Die filosofie en die bewerking van kontekste
- Authors: Pauw, Jacobus Cornelis
- Date: 1983
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Philosophy
- Language: Afrikaans
- Type: Doctoral Thesis
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/17852 , uj:15931
- Description: The root metaphor of this dissertation is that items of knowledge are as foci against a background:, a situation which it calls a contextual relation. Truth, meaning and justification are impossible outside a context. In terms of this epistemology, the view is defended that Philosophy is intrinsically concerned with the f amily of skills which we use in treating knowledge contexts. The treatment of contexts is a polymorphous practice and includes describing, creating, analyzing and ordering contexts. reforming, In Part One, the above view is introduced and the epistemological angle for treating the nature of Philosophy is defended. The origin of the leading theory of knowledge of this dissertation, namely contextualism, is expounded and in the process arguments against rival epistemological. paradigms are brought to the fore. At the same time, it is argued that holisrn is not compatible with the true aim s of contextualism. In Part Two, the concept context is analized. The ways in which truth, meaning and reality are related to contexts are discussed. It is found that context should not be regarded in substantialist terms and that an attempt at a linear ordering of all contexts is a highly unpromising endeavour. In Part Three the meaning o f "the treatment of contexts" is illustrated by taking Plato's Theory of Forms and Quine's attack on the two dogmas of empiricism as particular examples. In Part Four, the model put forward in the dissertation is applied in a discussion of the nature of Philosophy and the teaching thereof, as well as the the question of the possibility of a final context. , D. Phil. (Philosophy)
- Full Text:
- Authors: Pauw, Jacobus Cornelis
- Date: 1983
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Philosophy
- Language: Afrikaans
- Type: Doctoral Thesis
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/17852 , uj:15931
- Description: The root metaphor of this dissertation is that items of knowledge are as foci against a background:, a situation which it calls a contextual relation. Truth, meaning and justification are impossible outside a context. In terms of this epistemology, the view is defended that Philosophy is intrinsically concerned with the f amily of skills which we use in treating knowledge contexts. The treatment of contexts is a polymorphous practice and includes describing, creating, analyzing and ordering contexts. reforming, In Part One, the above view is introduced and the epistemological angle for treating the nature of Philosophy is defended. The origin of the leading theory of knowledge of this dissertation, namely contextualism, is expounded and in the process arguments against rival epistemological. paradigms are brought to the fore. At the same time, it is argued that holisrn is not compatible with the true aim s of contextualism. In Part Two, the concept context is analized. The ways in which truth, meaning and reality are related to contexts are discussed. It is found that context should not be regarded in substantialist terms and that an attempt at a linear ordering of all contexts is a highly unpromising endeavour. In Part Three the meaning o f "the treatment of contexts" is illustrated by taking Plato's Theory of Forms and Quine's attack on the two dogmas of empiricism as particular examples. In Part Four, the model put forward in the dissertation is applied in a discussion of the nature of Philosophy and the teaching thereof, as well as the the question of the possibility of a final context. , D. Phil. (Philosophy)
- Full Text:
The epistemic status of psychological theories
- Authors: Retief, Alexis
- Date: 2014-05-19
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Psychology - Philosophy
- Type: Thesis
- Identifier: uj:11115 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10702
- Description: D.Phil. (Psychology) , In the first part of the thesis the need for theory development in psychology is sketched by a review of the relevant literature, thus justifying the necessity of theoretical research in psychology. The appropriate method for theory development - comparative metatheoretical analysis - is delineated, and situated against the background of two major approaches to theory development in psychology: the transcendental and the empirical. The key terms that form the basis of most of the analyses are defined, and the aim and scope of the thesis is briefly stated. The second part consists of a review of the competing philosophical views regarding theorizing and scientific inquiry in the social sciences, with the goal of developing an adequate metatheory for psychology. It starts with a historical overview of developments in the philosophy of science, emphasizing issues that are relevant to psychology. The development of scientific realism is reviewed, with a specific focus upon McMullin's empirical argument in favour of realism, and Bhaskar's transcendental justification of realism. It is also shown how realism was adapted by Bhaskar in order to suit the social sciences. Social constructionism the diametric opposite of realism - is then reviewed, as well as the intermediate positions of Manicas and Rosenberg, and Layder. These positions are all critically evaluated, and a choice in favour of a realism as the most appropriate metatheory for social science and psychology is made. In the third part of the thesis the principles of the realist position are developed further and applied to psychology. In this regard, a framework is developed to assess the epistemic status of psychology as a distinctive and legitimate social science, when seen in relation to the other social sciences. The implications of a stratified reality for psychological explanation is examined, and these implications are also linked to psychology' 5 distinctive subject matter and domain of investigation. The epistemic status of psychological explanation in relation to ordinary language accounts is examined, and the influence of stratification in psychological explanation is analyzed. A substantive realist position for psychology is then developed, which starts with a brief review of Manicas and Secord's realist position. The realist position developed has some differences in emphasis when compared to that of Bhaskar, most notably as far as the notion of structural explanation is concerned. Four theoretical case studies the theoretical debate between Guilford and Eysenck, Gustaffson 's structure-of-intellect theory, Campbell and Fiske's validational model,and cross-cultural ability research in Africa - are used to illustrate the thesis that psychological theories are in fact realist explanations aimed at approximating the causes of observed effects. This development of a substantive realist position is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the epistemic power of psychological theories. This analysis is initiated by distinguishing between various levels of causal explanation in psychology, and a framework of levels of causal explanation is developed and linked to the notion of explanatory power. The realist view of psychological theories also entails that psychological theories are seen as having certain epistemic characteristics, and these characteristics can also be seen as evaluative criteria. A model for theory evaluation in psychology is developed in which these criteria are subsumed, whereby theories can be evaluated according to two major axes of evaluation: an axis assessing the epistemic gains effected by any given theory; and an axis which assesses the influence of external factors (or the social domain) upon the epistemic status of a theory. The utility of the model is demonstrated by two applications: a preliminary assessment of Sternberg's theory of human reasoning, and an extended case study which charts the development of Festinger' s theory of cognitive dissonance, and which culminates in the evaluation of the theory. The epistemic gains achieved by the model for theory evaluation are discussed, and the thesis concludes with an afterword where the benefits and limitations of the investigation are discussed.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Retief, Alexis
- Date: 2014-05-19
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Psychology - Philosophy
- Type: Thesis
- Identifier: uj:11115 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10702
- Description: D.Phil. (Psychology) , In the first part of the thesis the need for theory development in psychology is sketched by a review of the relevant literature, thus justifying the necessity of theoretical research in psychology. The appropriate method for theory development - comparative metatheoretical analysis - is delineated, and situated against the background of two major approaches to theory development in psychology: the transcendental and the empirical. The key terms that form the basis of most of the analyses are defined, and the aim and scope of the thesis is briefly stated. The second part consists of a review of the competing philosophical views regarding theorizing and scientific inquiry in the social sciences, with the goal of developing an adequate metatheory for psychology. It starts with a historical overview of developments in the philosophy of science, emphasizing issues that are relevant to psychology. The development of scientific realism is reviewed, with a specific focus upon McMullin's empirical argument in favour of realism, and Bhaskar's transcendental justification of realism. It is also shown how realism was adapted by Bhaskar in order to suit the social sciences. Social constructionism the diametric opposite of realism - is then reviewed, as well as the intermediate positions of Manicas and Rosenberg, and Layder. These positions are all critically evaluated, and a choice in favour of a realism as the most appropriate metatheory for social science and psychology is made. In the third part of the thesis the principles of the realist position are developed further and applied to psychology. In this regard, a framework is developed to assess the epistemic status of psychology as a distinctive and legitimate social science, when seen in relation to the other social sciences. The implications of a stratified reality for psychological explanation is examined, and these implications are also linked to psychology' 5 distinctive subject matter and domain of investigation. The epistemic status of psychological explanation in relation to ordinary language accounts is examined, and the influence of stratification in psychological explanation is analyzed. A substantive realist position for psychology is then developed, which starts with a brief review of Manicas and Secord's realist position. The realist position developed has some differences in emphasis when compared to that of Bhaskar, most notably as far as the notion of structural explanation is concerned. Four theoretical case studies the theoretical debate between Guilford and Eysenck, Gustaffson 's structure-of-intellect theory, Campbell and Fiske's validational model,and cross-cultural ability research in Africa - are used to illustrate the thesis that psychological theories are in fact realist explanations aimed at approximating the causes of observed effects. This development of a substantive realist position is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the epistemic power of psychological theories. This analysis is initiated by distinguishing between various levels of causal explanation in psychology, and a framework of levels of causal explanation is developed and linked to the notion of explanatory power. The realist view of psychological theories also entails that psychological theories are seen as having certain epistemic characteristics, and these characteristics can also be seen as evaluative criteria. A model for theory evaluation in psychology is developed in which these criteria are subsumed, whereby theories can be evaluated according to two major axes of evaluation: an axis assessing the epistemic gains effected by any given theory; and an axis which assesses the influence of external factors (or the social domain) upon the epistemic status of a theory. The utility of the model is demonstrated by two applications: a preliminary assessment of Sternberg's theory of human reasoning, and an extended case study which charts the development of Festinger' s theory of cognitive dissonance, and which culminates in the evaluation of the theory. The epistemic gains achieved by the model for theory evaluation are discussed, and the thesis concludes with an afterword where the benefits and limitations of the investigation are discussed.
- Full Text:
Towards a contextualist solution to the problem of expert testimony
- Authors: Cohen, Diilan
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Social epistemology , Knowledge, Theory of , Expert testimony
- Language: English
- Type: Masters (Thesis)
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/246126 , uj:25507
- Description: M.A. (Philosophy) , Abstract: Please refer to full text to view abstract
- Full Text:
- Authors: Cohen, Diilan
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Social epistemology , Knowledge, Theory of , Expert testimony
- Language: English
- Type: Masters (Thesis)
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/246126 , uj:25507
- Description: M.A. (Philosophy) , Abstract: Please refer to full text to view abstract
- Full Text:
Epistemologieë in die sielkunde : idees binne kontekste
- Authors: Combrinck, Maxie
- Date: 2014-08-19
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Psychology - Philosophy
- Type: Thesis
- Identifier: uj:12106 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/11850
- Description: M.A. (Clinical Psychology) , The point of view followed in this study is that people create, through dialogue, contexts of consensus in terms of their ideas. These cognitive contexts, of which they were co-creators, comprise their realities. Various, divergent theories exist within the field of psychology. In this study an' attempt was made to illustrate how, by means if the recommended point of view, it becomes possible to comprehend the simultaneous existence of different theories. By first dividing theories into two groups, namely linear- and circular epistemology, it was demonstrated that each epistemology has ideas of its own, as well as a language of its own, for conveying these ideas. Thereafter, it was suggested that epistemologists co-create their own contexts of reality with their ideas through the process of languaging about these ideas. In the light of this it was suggested that the idea of any epistemology or theory being regarded as a domain of cognitive consensus, which was co-created by the epistemologist/s, becomes viable.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Combrinck, Maxie
- Date: 2014-08-19
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Psychology - Philosophy
- Type: Thesis
- Identifier: uj:12106 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/11850
- Description: M.A. (Clinical Psychology) , The point of view followed in this study is that people create, through dialogue, contexts of consensus in terms of their ideas. These cognitive contexts, of which they were co-creators, comprise their realities. Various, divergent theories exist within the field of psychology. In this study an' attempt was made to illustrate how, by means if the recommended point of view, it becomes possible to comprehend the simultaneous existence of different theories. By first dividing theories into two groups, namely linear- and circular epistemology, it was demonstrated that each epistemology has ideas of its own, as well as a language of its own, for conveying these ideas. Thereafter, it was suggested that epistemologists co-create their own contexts of reality with their ideas through the process of languaging about these ideas. In the light of this it was suggested that the idea of any epistemology or theory being regarded as a domain of cognitive consensus, which was co-created by the epistemologist/s, becomes viable.
- Full Text:
Investigating collaborative knowledge construction in undergraduate education according to Tillema’s stage model
- Authors: Mdluli, Phindile Olga
- Date: 2012-08-27
- Subjects: Team learning approach in education , Tilema's stage model , Knowledge and learning , Knowledge, Theory of , Constructivism (Education) , Learning and scholarship
- Type: Mini-Dissertation
- Identifier: uj:3150 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/6568
- Description: M.Ed. , This study aimed at investigating collaborative knowledge construction in undergraduate education according to Tillema’s stage model The theories of Symbolic Interactionism, Pragmatism and Constructivism underpinned this minor dissertation. The problem which gave rise to the research was how to lessen the sense of isolation experienced by learners who have lecturers lecturing to them in huge lecture halls at Higher Education institutions in South Africa. A qualitative case study research design was deemed appropriate for the study. Data were collected by way of qualitative surveys, focus group and individual interviews, observations and collection of artefacts. The findings based on qualitative survey, focus groups and interviews and artefacts were recorded, observed and the data were discussed in terms of the learning theories commonly known as situated learning, deep and surface learning, emancipatory and transformational learning, collaborative learning, peer learning, study team learning and community of practice learning. The main findings were that students involved in study teams did engage in actions and activity, interacted with each other in and outside the classroom, challenged each other’s’ weak constructs about their subject knowledge, performed “learning tasks within relevant, realistic environments”, and shared their numerous different solutions to and versions of the same problems. They also made sense of their experiences when they engaged in actions and activities. In this way the study teams can be understood to have constructed knowledge socially and collaboratively. In terms of Tillema’s stage model for study team learning, the main findings were that participants challenged each others’ knowledge base and consequently acquired new knowledge by a respectful interaction with each other, despite the group dynamics which were evident. By the time they had identified the gaps in their knowledge and decided what to investigate further or to confirm what they knew and move to Tillema’s final stage, they were able to link inquiry to action and create useful practical outcomes. Finally in their co-construction of knowledge the participants were motivated by the need to present at a forum in front of peers and lecturers. Eliciting knowledge and beliefs, challenging existing knowledge and acquiring new knowledge and identifying gaps in knowledge and co-constructing knowledge - was applied to the findings and it was clear that the groups did construct knowledge collaboratively and their experiences could be described according to the stages of the model. The main recommendation from the study is that the process be expanded.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Mdluli, Phindile Olga
- Date: 2012-08-27
- Subjects: Team learning approach in education , Tilema's stage model , Knowledge and learning , Knowledge, Theory of , Constructivism (Education) , Learning and scholarship
- Type: Mini-Dissertation
- Identifier: uj:3150 , http://hdl.handle.net/10210/6568
- Description: M.Ed. , This study aimed at investigating collaborative knowledge construction in undergraduate education according to Tillema’s stage model The theories of Symbolic Interactionism, Pragmatism and Constructivism underpinned this minor dissertation. The problem which gave rise to the research was how to lessen the sense of isolation experienced by learners who have lecturers lecturing to them in huge lecture halls at Higher Education institutions in South Africa. A qualitative case study research design was deemed appropriate for the study. Data were collected by way of qualitative surveys, focus group and individual interviews, observations and collection of artefacts. The findings based on qualitative survey, focus groups and interviews and artefacts were recorded, observed and the data were discussed in terms of the learning theories commonly known as situated learning, deep and surface learning, emancipatory and transformational learning, collaborative learning, peer learning, study team learning and community of practice learning. The main findings were that students involved in study teams did engage in actions and activity, interacted with each other in and outside the classroom, challenged each other’s’ weak constructs about their subject knowledge, performed “learning tasks within relevant, realistic environments”, and shared their numerous different solutions to and versions of the same problems. They also made sense of their experiences when they engaged in actions and activities. In this way the study teams can be understood to have constructed knowledge socially and collaboratively. In terms of Tillema’s stage model for study team learning, the main findings were that participants challenged each others’ knowledge base and consequently acquired new knowledge by a respectful interaction with each other, despite the group dynamics which were evident. By the time they had identified the gaps in their knowledge and decided what to investigate further or to confirm what they knew and move to Tillema’s final stage, they were able to link inquiry to action and create useful practical outcomes. Finally in their co-construction of knowledge the participants were motivated by the need to present at a forum in front of peers and lecturers. Eliciting knowledge and beliefs, challenging existing knowledge and acquiring new knowledge and identifying gaps in knowledge and co-constructing knowledge - was applied to the findings and it was clear that the groups did construct knowledge collaboratively and their experiences could be described according to the stages of the model. The main recommendation from the study is that the process be expanded.
- Full Text:
The neoliberal rejection of Marxism : an analysis of method, freedom and social change on Marx’s terms
- Authors: Dampier, Graham A.
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Popper, Karl R. (Karel Raimund), 1902-1994 , Karl Marx, 1818-1883 - Criticism and interpretation , Neoliberalism , Social science - Philosophy , Knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Masters (Thesis)
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/410821 , uj:34496
- Description: Abstract: The purpose of this study is to analyse a neoliberal philosopher’s rejection of Karl Marx and his critique of capitalism. I focus specifically on the work of Karl Popper, a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society, which lay the ideological foundations for neoliberalism (Jones, 2012). I limit my attention to Popper’s dismissal of Marx in the process of exploring key concepts he contributed towards neoliberalism during its early stages. These concepts include (1) the unified scientific method, which seeks to collapse the distinctions between the natural and social sciences; (2) the argument that Marx’s use of the dialectic is consistent with Hegel’s and that he viewed social change as a linear step-by-step process that culminates with social revolution; and (3) the misconception that Marx believed that the transition to communism required a totalitarian system of government. In the process of analysing Popper’s critique, I present a close reading of Marx and his work to determine whether the Austrian philosopher studied his object of analysis closely and carefully enough to warrant the call to discard his contributions to philosophy and the political economy. My principle findings are that Popper often misrepresents Marx’s argument and frequently misreads his work. To be specific, I illustrate that Marx’s never attempted to develop a unified scientific method, but that he combines different conceptual domains to present a unique critique of capitalism. In addition, I elucidate not only what the implication of Marx’s departure from Hegel entails, but also how it manifests in his analysis of the concept of value. Finally, I explore Marx’s dynamic theory of social change, before setting out his views on totalitarianism, the Paris Commune, and participatory democracy. This serves not only to clarify some of the errors Popper makes, but also to present Marx and his work on his own terms. , M.A. (Philosophy)
- Full Text:
- Authors: Dampier, Graham A.
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Popper, Karl R. (Karel Raimund), 1902-1994 , Karl Marx, 1818-1883 - Criticism and interpretation , Neoliberalism , Social science - Philosophy , Knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Masters (Thesis)
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/410821 , uj:34496
- Description: Abstract: The purpose of this study is to analyse a neoliberal philosopher’s rejection of Karl Marx and his critique of capitalism. I focus specifically on the work of Karl Popper, a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society, which lay the ideological foundations for neoliberalism (Jones, 2012). I limit my attention to Popper’s dismissal of Marx in the process of exploring key concepts he contributed towards neoliberalism during its early stages. These concepts include (1) the unified scientific method, which seeks to collapse the distinctions between the natural and social sciences; (2) the argument that Marx’s use of the dialectic is consistent with Hegel’s and that he viewed social change as a linear step-by-step process that culminates with social revolution; and (3) the misconception that Marx believed that the transition to communism required a totalitarian system of government. In the process of analysing Popper’s critique, I present a close reading of Marx and his work to determine whether the Austrian philosopher studied his object of analysis closely and carefully enough to warrant the call to discard his contributions to philosophy and the political economy. My principle findings are that Popper often misrepresents Marx’s argument and frequently misreads his work. To be specific, I illustrate that Marx’s never attempted to develop a unified scientific method, but that he combines different conceptual domains to present a unique critique of capitalism. In addition, I elucidate not only what the implication of Marx’s departure from Hegel entails, but also how it manifests in his analysis of the concept of value. Finally, I explore Marx’s dynamic theory of social change, before setting out his views on totalitarianism, the Paris Commune, and participatory democracy. This serves not only to clarify some of the errors Popper makes, but also to present Marx and his work on his own terms. , M.A. (Philosophy)
- Full Text:
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »