Since the early 1980s, they were therefore either moved, evacuated and conned by opportunists selling land which they did not own, because they
battled for a roof or shelter over their heads, especially in Etwatwa around Daveyton.\textsuperscript{36}

The housing in informal settlements or squatter settlements is usually made of wood, mud, tin, cardboard and tar-paper, among other materials, which represents a desperate attempt by individuals to provide shelter when there is a lack of alternatives. These settlements are located on land occupied without the consent of the owner. The squatters usually build their houses or shacks without the assistance of the government.\textsuperscript{37}

Stren has offered an attempt at a universal definition of informal settlements or squatter settlements, namely an area in which the people have built themselves houses without regard to survey boundaries, whether or not such boundaries have been established, and where the squatter houses may sometimes be as good as many houses built on survey plots to which the house owners have the rights of occupancy.\textsuperscript{38} However, most of these areas have poorer urban amenities than areas where houses were built on surveyed plots. Roads, schools, water and electric facilities, refuse disposal services, surface water drainage, etc. in squatter areas were markedly inferior to those in formal settlements.\textsuperscript{39}

This definition is in line with the definition by Platsky and Walker in the South African context, as noted in the discussion referred to in footnote 4. Therefore it can be inferred that informal settlements or
squatting is triggered by factors such as enforced migration of refugees, and the search for subsistence in urban areas and opportunism.\textsuperscript{40} Areas such as these have developed rapidly in Third World countries as a result of or as a by product of urban landlessness, or where there is a large gap between the populations' demand for cheap housing and the supply by conventional institutions, for example at Etwatwa informal settlement around Daveyton, which is the area of this study.\textsuperscript{41}

Informal settlements develop on empty land near towns and cities, especially in areas either close to centres of employment or close to public transportation. Some settlements develop over a period of time while others are built literally overnight as a result of a large-scale planned invasion, a common occurrence in South African towns and cities e.g. Apex near Benoni. The type of buildings erected by squatters differ in the type of materials available. Most are one-storey, makeshift dwellings. Abrams has pointed out that while most informal settlements or squatter settlements are also slums, slums are not necessarily squatter settlements.\textsuperscript{42} Slum areas develop within the city or town, whereas informal settlements develop on the fringe of a town or city. A common occurrence now is that these areas develop in open spaces in and around townships.

A number of studies on the growth and nature of informal settlements in Africa since the 1970s have concluded that these forms of settlements are temporary solutions to difficult problems in housing,
politics, physical planning, landlessness and employment in urban areas.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore "informal settlements" can be described as a term used in developing countries to denote residential development which broadly conforms to the following: residential areas which develop spontaneously, that have no formal planning or management, have dwellings which would not necessarily conform to building norms and legal standards and are not generally part of towns' or cities' serviced area especially with regard to water, electricity, etc.\textsuperscript{44}

According to Peil, the attitudes of colonial and independent governments to urban housing have also had an important effect on informal settlements. The colonial and post-colonial governments of African countries only provided houses for the upper and middle classes without paying attention to low income residents. Consequently, the majority of West Africans built a number of squatter settlements during post-colonial times. Squatter settlements were less numerous during the colonial era than in present day West Africa.\textsuperscript{45} In places such as Cotonou, Benin, Dakar and Senegal, where French colonialism introduced restrictive building and land policies, squatter settlements developed only during the post-colonial era. In British-colonial West Africa, with less restrictive urban building and land policy requirements, squatter settlements developed on a small scale during the colonial era and increased in magnitude during the post-colonial era in Ghana.\textsuperscript{46}
In the central and eastern parts of Africa, for example in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), the Belgian colonial Government attempted to ensure that those who came to town settled down there permanently. They kept a close check on residents and assisted house building by providing inexpensive land and loans for materials. Relatively high wages encouraged migrants to settle in town with their families. After independence the then Zaïrean government found it almost impossible to stop the flow of migrants to towns and the planned settlement of Kinshasa suburbs were flooded with squatters. That was the beginning of squatter settlements in Kinshasa as well as in other cities of Zaïre.

In East Africa, the Kenyan colonial policy of permitting White agriculture at the expense of Black agriculture, forced many Africans to leave their land for the cities and gave them less to go home to. Agricultural land in Kenya tended to be grossly overcrowded and this increased the pressure to settle permanently in town. As a result Ross reported in 1973 that 74% of the squatters he studied in Mathare Valley near Nairobi were landless, and no viable alternative to urban residence existed. Lacking this choice, urban housing was essential and since they had no money to buy land, they squatted in Mathare Valley and thus developed informal settlements.

On the other hand, Government policy exacerbated the situation by failing to provide low cost building land available, but at the same time gradually destroyed the Punwani settlement in Central Nairobi,
which was the chief source of cheap rented rooms. People could not afford to move, as the government had expected, to relatively expensive estates. Some Mathare squatters bought land when it became available, indicating that a lack of official planning was an important factor in squatting.

Stren pointed out that squatting continued to increase in Mombasa, though the provision of private low-cost housing seemed to be better there than in Nairobi. The failure of authorised housing provision to keep up with the increase in permanent residents was probably as important in Mombasa as in Lusaka.

In Southern Africa, tight control over land and housing and a lack of agricultural alternatives were also important in Zambia. The British colonial government was influenced by the policies of South Africa and Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, to aim at a migratory rather than a permanent labour force, but did little to improve peasant agriculture. So the villagers who were not in the neighbourhood of railway lines often resorted to subsistence farming. Attempts to keep wages down were less successful in the copper mines, and mine towns attracted far more migrants than jobs available.

Housing erected by Africans was considered a health danger, so attempts were made to house all urban residents in controlled rented accommodation. Since this was tied to wage employment, the self employed were in fact squatters. Government and employer-
controlled housing encouraged squatting if other means of accommodation were not available, because the standards of government housing were often higher than what low-income marginally employed migrants could afford, and because those who intended to stay in towns, needed a secure roof over their heads.

Heisler found that until the 1970s home ownership among wage employees in Zambia was the exception to the rule, as in Ghana and Nigeria. In the latter countries, home ownership was and is often accompanied by a shift from wage to self employment. The increase in urban ownership in Zambia, both official and informal since independence, was related to a considerable decline in attacks on unauthorised settlements which allowed greater access to land and more tolerance of the cheap housing workers could afford. By 1973, 42% of the Lusaka population were squatters.\textsuperscript{54}

What is therefore a common experience in Africa, Asia and Latin America, is that squatter settlements or informal settlements are the results of urbanisation, which is a world-wide phenomenon. Research in developing countries has shown that migration to cities is based on people’s long-term expectation of a better quality of life in urban areas.\textsuperscript{55} The expectations lead people to migrate even when they know that they will be unemployed and will have to live in squatter areas for some time.\textsuperscript{56} The decision to migrate is based, among other reasons, on rational economic grounds. It depends on migration costs, the perceptions and prospects of finding a job, and
wage differentials between urban and rural areas. Urban incomes are practically always higher than rural ones, and migrants to cities generally seem to do relatively well in acquiring jobs and improving their standard of living.\textsuperscript{57} Most of these activities are performed in informal settlements.

On the peripheries of Latin America’s major cities, like in Africa and Asia, a vast migrant population has occupied vacant areas, and established a network of squatter settlements. Known as barriadas (Lima), barrio's (Caracas), callampas (Chile) or favelas (Sao Paulo), these legally unrecognised communities are often considered marginal to the existing political and economic system.\textsuperscript{58} Generally the inhabitants receive no municipal services, such as electricity and water, etc., and lack legal titles to their homes. Often 25\% or more of the squatter settlers lack stable employment. In Lima, Caracas, these migrant squatters represent one-third of the metropolitan population.\textsuperscript{59}

Like in all developing countries, South Africa is no exception when it comes to the origin and development of squatter settlements. The most common reasons are that people, in their quest for a better life in the urban areas, end up living in informal settlements because they cannot find suitable accommodation. In South Africa, by the late 1940s, vast squatter settlements mushroomed around urban centres. The central government began to recognize the seriousness of the African housing crisis and the predicament of the municipalities.
Accordingly, the state began to devise ways of reducing housing costs. In 1951 the Native Building Workers Act (No. 27 of 1951) was passed permitting the use of African artisans in building townships. This was to contribute in the 1950s to a considerable reduction in the cost of constructing housing for the growing urban African population. It was also in the early 1950s that the "site and service" scheme was officially adopted. In the "site and service" scheme a Black resident was given a serviced plot where he could build a temporary shack at the corner of a stand on which a municipal contractor was building his house, or if he could afford it, he built the house himself and then demolished the shack. Controlled and serviced self-help housing schemes for Blacks reduced the financial burden, while at the same time avoiding the dangers posed by uncontrolled squatter settlements.

The international experience has shown that apart from the common response of total neglect, there have been two major policy reactions to informal settlements. The first entailed the widespread and sometimes brutal demolition of shacks. Demolition was particularly favoured by authoritarian regimes often with the objective of crushing populist opposition in informal settlements, for example removals, undertaken by military regimes in Argentine, Brazil and Chile. Squatter removal programmes were common world-wide from 1950 onwards with examples in Africa (Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal) and Asia (South Korea, Philippines, India). Some removals were accompanied by the limited provision of public housing, but many
others simply left victims with little option but to make new informal arrangements. 63

The second recent policy reaction has been to seek to harness informal housing processes in an effort to house as many people as possible. In general, the vehicle adopted was the provision of new housing through variants of the site and service scheme and the rehabilitation of existing informal housing via processes of "in situ" upgrading. The 1960s - 1970s saw widespread experimentation with site and service, and upgrading in many countries for example Kenya, Zambia, India, Morocco, Egypt, Bolivia, Phillippines, including South Africa. In recent years the initial enthusiasm has been replaced by a more sober approach which recognises and seeks to overcome the shortcomings of these housing strategies. 64

The following observations drawn from international experiences are positive signposts for housing policy in South Africa:

- Successful housing policies for developing countries must be balanced and multifaceted. Policies that have pursued a single solution to housing problems have failed.
- Housing policies incorporating and supporting informal settlements offer a realistic and sustainable way to deal with the scale and nature of housing problems in the developing countries.
Site and service schemes and "in situ" upgrading are complementary elements of housing policies that incorporate informal housing, but they require determined, national political will and a commitment to partnership to survive.

Innovation and boldness are required if managed informal settlement experiments are to be expanded into national housing solutions.

Community participation is essential to the sustained consolidation of informal housing. Effective community organisation is an essential component of a democratic system of checks and balances.

Resource starved communities are vulnerable to exploitations, and prone to desperate action. Access to affordable, well located land will go some way to dealing with these problems.

The 1970s and 1980s were marked by a growing trend toward the re-evaluation of the role and importance of informal housing in developing countries. The process was not continuous, and it would be incorrect to suggest that a consensus had emerged. However, there emerged a recognition that the forced removal of squatters was not a solution to the housing problems of developing countries and that formal housing programmes had failed to deliver housing at the rate and scale required. Further, they had frequently proved to be unaffordable for the poor, especially for the inhabitants of Etwatwa.
Against this background, there was a growing international move towards mixed and pragmatic housing policies which mobilised diverse housing delivery processes and a wide spectrum of actors. The adoption of such policies was spurred by the growing realisation that informal housing processes such as site and service and "in situ" upgrading was to be harnessed together with formal processes if housing crises were to be solved. No single sector has the resources to address backlogs and the growing demand adequately, and rehabilitation of existing housing stock will have to accompany the construction of new houses. In the case of informal housing, this has led to the growing support for "in situ" upgrading.

1.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the process of rapid urbanisation that has partly contributed, to the massive housing deficit confronting many cities in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Different government policies in dealing with informal settlements have also been discussed comparatively.

It is also clear from the discussion in this chapter that the impact of urbanisation and the nature of the housing problem differ considerably amongst developing countries, regions, urban sectors and amongst towns and cities. It would therefore, be impossible to have a single set of housing policies that can uniformly address the housing crisis in developing countries.
According to a recent study by the World Bank, housing has substantial social benefits, including the welfare efforts of shelter from elements, sanitation facilities and access to health and education services. Improved health, education and better access to income earning opportunities can lead to higher productivity and earnings for low-income families. It is thus for a sound economic reason that, after food, housing is typically the largest item of household expenditure among poor families. They are willing to go to great lengths to obtain housing at locations with access to employment even if it means incurring the risks of illegal squatting.65

A sound housing policy can thus make a substantial contribution to economic development and social welfare for everybody, especially the residents of the urban informal settlements. As mentioned earlier in the study of Obudho and Mhlanga, one is bound to conclude that solutions to housing problems differ greatly among cities and countries of developing countries, in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The best way probably to improve informal settlements for the urban population, is to upgrade them "in situ", site and service schemes, aided self help, and recently in South Africa, the building of low cost housing or the variants of the mentioned approaches. Within this framework an open attitude toward housing construction is necessary to ensure efficiency, facilitate more economic use of land and improve access to income earning opportunities.
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CHAPTER 2

2. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with the emergence of informal settlements in South Africa, that is, when and how squatter areas emerged around South African towns and cities. It will also address the question as to how informal settlements manifested themselves in South Africa from a historical perspective. This chapter will also investigate the distribution of informal settlements in South Africa with particular reference to the East Rand, because this study is particularly focussed on that region. It will also discuss the types of informal settlements that manifested themselves in South Africa.

Squatter areas in peri-urban and urban areas today serve as a reminder of the housing shortage that has existed for decades since urbanisation took off in South Africa. The inhabitants of these areas, given the right opportunities, displayed initiative and ingenuity by creating their own solutions. It should also be noted that they were doing no more and no less than the majority of poor people in Europe and elsewhere before the era of the planned town or city, i.e. by building their own houses.¹

The squatter areas were very adequately performing the housing provision function for specific groups of people who would otherwise experience a crisis. Since there had been a housing shortage and backlog, homeless people built shacks for shelter which they regarded as their home, thus providing themselves with
temporary housing. These groups may very well have had less sophisticated aspirations, hence the relatively low dissatisfaction with shack housing, but given their situation the squatter areas represented a solution to the housing problem, at least on an interim basis.

2.2 The emergence of informal settlements in South Africa

Before embarking on the emergence of informal settlements in South Africa, it is proper to get to know who are the inhabitants of typical squatter settlements.

People living in informal settlements are, according to Schlemmer, drawn from various areas, namely:

1. Township overspill: these are people whose immediate social origins are in the formal townships, but for whom no houses are available or houses are too small.

2. A permanent or semi-permanent category of shack-dwellers: this category represents people who have moved from one informal area to another over the years and who prefer the freedom of informal areas to the firm control of the township.

3. People who have been subjected to forced resettlements: these are people who are moved from “Black spots” to former homelands, and who cannot survive in resettlement areas and hence move to the peri-urban and urban areas.

4. Migrant contract workers: these are people who need the comforts of family life, either with their country wives or
town wives and who move out of hostel accommodation into shacks in peri-urban areas.

5. Rural-urban migrants: these migrants are people moving into the urban environment, usually with no agricultural land in rural areas still in their possession and hence no strong bonds of rural identification.

6. Work seekers from rural areas: this category represents people wishing to be strategically located to find work. They do not necessarily intend to urbanise permanently.

7. Socio-economic refugees from impoverished areas: this category represents people from other states who are prepared to spend years, or even a lifetime in some cases, living illegally in peri-urban shack areas.²

The survey research commissioned by the Urban Foundation in 1990 supported Schlemmer on the question of the origin of the informal settlements' inhabitants. The study confirmed that the rapid growth of free standing informal settlements inside and outside of South Africa from the 1970s onwards could be attributed to a number of factors. The growth reflected the crisis response of growing numbers of poor people who had no other housing alternatives. Other factors included the saturation of certain areas in terms of backyard structure capacity; a perception that the response of authorities to unauthorised settlements would not be as hostile as in the past; a possible increase in the rate of immigration to the urban areas; a desire for privacy on the part of those who had shared rooms with other families in formal houses of backyard accommodation, and the staking of claims for sites in planned site and
service schemes i.e. physically occupying land. The latter was and is sometimes perceived as a way of gaining access to an authorised stand.³

The same view was held by Obudho and Mhlanga, who maintained that the spread of squatter or informal settlements in Africa in the late 1960s was a manifestation of normal urban growth processes under historically unprecedented conditions. This was because rural to urban migration increased the number of urban dwellers at such a rate that urban squatter settlements emerged in some urban areas of the world due to the lack of proper housing.⁴ Turner maintained that squatting was triggered by factors such as enforced migration of refugees, the search for subsistence in urban areas and opportunism. Squatter settlements developed rapidly in Africa, Asia and Latin America as a result of urban landlessness or where there was a large gap between the population's demand for cheap housing and the supply by conventional institutions.⁵ Squatter or informal settlements developed on empty land within the city, especially in areas either close to centres of employment or close to public transportation. Some of these settlements developed over a period of time while others were built literally overnight as a result of a large-scale planned invasion, for instance Apex in Benoni in the 1950s.

On the South African scene Mashabela maintained that the problem of homelessness was aggravated by the fact that the new Black municipalities which took over control of the townships from the then Administration Boards in the 1980s were not financially in a position to provide housing. Another factor that contributed to an increased inflow of people to urban areas was the repeal of influx control in 1986, which made it possible for migrants who had always wanted to bring their
families to urban areas, to do so. The repeal of pass laws also had the result that families who were unhappy with homeland independence because of the introduction not only of taxes, but also of levies by chiefs, began migrating to towns in White designated areas.⁶

As a consequence, the problem of homelessness became critical. The result was the growth of massive informal settlements or shantytowns. The fact that registered tenants charged sub-tenants and backyard dwellers excessive monthly rentals, also added to the increase in the number of shack settlements, as families who resented paying the high rentals fled from the overcrowded homes and backyards to put up their own shacks on vacant land. This was one of the reasons that led to the mushrooming of Etwatwa informal settlements, as many homeless people left Daveyton.

P Morris of the Development Bank of Southern Africa said that many people living in economically declining smaller platteland towns were likely to move to places where some employment opportunities were available. In addition, large agri-businesses were buying up land in the 1970s, mechanising and evicting families who had lived there for generations. Citing the Bronkhosrspruit/Enkangala region in the former KwaNdebele homeland, Morris maintained that the then official economic decentralisation programmes were not generating enough job opportunities for the employment of the economically active population living outside the metropolitan areas. In addition to a lack of finance, the lack of land allocated for Black housing was a major constraint which frustrated attempts to solve the housing problem throughout the country, hence the spread of informal settlements.⁷ Normal population growth has
also been a strong force behind the increase in squatting and informal settlements.\textsuperscript{8} Over a period of five years from 1986-1990, the Urban Foundation undertook a review of informal housing experience in diverse national contexts, including countries in Latin America, (Brazil, Columbia, Cuba and Mexico), Asia (Hong Kong, India, Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia) and Africa (Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Zambia). A cross-national comparison of the origin, policy and practice of informal housing was informed by an awareness of country-specific contextual factors such as demography, economic systems and the relative centralisation or decentralisation of political decision-making. A striking finding that emerged from this research was that there was considerable international convergence around informal housing policy, cutting across national differences. In essence there was a growing pragmatism stemming from the realisation that few developing countries could rely solely on formal housing provision to eliminate the vast housing shortages that existed. In response, there was a trend emerging that governments accepted the presence of informal housing and provided various forms of facilitation for the process. Governments saw informal housing less as a problem and more as a solution, which they actively sought to support.\textsuperscript{9}

Squatter settlements or informal settlements have become synonymous with rapid urbanisation and urban growth in Third World cities. Superficially they present a surprising number of common characteristics: they provide shelter for the poor; occupy land of low value; often but not always have peripheral locations; are physically dominated by poor quality dwellings; are developed spontaneously, and generally lack the services and facilities normally available elsewhere in
Most developing countries face a housing crisis of considerable magnitude. One of the consequences of this situation was that informal settlements have become a major and established component of developing countries especially of the South African landscape. While informal settlements occurred predominantly within existing proclaimed Black townships or behind homeland boundaries, it has become increasingly widespread from the 1970s onwards.

Clearly squatting and the growth of shacks were not the direct consequence of the abolition of influx control only, and informal settlements were not made up of pools of people flooding in from the rural areas. Instead, the inhabitants of these informal settlements were mostly long standing urban residents forced into shacks through the shortage of housing and their own property. Informal dwellers are not a marginal and parasitic underclass grappling on the edges of the cities. Rather they are integrated into the social and economic structure of the cities and towns in which they are located.

Informal settlements have taken different forms in various parts of the country. In some urban areas most informal housing was accommodated in large free standing settlements. There was a low incidence of backyard shacks, and outbuildings predominated. The explanation for this can be traced to a variety of local factors, e.g. place near to work, availability of land, to mention a few. Strategies to deal with informal housing differed from place to place.

Yet, despite their relative and absolute inadequacies as residential environments, these settlements were often the most rapidly expanding
sections of cities, and provide accommodation for an increasing proportion of urban populations. Bonner, Sapire, Hendler and Mabin agree that few forms of shelter have evoked as much controversy and emotion as informal settlements. Throughout the world it has been attacked by state, private and political interests, fearful of seemingly uncontrolled urban expansion, and of political mobilization of informal settlers. Informal housing has been condemned by some commentators as a vehicle for the reproduction of urban and rural poverty, and celebrated by others as an expression of the creativity and determination of people who do not enjoy access to formal housing, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

While there is a great diversity of views on the social and political role of informal settlements, these settlements are home to millions of people throughout the developing world. Indeed, in many countries it has become the dominant form of housing delivery, and there are numerous Third World cities where most of the population live in some form of informal housing without viable alternatives, consequently a growing international re-evaluation of informal settlements.

South African cities face many challenges towards fundamental reform. In housing terms, an accumulated backlog is growing rapidly each year as formal housing provision fails to keep pace with population growth and the formation of new households, and continues to be unaffordable for the majority of urban households. An immediate example of an informal settlement that has been expanding rapidly and that has outgrown the original formal settlement is the area of Etwatwa. Etwatwa
has outgrown the Daveyton township on the East Rand. This is also the main focus of this study.

Informal settlement here is used to denote residential development broadly conforming with the following: residential areas which developed spontaneously without formal planning or management; dwellings that did not necessarily conform to building norms and legal standards, and were not generally part of the city's or town's serviced area, especially with regard to water.¹⁶

2.3 Reasons for the emergence of informal settlements
The South African cities which today reflect a highly fragmented physical layout, were not designed as such. The early European foundations, built by the Dutch and later the British, were destined to accommodate Whites, together with the slaves, servants and workers dependent upon them.¹⁷ Within colonial society until the mid-nineteenth century, there was thus, according to Christopher, little practical segregation beyond wealth based differentiation of style of housing. Although racial overtones were present within free society, enforceable residential segregation was absent, as the political and economic dominance of the Whites was unchallenged in the towns.¹⁸ Structural segregation came about in the period after the 1850s and was ascribed to a growth in racism amongst the dominant classes in the British Empire, coincident with the rise of the age of imperialism.¹⁹ The motivation, for such segregation was diverse, ranging from the sanitary syndrome to cultural diversity where English settlers and officials regarded Blacks as unhygienic to their standard of living. These threats to health and welfare were met by segregation and the continued setting aside by legal means
of major resources for Whites in South African towns and cities. The perception of a health hazard was particularly effective in maintaining political pressure to keep Blacks away from White residential areas. It was mainly the work of Mabin and Parnell that has drawn the attention to the more indirect forms of segregationist legislation. From the 1910s the discourse on public health, expressed in the 1919 Public Health Act, increasingly viewed disease in racial terms and promoted segregation as one solution to urban health problems that were perceived to arise out of overcrowded and insanitary living conditions of urban Blacks.  

Cape Town, at the end of the nineteenth century, led the way in establishing the first formal location for Blacks, followed in the first decade of the twentieth century by Durban, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg, where sites for Black housing were selected at some distance from the cities. In this manner, Klipspruit was established in 1904 and also Daveyton in 1955. In the 1920s, the industrially based English Labour Party was able to gain general acceptance amongst Whites in urban centres due to the fact that the town was a European area in which there was no place for the redundant Blacks. For example, in Port Elizabeth, industry expanded northwards, taking over areas of Black settlements. In Natal the hilly terrain of Greater Durban placed a high value on the flat land to the south of the city. This entailed the expropriation of property and the large-scale removal of non-white communities, predominantly Indians. A similar destruction of inner city Black communities occurred in Johannesburg to create space for business development.
Parliament accordingly enacted the Native (Urban Areas) Act No. 12 of 1923, which enforced segregation by requiring all towns to establish separate Black residential locations. Guidelines were adopted or imposed upon towns and cities throughout the country as the various race groups were classified and assigned specific areas in which to live. Blacks, Indians and Coloureds were moved to areas on the brink of White cities. The Central Business District, industrial areas, main lines of communication and the more desirable parts of the city were classified for White residence or usage, while the other groups were assigned lesser valued areas under strict government supervision.

The Urban Areas Act of 1923 not only required local authorities to shoulder the responsibility of providing housing for their Black populace, but it provided for compulsory residential segregation. Local authorities were also empowered to establish the necessary administrative machinery to register service contracts of Black labourers to control the influx of Blacks and to remove surplus persons not employed in the municipal area. This meant that in one swoop the central government introduced the beginnings of centralised control of Black labour by creating segregated Black townships that would act as a sort of fine regulation on the flow of persons to and from the main labour pools, the reserves.

It appeared that the influx control introduced by the Act, and the necessity to provide separate housing for Black labour were not widely observed because of the financial burden it placed on the local authorities. In Johannesburg, for example, the requirement in the Act to proclaim areas of a city for exclusive White residence, was applied
slowly. Under the relevant provision, the inhabitants of the slumyards were first moved out of the higher and middle income suburbs. This meant that they simply moved into worse slums in the lower income areas such as Vrededorp and Pageview, as well as into the Black freehold townships of Sophiatown and Western Areas, without the municipality having to provide additional housing.\textsuperscript{25}

It was this reluctance and inability to provide housing that continued to block the process of urban segregation since there was no housing to move to. Attempts to proclaim certain White residential areas, were from time to time resisted through recourse to law. The Supreme Court in Johannesburg began to uphold appeals against proclamations on the grounds that Black residents who would be evicted, could not be provided with the necessary alternative accommodation. The reluctance of the authorities to implement the 1923 Act meant that the associated influx control was also non-operating. The 1923 Act was therefore amended in 1930 to allow employers to house Black labourers in a proclaimed area, but only under licence, securing greater control over Black influx into the urban areas.\textsuperscript{26}

With the passage of time, more and more areas were proclaimed throughout the country as the 1923 Act was amended repeatedly in 1930, 1937, 1945 and 1952, tightening the influx controls. It was partially the passage of time and partially the increased impact of the influx controls that allowed the Councils to get to grips with the problem of providing new additional housing for the Black urban residents. It was the implementation of the controls in the Act and its amendments that created the flow of removals of former slumyard people into Orlando, the
first major township in what was to become Soweto, the sprawling township that also incorporated the old Klipspruit location. Removals from the freehold townships also followed. 27

The early 1940s saw a major building and demolition programme, where zones of mixed residents were razed, while Black areas in former Transvaal towns judged to be too close to the urban centre were demolished, for instance the Benoni old location, commonly known as Etwatwa, in 1944. New suburbs were built at some distance from the White areas where personal contact between members of different groups could be reduced to a minimum. In this manner residential segregation came into being and was reproduced from one end of South Africa to the other. 28

Scholars who have continued to search for the origins of urban segregation in South Africa came up with the same questions. Does one trace modern configuration of segregated townships to the group areas policy of the apartheid era of segregation, or does it have more distant colonial origins? In other words, has it been a product of South Africa's own peculiar brand of racism, or a typical feature of colonialism?

The origins of urban residential segregation appear to have been firmly rooted in the English experience as the dominant urban element and influence upon politics in South Africa between 1806 and 1948. 29 A colonial medieval origin has been suggested by Christopher who traced urban segregation back to the early English colonisation of Wales and Ireland. It may therefore be argued that the historical foundation of modern Soweto were laid by Edward I in his Welsh military foundations.
in the 13th century at Flint, Conway and Caernarvon. This is because segregation could be traced back to the early English colonisation of Wales and Ireland. The conclusion is based on the influence British colonisation had on bringing about segregation amongst its subjects, regardless of colour. A search for more local, more recent origins of segregation, led to the Eastern Cape, particularly Port Elizabeth, as identified by Baines and Christopher as one of the principal cities where the foundations of apartheid were laid. In 1850, the Port Elizabeth English controlled municipality created the Native Strangers Location where Hottentots, Blacks and other strangers visiting Port Elizabeth could temporarily reside. A hundred years before the group areas act, the Port Elizabeth municipality tried to enforce urban apartheid, issuing regulations in 1855 requiring Blacks to live in the Native Strangers Location if not housed by their employers or owning their own property.

Mabin, Parnell and Posel showed that there was no group areas masterplan. The legislation was not preceded by a major government commission. The National Party policy makers in 1948 were uncertain as to how to achieve compulsory urban segregation. In the event it came to be as much of a bureaucratic as a political process, with town planners centrally involved in the whole business of urban racial zoning.

Segregation was essentially a form of spatial control over residential space, but residential segregation by itself was an insufficient means of achieving the kind of overall control for which the state was striving. The segregated space set aside for the occupation of the Blacks also had to be subjected to control. The control took various forms. Housing
policy for instance, was geared not only towards the provision of shelter, but also towards the subjugation of urban residents. A local state apparatus responsible for native administration was established in each of the major urban areas. That apparatus further regulated the lives of those who fell under its control or influence. Access to municipal political space was closed down. Instead, forms of co-option were created in an attempt to head off the growth of urban social movements. On top of all this, access to the city itself, or rather to the controlled, segregated space within the city, was tightly regulated by influx control and the pass laws.  

According to Maylam, the idea that the National Party came to power in 1948 and reversed the liberalising tendencies of the United Party government's urban policy, is part of the liberal mythology. It has already been shown that urban segregation was gaining momentum through the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. It is also clear that the momentum gained pace during the last few years of United Party rule in the 1940s. Local authorities in the major cities were becoming more and more concerned during the 1940s with the growth of uncontrolled Black settlements in their midst. Local urban planners, attached to the United Party, controlled city councils, thus became increasingly committed to racial zoning and the demolition of uncontrolled settlements.  

It is also apparent that the Durban City Council was eagerly advocating group areas principles in the 1940s. It has been suggested that the Durban City Council was the prime motivator for the Group Areas Act. There is ample evidence to show that the Group Areas Act, no. 41 of 1950 was very much in line with the earlier plans and practices of United
Party policy makers. Many cities, including Durban, Pietermaritzburg and East London were known to have been pretty thoroughly segregated by 1950. Cape Town often projected as the liberal city, also had a tradition of segregation. United Party-controlled councils had envisaged and planned the destruction of Black urban communities, such as Johannesburg's Western Areas in 1944, more than 10 years earlier than the removals eventually carried out by the National Party Government.

Influx control in the 1950s and 1960s represented a tightening of pre-existing measures rather than a significant new policy departure. All this tended to be concealed in the liberal mythology, which has tried to cover up the harshness of pre-1948 segregationism by pinning the severity of urban apartheid to Afrikaner nationalism. Indeed, little break in policy was apparent in 1948 when the National Party government came to power. What is noted is that the National Party started from the 1950s to the 1970s in earnest to create Black townships, which were meant to address housing shortages amongst Blacks. It was also during the time of National Party power, that informal settlements started to mushroom around towns and cities, because the number of houses, built in the townships, could not satisfy the growing immigration of Blacks into towns and cities in search of work and better living conditions.

The struggle of urbanising Blacks to establish and defend areas of "illegal" occupation has been the feature of the Witwatersrand’s history since the 1890s. The most familiar expression of these occurrences were the organised squatter movements and land invasion that spread across the Rand in the 1940s. Along with squatter areas and peri-urban settlements throughout the country, these were eventually cleared by the
National Party government in the 1950s. The promulgation of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, of 1952, together with influx and pass controls and the construction of mass housing estates, enabled the state to assert control over the squatter settlements and the combative political culture they had produced.

Despite these measures, however, squatting was never entirely eliminated. As a result of the freeze on the provision of Black housing in the 1960s and the rise of industrial production in those years, squatter settlements once again appeared in the late 1960s. Settlement patterns spread out freely in all directions, and most of these informal dwellings in the 1960s and 1970s, were constructed in the backyards of township houses whose occupants charged a monthly fee. Strict surveillance in the township and peri-urban areas strongly prevented the development of substantial squatter settlements.

It was only in the mid-1980s that a dense concentration of shacks re-emerged on the urban landscape of metropolitan regions. Unlike the settlements of the 1940s, which arose as a result of land seizures by militant squatter movements, new camps within the townships in the early 1980s developed by way of gradual and clandestine infiltration of vacant land. After futile attempts to eradicate squatter areas, and in accordance with the ideals of the policy of orderly urbanisation, the government sought to contain and control their growth. The government (local) started to formalise the informal settlements i.e. allocation of sites, provision of infrastructure as well as essential services, like water and electricity. Spontaneously established settlements became transit areas where municipalities undertook to
provide minimal services. In Daveyton and Soweto for example, the municipalities prepared site and service schemes and transit camps for the homeless, who were assured that they would eventually be provided with permanent homes.\textsuperscript{44}

Some areas however remained beyond the administrative reach of the local authorities. As some municipalities did not own the land upon which squatter settlements mushroomed, (the land that belonged to farmers) – they could not charge rent, as a result no services were provided. In cases such as these squatter communities would enjoy considerable more autonomy than the squatters in controlled transit camps or site and service schemes. Although erratic and arbitrary, police raids plagued squatter life, and although widespread controls never disappeared, most settlements enjoyed a stay of execution until such time as large regional permanent site and service schemes were prepared by the provincial authorities to receive squatters in accordance with the provisions of the amended Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1988.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1986 and 1987, for instance the Soweto City Council reached a temporary agreement with the inhabitants of the Fred Clark and Mshenguville camps. The agreement determined that the squatters could remain in the camps until site and service schemes had been completed in the township in return for an abstention of the erection of new shacks.\textsuperscript{46}

In May 1989, the resettlement of informal dwellers began in the first regional site and service scheme, being Orange Farm in the Vaal Triangle. Two months later squatters from the East Rand were relocated to another scheme of Etwatwa in Daveyton on the far East Rand.\textsuperscript{47}
In this period of regulatory impasse in South African towns and cities between 1986 and 1989, limited negotiations were held between some squatter communities and the authorities about provision of houses and the improvement of their informal settlements. In addition, these years saw the rapid expansion of existing settlements and the appearance of new camps. The total number of free-standing shacks in the PWV region increased from 28,513 to 49,179 in these years. Of the forty-seven squatter settlements in the early 1990s, twenty-five were situated within the proclaimed Black townships and twenty-two were located in peri-urban areas and on land designated for White, Coloured and Indian residence.

The apparent inaction of the authorities encouraged growing numbers of people to move into informal settlements. In 1989 and 1990 there was a high degree of mobility of shack dwellers from backyards and camps from all over the region, into areas targeted for resettlement, to jump the queue for serviced sites. In some areas they met with punitive action from the authorities. In the case of Phola Park in Thokoza on the East Rand, violent conflict with hostel dwellers was immediately preceded by a spate of local authority actions against incoming shack dwellers.

2.4 Manifestation of informal settlements in South Africa: A historical perspective.

The short-term success of urban residential segregation was based on the exclusion of Blacks and Indians from the centre of economic and political power in the cities of South Africa. This was coupled with minimal social amenities and infrastructure in the new townships in the
1950s, low wages and the creation of a differentiated workforce. Some urban Blacks were having less or no access to urban residential rights than Whites, while the majority were prohibited from settling in the urban areas permanently. Although repressive, urban residential segregation was an effective system in the short term, both as a mechanism of urban political control and, for a time, in securing an economically subservient workforce. The 1960s was a decade of political stability and rapid economic expansion. However, during the 1970s the underlying contradictions, costs and inefficiencies of the system began to appear. This coincided with the beginning of a new stage of urbanisation and apartheid spatial planning. The 1970s saw the government handing over greater powers to the homelands either in the form of independence or self-government. This had an impact on the process of urbanisation in a number of ways.

In the country as a whole, a form of deconcentrated urban settlements occurred on the fringes of the homelands lying next to the metropolitan areas, through the settlement of large numbers of workers who travelled to work daily in the core of city areas. This type of settlement contributed to the development of an irregular distribution of urban areas, reinforcing the racial stratification of the cities and adding to the high cost of infrastructural expenditure and services in Black residential areas. Long distance travelling to the city centre added another burden to the cost of the reproduction of workers.

The most obvious signs of the problem of residential segregation appeared in the early 1970s. By that time most new housing developments in the townships had stopped, and pressure increased on
the existing housing stock, through natural population growth, as well as illegal immigration into formal townships. During the 1970s township people, particularly the young who were unable to obtain houses, began moving out of the townships to nearby land where they joined migrants from rural areas to form squatter settlements. This created problems for the local authorities.

By contrast to the 1970s when squatting was done secretly and relatively slowly, the 1980s witnessed the mushrooming of open squatting, at times involving land invasions, in and around townships on brinks of towns and cities. Adding to the weakening of influx control that had been in place since the early 1970s, a number of new factors contributed to the disintegration of controls and opened the flood gates of immigration to the towns and cities. Severe droughts in the late 1970s drove large numbers of people out of neighbouring rural areas towards the cities in search of work. From the early 1980s a series of confrontations occurred between youth and resident organisations on the one hand, and township authorities on the other, which led to a weakening of township administration and hence of the capacity to control settlements. Government then attempted to devolve the control over housing and influx control to unpopular Black local authorities, who were regarded as illegitimate by local residents. At the same time they had to increase rents and public transport fares. This was in line with the Riekert Commission's report in August 1978 on Black community councils. It recommended modifications in the Community Council Act of 1977. The commission sought to strengthen the position of established Black communities in the White areas by affording them new and much wider opportunities for decision making.
This abortive application of the recommendations of the Riekert Commission of 1979, sparked off major rent and bus boycotts in the early 1980’s. These actions marked the beginning of extensive and prolonged political violence throughout the country. The weakening, and in some cases collapse of Black local authorities that followed, meant that control could no longer be exercised over land and housing allocation and hence the form and pace of urbanisation. Open land occupation and invasions replaced clandestine squatting, first on vacant land near the townships and then, in the late 1980s within townships themselves. At national level these developments were recognised and given further impetus by the formal abolition of influx control in 1986.

A further major social development in the 1980s was the growth of middle income suburbs in Black residential areas on the periphery of Black townships. Whereas some writers viewed classic apartheid as an attempt to suppress class divisions within the Black population, the urban reform strategy pursued by the government in the 1980s was also seen by some to foster class divisions within urban Black residential areas.

In the past the primary line of social demarcation within the Black urban areas has been between temporary migrants in the hostels and permanent residents in formal township houses. During the 1980s however, two new residential groupings emerged. Townships were flanked on the one hand by new housing schemes for lower-middle income earners, semi-professional and better off working class families, and on the other hand by mushrooming squatter settlements dominated by unskilled marginal and unemployed people. These squatter settlements encroached upon
these new houses, thus devaluing them and causing problems for the inhabitants of these houses, for instance they depended on the water resources of the inhabitants in formal houses.

The authorities were thus forced to retreat from earlier land use policies, but a variety of pressures, most importantly White opposition to new Black settlements, prevented them from setting aside the land they needed if they were to control the growth of informal settlements. This created a major problem in its own right, because squatters continued to invade land, even the land around the White suburbs.

2.5 **Distribution of informal settlements in South Africa**

Informal settlements have become a familiar occurrence throughout South Africa. In the established townships, tens of thousands of backyard shacks have become a permanent feature, and their emergence prompted tensions between occupants and local authorities. It has been primarily the growth of informal dwellings on vacant land, often outside a local authority area, which posed the most immediate challenge to the government's urbanisation policy.

This section will attend to the question of the distribution of informal settlements in South Africa with particular reference to the distribution of informal settlements on the East Rand, the target area being informal settlements around Daveyton.

In the national picture, the largest concentration of informally housed urban populations are found in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area amounting to 2 260 000 out of the total Black population of 5 213
000, and the Durban metropolitan region where the population is most congested, estimated at 1,800,000 out of the total Black population of 2,600,000. In other centres, compared according to the total population size, the informally housed populations are smaller although the population is increasing annually in places like Western Cape 330,000, Port Elizabeth 320,000, Bloemfontein/Botshabelo 160,000 and in East London at 105,000. 62

As a proportion of the total Black population, the size of the informally housed population in Gauteng is 43 per cent. In the Durban metropolitan district, the Western Cape and Port Elizabeth, the proportion of the Black population living under informal conditions is higher at 69 per cent, 58 per cent and 55 per cent respectively. In Bloemfontein/Botshabelo and East London the proportions are lower at 34 and 31 per cent respectively. 63

It is relatively easy to identify informal settlements throughout South Africa, because wherever they are, they are easily identifiable, even those situated within conventional townships, by the material used to erect them, which is usually mud bricks, corrugated iron, tin and wood. In Alexandra, north of Johannesburg, there are four districts of informal settlements, the biggest being the one situated near the local cemetery in the valley of the Jukskei River. The township is crammed with shacks in almost every yard or household along the north side of Selborne Street. 64

Bekkersdal township in Westonaria on the West Rand is bordered by Silver City, also known as Spooktown, to the north-west. On the East Rand, Etwatwa borders Daveyton on the eastern side and Thokoza in Alberton has its own large tin town which stands grimly on the southern
end of the township, called Phola Park. In Katlehong in Germiston, lies Crossroads. In Soweto there are a number of informal settlements, which include Mshenguville, Chicken Farm, Chiawelo Emergency Camp, to mention a few. Almost all the East Rand townships are surrounded by informal settlements, the notable ones being Ivory Park near Thembisa and Etwatwa around Daveyton. These are all large informal settlements standing testimony to the chronic problem of homelessness and the housing backlog in Gauteng and the whole of South Africa.65

In Kwa-Zulu/Natal informal settlements extend through the Durban Function Region (DFR) in a broad semi-circular belt some twenty kilometres from central Durban. The main concentration has occurred in large complexes adjacent to formal townships. Shack settlements in Greater Inanda around Kwa Mashu, Ntuzuma and Kwa Dabeka accounts for approximately 600 000 people. South of Umlazi township, informal settlements such as Malukazi, Mgaga and Ezimbokodweni accommodate around 320 000 and there are large settlements to the west in the Dassenhoek and Mpumalanga townships. In the Western Cape the Cape Metropolitan Area is surrounded by informal settlements such as Khayelitsha, Crossroads, KTC, Nyanga, Noordhoek and Houtbay. East London has Duncan Village and Compo Town; Port Elizabeth has Walmer, Missionvale, Motherwell and Zwide; while Bloemfontein has Botshadeli and several free standing settlements around Mangaung.66

Besides these tin towns which stand in and around townships, there are those located groups or informal settlements which are situated on land designated for other race groups. These include informal settlements such as Tamboekiesfontein, Weiler’s Farm, Sweetwaters, Vlakfontein
and Lenasia. Tamboekiesfontein is situated alongside the town of Heidelberg on the East Rand. Weiler’s Farm lies to the south of Johannesburg just north of Evaton in the Vanderbijlpark district, and a stones throw away is Sweetwaters. 67

Vlakfontein is alongside the Golden Highway a few kilometres beyond the Sun Valley entertainment resort at Nancefield. The Lenasia tin town is situated between extensions 9 and 10 of the formal Indian township of the same name. Several small clusters of informal tin settlements are found at Grasmere, Ennerdale and Lenasia South on the southern edge of Johannesburg, while others are found in Randfontein, Krugersdorp and Roodepoort. 68

A common feature of all these settlements is their lack of services, water, roads and schools. In some settlements, makeshift school buildings have been erected for use by local children. Where not even makeshift facilities are available, pupils attend schools in the neighbourhood.

2.6 Type of informal settlements
Sapire, Schlemmer, Bonner, Obudho and Mhlango, Haarhoff and Maasdorp and the Urban Foundation have identified three types of urban informal settlements throughout the world including South Africa. 69 Although there are rural informal settlements, this study will concentrate on urban informal settlements.
2.6.1 **Backyard shacks and outbuildings in proclaimed Black Townships.**

These shacks or outbuildings within Black Townships accommodated the majority of informal settlers. Moreover, not surprisingly, it is the larger townships which accommodate the bulk of backyard shack-dwellers, notably Soweto, Evaton, Katlehong, Alexandra, Daveyton and Tembisa. The conditions in backyard shacks, the rents charged and relationships between landlords and tenants is cited as a major source of dissatisfaction and one of the major reasons why many homeless people move into informal settlements.\(^7^0\)

2.6.2 **Free-standing settlements within proclaimed Black Townships.**

Free standing settlements or squatter camps are more commonly found within the borders of proclaimed Black townships or in the buffer zones between Black townships and other areas. One of the reasons for their existence is the alleged vigilance of the White and other local authorities and their sensitivity to anti-squatter settlements within their constituencies.\(^7^1\)

It is also within the townships surrounding the most heavily industrialised areas, providing the greatest number of work opportunities, that the bulk of these settlements occur. The central locations of Soweto and Alexandra in the urban economy are examples. Similarly Katlehong, Thokoza, Thembisa and Wattville are situated in densely industrialised regions. Many of the inhabitants of these settlements originally lived in the hostels, housing the vast steel and engineering factories' labour force of the East Rand. Therefore, one feature of free standing settlements within large townships is a sense of place and of commitment to the
locality. By the mid-1980s as settlements grew within townships, the local authorities in the affected areas found themselves confronted with full blown squatter communities which had often arisen in the space of months.\textsuperscript{72}

Conditions in free-standing settlements within townships differ greatly. This largely depends on the policies and attitudes of local authorities. In the areas mentioned earlier in this section, given the size of the settlements, and the absence of alternative accommodation, local authorities had little choice but to accept their presence until alternative arrangements could be made.

The table below shows the number of free standing settlements or squatter camps found within the borders of proclaimed Black townships or in the buffer zones between Black townships and other areas. This is meant to indicate that from the early 1980s free standing informal settlements began to mushroom, reaching its peak in the early 1990s because of forceful land invasion.
Table 1: Free standing settlements within Black townships on the Rand, 1983-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Year Started</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soweto:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mshenguville</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Clark</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken/Levin Farm</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dlamini 1 &amp; 2 and Chiawelo Emergency camp</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tladi Emergency camp</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naledi Emergency camp</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protea South</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alexandra:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erf 17</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bekkersdal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver City or Spooktown</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tokoza:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phola Park</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duduza:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duduza Buffer (Land Invasion)</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tsakane:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsakane: Buffer</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khutsing:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonderwater</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daveyton:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etwatwa East</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokosi Buffer</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Katlehong:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tembisa:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New City (Land Invasion)</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakmore</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sapire, H., Informal settlement monitoring projects, 1992
The social character of informal settlements varied from region to region, and indeed from township to township. The peri-urban settlements of the region to the south of Johannesburg were inhabited predominantly by former farm labourers from the agricultural hinterland, for example, the camps within larger townships such as Daveyton, Thembisa, Thokoza and Soweto in the east and central Witwatersrand, were and are still occupied by the poorest urbanites of these townships, many of whom had spent much of their lives as backyard shack dwellers or lodgers.\(^73\)

A settlement's particular character depended on such factors as the precise conditions under which they were established, their occupational and ethnic composition, the camps legal status, their location within or outside of townships, and by the attitudes of and relationship with neighbouring communities. Nevertheless, certain generalisations about the social origins of squatters can be made from the movement between hostels, shack settlements, backyard shacks and the employers' promises. This meant that there were vast areas of shared experience among shack dwellers in a settlement.

The socio-economic standing demonstrated too, that despite the dominant image of a uniformly impoverished community in informal settlements, living on the margin of the urban economic and social order, the informal population is indeed integrated into the urban regional economies. Moreover, they represent as socially and economically heterogenous a population as the formally housed population. Not only are there regional variations, which in themselves are the function of different local political economies, but there are distinct variations between informal settlement types. There is a distinct hierarchy of
wealth and integration into the urban economy within the informal population of South Africa, particularly in the PWV.

At the top are occupied outbuildings were socio-economic levels are comparable, and at times, even higher than those in formal households. It is predominantly this population whose presence in informal dwellings is a function of housing shortages in the area of choice, rather than affordability constraints. At the base are shack dwellers in free-standing settlements where the lowest levels of socio-economic attainment occur. For the most part, there is a more pronounced element of economic compulsion in the motivations of free standing shack dwellers than those in backyard shacks, as the cost of accommodation in settlements is considerably lower. Between the two extreme poles are backyard shack residents. While some backyard shack dwellers are comparable to the outbuilding component, there is also a considerable proportion whose incomes and employment levels resemble those of the free-standing settlements. Often, confronted by job losses or any other occurrence which disturbs the fragile household economies of these homes, such households tend to move into free standing settlements where the costs of accommodation are lower.74

The rapid growth of informal settlements after 1986 led many observers to believe that the underlying reasons for their appearance was the acceleration of in-migration of new rural arrivals after the abolition of influx controls. Several studies have however indicated that in the 1980s, shack-dwellers in settlements were long-settled inhabitants of the metropolitan region. A survey conducted from December 1989 to January 1990 found that over half of the free-standing shackdwellers had
been born within the Reef and that only 16% had arrived in the region after 1987. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a substantial number of new rural migrants from the former Ciskei, Transkei, North Western Transvaal and the present Mozambique, and it is these people who conferred the transitional, migrant quality upon some squatter settlements.75

The most significant source of in-migrants were the Transkei and Ciskei, followed by the Natal rural areas. While the bulk of Transkeian in-migrants were located in the East and West Rand settlements, those from Natal were mainly concentrated within the central Witwatersrand. Evidence suggested that the numbers from the Transkei and the Ciskei increased markedly during the 1990s. That partially explained the destabilization and conflict within certain Witwatersrand camps in the 1990s and the prominence of the Xhosa-speakers in these conflicts.76

2.6.3 **Peri-urban squatting and free standing settlements outside of proclaimed Black townships.**

Several small concentrations of informal dwellers outside Black townships exist especially in the PWV areas. Informal settlers in this category include those living in abandoned and disused factories such as in Wynberg, vacant houses in Ennerdale, in make-shift shacks on private properties, on farms, business premises and in the open veld.77 Due to the mobility of the inhabitants, many of whom wish to avoid detection, and the constant removals by authorities, it is impossible to arrive at a reliable figure for these groups. Many of these isolated shack dwellers spread over the plots and farms, particularly those not employed by
farmers, and were at risk of expulsion under the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, as amended.\textsuperscript{76}

What should be noted is that these categories are still valid in the late 1990s, because they are either upgraded in situ or just being provided with essential services. Again it should be noted that the year depicting the start of a settlement does not mean that squatter to occupancy or invasion has terminated. Squatters continue to invade the area up to the present day. One example is the informal settlement of Etwatwa around Daveyton, which started in 1987. Today the area is bigger than Daveyton itself and the inhabitants have divided it into a number of sections, with different names for identification purposes. The whole area remain known as Etwatwa.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Settlement & Year Started \\
\hline
Bedsider & 1986 \\
Lenasia & 1986 \\
Kwa Green & 1987 \\
Vlakfontein & 1986 \\
Weiler’s Farm & 1983 \\
Tamboekiesfontein & 1988-89 \\
Zonkizizwe & 1989 \\
Orange Farm & 1989 \\
Rethabisen’s & 1990 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Free standing shack settlements outside Black townships on the Rand 1983-1990.}
\end{table}

2.7 Conclusion

Most squatter settlements do not grow through an organised invasive movement. They usually begin when a relatively small number of families establish themselves close to their place of employment, except for those who joined the popular forceful land invasion of the 1980s. Lack of harassment by police is an important consideration when choosing a site. The small nuclei eventually attract family and friends, and steadily grows into a fully fledged informal settlement.

Although the dates for the establishment of some of these informal settlements are more recent than those within townships, the formation of large shack concentrations, especially on the South and East of the Witwatersrand in these years, did not imply the sudden arrival of urban newcomers. In fact, the rise of larger visible concentrations merely brought out into the open the existence of vast numbers of homeless families and individuals, many of whom had lived on farms, in townships and in the hinterland of the Reef for generations.

The fact that so many of the new inhabitants arrived as whole families rather than individuals, partly accounts for the greater degree of social stability within some of these settlements. Moreover, in certain settlements, explicit policies of only allowing married (official or unofficial) people to establish themselves, were adopted. As one of the section leaders of Etwatwa noted, single people tended to make too much trouble. In a settlement like Etwatwa West for example, the overwhelming majority of residents were found to be living as families with a greater number of male headed household heads.79
The phenomenon of family stability in some of the peripheral settlements contrast strikingly with some inner township settlements. Barcelona, a section of Etwatwa, was described as an area with a strong concentration of single women, a refuge for women from the violence of the men folk, or as haven for those who had been deserted or abandoned.

Most of the settlements outside townships have committee structures, and often because of their isolation from townships show more signs of self reliance and community initiative than some of their counterparts within townships. Moreover, the necessity of having to deal with hostile authorities in the early to late 1980s made effective representation a crucial factor to the survival of such communities. The mobilization of effective defences against external hostilities was one way of creating a moral authority and popular legitimacy, and this was certainly the case with Etwatwa.
References

Chapter 2


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CHAPTER 3

3. OFFICIAL POLICIES ON INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

A shortage of housing was not merely a shortfall in available units of accommodation. It also entailed ancillary aspects of community life such as job creation, recreational facilities, educational opportunities and the opportunity to contribute to the well being of the entire community. The housing backlog intensified problems and frustrations. Shortages of housing units for example, created over-crowding of existing units thereby reducing privacy and increased stress in the home. This resulted in the mushrooming of informal settlements. In informal or squatter settlements, inhabitants, especially young people, felt more independent and privacy could sometimes be guaranteed.

Until not long ago, Blacks were defined as temporary inhabitants in South African cities and urban areas. Legislation regulating urban Blacks from 1923 to 1968, with various changes and shift in emphasis, gave statutory effect to the views expressed by the 1921 Native Affairs Commission and the 1922 Transvaal Local Government Commission (the Stallard Commission). The latter body concluded that it should be a recognised principle that Black men, women and children should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence was demanded by the wants of the White population.¹

It is incorrect to associate racial legislation and apartheid entirely with the National Party, that assumed government in 1948.² Apartheid and pro-apartheid policies are in this study associated with the period 1948 to
the early 1960s, but the underlying imperatives, such as the labour requirements of a capitalist economy, and the protection of White privilege and supremacy, predate the use of the term apartheid and the National Party government. The foundations of "apartheid", and of a racially based housing policy, was laid long before 1948. Maylam also supports the view that the allegations that the National Party government reversed the liberalising urban policy of the United Party government and United Party controlled city councils, could not be defended and were just part of liberal mythology. There is ample evidence to show that the Group Areas Act was very much in line with the earlier plans and practices of the United Party policy makers.

The spatial separation of different races in South Africa has a long history. The basic structure of the modern settlement pattern stemmed from earlier legislation, much which predates the introduction of formal apartheid in 1948. Acts such as the 1913 Native Land Act, the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act, represented attempts to create a living environment which was the spatial expression of racial segregation.

The main trends of the late 1960s, 70s and 80s housing policies were the extension and intensification of the abdication by the government of its responsibility to provide housing for the non-White population in "white" areas. The established policies of homeland independence and influx controls of various sorts were preserved and large scale removals and repressive actions against squatters continued apace. In conjunction with these policies was the introduction of a series of strategies aimed firstly at co-opting an elite of skilled, educated Black labour force and permitting their fuller integration into the capitalist sector, and secondly,
lessening significantly levels of state expenditure on and responsibility for non-white housing and service provision.⁶

Among the consequences of these policies was the mushrooming or growth of the homeland population. Much of this population growth centred around rapidly developing, sprawling townships in those areas of the homelands in close proximity to South African cities, or to a lesser extent, industrial areas developed under the industrial decentralisation policy. This was particularly true around cities such as Pretoria, Durban and East London, which were able to push significant proportions of their Black population even further from their centres into dormitory towns for which they had no responsibility.

Smith, Fourie and Booysen and Smit demonstrated that the bulk of homeland urbanisation occurred in unplanned spontaneous settlements sprawled along the borders of the former homelands closest to major cities. Such developments were in line with the extremely poor physical structures of the squatter settlements in other parts of the Third World with the dislocation and social and economic costs their location created.⁷ Mass removal and homeland urbanisation represented continuity with past South African settlement policies. The same was true of the attitude of the Government towards spontaneous or informal settlements on the periphery of South African cities.⁸

The policy of removal was stepped up in response to the continued proliferation of informal settlements around all major South African cities. According to Smith, Mabin and Parnell, these informal settlements spread because their inhabitants had nowhere else to go. The
nature of the constraints which housing policies and influx controls placed upon Black urbanisation forced the inhabitants of these areas to endure a living environment which entailed grave physical, economic and psychological costs.  

Squatting has a long history in South African cities, and indeed many of the earliest segregation policies were introduced in response to the spreading thereof. Housing policies since 1945 have been designed to eradicate squatter or informal settlements, but notably failed to do so. For a time in the 1950s, widespread demolition and relocation programmes led to a decline in the number of squatters, but the continued entrenchment of the housing crisis and the severity of the constraints facing the non-white population led to the inevitable re-emergence of informal settlements in the 1970s, which developed into a position where hundreds of thousands of families today endure the deprivation and insecurity of life in informal settlements.

The inhabitants of informal settlements lived and still live in some of the poorest living conditions in South Africa, with individual houses frequently made of non-permanent materials and settlements lacking in most basic services. The attitude of the Government to informal settlements significantly contributed to their poor conditions. They were officially not recognised, and were consequently denied access to a full range of state-sponsored services and amenities. Private initiatives and community organisations frequently went some way in compensating for the failure to provide these facilities, but could not fully cater for the needs of their inhabitants.
An editorial comment of the Rand Daily Mail (4 March 1983), maintained that these housing policies, along with the denial of tenure, created an air of uncertainty, discouraged investment in house upgrading and service provision and, again, imposed a burden of stress upon their inhabitants which was the price the Black population of South Africa had to pay for the maintenance of White supremacy.11

In conjunction with the removals and mass eradication programmes, which represented continuity with the past, there emerged in 1983 a number of new policy initiatives which represented a significant radical change in South African housing policy. At the beginning of March 1983, the government announced plans to sell 500 000 state-owned houses, four-fifths of which were located in Black townships. This was significant since for the first time it constituted a recognition by the government of the permanence of urban Blacks. This policy emerged from the failure of the 30 year and 90 year lease schemes first advanced in 1978, which were both unpopular and unrealistic in their goals.12

The other change in housing policies of the late 1980s was the granting of autonomy to townships, which in practice meant that township councils would have to fund service provision and infrastructure development, which could lead to significant increases in the cost of such services. This policy closely paralleled homeland independence, and was a mechanism reducing state expenditure on Black housing drastically. As such, it was interpreted as the final abandonment by the South African government of its responsibility for the living environment of the bulk of South Africans.13
Informal housing therefore in its various forms became a major element of South Africa’s urban landscape that could no longer be ignored or wished away. This chapter will therefore assess the official policies on informal settlements. Informal settlements have emerged in different forms throughout this 20th century, and is currently developing on an unprecedented scale. The government's response to informal settlement has been dictated by wider political objectives.

3.2 Official Responses to Black Urbanisation
A historical analysis of government response to Black urbanisation broadly identified eight phases. This will start with the pre-1923 period which concerned the early Black urbanisation and conclude with the era of the 1990’s, which was the era of democratisation and urban reconstruction.

3.2.1 Pre-1923: Early Black urbanisation
Informal settlements are not a new phenomenon in South Africa, for example in Cape Town informal settlement became a feature of the urban environment after the ex-slaves set up shacks on the fringes of the town following their emancipation in 1834. Both Kimberley and Johannesburg initially developed as shantytowns and were later developed into formal settlements. However, the majority of the 80 000 Blacks resident in the Johannesburg city stayed in overcrowded compounds, backyard shacks and scattered informal settlements at the turn of the century. Racially mixed inner city slums and informal settlements were branded as health hazards by the authorities. In Cape Town, slums were destroyed after an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1902 and Blacks were moved out of the city to a new township of Ndabeni.
The 1918 influenza epidemic prompted the establishment of Langa as a model township for Blacks. In Johannesburg an outbreak of the plague in 1904 resulted in slums being burnt to the ground and Blacks being moved to Klipspruit, twenty kilometres out of town. New Brighton in Port Elizabeth was established for similar reasons in 1905. The epidemics drew attention to the appalling living conditions of urban Blacks and persuaded local authorities to attend to the provision of housing. It was only after the influenza epidemic of 1918 that the Johannesburg municipality agreed to establish the Western Native Township.

Before 1922 four major towns, that are of importance in terms of housing policies for Blacks, existed. These are Kimberley, Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Kimberley had the tightest form of labour control, in the shape of closed compounds, and Durban had the most developed form of administrative control over its Black population. Indeed, many of the practices that were evolving in Durban were to be borrowed by other municipalities or incorporated in subsequent legislation.

The specific practices and structures that evolved in Durban reflected the relatively high degree of municipal autonomy that existed before the 1920s. The local authorities in Durban were more concerned about controlling than segregating its Black population, and if a segregation impulse was to be found in early Durban, it was directed more against Indians than Blacks. Intervention by the colonial government or later by the central or provincial government was minimal. Local administrative systems and housing policies therefore tended to be
diverse and were to a large extent shaped by the nature of the local economy.

In Kimberley and Johannesburg housing policy with the emphasis on the compound system, was partly determined by mining capital. In the ports of Cape Town and Durban the pools of seasonal and casual labour were less easily controllable, although in both towns attempts at control were made through the establishment of compound-type accommodation. In all four towns, apart from the compounds housing workers at the mines, docks, factories and commercial businesses, there was no systematic policy for the housing of the urban Black population.¹⁹

By 1922 some formal housing had been provided for Blacks in major cities, e.g. Sophiatown in Johannesburg and District Six in Cape Town. However, in most of South Africa’s towns no specific provision was made for Black housing and Blacks squatted on the urban periphery or in backyards of houses in the locations or townships.

3.2.2 1923-1939: The Native Urban Areas Act (Influx control and racial segregation)

In 1923 the government acted to control the perceived problem of racially mixed slums and informal settlements by introducing the Native Urban Areas Act, No. 12 of 1923. This act restricted the movement of Blacks into urban areas by a system of influx control. It partly incorporated the recommendations of the Stallard Commission which had advised that Blacks should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence was demanded by the needs of the Whites.²⁰ This Act also empowered local authorities to set aside land for
Blacks and provide formal housing within segregated areas known as locations.\textsuperscript{21}

The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act represented the first major intervention by the central government in the business of managing the urban Black labour force and ensuring its reproduction. As mentioned earlier, the Act empowered municipalities to establish segregated locations for Blacks, to implement a rudimentary system of influx control, and to set up advisory boards. These were bodies which would contain Black elected representatives, and which would discuss local issues affecting Blacks, but without any power to change policy. The Act also required municipalities to institute native revenue accounts, into which all income derived from beer-hall sales, rents, fines and fees levied from Blacks, would be paid.\textsuperscript{22}

The short term significance of the 1923 Act was limited. Most of its provisions were not obligatory and few municipalities were willing to implement the Act. Segregation was gradually introduced as certain sections of municipal areas were proclaimed as "White", compelling all non-exempted Blacks and those not living on their employers premises to move into a municipal location or hostel. Johannesburg and Kimberley began proclaiming segregated areas in 1924, Cape Town in 1926 and Durban in the early 1930s.\textsuperscript{23} Wholesale segregation was impossible because proclamation of segregated areas could only be reinforced if alternative accommodation was available for those Blacks being forced out of their existing quarters. The availability of such accommodation was severely limited as municipalities were unwilling to make substantial investments in the construction of townships.
Other provisions of the Act also had minimal short-term impact. Many municipalities did not establish advisory boards, while others did so belatedly. Few local authorities used the power granted to them to institute influx controls, and by 1937 only eleven towns had systematically implemented such controls.\textsuperscript{24}

The significance of the 1923 Act lay more in its broader, long-term implications. It represented the first major intervention by the central government in the process of Black urbanisation. It also provided a framework and foundation upon which subsequent legislation and policy would to be built. The key elements of later, more refined urban apartheid practice were to be found in the 1923 Act in embryonic form. These included the principle of segregation and the ensuing practice of relocation, the influx control mechanism, a self financing system which shifted the burden of reproduction costs onto urban Blacks themselves, and co-opting of potential collaborators onto the advisory board. During the following decades, all of these mechanisms were to be tightened and refined, and the process of central government encroachment on municipal autonomy was to gain ground.

The tightening of control and the process of centralization were both taken further in the 1937 Native Law Amendment Act. The major concern of this act was influx control. It provided for the removal to rural areas of Blacks, in excess of the labour requirements in any particular urban area, to make it more difficult for African women and children to enter urban areas and for work seekers to remain in an urban area. The act tightened influx control and expulsion powers of local
authorities, but it also increased the powers of the Minister of Native Affairs, who could then compel a local authority to implement any section of the Native (Urban Areas) Act or have the section implemented by his own department.\textsuperscript{25}

3.2.3 1939-1950: Rapid urbanisation and the spread of informal settlements

Rapid industrialisation and the decline in rural economies, speeded up the mass movement to the towns and cities by 1946. The number of Blacks in Johannesburg, for example, increased from 244 000 in 1939 to 400 000 in 1946.\textsuperscript{26} At the same time, as a result of the disruption caused by the Second World War, the construction of new houses came to a standstill. The result was the unprecedented spread of informal settlements e.g. in Johannesburg and the East Rand.

In Durban the squatters moved into Cato Manor, where the population increased from 17 000 in 1943 to 50 000 in 1950. In Cape Town by the early 1950s two-thirds of the Black population lived within inner city slums and shantytowns on the urban periphery.\textsuperscript{27} Johannesburg faced a greater challenge, because squatter camps were organised under the leadership of James Mpanza, leader of the Sofasonke Party, who led the invasion of vacant land near Orlando where an informal settlement was set up with its own form of administration in March 1944.\textsuperscript{28} Attempts to destroy such settlements in Johannesburg were unsuccessful, and recognising the futility of attempts to do away with informal settlements, the Johannesburg City Council adopted a policy of controlled squatting in 1950, which was similar in many respects to present-day government policy. Johannesburg established Moroka in August 1955 as the
country’s first major site and service scheme where 50 000 people could live within an officially sanctioned informal settlement.\textsuperscript{29}

World War II gradually brought a relaxation of influx control and a breakdown of the colour bar, as these social restrictions no longer served the needs of a rapidly industrializing economy. A new trend of thinking was reflected by the 1948 report by the Fagan Commission, which was appointed by the Smuts Government. This Commission acknowledged that urbanised Blacks were a permanent part of South African towns and cities and that Blacks should be given some say in local government.\textsuperscript{30} The Commission did not recommend the abolition of influx control, but did state that pass laws should gradually disappear. In essence, the Fagan Commission proposed a policy of orderly urbanisation, as it accepted that the process of urbanisation could not be halted, although it could be guided and regulated.\textsuperscript{31}

3.2.4 1950-1966: Apartheid, mass housing and the destruction of informal settlements.

The 1948 election victory of the National Party did not represent a major turning point in South African history, as it is often made out. Certainly there were continuities in policy and practice predating 1948. However it was also true that under the National Party government, there were shifts of emphasis and changes of approach in native policy. One important shift at policy level was the movement away from the Fagan Commission's view that growing permanence of urban Blacks had to be officially recognised, and back to the old Stallard notion that Blacks could only be temporary sojourners in urban areas outside the homelands. This was the view put forward by the 1947 report of the
Sauer Commission, which set out National Party policy on the colour question, the maintenance and protection of the White race.32

Accompanying this shift or emphasis was a greater centralization of power. From 1950 the central government increasingly took upon itself the task of regulating the presence of Blacks in urban areas in accordance with the government policy. The government used two major instruments to combat informal settlements, i.e. the Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950, which prescribed where different population groups could own property, reside and work and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, no. 52 of 1951, which was aimed at preventing or combating unlawful occupation of land or buildings.33

Local authorities found their autonomy undermined as the Department of Native Affairs increasingly intervened. Many local authorities were compliant, others were less so, leading to conflicts between central government and local authorities. Such a dispute arose in the 1950s between the Johannesburg City Council and the government over the latter's plan to uproot and relocate long established Black communities in the western areas of the city (Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare). The United Party dominated city council opposed, both the planned removals and the manner of their implementation, objecting to the way in which Dr. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, pushed aside municipal opposition in carrying through the operation.34 During the 1950s the government started to eliminate shanty-towns and inner city slums. Those destroyed included Sophiatown and Newclare in Johannesburg, District Six in Cape Town and Cato Manor in Durban.35 These mass removals were accompanied by a major construction
programme. The townships built during this era included Soweto (Johannesburg), Kwa Mashu and Umlazi (Durban), Nyanga and Gugulethu (Cape Town) and Daveyton (Benoni). It is worth noting that the greatest progress in meeting housing requirements for Blacks was made during the first decade that the National Party was in power.\textsuperscript{36}

This view is also supported by Bloch and Wilkinson when they revealed that the success of the National Party in trying to combat informal settlement became apparent in the period between 1948 and 1962, when an average of 11,386 houses were built every year in Black housing schemes as compared to 1,573 annually between 1920 and 1948. In Johannesburg alone, at the peak of the building programme in 1957-58, 11,074 houses were completed in a single year.\textsuperscript{37} In Daveyton for the period starting in November 1954 to December 1966, 10,571 houses were completed, and according to Bantu of February 1959, from 1948 to 1958 a total of 81,000 houses were built for urban Blacks.\textsuperscript{38}

By the mid 1960s informal settlements within and around South Africa’s towns and cities had largely been eradicated, and in its place were the sprawling townships.\textsuperscript{39} Maasdorp and Humphreys reported that there were 38,000 shacks in Durban in 1958 compared with only 10,050 in 1966.\textsuperscript{40} In Benoni squatting was virtually eliminated for the time being with the relocation of the Apex squatters to a newly established township, Daveyton, in April 1955.\textsuperscript{41}
3.2.5 **1967-1979: The housing freeze and the re-emergence of informal settlements**

In 1967 the government decided to freeze all township development outside the homelands. All further housing construction took place within the homeland boundaries, where sixty-six towns were established between 1960 and 1970.\(^{42}\) The housing freeze was implemented at a time when migration to the major metropolitan areas was accelerating, despite tightened influx control. The result was the re-emergence of informal settlements, this time on the periphery of urban areas.\(^{43}\)

The re-emergence of informal settlements around Durban housed an estimated 300,000 shack dwellers within the Durban-Pinetown region by 1971. This increased to over one million by 1981.\(^{44}\) The close proximity of the homeland boundary to Durban was one of the critical factors facilitating the rapid development of informal settlements within that locality.

Cape Town was different, yet even there informal settlements re-emerged during the 1970s eg. in areas such as Crossroads, Modderdam and Werkgenot. This was despite the stringent imposition of influx control within the Western Cape, which was designated as a Coloured Labour Preference Area.\(^{45}\) The increasing flow of migrants from the Transkei and Ciskei were not provided with housing as they were regarded as illegal entrants into the urban area of Cape Town, - Stellenbosch, Paarl, etc. In addition large numbers of Coloureds also lived in shanty towns as a result of a serious backlog in the provision of affordable housing. In 1977 there were between 120,000 and 180,000 Coloureds and 50,000 Blacks within Cape Town’s shantytowns.\(^{46}\) Before 1975 the settlements
were racially mixed, however the Divisional Council encouraged Blacks to move from other areas to the new Black settlements at Crossroads. The policy towards Coloured squatters was one of containment, that is, existing shacks were allowed to remain, but the erection of new shacks were prohibited.\textsuperscript{47}

In the former PWV area, informal settlements developed mainly in the form of backyard shacks, within existing urban areas. Free-standing informal settlements were only to re-emerge by the mid 1980s.\textsuperscript{48}

During the 1970s new attitudes towards informal settlements began to emerge in South Africa. The factors underlying that shift were the following:

* International trends.
* The influence of liberal South African academics and the business sector.
* Resistance to removals.
* Fiscal constraints on the government, and
* the inescapable reality of informal settlements.\textsuperscript{49}

Internationally a paradigm shift was underway by the late 1960s. Prior to this time, hostility towards informal settlement had been universal. These settlements were trying to portray themselves as symbols of the loss of control by government authorities. They were viewed as sources of crime and disease. However, a movement of scholars and development workers led by John Turner, challenged these perceptions. Turner argued that informal settlements were not the problem, but were
part of the solution to the housing crisis and that informal settlements represented the creativity of the poor. Turner urged decision-makers to support the self-help efforts of informal settlers.\textsuperscript{50}

At the 1976 United Nations Habitat Conference in Vancouver, there was almost universal acknowledgement that informal settlements could play a significant role in the national development process.\textsuperscript{51} It was acknowledged that informal settlements were loaded with opportunities for human advancement, but to realise the potential, there had to be a whole new vision, a reversal from previous positions and a more positive attitude which would appreciate the existing potential contribution of the inhabitants of slums and squatter settlements.\textsuperscript{52} Squatter settlements should be viewed as a natural phenomenon because the inhabitants were people seeking to fulfil their natural hopes for betterment, or people acting out of sheer desperation. Indeed, informal settlements should be regarded as pioneering which should be treated with respect and helped to become an object of reward rather than punishment.\textsuperscript{53} This new perception successfully established a more positive approach towards informal settlements.

The changing international perspective was taken up by liberal South African academics, who in turn influenced state thinking. In 1975, for example, Maasdorp and Humphreys referred to informal settlements as "self help community development by the poor" and argued that there was in fact sufficient evidence in the rapidly urbanising countries to show that squatter communities were highly successful solutions to the problems of mass urbanisation. They called for the introduction of site
and service schemes, referring to the approach adopted by the Johannesburg City Council during the 1940s.54

Maasdorp and Humpreys made a call for the Site and Service scheme because they were aware of its successes in providing shelter to needy people. Site and service schemes offered a compromise between the provision of housing to many people in a community and encouraging self-help initiatives, while the government concentrated on whatever individuals could not do for themselves. In most cases the government provided the site of the scheme, laid individual plots and constructed the core of each house in the form of a toilet and shower. The government also provided a concrete foundation for some rooms and provided access roads, piped water and sewerage, while the residents undertook the central house construction at whatever speed they wanted. They argued that the site and service approach, which serviced urban land and made it available in small plots, so that individual households could build their own dwelling, was particularly suited for African countries where neither the financial nor the administrative resources were available for constructing large scale public housing.55 The success of this approach can be observed in Daveyton township, the main area of this study.

The establishment of the Urban Foundation in 1976 was also an important development. Its aim was to contribute to a viable, democratic and non-racial South Africa by focusing on the critical development needs of disadvantaged South Africans, particularly in the urban areas e.g. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. The Foundation was basically involved in policy analysis, lobbying and in residential development. As far as policy was concerned, it was involved in
urbanisation, housing and education. In the field of residential development, the Foundation established a number of housing utility companies in major urban centres of the country. These companies were involved in the development and sale of serviced stands and houses, and they competed in the open market with the private sector. Companies involved were the Group Credit Company and Home Loan Guarantee Company.\footnote{56} The political cost of the then existing policy increased to an unacceptable level.

The focus of struggle during the late 1970s, was the Western Cape where the government feared that a relaxed attitude towards squatting at Crossroads would set a precedent for further squatting. In 1977 Modderdam and neighbouring squatter camps were razed by the authorities, and the next target was to be Crossroads. That action resulted in immense negative publicity for the government, placing Crossroads on the world map overnight.\footnote{57} The government decided to postpone the demolition of Crossroads, and in April 1979 Dr. Koornhof, then Minister of Co-operation and Development, announced that the residents of the squatter camp would be accommodated in a new housing scheme. Khayelitsha was built as a scheme into which the residents of Crossroads and other squatter camps could move. Crossroads itself would eventually be reprieved.\footnote{58}

Financial constraints and the reality of existing informal settlements, also convinced the government to change its policy direction. Although the provision of housing slowed down considerably during the 1970s, it was nevertheless government policy to remain an active participant in the housing delivery process.\footnote{59} By 1979 the freeze on the delivery of
housing to Black people outside the homelands, was still in effect and influx control was being enforced. No form of informal settlement was officially tolerated and the government remained committed to public housing, although very few houses were built during the 1970s. Yet there was a growing awareness amongst government officials that their policies could not be defended.  

3.2.6 1979-1985: Self-help housing and the gradual acceptance of Black urbanisation

The first half of the 1980s was a period of transition. Although the government officially pursued anti-Black urbanisation policies, it was increasingly recognised that this approach was economically and politically not viable. By 1985 the government had largely adopted the liberal stance which had been promoted by South African academics such as Maasdorp, during the 1970s.  

By the early 1980s the extent of the housing crisis was becoming visible. The rate of urbanisation and the years of inactivity in the housing field had given birth to a new generation of informal settlements. This reality led to calls on the government by the opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party, to abandon its official policy of public housing and the accompanying high zoning and building standards which discouraged lower quality housing.  

In Natal, during 1980, the Chief Town and Regional Planner of Pietermaritzburg was among those who argued that state funds were not available to build houses for everyone and that the inevitability of informal settlements should be accepted. It was contended that the task
of government should be to order informal settlements through the site and service schemes.\textsuperscript{64}

During 1981 the Urban Foundation provided a model for future development by establishing Inanda Newtown near Durban as a site and service scheme to resettle an informally settled community that had been stricken by typhoid and cholera epidemics. In 1982 the government followed that lead by announcing a new strategy for Black housing. In terms of that policy, the government restricted its role to providing infrastructure and services, while the private sector and individuals would be responsible for the construction of the houses. Site and service schemes were promoted with self help as the catchword. It was emphasized that squatting would not be accepted, but that where it was a reality it was to be controlled and where practical, upgraded.\textsuperscript{65} The new policy was criticised from a radical perspective by Hendler and Ratcliffe. Self help was perceived as a deliberate attempt by the government to remove itself from the responsibility of providing housing and as a ploy to de-politicise the housing area.\textsuperscript{66}

Government nevertheless promoted self-help housing albeit within the context of its policy of influx control and anti-Black urbanisation. The government's policy of influx control had clearly failed in its objectives, and the government was gradually moving towards extending home ownership rights to urban Blacks. This could be observed in March 1983 when the government announced plans to sell 500 000 state-owned houses, four-fifths of which were located in Black townships.
In 1979 the Riekert Commission had recommended that Blacks in urban areas qualifying for permanent residence should experience the full benefits of a free market, while influx control should be tightened to control the numbers of the privileged urban class. The policy programme formulated by the Riekert Commission was based on the assumption that the permanence of a section of the urban Black population should be recognised by law and administrative practice. A distinction was drawn between "settled urban Blacks" and Blacks living in the homelands who were under temporary contracts in the towns. Urban Blacks were to be allowed to move freely within the urban areas, subject to the availability of housing and employment. Strict controls would be applied to outsiders wishing to enter these areas. This necessitated the redefinition of administrative control areas in the country. Administrative boundaries between urban areas (prescribed areas) and rural areas (non prescribed areas) were to be dismantled, thereby creating a free labour movement zone covering all urban and rural districts under direct White administrative control. In this way South Africa would be divided into two spatial sectors, the one comprising areas of relatively high employment and incomes, and the other areas of high unemployment and low incomes. Existing controls over movement from homeland to White areas would be strengthened, and workers who qualified to remain permanently within the urban areas would be given preference in the allocation of employment within these areas. For those purposes the Riekert Commission recommended that a system of assembly centres should be established on the borders to control influx into the White areas, and that employment agencies should be set up in the townships to assist local workers to find jobs. The basic strategy offered by the Riekert Commission was then to differentiate between the
permanent urban and the temporary migrant Black population. However, in 1984 the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which was to give effect to the Riekert Commission's recommendations, was withdrawn because of strong resistance by independent unions, emerging community organisations and a range of liberal organisations. Since 1980 the opposition was backed by considerably enhanced organisational strength. 69

In 1985 the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, announced that unconditional property rights would be granted to urban Blacks and that the housing freeze which was in place since 1966, would be lifted. 70 This allowed for the upgrading and extension of townships which had previously been under threat of removal.

The 1985 report by the President's Council on "An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa" put the final nail into the coffin of influx control and anti-urban policies. The President's Council accepted urbanisation as an inevitable process and proposed that it should be used positively to the benefit of communities. Most of the recommendations of the President's Council were accepted by the government in the 1986 White Paper on urbanisation. 71 The White Paper on Urbanisation, published in 1986, could be seen as the former government's most comprehensive policy statement on housing. The government reiterated the view that the maintenance and promotion of the free enterprise system was a prerequisite for the improvement of the quality of life of all communities in the country. It further recognised the right of every individual to obtain accommodation within his means. At the same time it was accepted that the Government was responsible for creating the
opportunities to attain that ideal, and that it should intervene in the construction of houses only in exceptional circumstances. The government's role was to create favourable conditions under which the private sector could contribute to housing.72

The White Paper further acknowledged that the process of urbanisation was inevitable. It stated that the government accepted the policy of promoting property rights and that all South Africans should have the right to obtain their own homes. The conviction that all communities should be involved in their own development was emphasised. The White Paper noted the importance of the timely identification of sufficient land for human settlement as well as for commercial, industrial and social development. As far as the establishment of townships was concerned, it was asserted that ongoing attention be devoted to expediting procedures. It emphasised the importance of higher housing densities in order to make optimal use of the available land and infrastructure, and save on transportation costs. In view of the importance of home ownership, the large backlog in housing, the growing demand and the scarcity of funds, affordable standards and regulations were emphasised.73

The White Paper also stated that the government was prepared to make a contribution to the cost of supplying bulk and other services where necessary. However, the principle that consumers should pay for services and facilities, was reaffirmed. Much attention was devoted to the involvement of private sector financial institutions in the housing process. Even so, the government itself was still to make substantial financial contributions. As far as government institutions were
concerned, the White Paper emphasised the importance of the maximum devolution of authority and responsibility.\textsuperscript{74}

3.2.7 1986-1990 The Policy of Orderly Urbanisation

Although the 1986 White Paper saw urbanisation as an economically beneficial and socially desirable process, it emphasised the need for urbanisation to be planned, ordered and directed.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore squatting and uncontrolled informal settlements would not be consistent with a policy of orderly urbanisation. The President’s Council differentiated between informal settlement and squatting. Squatting, which was defined as illegal settlements, was regarded as always being undesirable, but it was accepted that informal settlements could make an important contribution to the urbanisation process.\textsuperscript{75} The report further distinguished between undesirable informal settlements, which took place in an unorderly fashion and involving social and health risks, and desirable informal settlements, which occurred on land identified for urbanisation and service.

The President’s Council proposed indirect measures to control squatting such as legalising certain settlements, upgrading those settlements legalised, the provision of land for site and service schemes and the determination of economically feasible standards of providing sites, as controls of government spending in designated areas.\textsuperscript{76} In the White Paper the government emphasised that direct controls would still be applied through the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 of 1951, together with the measures proposed by the President’s Council.\textsuperscript{77}
In 1988 an amendment to the *Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act* tightened control on squatting, while at the same time provided a mechanism (i.e. Section 6A of the Act) to legalise settlements and establish site and service schemes. During this period certain squatter / informal settlements e.g. Etwatwa East in Daveyton, were relocated while others were granted secure tenure and their settlements were upgraded. A significant number of site and service schemes were also developed e.g. Etwatwa West in Daveyton.\(^78\)

While there was a perceived need on the side of government to control and regulate urbanisation, there was a growing awareness that spontaneous informal settlement was inevitable, given the housing backlog. In 1987 the Minister of Information and Constitutional Development, Dr. S. van der Merwe, described informal settlements as more of a solution than a problem and spoke of the need to support the informal housing sector.\(^79\) Despite the government’s commitment to accommodate urbanisation in an orderly fashion, the housing backlog continued to escalate during the second half of the eighties. Informal settlements grew rapidly and for the first time since the 1950s, substantial free-standing informal settlements appeared in the PWV-area. Land invasions and densification of informal settlements also continued around Durban, and through the 1980s the number of shacks in Durban increased at an annual rate of 3 600 shacks. In the PWV the total number of shacks in free standing settlements increased from 28 500 in November 1987 to 49 280 units in late 1989. Moreover, the free-standing settlement population grew from 116 900 in 1987 to 377 109 in 1989 which means that it tripled in a space of two years.\(^80\)
Cape Town was believed to have overtaken Durban as the fastest growing metropolitan area in the country with estimated numbers of squatters moving into the Cape Metropolitan area each month varying from 5 000 to 10 000 in the 1980s. In the Eastern Cape around East London and Port Elizabeth informal settlers moved into some of the worse conditions in the country. These informal settlements developed within a highly charged environment following the township revolts of the mid-1980s. By 1990 squatting and informal settlements were a highly visible and politicised phenomenon. It was increasingly recognised that an urgent and effective policy response was required.

3.2.8 Post-1990: Democratisation and urban reconstruction
On 2 February 1990 South Africa entered a new phase in its political development. The political changes had an impact on urban policy and planning. Important developments included the following:

* The scrapping of the Groups Areas Act and other restrictive legislation.
* Provision for non-racial local authorities with a single tax base and other negotiated forms of third-tier government in terms of the Local Government Transition Act, No. 209 of 1993.
* The establishment of the Independent Development Trust, which provided a R7 500 subsidy per serviced site.
* The Less Formal Township Establishment Act, No. 113 of 1991, which allowed for rapid development of land for low income communities, and
The entry of the ANC and other groups into the policy debate.  

The White Paper on Land Reform, released in 1991 reflected the increasing concern by government over the problems posed by squatting and uncontrolled informal settlements. It emphasised that the integrity of land rights and the interests of established communities would be protected. Squatting that took the form of trespassing on, and taking over of the property of another, would not be tolerated in an orderly society. At the same time the White Paper accepted that the government had a responsibility towards the homeless who were seeking a livelihood in urban areas and that squatting was part of the urbanisation process.

To resolve the problem of squatting, the White Paper proposed that the emphasis in dealing with squatting should always be on guiding those people towards land which was suitable for less formal settlements on which at least rudimentary but upgradeable services were available. It was clear from the White Paper that the strategy with respect to squatting and disorderly informal settlements, would be rapid designation and servicing of land on which informal settlements could be established in an orderly manner. The emphasis on the timeous provision of land and services to forestall squatting, was a logical extension of the 1983 policy of self-help housing, the 1985 recommendations of the President’s Council and the government’s stated policy of orderly urbanisation in 1986.
Mechanisms to achieve rapid development of land for low income residential development were provided in the *Less Formal Township Establishment Act*, No.113 of 1991, while the capital subsidy provided by the Independent Development Trust made large scale provisions of serviced sites much more feasible. In order to assist with the early identification of squatting and the movement of squatters into site and service schemes, the Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs and National Housing announced the establishment of "squatter auxiliary units" in the former four provinces. These were squatter monitoring groups which were elected from the communities of affected groups (squatters) to operate for 24 hours a day monitoring the movement of squatters into site and service schemes. These were announced in July 1991 and were managed by the Provincial Administrations which had full responsibility for combating squatting. The ANC responded by accusing the government of declaring war on squatters, and the Democratic Party referred to it as squatter hit squads. While the Democratic Party and the African National Congress opposed the formation of these units, the government emphasised that the main task of the structures was to achieve a negotiated settlement to local conflicts surrounding squatting.

By the early 1990s, informal housing was an accepted form of shelter, provided that it occurred within an officially sanctioned site and service scheme. In practice, much, although not all, informal housing outside site and service schemes was accepted as a reality and tolerated as such. The position of the ANC and other non-established groups like the Civic Associations was less clear. While some constituencies within the ANC accepted the liberal approach advocated by institutions such as the Urban
Foundation, the Independent Development Trust and the Development Bank, there were others arguing for far greater state intervention in the provision of housing. An ANC discussion document stated that the provision of housing for the poor was seen as a state responsibility. However, there was no clear consensus as to whether this meant that the government would build all the houses or whether it would merely facilitate the construction of housing and put its money into services. The same document referred to the need to upgrade squatter settlements as a matter of priority in the short term.

At the ANC National Consultative Conference on Local Government (October 1990) it was agreed that the basic goal of a housing policy should be houses for all within the next ten years and the immediate provision of serviced land. It was argued that the site and service schemes would be necessary in the short term, but only if this was coupled with a commitment to decent and affordable housing. It appeared therefore, that the ANC accepted informal housing, in its various forms, as a short term necessity, but not as the ultimate solution to the housing crisis.

3.3 Recent government policies regarding informal settlements
The provision of adequate shelter at prices poor people can afford is one of the most formidable tasks facing the government. Over 60% of the South African population is urbanised.

Government restrictions on urban Black home ownership over the past four decades have resulted in a housing backlog estimated at 2.5 million units, with demand growing by 200 000 units each year. Estimates vary,
but approximately 7 million people in 1990 were living in informal settlements throughout South Africa, on land occupied legally or illegally. Two hundred and forty government-built hostels around the country have over 600,000 beds, occupied sometimes by three people to a bed space. With unemployment rates around 40%, four out of five households are not able to afford a mortgage in the 1990s. Hence the mushrooming of informal settlements.

In a 1993 policy guide of the ANC on a new housing policy for South Africa, the ANC expressed its belief in a single national housing policy, administered through one national housing department to address the provision of housing and services. Within that single framework, different but complementary policies would have to be formulated for urban and rural areas as well as the upgrading of existing poor levels of housing and services. The ANC proposed that the Government should play a significant role in the provision of finance for low income housing. While market relations were an essential component of a mixed economy, the ANC did not believe that the market was able to address the housing needs of all South Africans adequately, and therefore supported the provision of subsidies to facilitate access to basic and essential services and housing. The ANC advocated the restructuring of the housing finance and subsidy system so as to target those most in need of assistance. They rejected the privatisation of land supply for low income housing and believed that it was the government’s responsibility to ensure that low income households have easy access to well located, affordable land. Hence the ANC in their election campaign promised to deliver 1,000,000 houses to the homeless people. The ANC by 1995 had to acknowledge that its stated goal of one million new homes by
1999 was unlikely to be achieved. It still believed that whatever housing
was or is generated, would contribute to economic growth and stimulate
employment in related industries ranging from services to utensils and
furniture.99

The government’s White Paper on Housing published in 1994
emphasised that housing policies and strategies would be directed at
enabling and supporting communities to mobilise towards participation
in the satisfaction of their own housing needs in a way that maximises
the involvement of the community and the private sector, and leads to a
transfer of skills and economic empowerment of members of the
community. The policy emphasis was placed on supporting local
initiatives including small or medium sized companies in partnership
with larger, established companies committed to providing support and
training.100

The government’s overall policy and approach to the housing challenge
when dealing with informal settlements, was aimed at mobilising and
harnessing the combined resources, efforts and initiative of communities,
the private, commercial sector and the state. It was doing this through
pursuing seven key strategies:

* Stabilising the housing environment in order to ensure maximum
  benefit of state housing expenditure and mobilising private sector
  investment.
* Facilitating the establishment or directly establishing a range of
  institutional, technical and logistical housing support mechanisms,
to enable communities to improve their housing circumstances on a continuous basis.

* Mobilising private savings and housing credit at scale, on a sustainable basis and simultaneously ensuring adequate protection for consumers.

* Providing subsidy assistance to disadvantaged individuals to assist them in gaining access to housing.

* Rationalising institutional capacities in the housing sector within a sustainable long-term institutional framework.

* Facilitating the speedy release and servicing of land.

* Co-ordinating and integrating public sector investment and intervention on a multi-functional basis.\(^{101}\)

The government's approach to housing delivery centred around the encouragement of various approaches towards delivery, hoping that it would ensure that the homeless are afforded suitable land accessible to basic services. It was perceived that this will allow the continuous building of new houses to combat homelessness and the upgrading of services and the surroundings. The state subsidies together with technical expertise and institutional support was aimed at ensuring that the poor were afforded low cost houses which would eventually curb the mushrooming of informal settlements.\(^{102}\) The government of national unity decided to institute a comprehensive low income housing subsidy scheme, available to all South Africans on an individual or project basis. Funding for subsidies came from the budget for housing as well as from the Reconstruction and Development Programme funds. These subsidies took effect from 14 March 1994.\(^{103}\)
The scheme for individuals consisted of an upfront capital subsidy graded according to the recipients income levels, as reflected in Table 3.

**Table 3  Subsidy Table, 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R0 - 800/month</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 801-1500/month</td>
<td>R12 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-2500/month</td>
<td>R 9 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-3500/month</td>
<td>R 5 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Local Government and National Housing: Housing Scheme Implementation Manual, November 1995.*

This table indicates that an individual who earned less than a thousand rand, qualifies for more subsidy than an individual who earned above R3 000 a month. This therefore means that the subsidy scheme is meant to help the poor and the unemployed. The project based subsidy was intended for projects initiated not only by developers, but also by community based organisations. Social agreements were drawn up by the community involved and the suppliers of the infrastructure and services. The basic principles of these projects also included a focus on addressing the needs of disadvantaged communities, whose rights and relationships were not to be disturbed if possible. The community would be involved in the process for their own benefit. The local initiative was encouraged and an environment was created where obligations are met.¹⁰⁴
3.4 The state departments responsible for informal settlements to 1994

Government's involvement in the provision of housing in South Africa started with the adoption of the Housing Act No. 25 of 1920, in terms of which the Central Housing Board of the Department of Housing was established. This body controlled the housing developments of local authorities and was viewed initially as a purely administrative organisation, which supervised the lending of government funds for the purpose. Local authorities in terms of the Act, borrowed money from the Administrator of the Province, or, with his consent, from any other source, to construct approved dwellings or carry out approved schemes. For many years, however, the powers given by the Act in respect of Blacks and Coloured housing were not used frequently.

After 1948, housing was used as an instrument to implement the policy of separate development more strictly. The overall task of regulation generally fell to the municipal native administration departments, until the 1970s when the central state agencies, the Bantu Administration Boards, took over their responsibilities. Under the policy of separate development, the aim was to make the homelands politically and economically viable. In the rest of the country, various measures were enforced to make areas outside the homelands less attractive to Blacks. Local communities were often relocated to the homelands from the so-called Black spots. Housing programmes for Blacks outside the homelands were suspended. A dualistic housing system developed in which the market operated only in the White sector, while Blacks were deprived of ownership and property rights in areas outside their homelands. From the beginning of the 1980s, the government
Some of the functions of the Department of Planning, Provincial Affairs and National Housing were affected by the rationalization of government departments announced by the State President on 16 October 1991. The department's name was changed to the Department of Local Government and National Housing. Its housing functions fell into two categories. In the first instance, there were general matters involving all population groups. Secondly there were functions relating to the housing of Blacks residing outside TBVC states, the self-governing territories and Trust Areas. The Department's general responsibilities involving all population groups, comprised the promotion of local government affairs, and general housing affairs. With regard to general housing affairs it regulated the allocation of land for housing, formulated policy on squatting and assisted in the formulation of general housing policy and strategy. As far as Black housing outside TBVC and self-governing territories were concerned, the Department, in collaboration with the four Provincial Administrations, could in some way be compared to the three Own Affairs Administrations. It formulated guidelines for the development of towns for Blacks within its area of jurisdiction and coordinated township development programmes at national level.

In addition, the Department made funds available to the provinces and Black local authorities for the purchase of land for the settlement of Blacks. Housing programmes for Blacks were carried out by the four provincial administrations, whereas the National Housing Fund financed these programmes. Monies for this fund were channelled through the Department's budget. This status remained until 1993 when a new constitution came into being, and in 1994 a new government came into power with its own policies, which are discussed here under.
The general consequences of this restructuring include economic inefficiency brought about by the spatial structure of South African cities, a dualistic financial system with regard to housing, and a socio-political mind set that would be difficult to change. The Black township policy resulted in a particular urban structure that could be distinguished from more generally accepted urban models. The main consequence of the South African city structure was the underutilization of available services and a duplication of expensive facilities.

Subsequently a dualistic financial system developed regarding housing and other urban facilities. The private sector was usually responsible for provision to the White population through predominantly market-driven forces. The Black urban sector was almost totally financed by government intervention from the central government's budget. Both the abovementioned factors contributed directly towards a socio-political attitude, which assumed the private sector to be responsible for the White market and the government for the Black market. The consequences of this attitude in the South African community was that financial institutions, for example, did not readily accept that Black housing was part of the housing market. On the other hand Blacks regarded housing as a purely social acquisition, and consequently the responsibility of the government. Therefore Blacks did not care to invest in housing as such. This contributed towards structures for housing delivery that were economically unattainable.
3.4.1 **The National Ministry and Department of Housing**

Schedule 6 of the Constitution of South Africa of 1994 determines that provincial legislatures and national government have concurrent competency to legislate in respect of housing, regional planning and development as well as urban and rural development. The intention is that appropriate housing functions and powers should be devolved to the maximum possible extent, up to the provincial level. The Department of Housing have to fulfil the functions of setting broad national housing delivery goals and negotiate provincial delivery goals in support thereof and to determine broad national housing policy, in consultation with other relevant national departments and provincial.¹¹²

Issues for discussion include land development and use, land title and registration systems, minimum national norms and standards, national subsidy programmes, fund allocation to provinces, fund allocation to national facilitative programmes, mobilization of funds for land acquisition, infrastructural development, housing provision and finance, and guidelines for the settlement pattern.¹¹³ The national Department of Housing is also entrusted with the duty of effecting national housing policies.

It was the National government's policy in 1994 to manage urbanisation so as to prevent squatting. The view was that the rights of land owners should not be unlawfully infringed upon. At the same time land should be designated legally to accommodate urban settlement in an orderly fashion. Primarily, that entailed the provision of sites with basic infrastructural services to enable individuals to build their own structures according to needs and means. The current policy states that where
illegal settlement already occurs, regulation and orderly resettlement should be undertaken after consultation with those involved. This was well received by the informal settlement residents, especially those in Etwatwa.\textsuperscript{114}

3.4.2 **Role of Provincial Government**

Provincial governments play a critical role in ensuring effective and sustained housing delivery. Within the overall institutional and constitutional framework, certain housing functions are executed at provincial level, the responsibility given to the Provincial Department of Housing headed by the Member of the Executive Council in each province. Among the functions to be performed by the provincial department is the setting of provincial housing delivery goals, determining the provincial housing policy, monitoring the legislature in this regard, overseeing and directing the housing activities of provincial statutory advisory and executive bodies, local authorities as well as the activities of provincial facilitating institutions. They liaise and negotiate with the National Department and facilitate fiscal transfers for housing to the provinces, and also facilitate national housing policy and programmes.\textsuperscript{115} Provincial governments are accountable to the people who elected them for the delivery of houses in the provinces, and at the same time the Minister of Housing is accountable to Parliament for overall sectoral performance.

This means too that the provincial governments are responsible for province-wide services which are redistributive, and cross over municipal boundaries. With respect to urban development, the provincial role was and is still to regulate the local planning process and build
municipal capacity. That included the evaluation and prioritisation of infrastructure programmes that required provincial government funding and the monitoring of projects. The direct involvement of the provincial authority was well received by the community, but the slow rate of delivery on the part of provincial and local governments was problematic.116

3.4.3 The role of Local, Rural and Metropolitan Government

The operation and legal framework of the provincial administration was spelt out in the Provincial Government Act of 1986. With the establishment of Own Affairs Administrations, many of the traditional responsibilities of the provinces were transferred to Own Affairs Administrations. Since then the provinces took on various new duties, and of special importance were those duties concerning the implementation of Black urban development programmes and projects. They assisted Black local authorities, with development projects and exercised control over housing and land use, as well as financial control over Black local authorities and provided financial assistance where necessary. They also assisted Black local authorities in maintaining technical services and were responsible for matters relating to squatter communities or informal settlements. However, the functions of policy formulation and the determination of norms and standards were retained by the central government.117

In the 1980s when Black local authorities were almost non-existent or inoperative, provincial administrations provided local government services on an agency basis. In this regard, and as part of their responsibilities to implement government policy on squatting and orderly
delayed the housing provision and thus led to the mushrooming of informal settlements.

Local authorities occasionally used their own funds to finance housing programmes and projects in which they were involved. However, the major portion of their housing finance was provided by the respective Housing Development Funds mentioned earlier. They also obtained funds from regional services councils/joint services boards, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Local Authorities Loans Fund and the private capital market.¹²²

Local governments remained subject to the precepts of the transition process until 1999 as negotiated during 1993 in the Local Government Negotiating Forum, and as regulated by the Local Government Transition Act, No. 209 of 1993. The primary object of this transition process was the de-racialisation and democratisation of existing local government structures, and the establishment of democratically elected structures in those parts of South Africa not previously governed by local governments.¹²³

The physical processes of planning and provision of housing has thus become a local community matter. It is the task of metropolitan and especially local government, to enable, promote and facilitate the provision of housing to all segments of the population, in areas under their jurisdiction. The absence of legitimate, functional and viable local authority structures is seen to jeopardise both the pace and quality of the implementation of housing programmes.¹²⁴ Some of the housing functions performed at metropolitan and local levels were the setting of
metropolitan or local housing delivery goals, identifying and designing of land for housing purposes and the regulation of safety and health standards in housing provision, as well as providing facilitative support to housing delivery agencies.\textsuperscript{125}

An important cornerstone of housing delivery was put in place on 25 November 1997, when both Houses of Parliament finally approved the Housing Bill in 1997. The bill was subsequently signed by the President and became an Act of Parliament on 19 December 1997. The Housing Act, no. 107 of 1997 abolished all previous housing legislation and replaced it with a single Housing Act which reflected the housing priorities of the current government.\textsuperscript{126}

The principles of the 1997 Housing Act can be classified into four categories, namely: principles relating to human rights matters, principles relating to the interests of those who could not independently provide for their housing needs, principles aimed at promoting integrated housing development which is financially affordable and sustainable and principles guiding the effective functioning of the housing market. The Act furthermore defined the roles and responsibilities of the different spheres of Government, i.e. National, Provincial and Local. The roles as defined in the Act can be summarised as follows: National government had to establish and facilitate a sustainable national housing development process; provincial governments had to do everything in their power to promote and facilitate the provision of adequate housing in their province within the framework of national policy; and municipalities had to take all reasonable and necessary steps within the framework of national and provincial legislation and policy to ensure that inhabitants
of their areas of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing on a progressive basis.\textsuperscript{127}

3.5 \textbf{Estimated population of informal settlements in South Africa}

In the late forties, several squatter groups occupied land close to existing Black residential areas in Johannesburg, and early in 1947 the squatters were estimated to number some 60,000. In 1946 Durban had an estimated 30,000 shack dwellers showing a post-war popular response to housing shortages, the high cost of tenancy and poor living conditions countrywide.\textsuperscript{128}

Large scale demolition of shacks took place in Durban after 1958, but actions against squatters became a feature of the entire period of 1948 to 1986.\textsuperscript{129} Squatter clearance was but one facet of the broader programme of population relocation that gained momentum through the 1950s, peaking during the homeland development drive of the 1960s and 1970s. It has been estimated that more than three million people were moved between 1960 and 1983, sometimes to segregated residential areas in White towns and cities, but in the vast majority of cases to the homelands.\textsuperscript{130}

Although squatters had always been subjected to removal, the huge informal settlements that mushroomed in the homelands in the 1970s were allowed to grow relatively unhindered. Declining agricultural production and the growth of a landless population in the homelands, contributed to the rapid expansion of informal towns within commuting range of metropolitan areas. These towns thus became integrated into regional metropolitan centred labour markets. Winterveld in
Bophutatswana is an example of such informal urbanisation. Winterveld is close to Pretoria and it surrounds formal border towns that were designed to house cross border daily commuters to the industrial areas north of Pretoria.\textsuperscript{131}

Informal settlements were and are still highly visible, but considerable settlements in the form of backyard shelters, took place in the formal townships outside the homelands. Sporadic campaigns to eradicate backyard shacks were mounted in many townships, but they remained an important form of housing for Blacks in urban areas. In the early 1980s, an estimated one-fifth of the population of Black townships in Port Elizabeth occupied illegal makeshift shelters.\textsuperscript{132}

With regard to the distribution of the informal settlement population, official estimates indicated that an overwhelming majority (91\%) of informal settlement dwellers lived in Black townships and on developed residential stands in backyard shacks and outbuildings. By contrast, only 8,7\% of informal settlement dwellers lived in free-standing settlements by 1989. Of the free-standing settlements, 10\% were located within Black townships, the remaining 90\% outside of Black townships. The settlements within townships were the most sizeable and occurred in larger, most populous townships in the central, east and west Rand such as Soweto, Alexandra, Bekkersdal, Khutsong, Daveyton, Katlehong, Tokoza and Tembisa with a combined population of 2.5 million.\textsuperscript{133}

Unless jobs are created, minimum wages increased and land made available, South Africa faces a major crisis. Presently 68\% of South Africans earn less than R1 500 per month, translating into some 5,7
million households.\textsuperscript{134} About 1.06 million South African households, (13.5%), live in squatter housing nationwide, mostly in free-standing squatter settlements on the periphery of cities and towns and in the backyards of formal houses.\textsuperscript{135}

Table 4, below, illustrates the projected monthly income of the South African population. It shows that the majority of the South African population earned less than R2 500 a month. This meant that the bulk of South Africans depended on the government to provide them with shelter.

Table 4. Projected monthly household income distribution figures, 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>INCOME CATEGORY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>R0 - R800</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>3.30m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>R800 - R1 500</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>2.41m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>R1 500 - R2 500</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>0.98m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>R2 500 - R3 500</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0.46m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>&gt; R3 500</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>1.15m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8.3m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Housing: Housing the Nation, 1998.

The small housing stock available and low and progressively decreasing rates of formal and informal housing in South Africa have resulted in a massive increase in the number of households forced to seek accommodation as squatters in backyard shacks and overcrowded conditions.\textsuperscript{136} Low rates of formal housing delivery coupled with high
rates of new household formation have resulted in a massive growth in the number of people housed in squatter camps.

According to the White Paper on Housing, informal housing remains the prevalent means through which urban households presently house themselves in South Africa. It is estimated that approximately 150 000 new households per year house themselves this way. The recent rapid increase in the number of land invasions is a further indication of this. There are approximately 1.5 million urban informal housing units, and some 620 000 serviced sites exist at present.

In his 1997-98 Annual Report, Gauteng MEC for Housing and Land Affairs, Mr. Dan Mofokeng, estimated that 2.5 million people were presently landless in the province, and that about 378 000 households were targeted for the delivery of secure tenure through the transfer of land valued at R7.9 million. The provincial housing backlog was estimated at 761 000 households. In the Eastern Cape the backlog was 338 239, the Free State 132 323, in KwaZulu Natal 473 214, in Northern Province 180 667 and in the Western Cape 215 642, which form the total of 2 527 933 households. The figure escalated at a rate of some 40 000 households a year as a result of national growth and inward immigration.

As part of the national target to deliver one million units by April 1999, the Gauteng Housing Department set itself a delivery target of 243 000 units in that period. The provincial hostels upgrading programme also aimed at improving the living conditions of some 90 000 inmates.
3.6 The current Government action to alleviate the problem of informal settlements.

The People's Housing Process is the government's national housing policy put forward in March 1998 by the Department of Housing. This policy intended to encourage and give support to individuals and communities in their efforts to fulfil their own housing needs. The government assisted these people in obtaining land, securing tenure, services and technical assistant so as to empower the individuals and community.

Poor families in both urban and rural areas, fall within four broad categories, namely families who either have been settled on fully serviced sites with ownership rights, or families who have been settled on fully serviced sites on a rental basis and have not yet received ownership right. Then there are those who have settled informally on land and are not yet in possession of any form of tenure right, or there are those families without land. They reside in overcrowded hostels, backyard shacks and any other form of accommodation without secure tenure rights.142

One of the examples of an institution attempting to promote the building of houses in South Africa, is the South African Homeless People's Federation. The Federation has private savings in excess of three quarters of a million rands, obtained from its more than 50 000 member families, and they have built more than 700 houses without government aid. The efforts of the Federation have been recognised by the Department of Housing which last year gave R10 million to support its saving-driven housing programme.143
A trust known as the People’s Housing Partnership Trust (PHPTrust) was established in March 1997 with funding totalling $2,75 million (about R12 million) from the United Nations Development Programme and USAID (United States Agency for International Development). Wherever a lack of capacity or skills is identified at provincial or local levels, the PHPT can be invited to assist, promote and facilitate the establishment of housing support projects. Where required, the PHPT provides capacity building and develops the skills required to implement and sustain these support projects. The aim of the PHPT is to build and mobilise the capacity and strengths of people who, because of their limited incomes are unable to afford housing provided by contractors. These people comprise mostly of unemployed people with limited formal education and skills training.

Critical factors which influence the success of this programme include access to both urban and rural land, with secure tenure and adequate services, access to housing subsidies, access to alternative forms of housing credit, access to affordable building materials, access to technical support in home building and basic skills training, access to housing information and consumer education, and the mobilization of savings and opportunities for employment creation.

To support the Peoples Housing Process, funds were set aside by the government for the establishment of housing support initiatives or centres, but these initiatives have been rather slow to take off. The following housing support centres have already been established:
A further 31 initiatives are currently in the planning phase with implementation occurring during the 1997/98 financial year:

- Northern Cape: 4
- Western Cape: 5
- Free State: 5
- Eastern Cape: 1
- Northern Province: 2
- Gauteng: 3
- Kwa Zulu Natal: 4
- Mpumalanga: 2
- North West: 5

Housing support centres are established in areas where subsidies have been approved but people need support to build their own houses. A total of R150 million was set aside in the 1997/98 financial year for the establishment of such centres. The nature of each centre differs from
province to province and community to community. In general, housing support centres or housing support initiatives offer people information, training and technical support on building and construction. Housing support centres or initiatives are not yet developed in all areas as expected, primarily due to inadequate institutional capacity at provincial and local level. In addition, appropriate policy guidelines and operational procedures are still being formulated in a partnership approach involving all key stakeholders. People’s Housing Process of which housing support centres are a support programme, is the focus of the third report of the Ministerial Task Team or short-term housing delivery. The report was delivered to the Minister in September 1997. This has been well received by the affected communities especially in Kathorus.\(^{150}\)

### 3.6.1 National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC)

The National Housing Finance Corporation was established in June 1996. It is a public company, wholly owned by the government, with the objective of facilitating the provision of wholesale housing finance to those who do not have ready access to the formal credit markets and to institutions which provide affordable housing to this market segment.\(^{151}\) Its immediate aim is to build financial capacity in the housing sector while at the same time it mobilises funds. In its short period of operation the NHFC has made positive strides to establish a base of operations and is negotiating various deals which, when concluded, will begin to meet its objectives. The NHFC also manages the R525 million from the RDP. The report of the second Ministerial Task Team, approved in December 1996, provided the framework for the establishment of a R75 million fund to be matched Rand for Rand by local promoters, to start up housing
institutions such as housing or tenant associations. By 1997 one application for R6 million to build 538 rent-to-buy homes in Mitchells Plain, had been approved, and another five proposals for housing institutions are being investigated. The NHFC has committed R246 million which is expected to benefit 213,500 households. In addition R103.2 million has already been paid out and has benefited 23,681 families. Projects worth R119 million are in the pipeline.

The Rural Housing Loan Fund is managed by the NHFC. Set up as a revolving fund with a DM 50 million grant from German donors, this fund aimed at improving the housing situation of rural people through increasing access to housing loans. The fund provides wholesale finance and support to non-traditional lenders to enable them to lend to lower income earners in rural areas. The first grants to non-traditional lenders have already been made.

3.6.2 RDP programmes involving the Department of Housing

Three current programmes provide support to local authorities and communities to upgrade existing municipal services, i.e. the Municipal Infrastructure Programme (MIP), the Extension of the Municipal Infrastructure Programme (EMIP) and the Bulk and Connection Infrastructure Grant (BCIG).

MIP and EMIP are administered by the Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, and the BCIG is administered by the Department of Housing. The total combined value of these three programmes is R2.15 billion, which can provide considerable assistance in housing delivery. However, the Government has decided to
establish a single comprehensive infrastructure assistance programme which became operational during the 1997/98 financial year. This programme is administered by the Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, and will in the first financial year involve an amount of around R500 million, made available as a grant to local authorities to provide certain bulk and connector services for the poorer sections of their communities.

With a view to promoting horizontal and vertical co-ordination in the public sector and to upgrading certain areas which had been affected by violence, i.e. in the upgrading of informal settlements, basic services, such as portable water, toilets, surface drainage, garbage collection and disposal, electricity supply, schools, streets and community centres, are introduced or provided in informal settlements. In cases where these services already exist, they are improved. Thirteen Special Presidential Projects on urban renewal were identified as part of the RDP for upgrading and development over a five-year period with a budget of more than R2 billion. Business plans for each project within these programmes were approved by December 1996, and although the actual expenditure on these projects has been fairly slow, due in particular to capacity constraints, expenditure patterns are improving and it is expected that, in most cases, projects will be completed within the prescribed five year period.

The Special Integrated Presidential Projects on urban renewal are:

Western Cape: Integrated Service Land Project
Eastern Cape: Duncan Village, Ibhayi
KwaZulu Natal: Cato Manor, KwaZulu Natal Disaster Fund
Gauteng: Kathorus
Mpumalanga: Masoyi, Siyabuswa
Northern Province: Mahwelereng
North West: Molopo River Basin
Northern Cape: Galeshewe
Free State: Thabong, Free State Projects.

3.6.3 **Statistics Relating to the Capital Subsidy Scheme**

Approximately 49 per cent of all households in South Africa have an income of only R1000 per month. These households are living below the minimum subsistence level, which is currently calculated at R1072 per month. They are unable to make any contribution towards mortgage finance and are dependent on the government subsidy to fulfil their housing needs. The Capital Subsidy Scheme, established in March 1994, allows a person(s), married or with dependants, who have an income of less than R3500 per month, to qualify for a subsidy based on a sliding scale against income, with a R15 000 subsidy going to those who are unemployed or earn less than R800 per month.
### Table 5. Housing Statistics - April 1994 to December 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>TOTAL SUBSIDIES APPROVED</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL SUBSIDIES APPROVED</th>
<th>HOUSES COMPLETED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>PROJECTS APPROVED</th>
<th>PROJECTS STARTED</th>
<th>PROJECTS WITH HOUSES IN PROGRESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN CAPE</td>
<td>77,817</td>
<td>8,235</td>
<td>42,034</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREE STATE</td>
<td>33,454</td>
<td>4,074</td>
<td>35,503</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAUTENG</td>
<td>174,373</td>
<td>24,516</td>
<td>140,392</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAZULU NATAL</td>
<td>141,484</td>
<td>8,778</td>
<td>88,546</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPUMALANGA</td>
<td>61,223</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>26,732</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN CAPE</td>
<td>18,786</td>
<td>4,441</td>
<td>14,250</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN PROVINCE</td>
<td>62,454</td>
<td>8,170</td>
<td>21,183</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH WEST</td>
<td>74,204</td>
<td>6,286</td>
<td>36,730</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN CAPE</td>
<td>91,580</td>
<td>6,947</td>
<td>64,074</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>735,375</td>
<td>77,447</td>
<td>469,444</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The individual subsidy programme, which was introduced in April 1994, gave qualifying beneficiaries access to housing subsidies to acquire ownership of existing property or property not located in a project approved by a provincial housing development board. A person may also buy a serviced site and construct his or her own top structure. Project-limited subsidies provide housing opportunities for individuals on an ownership basis within housing projects approved by provincial housing development boards, and the total subsidies approved is the combination of both individual and project-linked subsidies.
As reflected in Table 5, between April 1994 and December 1997, 469,444 houses of the one million houses promised, were built or partly constructed, giving people home ownership opportunities for the first time. Of these only 10.4 per cent have limited credit financing. Some 2118 institutional subsidies have been reserved by the government to enable institutions to provide subsidised housing in various tenure forms.

The Department of Housing expected to have at least 800,000 subsidies reserved by Provincial Housing Boards by the end of the 1997/98 financial year. This was only achieved in March 1999. With more than 735,378 subsidies approved by March 1998, (of an average amount of R14,800), and the projects being in various stages of planning or development, the indication is that possibly one million houses would be built or would be under construction by the end of 1999.\[159\]

In total, more than 987 projects have been approved by the Provincial Housing Boards. Of these, 690 projects were started and 506 projects are houses under construction.\[160\] The national Minister of Housing, has admitted that the government's efforts alone will not produce one million houses unless homeless people contributed by building their own homes.\[161\] The fact that the housing subsidy does not provide sufficient finance for a completed house, is not in dispute. For the majority, it only provides access to land with secure tenure plus shelter that meets little more than basic needs.

In July 1997, the Minister of Housing and Provincial MECs responsible for Housing, agreed to the allocation of 280,000 subsidies by provinces
in terms of a formula which took into consideration factors such as provincial populations, housing backlogs and for the first time, provincial performance in terms of actual numbers of houses built or under construction.\textsuperscript{162}

The Provincial allocation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>R473,5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>291,7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>1331,7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>494,6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>363,6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>135,3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>357,9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>405,9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>437,5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6.4 \textbf{Masakhane}

Masakhane is a Nguni phrase that means "Let's build together". It was a national government campaign, launched by the State President in February 1995, to drive the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The Masakhane Campaign was launched to accelerate the delivery of basic services and housing; to stimulate economic development in urban and rural areas; to promote the resumption of rent, services and bond payments, thereby creating conditions for large scale investments in housing and services. The Masakhane Campaign was also responsible for promoting the creation of conditions conducive to effective and sustainable local governance.\textsuperscript{164}
Mushakane was managed by the Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs. The launch and devolution of implementation to provinces and local government promised improved results. Masakhane sought to unite people in action to build the country on a basis of shared socio-political and economic vision. It was a vehicle to normalise and stabilise the socio-economic environment for sustainable development and growth.

Since the launch of the campaign, much was done to promote it at national, provincial and local level. A wide range of instruments were used to promote the campaign messages and to encourage participation. These included publicity programmes, workshops, roadshows, consultations, rallies, marches, etc. These efforts succeeded in increasing the awareness of the campaign, and attempted to encourage inhabitants to start paying for services rendered, which in turn could accelerate housing delivery.

3.6.5 **What is being done to accelerate delivery?**
Government was satisfied by 1997 that much had already been done to improve the chain of housing delivery. There are four phases in the housing delivery chain. Phase one is the lodging of applications for subsidies by developers with the Provincial Housing Boards. Phase two is the processing of applications by Provincial Departments, approval from Provincial Housing Boards and signing of a contract. Phase three is the preparatory work for the implementation of the contract, and phase four is the completion of the top structure, i.e. the building and completion of the house.165
Serious problems are still being experienced with the signing of contracts and the approval of individual subsidy applications by provinces. Proposals to streamline the handling of applications were approved by the National Minister and the Provincial MECs in July 1997. Another key problem area is payments to developers, which in many cases, are made unacceptably late or inaccurately. The Department of Housing hence developed a simple payment system linked to the computer data management system Nomvula, which was operational by mid-1998.¹⁶⁶

The degree of efficiency differs from province to province and region to region, depending on the capacity and skills of the staff employed at the various levels of interface with the government private sector partners. Capacity and skill levels are problems which affect the private sector as well as the public sector. The skills needed by housing are those which are among the most scarce in the country, namely engineers, town planners, skilled financial administrators and experienced project managers.

Specific actions are being set in motion to speed up delivery. These include the establishment of a national capacity-building programme promoting joint ventures, which will enable mass delivery of houses, the addressing of legal obstacles inhibiting the distribution of subsidies in rural areas, the development of the people’s housing processes, and the establishment of Provincial Task Teams.¹⁶⁷ The lack of adequate human resources at provincial and local level, township planning procedures, delays in the approval and paying out of subsidies, and insufficient monitoring of housing projects represent some of the major constraints in housing delivery. By the middle of 1996, the National Department of
Housing, together with the National Business Initiative (NBI), set up the Housing Delivery Support Team, of which the objective was to assist provincial housing authorities to speed up housing delivery by helping to build capacity among housing officials.  

The frustration of the squatters has now spiralled into a fight for survival, as empty promises and forced removals seemingly remove any moral codes of fair play for the so called space invaders. Goldev was one of the companies to witness the anger of squatters. The site near Johannesburg which was to be developed for low cost housing, was invaded in 1995, terminating essential progress on the provision of housing. The squatters also threatened that if new houses were built, they too would be invaded. The fair play, or rather, the lack of it, involved the thousands of people who have followed the proper channels and patiently waited for their number to be called. In this case the squatters have jumped the queue and are now living in their space. However, squatters were a reality and solutions were desperately required.

The Gauteng Provincial Government and the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council have introduced one such solution, namely the concept of reception areas. The Gauteng Provincial Government and the GJTMC relocated the Moffat Park squatters, who were evicted in December 1995, as well as those who re-invaded the area, into reception areas at Weilers Farm. Basic services such as water, sewerage and refuse removal were supplied. Reception areas in fact, were referred to in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 as "transit areas". In terms of the act a local authority could place a notice in the Official Gazette thereby declaring a portion of land as a transit area
for the temporary settlement of homeless persons. The transit areas were therefore to act as catchment areas for households that have been evicted for illegally invading land.  

At least 200,000 people are presently living in some 85,000 structures in informal settlements in Greater Johannesburg, and some of these people have been living in these areas for more than 10 years. The reception area has been identified as a short term solution in a bid not to prejudice those people who have in effect been on a waiting list for those ten years.  

3.6.6 Prevention of Unlawful Occupation of Land Act No. 19 of 1998

In December 1996, the Cabinet approved the Extension of Security and Tenure Bill. Section 24 of this bill provided for the amendment of related lands, including substantial amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951. Given the extent of the amendments necessary to the Squatter Act, the Government decided that completely new legislation should be drawn up and effected through a separate bill, the Prevention of Unlawful Occupation of Land Bill, which was passed by the National Council of Provinces in February 1998. The Prevention of Unlawful Occupation of Land Act no 79 of 1998 provided for the eviction of unlawful occupiers of land as well as the eviction of people only with a court order. The act repealed the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, and other related laws. The major imperative for the new act was the need to cure illegal land invasions by establishing a fast track, lawful and fair legislative process in terms of which people who illegally occupy land, can be evicted. This meant that the
inhabitants of the informal settlements could not be evicted without a court order. Evictions must be just and equitable for both the landowner and the occupier. If the occupier had stayed for more than six months, then the court had to consider all circumstances, including the rights of children, the elderly, disabled persons and households headed by women. Thereafter a reasonable decision would be taken.¹⁷⁵

Previously, homeless and landless people occupying land unlawfully were not given an opportunity by either landowners nor the legal structures to state their case. None of the laws instituted offered provisions for mediation or negotiation for alternative land settlement.

3.7 Conclusion: an evaluation of the steps taken by the Government

Throughout the period of this study, Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks have had differing levels of access to secure residential tenure, due to the implementation of legislation to restrict influx and to create residential areas for the exclusive occupation and ownership of racially defined communities. Among Blacks outside the homelands, tenure was withdrawn and granted at the whim of the government in support of the prevailing housing policy. This secure tenure for a selected group of urban Blacks in the cities and towns was supported during the townships and passes phase, only to be withdrawn when the focus of apartheid policy shifted to the homelands.

Tenure for Blacks in the cities was most closely related to the various shifts in emphasis in settlement policy under apartheid. As an addition to
the township site and services schemes of the 1950s, a thirty-year leasehold tenure was introduced, and between 1955 and 1968 some 112 848 leaseholders were registered. During the fifties, however, pre-apartheid freehold rights were withdrawn and Blacks were moved from inner city areas such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg, to outlying segregated townships.\textsuperscript{176}

In 1968, during the homeland development phase, the granting of leasehold tenure in the townships was stopped, and various measures to strip township tenure of permanence were introduced. Apart from leaseholders, who were prohibited from passing on ownership of owned houses to their heirs, this move effectively barred township residents from access to homeownership unless they bought property in the homelands. A thirty-year lease scheme was reintroduced in 1975, but only Black people who qualified to live in the townships in terms of influx control, were allowed to participate. In a widely applauded reform initiative, a ninety-nine-year leasehold was introduced in 1978 (except in the Western Cape: a coloured labour preference area) allowing Blacks access in principle to private sector housing finance. The government announced its intention to sell large portions of its township housing stock to tenants in 1983, supported by the ninety-nine year leasehold scheme. The new tenure dispensation was designed to pave the way for greater private sector involvement in the provision of Black housing.\textsuperscript{177}

In general, township dwellers were slow to take up home ownership. The mass housing sale was greeted with suspicion despite generous incentives. Only 12.7 percent of the 345 640 township houses available for purchase, were taken up between 1983 and the middle of 1985.
Formal self-help schemes in the townships tended to be modest in scale and privately funded, and houses were erected in significant numbers. The most important impediment to Black home ownership in the new policy environment was undoubtedly income, with 84 percent of Black households in South Africa estimated to be unable to acquire a low-cost house without assistance, hence the mushrooming of informal settlements.\(^{178}\)

During the period of homeland development, the government's housing finance was increasingly diverted from the townships to the homelands. Between 1971 to 1977, annual state investment in Black housing outside the homelands was half of that invested between 1962 and 1971. By contrast, annual investment in homeland housing from 1971 to 1977 was between three or four times higher than during the period 1962-1971.\(^{179}\) State investment in Black housing outside the homeland grew significantly in the period following the township riots in 1976, as in fact did the Black housing portion of total government investment in housing. Black housing and residential circumstances featured predominantly in the government reform agenda, but even increased funding allocations remained disproportionate against the background of the accumulated Black housing backlog.

It is unclear exactly how increased government funding for Black housing during the reform and existence phase was spent, i.e. up to 1986, but various new forms of colour blind subsidisation introduced from 1979 onwards must have absorbed a considerable proportion of the state housing budget. In addition, expensive housing schemes were undertaken in designated decentralised growth points. Extensive physical
upgrading programmes were also initiated in some riot-torn Black townships, and land and infrastructure were provided for sites and service schemes outside and within homelands.  

Whereas public housing has come to bear the stamp of the housing policy and apartheid, non-government sources of housing supply were also influenced by allocation mechanisms controlled by the state. Reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s undoubtedly began to reshape the roles of the state and private sectors in the non-white housing markets, but still within the confines of spatial zoning and residential segregation. Throughout the period of study the racial segregation of living places has remained the focus of housing policy, and despite the scrapping of influx laws and the Group Areas Act, the effects of residential zoning continued to be felt in the Black housing market.

While the present housing crisis has its roots, at least partly in the policies of the past, today's reality is that seven million South Africans are living within informal settlements. With a housing backlog of over 1.2 million units in urban areas, there is no alternative but to recognise that a large proportion of the population will continue to be informally housed for the foreseeable future.

The responsibility of the government and the private sector must therefore be to support informal housing delivery processes, using them creatively to resolve the housing shortage. At the same time it is necessary that informal housing occurs within a liveable environment that is as safe and healthy as possible. To achieve this, both site and
service schemes and in situ upgrading will have to be actively promoted as housing strategies.

While it should be acknowledged that given the present realities, informal housing should be promoted as a necessary component of the total housing delivery package, it must be recognised that informal shelter is not ideal housing for anyone. Once South Africans have access to at least basic services, then serious attention should be given to the upgrading of the quality of housing and infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 4

4. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN AND AROUND DAVEYTON, 1970s TO 1990s

4.1 Introduction
South Africa's housing policy and strategy cannot be divorced from the past and present political situation in the country. Housing, especially informal housing, can no longer be seen as merely a socio-economic phenomenon. It has become a crucial socio-political factor. Many of the present backlog and deadlocks in the housing sector stem from changing political policies and the changes that are taking place in the country. The sensitivity of the issues surrounding informal settlements, was apparent when local government officials and individuals were interviewed and invited to provide their inputs on the issue for purposes of this study. Many were hesitant and some even refused to co-operate because of political considerations. South Africa's housing plight is so serious that political differences in this respect will have to be set aside. The three key players that have to co-operate with each other are the community, the business sector and the government.

The previous chapter dealt with the recent estimated population of informal settlements in South Africa. It also reflected on the current housing policy as well as the distribution of informal settlements and the types of informal settlements in South Africa. The actions of the Government at national, provincial and local level, to address the issue of informal settlements and
an evaluation of those steps, was also discussed in this chapter. Government is fully committed to attend to the issue of informal settlements. This is seen by the mass building of low cost housing for the homeless, the relocation of some informal settlements, the relocation of inhabitants in areas not suitable for housing to these low cost houses and the formalisation of long standing informal settlements by rearranging sites, in situ upgrading and provision of infrastructure.

Now the focus will shift to a discussion of informal settlements, specifically in and around Daveyton, as this is the area of study. This will entail its appearance, the history of government policy, actions by the government in Daveyton, present developments of informal settlements around the township, as well as an evaluation of the government’s actions around Daveyton.

4.2 The appearance of informal settlements in and around Daveyton

Daveyton was established and developed as a model township in the late 1950s. Many of the new residents came from the Apex Emergency Camp and some from the old Benoni location. Infrastructural development continued through the 1970s and Daveyton was fully electrified by 1975. Whilst infrastructure and services were good, Daveyton had a growing housing shortage. Between 1961 and 1982, the population of Daveyton doubled, but its housing stock grew only by one third. In 1979, for instance, nearly four thousand families had been on the official housing waiting list
for at least four years, and in 1983 the housing shortage was estimated at 5539 houses.³

The Daveyton Council, inaugurated on 25 May 1978, adopted a populist stance under the leadership of Tom Boya on some issues from 1980. Boya regarded Mandela and the ANC as the legitimate political leadership. At local level, Boya strongly criticised the East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) on the powers of township councils and their resources. Despite his stance, Boya and the governing councilors were perceived to be responsible for the unpopular policies and the unresolved housing shortage. These circumstances provided Shadrack Sinaba with an opportunity to strengthen his political position in the township. He became a constant thorn in the side of the Daveyton Council and the ERAB when he championed the claims of squatters and backyard shack residents. He publically condemned state policies, marshalled opposition to rent increases and thereby obtained substantial local support from people who were on the housing waiting list.⁴

Sinaba protested vigorously in the Council and was very critical of the ERAB and the central government. In 1979 he formed a new political party, known as the Sinaba Party and organised all opposition groups in the township. Supporters, including many women from homeless families, engaged in direct action protests. Families erected shacks either in backyards, or more confrontationally, on the boundaries of the township. Hence the establishment of Etwatwa squatter area on land that belonged to the Daveyton Council just outside the boundaries of Daveyton proper in 1986.⁵
Sinaba’s followers protested at the township council chambers, generally in response to shack demolition or the threat thereof. Sometimes they marched and chanted outside the council chambers, and at other times they invaded the chambers themselves and sat in on meetings usually ending up disrupting them. In December 1984 a group of women and children slept in the open outside the townships administration offices, in protest against the housing shortages, and over one thousand protesting shack residents were reported to have angrily surrounded the Mayor’s car as he drove through the township, although no damage was reported. 6

The Council and the ERAB’s policy of demolishing shacks and prosecuting their occupants, without implementing the promised new housing schemes, the selfhelp site and service scheme and the council built four-roomed houses, gave rise to a range of protests between 1979 and 1985. In 1986 these protests seemed to have subsided, following a Council and ERAB agreement to be tolerant of backyard shacks and the prospect of houses in the new Daveyton Extention, known locally as Phumlamqashi (where lodgers could rest). 7 In 1986 the Daveyton Council accepted in principle that squatting was a legitimate means for homeless people to provide shelter for their families. The Council formally accepted Etwatwa as an area to be developed for low income housing following protests and the spread of squatters. A site and service scheme was established in the same year at Etwatwa to accommodate lower income families. However, the scheme provided only a limited number of homes. About 600 families evicted from Varkfontein, a farm situated near the township, were resettled at Etwatwa in
November 1987. The Transvaal Provincial Administration, which had obtained a Supreme Court order earlier in the year to remove families from Varkfontein, gave the Daveyton Council a R6 million loan to upgrade the new area.  

Another 300 families, approximately 2 600 persons, who had squatted on a farm belonging to a white person in the former constituency of the National party MP at Petit, were also resettled to Etwatwa. The TPA made another loan available (R7 million) to the Daveyton Council, for the latter would accommodate these people in addition to its own squatters from backyard shacks. The TPA also provided free transport for the relocation of these people to Etwatwa. It is interesting to note that a significant number of these homeless people had come back to the East Rand from Kwa Ndebele homeland. There were not however, a sudden rush to town when influx control was abolished in 1986. Enquiries have shown that they had been endorsed out to Kwa Ndebele from the East Rand during the 1970s. They were people from the East Rand who were never accommodated in the said homeland.  

According to Boya, in July 1988 a total of 2 775 homeless families were given plots at Etwatwa under the site and service scheme. For service provision purposes, Etwatwa was divided into two parts, i.e. Etwatwa West and Etwatwa East. Every household in Etwatwa West was provided with water and sewerage services, but at Etwatwa East only rudimentary services were provided, i.e. water tanks and mobile toilets as a temporary measure, until funds were available for permanent services. A total of 1 336 families
were resident at Etwatwa West and 1 439 at Etwatwa East by mid-1988. Families at Etwatwa East paid R50 a month rent each for services, while those resident at Etwatwa West paid an average of R80 each per month because permanent services were provided in Etwatwa West, while Etwatwa East only had temporary services. 10

Some residents were critical of Etwatwa as a residential area. They claimed that the land was clay, and therefore not suitable for housing. They also complained that no recreational facilities and schools were provided, nor the streets demarcated before families were settled there. Some complained that the Council had allowed private developers to build too expensive houses in the township. Some developers even built houses in the site and service areas, for example Etwatwa Ext. 7 where the South African Housing Trust built what was supposed to be affordable houses next to Etwatwa East. The Council ensured the community that the land was suitable for housing and that more land was to be made available for the homeless. The houses built by the SAHT were occupied by those who could afford it. 11

The appearance of informal settlements in Daveyton was the consequence of the housing backlog of the 1970s. Informal settlements appeared at first in the form of backyard shacks. In the 1980s it took further shape as squatters established themselves in and around Daveyton. This development was accelerated by the forceful invasion of land in the late 1980s, which resulted in the establishment of Etwatwa, extension one. Today Etwatwa has developed to Extension 32 with ± 27 047 families in informal settlements and a population of ± 160 000. 12 It should be noted
that for efficient and effective provision of infrastructure, some of the extensions of Etwatwa have been fused in 1994, and now Etwatwa has physically 19 extensions. A map to explain this development is provided hereafter.
Map 1: Etwatwa expansion areas 1987-1990s

- Old Daveyton
- Etwatwa West
- Etwatwa East
- Expansion areas

**Source:** Daveyton City Council 1989.
4.3 The history of the Government policy in Daveyton

Since the inception of the Daveyton City Council during the latter part of 1983, the Daveyton City Council experienced difficulty with the provision of housing for the rapidly increasing population of Daveyton, a problem similar to that of most other Black urban areas. The reasons for this had been:

1. The procuring of land in terms of the township establishment requirements.

2. The availability of funds for the installation of bulk, connector and internal services, and the provision of sufficient stands for the population.\textsuperscript{13}

The above said difficulties resulted in Daveyton having to resort to a number of methods to achieve at least some progress with the provision of housing to its population.

Although Etwatwa East was ostensibly tightly controlled since its inception in 1988, several shack dwellers allowed other families to erect shacks on their sites. The Daveyton Council was aware of this, but found it extremely difficult to do anything about it.\textsuperscript{14} Prior to land invasion, the Council was confident that they could prevent the erection of shacks in open fields. As one official explained, when such shacks were sighted, the municipal police were notified, and if police warnings were ignored, the shacks would be
demolished. It was realised though that shack dwellers affected accordingly, generally made their way back to backyard shacks, regrouped and then came back to erect shacks in the areas demolished.\textsuperscript{15}

In the meantime, the Council was proceeding with development programmes within the established informal settlements. In August 1989, the Council made available two extensions of Etwatwa East for informal settlements with approximately 3000 sites. These are the present Extensions 9 and 10. The Council, working in collaboration with the South African Housing Trust, secured a loan from the Development Bank of Southern Africa, for an amount of R3 248 204 57 and R5m respectively for infrastructure or bulk services and a housing project in the said areas. The Council introduced a self help scheme along the lines of the same scheme at Etwatwa West.\textsuperscript{16} The Daveyton Council City Planner nevertheless believed that backyard shack dwellings would continue to provide a major source of accommodation, particularly in the light of the expected natural increase and the abolition of influx control. Backyard shack rentals also continued to serve as an important source of additional income for formally housed residents.\textsuperscript{17}

In January 1990, a land invasion occurred, apparently encouraged and sponsored by veteran Daveyton politician and then mayor of Daveyton, Mr. S Sinaba. This invasion was an effort to thwart the development by the SAHT. The SAHT was allocated land to build low cost housing for the homeless, but these houses proved to be too expensive for the unemployed.
The invaders were predominantly backyard shackdwellers from Daveyton who were no longer prepared to pay rentals to formally housed residents. They were also joined by people from other areas. This land invasion compelled the Council to act immediately and in a way which had not been anticipated by the invaders. When 200 families occupied land allocated for private development, the police moved in and demolished the shacks. In a public meeting held at Etwatwa on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of January 1990 the Etwatwa Concerned Resident's Committee eventually succeeded in convincing the invaders that the committee was going to negotiate on their behalf with Council for the provision of land where sites were to be allocated to the invaders. By February 1990 the Council, through the pressure of the Etwatwa Concerned Residents led by Mr. Chris Dlamini, agreed that 5 000 sites in Etwatwa extension would be allocated to squatters.\textsuperscript{18}

4.3.1 \textbf{Housing strategy}

As early as 1986, the Daveyton City Council envisaged that grave problems could be encountered with the provision of houses, should Daveyton not embark upon a policy whereby the Council could assess the real needs of the people for development within Daveyton. The Council subsequently appointed Messrs Van Žyl, Attwell and De Kock, a firm of Town and Regional Planners, to compile such a housing strategy in order to establish a sound policy for the development of the area. This was after the Council had employed the services of a company known as Social Survey in 1986 which undertook a socio-economic survey to assess the needs of the residents of Etwatwa and Daveyton. This company presented its findings to
the Council, upon which the Council appointed town planners to compile a housing strategy.\textsuperscript{19}

During February 1987, the Daveyton City Council was presented with a strategy report compiled by the previously mentioned town planners in which the proposed development for the whole of Etwatwa as well as further expansion of Daveyton, was addressed. The development strategy included all the development projects and development processes to be undertaken by the Council for the development of Etwatwa and Daveyton. Included in the proposal were projects required for the development of the areas, including the upgrading of existing services as well as the provision of social and welfare services. These included municipal bulk and connector services in Etwatwa East phase one and two, bulk water, bulk sewer, electricity and arterial roads and electrical reticulation of 1 400 sites in Etwatwa West, East, Extension 8 and the compilation of an urban development plan for Etwatwa as a whole. This was done to provide project assistance as part of a comprehensive and co-ordinated urban planning process aimed at facilitating appropriate identification, prioritising and phasing of projects, as well as budgeting, programming, planning and strategies to address the development issues, including social and welfare services.\textsuperscript{20}

The municipal bulk and connector services were to be provided to facilitate the provision of residential accommodation to the full spectrum of effective demand, especially the low income groups. This translated into the widening and deepening of three trenches in Etwatwa West to discharge
stormwater run-off from Etwatwa East. A bulk water main connected to the bulk main then under construction in Etwatwa West, had to be rerouted into Etwatwa East. An outfall sewer to serve Etwatwa East routed to the existing Poepieskloof Sewage Works, was to be implemented in phases. A 132 kv supply line from substation C under construction in Etwatwa West was to be connected to a new substation D, in Etwatwa East including the erection of substation D itself. A minor arterial road would be built to connect the extension of Eisselen street from Daveyton proper and a provincial road K175 to serve the northern half of Etwatwa East. The planning and preliminary design of electrical reticulation as an upgrading of an existing residential area of 1400 sites was to be undertaken with the preliminary urban planning and design of 3000 sites in Etwatwa East. The estimated cost of these projects amounted to R11,5 million.\textsuperscript{21}

The Daveyton Council adopted the recommendations of the report, and subsequent to that a Steering Committee was formed. This committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Town Clerk, and was responsible for coordinating the preparation of the projects, finalisation of the loans from the DBSA and other institutions, and overall control of the projects during execution.\textsuperscript{22} The committee comprised of the Town Treasurer, Town Engineer and the Consulting Project Co-ordinator and the Town Clerk as Chairman. What was notable, was the absence in the committee of community leaders and organisations of the affected areas. This absence would cause problems when the communities were expected to pay for services rendered in terms of these projects. The committee met on a monthly basis. Mr. Moyo pointed out that their committee was not legally
recognised by the Council in 1987, and that they were only offered a hearing to present the aspirations of the inhabitants of Etwatwa. 23

After detailed investigation and various meetings by the committee, a loan application of R12 million was made to the DBSA, which was subsequently granted on 29 October 1987. Construction work proceeded in November 1987 for completion in 1988. Conditions put forward by the DBSA included the involvement of the local people in the construction of these projects, a gesture that was warmly received by the unemployed of Etwatwa. This established a precedent because any project undertaken in Etwatwa by outside contractors was not welcome, and if allowed to enter the area, they were not allowed to bring along their own labourers. They had to employ Etwatwa residents.

As the town planners' strategy only dealt with housing and the provision of land, a further broad policy basis was formulated, whereby the council embarked upon a process where certain portions of land were made available to private developers and to other institutions. Those developers would target specific income categories i.e. lower and middle income groups within the framework of the total Daveyton population. Examples of these are Boya's view or Daveyton Extension Two and Three, which were made available to developers for people in the higher income bracket. There was also the Etwatwa Site and Service Area, where funds, services and building material were channelled through a self help project to accommodate the lower income group of the population. 24
The Social Survey company, commissioned by the Council, established in 1988 that the levels of affordability of the population of Daveyton could sustain approximately 4,000 housing units within the framework of the affordable low cost houses. The remainder of the population would qualify for housing of about R20,000. Thus the Council had to approach institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the SA Housing Trust and the National Housing Commission for funds to procure the land and services in respect of the lower income group.25

It was conservatively estimated at that specific stage that Daveyton would require approximately 14,000 housing units to cater for all the levels of affordability of the population and to ensure stability in the provision of housing within Daveyton. This situation was however never realised. Only approximately 500 housing units were delivered per annum between 1988 and 1990.26

4.3.2 **Urban Development Plan**

During 1987 the Council decided to embark upon a comprehensive urban development strategy and accordingly applied for the necessary funds from the Development Bank of Southern Africa to compile such a document. This facility was granted and the process to compile such a strategy document proceeded during the latter part of 1988.

The Development Plan was compiled by Messrs. Van Zyl, Attwell and De Kock. The plan could be seen as a combined effort by these consultants and
officials of the Daveyton City Council as well as the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The purpose of the development plan was to determine and analyse the major determinants of development in Daveyton/Etwatwa within a national, regional and local context. The plan identified the basic facts and general observations relating to Daveyton/Etwatwa and suggested certain key development issues which would eventually be evaluated by the Daveyton City Council.

The Urban Development Plan was concerned with assessing the potential for production and consumption of houses and services and investigated community perceptions and aspirations. This included a socio-economic analysis of the population of Etwatwa. The Council officials investigated and analysed the population characteristics, i.e. the composition, affordability and employment levels and then proposed development standards accordingly. This plan would assist the Daveyton Council in the formulation of financial policies and accessing financial sources.  

In concluding the first stage of the Urban Development Plan during the latter part of 1989, it was once again realised that the immediate need for housing units at that stage was for approximately 19 000 units, not considering future growth. This situation obviously caused grave concern for the Daveyton City Council. The Development Plan was adopted by the Daveyton City Council. Its implementation was interrupted by the 1993/94 transitional period of local governments when Daveyton was incorporated into the Greater Benoni City Council, but most of the recommendations were included in the Land Development Objectives of 1996.
The plan recommended the upgrading of rental housing in Daveyton and proposed a reasonably achievable new settlement rate, made proposals towards upgrading of infrastructure and assessed the incorporated undeveloped land. This assessment dealt with Etwatwa East and West, which was incorporated into Daveyton in 1987, and where development had just commenced. A broad framework for the development of the area was developed providing for town planning, bulk and connector services, transportation, expansion potential of Etwatwa and other infrastructure.

4.3.3 Private Development

Whereas other Black local authorities, for example Thembisa and KwaThema, could rely largely on private developers to purchase and incorporate land into their area of jurisdiction, Daveyton was unable to attract these developers due to the political objection to that expansion, which hampered its growth, and at present is still doing so in certain respects. In October 1989 for example, Mr. J Weaver, the then General Manager of the site and service project of the Urban Foundation, requested the Council to permit the Urban Foundation to run a site and service project in Etwatwa. The areas that were identified as suitable for the implementation of the project by the Urban Foundation were Etwatwa Extension 9 and 10, where the Council in August 1989 had approved of approximately 3 000 sites for informal settlements. The Urban Foundation wished to undertake a site and service scheme of a minimum of 1 000 stands on a commercially viable basis. The scheme was aimed at people who
could not pay the R12 500 starter fee for core and conventional houses on offer by other private developers like the South African Housing Trust\textsuperscript{31}.

Before the Council could approve the request of the Urban Foundation in January 1990, a land invasion had occurred as mentioned earlier. This invasion thwarted development by private developers, who were seen to be providing expensive houses. The areas earmarked by the Urban Foundation and areas bought by private developers, were forcefully invaded, and that led to a number of private developers withdrawing from Etwatwa East\textsuperscript{32}.

With the exception of two small extensions in Daveyton, namely Daveyton Extension 6 and Etwatwa Extension 16 in Etwatwa West, which comprised of 1 200 residential stands, was declared a development area only during the latter part of 1989. These areas in Etwatwa West were developed by private developers for middle income groups, but the remaining land owned by private developers was invaded, eventually resulting in a decline in the value of the houses built in the surrounding areas. Private developers fought a loosing battle with the Etwatwa Civic Association for their land, but they eventually withdrew from Etwatwa. Initially Etwatwa was earmarked to be developed for the low income group, but from the findings of the survey conducted by the Social Survey in 1986, there arose a need to provide land and houses for middle income groups. Due to a lack of space in Daveyton Extension 2 and 3, meant for upper and middle income groups, the Council decided to make available land to private developers to build houses for the middle income groups and also low cost housing for the low income group. This action by the Council was not well received by the community of Etwatwa who perceived the Council to be betraying the
unemployed and the low income earners by giving away land earmarked for them. On the other hand, the community complained that the private developers were building low cost houses which were expensive for them to afford, hence the forceful invasion of land set aside for private developers. Most of the private developers were not compensated by the Council, as the Council was generating almost nil revenues because of the rent boycott that started in 1990.\textsuperscript{33}

In terms of the Premier's Proclamation, no. 33 of 1994, the former City Council of Daveyton was dissolved and the City Council of Greater Benoni became its successor-in-law. In June 1995 the South African Housing Trust submitted a claim for R3 248 204,57 (plus eleven percent interest per annum) to the Greater Benoni City Council, being the amount owed for a housing project in Etwatwa. While the claim of the Housing Trust could be opposed, the Council lawyers suggested that the Council should not follow that course of action, but should enter into negotiations with the SA Housing Trust about a reduction of the amount owing and an arrangement to repay a negotiated amount. On the 15\textsuperscript{th} of October 1996 the Council entered into negotiations with the Housing Trust regarding the amount and the manner of payment.\textsuperscript{34} This was agreed upon by both parties.

4.3.4 The settlement of squatters

Against the background of the policy of Daveyton to accommodate the broadest possible spectrum of people, the Daveyton City Council agreed during the latter part of 1987, to settle approximately 600 families from a
squatter camp called Varkfontein, (the responsibility of which was primarily that of the Transvaal Provincial Administration) outside Daveyton in Etwatwa East. The Daveyton City Council took up loans to facilitate rudimentary services to that area.\textsuperscript{35}

In order to evade the possible political criticism that might have resulted from this, i.e. from backyard residents of Daveyton that the Council was catering for people who were not residents of Daveyton and ignored its subjects who were homeless, the Council agreed that approximately 900 families would be accommodated in the same fashion as the site and service scheme, and would be selected from the backyard dwellers in Daveyton.\textsuperscript{36}

On 2 June 1988, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning announced the future expansion of Etwatwa following an investigation by a consortium of planners appointed by his Department. The areas consisted of three areas, namely:

1. An area north of Etwatwa consisting of the farm Knoppiesfontein with approximately 530 developable hectares.
2. Areas east of Daveyton consisting of approximately 2995 developable hectares on the farms Holfontein, Katboschfontein, Modderfontein and Modder East.
3. A small area south-west of Daveyton consisting of 35 hectares of land, namely Portoin 28 Modderfontein.\textsuperscript{37}
It was estimated that the total expansion would be able to accommodate approximately 53 075 housing units or an estimated population of 301 000 people. It was also estimated that a shortage of approximately 19 000 stands existed in Daveyton and that the potential number of stands available would be in the vicinity of 9 000, resulting in a need for approximately 10 000 stands or 600 hectares of land. Considering the growth rate of the population, it was estimated that approximately another 44550 stands would also be needed, effectively resulting in a need for 54 550 stands. The land earmarked as such could cater for approximately 53 075 housing units, obviously resulting in a slight shortage.38

Considering the income profiles of the population of Daveyton, it was estimated that only 8% of the population was able to afford housing of more than R25 000.00. It was therefore estimated that the greater part of 92% of the population would have to look at some form of subsidised housing of considerably lower standards of housing than provided by private developers. The South African Housing Trust, could cater for the income sectors between R13 000 and R25 000. Approximately 40% of the population fell within that range, whereas the remaining 52% would be dependant on the Daveyton Council to fulfill the welfare task of providing them with accommodation. Both these groups were, however, largely dependant on the provision of relatively cheap land and services, and if that land had not been available on those terms, the provision of low cost accommodation would virtually have been impossible without a significant subsidy. It was therefore imperative that the Council obtained land to provide for those facilities.39
Two factors largely influenced the facilitation of land for low cost accommodation, namely: the cost of vacant land for development, and the availability of appropriate and suitable bulk services. The cost of land factor could largely be influenced by the Government by creating a significant over supply situation or by expropriating land at a reasonable cost. Both of the above aspects were achievable within the expansion area of Daveyton and Etwatwa. The provision of cost effective bulk services of an appropriate nature was largely different and had to be considered a lot more carefully as the location, capacities and accessibility of these services (water, sewage treatment and electricity) had an enormous influence on the feasibility of low cost development.

During a brief investigation by the Council, the following development priorities were identified in respect of those areas discussed above. Area 3 could be developed most cost effectively. However, the extent thereof was rather insignificant and the location adjacent to Boya's View (Daveyton Extension 2) lent itself to a development of a prestigious high income area. This area was therefore ignored. Area 1, namely Knoppiesfontein just north of Etwatwa, was fairly substantial and large areas could be developed without a significant outlay of capital for the provision of bulk services. Area 2, the area east and south of Etwatwa, was not well located in terms of the provision of bulk services and would therefore require large scale capital investment, and was therefore to be considered as a last resort. Therefore the land north of Etwatwa was considered as a matter of priority
for acquisition by the Council, and was bought in 1990 for the development of low cost housing.40

In January 1990 due to extreme pressure from local inhabitants of Daveyton, when they forcefully invaded land belonging to the Council, the Council of Daveyton therefore embarked upon a process whereby families living in shacks in the backyard of existing houses would be allowed into Etwatwa Extensions. The Council laid down the following conditions for settlement:

1. Only one family would be settled per stand.
2. Stands would be planned and surveyed in accordance with contemporary standards.
3. No one would be forced to settle in those areas, and settlement would have to take place by free choice.
4. Every effort should be made to obtain ownership rights for the inhabitants within the shortest possible period.
5. Administratively both Daveyton and the inhabitants must have a proper constituted and signed agreement before occupation.
6. The occupant had the right initially to construct a shack on the property, which should be followed by a permanent structure, and be constructed in terms of the Council's specifications and regulations.
7. Services would initially be supplied on a rudimentary basis, and emphasis should be placed on the cost effectiveness and the affordability thereof (water and sewerage).
8. Services should however be planned in accordance with the minimum standards of Daveyton, and provision should be made during the planning stage to ensure that service corridors were left open to ensure the minimum frustration during the construction period.\textsuperscript{41}

The settlement of households took place at a rate of approximately 500 households per week, and by the 16\textsuperscript{th} of March 1990 about 2 200 stands were allocated to the homeless around Extension 9. By the end of April 1996, 2 500 stands were taken up by residents in Extension 10. The Council had to pay R22 780 160,25 towards the provision of services. The allocation of stands and occupation was hailed by residents of Etwatwa as a step in the right direction by the Council, but forceful invasion of land was still to continue.\textsuperscript{42}

4.3.5 Availability of land

On inception of the Daveyton City Council in 1983, approximately 1 350 hectares of vacant land were transferred to Daveyton by the East Rand Development Board for future development. Approximately 350 hectares of land could not be transferred, since the Poepieskloof Sewerage Works was operational on this property. The Daveyton City Council was not willing to take over the sewerage works because it was below standard, i.e. it was old fashioned and upgrading was expected to be too expensive.

In 1986 the Daveyton City Council was again approached to utilise the land, but the Council declined because of the said reason. The Council pointed
out that should the Transvaal Provincial Administration be prepared to finance the improvement of sewerage works in the area, the Council would accept the land for residential development. This land was however contractually committed to be transferred to Daveyton by virtue of the agreement between the then East Rand Development Board and the Daveyton City Council in 1985. The remaining approximately 1 000 hectares of land was divided into 15 000 residential stands of which approximately 5000 were to be in Etwatwa West and the remaining approximately 10 000 were to be in Etwatwa East. 43

In Etwatwa West approximately 1 500 stands were developed as site and service scheme housing, through funds obtained from the National Housing Commission. The remaining 3 500 stands were developed as follows: approximately 600 were developed by the SA Housing Trust for R20 000 a core house and approximately 500 stands were for sale by the Council to developers. The remaining 2400 stands were for sale to the private sector in terms of the housing strategy mentioned earlier. 44

Etwatwa East was developed mainly for people of the lower income categories, hence the decision by the Council when the request came from the Transvaal Provincial Administration to accommodate the above said 600 squatters from Varkfontein within the framework of this area, because these were poor people from a farm. Subsequently however, the Daveyton City Council was forced politically to accommodate a further approximately 5 000 squatter families formally in the framework of Etwatwa Extension 9 and 10, after forceful invasion of the areas. A further 3 000 settled illegally
and informally within the area approved to be Etwatwa Extension 8. Thus Daveyton utilised all the land resources placed at its disposal, with the exception of Poepieskloof area.\textsuperscript{45} In discussions with the Transvaal Provincial Administration and the East Rand Regional Services Council, the Council was requested by the latter two organisations not to utilise the Poepieskloof land for residential purposes until such time as the Regional Services Council had decided and embarked upon a strategic regional framework for the treatment of sewerage. This meant that all available land in the areas surrounding Poepieskloof would be sterilised for residential purposes indefinitely until such time as the Regional Services Council had decided to finance the upgrading of the sewerage and was able to make the necessary capital investment to release the land surrounding Poepieskloof.\textsuperscript{46}

In terms of the above, it was clear that in 1988 Daveyton had no further land to accommodate further residential settlement unless land was obtained beyond the boundaries of Daveyton. The following map illustrates that land was made available by the Daveyton Council for future expansion of Daveyton and Etwatwa in 1989.
Map 2: Daveyton/Etwatwa expansion areas 1987-1990s

- Existing town Daveyton/Etwatwa
- Area accepted for future urbanisation
- North Eastern Area
- Eastern and Southern Area
- South Western Area
- Watershed

Source: Daveyton City Council 1989.
4.3.6 **Need for further land**

During the compilation of the housing strategy mentioned earlier, it was already realised in 1987 that there would be a need for further land to accommodate the increasing needs of the population of Daveyton. Subsequent to that exercise it was calculated in the Urban Development Plan that approximately 19,000 residential units would be required, excluding the possibility of further influx and natural growth. The accommodation of squatters at Etwatwa East had not satisfied the requirements of the population of Daveyton at all. It was estimated that in all probability the requirement for accommodation had remained exactly the same as had been anticipated within the framework of the Urban Development Plan, namely approximately 19,000 residential units or a further 1,200 hectares of land.

The pressure exerted by communities in the townships of the Transvaal on their Councils for more land to house the squatters, led the Council to demand more land from the Transvaal Provincial Administration. Mr. Louis Kok, Executive Director of Community Services from the TPA acting on recommendations by a private consortium, appointed by the TPA in 1985 to identify land in the region, recommended to the Minister of Development Planning that more land should be provided to house squatters. He added that the only way to handle squatters in the Transvaal province was to have enough sites available. Minister Heunis therefore in 1987 identified a further 13,000 hectares land on the PWV for the settlement of the Black population. This was in addition to the 16,000 hectares identified in 1985.47
Much of the land designated could not be developed. It was reliably understood that at least forty percent allocated to the west of Soweto could not be used because of the danger of sinkholes. Other more suitable sites that were recommended by the private consortium appointed to identify land in the region, i.e. to the south of Johannesburg and to the east of Thembisa, were rejected by the Government because these areas were next to White areas.

During 1987 the then Minister of Development Planning, Mr. Chris Heunis, announced the expansion of Daveyton towards the east and south, to a total of approximately 4 000 hectares of land that also belonged to the East Rand Development Board. However, in this announcement the Minister did not consider certain latent aspects such as vlei areas, geological instability of land and land subject to mine reservations, which would in large areas not be suitable for residential developments. As most of the land earmarked fell within the framework of different drainable areas and was distantly removed from the main bulk services and transportation routes, only a limited portion thereof could in actual fact be developed for residential purposes. This situation largely increased the cost of possible development in those areas.

The only viable extension possibilities were situated north of Etwatwa, the land which belonged to a Mr. Opperman and Luries Farming Company. Both parties were unwilling to part with the land at reasonable rates as to enable the settlement of squatters. A request by the Daveyton City Council (DCC) to the TPA in respect of the expropriation of the Opperman land was
denied verbally, but never officially in writing. In 1993 the Daveyton City Council finally acquired the Lurie land, a portion of which was developed as Etwatwa Extension 23. This was after the DCC had convinced the owners of Lurie farm of the possible danger of losing their farm without compensation as a result of forceful invasion by squatters. The farm owners were therefore willing to sell.\footnote{50}

Subsequent deliberations with the officials from the TPA revealed an unwillingness to assist the Daveyton City Council with the further acquisition of land. In 1990, when Mr. S Sinaba took over from T Boya as mayor of Daveyton, the TPA declined assistance to the DCC with the acquisition of land, since Mr. Sinaba was a proponent of informal settlements, and was fully behind the forceful invasion of land in 1990. In his report back to the Daveyton City Council on the subject of land acquisition in the latter part of 1990, Sinaba told the Council that the TPA was unwilling to assist the Daveyton City Council in obtaining further land.\footnote{51}

It was a commonly known that the TPA had assisted with the settlement of squatters at places such as Duduza, Rietfontein and Orange Farm. Daveyton, an area which had largely assisted and supported the TPA in its struggles with squatters, was neglected. This matter caused grave concern within the political circles of Daveyton because the Daveyton City Council was actually willing to lend a helping hand to the TPA. The years 1991 to 1993 was characterised by further forceful invasions and the collapse of the Daveyton City Council. After the transitional period of 1993/94, the
Greater Benoni City Council took over the running of Daveyton/Etwatwa areas and the question of land was taken up by the Benoni Council, which is still the authority dealing with the issue.

4.4 Provision of bulk services and problems encountered by the Daveyton City Council

The Daveyton City Council accepted in principle in 1987 that squatting was a legitimate means for homeless people to provide shelter for their families, therefore the Council undertook to establish a site and service scheme and a self help scheme at Etwatwa to accommodate families of the lower income group. The Daveyton City Council as the local authority, undertook to provide bulk services for the designated land and to recover the expenses from the end user by means of rates and taxes.

During the latter part of September 1989, an application by the Daveyton City Council was made to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) for a loan towards the provision of bulk services, i.e. water, sewerage and road infrastructure to Etwatwa. The DBSA granted the Council a loan of R25 m at an annual interest rate of eleven percent. Subsequent to the granting of funds by the DBSA, the Daveyton City Council experienced serious problems with the settlement of squatters. The Daveyton City Council was forced to settle approximately 8 000 squatters in its area of jurisdiction. The Etwatwa Concerned Residents led by Mr. Dlamini, put pressure on the Daveyton City Council to accommodate these squatters because it was claimed that the Council was ignoring its subjects
i.e. backyard settlers, when the Council agreed to accommodate squatters from Varkfontein in Etwatwa East as mentioned. The squatters realised that the Council was obliged to provide services to the informally settled areas in the form of water trucks and chemical toilets. The Daveyton City Council also submitted an application to the National Housing Commission for a loan of R22 million which was also granted in 1990. The first phase of the installation of water and Aqua privys to a total amount of R5 million, was provided for by the Daveyton City Council. The Aqua Privys and installation of stand pipes to provide water was tendered and these services were installed in 1990-91.\textsuperscript{52}

It should however be emphasised that the following departments, namely National Department of Health, Benoni Health Department, Department of Water Affairs and Rand Water Board, expressed their objection to the installation of pit latrines and Aqua Privys. This was based on the conviction that the situation would affect ground water and other natural resources within the area detrimentally. It was however pointed out to them that these services would only be of a temporary nature, and as soon as funds were obtained, the Aqua Privys would be linked to a fully reticulated water borne sewerage system.\textsuperscript{53}

Due to these developments it became imperative that bulk services were extended to other extensions at Etwatwa to enable the connection of the internal reticulation to the bulk supply network. This was meant to alleviate the cost of providing water by truck and sewer services. The chemical toilets to the inhabitants was costing the Council in the vicinity of R400 000
per month. It should furthermore be emphasised that the services rendered were unsatisfactory as only every six units were provided with a chemical toilet. This situation caused dissatisfaction amongst inhabitants of those areas.\textsuperscript{54}

The areas where squatters were accommodated on an informal basis, caused significant concern, as they were impeding the effective provision of services to the formal squatter areas by hijacking services from squatters in the formal areas. This resulted in further dissatisfaction because legitimate residents were paying for those services hijacked by the informal squatters.\textsuperscript{55}

In the latter part of 1989 and early 1990, Daveyton was affected by a rent boycott which severely hampered the provision of services such as transport, and the maintenance of sewer and water, thus resulting in an unfavourable political climate within the area. The Council endeavoured to speak to the Civic Associations to solve the rent boycott and to convince the people of the Council’s good will. The Etwatwa Civic Association led by P Moyo, encouraged the inhabitants of Etwatwa not to pay for services as they alleged that the Council was dragging its feet in the provision of such services. On the other hand, the Council expected them to pay rent similar to the inhabitants of Daveyton Proper who were formally housed. This meant that the Council had not been able to raise any revenues, since the inhabitants of Daveyton Proper also embarked on paying a flat rate of R70,00 per household from June 1990. On a public meeting of residents of Daveyton in May 1990, held at the Sinaba Stadium, it was decided that they
would be represented as the Daveyton Concerned Residents (DCR). Mr. J. Ngubo subsequently led a delegation of the DCR to put demands to the Daveyton City Council. They wanted the Council to scrap rent arrears, transfer the houses in Daveyton to their owners, upgrade services, buy more land for low income housing, introduce affordable tariffs for services, and establish a non-racial and democratic local government for the whole of Benoni, which would include Daveyton, Etwatwa, Actonville and Wattville.  

The issue of electricity will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter five. The Council did not give in to the demands, but Mr. Tom Boya resigned in June 1990 as mayor of Daveyton and the residents embarked on non-payment for services to bring about the downfall of the Council. The provision of bulk services to Etwatwa Extensions was of the utmost importance in creating a favourable environment whereby the Council could discuss the future of Daveyton with the Civic Association, and prove to them its endeavour to create a better environment and society.

It was however learned during discussions with the Development Bank of Southern Africa, that difficulties were being experienced in the provision of loans to Local Authorities. No Government Department and/or Institutions were willing to guarantee the loans to be provided by the Development Bank. This placed the Development Bank at risk should those loans be granted.
As the Daveyton City Council did not have the ability to raise sufficient finance on its own, it was imperative that some state assistance be given to acquire those facilities. The Daveyton City Council tried to negotiate the question of the social responsibility of Central Government, specifically when considering that large sums of money were made available for the settlement of squatters at Rietfontein near Germiston, Orange Farm near the Vaal Triangle and Duduza near Nigel, to name only three of the major settlements. The situation remained unsolved until in 1994 when the Greater Benoni City Council took over the administration of Daveyton.

4.4.1 The township lay-out plan

The lay-out plan was designed within the parameters and according to the standards set by the Daveyton City Council, Provincial and other authorities. Due to the fact that services were to be installed after actual settlement had taken place, it was decided to construct a conventional township layout plan to eliminate possible cost escalations that might arise due to unforeseen circumstances during construction.

The stand sizes were to be an average size of 11m x 20m. Permanent services, such as roads, would initially consist of scraped roads, that would only be compacted where necessary, until main routes were tarred. Stormwater drainage was directed in open channels on the surface, and sewage systems consisted of Aqua privys linked to a water borne sewer that eventually discharged into the main sewer outfall network at the
Poepieskloof sewage works. Each stand was provided with a separate conventional sewage connection.

Initially water was installed to provide pipes to an average of 75m radius from all stands. The system would later be completed to include metered water to each stand within the township. The Greater Benoni City Council is presently busy upgrading these services. This will be discussed fully in the next chapter. Electricity was not provided for initially and this was to become the subject of an upgrading programme presently underway.

Temporary arrangements for services were also made. Due to the fact that families were settled before any services had been installed, it was necessary to provide water and sewage services to the area. Water was brought to the area by water cart. A maximum of one water cart for 300 units was required to provide the service. The only appropriate method to handle sewage during the initial stage of settlement was to provide chemical toilets to the area. There was one toilet for every six families.

In the period from 1990 to 1993, funds which were not utilised by the National Housing Forum, were re-allocated to the National Housing Commission. These funds were made available for the development of informal settlements. The Daveyton City Council was therefore able to obtain access to some of these funds to provide rudimentary services at Etwatwa informal settlements and its extensions. More funds were received from the TPA as well as loans from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.59
These developments enabled the Daveyton City Council to acquire the Lurie farm land, in 1993, a portion of which was developed as Etwatwa Extension 23. The rest of the land was not developed until funds to the value of R10 270 483,00 were received from the NHC for the development of this township. This amount was used for the construction of civil services, as well as toilet structures and professional fees for approximately 2000 stands.\textsuperscript{60}

In the course of time more informal settlements sprang up around Daveyton namely in Chris Hani, New Village (Combisa) as well as the Daveyton Northern Buffer (Zanzele). These settlements were not serviced at all. Applications for the upgrading of these areas were made to the National Housing Commission. It was estimated that an amount of R6 858 965,00 would be needed for infrastructure and toilet structures for the Northwestern Buffer, an amount of R38 393 435,00 for infrastructure and toilets for Chris Hani, and an amount of R6 800 000,00 also for infrastructure for New Village. The Daveyton City Council applied to the National Housing Commission for assistance.\textsuperscript{61}

These areas were not upgraded between 1993 and 1994, and when a new dispensation was introduced in 1994, the Greater Benoni Transitional Local Government took over the running of Daveyton. These areas are currently being upgraded by the Greater Benoni City Council, and the upgrading involves the resettling of some of the inhabitants from Chris Hani, Zanzele and New Village to Etwatwa Extension 25, also known as Barcelona. This
is done because these areas are overpopulated and some families of these communities cannot be accommodated in Chris Hani, Zenzele and New Village because of the scarcity of land. The upgrading of these areas will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.5 Current developments in the informal settlements in and around Daveyton

The Land Development Objectives (LDO) process is a five year rolling programme of actions undertaken by the local authority in 1996. The five year programme is a planning horizon dealing with the larger issues facing the development of the region. The Eastern Gauteng Services Council (EGSC) was responsible to co-ordinate the preparation of the LDO's for its area of jurisdiction. In terms of these, the Greater Benoni City Council was required to formulate the Land Development Objectives for Greater Benoni. The formulation of LDO's for Greater Benoni was the result of a joint effort between the Council of Greater Benoni, representatives of the departments within the Council and representatives of the civil society. Co-operation and co-ordination between these bodies was aimed at ensuring consistency with land development, as well as to achieve maximum participation to ensure that the Greater Benoni LDO's are based on general consensus. The co-operation was achieved as most affected parties took part in the drafting of the LDOs.

The purpose of the Land Development Objectives was primarily to create a new system of planning for development at a local level in order to deepen
and promote democracy. The preparation of LDO's in the first cycle of Greater Benoni structures interpreted this primary intention as to encompass a reorganisation of its institutional structures and management style in order to manage and align the funding, implementation and monitoring of projects in Greater Benoni effectively.\(^{63}\)

The Gauteng Land Development Objectives Regulation (LDO), 1996, required that a development framework be included in the Land Development Objectives of all local authorities. The development framework involved a status quo analysis together with an analysis of the major factors influencing development in the area. This framework included an analysis of the following: projected demographic growth, existing services, economic and social conditions and trends, existing spatial form, development priorities and needs, safety and security and the state of the environment.\(^{64}\)

The first section of the framework spelled out in detail a regional analysis, followed by the sectoral analysis which dealt with a localised status quo analysis. For the purposes of the LDO exercise, the localised status quo analysis only pertained to the areas of focus which were grouped under various sectors. To improve the understanding of a sectoral-based approach, various sectors within Greater Benoni were grouped together as Task Teams. Due to the broad nature of data, the localised analysis only covered the key issues specifically identified within and affecting the mission of each task team as well as those trends stipulated in the LDO regulations.
This chapter will deal with the Physical Sectoral Analysis because it includes more specifically, spatial, infrastructural, housing-oriented and environmental aspects of Benoni, especially the upgrading of informal settlements. The Physical Analysis included firstly an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) facing Greater Benoni in terms of its physical aspects. Secondly, the analysis involved the identification of critical physical issues from where a mission statement was formulated and finally, a status quo analysis of the physical environment in terms of the critical issues and mission statement.65

A SWOT analysis was undertaken by the Physical Task Team. The criteria used were the key areas to which the vision statement of Greater Benoni refers, which were “A growing and investment friendly city with a heart to provide sustainable, adequate and affordable services to all citizens in a healthy and safe environment”. The analysis was then undertaken with the specific aspects pertaining to the physical environment being considered. Hence the physical task team focussed on electricity, public works, land conservation, community facilities, infrastructure, housing, pollution, environment, water, transport and sanitation.66 In Table 6 here under, a concise version of the SWOT-analysis is given.
### Table 6. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis of Physical Sector

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<th>SUSTAINABLE, ADEQUATE &amp; AFFORDABLE SERVICES</th>
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<td>Lack of planning</td>
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<td><strong>THREATS</strong></td>
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<td>Crime rate (development)</td>
<td>Boycotts</td>
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<td>Over population</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Greater Benoni Land Development Objectives (March, 1998).
The SWOT analysis found that the most critical issue in Greater Benoni was and is still housing. The issue of housing was not simply the lack of or need for houses, but rather referred to the housing process as a whole. Parliament defined housing as an adequate shelter, the fulfilment of a basic need, a product and a process, a primary function of the development process, a key sector of the national economy and a vital element contributing to socio-economic wellbeing of the nation. Thus, housing is an integral element affecting most sectors of society, which emphasises the importance of addressing the issue as a critical one. The mission statement of the physical task team was also strongly linked to the critical issue of housing and reads as follows: “The facilitation of affordable new and upgrading of existing ‘housing’ in appropriate locations to our citizens”.

An analysis of the Greater Benoni housing stock gave high and low estimates for formal and informal housing. (See Table below).
Table 7. Greater Benoni type of housing stock, 1997

Source: Greater Benoni Land Development Objectives (March 1997)
It was recommended that the lower estimates in Table 6 be used as the more accurate estimate since the higher estimate assumed a higher average occupancy rate, which was and is not truly reflective of the actual situation. It can be seen from the lower estimates in Table 6, that there were approximately 42 000 formal dwellings and 25 000 informal dwellings in Greater Benoni. This totalled ± 67 000 for Benoni’s entire housing stock. Reflected against the housing backlog, there was an approximate backlog of 20 000 units, comprising needs which arose from legal shacks (those shacks built on serviced land, for example site and service stands), squatter shacks (shacks illegally erected), backyard shacks, hostels and farmworkers' requirements.69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Highest Estimate</th>
<th>Lowest Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Shacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatter Shacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backyard Shacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Greater Benoni's Housing Backlog, 1997

Table 7 shows a major problem in the physical delivering at houses, since the housing needs totalled approximately one third in excess of the existing housing in Greater Benoni.

Other issues relating to housing in Greater Benoni which were found to be of the greatest importance, were addressed in the following status quo analysis of the physical environment. It must be emphasised that only the issues which particularly pertain to housing were addressed in this section.

4.5.1 Semi-Developed Land

Several studies were undertaken by the Benoni Council to ascertain where the vacant or semi-developed land in Greater Benoni was situated. These studies showed that the semi-developed land in Greater Benoni could be placed into three categories.

The first of these categories is mining land. Mining land encompassed undermined land and land with mineral rights. Most of this land exhibit development restrictions. Undermined land placed constraints on the height and size of development to occur on the surface, as there exists a danger of the soil collapsing. Land owned by mines either has a mining lease attached to it, prohibiting any development other than that by the mining company, or it has a potential to be mined in the future, thereby also obstructing development. Undermined land and land owned by mines had restrictions from both these types. Land with mining constraints was predominantly located to the south of the N12 freeway. Several old mine dumps were being
deconstructed or reprocessed, which meant that the land might become available for development in future. This land consisted of developable land and land that could be developed for housing purposes but was fragmented because it was also owned by different farmers, some of whom were willing to sell the land to the Council and some were not. This thus compromised the objectives of the Council of providing land for development especially for the low income groups. These farmers wanted to sell their land at very high prices and until the Council was willing to pay, the land remained in the hands of the farmers and no development could take place.

The second category of semi-developed land was that of agricultural holdings. Located primarily to the north of Greater Benoni, this land lay mainly on the urban periphery. This land was mostly variable and fragmented in terms of size and ownership and mostly privately owned. The final category was farm lands which consisted mainly of larger farms and was found on the urban fringe. These farms were also privately owned. The Council was in constant contact with the farmers with the intention to buy land from those farmers who were willing to relocate or sell part of a farm.71
4.5.2 Service Areas: Sewage, Water and Electricity

4.5.2.1 Electricity

The Benoni Electricity Department was the licenced holder and distributor of electricity in Benoni, Actonville and Tamboville. Eskom was the licenced holder and supplier of electricity in Daveyton, Wattville and Etwatwa. There were ± 25 000 domestic and 27 large industrial consumers which the Council was licenced to supply electricity to. The main problem with electricity distribution by the council lay in the area of small holdings, with unusually high incidents of faults being reported. It was found in 1997 that the Council had approximately 1 000 kva of electricity in excess capacity. This could be utilised for the provision of electricity to informal settlements, but the culture of non payment of services in informal settlements was still rife in Etwatwa. Hence the Council's unwillingness to provide this service, therefore a number of areas in Etwatwa were still without electricity. From March 1998 Eskom started to provide individual households with electricity within Etwatwa, but this was also hampered because Eskom material is stolen and cars are being hijacked resulting in some deaths of Eskom workers. The Council provided street lighting only.72

4.5.2.2 Water

Rand Water currently supplies most of the portable water consumed in Greater Benoni, from the Vaal Dam. The rest of the water, particularly
ground water, is extracted from the ground by individual users. The Council is responsible for the distribution of water to consumers beyond Rand Water metering points.\textsuperscript{73}

The most recent calculations on spare capacity are from a 1993 survey which was undertaken to determine capacities and reticulation comments. It was found Benoni could accommodate an additional 1,217,000 people without a major upgrading of bulk water supply excluding reticulation.\textsuperscript{74} There were however areas in Etwatwa without bulk supply, but as indicated, Benoni had the capacity. It only depended on the Council finding funds to erect such a facility, for bulk water to be available to all in Etwatwa. Funds were eventually provided for in the 1997/98 financial year to provide water to Etwatwa.

4.5.2.3 Sewage

The history of the sewage system in Benoni explained the presence of the present waterborne sewage system. The town was originally on a nightsoil system, which involved transporting and depositing at a site south of the present central business district. Since the site was located on a higher elevation relative to that which the rest of the area serves, when a waterborne sewage system was introduced, the sewage had to be pumped through a system of pump stations. Should the need for a new system arose, the logical location for the new water care works would be located at a point lower than the original site, to avoid pumping.\textsuperscript{75}
A problem existed in Daveyton where the sewage pipes lay at too flat a gradient, were too narrow and experienced a lack of maintenance, resulting in frequent siltation. Regular infiltration of rainwater also affected the efficiency of the sewage system.\(^7\)

Sewage planning for the future estimated that there should be adequate spare capacity for 60,000 families of high density housing, or 45,000 families at medium density level or 30,000 families at low density level in 1997.\(^7\) There are however areas in Etwatwa without bulk sewage service, because these are provided for according to the priority list and when funds are available.

4.5.2.4 **Land Use**

A large section of Greater Benoni consists of agricultural smallholdings and mining land, and large volumes of high density residential land. These areas are found in Daveyton, Etwatwa, Wattville, Actonville and Benoni CBD. It is in these areas, excluding the CBD, that the housing issue holds particular relevance. Low density residential land use is found to the west and centre of Greater Benoni in previously “White” areas. A small industrial component can be found in Benoni South and Apex alongside an extremely high density residential land use area in the south. Vacant and undeveloped land (mining land) is situated to the east. Several dams, vleis, wetlands and open spaces can be found throughout Greater Benoni, exhibiting the potential recreation and conservation importance for the area.
4.5.2.5  **Informal Settlements**

A large number of informal settlements can be found throughout Greater Benoni. There is evidence of informal settlements being located alongside existing high density residential areas. In the south, in the vicinity of Wattville and Actonville, there are 14 informal settlements. Reasons for their location include proximity to job opportunities (industry and CBD) as well as man's natural tendency to settle next to one's own kind. In the vicinity of Etwatwa and Daveyton there are also some informal settlements, due in part to urban inertia, but due mostly to the availability of land. Informal settlements in this area have expanded across the borders of the Greater Benoni City Council into Mpumalanga.78

The various informal settlements hence fall into the following order of priority for the period June 1997 to May 1998, as reflected in Table 9. The list prioritise the areas for service provision should funds become available. The list was drawn up by the Council with input from local residents.
Table 9: Greater Benoni Priority List, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>COMMON NAME</th>
<th>NO. OF FAMILIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mayfield x 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 22 (now x 30)</td>
<td>Albertina Sisulu</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 8 and x 21</td>
<td>Mandela Park</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chris Hani Proper</td>
<td>Chris Hani</td>
<td>3 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Buffer Strip</td>
<td>Zenzele</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Portion 100/P26</td>
<td>Zenzele</td>
<td>2 020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 546 (now x 31)</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>1 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 23 (now x 32)</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 16</td>
<td>Kamashonisa</td>
<td>1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 20</td>
<td>Combiza</td>
<td>1 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 17</td>
<td>School site</td>
<td>± 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 19</td>
<td>Below Kamashonisa</td>
<td>± 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Etwatwa x 25, 26, 27</td>
<td>Barcelona Extension</td>
<td>± 6 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Etwatwa Ext 18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 9 above reveals the number of families that are housed in informal settlements. This is where the Greater Benoni City Council has to provide proper housing and proper services. The upgrading of these areas will be discussed in full in the next chapter. It should however be noted that these areas exclude the 14 informal settlements situated next to Wattville and Actonville.

The lack of provision of sites for non-residential purposes (schools, health, etc.) is a matter of serious concern in these informal areas. The provision of
sites for such purposes are planned in accordance with viability and affordability levels of the departments involved.

4.6 Conclusion

The housing and economic policies of the government in Daveyton and surroundings were intended to promote development, and the emphasis was placed on private initiative in respect of development *per se* and cost recovery from the end users in the 1980s. A greater responsibility was also placed on the Daveyton City Council, as a local authority, to initiate development within the framework. The Council's administrative structure and economic resources did however appear to be inadequate to cope with this challenge.

The final acceptance of urbanisation and informal settlements as being inevitable and in fact a positive socio-economic mechanism, resulted in, on the one hand a more relaxed attitude, whilst on the other hand a greater emphasis was placed on orderly urbanisation. The process was however inhibited by inadequate planning, resources and land provision on the part of the Daveyton City Council. As a result land invasion accelerated during the late 80s and early 90s.

Land and housing policies were in essence directed at the promotion of home ownership with an emphasis on affordability and appropriate standards, and neglected the unemployed who were also in need of shelter. The private sector could not shoulder the responsibility of providing sufficient and appropriate land and housing for the lower income groups
alone. Nor could they ensure the creation of an environment conducive to the generation of sufficient employment opportunities. The unemployed and homeless expected the Daveyton City Council to provide land and housing, and when the Council could not fulfill their expectations, land invasion followed which led to the mushrooming of informal settlements within the boundaries of Daveyton.

When informal settlements started to spread around Daveyton, it showed that the Daveyton City Council lacked the timeous identification of sufficient and well-located land for both residential purposes. There was no integrated and realistic development approach which included affordable land and services, no equitable redistribution of resources within functional areas especially in the informal settlements, and there was no public participation in decision making concerning the issues that affected the inhabitants of informal settlements.

In Etwatwa West originally there were 5 293 stands which consisted of 8 separate townships or extensions. Approximately 1 505 houses were built by the private sector and an additional 917 existed in the area. These shacks were found in the site and service area, also known as Etwatwa proper. The rest therefore were eventually forcefully invaded. Etwatwa East initially had an area sufficient for approximately 11 000 stands. The area consisted of 1 township with 1 492 stands. This area, as earlier mentioned, was planned to accommodate 600 families relocated from the farm Varkfontein and approximately 1 000 backyard families from Daveyton Proper.
The township was not serviced, and predominantly shacks or informal housing existed, as the area was planned for the lower income group of Daveyton. The area therefore became a fertile ground for forceful invasion, which resulted in the mushrooming of informal settlements. It should however be noted that from 1989, the provision of services commenced at a cost of approximately R5 000 per stand. This has been a very slow process over the years because of the unavailability of funds. In 1994 when Daveyton fell under the control of Greater Benoni, more emphasis was placed on the provision of services in these areas. This was witnessed through the drafting of LDO's which prioritised areas to be provided with services. The process is continuing, the details of which will be provided in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Reference


3. The Sowetan, 19 July, 1983; Daveyton Memorandum; p. 4.


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11. Ibid.

12. Interview: K. Esterhuyse, Senior City Planner, Greater Benoni City Council, 08-06-98.
17. Ibid.
19. Daveyton Memorandum, p. 5; Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 14 March 1986, p. 4.
20. Daveyton City Council: Minutes 1 March 1987; Daveyton City Council: Daveyton urban ..., p. 5.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 6.
26. Ibid.
27. Daveyton City Council: Department of Town Planning: Proposed future development of Daveyton, p. 3.
28. Daveyton Memorandum, p. 7; Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 10 April 1989, p. 3.
29. Ibid.
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38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
41. Greater Benoni City Council: Department of the City Engineer: Proposed low cost housing project, Item 16/90, p. 2.
42. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 25 May 1990.
45. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 5 April 1988, p. 3.
46. Daveyton City Council: Daveyton urban..., p. 8.
47. Daveyton City Council: Memorandum Technical Services, p. 20.
48. Ibid, p. 21; Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 13 May 1989, p. 3.
49. Interview: E. Talane, Deputy Head, Community Services, 02-07-1998.
51. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 01 February 1990.
53. Ibid., p. 3.
54. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 12 December 1990, p. 15.
56. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 12 December 1990, p. 16.
57. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 12 December 1990, p. 17.
59. Interview: S Mashele, Head of Community Services, 03-07-98.
60. Daveyton City Council: Minutes, 24 March 1993.
61. Daveyton City Council: Department of City Engineer: Application for funds, Item 79/93, p. 8.
68. Greater Benoni City Council: Land Development Objectives, p. 29.
72. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid, p. 5.
76. Ibid.
78. Greater Benoni: Land Development Objectives, p. 34.
CHAPTER 5

5. THE DEVELOPMENTS OF SERVICE PROVISION TO THE INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN AND AROUND DAVEYTON

5.1 Introduction and background to the establishment of Etwatwa
The previous chapter dealt with the appearance of informal settlements in and around Daveyton which eventually became a problem to the Daveyton City Council in the 1980s. In 1986, during that time that the Council gave in to informal settlements, the Council accepted in principle that squatting was a legitimate means for homeless people to provide shelter for their families. This therefore meant that the Council had to shoulder the responsibility of providing services to these informal settlements, a responsibility which proved to be a costly problem. During this time the Council had financial assistance from institutions like the Transvaal Provincial Administration, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and others. The money that was borrowed from these institutions was used to provide services to these areas, but the Council experienced problems in repaying these loans when the culture of non-payment of services became rife in the late 1980s to the early 1990s.

Chapter five will therefore look at the developments that have taken place within the informal settlements around Daveyton. In this chapter developments in Etwatwa, as the area of study, will be examined. It should be noted that these developments occurred subsequent to the pressure on the Council i.e. through organised pressure from the community involved, represented by either their political organisations or the Etwatwa Civic
Association. When the Council accepted squatting in principle, the Council therefore saw it fit to provide services to Etwatwa as the area fell within its jurisdiction.

The name “Twatwa” by which Benoni was known to Black people throughout South Africa, means “The sound of bullets”, a reference to the violent character of the area from the 1920s to the 1950s.¹ The old Benoni location was also known as “Twatwa”, until Blacks were removed to make way for the establishment of Indian residents in 1948. The Black people were resettled to the Wattville Emergency Camp in May 1948 until suitable land was found to accommodate them. Wattville eventually became a Black township following the initiatives of Harry Mabuya who championed the route of the homeless to provide people with housing or shelter.² The name Twatwa faded out, but was revived with the establishment of Etwatwa in Daveyton. This shows that the inhabitants of the Benoni locations have memories of their old location, since Etwatwa informal settlement reminded them of their former overcrowded old location.

Mabuya was born in Bergville, Kwa Zulu Natal in 1906, and as a youngster of twelve he came to Benoni with his parents. In 1945 he achieved prominence by forming the African Housing and Rates Board, the reputed object of which was to find housing for families living under shocking conditions in the Asiatic Section or the grossly overcrowded old township.³ To those desperate families, Mabuya offered a ray of hope. His ability to get the better of the authorities when authorities were unsympathetic to his cause won him popularity and he soon had a large following. To some extent
he followed in the steps of James Sofasonke Mpanza, who was the leader of the much larger squatting movement near Orlando, in Johannesburg.4

Mabuya's African Housing and Rate Board bought tents from war disposal stores for the families in need of accommodation. His method of persuading the Blacks to leave the slums was a simple one: he advised the tenants to pay no rent at all. He encouraged people to set up tents and shacks on a piece of vacant land of Council property west of the old location. Inhabitants of the old location, who saw in this a golden opportunity to escape their own cramped conditions, joined them late in 1946 and the camp grew rapidly in spite of attempts to contain it. The Council soon admitted the justification for such accommodation by setting up a "tent town" of its own in January 1947, hoping to lure the residents of Mabuya's "tent town" there. In this the Council was unsuccessful, for the Blacks had more faith in their leader than in the Council. Besides they were free from official control in Mabuya's camp. The growth of the unofficial "tent town" thus far outstripped the official one by March 1948, when approximately 1 000 families were accommodated in Mabuya's tent town.5

However, the Council could not permit such an anomalous situation to continue, and on the recommendations of the Native Affairs Commissions a property proclaimed Emergency Squatter's Camp, was established to the west of the old location in May 1948. This led to the end of Mabuya's camp, since the residents were compelled to move into the new Wattville Emergency Camp.6
In a report submitted by the Council to the Native Affairs Commission on the 13th of June 1950, it was pointed out that there would be only 1 300 sites available in Wattville after the emergency camps had been closed down, while the urgently required accommodation was estimated at 4 400 sites. Ten days later on Friday, 23rd June 1950, Blacks invaded the industrial land/area south-east of the town of Apex and set up a squatter camp. The Apex Squatter's camp eventually provided accommodation for 3 989 families comprising a total population of over 23 000 persons. These people were later resettled to Daveyton from the 1st April 1955.

Daveyton was established as a model township in the late 1950s. Many of the new residents came from the Apex Squatter Camp and only a few from the more militant old location. Infrastructural development continued through the 1970s, and Daveyton was fully electrified by 1975 and boasted the largest number of television viewers in any African township in 1982. Whilst Daveyton's infrastructure and services were good, there remained a growing housing shortage. Between 1961 and 1982 Daveyton's population doubled but its housing stock increased by only one third. In 1979, nearly four thousand families had been on the official housing waiting-list for at least four years.

The Sinaba Party led by Shadrack Sinaba, an opposition party organised by a councillor in the township, and supporters including many women from homeless families, engaged in direct action protests. Families erected shacks either in backyards of formal houses or more confrontationally on the boundaries of the township. This led to the birth of Etwatwa, a name revived from the old location by the Mayor of Daveyton, Mr. T Boya, in
1984 when the Daveyton Council became involved in the running and development of a farm known as Holfontein, for the housing of people with low incomes. Holfontein farm had a number of portions: portion 1 and 2 belonged to the Transvaal Provincial Administration. In 1983 the TPA gave this land to the Daveyton Council to develop housing for low income earners. The Council could not develop this land due to financial constraints, but in 1986 when about 600 families from neighbouring farms invaded Varkfontein farm just outside Daveyton, the TPA asked the Daveyton Council to accommodate those families within its boundaries in Holfontein, which was eventually developed as Etwatwa East and Etwatwa West. The Varkfontein squatters and backyard residents of Daveyton were resettled into these areas in 1987. In 1986 the Daveyton City Council eventually gave in to the pressure of Sinaba supporters, to develop the Holfontein area, which by 1984 had been invaded by homeless families on a small scale.

Etwatwa East came into the picture in 1987. Those shack dwellers had been settled on a farm called Varkfontein owned by Mr. Nieuwoudt. In 1984 Mr. Nieuwoudt left the farm, and left a farmer who was commonly known as "Umathumbu" to look after the farm. In order to make quick money he opened the farm to shack dwellers at a price. Homeless people paid money to build shacks in Varkfontein until there were approximately 1 454 families in 1985.

In 1986 the Council split Etwatwa into the section west of the railway line and that east of the railway line. East of the railway line was demarcated as Daveyton Ext. 4 or Etwatwa East. Etwatwa East was originally meant for
residents of backyard shacks from Daveyton proper. Towards the end of 1986 Mayor Boya announced on television that people who needed shelter should come to Daveyton.\textsuperscript{12} This opened the floodgates for people who needed sites, and Etwatwa was overwhelmed by shacks.

The total number of stands, except for site and service stands, in Etwatwa West was approximately 15 000. It was anticipated at that stage that the Council would make provision for a further 12 000 stands. The area west of the railway line was allocated to the private sector for development, and only an area of approximately 1 400 stands was developed for the site and service scheme. The number of stands allocated to private developers in the area west of the railway line was approximately 3 500 and the rest was given to the East Rand Development Board for a "self help scheme".\textsuperscript{13}

According to the East Rand Development Board (ERDB), the "self help scheme" meant that an individual had to buy and register a stand in his name and then apply for assistance from the ERDB to erect a structure. The ERDB appointed project managers from construction companies and provided them with building material for a foundation only, according to the owner's choice of plan. The ERDB made available 12 core plans for people to choose from. When a foundation was finished it was then the owner's responsibility to systematically add on the rooms until the whole structure was finished. This was also known as "core development" from the foundation. The shack dwellers were happy because that provided them with the basis to build a house.\textsuperscript{14}
The loan for the development of the area, in terms of provision of services i.e. water, sewage and roads, negotiated with the Development Bank of South Africa in 1987 by the Daveyton City Council and the East Rand Development Bank, made provision for higher priority for the provision of certain projects, such as the bulk services provision mentioned earlier. The loan portion related to the entire Etwatwa area, was approximately R40 000 000 00 (forty million rands). The portion of the loan that was to be utilised for the western portion of Etwatwa was R7 000 000 00 (seven million rands). It was this portion of the loan that was taken up first to provide water, sewage and roads.  

The Council anticipated that repayment of R42,00 per month per stand was required from residents for services rendered to repay the aforesaid loan. The DBSA gave the Council twenty years to repay the loan at 11% interest. To provide for the additional 12,000 stands the Council had to acquire or incorporate more land of approximately 1,000 hectares into Etwatwa. In this regard the two portions of farmland to be incorporated were owned respectively by Putfontein Farms (Mr. J Lourie) and Mr. Opperman. The land of Putfontein Farms was approximately 500 hectares and the Opperman land was approximately 570 hectares. Mr. Lourie made representations to the Council for the development of his land and indicated that seventy percent of the stands were to be developed on his land and were to be made available for allocation by the Council. The Council declined the offer, because the Council wanted to buy the land outright. The land of Mr. Opperman was purchased directly by the Council at a price of R5 500 000 00 (five million five hundred thousand rands) in 1987 with funds provided by the National Housing Commission.  

The land belonging to Mr. Lourie
was only acquired by the Daveyton City Council in 1993 as mentioned in the previous chapter.

In 1987 the Council made available 3 000 stands for development by needy people at Etwatwa East. Ten councillors were each given 300 stands for allocation to people on a self help scheme. This was the same as the ERDB scheme mentioned earlier. The Council provided these stands at a cost of about R12 000 000 (twelve million rands) by taking up a loan, from the National Housing Commission.¹⁷

As mentioned in the previous chapter, although Etwatwa East was ostensibly tightly controlled, since its inception, several shack dwellers allowed other families to erect shacks on their sites. The council was aware of this, but found it extremely difficult to do anything about it. Prior to the land invasion of the 1990s, the council was confident that they could prevent the erection of shacks in open fields. As one official explained, when such shacks were sighted, the municipal police were notified, and if police warnings were ignored, the shacks would be demolished. It was realised though that those shack dwellers thus affected, generally made their way back to backyards.¹⁸

The land invasion of early 1990 compelled the Council to act immediately. The families involved were caught unexpected. When 200 families occupied land allocated for private development, the police moved in and demolished the shacks. By February 1990 the Council agreed that 5 000 sites in Etwatwa Extension be allocated to squatters. This was then the beginning of Extension 9 and 10, each allocated 3 000 sites by the Council.¹⁹ This
opened the flood gates and the whole area of Etwatwa became overcrowded by shacks. That area was later divided into further extensions.

Extension 15, also known as City Corn, was given to the South African Permanent Bank (Perm) for private development. They were given 1,000 stands to build houses for people who would be subsidised by their employers. In return and as a form of their social responsibility, the bank promised to build a school and a community centre in the area. Perm fulfilled its promise and built a high school known as Dr. Harry Gwala High School, which opened in 1994, as well as the Community Centre. The Community Centre was built to cater for the needs of the community. It provided a comprehensive facility which included a clinic, multi-purpose hall, advice centre and a variety of training facilities.

Extension 7, also known as Maphupheni (where people dream) was established at the same time as the development of Extensions 9 & 10 in 1990. It was developed by the South African Housing Trust. The SAHT built affordable houses for low-income groups. Extension 8, 21 and 24, known as Mandela Park were forcefully invaded by homeless people. The Greater Benoni City Council started in 1998 to rearrange the area and to allocate sites to people. Extensions 16, 18 and 19 were also forcefully invaded and private developers were thrown out by militant homeless people. It has now been realised that these extensions have extended beyond the boundaries of Benoni. Some of the residents occupied an area that fell under the Delmas town council which was part of the Mpumalanga province. This meant that the inhabitants of the said extensions would lose out on services provided by the Greater Benoni City Council until these
people were resettled and accommodated within the boundaries of Greater Benoni.

On Thursday, 27 August 1998, the Gauteng and Mpumalanga province officials signed, what became known as the "Etwatwa Agreement". The agreement allowed part of Etwatwa to be administered by Greater Benoni, while it remained under the jurisdiction of the Eastvaal District Council in Secunda. The landmark agreement meant that the communities of Etwatwa Extensions 16, 18 and 19 were then entitled to benefit from services provided by Benoni, while in essence they remained bona fide residents of Secunda in Mpumalanga. This was beneficial to them because they could receive (basic) services until they were resettled within Greater Benoni. The Council of Secunda wanted them excluded from its boundaries and no services were provided.

Extension 20 was earmarked for heavy industries, but was forcefully invaded by homeless people under the leadership of a person commonly known as Comrade Bizzah. He used the banner of the ANC and made people pay him in order to be allocated sites. The area is now known as New Village. Extensions 5 and 6, now Extension 31 and Extension 23, now Extension 32 or Barcelona, were given to Bester and Co., a private developer, in 1989 to build houses for middle and high income groups. About 3 000 sites were given to this company, but halfway through the project, homeless people invaded the area in 1992. The company withdrew and remaining stands were occupied by shack dwellers. Recently the area accommodated about 11 350 families, with the inclusion of Etwatwa
Extensions 25, 26 and 32, also known as Barcelona Extensions. This is an Inkatha Freedom Party stronghold.\textsuperscript{25}

The Northern Buffer Strip of Daveyton, which is also known as Zenzele, was also forcefully occupied by homeless people in 1992. These people could not get sites in Barcelona. This area is also a stronghold of the IFP. Chris Hani, which is on the Eastern buffer strip of Daveyton was also invaded by homeless people under the banner of the ANC in 1992. Extension 17 and 22, also known as Albertina Sisulu, were originally school sites, but were forcefully invaded in 1993 and in this area subsidy schemes for low cost houses with a minimum of two and half rooms, was made available since 1997.\textsuperscript{26}

Map 3 illustrates Etwatwa and existing areas of informal settlements as well as areas in Etwatwa informal settlement where people who could afford it, have built houses of their own through \textit{in situ} upgrading and self help schemes. Informal settlements and houses are both indicated by a yellow colour on the map. The numbers shown on the map indicate areas that were forcefully invaded, where formalisation of stands has or is presently taking place.
Map 3: Existing areas of informal settlements

5.2 **Provision of essential services**

For proper explanation of the provision of essential services, the discussion will centre around areas provided with services first by the Daveyton City Council when funds became available and later by the Greater Benoni City Councils when the Council took over the running of Daveyton in 1994. This is in line with the way it was handled by the Daveyton City Council and, also how the Greater Benoni City Council had prioritised the provision of such services to the different extensions.

The Daveyton City Council first made land available to various township developers within the Western Areas of Etwatwa, e.g. Bester was allocated 2 000 stands, Geo Rennie and Company was allocated 700 stands and Leon Nafte Construction were also allocated 700 stands. These developers proceeded with the site and service scheme of about 1 400 stands and later in 1985, embarked on the development of a further 400 stands. The inhabitants demanded essential services.27

After an investigation by the Council into the supply of bulk services i.e. water, sewerage and roads to Etwatwa West in 1987, it became evident that the provision fell far short of the needs. Although to a large extent some of the larger developers would supply their own bulk services, it was found that the provision of services to the area could be provided more functionally should the Daveyton Council undertake the provision of these services. The cost of the services could be recovered from the end user of such services.28
After various discussions between the Council, community and developers on the issue, it was decided that these costs would be recovered on a pro rata basis per individual residential unit and paid over to the Council once each stand has been sold to the individual buyer. This effectively meant that the Council had to obtain bridging finance to install the necessary services by means of a loan or by utilising their own resources. It was subsequently decided to apply for a loan to cover the cost to provide such services.29

The proposed development of the area proceeded on a limited scale since only a limited number of stands could be provided with water and sewage. Electricity posed a major problem. It was foreseen that this could be overcome by funding the supply of an overhead electricity line to Daveyton as well as a substation to serve the area. This funding would have to be financed by means of the Council's funds over the short term until a loan to provide all the services to the whole area had been taken up. This enabled the developers to proceed with the development of the area whilst the remainder of the bulk services were upgraded and installed by way of the loan taken up by the Council.

The cost of the services to be provided were as follows:30

**Phase 1**

1. **Electricity**
   1.1 Overhead line 132 kw R 430 000 00
   1.2 Substation C R 740 000 00
   1.3 Alteration to Sub A R 160 000 00
   **Total** R 1 330 000 00

**Phase 2**

2. **Civil Services**
   2.1 Roads R 1 920 330 00
   2.2 Storm water R 610 750 00
The Daveyton Council then applied to the DBSA for a loan of R4 966 930 00, to provide these essential services to the Western Areas of Etwatwa. This realised a total cost of R955 00 per stand for bulk services. An aspect that was not considered in the above costing estimate was that a water reservoir had to be installed for the entire area. The pro rata cost of the structure was approximately R650,00 per stand. The Council decided to cover the cost by a separate loan, and that the financing thereof would be recovered through rates and taxes. These projects were commenced with and completed in the Council’s 1988/89 financial year.31

The community approved of the developments, but a problem arose when payments of rates and taxes were to be effected. It should be noted that in the late 1980s the culture of non-payment was rife, and it became worse in October 1990 when the Daveyton Interim Committee, Etwatwa Concerned Residents and the Wattville Concerned Residents struck a deal with Escom on the supply of electricity. In terms of that agreement Escom was to supply electricity directly to the consumer and not to the Daveyton and Wattville Councils as these councils were alleged to be corrupt and overcharging. Escom had to issue separate receipts to customers for electricity consumed, and the Councils had to issue their own receipts for services such as water, waste refuse, etc. An interim flat rate of R70 in the case of Daveyton and R50 for Wattville was agreed upon by the residents representatives, Escom
and the Daveyton and Wattville Councils, until Escom had finalised the removal of the Council meters and installed its own, to meet in demands of the residents.\textsuperscript{32} Escom was formally allocated the right to supply electricity directly to Etwatwa and Daveyton on 1 December 1992.\textsuperscript{33}

In 1990 these communities had demanded the scrapping of rent arrears by the Councils and Escom, transfer of houses to owners, upgrading of services and instruction of new ones in the whole of Etwatwa, more land for low income housing, affordable tariffs for services and a non-racial democratic local government. Since the majority of the inhabitants of Etwatwa did not have electricity, they decided not to pay for any services provided by the Council of Daveyton until the demands of the Daveyton and Wattville communities had been met. This then posed a problem to the Daveyton Council which had to repay the loans taken up for bulk services in Etwatwa. The problem was eventually solved by the East Rand Regional Services Council, by providing the Council with bridging finance to honour its obligations for the 1991/92 financial year.\textsuperscript{34}

At a meeting between the Daveyton City Council, Town Planners Van Zyl, Atwell and De Kock and the Etwatwa Concerned Residents, (which changed their name to Etwatwa Civic Association (ECA)), held on 7 July 1992, Mr. P. Moyo, chairman of the ECA, advised the Council and the Town Planners that at each and every stage the people at the grassroots would decide what should happen in Etwatwa, and that the inhabitants should prioritize their needs in terms of the availability of funds.\textsuperscript{35} It was then decided that projects which entailed the relocation of families when bulk services are provided, would only be viable if there was participation by the Etwatwa community.
Within the particular circumstances the imposition of priorities on the Etwatwa community would not succeed. Participatory decision making was essential if the Etwatwa community was to accept the limitations of available financial resources, and if the long term economic and socio-political goals of the Etwatwa community were to be met. Whilst the development options could be discussed at length at the level of the boardroom, it was considered that the final decision making in respect of the development options should be made by and from within the Etwatwa community. The community, through ECA, decided that a layout plan of Etwatwa as a whole had to be designed to enable in situ upgrading developments where private developers were not involved. This would enable the minimum relocation of families and the few that would be relocated would be given preference in the allocation of sites in other or new extention. The Council and the town planners agreed and wherever possible the principle of in situ upgrading was maintained. In the area of Etwatwa East, the most pressing needs that needed immediate attention were upgrading the provision of a sewage system, water reticulations and roads. Electricity provision was to follow as funds became available.

In order to determine the appropriate detailed sewage system for use in the Southern half of Etwatwa East, the engineering firm Bruinette Kruger Stoffberg Inc., carried out a detailed investigation into the comparative costs of alternative systems in 1987. At the request of two of the potential funding institutions, i.e the SAHT and DBSA, the investigation included several options which were regarded as of standard quality. Any alternative system would not necessarily be applied throughout, but was used in various extensions. This would depend on the choice of the affected inhabitants
concerning the standard and cost of such services, i.e. to affordability on the part of consumers. 37

In the basic planning of the provision of sewer outfall to Etwatwa East, also known as Extension 4, the engineers deemed it necessary that the pipeline should pass through the Etwatwa Extension 1 development. This in turn meant that the sewer outfall had to be placed underneath some of the major roads in Etwatwa Extension 1. The installation of services at Etwatwa Ext. 1 could seriously be affected if the new bulk sewer was not installed, because the road contract would have had to be delayed until after completion of the sewer line. Due to the possible escalation of costs, it was imperative that the sewer line be installed. After deliberations with the DBSA and SAHT, it was decided by the Council that special efforts should be made to install the pipe line as a matter of priority. It was agreed that finances should be sought to bridge the period from time of installation until such time as a loan was finalised with the DBSA. The DBSA agreed that they would provide bridging finance within the framework of the loan granted to the Daveyton City Council. 38

These particular circumstances in the southern half of Etwatwa East, were taken into consideration in assessing the cost of the alternative options. Important features included the geographic location in close proximity to existing sewage works, which was believed to have sufficient hydraulic capacity to cope with the demand to be generated by that area, and the geological formation which existed. Of the options considered, the conventional water-borne sewage system had the lowest monthly total costs. Only by a reduction in water reticulation, such that only one water point per
20 stands was provided, could the cost of another option, the Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine (VIP) be reduced by 38 cents a month. However, the level of inconvenience and user discomfort associated with this option excluded it by comparison from the water-born system. While some of the other options were fairly close in cost to the conventional system, it should be noted that they had a higher proportion of operating costs versus capital costs. As the operation costs were subject to inflationary effects while the capital costs were presumably not, i.e. fixed interest loans, the cost differentials would increase over time, thereby making the water-born option more attractive. The ECA was informed of the differences and in turn informed the affected communities. The inhabitants supported the water-born system.39

It must be mentioned that subsequent to the investigation into costs, a further alternative, namely a patented Aqua Privy was brought to the attention of the consultants by the Council engineers. This was claimed to have somewhat lower costs to any of the alternatives investigated. It did however have a potential problem associated with it, in that percolation of contaminated water into the ground would be necessitated. However, the volume of such permeation was evidently small, i.e. ± 12 litres per unit per day, so that a more detailed investigation was necessary to determine whether or not that amount of infiltration into the ground was to be accepted. It was therefore not possible at that time to evaluate the feasibility of that system for application in Etwatwa East, because the communities affected had already accepted the water-born system and they were too impatient to wait for another investigation. They desperately wanted services to be provided.40
It was therefore recommended by the consultants that standard waterborne sewage be adopted as the system for the southern half of Etwatwa East and that the possible utilisation of aquaprivies be considered for future development in Etwatwa. It was also agreed by the Council, the DBSA and SAHT that cognisance be taken of the fact that expansion of the existing sewer works would soon become necessary, in order to cater for demand arising from development in the northern half of Etwatwa East. The capital costs of that and any further expansion would be of the value of R500 per stand, equivalent to monthly costs of R4,18 per stand. This had to be taken into account in any further development.

The bulk water supply network for Etwatwa East was provided separately in 1988. This was designed in such a way that a detailed reticulation system could tie in at a convenient point adjacent to the developing areas. It was also designed to maintain adequate water supply at satisfactory pressures. The water reticulation within residential areas was on the basis of a metered connection to every site. Water demand was calculated at an average of 800 litre per household per day, with an instantaneous peak factor of 4,5 to 6 litres. Working pressure was initially in the order of 80m, declining at around 30m on average after the commissioning of the local reservoir system. The reticulation pipework was laid on a riversand bedding as necessitated by the soil conditions. A tap with gulley was provided adjacent to the toilet.

The estimated cost of the project was based upon the preliminary design of the water reticulation of Extention 4. The resultant cost per stand was
indicative of the costs per stand throughout the southern half of Etwatwa East.

Extention 4:  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction Cost</td>
<td>R 878 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escalation (13%)</td>
<td>R 114 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>R 993 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional fees (10%)</td>
<td>R 99 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>R1 092 473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost per stand  R759.20

This project was also completed in the 1988/89 financial year of the Council.

Phase two of the Council's provision of bulk services hiccupped the construction of roads to the serviced areas. The Council then embarked on the project of providing roads in Etwatwa, because in a new settlement like Etwatwa, there was a need for roads so that the area could be accessible to neighbouring areas. The southern half of Etwatwa East was roughly divided by arterial roads into two portions, namely Extension 4 and Extension 8. Each of the portions was served by a network of streets, which were categorised into a hierarchy which coincided with the size of the road reserve provided.

The hierarchy of the roads stood as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Road</th>
<th>Reserve width</th>
<th>Surface width</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major collectors</td>
<td>16m</td>
<td>7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor collectors</td>
<td>13m</td>
<td>5.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local streets</td>
<td>10m</td>
<td>4m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The type of traffic which was expected on each of these categories varied. The major collectors were roads meant for buses, taxis and cars. Minor collectors were roads meant for taxis and cars only. The local streets where roads meant to carry mainly pedestrian traffic, with vehicular traffic limited in general to the cars of the residents only. Because of the variety of classes of residential area, it was proposed by the Council and approved by the ECA that standards of sulfating be varied according to appropriate levels of cost applied to each area.

It was approved by the City Engineers, the Council and ECA that the local streets in the self-help area would not to be surfaced, but would have cinder, i.e. ash mixed into the upper layers of soil for mechanical stabilization and thereafter compacted and graded.

The cost of the construction material per stand associated with each of the three classes of areas were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Sub-Economic</th>
<th>Self Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost per stand</td>
<td>R1178,00</td>
<td>R750,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was also approved by the Council that as far as practically possible, the roads would be built after the installation of other services, especially water
and sewage, in order to avoid digging up some of the roads for pipe crossing, etc.

It should be noted that the above project was not undertaken because of a lack of funds and the transition of most local government in 1993/94. It was later taken up by the Greater Benoni City Council in its 1997/98 financial year.

5.2 Recent actions to improve conditions in informal settlements around Daveyton

The areas in the Etwatwa Extentions where bulk services were to be provided in the 1992/93 financial year of the Council, were already occupied by informal settlers which made it impossible to implement the initial layout of these areas without relocating people. The relocation of families would have had a major impact on the community. Therefore due cognisance was given to the time and cost which had been invested by individuals in their dwellings and to the social inter-relationships which had developed within the community, between families and neighbours. The uprooting and displacements of the community through their relocation could have caused a major upheaval at family level. This aspect was considered to be politically extremely sensitive, and the community of Etwatwa made it clear that they were totally opposed it. After consultation with the ECA, the Council agreed that formalisation of residential erven should result in minimum community disturbance. It would maintain the status quo in the community in terms of social and family interactions and inter-relationships
by not relocating them to other areas. This was a crucial factor in ensuring the ongoing and long term viability and stability of the community.

In a meeting held in October 1992 attended by a representative of the Daveyton City Council, Town Planners and the Etwatwa Civic Association to discuss the development and service provision to Etwatwa Extension 16, 18, 19 and Mandela Park (which are Extension 8, 21 and 24), priorities for action were laid down. These included the provision of water and sanitation, the upgrading of land tenure and refuse removal in these areas.\(^{47}\)

It should also be noted that these projects were not embarked upon by the Council because of a lack of funds and the transition to Greater Benoni. When the Greater Benoni City Council (GBCC) took over the running of Daveyton and Etwatwa in 1994 the East Rand Regional Services Council advised all its member councils to draft Land Development Objectives and prioritise projects that needed immediate attention for which the Councils had to allocated funds. This then meant that future projects be shelved, while the GBCC provided funds to complete projects already commenced with. This slowed down developments at Etwatwa while the invasion of land continued unchecked. It was only after the completion of the Benoni LDOs in March 1997 that the Eastern Gauteng Regional Services Council and the Gauteng Provincial Government started to release some funds for service provision in Etwatwa through the Benoni Council Housing and Community Services Department.\(^{48}\) It should be noted that when the LDOs were compiled, community involvement was emphasised.
Before services could be provided to areas forcefully invaded, the Council, after consultation with the ECA, decided to formalise the affected areas so that proper stands and roads could be put in place. The formalisation of 8,198 stands by the Council's Engineering Department are in various stages of finalisation, i.e. layout and proclamation, land surveyor pegging and registering the stands in the beneficiary's name, for example Etwatwa Ext. 21 (Mandela park) consists of 52 stands, Etwatwa Ext. 31 (Barcelona) 948 stands, Etwatwa Ext. 32 (Barcelona) 3,177 stands, Etwatwa Ext. 30 (Albertina Sisulu) 493 stands, and Chris Hani 2,300 stands. 49

5.3.1 Water and Sewage supply

The Council achieved a record service delivery month in January 1998 with an investment of over R30 m in Benoni's disadvantaged areas, such as Chris Hani, Daveyton, Wattville, Etwatwa and Actonville. These services provided i.e. water and sewage, greatly improved the quality of life of the residents in these areas. The investment in services demonstrated the Council's commitment to improving the quality of life for the residents in the disadvantaged areas and played a major role in creating jobs for the local community.

Mr. P. Moyo and Mr. A.M. Zwane, who both served in the Etwatwa Civil Association, now Councillors for Etwatwa, extended the appreciation of their constituencies for the services provided by the Council. While they appreciated the steps taken by the Council, they were quick to record their dissatisfaction with the slow rate of service provision, especially since their
constituencies had started to pay for services. Further service provision followed in Daveyton/Etwatwa in January 1998.

The following major projects were undertaken since the 1993/94 financial year: Firstly there was the upgrading of the Daveyton water network to eliminate flooding. Three new roads and ancillary stormwater drainage systems were built in Etwatwa to provide safer and more convenient all weather access to densely populated areas in the area during rainy seasons. The Council also started with the installation of the main water supply from Vlakfontein reservoir to Daveyton reservoir to ensure continuous water supply. That opened the way for future developments in the Daveyton/Etwatwa area. The construction of a R3,8 million project on the Wilge Street Outfall Sewer that would provide huge savings in pumping costs and eliminate sewerage overflows was also commenced with. A water tower was built at the Knoppiesfontein reservoir in Etwatwa. That tower ensured sustained water pressure during peak periods. Provision was also made for modern toilet facilities for the 2,250 sites in the New Chris Hani township. High mast lighting was also commenced in Etwatwa Extension and bulk electricity supply to the new low cost housing area in the area was started. The total cost of these improved facilities amounted to approximately R30 million.

These labour intensive projects have created jobs which were well received by the affected communities. Emerging contractors like Sakhile Building and Civil Construction, M Ndala Building and Civil Construction and Mochomo Building and Civil Construction, to mention a few, trained by the Eastern Gauteng Services Council, were used for the kerbing and paving of
roads in Etwatwa as well as for a portion of the Daveyton water network. Most of these contractors were local and based in Daveyton.

The table below shows the current or on-going contracts in the Daveyton/Etwatwa area for the upgrading of water supply and sewerage systems. This table shows that of the 12 projects started in the 1997/98 financial year, only three are due for completion in 1999. The rest have been completed. This has brought relief to thousands of informal settlers in and around Daveyton.
### Table 10: Ongoing Projects in Etwatwa/Daveyton Area, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Consultants</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Repair Daveyton Reservoir</td>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>INTERSTRUCTURES</td>
<td>R5.3m</td>
<td>27-10-97 - 06-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outfall Seiner North of Daveyton</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>B MARTINI</td>
<td>R3m</td>
<td>02-01-98 - 06-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bulkwater for Cloverdene</td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>MARSHALL</td>
<td>R3m</td>
<td>05-06-97 - 31-06-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Upgrading Daveyton Sewer Network</td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>LR CIVILS</td>
<td>R1.4m</td>
<td>17-08-98 - 29-01-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Water Tower, Knoppiesfontein</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>BFA CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td>R3m</td>
<td>16-02-98 - 16-12-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Upgrading Daveyton Water Network</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>JD</td>
<td>R3m</td>
<td>01-03-98 - 01-08-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Main Water Ring (North)</td>
<td>B&amp;K</td>
<td>WK PIPELINES</td>
<td>R6.8m</td>
<td>30-03-98 - 28-10-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Outfall Sewer Etwatwa Ext. 25 264.27</td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>G NUSCA</td>
<td>R2m</td>
<td>01-05-98 - 16-10-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Outfall Sewer Etwatwa Ext. 31</td>
<td>B&amp;K</td>
<td>L&amp;R COVILS</td>
<td>R426 000</td>
<td>06-04-98 - 04-10-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Internal Services Etwatwa Ext. 31</td>
<td>B&amp;K</td>
<td>B MARTINI</td>
<td>R3.5m</td>
<td>18-08-98 - 06-04-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Internal Services Chris Hani Ext. 1</td>
<td>B&amp;K</td>
<td>B MARTINI</td>
<td>R7.8m</td>
<td>23-07-98 - 01-08-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Outfall Sewer Cloverdene</td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>MOSIA</td>
<td>R5.1m</td>
<td>15-09-97 - 13-04-98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Dept. of Greater Benoni City Council. Material provided by Tina Korfias: Civil Engineer, November 1998

**MBA:** John Bakkes and Munitsi Bakkes Association

**PRC:** Peter van der Merwe & Associates

**CES:** Civil Engineering Consultants

**B&K:** Booyens & Koen Associates
5.3.2 Roads and stormwater projects in Etwatwa/Daveyton

The Greater Benoni City Council started to implement the recommendations of the LDOs in March 1997 as funds became available. The projects mentioned above were started by the Daveyton City Council but later abandoned because of a lack of funds and the transition period mentioned earlier. The regravelling and shaping of earth roads and cutting of Side V drains was done in Etwatwa by MBS Consulting Engineers as consultants and the contractor was Mivami Contractors. This road project at a cost of R1000000, started in March 1997 and was completed in February 1998. All the roads not highlighted in the attached map were regravelled and shaped to earth finish.53

The upgrading of earth roads to sand seal roads i.e. low cost-surfaced roads and stormwater drains, highlighted in orange on the attached plan, was done by V&V Consulting Engineers, contracted to De Flaming Construction at a cost of R2 200 000. The project was started in June 1997 and completed in March 1998. The upgrading of the stormwater drainage system in Etwatwa Proper i.e. the installation of concrete lined V drains and proper constructed outlets was done in 1997 at a cost of R300 000 by V&V Consulting Engineers.54

The upgrading of the major stormwater channels in Etwatwa was done in two phases at a cost of R1 977 000,00. These projects commenced in 1997 and were completed in December 1998 by the Community Engineering Services Consultants contracted to Infracor Construction and Emerging Contractors. Stormwater drainage at Pulane Street in Daveyton which
included the construction of kerb inlets, laying of underground pipes and connecting to existing systems, was started in March 1998 and completed in August 1998. The work was done by Wates, Meiring and Barnard Consulting Engineer contracted to Infracor Construction. The construction of new roads in Etwatwa, i.e. proper construction of the major collector and distributor roads network in Etwatwa surfaced and kerbed with stormwater (shown green) was also done in two phases from January 1997 to October 1998 at a cost of R7 000 000 by PRC van der Merwe & Associates contracted to Taxco Construction.55

By the end of 1998 the Greater Benoni Council completed the land formalisation, transfer of ownership of sites to inhabitants and installed water and sewerage services to 4 345 stands in the Chris Hani area and to extensions 21, 30, 31 and 32 of Etwatwa township to a value of R29,3m. The remaining 2 590 stands in Etwatwa Ext. 32 will be serviced as funds become available. According to the official newsletter of the Greater Benoni City Council – these projects were done strictly in accordance with the priority list the Council developed in 1996 and re-affirmed in 1997. Other areas on the list will receive services over the next five years depending on the availability of funds.56 The community of Etwatwa expressed appreciation on the progress made so far, but in community meetings where the Council is represented they always raised their dissatisfaction about the slow rate at which these developments were taking place.57 The following map illustrates the progress made by the Benoni Council in the construction of main roads and stormwater drainage in Etwatwa in the financial year of 1997/1998.
Map 4: Construction of roads and stormwater drainage in Etwatwa

5.3.3 Electricity supply in Daveyton/Etwatwa

In order to understand the question of electricity supply in Daveyton/Etwatwa fully, the following needs to be noted:

Initially the Benoni City Council was a bulk buyer of electricity from Escom and then supplied electricity to the Daveyton City Council which in turn supplied to the end users, the inhabitants of Daveyton/Etwatwa. This was the procedure until March 1990. (see Chapter 4).

In January 1990 the Daveyton City Council was accused of mismanaging the revenues of Daveyton and of overcharging the inhabitants of Daveyton for services rendered and i.e. water, electricity, etc. to enrich themselves. These allegations were put forward by the Daveyton Interim Committee led by J Ngubo in a community meeting held at Sinaba Stadium. The Daveyton Interim Committee was formed by the residents of Daveyton to fight the implementation of a 50% rent increase for households in the township, introduced by the Council in the late 1980s. The committee negotiated with Escom on behalf of the residents to receive electricity directly from Escom and not through the Daveyton Council. This was after Escom had cut off the supply of electricity to the whole township in December 1989 because the Daveyton Council was owing the Benoni Council, and in turn the Benoni Council was unable to pay Escom for electricity consumed in Daveyton. In March 1990 the committee encouraged the residents of Daveyton to pay a flat rate of R70,00 per month for electricity and water, and R60,00 of that
amount to be paid into a separate account for the credit of Escom and R10 to the Daveyton Council for water.

Daveyton City Council agreed with the Daveyton Interim Committee on flat rates for services provided. This was an interim payment during negotiations between the Daveyton Interim Committee which became known as the Daveyton Civic Association led by J Ngubo, the Council and Escom (an agreement was signed in October 1990, with the flat rate commencing from 1 April 1990). The Daveyton Council regarded the arrangement as worthless because very few inhabitants paid the flat rates. This was also raised by Ngubo in public meetings when he encouraged the community to pay the flat rate when he gave a feedback on this progress of negotiations. The inhabitants of Daveyton were defiant towards the Council and wanted the Council member to resign.

Having lived with the flat rate for more than a year and a half, hoping that negotiations would bear fruit, the Daveyton Council was convinced that continuing with that programme would affect the lives of the residents. It was left with no alternative but to advise or warn the community of the dangers of not paying for services. The risks were that Daveyton could face a general electricity cut-off, water rationing was also a possibility as the Rand Water Board’s account had not been paid for some months. The provision of other services would continue to deteriorate. Continued supply could not be guaranteed.  

The flat rate agreement with the Daveyton Interim Committee of R70,00 per month per household lapsed in May 1991. The Council held a special
meeting on Monday 8 July 1991 and finally accepted the failure of the concept of flat rate payment, which was meant to foster negotiations with the local civic association. Institutions which had assisted the Council during the period of the partial services boycott were unwilling to continue due to their own unhealthy financial positions.\(^59\)

The agreement whereby Benoni acted as supplier of electricity to Daveyton also lapsed on 30 November 1992. In a letter from the Benoni City Council it was stated that the Council had considered a report on 24 November 1992 regarding the supply of electricity directly to the end user by Escom. At a meeting of the Greater Benoni Forum held on 25 November 1992, the Benoni Council informed the meeting that there was no objection in principle to Escom taking over the direct supply of electricity to the Daveyton end user. All arrears owed to Escom by Benoni, being a bulk supplier to Daveyton, would be scrapped forthwith and that Daveyton should do likewise to the end users. The supply of electricity to Daveyton with effect from 1 December 1992 was therefore allocated to Escom, a decision which was very popular and accepted by the community of Daveyton/Etwatwa. The community felt that if they paid for electricity directly to Escom, it would be cheaper, and they would not be exploited by the Council which had imposed a fifty percent increase in rates for electricity consumed by the community. This also showed a lack of trust towards the Council officials since the community was of the opinion that the Council officials were enriching themselves at the expense of the community.\(^60\) This was also highlighted in the front pages of the local newspapers, the Sunbeam and The Benoni City Times on the 3\(^{rd}\) and 4\(^{th}\) of December 1992 respectively. The newspapers gave credit to the efforts of
Ngubo when negotiating with Escom on behalf of the community predicted the demise of the Daveyton City Council.61

Etwatwa as an extension of Daveyton was also subject to that decision, and Escom undertook to electrify all households in Etwatwa – a process that is still in progress. The Greater Benoni City Council, established in 1994, undertook to provide community services to Etwatwa and to provide street lights to Etwatwa. The Greater Benoni City Council has since 1995 attempted to convince residents to start paying for services rendered, i.e. water, sewage and wade refuse. Defaulters were handed over to their lawyers (Council lawyers).

Three phases of street light projects have been completed as dictated by the availability of funds. The first phase was undertaken in the 1995/96 financial year of the Greater Benoni City Council, by Frog Electrical Construction at a cost of R1 254 000,00. They connected 38 high mast lights in Etwatwa East and West as well as the site and service areas and at Etwatwa Extension 4, 10, 12, 13 and 14. This project was completed in 1996.62

Phase two was done in the 1996/97 financial year. This phase consisted of the construction of 14 high mast lights by Impact Maintenance Services. They added high mast lights in Ext. 10 and partially installed other in Ext. 9. Phase three was started in the 1997/98 financial year. This phase included the erection of 21 high mast lights at a cost of R883 500,00 by Jason Barrie Electrical. They completed the lights in Ext. 9 and installed others in Ext. 16, 19, 22 and 24 which were partially completed because funds ran out
in 1997/98 before the end of the financial year. It is envisaged that as funds become available in the 1998/99 financial year, all the extentions at Etwatwa will be afforded high mast street lights.

Escom undertook to provide internal electrical infrastructure and reticulation in Etwatwa when all the infrastructure has been provided by the Council. This included house to house connections and the provision of pre-paid meters. In Etwatwa Escom provided 2,5 amps and 2- amps homelights. The 2,5 amps homelight was suitable for homes with a few electrical appliances. There is no connection fee, and in 1998 the unit charge was 30,79 cents per unit. A maximum of 525 watts of electricity can be used at any one time. The 20 amps homelight was suitable for homes with a selection of appliances and where some management of appliances is taking place. The connection fee was R75,00 and in 1998 the unit charge was also 30,79 cents per unit. A maximum of 4 200 watts of electricity can be used at any one time. So far about 21 000 homes have benefitted from these facilities.63

Escom has its own field construction team which is aided by local contractors as part of the Escom Reconstruction and Development Projects. The Escom sales and customer manager, Steward Phopson reported that in 1998 in Ext. 30 of Etwatwa alone, Escom spent R2 000 per stand to install electical connnections. They connected 493 stands at a cost of R986 000.00. Residents paid a R75,00 deposit for installation. The money was charged so that residents should not abuse this privilege.64 It should be noted that this process will continue until the whole of Etwatwa and surrounding informal settlements are connected. This is preceded by the provision of the infrastructure by the Council. The problems highlighted by Phopson in
achieving their objectives in informal settlements were the highjacking of Escom cars and the stealing of their material and equipment. This eventually slowed down the provision of these services.\textsuperscript{65}

These facilities have been widely applauded by the communities affected because the majority of houses in Etwatwa have been supplied with electricity. This has been seen by the response of those connected to Escom.\textsuperscript{66} The councillors at Etwatwa are trying their best to encourage their constituencies to pay for services rendered and the response is promising, but unemployment of the majority of Etwatwa residents is still a drawback.

5.4 Provision of amenities

5.4.1 Community and social centres

The basic aim of providing social or community centres, is to create an environment for the promotion of culture and to encourage a harmonious and balanced lifestyle. The activities for which community centres cater are numerous and diverse. Many recreational activities require accommodation for which space is not available in the home, while others are of an educational nature. These all necessitate buildings. These sites must be accessible to the whole community as they are intended to serve the community sites were grouped with other social and community services.

The uses to which parts of the community centres could be put fall into three main related groups, namely social, recreational and educational. The social group includes activities such as dances, concerts and dramatic
performances. The recreational activities cover activities such as physical training and indoor games. The educational activities provide for lectures, libraries and reading facilities. Community centres can also incorporate a clinic for mother and infant welfare.

According to Mokgohloa, an employee of the Greater Benoni City Council in Community Services, most of the areas of Etwatwa pose a problem for the Council, because of unplanned forceful invasions of areas which were meant to accommodate community and social services. The Council has therefore embarked on a planning and relocation process with the aim of finding land for community services. Areas which were earmarked and developed for the community before the invasions of the 1980s, however have centres for community services, although insufficient.

The whole area of Etwatwa is served by two community centres i.e. the Tshepo-Themba and Women for Peace Halls, which were built by the private sector. These are functional but inadequate. The third is the Apex Training Community Centre, a multifunctional centre donated by the private sector. This centre was by 1989 no longer functional, because it was vandalised by the community it was supposed to serve. In the community centres, females are trained in knitting, sewing, baking and interior decorating, etc. Males are trained to acquire skills like building, welding, carpentry and upholstery. Due to the shortage of space, these centres can accommodate only about 50 people at a time.

In the Land Development Objectives (Five year Plan, 1995) of the Benoni Council, an amount of R300 000,00 has been put aside to renovate the Apex
Training Community Centre in Etwatwa. The renovated centre will be able
to house offices of social workers, a mini library and a hall. The project will
be accommodated in the 1999/2000 financial year of the Benoni Council.\textsuperscript{67}
It should be noted that as these facilities are not adequate, the community of
Etwatwa is free to use the facilities of Daveyton proper if a need arise.

5.4.2 \textbf{Recreational facilities}

In modern townships provision is made for open spaces which are laid out as
parks, gardens, playgrounds, open air baths and sportsgrounds. These are
either grouped together or provided separately. Playgrounds for children are
advantageously placed near dwellings in the centre of groups of houses, thus
avoiding journey and road crossings. Whilst the ideal is to place
playgrounds within half a kilometer of every house, it is realised that
playgrounds attached to schools are also part of the open air amenities.
Recreational grounds for adults and juveniles are concentrated in one large
area, and if possible the area is planned to be used for different types of
games in different seasons, e.g. athletics, soccer, rugby, hockey, basketball
or netball, etc.

In the recent layout of the recreation grounds of Etwatwa, the Council has
provided land for facilities such as parks, playgrounds, open air baths and
sportsgrounds. These are not yet developed due to financial constraints on
the part of the Council. Hence makeshift facilities are in use at Etwatwa
until funds are available to erect proper recreational facilities.\textsuperscript{68}
Land is provided to build one sports stadium, but there are eight stands currently used as soccer sportgrounds, and two tennis courts which are also used as netball grounds. These are makeshift facilities, and the Council assists by scraping these fields twice a year for effective use. For the 1999/2000 financial year R25,000 has been put aside for two additional soccer fields and R150,000 to fence the proposed area of the main stadium until funds are available to build it.

It should be noted that while money is being sought by the Council, life continues and the residents of Etwatwa are making full use of the makeshift facilities. Evidence of this is seen by the successful soccer and netball leagues that are being run by the local residents sponsored by Coca Cola, Albany Bakeries and PG Glass. The Etwatwa Sport Council headed by Mr. Nhlabathi has soccer teams affiliated under its umbrella. The teams range in age groups from under 11 to under 20. Each league has about fourteen teams each competing for a prize at the end of the season, which starts in January and ends in November/December. The leagues are well run and every Friday they publish the fixtures for the weekend in The Sowetan. Games are played on Saturdays, Sundays and Public Holidays. This is done to provide space for schools to utilise these facilities during the week.

A number of meetings have been held between the Etwatwa Community representatives and the Council concerning the building of the sports stadium. Negotiations on this have been blocked by the priority list of the Council's LDO's and the unavailability of funds. Unless funds are obtained from a private sponsor, the community of Etwatwa has to wait for a sport
stadium as most of the funds budgeted by the Council are utilised to provide new and upgrade bulk services for Etwatwa as a whole.

5.4.3 Crèches, schools, churches and clinics

The purpose of establishing a crèche is to care for pre-school children whose mothers are compelled to work in order to make ends meet. The urban family today is affected almost daily by circumstances which tend to hamper its existence as a happy unit. Life is punctuated with constant economic changes and fluctuations, whilst basic needs only increase.

In Etwatwa there are currently 19 crèche facilities consisting of 6 primary and 13 secondary structures. (Primary structures are Council built and secondary structures are privately owned). Kievit maintains that no additional facilities are required unless the township expands. It was however proposed by the ECA and the community that the existing vacant crèche sites be preserved for such purposes in order to provide opportunities for additional formal (primary use) facilities. The community is still satisfied about the turn of events.71

The population of Etwatwa has increased to such an extent that there is a shortage of schools. Land has been provided for schools. For primary schools 16 stands were provided, but nine have facilities and are used. The erection of these facilities are determined by need and availability of funds. The school going population require that 23 primary schools must be erected for Etwatwa residents. For high schools, 5 stands were provided. All have been utilised for that purpose, but the present need for high schools is 9,
which means that there is a shortfall of 4 high schools. However there is one technical college.\textsuperscript{72}

When it came to clinics, two stands were provided for the erection of such facilities, of which both have been utilised to that effect. Moreover there is one privately owned clinic at Etwatwa. One of these facilities serve a population of ± 10 000 people, which is a far cry considering that the population of Etwatwa was estimated at 219 384 by the end of 1998.\textsuperscript{73} Forty stands were provided for church buildings of which 22 have been utilised to that effect, and about 13 more applications for church sites are in the process of being finalised in 1999.\textsuperscript{74}

The whole of Etwatwa has 38 passive open spaces including parks. These are earmarked for recreation and parks. This translates into 105,21 hectares of land of which an average of 0,79 hectares is presumed to cater for 1000 residents. Thirty four spaces translating to 104,01 hectares, have been utilised either for recreation or have been forcefully invaded. There is no Post Office, but about 26 calister post boxes spread evenly around Etwatwa, were installed by Telkom. This situation reveals a need for two Post Offices. There is one Police Station, no magistrate court, one fire station, no centre for the physically disabled or for the handicapped, the latter two being determined by welfare organisations.

About 117 stands were provided for businesses including offices, which translates into 14,29 hectares of land. Twenty seven stands have been utilised for formal businesses, i.e. retail outlets, etc. amounting to 1.85 hectares of land and about 195 informal businesses, e.g. tuck shops have
been established. There are two filling stations and about 40 stands for industrial development translating to 7.6 hectares of land of which eight stands have been used for small industries. Total land required for industrial development is approximately 114 hectares taking into account the standard land occupation of 500 residents per hectare.75

5.5 Conclusion

Despite intensified activity on the part of the Daveyton City Council and now the Greater Benoni City Council and the Gauteng Provincial Government, to contain the growth of informal settlements and to implement programmes to accommodate shack dwellers in controlled informal settlements, the figures suggest that informal settlements are still growing. These schemes have not as yet succeeded in keeping pace with the need for affordable serviced sites. Local authorities throughout the country feel trapped by financial constraints and despair at the insufficiency of land and slow processes of land delivery for the purposes of accommodating shack dwellers and lower income groups.

Some local authorities have developed explicit policies or long term plans for informal settlements, for example the Land Development Objectives of the Greater Benoni City Council which is a five year plan to provide houses to informal settlement residents and upgrade existing ones. Official responses to the emergence of informal settlements or land invasions reflected a policy of containment. These councils turned expectantly to the provincial government in the hope that the burden of administering and catering for such communities would be taken off their shoulders.
The provincial government regarded informal settlement within or around proclaimed Black townships initially as the responsibility of the local authorities. However a number of transit camps were established, and in some townships like Daveyton, services were provided for site and service schemes for informal settlement dwellers.

When considering the survey conducted in Etwatwa for the purpose of this study, the survey has shown improvements in the provision of services which are aimed at meeting the needs of the people. Most improvements have occurred in the provision of electricity and water. Roads and sewage systems are still lacking and this can be attributed to a lack of funds from the Provincial Government, which released funds according to the priority list of the Council stemming from the LDOs of the Council, and when funds were available. Overall the picture on the provision of services to Etwatwa looks promising, although the community still complains that the rate at which services are provided is still slow.

Another factor that contributed to slower service delivery in Etwatwa was the tendency of inhabitants of not paying for services rendered. The culture of non-payment for services has not been completely eradicated by the Mashakhane campaign. This has therefore resulted in reduced revenue to the Council, and hence they could not meet all its obligations. The Council has instructed its lawyers to issue summons to defaulters with the aim of recovering outstanding funds. Furthermore, the transitional period of 1993-1994 for local councils also contributed to slower service delivery. During that period, nobody was accountable for service delivery until proper local
governments were put in place. This affected service delivery in Etwatwa and Daveyton until the Greater Benoni City Council took over the running of these areas fully in 1995.

Forceful invasion of land in Etwatwa also disrupted service provision. A number of informal settlements in Etwatwa and around Daveyton sprang up from January 1990. The Council had to provide services for those people from depleted revenues because of the non-payment for services provided. The Daveyton Council could not provide services to these areas until 1997, when the Greater Benoni City Council started to formalise these settlements. Money that was meant for service delivery, had be utilised for the formalisation of these settlements. This caused a delay in service provision, hence the compilation of a priority list mentioned earlier, which also depended on the availability of funds. The fault of slow delivery therefore lay with both the government, i.e. Local Government and the community.
Chapter 5

References

12. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 162
21. Ibid.; "Affordable" means low cost housing that could be purchased by low income groups.
22. The Sowetan, August 28; Sunbeam, August 28; Greater Benoni City Council: Opendoor, September 1998, p. 2.
23. Ibid
26. Ibid.
28. Department of City Engineer: Provision of Bulk Services to Western Site of Etwatwa, Item 18/87.
30. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
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41. Ibid, p. 32.
42. Department of City Engineer: Standard of Services: Water Reticulation Etwatwa East, Item 103/88.
43. Ibid.
44. Department of City Engineer: Standard of Services: Roads Etwatwa East, Item 107/88.
45. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Department of City Engineer: Upgrading of Disadvantaged areas, p. 3; Greater Benoni City Council: Opendoor, December 1998, p. 2.
54. Interview: Sthembiso Mbimbi: Technologist: City Engineer Department, 18 September 1998.

55. Ibid.


57. Interview: Stembiso Mbimbi: Technologist: City Engineer Department, 18 September 1998.


59. Ibid.


63. Ibid.


65. Ibid.


73. City Engineer: Benoni population profile by area, p.1.


75. City Engineer Land Audit..., 02-1998, Land Development Objectives ..., p. 21; Greater Benoni Spatial Development Framework, p. 27.
CHAPTER 6

6. RECENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN DAVEYTON/ETWATWA INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has dealt with the developments in the informal settlements around Daveyton which involved the provision of municipal bulk and connector services in Etwatwa. This chapter will focus on current problems in informal settlements in Etwatwa and current and future developments in informal settlements around Daveyton. In order to assess these problems and developments properly, certain aspects need to come to the picture, like the population profile of Daveyton/Etwatwa, the housing backlog and need in order to come to an informed conclusion as to whether the current actions by the local government, i.e. Greater Benoni City Council, to improve the conditions of informal settlements are adequate or not. The contribution currently underway by the National Government to improve informal settlements will also be discussed and evaluated. Lastly the community's response in the affected areas will be discussed, in order to bring forward the perceptions of the informal settlement dwellers on the role played by the local government in improving their areas.
6.2 Population profile of South Africa, Benoni, Daveyton and Etwatwa

The Development Bank of Southern Africa estimated the population of South Africa at 38,1 million people in 1990, a figure that was expected to increase to 47,7 million by the year 2000, an average annual increase of 2,29 percent between 1990 and 2000.¹ These figures were proven to be inaccurate by the preliminary results of the 1996 census conducted by the Central Statistical Services (CSS) which indicated that there are 37,9 million people in South Africa of which 18,2 million (48 percent) were males and 19,7 million (52 percent) were females.²

In 1990 approximately 24 million (according to the DBSA) or 63 percent of the total population was urbanised. It was estimated that these figures would increase to nearly 36 million or 75 percent of the total population by the year 2000. This implied a decline in the rural population from 14,1 million in 1990 to some 11,7 by the year 2000, thus underlining the increasing need for housing in urban areas.³

Table 11 depicts the estimates of the rapid process of urbanisation for the period 1990-1995 and 1995-2000.
TABLE 11. Estimated annual urbanisation rates: Natural growth plus net migration 1990-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.84%</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DBSA: Centre for Information Analysis, 1990.

The table above indicates that the rate of urbanisation of the Black population that has already reached high levels, is expected to accelerate, thus anticipating that the next urban generation will comprise of even larger numbers of low income Black families. This is in line with the urbanization process taking place worldwide in developing countries. In the 1970s over half the world’s urban population lived in the developed countries (698 million of them compared to 654 million in developing countries). By 1990, 61 percent (1,401 million in all) of the world population lived in developing countries. The projection for 2025 indicate that this share will then be 77 percent (or 4,011 million), a six fold increase of the population of developing countries since the 1970s. Thus urbanisation will increasingly be dominated by developing countries.

The numbers involved are staggering. In Africa there were 32 million city dwellers in 1950, a total that nearly tripled by 1970 (to 83 million), to reach 206 million by 1990. Projected for 2025, the total will be 857 million. So rapid is Africa’s urbanization, that it increases its share of the world’s city dwellers even though other parts of the world are also rapidly urbanizing.
Four point four percent of the world's urban population lived in Africa in 1950; 6.2 percent in 1970; 9.0 percent in 1990, and this is projected to increase to 13.1 percent in 2010 and 16.5 percent in 2025. These increases in urban population effectively translate into more informal settlements, and the increased demand for housing.

The Urban Foundation pointed out that more than 50 percent of the actual Black population growth in the urban areas will result from the natural increase of the existing population. Less than 50 percent of the anticipated growth will consist of persons migrating to urban areas. Therefore the rate at which housing is needed, is largely a function of natural population growth.

The preliminary results of the 1996 census indicated that 55.4 percent of the South African population live in urban areas, which is about 7.6 percent less than the DBSA estimates of 1990. Gauteng is the most urbanised province with 96 percent of the population living in urban areas, followed by the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, with 90 and 72 percent respectively. The Northern Province has the largest rural population with fewer than 12 percent of the population living in urban areas, followed by the North West and Eastern Cape with 65 and 63 percent of their respective populations living in rural areas.

One would therefore expect that the main thrust of the housing backlog in provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape, will be concentrated in
urban areas, whereas provinces such as the Northern province and the Eastern Cape will experience a proportionately larger rural backlog.

Figure 1 below depicts the population distribution per province.
Figure 1. Population distribution per Province, 1997.


The figure above illustrates the distribution of the most pressing housing needs in 1997, i.e. in the three provinces i.e. Kwa Zulu Natal with a 20.27 percent of the total population, followed by Gauteng with 18.94 percent of the total population and the Eastern Cape with a total population 15.49 percent of the total population.
Coming back to our area of study around Benoni, the total population of Greater Benoni amounts to approximately 560 000 people, according to the 1997 Greater Benoni City Council estimates. About 70 percent of the total population resides in Daveyton/Etwatwa. The spatial manifestation of the population of Greater Benoni, 1997 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daveyton/Etwatwa</td>
<td>394 431</td>
<td>70,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wattville/Tamboville</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>6,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actonville</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>3,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Benoni</td>
<td>113 000</td>
<td>20,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relative number of people compared to the size of the areas in which they reside are reflected in Figure 2 above.

**Table 13. Population Density in Greater Benoni, 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>PEOPLE PER HA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAVEYTON/ETWATWA</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATTVILLE/TAMBOVILL</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTONVILLE</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLD BENONI</td>
<td>5-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 13 above shows the population densities within Greater Benoni, and where housing is needed most. It can be seen that the population densities in Daveyton/Etwatwa, Wattville/Tamboville and Actonville are between seven and eight times to that of Old Benoni. Consequently the focus has developed on the need for services and infrastructure in those areas.

In 1988, the Daveyton City Council estimated that the population of Daveyton was 189 000. The rate of immigration from neighbouring towns and farms was about 5% per annum. The overall population growth of Daveyton/Etwatwa was growing at a rate of about 7% per annum as compared to the 2.29% population growth for the total South African
population. It therefore meant that the population of Daveyton/Etwatwa would increase by approximately 100 000 by the year 1995 and 175 000 by the year 2000. The implications of the above population estimates were that approximately 2400 dwellings had to be provided every year from 1988 until the year 2000. It was also anticipated by the Council that greater influx would occur from surrounding areas such as former KwaNdebele, the former Eastern Transvaal and Wattville, as these areas became saturated due to slow growing economies. 

6.3 **Present housing needs in Daveyton/Etwatwa**

In contrast with demand, the need for housing was not related to affordability. The need for housing was related, rather to the decision about what standard of accommodation is necessary at the basic level of housing. A decision on this aspect can be based on various grounds, for example it can be defined at a basic level as protection against the elements or, at a more advanced level, as a shelter which leaves its residents better off in terms of health than they would have been without a shelter. The term housing need is a socio-economic concept and is unavoidably linked to politics. The problem of defining housing needs is further complicated in a society where the population comprises of different population groups and where the quality of housing has been closely correlated with the various population groups.

In assessing and evaluating housing needs, important basic philosophical points of departure need to be established. These points are not only related to money, but rather to human dignity and quality of life. As indicated
above, the concept of need does not relate to affordability on the part of either the individual or the society of which he is a member. It relates to human dignity and to standards. In this regard, housing standards must take cognisance of morals ethics, the need for privacy and the living standards of people which have evolved over a period of time.

At a quantitative level housing needs stem basically from two sources. In the first place there is the formation of new households as a result of population growth. New entrants into the housing market represent an additional need as they had not been catered for before. Secondly, there is a need to eradicate the existing backlog. Backlogs arise where the current standards do not comply with those accepted by a particular society or country, and there is consequently a need to upgrade or replace existing housing stock.\(^{11}\)

As indicated previously, housing needs are also related to the decision of what the appropriate standard of housing should be in a particular community. When determining standards for housing needs, it should be acknowledged that housing policy is an important issue in the politics of all the population groups. Therefore housing policy can be said to be a sensitive and in many ways a politically determined function. It should be mentioned however that, if at all possible, it would be preferable that future housing policy be depoliticised as much as possible in order to ensure optimal application of scarce resources.
With regard to the number of new households, De Loor estimated that 198,000 shelters would be required annually between 1990 and 2000 in South African urban areas. This was derived from estimates which suggested that the number of households will increase from 4.8 million in 1990 to 6.8 million in the year 2000. The estimated number of households in South Africa in 1997 was 8.9 million of which 5.4 million were in urban areas and 3.5 million in non-urban areas. The household figures are based on the 1996 census, preliminary estimates of the population by Central Statistical Service, and average household sizes extracted from the 1995 October Household Survey.

The household distribution per province indicates that Gauteng has the highest number of households with 22 percent of the total households in South Africa. This is despite the fact that KwaZulu-Natal is the most populous province in the country. The number of households in Gauteng exceeds the number of households in KwaZulu-Natal because of the lower average household size in Gauteng which is 3.6 compared to KwaZulu-Natal which is 5.0. The same phenomenon can be observed when comparing Western Cape to Northern Province and Free State to Mpumalanga.

The densities per province show that Gauteng is by far the most densely populated province with 379 persons per square kilometer. The average for South Africa is 34 persons per square kilometer.
According to Robert van Dijk, City Planner in the Benoni City Council, the area of Etwatwa and the surroundings of Daveyton presently need about 70,000 new houses to cater for informal settlement inhabitants. A recent article in The Sowetan stated that hundreds of homeseekers in Daveyton will benefit from a R2,8 million deal entered into by the Greater Benoni City Council and the Gauteng Department of Housing and Land Affairs. According to the Council's executive committee, Naweed Hassan, the deal is geared to allow the council to build 5,000 houses. The amount will be advanced to the Benoni Council to speed up payment to various developers on completion of the walls and roofs of 5,000 structures in Etwatwa Extensions 21, 30 and 31, as well as Chris Hani (Proper), Chris Hani I, and other areas around Daveyton.

Therefore, if it is taken into account that the present need of Daveyton/Etwatwa is approximately 70,000 houses. The 5,000 units to be built is a drop in the ocean. This leaves the local government with the option of upgrading the existing informal settlements in situ if the area is conducive for housing. Moyo, the Councillor for Etwatwa, pointed out that the majority of the inhabitants of Etwatwa were not prepared to move to other areas where new houses are built by the Council.

6.4 Housing demand around Daveyton

Housing demand refers to the number of families who are willing to purchase accommodation, but are unable to do so because of a shortage of the type of accommodation they require. This is different from the housing
need with regard to the aspect of affordability. Housing need is determined by predetermined minimum standards, which are dependant on social and other norms, while demand is a direct derivative of affordability. This implies that housing demand is determined by the ability of households to pay for their own housing.

Should the standard of an affordable house be lower than the socio-politically acceptable minimum standard, then it becomes necessary for intervention by the Government to intervene. This intervention usually takes the form of subsidies. The extent of this assistance depends on what the government can afford and not the number of families needing assistance. In Daveyton and the surrounding areas, about 3792 new houses have been built over a three year period between 1996 and 1998. This is far below the required number of houses.

In the Greater Benoni boundaries, there are potential zones of development which can meet the housing demands of the area with the funds available. Analysis of the structure of Greater Benoni led to the identification of certain areas, which are currently underdeveloped such as smallholdings, farms and mining land. These areas are classified according to varying degrees of development "pressure", which are being exerted on them; at present ranging from a low to medium to high pressure. The degree of pressure is heightened by the rapid growth and expansion of certain areas of Greater Benoni.
As reflected in Map 5, the Daveyton/Etwatwa area is the high-pressure zone which grows most rapidly in Greater Benoni, and therefore the area with the greatest housing demand. There is already growth in residential pressure to the north of Daveyton/Etwatwa, where informal settlement is taking place in Putfontein. In order to contain sprawl and to cater for orderly inward growth towards old Benoni and towards the existing infrastructure, the following areas are included in the zone of high pressure:

The area containing smallholdings to the north of Daveyton/Etwatwa up to Durandt Road including Putfontein, Putfontein Agricultural Holdings, Lilyvale Agricultural Holdings and Hillcrest Agricultural Holdings; the portion of the farm Knoppiesfontein 231R to the Northwest of Etwatwa, and the underdeveloped portion of the farm Modder East 721R to the south of Daveyton/Etwatwa, extending to the N12 and bounded by the Holfontein Road at the Benoni/Holfontein offramp. This zone of high pressure was identified for potential short-term growth.

The medium pressure zone was identified as that zone that lies directly next to the lower density residential areas and the commercial/industrial areas of Greater Benoni. It included the following areas: The mining land and the small holdings and farms other than those to the north of Sandpan and Bullfrog Pan, bounded by Great North Road and Pretoria Road. Of these areas, Van Ryn Smallholdings, the Gous Farm, the area to the east of Crystal Park to Springs Road and Rynfield Agricultural Holdings have an established service infrastructure. That is to say that the aforementioned areas are serviced with water, sewage and electricity in order for them to cater for future densification and growth.
The medium pressure zones further to the north have limited or no infrastructure, whereas the mining land has a partially established infrastructure from the days when mining was active in that area. The medium pressure areas have been identified for growth of the lower density areas, but because this growth is not occurring as rapidly as in Daveyton/Etwatwa, the availability of services is sufficient to cater for growth.

Benoni Agricultural Holdings, Marister Agricultural Holdings and the far northern part of Putfontein exhibit the lowest pressure for potential future growth and development. Due to the fact that the level of services in this area is generally low and that development is of an extremely low density, the area currently forms a suitable interface with neighbouring Bronberg to the north, and is identified as being suitable for development in the long term. These areas can be identified in Map 6, which depicts proposed residential areas in Greater Benoni.
What should be noted here is that the Council has taken these decisions on future developments on their own without involving the prospective inhabitants of these areas. Mr Harmse, the City Engineer of Benoni, reluctantly explained that the reason why the public was not involved in the process of identifying the areas, was that they were afraid that these areas will be flooded by squatters if the public was aware of such areas. Mr. Moyo, a former member of the Etwatwa Civic Association, now councillor, explained that his immediate concern was to see the existing Etwatwa informal settlements being upgraded to the status of a fully fledged township. He could not be drawn into discussing the proposed new areas.23

It should be noted that when the Department of the City Engineer and Planning of the Greater Benoni embarked on the process of identifying areas for residential development around Benoni, the communities of informal settlements to be relocated were only told to enlist for stands in new areas, including those who qualified for Government housing subsidy, who were living in the backyard shacks. The Councillors were involved in the process, but could not divulge the whereabouts of the identified areas, because of reasons put forward by Mr. Harmse. This therefore resulted in the majority of Etwatwa residents opting for in situ upgrading of the areas they occupied which they were familiar with, rather than starting a new life in an unknown area. These feelings were communicated to the Council through the Etwatwa Civic Association. Therefore it should also be noted that the majority of the people relocated to these new areas were backyard residents of Daveyton Proper, who saw this as an opportunity of finally owning their own houses.24
6.5 **Housing backlog around Daveyton**

In discussing the housing backlog, a distinction is made between urban and rural areas in South Africa. The urban housing backlog in South Africa was officially estimated by the national government at 1,92 million units in 1996. Based on the trend in population growth, the housing need was expected to increase at an estimated rate of 204 000 units a year. The urban housing shortage by province was estimated as follows (see Table 14):

**Table 14. Urban housing shortage in South Africa, 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL NEED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAUTENG</td>
<td>761 321</td>
<td>39,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAZULU-NATAL</td>
<td>391 897</td>
<td>20,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN CAPE</td>
<td>223 791</td>
<td>11,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN CAPE</td>
<td>195 632</td>
<td>10,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH WEST</td>
<td>113 560</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREE STATE</td>
<td>102 012</td>
<td>5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN PROVINCE</td>
<td>70 286</td>
<td>3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPUMALANGA</td>
<td>31 737</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN CAPE</td>
<td>29 764</td>
<td>1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1920 000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Housing: Annual Report, 1996.*
The backlog figure was derived from and based on the projections from the 1991 census. Gauteng was and is still facing the highest shortage of urban housing and the second highest is KwaZulu-Natal. The lowest urban housing shortage is found in the Northern Cape, primarily due to its large area and low population density.

The total housing shortage of 1,92 million units only refers to urban areas, since it was uncertain what could be regarded as acceptable housing stock for rural areas. Apart from people living in traditional housing in rural areas, approximately 300 000 households were living under unacceptable living conditions in the rural areas, taking the total estimated backlog to 2,2 million units.25

The year 1996 saw a substantial growth in the number of housing units delivered, indicating that the housing department's delivery was starting to perform in a significant way. Information received from the National Housing Department revealed that the housing shortage in South Africa at the end of June 1998 was estimated at 2,6 million units.

The housing backlog at the end of June 1998 in South Africa was obtained by adding to the urban housing shortage in 1996, the growth in low income households until the end of June 1998. Since this only included the urban backlog, the number of informal dwellings and shacks in non-urban areas were added to the backlog. The delivery of low income housing units was deducted to arrive at the backlog of 2,6 million units at the end of June 1998.26 (See Table 15)
Table 15. Housing shortage in South Africa, June 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL NEED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN CAPE</td>
<td>338 239</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREE STATE</td>
<td>132 323</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAUTENG</td>
<td>836 784</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAZULU-NATAL</td>
<td>473 214</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPUMALANGA</td>
<td>109 825</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH WEST</td>
<td>296 561</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN CAPE</td>
<td>20 462</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN PROVINCE</td>
<td>180 667</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN CAPE</td>
<td>215 642</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2 603 717</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Housing: Housing shortage in SA during June 1998

A comparison of housing statistics indicate a slight improvement in the delivery of formal houses from April 1994 to December 1998. The provision of formal housing was aimed at eliminating squatter settlements. Due to the cut in the budget on housing expenditure for 1999/2000, the promise of 1 million houses within five years seems unlikely to be fulfilled. This was also confirmed by the President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in his opening address in Parliament in February 1999 when he admitted that the Government might not fulfill its promise within the term of his office. In her address on housing in Nelspruit in October 1999, the
Minister of Housing, Mthembu-Mahanyele pointed out that more than 800,000 units of houses were completed or under construction. This therefore means that the Government is still far from addressing the 2.6 million housing backlog of 1998.²⁸

The small housing stock available and low and progressively decreasing rates of formal and informal housing in South Africa, have resulted in a massive increase in the number of households forced to seek accommodation as squatters in backyard shacks and overcrowded conditions.²⁹ Low rates of formal housing delivery coupled with high rates of new household formation, have resulted in a massive growth in the number of people housed in squatter housing. Low levels of income is a major factor contributing to squatter settlements.

In the area of Greater Benoni, including Daveyton/Etwatwa, there is a housing need of 70,000 houses and the backlog stood at 30,000 units in July 1999.³⁰ Unless the current low rate of housing provision is substantially addressed, it is estimated that the housing backlog will increase at a rate of about 178,000 units per annum.³¹ The magnitude of the housing and service backlog, and the rapid growth in housing demand present a mammoth challenge to future housing policy.

6.6 Recent actions to improve informal settlements at Etwatwa

In Daveyton/Etwatwa the range of incomes is very large. Although the average income of households in Daveyton/Etwatwa is similar to other
major urban concentrations, the percentage of poor people within Daveyton/Etwatwa is more than double that of, for example Soweto.\textsuperscript{32} Table 16 below indicates the income distribution for the entire Daveyton.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Bracket</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - R100</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R100 - R250</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R251 - R400</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R401 - R600</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R601 - R800</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R801 - R1 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1001 +</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source:} Greater Benoni City Council: March 1998

The minimum subsistence income per household in Daveyton/Etwatwa, especially in Etwatwa informal settlement, is considered to be approximately R450 per month. About 35\% of Daveyton/Etwatwa's population earn less than the subsistence level. This means that these people in most cases depend on the local and national governments for most of their basic needs including food and shelter. About 14\% of the households average monthly income is generated in the informal sector, like selling in the streets.\textsuperscript{33}

The general outcry throughout the informal settlements of Etwatwa is the provision of essential services and amenities which the community of
Etwatwa sees as being too slow. There is a growing number of inhabitants who are taking up the offer of subsidised low cost housing although the majority who are long established in Etwatwa, have opted to upgrade their existing structures.³⁴

In Greater Benoni, the Land Development Objectives drafted in 1997/98, deals with amongst other things the upgrading of infrastructure in existing informal settlements, particularly Etwatwa area.³⁵

Two considerations are central to developing a housing and infrastructure investment strategy. The first concerns the need and the ability of consumers to pay, and the second concerns the economic and social impact of development. Based on these considerations, housing and infrastructure investment programmes have been and are being developed in Greater Benoni for the benefit of Etwatwa residents.

The Benoni municipality is tackling the backlog in water, sewage, electricity and housing in three major ways. Firstly, it is reprioritising the budget to focus more on infrastructure investment in poorly serviced areas, especially Etwatwa. This means not only moving expenditures from the operating budget to capital budget, but also changing expenditure priorities within the capital budget from well serviced areas to poorly serviced areas. Secondly, the Benoni municipality is raising property taxes to provide additional funds for infrastructure investment but, there is reluctance to increase the tax because of the perception that residents and business will leave. Thirdly, the reliance on central government transfers remains an
important component of municipal finances of the Greater Benoni City Council.36

In Etwatwa, developments and improvements on infrastructure are visible, although the process is not proceeding according to the inhabitant’s expectations. This should be seen to be in line with the Greater Benoni LDOs, which prioritised areas earmarked for development as funds became available. The success of the LDOs will be judged after a period of five years starting from 1998, which will be in the year 2002.

The Greater Benoni City Council has compiled a land delivery programme which is mainly aimed at formalising or consolidating the informal settlements within the area, i.e. cutting of stands, registering, and providing stand numbers, establishment of streets and the provision of infrastructure to these areas. On the other hand people residing in unsuitable areas are being relocated to suitable areas within Benoni, where they are either given stands to build, or those on the waiting list are allocated houses under the Housing Subsidy Scheme. This formalisation and relocation which is monitored by the City Engineer's Department of the Greater Benoni City Council, takes place according to the priority list mentioned in the earlier chapter. This is an ongoing process, but internal reticulation of water and sewage in existing areas was completed in November 1999.37

The construction of roads and stormwater drainage as well as the upgrading of secondary and main roads is also an ongoing process, which is largely controlled by the availability of funds. Also included in this process is the
provision and upgrading of public transport infrastructure. Street lights, high mast lighting and electrification of informal settlements within and around Daveyton, especially in Etwatwa, is also an ongoing process undertaken by the City Engineer's Department in conjunction with Escom. Inside Daveyton a process to "rationalise" multi dwellings per stand is undertaken by the Community Services (Housing), where they encourage backyard shack dwellers to come forward and place their name on housing waiting lists. This process was started in March 1998. By the end of 1999 the majority of households in Etwatwa had been electrified, while upgrading and construction of roads and storm water still progressed. On the other hand the relocation of backyard residents to a new area between Benoni and Daveyton commenced in November 1999, and is still proceeding. The new residential areas are known as Chief Albert Luthuli Township. The formalisation of informal settlements in and around Daveyton is done according to the priority list compiled by the City Engineer and Planning Department, in consultation with the stakeholders and the communities involved. The following areas are involved in the formalisation process:

The areas on the western side of Daveyton known as Zenzele with an estimated number of 680 families, is to be formalised, but funds are still to be secured, because the application for such funds from the Eastern Gauteng Service Council was rejected in the 1997/98 financial year. The reason was that the area was on private land which had not yet been secured by Greater Benoni. The Greater Benoni Council has therefore applied for funds to purchase the land, formalise and provide essential services. This is expected to materialise when the 1999/2000 budget for Greater Benoni is
finalised in June 1999. Portion 100 (Putfontein 26) which is also known as Zenzele, has an estimated 2,020 families, and was initially on private land, but was purchased by the private developer in 1997. Formalisation is taking place as well as in situ upgrading of houses. This project is undertaken by private developers, namely Group 5, Minanawe and Wietpro. \(^{39}\)

Etwatwa Extension 16, commonly known as Kamashonisa, has about 1,600 families with an estimated overspill of 224 families. Funds for formalisation and essential services were secured from the Provincial Housing Board. The project is undertaken by the Greater Benoni City Council, and the sub-contractor is Capitol Hill Investments. One problem is that additional land of about 10.18 hectares is still required. Etwatwa Extension 17 and 19 with about 700 families respectively, and a combined estimated overspill of 123 families, also received funds from the Provincial Housing Board for formalisation and essential services in 1997. Greater Benoni City Council monitors the work of the sub-contractor, Capitol Hill Investments. These projects are supposed to be completed over a five-year period starting from March 1998. \(^{40}\)

Etwatwa Extension 18 has an estimated number of 1,600 families with an estimated overspill of 122 families. The project agent is the Highveld Regional Services Council which has applied, for funds for formalisation and essential services. Additional land of about 1.00 hectares is still required. Details of this area will be available when funds are secured. Extension 20, commonly known as Khombiza, has an estimated number of 1,000 families and an estimated overspill of 140 families. Funds for projects
of formalisation and essential services were also obtained from the Provincial Housing Board in 1997. The project agent is the Greater Benoni City Council (GBCC) and the sub-contractor is also Capitol Hill Investment. Extension 21, commonly known as Mandela Park, was allocated a sum of R368 035 by the GBCC for formalisation and essential services of 57 families. The services have been supplied and the process was completed by the Benoni Council in December 1998.41

The Chris Hani Township, with an estimated number of 4 452 families, was also allocated R14 850 000 by the Greater Benoni Council for the provision of essential services in the 1996/97 financial year. The project agent is the Greater Benoni Council, and the projects are to be completed over a period of five years, commencing March 1997. Additional land of 52,27 hectares is still required to accommodate all the families. Etwatwa Extension 25, 26, 27 commonly known as Barcelona, with an estimated number of 2 440 families, have yet to receive funds applied. These funds were applied for by the Greater Benoni Council from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP). Additional land of 56,36 hectares is still required.42

Mayfield Extension 1, commonly known Jacob's land, has an estimated number of 2 354 families, which occupied private land. Formalisation and the provision of essential services are in progress, undertaken by a private developer SADICO, but additional land of 13,14 hectares is still required. Extension 30, commonly known as Albertina Sisulu, has an estimated number of 518 families. This area was allocated funds amounting to
R3 167 680 by the Greater Benoni City Council for formalisation and essential services in March 1998. The process is still on, and is spread over a period of 4 to 5 years with additional land of about 1,14 hectares still required. Both Extension 31 and 32, also known as Barcelona, have a combined population of 5 191 families, were allocated funds amounting to R4 878 235 for formalisation only by the Greater Benoni City Council in the 1998/99 financial year. Extension 31 was allocated R5 250 000 for essential services by the Council, but Extention 32 funds have been applied for by the Council from the CMIP funding. The projects by the Council were scheduled to start in March 1999 spread over a period of five years, although additional land of 41,91 hectares is still required to accommodate all the families in these two areas. This process of service provision is progressing well, except that the processes of available funds is slow.

The figure below shows how Provincial Housing Board Housing Subsidies are determined in order to arrive at the total of a R15 000 subsidy afforded for people with a household income of between R0 - 800.
Source: Greater Benoni City Council: Housing Strategy, 1997

It should be noted that the houses build under the PHB housing subsidy in the 1998/99 financial year amounted to 12,347 units completed and under construction in the Etwatwa area. Funding allocated to the above amounted to R37 million. It should be noted that in the informal settlements in and around Daveyton still need in-situ upgrading. The relocation and overspill of homeless
people eventually need about 12,680 units, of which the land available for such purpose is about 447 hectares - a shortfall of 129 hectares. The council definitely has to purchase surrounding farmland before forceful invasion takes place. From the information received from the Council, private initiatives are yet to deliver 4,200 housing units around Daveyton. Units that will eventually be provided by the Council, will amount to 8,600 units.45

6.7 Community's Response

A random circulation of questionnaires was done to residents of informal settlements in and around Daveyton, and in most cases interviews were held with respondents, who are the heads of the households. This was mainly undertaken to establish the way of life of the squatters, their feelings about the place and progress, if any, on the efforts by the central provincial and local governments to improve their lives as citizens of the country.

Most of the people interviewed and who responded to the questionnaires, were people who were initially backyard residents or lodgers who were living in Daveyton Proper, Wattville or the surrounding farmlands. There is a large number of people who are from neighbouring townships outside the jurisdiction of Benoni. These people responded to the Mayor of Daveyton, T. Boya's announcement on television in 1986. He invited people who needed sites, to come to Daveyton. Many people grasped that opportunity and went to Daveyton. The bulk of these people ended up receiving sites in the mushrooming informal settlements around Daveyton. These people
were joined by illegal immigrants, who saw that as an opportunity to establish them by acquiring sites in the informal settlements. It should be noted that the bulk of these immigrants are currently in possession of the identity documents of South Africa and South African passports. They now own sites, have opened small businesses like welding, and some who have skills are even finding work in towns like Benoni, etc where they are prepared to be paid less than the local people.46

Initially when these people came to the informal settlements, they were allocated sites by the councillors at a fee of between R50 to R100, depending on the size of the site in areas like Etwatwa East and Etwatwa West, which were the first to be occupied. Later in the 1980's, because of forceful invasion of land which was prevalent throughout the country, the Civic associations were established. The civics eventually discarded the Council's principle of site allocation, and began to allocate sites on their own, and in some cases, encouraged homeless people to invade every seemingly available land.

Places like Etwatwa Extension 25, 26, 27, 31 and 32, commonly known as Barcelona, were products of forceful invasion, where people built shacks anywhere, anyhow. They even went so far as to bribe the Civics for a site. Recently in 1998, hooligans removed people from their shacks or demolished them for not paying to them a protection fee to live in the area, and allocated those sites to their friends and those willing to pay them.47

Mr. Talane, who is the Deputy Head of Greater Benoni Community and Social Services, pointed out that the Council was caught off guard by these
hooligans. The Council was still busy putting together a plan to formalise the area. In a community meeting called by the Council and the Etwatwa Civic Association in May 1998 to discuss the problem of hooligans, it was agreed by all in the meeting that police intervention had to be sought.\textsuperscript{48} Police have intervened. The Greater Benoni City Council has eventually completed its plan to formalise the area, and some funds have been allocated for the provision of essential services.

The trend was to build a small shack for shelter while the incumbent of the site started to build a proper structure. In places like Etwatwa East and West, where the "site and service" scheme mentioned in chapter 4, was implemented, the Council provided building material at a cost, together with a toilet. Most of their shacks were built by either using corrugated iron, wood, mud or cement blocks. This is still the case in most informal settlements. Those who could or can afford, have succeeded in building modern houses on their sites. This is evident in Etwatwa Extension 7.

Since the focus of the study was on the experience of the principal actors involved in informal settlements, i.e. residents of Etwatwa, it was decided to use in depth interviewing and household surveys. Etwatwa has been formalized into 19 sections, and as a result, a total of 380 households were surveyed, twenty from each section, spread evenly across a section. Preferably the owners of the shacks were interviewed. This is representative of all the areas or sections of Etwatwa.
It should be noted that respondents were interviewed individually. Confidentiality and anonymity was emphasised and respondent’s cooperation was voluntarily elicited with complete success in most cases. Where elected, respondent’s names and or addresses were not included in the interview records. Interview periods with individual respondents varied between 30 to 45 minutes including household surveys. The exercise was started in 1999 and completed in September 1999.

The following will show the response of people interviewed on the conditions they live in at Etwatwa:

Reasons for choice of informal housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land/housing shortages elsewhere</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to employment</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal considerations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to transport routes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-affordability considerations elsewhere</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors influencing choice of specific settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land/housing shortages elsewhere</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space considerations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to employment/transport, etc.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumventing legal obstacles</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives/friends already resident in area</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced relocation/eviction/removal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordability considerations / free sites</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Source of information on location of settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A friend</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/relatives</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A work colleague</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relevant authority</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A community leader</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Period of residence in specific area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Residence</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 5 years</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – 5 years</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 2 years</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1 year</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Is person/entity being paid for use of land?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The person/entity being paid for use of land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobody being paid</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black owner/landlord/resident</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A local authority 5  
Other 2  

**Facilities available to the Community**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared external water and toilet</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudimentary toilet</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pot latrine</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No toilet</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cost to construct dwelling**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1001 or more</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R901 — R1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R801 — R900</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R701 — R800</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R601 — R700</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R501 — R600</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R401 — R500</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R301 — R400</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R201 — R300</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R101 — R200</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under R101</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing (e.g. took over existing shack)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Constructional material**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrugated iron</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixture including some bricks</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of iron, wood, plastic</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mud</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Average size of dwellings in square metres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mid points of ranges</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>± 26 sq m</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 24 sq m</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 16 sq m</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 12 sq m</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 4 sq m</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Number of people occupying dwelling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 or more people</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 people</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 people</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 people</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 people</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 people</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 people</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 people</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 people</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 people</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 person</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Are services paid for separately?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What services are paid for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t pay</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse removal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/sanitation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Composition of sample by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondent age profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61 years or older</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 – 60 years</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 50 years</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 40 years</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 30 years</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years or younger</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondent employment profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Employment profile by sex and formal/informal activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed in formal sector only</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal sector plus informal sideline</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector employment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No employment at all</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(includes women supported)

### Place where respondent spent largest portion in life up to age of 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban city/township</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland rural farm/tribal area</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White rural farm</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland town</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White rural town</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Housing expenditure on essentials, e.g. foodstuffs, paraffin, candles, gas, water, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over R400 per month</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R201 – R400</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R101 – R200</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R51 – R100</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under R51</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maximum amount respondents are prepared to pay for accommodation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount Prepared</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R51 per month or more</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R46 – R50</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R41 – R45</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R36 – R40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R31 – R35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R26 – R30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R21 – R25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R16 – R20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11 – R15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 6 – R10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under R6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondent housing/accommodation preferences assuming means and choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional house in existing township</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New conventional house in new township</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A white area in city</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A white suburb</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another squatter area</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amount prepared to pay towards services if area was upgraded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount Prepared</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over R51 per month</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R26 – R50 per month</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under R25 per month</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondent education profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post school qualification</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8/9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Grade 7</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey conducted at Etwatwa: April-September 1999.

From the response of the inhabitants interviewed, a sense of relief and pride can be inferred, especially amongst those who were lodgers and backyard residents, who now occupy their own sites. If means allow, they will build their own houses without the control of the landlords. The general outcry throughout these informal settlements is the provision of essential services and amenities which they see as being too slow. Again the high rate of crime features prominently throughout the informal settlements in and around Daveyton, and these people would like to see more police stations being built.

The dominant motivations for living in an informal settlement or informal housing are the lack of housing alternatives, proximity to employment and space consideration, i.e. existing formal housing is overcrowded.
Surprisingly, however, rather few respondents were principally motivated by financial concerns, therefore shack accommodation is not chosen because of its relative cheapness, but because of the lack of shelter.

Generally, information leading to choice of a particular area emanated from social or kin networks of respondents. It was evident from the survey that the overwhelming majority of respondents had been in the urban area since long before influx control was abolished. The shack dwellers are most certainly not very recent migrants. Over fifty percent spent their childhood in a city or town linked to a township. Just over one third are people of rural origin.

Most significantly, the survey showed that the Etwatwa informal settlements are overwhelmingly composed of people who were in metropolitan areas before influx control was abolished. A maximum of 3 out of 10 moved to their present addresses after influx control was abolished, and virtually all came from metropolitan townships and neighbouring farms. Even people of rural origin did not move directly to the present area from the rural areas. Virtually all these people were in urban areas before pass laws were abolished, the dates of their migration being evenly spread over the fifties, sixties, seventies and early eighties.

The shack dwellings tend to be reasonably substantial as informal structures, costing an average of some R200 or more to build. Obviously, however, the costs involved bear no comparison to the price of formal housing. The main construction type is wood and iron, frequently with
additional materials. Increasing use of commercial built "zozo" type huts is apparent. Generally, it would seem that respondents either pay a structure rent or pay a site rent, except for those who pay nothing at all. Under 20 percent of respondents have their own rudimentary toilets, about 60 percent have the use of a shared toilet and the rest appear to make do as best they can. Just over a third enjoy some form of refuse collection, and nearly eight out of ten have access to a shared source of portable water. Generally, however, services are most unsatisfactory.

The shack structures themselves, at an average of 19 square meters, are well under half the size of the typical basic formal B51 type of house of 49 square meters. Thus the shacks are cramped and crowded even by township standards. They most certainly do not represent sound value for money seen in comparison with rental and service charges for existing formal housing.

The shack households in Etwatwa have relatively young breadwinners (± 35 years old on average), two thirds of whom have worked in an urban area for five years or longer. They are largely unskilled or semi-skilled with over two thirds having less than Grade 10 education, (the average educational level is Grade 7). The average monthly income of the 6 out of 10 is not very low, averaging R385 to R400 per month. The shack dwellers are poor by standards, but do not exist in utter deprivation. Furthermore, a clear majority are not marginal to the formal economy of the region. It must be borne in mind that there is a marginal category of shack dwellers who have no income, and probably exist on charity, as well as others who earn less than R100 per month. The proportion would be estimated at some 15
percent or slightly higher for the total adult population. These people cannot afford to pay for housing.

Among the unemployed respondents, a good deal of informal sector activity occurs. Informal sector activity can roughly be divided between informal commercial activity, being trades and machine operators, who earn substantial amounts (from ± R750 - R6 000 per month), and petty operators who have no skills, and who earn between R100 and R300 per month. The informal sector, however, is clearly a vital component of informal settlement economies. A small but significant proportion of employed respondents have additional informal sector income.

The shack dwellers do not appear to be enthusiastic about paying higher accommodation costs for formal housing. The survey indicated that they are prepared to pay an average of only slightly above what they pay for their current accommodation. The clear majority would like formal housing in a planned township, but they are not attuned to the cost implications. They do, however, appear to value good services sufficiently highly to declare themselves able to pay roughly R50 per months towards these services (water and lights).

There seems to be a keen awareness of the problems associated with density and crowding since nearly 6 out of 10 express unhappiness at the thought of an increase in the size of their existing communities. Given the fact that shack structures are very densely clustered, this is not surprising. In the informal settlement at Etwatwa, shacks are literally built back to back, a
situation prevalent in most informal settlements in all townships in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. The broad analysis of expenditure patterns (transport, food, accommodation) in relation to income, suggest that the bulk of shack dwellers would find it difficult to afford conventional new township housing, although it would not be impossible, given the opportunity for extra income from lodgers, backyard shacks and the government subsidy.

Reviewing the outcome of the survey, it is indicated that there are many shack households, frequently headed by women, who are unemployed (about 47 percent) and living in or on the edge of destitution. These households are marginal to the economy of the region, and require to be viewed as a category with special needs. The majority however, although poorer than formal township-dwellers, are integrated into the formal economy of the city and have income to spend on housing. They are in an informal settlement, not because they are socio-economically marginal, but because of a massive shortage of housing.

As mentioned earlier, the Greater Benoni City Council has embarked on the process of formalisation, relocation and provision of houses, although the process is slow. This is the case because housing delivery depends on the availability of funds, and is impeded by budget constraints. On the other hand, the Council had to upgrade existing structures and facilities before embarking on new projects. These normally need thorough planning projects which are in most cases spread over a period of five years.
6.8 Conclusion

In Etwatwa East there were no houses in 1988. There were shacks and temporary prefabricated buildings. There were no flushing toilets, taps or electricity, and there was one tap per street and one bucket system toilet that was shared by more than four families. The residents of Etwatwa East mostly came from neighbouring White farms or plots, e.g. Varkfontein, Holfontein, Delmas, Babsfontein, etc. These are the lowest income earners in the area, and they are not well educated and lack skills. Most men in this area work for building construction companies as labourers, and women are mostly domestic workers. These people are happy to be in Etwatwa East because they say it is better than living on the farms or plots. They also like the place because the sites are bigger than those in Etwatwa West, and they are now used to the place.

The other group in Etwatwa East consist of people who came from the backyards of Daveyton proper and other surrounding Black townships. They are more sophisticated than the first group, and they are used to town life. They are residing in Etwatwa East as a last resort as they could not find houses at their previous place of abode. Fortunately, the area is in the process of being upgraded, and more services are coming their way, although at a slow pace.

In Etwatwa West there are sites with houses or shacks, and the area is different from Etwatwa East, because there are flushing toilets, taps on each
and every stand. However, electricity is still a problem in some parts of the area. The sites are smaller than those of Etwatwa East, and their shacks are temporary because they have started to build houses. Some of the houses have been completed, and some are semi-finished or at the foundation level. Most of these residents were afforded the self help scheme, and they seem to like the area because they own the sites. These residents earn better wages than those at Etwatwa East. They come from Daveyton Proper and have been living in the backyard shacks for many years. Although they seem to be satisfied with this new township, they still have problems with the lack of services. The area has been flooded by informal settlements, and the Council has to provide services to those informal settlements. As mentioned earlier, the Council is busy with the formalisation of the area and the installation of services. What is now left to the residents of Etwatwa as a whole, is to start paying fully for services provided so that the Benoni Council can speed up the provision of services, as these are dependent on the availability of funds.

The experiences of the inhabitants of Etwatwa East and Etwatwa West are similar in many ways to the experiences of squatters in Africa and Latin America, when it comes to site and service schemes and in situ upgrading. In 1981 for example, the population of Metropolitan Manila was approximately 7 million, 40 percent of which was informally housed. The Dasmarinas Bagong Bayan (DBB) site and service scheme was planned to accommodate squatters dislocated through upgrading projects in Manila in 1983. The DBB project was administered by the National Housing Authority (NHA). The development included walkways and roads, wells
and water tanks, a drainage and sanitation system, street lights and a rudimentary electricity supply. Housing materials were supplied through the Housing Material Loans Programmes and a building supply store for self-help construction.\textsuperscript{52}

These measures were also undertaken at Etwatwa. The only difference was that the Daveyton City Council had to do almost all the work to meet the massive needs of the Etwatwa residents. There was some help for some developers, and non-government organisations did come forward.

Overall, the DBB project showed considerable success in reaching its target group of very low income families, as it also provided for balanced community development and the ongoing improvement of the settlement, which can also be said about the site and service scheme of Etwatwa. This is revealed by the reluctance of the residents of Etwatwa to be relocated to subsided housing schemes, but prefer in situ upgrading of the sites they already occupy.

The same can be said about the Lusaka experience in Zambia. In Lusaka, post-independence housing policy based on standards set in the colonial era, failed to address the shelter needs of the urban poor. Homeless people did not have access to public housing and lived around the fringes of Lusaka in illegal, unsafe shanty settlements in 1982. The Lusaka Upgrading Project was therefore developed, combining site and service schemes with in situ upgrading, and aimed at relaxing official housing standards, while improving the housing conditions of nearly 40 percent of the city.
There were several positive features about the Lusaka upgrading project. It was effectively administered and implemented by the Housing Planning Unit within the Lusaka City Council, and in Etwatwa the process is monitored by the Community Social Service within the Greater Benoni City Council. Overall, the project in Lusaka succeeded in providing sites and shelter specifically for the poor, like the projects undertaken at Etwatwa, which are slowly proving to be a success in improving the living conditions of the informal settlement communities.
Chapter 6

References

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4. N. Harris: Urbanisation in Developing Countries: A World Overview, p. 5.
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16. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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34. Etwatwa Survey (S.S. Malinga): April/September 1999.
36. Ibid.
38. Greater Benoni City Council: Land Development..., p. 28.
39. City Engineer Department: Benoni: Housing strategy, p. 3.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 10.
43. Ibid., p. 11.
44. Interview: B van Zyl: Co-ordinator LDOs, 14 January 1999.
45. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
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52. Urban Foundation: Informal settlements, p. 42.
53. Ibid.
CHAPTER 7

7. AN EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AROUND DAVEYTON

South Africa's history of urban development established precedents and norms, which position the society very badly to cope with the rapid growth of a growing and poor urban population. It is a history of controlled settlement and closely administered Black urban development with marked colonial characteristics. The approach of accommodating community choices and accepting the necessary developments and housing standards which flow from such choices, is a relatively recent development in the political culture of decision makers.

It is clear from interviews conducted for this study with officials at various levels of the administration, that the consultative approach has not effectively penetrated down to the level of the officials who work at the interface with Black urban communities. The acceptance of this is, however, starting to emerge at central and provincial level and among professionally qualified local officials as well.¹

The present phase in urban development, therefore, is one in which an incompletely transformed culture of official decision-making is attempting to cope with a formidable backlog in the delivering of urban shelter, which is in itself the deliberate consequence of past policies. The culture of decision-making has not yet adapted nor has the machinery of administration. Until the early 1980s the administrative machinery was geared towards a reduction of the numbers of the Black urban population.
The old administration boards, later development boards, would not have been capable to cope with the current expansion of urban Black populations. Furthermore, from 1982 onwards these boards were anticipating their eventual demise, and at the same time the Black local authorities were established without anywhere near adequate staffing and budgets. Hence the abolition of influx control in 1986, which allowed the mounting pressure of the need for urban shelter and services to manifest itself, occurred at a time of administrative transition, flux and in some cases breakdown.²

The present situation, as reflected by conditions in Daveyton/Etwatwa and other townships in South Africa, is one where a virtual explosion of manifest urban population needs coincides with these problems of administrative transition. The system has not yet coped. Authorities at central level have chosen to delegate powers to officials at lower levels (provincial and local) in the hope that problems could be solved on the ground. This delegation has been to new institutions, which have yet to establish working procedures, or it has been to institutions like local authorities, which experienced serious problems of credibility, finance and expertise after 1994. Hence the crisis was in many ways deepened.³

Under these circumstances it is not surprising, although unfortunate, that divisions of the national housing and services management system have taken over co-ordinating roles in attempting to rescue the situation from the disarray into which it has fallen. For instance, the Gauteng Housing Department could not release funds to the Greater Benoni City Council to upgrade and improve Etwatwa before the LDOs were completed by the Council.
The emergence of informal or shack development is very clearly not only the consequence of the abolition of influx control. It is pre-dominantly the manifestation of a growing pressure of numbers which legislative changes allowed to become visible, and it also has a historic dimension. The Greater Benoni area, like the rest of the PWV region, has an urban growth problem, and a housing problem, not an urbanisation problem. The vast majority of shack dwellers are city born or have been in the neighbouring areas. Some of them have been on the housing waiting list for some years, and when invasion of land appeared, they jumped onto the bandwagon in order to provide themselves with shelter. 4

There are a number of problems and trends associated with informal residents that have emerged in Daveyton/Etwatwa. While the initial cost of structures is not high (+ R200), the cost of accommodation to the shack-dwellers is very high for what they get. An average of over R50 per month is paid either in structure rental, site charges or service charges, but 20 percent or more pay nothing at all, or only nominal amounts. The average size of a shack is under half of that of standard township housing, while most shack dwellers have access to a shared water source. Only a small minority have adequate toilets and bath facilities. 5

Another major problem is density of shack development. Shack dwellers complain of the high density of settlements and would not welcome additional developments on their sites or in their settlements. The shack development in Etwatwa and the rest of the Rand is generally of lower standard, and much more crowded than in Greater Durban or the
Winterveld. The main reason is simply a lack of appropriate space. It is for these reasons, among others, that almost all shack dwellers aspire to a formal house in a lasting informal settlement or new township. This therefore supports the idea of *in situ* upgrading by the local government, since the amount they declare themselves willing or able to pay, is well under the cost of a new formal house.

Shack dwellers in Etwatwa as a group, are not akin to vagrants or a fringe group with little hope of becoming self supporting urban dwellers. The majority are integrated into the economy, have formal jobs and form part of the working class without recognised and serviced shelter. In terms of breadwinner and household income, those in formal employment, while poor, are not drastically worse off than formal township dwellers. Incomes are some sixty to sixty five percent of that in formal township houses.

A major problem in shack settlement is that the unemployment rate appears somewhat higher than in the formal township, a problem to a degree alleviated by informal sector employment. This problem is not as pronounced among men, than amongst female heads of households, among whom unemployment and under-employment exceeds fifty percent. This is a category of mainly female shack residents often responsible for children, which is marginal to the economy and almost destitute. Some 10 to 15 percent of shack dwellers are too poor to afford more than the most rudimentary housing.

An assessment of major elements of household expenditure among some of the shack-dwellers, suggests that they can afford to pay more for housing.
than they are willing to pay, although family budgets are highly constrained by heavy dependency.\textsuperscript{10} The major issue in the lives of Etwatwa residents is that of housing. There are surprisingly few complaints about other aspects of urban living, relatively speaking.\textsuperscript{11} Their housing problems are so serious as to eclipse other issues. The level of grievances about housing, as well as a perception of considerable corruption at local level associated with housing provision (under-cover payments for access to sites, over-priced sales by local officials of building materials, etc.),\textsuperscript{12} suggests that unless matters improve, more land invasion will take place in places earmarked for low cost housing.

7.1 \textbf{Summary and Conclusion}

Until recently, the official low-cost housing policy in South Africa consisted of the construction of public housing units, that is low and high rise structures built according to certain specifications. The other aspect of this policy was the demolition of squatter structures. One of the problems with regard to public housing in developing countries, like South Africa, is that it requires substantial subsidisation due to the low rent paying capacity of the population, but in most of the developing countries, the use of subsidies on any significant scale is restricted because of the limited funds available.\textsuperscript{13}

Since financial resources are more or less fixed in the short-run, it is only when these resources are expanded through economic growth that the need for housing and other basic services can be met from public funds. Thus most developing countries attach a greater priority to the more productive sectors of the economy such as agriculture, manufacturing industry and transport, which increase output and thus generate income and capital
formation. In the field of social services, housing tends to be accorded a
deeper priority than education and health, and is usually allocated only a
small proportion of total public expenditure. The government of South
Africa has recently cut its spending on housing, which will translate to more
homeless people living in informal settlements like Etwatwa, because less
low cost houses will be built which are meant to house the homeless from
informal settlements.

Under a policy geared to the construction of public housing, it has been the
almost universal experience that official housing is unable to keep pace with
urban population growth. The inevitable consequence, therefore, is that the
housing backlog continues to increase. There is a more important way in
which public housing does not solve the problem. It fails to reach the people
for whom it is intended. A series of World Bank studies revealed that even
the cheapest new housing provided by governments is not affordable by low
income households. Under reasonable repayment terms, between one-third
and two-thirds of those households cannot afford the cheapest public
housing. Such schemes, therefore, exclude not only the poor, but also many
middle income families. Since there is also a housing shortage for the
middle income group, it is this group which tends to take over public
housing originally intended for lower income households. In Etwatwa, the
majority of residents have opted to remain on the sites they occupy, and they
prefer in situ upgrading of their shacks. They allege that they cannot afford
to move to low cost housing, because they are too expensive to maintain.

The second component of the traditional approach, namely the demolition of
squatter settlements, also created more problems than it solved. In addition
to involving a reduction in the existing stock of housing, demolition involved harassment of the squatters. This was no solution since the squatters had to live somewhere, and they merely relocated their structures elsewhere in the urban area. Unless alternative housing was provided simultaneously by the authorities, demolition and harassment were part of a policy in which there were no winners. The authorities did not win because the shacks reappeared elsewhere, and the squatters did not win because of the inconvenience they suffered. In Etwatwa, for example, squatters invaded an area which was meant for low cost housing by the South African Housing Trust. The Daveyton City Council, with the help of the police, demolished the shacks, but that did not solve the problem because the squatters invaded another area of Etwatwa. In 1990 the very same area evaluated was forcefully invaded, and the Council had no option but to develop the area by providing essential services.

Squatter areas have typically been regarded by governments as havens of unemployment, crime, disease, etc. However, beginning in about the mid-1980s, empirical studies in developing countries showed that that attitude could not be supported. On the contrary, these studies revealed that squatter settlements provided housing, which was often of a substantial quality; housed a substantial number of people; engaged in the wage sector even including professionals; provided considerable local employment opportunities of a productive nature through the operation of the informal sector, notably in construction; provided incomes which were sometimes higher than in the wage sector, and had not given rise to the outbreak of any epidemic. This led the Daveyton City Council in 1987 to accept in principle that squatting was a legitimate means for homeless people to
provide shelter for their families, and therefore established a site and service scheme at Etwatwa to accommodate lower income families and the homeless.\textsuperscript{21}

The 1970s saw a substantial change in emphasis in development and planning in developing countries. In no sector of the economy was this more marked than in housing. By the early 1970s, the views of a small group of officials and researchers could no longer be rejected. The evidence was irrefutable, because conventional government housing programmes for low-income families could not keep pace with the urban population increase. Moreover, the housing that was provided was too costly for the target groups. Instead, low-income groups or households tended to congregate in squatter settlements in which they provided their own shelter.\textsuperscript{22} Although such shelters did not meet official standards, it was often substantial. It suited the pockets of the poor, and it could be improved as and when required by changes in family size and financial circumstances. When the South African government stopped the construction of four roomed houses in townships like in Daveyton in 1970, there developed a housing backlog in Daveyton resulting in the emergence of informal settlements in the 1980s. That was how Etwatwa was born.

During the 1980s the promotion of the concept of upgrading existing informal settlements, was commenced in developing countries, particularly in South Africa. This was a policy response to the fact that more than seven million people were living in informal settlements in and around South Africa's urban areas, and clearly most of them could not be moved. Historically the \textit{in situ} upgrading of informal settlements was not an
accepted practice in South Africa. In Daveyton for instance, the Daveyton City Council initially adopted the policy of demolition, but in the 1980s reality prevailed when they accepted squatting in principle. This was despite the high social and financial costs involved in adopting alternative approaches by local governments. The idea was rejected by local governments, because they did not approve of informal settlements and they had to be demolished. Upgrading of informal settlements in South Africa was undertaken by non-governmental organisations like the Urban Foundation in e.g. Inanda Township near Durban, or by the South African Housing Trust in Etwatwa, to mention a few. In effect this led to the destruction of many informal settlements and the removal and relocation of residents with insufficient provision of alternative accommodation.

In other countries e.g. in Latin America where the governments intervened in this way, squatters often found themselves unable to afford the alternative housing options provided, and most were forced to settle illegally elsewhere. Official housing projects were often located far from job opportunities on the peripheries of cities, and poor families had no option but to abandon their new accommodation in favour of better located squatter settlements closer to urban centres. Policy makers had to re-evaluate these approaches and consider the potential of in situ upgrading of existing informal settlements. This was a trend that was followed by most councils in South Africa in the 1980s, but a lack of funds by the Councils proved to be a drawback, since the culture of non-payment of services had manifested itself in most townships. Hence non-governmental organisations like the Urban Foundation, took the lead in upgrading informal settlements.
In situ upgrading of informal settlements and incremental housing are closely related. In the case of in situ upgrading of informal settlements, the starting point of an upgrade programme is the existence of informal dwellings in a location. The upgrade process entails the provision of infrastructure and services such as roads, water and sanitation, and also in principle improvements in dwellings (sometimes called the top structure) on sites that have already been settled. Incremental housing also involves the provision of infrastructure and services to sites. The difference lies in the addition of a modest top structure as part of the package provided to households. The basic idea in developing incremental housing is that additions and improvements to the top structure can be made gradually over time as the household gains the means to do so.25

This study focused on the role the local government played in the provision of infrastructure and services, while the upgrading of dwellings was left to households in Etwatwa. The new government which came to power in 1994, adopted an incremental housing policy as a component of a strategy to house the poor at national level. It was unclear to the inhabitants of informal settlements in Etwatwa whether the policy concept applied to circumstances of in situ upgrading or whether only greenfields development were compatible with the policy. The government eventually introduced subsidised low cost housing meant for the poor. The majority of informal settlers in Etwatwa preferred in situ upgrading and were not prepared to move. They put forward that the sites in areas of low cost housing were small, and they could not afford the movement to those areas, because of the social stability they have created in Etwatwa. The sites at Etwatwa East were three times bigger than the sites of the low cost houses.26
Both approaches made the crucial assumption that housing was not merely a product but also a process, and that the householder had a crucial role to play in homebuilding. It assumed that conventional housing for the poor could not be provided immediately, and set in motion a process in which with initial support, the householder could eventually build an improved informal dwelling or conventional home using domestic resources, such as labour, time and savings, as these become available. This approach projected the possibility of gradually improving the physical and social conditions of households within sustainable communities to be eventually integrated into a wider urban framework. This proved to be a proper approach in as far as Etwatwa East is concerned. In 1989 the Daveyton City Council allocated sites to the homeless people in Etwatwa East, and the people were allowed to erect temporary shacks to reside in, while on the other hand the owner was building a formal structure. The people of Etwatwa East, who could eventually afford the building of some formal structures with the passage of time, were integrated to the wider urban framework, although shacks still existed.

Once an informal settlement has been upgraded, in-situ, it does not differ fundamentally from a settlement where housing has been delivered on an incremental basis. The challenge in both cases is to ensure that the settlement is developed further over time until it is integrated with surrounding formal settlements, and acquires all the public goods and services that any conventional township enjoys. It must attract the necessary private investments to create jobs, and develop a commercial sector, etc. The Daveyton City Council and later the Greater Benoni City Council
encouraged these developments by putting aside a number of sites for commercial use. This paid off because the survey conducted for this study has revealed these sites are now utilised for small enterprises.

The conventional housing delivery system in the country has proved incapable of matching the demand for housing. A simplistic view poses the problem as an elementary policy choice: whether to direct resources of the state to the production (or financing of the production) of mass state housing programmes to place poor households in formal, conventional housing, or whether to subsidise these households into basic accommodation, namely serviced sites with a very modest starter house, which can be improved incrementally over time. The government has chosen the latter. In reality of course, the simple policy polarisation between mass formal housing and incremental housing neglects the fact that a variety of housing policies and strategies are needed to deal with a complex and diverse set of housing needs. In Etwatwa West, the site and service scheme introduced by the Daveyton City Council has proved to be a success. The area is now integrated into the urban framework, displaying a number of modern houses for those who can afford it.

However, arguments in favour of the incremental approach question the ability of the government to finance a programme which aims at placing every eligible household in conventional housing at the rate and scale required. The incremental housing approach is also not without controversy. As already indicated, the strategy hinges around the contention that by assisting households to access the most basic accommodation, the government can do two things. It can spread available public resources as
widely as possible rather than concentrating most of its resources on a limited number of beneficiaries. Secondly, it can engage the resources of a range of actors (individual households, non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, the private sector, etc.) to improve the quality of this accommodation over time. In Etwatwa West especially Extension 7, there are a number of modern houses built by the private sector and this has greatly improved the quality of life of those people.

The gradual improvement of the physical condition of housing following the provision of basic infrastructure and services, has been referred to as "consolidation". In-situ upgrading of an existing informal settlement, and also upgrading of accommodation that follows greenfields site and service development, both require consolidation to improve the quality of life for their residents. However, this study recommends that a wider process of development, which extends beyond the mere improvement of the physical condition of infrastructure and accommodation, is needed to create viable communities out of informal settlements. Ultimately, the concern with informal settlement upgrading should be to initiate a process by which not only physical, but also family and social development can take place in a continuous manner, namely that a sustainable development process is set in motion as is happening in Etwatwa and Daveyton.

The creation of sustainable communities in upgraded settlements requires not only the building of adequate and properly serviced houses but also the provision of such amenities as schools, clinics, recreational facilities and open spaces. Sustainable development depends also on the integration of the
community into a wider city through access to employment opportunities and services and through full involvement within its systems of governance.

Ultimately for an upgrade programme to be successful, it should initiate a process of development through time, which leads to the gradual and continuing improvement of individuals, households and built environment, not only for the present, but also for future generations. In Etwatwa, a number of amenities such as schools and clinics have been provided, although still not sufficient, and recreational facilities are still lacking, but promises have been made by the department concerned for future provision of more of these facilities.

The overall purpose of this study was to examine a South African case study of the experience of informal settlements (in established and new informal settlements), to determine whether or not these policies implemented by the local government in Etwatwa were in fact mobilising the resources required to provide for the needs of the poor, and thus answer the broader question of whether or not the type of incremental housing delivery was an acceptable and effective part of an economically viable and more generally sustainable national housing strategy. Generally it was found that the residents of Etwatwa were not prepared to move to low cost houses and preferred in situ upgrading of the areas they accommodated. However, efforts by the Greater Benoni City Council to upgrade the area of Etwatwa were appreciated by the residents, although their main complaint was that the process was slow.28

Whereas there seems to be broad recognition among authorities of the reality of informal settlements, and of the need to upgrade health and safety
conditions in those settlements, there is still a perception that existing informal settlements are somehow temporary, and that their residents should be relocated into formal housing projects once these become available. 29

Services delivery in informal settlements is a viable option for housing the poor at the rate and scale required, but it should be accompanied by a consolidation programme that aims at improving living conditions, and ultimately integrating informal settlements into the broader, formal urban and regional system. Unless the poor and homeless can see the longer term benefits of such an approach, it will be unpopular, and unless the state can ensure that programmes for sustainable development are set in motion, it will yield little but floods of dissatisfied informal settlers. In Etwatwa, consolidation programmes are in place, especially in areas like Barcelona, where the formalisation of sites is taking place.

It is essential that informal settlement upgrading is the first step in a long term programme of incremental improvement, and that the gains of existing service delivery programmes are followed by further and continuous improvements.

There is no doubt that the provision of services to informal settlements (whether in-situ or of new settlements) will remain a critical element of South Africa's development challenges for decades to come. In a developing country context, however, South Africa is widely regarded as the beacon of hope in a gloomy area, in that it has both the experience and means to resolve its so-called squatter challenges. At an international conference on urban land management and informal settlements in Abidjan in March 1995,
it was concluded that South Africa may well provide the world's best example of how to respond to the informal housing challenge.³⁰

There are several reasons why it is critically important for South Africa to be successful in rising to the challenge: the improvement in the quality of life of South Africa's poor and homeless is important both for its own sake, and for the sake of political stability, in the wake of the expectations that have been created by political democratisation. Numerous surveys conducted in Africa have shown that the essential services provided through informal settlement upgrade, together with the alleviation of unemployment, are the top material priorities of the poor. This suggests that upgrading should also be a key political priority together with the started provision of low cost housing.³¹

With rapid urbanisation and the spectacular growth of informally housed populations from the 1950s onwards, many governments in developing countries reacted to shack settlements and their occupants with hostility. For reasons that were fundamentally political, such settlements were treated as a blight that had to be removed. Thus an international way of forced squatter and slum removals disposed thousands of their housing. Major clearance programmes took place in Venezuela, Nigeria and the Phillipines in the 1950s, in Brazil, Tanzania, India and Senegal in the 1960s and 1970s and in South Korea and Zimbabwe in the 1980s.³² This was also the trend followed in South Africa, but this eventually subsided in the 1980s, especially in Daveyton/Etwatwa when the Daveyton Council accepted in principle that squatting was a legitimate way of housing the homeless.
By their very nature, removals have been disruptive and confrontational. Worse, the trauma has in many cases been futile, as removed communities have re-established informal settlements on the removal site or land elsewhere in the same urban area. Forced relocations have not always been limited to the provision of alternative housing, but many clearance programmes in the 1960s and 1970s were associated with public housing initiatives in South Africa. Whether as a means to rehouse removed informal settlers, or as a strategy to provide new housing for the urban poor, public housing programmes in developing countries had a very poor record of performance generally. It has failed to deal with the scale of housing required. In addition, this housing tended to exclude the poor. In short, in the majority of cases where this option was tried, public housing programmes have failed to address the housing crisis. In Etwatwa and Daveyton, public housing has not yet met the housing needs of the homeless. The majority of Etwatwa residents have opted for in-situ upgrading, since they allege that low cost housing will be expensive for them to maintain as mentioned earlier.

Removal persists in many countries, but has become increasingly discredited as a tool of housing policy. The inability of the governments of most developing countries to reverse the tide of informal housing has led to an international review of the negative policies that were pursued most vigorously in the 1950s and 1960s. Encouraged by agencies such as the World Bank, many governments turned their attention to site and service schemes and to the in-situ upgrading of informal housing. There was considerable optimism in the 1970s that "self help" in site and services schemes would provide an answer to the shelter crisis in the developing
world. In retrospect, the site and service process showed considerable promise, although they delivered mixed success. Where the "self help" method in the site and service scheme in Etwatwa West was highly successful,\(^{34}\) the achievements of others such as in Vashi, New Bombay were diluted by several problems.\(^{35}\)

Indeed, evaluations of site and services schemes established in various parts of the world highlighted several common difficulties. There has been widespread disappointment concerning the slow rate of consolidation in many site and service schemes. International experience revealed that there were factors like the provision of secure tenure, access to small loans for home improvement and the degree of community mobilisation, which were central to the success of consolidation in site and service schemes, but which were not always present. Although site and service schemes in general proved to be more accessible for the poor than public housing, they were nonetheless criticised for being unaffordable for significant segments of the urban poor. Hence in Etwatwa there are still shacks, and residents are unable to build proper structures.\(^{36}\)

There is substantial evidence of "down market raiding", a situation when land intended for the urban poor was occupied by people of a higher income group. The result was that often only a small proportion of sites were occupied by income groups for whom they were initially intended, for example Etwatwa Extension 7, which was occupied by a middle income group, whereas Etwatwa was meant for the poor and unemployed. Because most schemes require that regular payments be made both to redeem capital costs as well as to meet service charges, the schemes tended to exclude those
who did not earn regular incomes. The affordability problem is further worsened by the fact that, because of high metropolitan land prices, site and service schemes were often located in remote areas on the urban periphery, thereby imposing substantial transport cost on residents.  

Criticism of site and service schemes must, however, be seen in perspective. Many of the difficulties could be resolved by placing such site and service schemes in the context of a broader housing strategy and by actively pursuing ways to ensure a policy context in which the site and service scheme option is affordable, and all forms of support are fully mobilised. Down market raiding for example, is often attributable to the fact that other residential land is being neglected, or underdeveloped. In Etwatwa, for example, an area meant to accommodate the poor and the homeless, the authorities of the Daveyton City Council decided on their own in collaboration with developers to set aside Etwatwa Extension 7, 8, 9 and 10 for middle income groups. The homeless forcefully invaded those extensions accusing the Council of not catering for the needs of the poor and homeless, as the middle and higher income groups were also allocated sites in Daveyton Extension 2 and 3 respectively. With reference to affordability and support, there are now growing calls for appropriate subsidisation and the facilitation of broad private sector involvement.  

Alongside site and service schemes, in-situ upgrading has won increasing international support as a key element of national housing policy in developing countries. Following the site and service advocacy of the 1970s, the World Bank shifted its funding emphasis towards the upgrading of existing informal and slum housing, and many subsequent World Bank
projects combined site and service schemes with upgrading initiatives. Numerous countries throughout the developing world adopted upgrading programmes, and at least two (Indonesia and Tanzania) had national upgrading programmes in the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike site and service, upgrading does not produce new units of shelter. It is simply a process where conditions in existing residential areas are improved with limited displacement and disruption of the community. 39

In Africa, early impetus in situ upgrading was provided by the success of a massive upgrading in Lusaka in 1982. The World Bank supported the process and concluded at the time that upgrading in Lusaka made a much larger contribution to the satisfaction of basic needs for infrastructure, services and shelter than all the other housing strategies combined. This is not to suggest, however that the upgrading project proceeded without problems. One of the most important consequences, was poor cost recovery. In the 1980s, the acceptance of upgrading spread to Kenya and to Zimbabwe as well as South African townships, especially in Etwatwa. 40

In general, the international experience suggested that in situ upgrading was able to assist people lower down the income spectrum better than the site and service schemes, because unusually high housing densities could be achieved. There were also savings in land costs, since there would be no need to purchase new land. Savings were derived from local community mobilisation in service installation and operation, and spontaneous informal settlements tended to be reasonably well located with respect to work and consumption opportunities, and transport costs for residents were often much lower than in peripheral site and service schemes. 41 In Etwatwa, two
schemes were introduced by the Daveyton City Council i.e. the site and service scheme in Etwatwa West and self-help schemes in Etwatwa East. These schemes have been successful, because they cater for the employed and the unemployed.\textsuperscript{42}

While the international experience of \textit{in situ} upgrading is more limited than site and service projects, it would appear that upgrading has a better potential of meeting the shelter needs of the urban poor. However, some common difficulties facing \textit{in situ} upgrading should be noted, i.e. that relocation may be necessary in densely settled areas; securing tenure may be difficult and complex; upgrading is difficult in some localities, and essential community participation may be obstructed by government opposition to local mobilisation.\textsuperscript{43} For example in Etwatwa \textit{in situ} upgrading could not take place in the Barcelona area as it first had to be formalised. Only then could services be provided. This resulted in relocation to other areas within Etwatwa.

There are many lessons to be learned, but site and service schemes and \textit{in situ} upgrading are gaining international acceptance as the most positive and pragmatic way to ensure that the urban population in developing countries have real access to safe and affordable housing, without the stigma and insecurity of illegal squatting. It might be argued by critics of the site and service schemes and \textit{in situ} upgrading that these approaches to housing delivery condemn participants to live in shacks forever. At best such criticism is only partially valid, since international experience has shown that squatters in many cities have in fact been transformed over time, often to become virtually indistinguishable from neighbourhoods with formal
housing, e.g. "Sector Popular" in Mexico City. The area of Etwatwa West can no longer be distinguishable from a neighbourhood with formal housing, especially Extension 7, which is now a fully fledged township with formal houses.

The process of formalisation and transformation has also been termed consolidation, and in an informal settlement context, it refers to the acquisition of legal tenure, the incremental replacement of shacks by more permanent dwellings constructed with orthodox materials, the installation and improvement of services and the establishment of social and commercial facilities. It includes the decriminalisation of squatter communities, and their incorporation into the political and social structures of the city. Since consolidation is the core of many site and service schemes and in situ upgrading initiatives world wide, it must be noted that these strategies are explicitly designed to help participants move beyond shacks, which are simply the first step in a process of incremental shelter upgrading. Based on the international experience with other policy approaches, it is evident that the failure to embrace informal housing has slowed down or even reverted to consolidation, for example by demolition or neglect, and that this failure has been a key factor sustaining permanent shacking. In areas like Barcelona in Etwatwa, an area forcefully invaded in the 1990s, formalisation is still taking place, as the areas were initially neglected by the Council. In the 1998/99 financial year, the Greater Benoni City Council started the process of formalising the areas, a process which is still in progress with the help of the Community and the Etwatwa Civic Association.
International evidence suggests that a crucial determinant of consolidation in site and service and in situ upgrading initiatives in developing countries, is the extent of community participation in the formulation, construction and management of projects. Participation has been found to influence both the initial success projects and the sustained consolidation of both structures and communities. It also has a potential to transform communities by allowing access to decision making, by facilitating organisations around issues of local concern, and by promoting political awareness and the potential to influence policy. The success of the above has been observed at Etwatwa, although the local government authorities were late to involve the community in decision making, but things are starting to shape up, to the benefit of the inhabitants.

It is clear that whilst the different levels of community participation have various consolidation and community benefits, the realisation of the full spectrum of these benefits will be difficult in cases where strong interests are likely to resist the possibility of empowerment. The World Bank suggested that the facilitation of community action leading to empowerment is only viable when the objective is clearly supported in official policy. In Etwatwa the Greater Benoni City Council has in principle since 1997 accepted that in situ upgrading is a viable option. This was as a result of planning and negotiations between the Council and the community of Etwatwa. The Council wanted to relocate some families in congested areas within Etwatwa to low-cost houses. The majority of the families opted for in situ upgrading than relocation, arguing that they could not maintain the low cost houses, let alone paying for services. Hence the Council accepted in situ upgrading when funds become available.
Whilst it is folly to seek to transfer projects and housing related initiatives from one country to another without reference to socio-political and cultural contexts, a number of substantial themes emerged from the housing experiences of developing nations. Each of these is relevant to deliberations on housing policy in South Africa, but the extent to which lessons are taken depends in part on the willingness of policy makers to look seriously at the positive aspects of international experience and their determination not to repeat the mistakes.

At the level of practical implementation, there are still many lessons to be learned. Early experiments with managed informal housing have not been universally successful, and numerous problems had to be resolved. However with past experience, a diversity of supporting initiatives have begun to emerge in a number of developing countries. These are innovative and constructive responses representing a growing maturity in the development of informal housing delivery processes. In South Africa, discussion around the role and potential of informal housing has yet to gain momentum. The study is fully aware of the complexity of the issue and the diversity of perspectives that underpin current thinking. However, several key realities should inform further debate.

Informal housing is a major component of the residential fabric of South African towns and cities. Viewpoints envisaging the rehousing of all or most of these people, will have to come to terms with the scale and fiscal consequences of the programme that is implied. It is incorrect to see people in informal housing as a uniform and separate subgroup of the urban
population. Organisation and interaction in and around informal settlements is inhibited by the insecurity and vulnerability of many communities. Conflict is frequently a result of these factors. There is often a politicised struggle to secure scarce resources.

What does the international experience mean for South Africa? At one level it illustrates the striking convergence of housing policies among countries that share with South Africa a large informally housed population, and an initial reluctance to incorporate informal housing into broader housing policy. It also provides insight into the factors determining success and failure among housing initiatives of various kinds. For instance, the 1950s saw the demolition of informal settlements and mass production of public houses, the four roomed houses, which saw the birth of Daveyton, and which in the 1970s proved to be insufficient to accommodate the growing numbers of urban Blacks. This eventually led to a housing backlog and the mushrooming of informal settlements throughout South Africa, including Etwatwa. However, it would be a mistake to seek policy and programme blueprints internationally for the following reasons: The legacy of our past policies adds a unique dimension e.g. the relaxed mode of influx control added to the growing list of the homeless. Support for a housing policy with informal housing as a key component cannot be taken for granted. Informal housing has come to symbolise exclusion for many South Africans, and disorder and anarchy for others. If it is to gain broad support, a new policy will have to be widely discussed and debated, and not unilaterally imposed.

The survey conducted at Etwatwa has identified some important points in as far as Etwatwa housing delivery is concerned. The positive gesture was the
Council's willingness to listen and understand the plight of the inhabitants when it came to relocation. The community opted for in situ upgrading, and the Council eventually conceded. This resulted in minimal relocation, which was appreciated by the community. On the other hand, while in situ upgrading continued, the Council embarked on building low cost housing for those who qualified, and were willing to take up the subsidy in places like Etwatwa East and Chris Hani. This has proven to be positive steps towards alleviating the housing problem. The responsibility now lies with the community to start paying for services rendered.

There are some close parallels between the present phase of urbanisation and the last years of influx control. The Government is aware of the fact that the present housing delivery system is not yet sufficient to control settlement patterns in Daveyton/Etwatwa. The government agencies may not have formally recorded all the shacks, but they are aware of the fact that there are probably more people unhoused than the numbers of those in the shacks they have counted.

The problem for the Government, especially the local government, is that a negative response, similar to that which emerged in relation to the relaxation of influx control, has become increasingly problematic, i.e. forceful invasion of land. An appropriate response would be massive land purchases for controlled site and service, self help in situ upgrading and low cost housing, both in areas which emerged as models of informal housing like Etwatwa, and in other areas determined by the work locations of majorities of shack dwellings. Such land would have to be added to the land already identified for new Black housing development.
There is therefore a need for a unique policy process in South Africa, informed by events elsewhere, but negotiated locally among all actors whose interests are at stake.
Chapter 7

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APPENDIX

Etwatwa Survey: S.S. Malinga: April - September 1999

The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information about the living conditions of the residents of informal settlements in and around Daveyton. The information received will be used for study purposes only. It would therefore be appreciated if you could take a few moments of your time to answer the questions below:

1. In which area of Daveyton do you stay?
   [  ] Etwatwa East
   [  ] Etwatwa West
   [  ] Barcelona
   [  ] or Name your place ............................................

2. Where did you live before you came to your area?
   [  ] Backyard
   [  ] Lodger
   [  ] Daveyton proper
   [  ] Wattville
   [  ] or Name other place ............................................

3. How long have you lived in your present area?
   [  ] Less than 5 years
   [  ] More than 5 years
   [  ] or Specify the year of your arrival ......................

4. Why did you move into your area?

   Explain:
   .....................................................................................
5. Which type of building material did you use to build your house?

[ ] Corrugated iron
[ ] Wood
[ ] Mud
[ ] Cement blocks
[ ] Bricks
[ ] Other .................................................................

6. Where did you get your building materials for your house?

[ ] Free               [ ] Council
[ ] Previous home     [ ] Other
[ ] Bought

7. How much did it cost to erect or build your house?

R..........................

8. What is the total number of people living with you? .................

9. How many rooms do you have? .................

10. Do you have a toilet on your site?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] or Explain .................................................................

11. Did you pay money to get a site?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] or Explain .................................................................

12. If yes, how much? R.........................
13. To whom did you pay the money?

[ ] Council
[ ] Councillor
[ ] Civic
[ ] Other ....................................................

14. Who allocated sites in your area?

[ ] Yourself  [ ] Civic
[ ] Council  [ ] Other .........................
[ ] Councillor

15. How was the allocation of sites in your area?

[ ] Fair
[ ] Unfair
[ ] or Explain ....................................................

16. Are you happy or unhappy about your site?

[ ] Happy
[ ] Unhappy
[ ] or Explain ....................................................

17. Below is a list of some essential things in life (basic needs). How important do you regard each of the following items?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>LESS IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ELECTRICITY</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARRED ROADS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. Which basic aspiration is most critical to your household needs? (Spontaneous response: then prompt first there in ranked order by the number next to it).

1. Bigger house/more rooms
2. Improved water supply
3. Better sanitation
4. Electricity
5. Bigger yard
6. Telephone

Spontaneous .................. 1st 2nd 3rd

19. Basic needs most critical to your community: (Spontaneous response the prompts first three in ranked order).

1. Tarred roads
2. Neighbourhood schools
3. Neighbourhood clinic
4. Taxi/Bus rank
5. Post Office
6. Street lights
7. Police Station
8. Community security
9. Recreation facilities
10. Shopping facilities
11. Public telephones
12. Crèches
13. Housing
14. Churches
15. Private telephones

Spontaneous .................. 1st 2nd 3rd

20. List the most positive aspects of living in your area. (Spontaneous response: then prompt first three in ranked order).

1. Good community spirit
2. No political intimidation/violence
3. No criminal activity
4. Better facilities
5. Close to work
6. Close to town
7. Own my land/house
8. Next to main routes

Spontaneous .................. 1st 2nd 3rd
21. Which of these facilities are available in your area?

- [ ] Tarred roads
- [ ] Primary school
- [ ] Secondary school
- [ ] Clinic
- [ ] Police Station
- [ ] Shops/Tuck shop
- [ ] Post Office
- [ ] Recreation facilities
- [ ] Public telephone
- [ ] Private telephones
- [ ] Créche(s)
- [ ] Church
- [ ] Electricity
- [ ] Sewerage
- [ ] Refuse removal
- [ ] Taxi/bus rank

22. List the most negative aspects of living in your area. (Spontaneous response: then prompt first three in ranked order).

1. Poor community spirit
2. Lots of political intimidation and violence
3. Lots of criminal activity
4. No proper infrastructure
5. Don’t own land or house
6. Lack of basic facilities

Spontaneous ...................  .......  .......  .......
1st  2nd  3rd

23. Is life in your area as good as you thought it would be, when you came to live there?

- [ ] Yes, it is even better than I thought
- [ ] Yes, it is as I thought it would be
- [ ] No, it is not as good as I thought
- [ ] No it is far below what I expected
  or Explain ..............................................................
24. Who must supply the infrastructure in your area, e.g. water, sewerage, electricity, road, etc.?

[ ] Greater Benoni City Council
[ ] Civic
[ ] South African Government
[ ] other/Explain ...............................................................

25. Are you prepared to pay for essential services provided?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] Explain .................................................................

26. How is the provision of essential services, roads, water, electricity, sewerage and schools in your area?

[ ] Excellent
[ ] Good
[ ] Sufficient
[ ] Poor
[ ] Very poor

27. How is the provision of amenities, e.g. sportsgrounds, halls, parks, etc. in your area?

[ ] Sufficient
[ ] Insufficient
[ ] or Explain

28. What improvements or developments would you like to see in your area? List them:

.................................................................

.................................................................

.................................................................

.................................................................
Name: .................................

Residential Address: .................................

Telephone number: .................................

Biographical Information:

1. **Sex**
   - [ ] male
   - [ ] female

2. **Age**
   - [ ] 16 - 30
   - [ ] 31 - 40
   - [ ] 41 - 50
   - [ ] 51 - 60
   - [ ] Above 60

3. **Home language**
   - [ ] Southern Sotho
   - [ ] Tswana
   - [ ] Xhosa
   - [ ] Swazi
   - [ ] Tsonga
   - [ ] Other

4. **Education/qualifications**
   - [ ] Sub A - Std 1
   - [ ] Std 2 - Std 5
   - [ ] Std 6 - Std 8
   - [ ] Std 9 - Std 10
   - [ ] Above Std 10
5. **Vocational Status**

- [ ] Employed
- [ ] Unemployed
- [ ] Self employed
- [ ] Student

6. **Type of employment**

- [ ] Domestic servant
- [ ] Labourer
- [ ] Contractor
- [ ] Hawker
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Driver
- [ ] Teacher
- [ ] Policeman/woman
- [ ] Nurse

7. **Working place**

- [ ] Daveyton
- [ ] Etwatwa
- [ ] Springs
- [ ] Benoni
- [ ] Farm
- [ ] Other

8. **Mode of transport to work**

- [ ] Bus
- [ ] Taxi
- [ ] Own vehicle
- [ ] Walk
- [ ] Train
- [ ] Other

(Thank you for your time and contribution)