EXPLORING HYDROPOLITICS AND EXPRESSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP: THREE COMMUNITIES IN MADIBENG, SOUTH AFRICA

by

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Dedication

I dedicated this work to Andries Tatane, *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela and everyone else who lost their lives or their loved ones in fighting for their human and democratic right to access sufficient water. These men did not lose their lives in vain. Through this study, I hope to contribute to the realisation of universal access to basic water services.

A luta continua, vitória é certa

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Abstract

This study set out to investigate forms of expression in the context of Madibeng Local Municipality hydropolitics, paying particular attention to Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Madibeng was an ideal location for this study because there is evidence that the local municipality has been struggling to provide water services. This has culminated in *toyi-toying* – one form of expression.

I adopted a qualitative research methodology underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. The primary data collection method was in-depth interviews supplemented by observation, field notes (journal entries) and photography. I selected twenty-seven participants purposively. Major findings point to the fact that the participants viewed water services as grossly inadequate – they indicated that their communities experienced rampant and prolonged water interruptions and poor water quality. They perceived the municipality officials as contributing to poor water service delivery through corruption and financial mismanagement of the local municipality. Water infrastructure in the community was noted to be worn and obsolete. In addition to this, I found that some participants held the view that citizenship spaces in the communities were on the decline: politicians highjacked community meetings, there was a rise in gangsterism, and some community members contested "good citizenship" practices like paying for water. While some community members favoured *toyi-toying*, a constitutional right, others did not, in fear of getting hurt, or worse, dying.

From the findings, I make three contributions to the body of knowledge: first, I provide a broadened definition of hydropolitics which moves beyond the macro-level to also include water politics as transpiring on meso and micro-levels; second, I contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics by giving an account of Madibeng hydropolitics paying attention to the experiences of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau residents; third, I present how the "new" South Africa is for some participants viewed as an exclusionary space as they withdraw from expression due to fear, coercion or duress, and coin the term *disengaged citizenship* to describe this social phenomenon.

Keywords

Anthropogenic Water Scarcity, Citizenship, Community Protest, Hydropolitics, Madibeng, Water, Human Right to Water, *Tenderpreneurs,* Water Apartheid

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Acronyms

AG	Auditor-General
ANC	African National Congress
BWTW	Brits Water Treatment Works
DA	Democratic Alliance
DWAF	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
DWS	Department of Water and Sanitation
FBW	Free Basic Water
FBWP	Free Basic Water Policy
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
HRtW	Human Right to Water
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
JOWAM	Johannesburg Water Management
KL	Kilolitres
L	Litres
MLM	Madibeng Local Municipality
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSP	Non-State Water Provider
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PSI	Private Sector Involvement
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAPS	South African Police Services
VBS	Venda Building Society
WMDs	Water Management Devices
WRC	Water Research Commission
WSA	Water Services Authority
WSP	Water Services Provider
WSSA	Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd

CHAPTER ONE

Introducing Citizenship and Hydropolitics in Madibeng

"A water-political order becomes institutionalised in a users' society only when it becomes integrated within its economic, moral and ideological structure. Laws cannot act; only societal forces can shape such change."
Unknown

1.1. Introduction

Watching live news on a local South African television station on 13 April 2011, I saw Andries Tatane die. He was assaulted and shot twice at point-blank range with rubber bullets by seven South African Police Service (SAPS) officers (CNN, 2011; eNCA, 2013; Dugard, 2016; Mashaba, 2020). This incident happened during a community protest in Maqheleng, a township in the Setsoto Local Municipality, Free State Province, South Africa. Tatane, together with 4,000 other Ficksburg residents, was protesting, or *toyi-toying*[1], as it is commonly known in South Africa, over poor service delivery of basic services, most notably water (Hattingh, 2011). He was a community leader, and his untimely death resulted from his altruism - he had been shielding elderly community members from a spraying police water cannon (Dugard, 2016: 1). While the excessive use of force and police brutality are not unique to South Africa (Gilmore, 2013; In on Africa, 2014; Hadebe and Gopal, 2019), Tatane's death drew widespread attention and condemnation as news channels captured it in real-time (Hattingh, 2011; van Schie, 2013).

Then, in 2011, I had been in South Africa for just over a year – having relocated from Zimbabwe. I could not fathom how such brutality could occur in the full view of South Africa and the rest of the world, for, among other issues, water. I could not comprehend how the "champion of democracy", South Africa, could let such a dehumanising act and a gross violation of Tatane's right to life happen. Tatane's death raised questions in me

[1] *Toyi-toyi* is a dance performed in Southern African. It originates from Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the 1970s.It has been used in protests in South Africa (Kellerer, 2017).

around the meaning of "citizenship", "citizenship rights", and ultimately, the "politics of water". The police officers responsible for his unjustifiable death were acquitted in March 2013 (Gilmore, 2013; SABC, 2013; van Schie, 2013).

My interest in citizenship and the politics of water would be re-ignited when SAPS officers again shot and killed protestors in another water-related community protest in Mothutlung and Damonsville (Madibeng Local Municipality, North West Province, South Africa) on 13 January 2014 (Bond, 2014; eNCA, 2014; Masombuka, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). The police used live ammunition during this incident (Moore, 2014). Michael Tshele (*alias Bra* Mike), a 64-year-old freelance journalist, and Osia Rahube, a 28-year-old mineworker, were shot dead at the protest scene (Davis and Lekgowa, 2014; De Vos, 2014; Seseane, 2014). In a case believed to be the silencing of journalists, unarmed *Bra* Mike died in action with his camera in his hands (CPJ, 2014). One of the participants who took part in this study, Andre, knew *Bra* Mike personally and could support the claim that *Bra* Mike was "silenced". He had seen pictures taken by *Bra* Mike showing shoddy repairs of pipes in the area. The following is an excerpt from my interview with Andre attesting to this:

> *Bra* Mike, a loyal Mothutlung resident, took pictures, and he found out that the Madibeng Local Municipality was not doing a proper job. He took pictures and showed them to some of us, saying how [the] Madibeng [Local Municipality] was repairing them was not good.
> (Andre, Personal Interview, September 2018)

The third victim, 27-year-old Lerato "Waap" Seema, subsequently died from injuries sustained after being thrown out of a moving RG-31 Nyala[2] (Maphumulo et al., 2014). The fourth, and last victim, was 36-year-old Enoch Seimela. He died in hospital six days after the protest due to injuries he sustained from police beatings (Nicolson and Lekgowa, 2014; SABC, 2014).

[2] An RG-31 Nyala is a 4x4 armoured personnel carrier vehicle carrying two crew and six passengers (Army Recognition, 2019).

The stories of Tatane and *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela highlight the importance of citizenship - both in rights and as an identity - within the context of post-apartheid South Africa. Unfortunately, such cases are not isolated, and these two cases got global media attention. Mulling over this, I began to ask how people in a democratic South Africa could lose their lives at the hands of the state in pursuit of their right to protest over their right to water. Protest is not the only form of expression – it is the broader experiences of residents in their struggle to access water services in the new South Africa that became an area of interest to me. I became particularly interested in how citizenship is expressed within the context of access to water and state provisioning in post-apartheid South Africa.

Before enrolling for my doctoral studies, I approached Professor Mary Galvin in 2016, who not only researches local water politics but has extensive experience as a development practitioner and social justice activist. We had three more meetings that year in which we discussed my fascination for the politics of water in contemporary South Africa. Professor Galvin also shared her work on the killing of the four people in the Mothutlung protest in the Madibeng Local Municipality, the challenges she encountered researching the area, and how she overcame them. She introduced me to Siphiwe Mbatha – a witty gentleman who had assisted her in her work in the municipality over the last couple of years. Mr Mbatha subsequently aided me in conducting the fieldwork for my study between 2018 and 2019. Professor Galvin co-supervised this thesis.

What follows in this chapter is a problem statement of the thesis leading to a brief conceptualisation of water politics, its scale and range, and then followed by the research question and objectives. I describe the research area, the Madibeng Local Municipality, indicating why it was the ideal location for this study. I move on to present the layout of the thesis providing summaries of each chapter in this thesis. I end this chapter with a conclusion in which I tie together the core arguments I presented.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Water scarcity is considered one of the most pressing problems confronting humankind's well-being in the twenty-first century (Mehta, 2003; UNDP, 2006). In South Africa, water scarcity has generally been attributed to natural and biophysical factors. As a country, South Africa is water-scarce (Kidd, 2009; Muller et al., 2009; Humby and Grandbois, 2010; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017) and is ranked as the 39th driest country in the world (AfricaCheck, 2017). South Africa has the third-lowest precipitation level in the Southern African region (IndexMundi, 2019). The impacts of the *el niño* drought in the country has been devastating in the post-2010 period. As one delves deeper into contemporary debates in water scarcity, some schools of thought argue that natural and biophysical factors do not wholly explain scarcity in the country; and say that the state can provide adequate water (Muller, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020). Several human-related factors constrain the country's ability to harness its water resources to benefit the whole population. Overstating the effects of biophysical and natural elements, such as drought and the effects of climate change, obstructs us from realising the cause of water problems, which are, in reality, human-induced (Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020).

The implementation of the policy of *apartheid* from 1948 to 1994 by the conservative National Party saw the application of "separate development" based on races (Mudiriza and Edwards, 2020: 6). Full citizenship rights were afforded to white people, while black people were relegated to being citizens of the bantustans as per the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act No. 26 of 1970 (Bulled, 2015: 543; Hobden, 2018: 2). Black people were stripped of South African citizenship and corresponding constitutional rights whether they lived in rural areas in the bantustans or slums in urban areas (Mamdani, 1996: Coovadia et al., 2009: 819; Hobden, 2018: 3). Compounding land dispossession, black people faced mobility and employment restrictions and inferior public education and healthcare (Seekings, 2011: 22). The implementation of apartheid further contributed to most black people experiencing high levels of poverty and inequality.

Income poverty was quite apparent as opulence mirrored high inequality, and inequality correlated with race (Seekings, 2011: 21). The African National Congress'[3] (ANC) election manifesto promised that "attacking poverty and deprivation" would be "the first priority of the democratic government" (Seekings, 2011: 22). One of the areas in which inequality was experienced was access to water (Sahle et al., 2019: 298). Pre- and apartheid water politics had resulted in about a third of the country's population, about 14 million people, not having access to a safe water supply, and more than 21 million people, half the population, lacking access to adequate sanitation services in 1994 (DWAF, 2004a: 4). Accordingly, asymmetrical access to water between the races was one of the core issues that the post-apartheid South African government needed to address (Tempelhoff, 2017: 200).

In a bid to redress poverty and inequality inherited by the democratic ANC-led government in 1994 and to establish a society based on social justice and fundamental human rights, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 was promulgated (RSA, 1996). Different scholars and commentators hail the South African Constitution to be one of the most liberal and progressive globally (BBC, 2014; Oechsli and Walker, 2015; Sahle et al., 2019). South Africa was one of the first countries in the region to have the right to water listed as a constitutional right (Soyapi, 2017: 14). The post-apartheid state's immediate efforts to improve water access were evident in its pursuit of universalising the Human Right to Water (HRtW). Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), the *Bill of Rights*, is "a cornerstone of South Africa democracy" that details socio-economic rights for everyone in South Africa – citizen or not. Section 27 (1)(b) states: "everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water". To operationalise the HRtW, the state implemented legislation and various programmes.

Before the 1994 elections, the ANC started implementing a welfarist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Bond, 2007; 2010; Nnadozie, 2011). The programme linked growth and equity, mainly through reducing extreme poverty and imbalances inherited from apartheid (Nleya, 2008: 270). The RDP document affirmed a

[3] The African National Congress is the ruling party in post-apartheid South Africa founded on 8 January, 1912.

commitment to reconstructing South African society and redistributing state resources (Chirwa, 2009: 183). The RDP ensured equality in accessing the state resources such as water, hence an active pursuit of the universalisation of the HRtW. The RDP's short-term aim regarding water services provision was "to provide all households with a clean, safe water supply of 20–30 litres per capita per day (lcd) within 200 metres". In the medium term, it aimed "to provide an on-site supply of 50–60 litres per capita per day" (ANC, 1994 in Sahle et al., 2019: 300).

Two years after the inception of the RDP, in 1996, the post-apartheid government abandoned it for a new macro-economic strategy – the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Nleya, 2008; Eloff, 201; Mosala et al., 2017). Under GEAR, basic service delivery was privatised in various ways, and cost recovery[4] methods were implemented. Policies on basic service provision were located within a neoliberal framework (McKinley, 2004: 182; Sahle et al., 2019: 300). Some of GEAR's neoliberal facets directly contradicted the provisions in the RDP (1994) and the Constitution (1996), which both fostered the universal HRtW (Sahle et al., 2019: 300). GEAR's shift from the RDP left indigent communities unable to pay for basic services very vulnerable. Under GEAR, citizens unable to pay for water services could have their supply cut once they had expended the basic minimum allocation. Policies that were implemented after GEAR in 2006+[5] have reflected the largely neoliberal stance of the South African government. This practice raises questions about the significance of citizenship as well as the realisation of the HRtW.

During this transition from the RDP to GEAR, the Water Services Act (WSA) No. 108 of 1997 was promulgated. This Act is the primary legislation regulating access to basic water and sanitation services. The Act deals with water for consumption and sanitation services to both households and other municipal water users by municipalities. A salient aspect of the WSA (1997) is that Section 1 (i) and (ii) define "basic sanitation" and "basic water supply":

[4] Cost recovery is recouping of costs incurred as the result of providing a service.
[5] These were Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (AsgiSA) (2006); the New Growth Path (NGP) (2010) and the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 (see van der Walt, 2007; Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017; Kgatkle, 2020; Mathonsi and Sithole, 2020).

> 2. Basic sanitation.—The minimum standard for basic sanitation services is —
> (a) the provision of appropriate health and hygiene education; and
> (b) a toilet which is safe, reliable, environmentally sound, easy to keep clean, provides privacy and protection against the weather, well ventilated, keeps smells to a minimum and prevents the entry and exit of flies and other disease-carrying pests.
>
> 3. Basic water supply.—The minimum standard for basic water supply services is —
> (a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and
> (b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month —
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (WSA, 1997)

In 2001 the state introduced the Free Basic Water Policy (FBWP). This policy entailed the implementation of a basic water allocation at the state's expense to support the HRtW, even for indigent households that could not afford to pay for water. The FBWP (2001) was finally given legal status by promulgating tariff regulations in June 2001 (Muller, 2008: 74). According to the FBWP (2001), the maximum free allocation for water per household was pegged at 6,000 litres (6 kilolitres) of water per month. This free basic allocation was calculated at 25 litres per person per day for a family of eight. This allocation was insufficient as it lasted less than half a month, with the household members using it sparingly (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 2). People without money had to wait until the next month when a FBW allocation was credited.

National statistics on access to basic water seem to demonstrate that the state has made remarkable progress in implementing the HRtW. From 2006-2018, access to municipal water increased from 77%-85% (Stats SA, 2019). An estimated 46% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings in 2018. A further 29% accessed water on-site, while 12% relied on communal taps and about 2% on neighbours' taps (Stats SA, 2019:

42). However, these figures do not accurately represent how citizens are experiencing water services as they do not reflect whether the taps produce water. Having access to water goes beyond having pipes, valves, and taps; people need water coming out of the taps. The main problem with water access statistics is that water infrastructure is a proxy for "access to water" (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019). Citizens' experiences of water services are complex and varied (Angel and Loftus, 2019). The problem of defining access in relation to infrastructure means that in some cases, citizens experience water cuts and disconnections that are not factored in. Furthermore, they may receive water of poor quality, and that will still be considered water provision.

There is considerable evidence supporting a growing sense of dissatisfaction by communities over basic services like water. The number of taps that could not supply reliable water increased by almost 2 million from 2011 to 2015 (Muller, 2016). Water access is still highly stratified along with the racial and class lines which dominated the apartheid era (Kemerink, 2011; Bayliss, 2016). Black people residing in rural areas (Muller, 2016; Mnisi, 2020) and townships (Muller et al., 2009) struggle the most with basic access to water. Whilst the infrastructure is physically present in some instances; there is no water coming out. This demonstrates the complexity associated with understanding access to water because, on the one hand, the state presents figures that tell a good story. There is a disjuncture between increases in access to water as per water infrastructure statistics; and people's actual access to water. This is evident two-fold. Firstly, municipalities' "good" rating for water service delivery declined from 73% in 2006 to 62% in 2018 (Stats SA, 2019). Secondly, there has been an increase in the "poor" rating for municipal water-related service delivery from 6.9% to 11% from 2006-18 (Stats SA, 2019). The reduction in the "good" rating and increase in "poor" rating between 2006-18 suggests that municipalities' water services to communities have progressively declined over the years. The citizenry's experience of water services in South Africa is critical in understanding their perceptions of the state's ability to provide and how they respond to the state.

Poor water services delivery in the post-apartheid landscape draws attention to the roles of municipalities in water service provision as listed in the WSA (1997). Municipalities are mandated to provide water services to inhabitants of their jurisdiction. The municipalities' mandate to provide basic services is reinforced by the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) No. 32 of 2000 - a critical policy framework that directs how municipalities should manage service delivery, including water provision to households. All municipalities are potential water service providers (WSP); however, not all are Water Service Authorities (WSA). Only 169 of the 278 municipalities are water services authorities (WSA) (Toxopeüs, 2019a). A water services provider is an entity that provides water services to consumers or any other water services institution; however, it does not include a water services intermediary (RSA, 1997). The entity can be public, private or mixed entities, or even the municipality itself. A water services authority is any municipality, including a district or rural council, as defined in the Local Government Transition Act (No. 209 of 1993), responsible for ensuring access to water services within its jurisdiction (RSA, 1997). In South Africa, only 169 of the 278 municipalities are WSAs (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The assess municipalities' ability to render services to their jurisdictions in line with their mandate, the Auditor-General's[6] (AGSA) reports are very important.

Looking at the five most AGSAs reports (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021), it is evident that is a correlation between municipal audit outcomes and the quality of its service provision to some degree. Municipalities with poor audit outcomes tend to provide poorer services to their constituency (Aadnesgaard and Willows, 2016; Craig, 2017). Less than 20% of South African municipalities have received clean audits (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021) in the last five years. The worst consistent performers have been the Free State and North West provinces, which have failed to produce a single municipality with a clean audit. This strongly indicates that the cause of problems with water services

[6] The Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA) conducts regularity audits of national and provincial government departments, identified public entities, municipalities and municipal entities (its clients or auditees). The AG's Office is the supreme audit institution of the Republic of South Africa that provides oversight in promoting financial accountability in government (Nzewi and Musokeru, 2014: 36). If a municipality can provide accurate financial statements, performance reports and complies with all key legislation, it receives a clean audit from the AG's Office. However, in South Africa, municipalities in most provinces generally perform poorly, with one exception – the Western Cape Province.

provision in these areas was more linked to the functionality of municipalities as opposed to any alternative explanation. Municipalities in the Western Cape Province have performed far better than the other provinces (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

Life in post-apartheid South Africa has become increasingly difficult for indigent communities plagued by the "triple challenge" - high levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015). In the post-apartheid era, some citizens are struggling to access basic water services. The lack of access to water in the new South Africa has been referred to as "water apartheid" (see Bond and Dugard, 2008; Jegede and Shikwambane, 2021). Jegede and Shikwambane (2021: 3) explained this unequal access to water as "water apartheid", as some people still experience "perennial problems" with access to water. Its defining characteristic is that this post-1994 "water apartheid" is no longer discriminating based on race but socio-economic status (Hellberg, 2015; Simmons, 2020). This "water apartheid", as argued by Bond and Dugard (2008: 17), is experienced by South Africa's poor, who are disproportionately the black population. (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 17).

The relationship between citizens and the state post-apartheid has progressively gotten worse, and as citizens get disillusioned and clamour for their right to access water, they have adopted several different strategies. Out of desperation and a loss of faith in the state's ability to provide water services, some residents have resorted to unregulated alternatives like rainwater harvesting (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017) and fetching water from unprotected sources such as rivers and streams (Hemson and Dube, 2004; McKinley, 2005; Angel and Loftus, 2019). Some citizens have adopted apartheid-style tactics employed in urban townships and bantustans during apartheid to fight for water. These include non-payment of water services[7], as well as bypassing municipal meters and making illegal connections[8]. One

[7] See Ajam, 2001; Centre for Development Support [CDS], 2001; Bond, 2000; Brown, 2005; Earle et al., 2005; von Schnitzler, 2008, 2010; Akinyemi et al., 2018; Worku, 2018; Lilley, 2019; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Akinyemi, 2018; Lilley, 2019 Akinyemi et al., 2018.

[8] See McKinley, 2004; Bakker, 2011; Tapela and Pointer, 2013; von Schnitzler, 2013; Piper, 2014; Bayliss, 2016; Mogalagadi, 2017; van Zyl et al., 2018; Bond and Galvin, 2019; Muller, 2020.

of the most popular ways to express dissatisfaction is *toyi-toying*[9] while others take legal action against the state[10].

What is fascinating with some of these responses like non-payment, bypassing meters, and *toyi-toying* is that they emerged during apartheid, a time when black people were not citizens of "white" South Africa. What does this mean when citizens utilise the same apartheid tactics to access their right to water in post-apartheid South Africa? The discussion above highlights problems, tensions, and contradictions associated with the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water services in post-apartheid South Africa. It also highlights how water services provision is a highly contested terrain that is highly politicised. This study, therefore, sought to investigate the varying forms of expressions of citizenship within the post-apartheid landscape within the hydropolitics of the Madibeng Local Municipality.

1.3. Research question and objectives

This study sought to investigate how the residents of three communities in Madibeng express themselves as citizens within the context of access to water and state provisioning. Therefore, my overall research question was, "**How do residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics?**"

This study focused on how individuals express citizenship within hydropolitics in post-apartheid South Africa. To answer the research question, I formulated the following five objectives:

[9] See Bond and Dugard, 2008; von Schnitzler, 2008; von Holdt et al., 2011; Jankielsohn, 2012; Tapela, 2012a,2012b; Cato, 2013; Tapela and Pointer, 2013; Robins, 2014; Bulled, 2015; Rodina and Harris, 2016; Hosken and Mabena, 2017; Hove et al., 2019; Sleet, 2020.

[10] See Welch, 2005; de Visser and Mbazira, 2006; Pegan et al., 2007; Bond and Dugard, 2008; Angel and Loftus, 2019; Bond, 2010; Danchin, 2010; Bond and Dugard, 2008; Bond, 2010; Danchin, 2010; Bulled, 2015; Couzen, 2015; Matchaya et al., 2018.

(i) To explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality;

(ii) To explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver water services;

(iii) To analyse coping strategies adopted by residents of three Madibeng communities when there is inadequate water services delivery;

(iv) To investigate how the residents of three Madibeng communities respond to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water; and

(v) To contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities.

1.4. Madibeng Local Municipality: A "place of water"?

Data was collected in the Madibeng Local Municipality. "Madibeng" means "place of water" in SeTswana, the main language spoken in the municipality. The municipality is approximately 50km from Pretoria and 55km from Johannesburg, covering 3,839 km^2 (MLM, 2020). The area nestles between the Magaliesberg and the Witwatersrand mountain ranges. It is in proximity to abundant water resources:

> Hartbeespoort, Rooikoppies, Vaalkop and Klipvoor Dams are located in the Madibeng Municipality. Four dams…that should be more than enough water for everyone, to drink, wash and wallow in on scorching summer days in the North-West Province.
> (Govender, 2014)

The Madibeng Local Municipality has struggled to provide basic services to its jurisdiction, such as adequate water services. Black communities in Madibeng struggle to access basic water services from the Madibeng (Bond, 2014; Govender, 2014). The 2014 protest sparked by poor water service delivery in the area that resulted in the killings of the four men in Madibeng that I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter provides an important illustration of the issues in Madibeng.

Poor water service delivery that culminated in the 2014 protest was attributed to municipal employees' sabotage of water service provision equipment (Muller, 2020: 36). It is alleged that councillors and municipal employees tampered with the three water pumps at the Madibeng water-treatment plant to hire water tankers to provide water to affected communities (Masombuka, 2014; Masimanga, 2014; Moore, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). Community members believed that the saboteurs were in cahoots with owners of water tankers – popular opinion was that the latter paid bribes to municipal officials to interrupt water supply (Masombuka, 2014). The affected areas were Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau (Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). While this remains an allegation, it suggests that acts of sabotaging water services infrastructure occur, leading residents in the community to lack adequate water.

Another explanation for the water service delivery problems was poor infrastructure maintenance, which differs from the sabotage hypothesis. Following the 2014 protests, the Democratic Alliance laid criminal charges against the former Executive Mayor of the Madibeng Local Municipality, Jostina Mothibe, and the municipal manager, Morris Maluleka, for their alleged role in the municipality's continuing water and sanitation service delivery crisis. The DA-North West leader, Chris Hattingh, held Edna Molewa (Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs from 2010–2014) responsible for the failure of two water pumps because the municipality had not serviced the equipment. He held the view that the municipality's water infrastructure was not properly maintained; hence it was failing, as is evident from the following:

> The crisis has not been the result, as the minister [Edna Molewa] has implied, of a sudden and unexpected breakdown of the water pumps in Madibeng. During her explanation to the community of Mothutlung, Minister Molewa failed to state that two of the three water pumps (300cubic meter /hour each) serving the Mothutlung and Damonsville communities had been out of service for more than two years. The municipality did not care enough to repair the pumps before. When the third 600-700 cubic meter /hour pump broke down the communities were left with only the water remaining in the reservoirs.
> (Hattingh, 2014)

Another DA Councillor, Leon Basson, supported this and believed that a permanent technician should be appointed at the plant. He stated the following:

> I don't buy this theory of sabotage because the pumps are situated in a confined area with security. They are situated in a building in Brits. The water pump that were supposedly sabotaged – if they were sabotaged – why were the other two standby pumps not functioning for two years? (Basson, in Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014)

This second explanation of the pumps' failing, as a result, is also very important. It suggests that water services infrastructure was in a dire state because the municipality was not servicing or repairing equipment and machinery according to their schedules. This poor maintenance of infrastructure is noted by Worku (2018), who also moved a step further to assert that there was low infrastructural investment. For example, upgrades to water infrastructure have not taken place been according to set timelines. The Brits Water Treatment Works (BWTW) was scheduled for completion end of 2018, and in 2019, the project had not been completed (Frankson, 2015; Montsho, 2019).

Planning appropriately and adequately is also an important area where the municipality struggled. In support of this, Moore (2014) stated the following:

> [T]wenty years the population of the area [i.e., Madibeng] has grown, new townships have been built, existing townships and residential districts have expanded… but the water provision has not kept pace. (Moore, 2014)

Another possible contributing factor to the Madibeng Local Municipality's poor service provision is that the entity is grossly under-resourced. It suffers from, among others, a restricted budget and a shortage of skilled personnel (Worku, 2018: 100). Regarding the restricted budget, Rand Water[11] threatened to reduce water supply to three South African municipalities, Madibeng included, which have been defaulting on payments over the last couple of years (Kgosana, 2020). The financial mismanagement issues in

[11] Rand Water a South African water utility entity that supplies potable water to the Gauteng province and other areas. Its customers include municipalities, mines and industries.

the municipality have been widely reported, and for one to appreciate the gravity, I focused on the AGSA reports to understand how the entity has been (mis)managed.

A look into the AGSA's Reports shows that Madibeng has been one of the most financially mismanaged[12] municipalities in the country. One of the most glaring financial irregularities was when the Madibeng Local Municipality under Mayor Mothibe[13] invested R50 million, from which it could only recover R20 million (Van Huizen, 2018). Systemic management problems at the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2010 have resulted in the entity being placed under administration on several occasions as per Section 139(1)[14] of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) (see CoGTA, 2014b: 3; CoGTA, 2014a; CoGTA; 2020; CoGTA, 2021; RSA, 2021).

There are complex hydropolitical processes that result in some communities struggling to access basic water services in Madibeng. So, from the "place of water" for some, the municipality is a "place of no water" for others. From this standpoint, exploring the situation in some Madibeng communities will possibly allow us to understand how citizens select various forms of expression when the state is struggling to provide basic water services in post-apartheid South Africa.
What follows is a layout of the thesis.

1.5. Thesis layout

This research focuses on how people residing in three communities in Madibeng express citizenship within the context of hydropolitics in that area. This thesis is composed of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter.

[12] Financial mismanagement entails failure to comply with legislation, particularly irregular, unauthorised as well as wasteful expenditure; procurement; and contract management.
[13] ANC's Jostina Mothibe was the Executive Mayor of the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2014 and ousted in 2021 through a motion of no confidence tabled by three opposition parties at a special council meeting.
[14] Section 139 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is invoked when a provincial government intervenes after a municipality has failed to fulfil an executive obligation.

Chapter Two, Post-apartheid Hydropolitics and Insurgent Citizens– In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate how expressions of citizenship are transpiring in invented spaces. I argue that in South Africa, a nuanced understanding of the country's water challenges should focus on the anthropogenic drivers of water scarcity. The existence of these drivers brings forth the political nature of the allocation, distribution and access of water resources and services. I formulate a broadened definition of hydropolitics that I employ throughout this thesis that encapsulates all levels of social analysis and incorporates water services. I also look at the development of citizenship. Taking Marshall's (1950) triadic theory as a point of departure, I argue that he provides an understanding of citizenship as a *legal status*. Citizenship is much more complex and is constantly in dispute. I look at how people's citizenship *conscience* feeds into citizenship *expression*. From these, I demonstrate how invited spaces of participation are on the decline; and how citizens are increasingly becoming insurgents "inventing" spaces. Insurgents have expressed themselves in many ways in (re)claiming their right to water: non-payment, litigation, unregulated private alternatives, destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections, and *toyi-toying*.

Chapter Three, Flows of Power - Flows of Water: Water Allocation in South Africa – In this chapter, I unpack water governance systems in post-apartheid South Africa, demonstrating how current asymmetrical access to water has emerged. Developing the link between power and water, I argue that in the new South Africa, neoliberal policies implemented by the ANC-led government have largely left out the poor who continue to struggle to access basic water services. I draw out core arguments in South African literature on hydropolitics that revolved around the commodification and privatisation of water and the implications of these processes for the poor. In addition to the literature dealing with cost recovery methods and the violation of the right to water, I also unpack literature that employs Gramscian and Foucauldian lenses in hydropolitics. To give a nuanced indication of access to water in South Africa, I interrogate facts and statistics about access to water, paying attention to how installed infrastructure has always been used as a proxy for access to water. The chapter closes with an overview of the research area, the Madibeng Local Municipality.

Chapter Four, Researching Expressions of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid Hydropolitics - This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the entire research process. I adopted a qualitative approach because I wanted to investigate how people express citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning in Madibeng. Epistemologically, I embraced social constructivism, enabling me to look at my participants' perceptions, experiences, and subjectivities. I justify my collection of data in Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, three communities in the Madibeng Local Municipality, in the North West province of South Africa. These three areas have epitomised the struggle for water in the country since some of the most atrocious and widely known protests, and police killings of protesters occurred. Participants were selected purposively. Other central aspects of the research that I unpack are how I achieved data saturation and information redundancy, and trustworthiness and how my subjectivity influenced the research process in terms of reflexivity. I end with the ethical issues involved in the study. The core argument in this chapter is that a qualitative research methodology is ideal for gaining an in-depth understanding of how citizens engage with the state regarding water provisioning.

Chapter Five, Water Services in Madibeng: Views of Residents in Three Communities - My point of departure is looking at Madibeng residents' perceptions of the water services provided by the MLM. I proceed to unpack the causes or explanations of water scarcity in the area and strategies that the communities have evolved to mitigate the impact of water scarcity. I conclude the chapter by presenting the participants' views of the functionality of the municipality. Based on the qualitative data I collected and analysed, I argue in this chapter that the participants from the research communities perceived water services from the state as represented by the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as grossly inadequate. They believed that water cuts were frequent and prolonged, and when water services were available, water quality was deplorable.

Chapter Six, Hydropolitics in Madibeng: A Quest to Access and Express Rights in Three Communities - This chapter constitutes an interrogation of my findings associated with expressions of citizenship within the context of hydropolitics. I interrogate how participants view their positionality against the municipality's water service provision. This chapter argues that the decline of citizenship spaces inhibits full citizenship development as people cannot access their rights. Some community members respond by not participating in political processes such as refusing to participate in meetings, paying for water services, and voting. This chapter further examines the complexities in hydropolitics associated with the various forms of expressions linking them to citizenship theory.

Chapter Seven, Conclusion: Disengaged Citizenship - This chapter provides an overview of the thesis and discusses the main findings. I detail my main contributions to the body of knowledge and provide recommendations for future research.

1.6. Conclusion

The lack of access to sufficient water in the new South Africa has resulted in a loss of dignity. Coming from a history of apartheid, the democratically elected government had to redress the past injustices; these were evident in high levels of inequality – listing the right to access sufficient water in the Constitution (RSA, 1996) as one way of achieving this. The HRtW is under threat. The state is embarking on neoliberal policies in a country experiencing the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Compounding this are problems in local municipalities around the provision of basic services. In this study, I investigate how residents in the communities of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of municipal hydropolitics. To do this, I formulated objectives that could help understand the perceptions of residents causes of water issues in their areas, ultimately narrowing how they express themselves in the new South Africa. In the next chapter, I review literature on conceptualising hydropolitics, the causes of water scarcity, an analysis of citizenship, forms of expression, and their link to hydropolitics, within the context of South Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

Post-apartheid Hydropolitics and Insurgent Citizens

"No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime…"
Kofi Annan (2015)

2.1. Introduction

Water is a fundamental resource – it is indispensable to all forms of life on earth. In order to understand how citizenship is expressed in contemporary South Africa, this chapter begins by conceptualising hydropolitics by unpacking the concept's link to power and its levels and scope to provide a broadened definition. Power is a crucial aspect of hydropolitics as it demonstrates how there are asymmetrical relationships in the allocation, distribution and accessing of power. The other two important aspects linked to hydropolitics are its level and scope. To set the scene to investigating expressions of citizenship, this starts by looking into expanding the definition of hydropolitics.

2.2. Broadening the definition of hydropolitics

Hydropolitics, in its simplest form, translates to "water politics", or the politics of water. In the social sciences, and sociology to be more specific, "politics" is a term synonymous with power. The term is generally associated with the likes of Aristotle, a 4th-century Greek philosopher. The term "politics" largely stirs images of state institutions, political parties, state security and law enforcement agencies, and various departments of, and affiliated to, the state and governance (Modebadze, 2010: 43). However, politics should not be confined to a particular sphere – particularly the governance of an area – as it occurs in all spheres of social life (Modebadze, 2010: 43).

2.2.1. The *power* in hydropolitics

Politics and power are interlinked. Political sociologists Dowse and Hughes (1972) state that "politics is about 'power', [and] politics occurs when there are differentials in power". According to this view, any relationships with asymmetrical power relations are inherently "political" (Modebadze, 2010: 43). What then is power? Max Weber (1864–1920) defined power as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 1946). Weber's point of departure when looking at politics is the distinction between "power as authority" and "power as coercion" (Weber, 1946). Whilst authority is the legitimate use of power; coercion is the illegitimate use of power, requiring force (Weber, 1946). Drawing from Weber's (1946) definition of power, one can argue that access to water is largely determined by who has socio-political and economic power. The link between access to water and power is affirmed by Swyngedouw (2004: 175). He argues that before looking at the processes and systems of water management, one needs to look at power relations that exist: "[t]he water problem is not merely a question of management and technology, but rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power". The political nature of water is underscored by Bakker (2012: 616), who states the following:

> [L]inks individual bodies to one another through the cycling of waters and water-borne effluents between water bodies and organisms – both human and non-human. As it flows, water transgresses geopolitical boundaries, defies jurisdictions, pits upstream against downstream users, and creates competition between economic sectors, both for its use and for its disposal (invoking intertwined issues of water quantity and quality). Water is thus intensely political in a conventional sense: implicated in contested relationships of power and authority.
> (Bakker, 2012: 616)

Across time and space, the repertoires of water law and actual water use are expressions and manifestations of asymmetrical power relationships between people (Kemerink, 2011: 585) and thus hydropolitics. Put differently, decisions in hydropolitics revolve around the questions of "who gets what [water], when, where and how" (Turton, 2002:

16). Turton's question about hydropolitics focuses on the levels/scale and range of issues that the phenomena encompass.

2.2.2. Levels and scope of hydropolitics

Henwood and Turton (2002) argue that at the core of hydropolitics as a social phenomenon are two issues: the *scale* of the issues, which are the levels of social analysis, and the *range* of the issues, which encapsulates the matters interrogated. The authors state the following:

> Central to any understanding of hydropolitics is the issue of *scale*, ranging from the individual, to the household, village, city, social, provincial, national and international level with a number of undefined levels in between. In short, the writer and consumer of hydropolitical literature should always be acutely aware of the issue of scale, best depicted as a vertical axis within any given study.
> (Turton, 2002: 16-17).

This thesis argues that hydropolitics occurs on three levels: micro-, meso- and macro, as is generally accepted in the social sciences (Kirdina, 2016: 101). I start by conceptualising the two extremes: micro-and macro-level analysis. Micro-level analysis centres on the study of human behaviour in small scale everyday interaction, where, to an extent, there are commonly shared expectations in social life (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). In micro-level hydropolitics, the analysis would be individuals and small groups engaging within water services provision. This sheds light on how people understand and employ citizenship to vindicate their right to access adequate water.

A macro-level analysis is on a large scale and is usually represented by a society, a country or an economy in a national or global context (Kirdina, 2016: 101). Macro-level hydropolitics entails the politics of water that plays out at the national or international level. This includes outcomes of processes such as legislation, statutes, policies, and systems put in place by the government to influence the allocation, distribution and accessing of water services infrastructure to facilitate the realisation of the HRtW in South Africa.

Within the vertical continuum between micro-and macro-levels is the "middle" scale, the meso-level of analysis. This level is the intermediate level between the micro (i.e., an individual, and macro-levels. (i.e., a society/country) (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 122). This level of analysis is vital to understanding hydropolitics because it enriches both structural and interactional approaches, emphasising shared and ongoing meaning. The meso-level approach is very important when understanding social life and order – sociology is the study of human interaction and behaviour (Fine 2012 in Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). The meso-level "links the clans, populations of settlements from a village or city to the state, region, [and the] republic" (Kirdina, 2016: 101).

In short, the micro-level analysis entails individual identity, motives, and cognition. Meso-level analysis concentrates on organisations and groups, whereas macro-level analysis focuses on the broader society (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). The employment of these levels does not come without limitations. Besides the paradigmatic and methodological complexities, the influence of micro-, meso-and macro-levels of social analysis has profound implications and even limitations (Kirdina, 2016: 100; Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 120). One of the issues with using levels as a lens is that it ignores:

> [h]ow scales are in fact much more multiple, rich, and messy, but it is also inattentive to how processes, actions, and associations may crisscross various scales as well as how scales are produced in action. (Pyyhtinen, 2017 in Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 123)

I use "levels of social analysis" in this thesis as a conceptual tool. In the volume, *The Micro-Macro Link*, Alexander and Giesen (1987) (cited in Pawlal 2018: 24) argue that the micro/macro dichotomy is an analytical distinction. The terms "micro" and "macro" can be so vague that they can either mean "nothing" or "a lot" (Pawlak, 2018: 27). Taking the three levels of social analysis as significant levels might be very deceptive, and as scholars, we should not reify the levels (Pawlak, 2018: 27). The main benefit of using these categories sociologically is that they can lead to the generation of knowledge that provides a sociological perception of reality (Pawlak, 2018: 25). This thesis presents a sociological appraisal of the expression of citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics.

The second core aspect of hydropolitics is the scope of topics that it encompasses. Turton (2002: 16-17) argues that;

> Another critical element in the understanding of hydropolitics is the *range of issues* that are covered. These can best be understood as a horizontal dimension of the discipline of hydropolitics. In reality, the range is infinitely wide, including issues such as conflict and its mitigation, states and non-state actors, water service delivery, water for food, the social value of water, the political value of water, the psychological value of water, water demand management (WDM), water as a target of aggression, water as an instrument of peace, water and gender, water and ecosystems, and water as a critical element in sustainable development.
> (Turton, 2002: 16-17)

The above explanation of the scope of hydropolitics demonstrates that the covered topics are broad and diverse. These topics converge at the point where the central issue is access to water.

2.2.3. A broadened definition

Mainstream definitions of hydropolitics have generally been macro-oriented. The earliest known definition of hydropolitics was introduced in the late 1970s by political scientist Waterbury (1979). He defined hydropolitics "[a]s issues that emanated due to a water resource attention more particularly when it spanned more than one country" (Waterbury, 1979). This definition was congruent with the temporal context. In the 1960s and 1970s, conflict over land was a topical subject, and this informed arguments within a geopolitical context that landmass was a finite resource, and as such, nation-states would go to war over it (Jankielsohn, 2012: 126). Similarly, Kraak (2012: 36) argued that "hydro-politics" was "the study of the geopolitics of freshwater resources", and Biedler (2004) stated that "[hydropolitics] dealt with the politics of international water resources". On the issue of geopolitics, Jankielsohn (2012: 125-6) provides a nuanced critique on the similarities between "hydropolitics" and "geopolitics", arguing that by the same right geopolitics is a field of study on its own, hydropolitics is the same.

Macro-level definitions of hydropolitics focus on the contestations that emerge within a space where countries access inter-state water resources. In support of this, Elhance (1997: 218) defined hydropolitics as "[t]he systematic analysis of interstate conflict and cooperation regarding international water resources". Jankielsohn (2012: 126) argued that water was a finite resource, a source of conflict within and between nations. These definitions clearly show that conflict, or the absence of cooperation between nation-states, are considered defining aspects of hydropolitics.

The definitions of hydropolitics presented by Waterbury (1979), Kraak (2012), Elhance (1997), and Biedler (2004) all draw on the same logic of geopolitics – that there is a contestation over mass international waters by nation-states. The definitions focus on a macro-level analysis of how water resources are declining. Like landmass, they are becoming a resource that could result in at least two competing countries getting into conflict. Some definitions of hydropolitics very positively focus on sustainability and the equitable distribution of water resources instead of concentrating on conflict and contestation. These definitions consider the ability to garner solidarity in how the administration of international water resources should deliberate on nation-states' collective benefit. For example, Wolf (2007: 3.12) argued that hydropolitics revolves around conflict and violence over internationally shared freshwater resources. He also focused on nation-states' role in managing the water resources and relations thereof. His definition is as follows:

> [T]he result of substantial attention to the potential for conflict and violence to erupt over international waters and relates to the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner, i.e., without tensions or conflict between political entities.
> (Wolf, 2007: 3.12)

Another example is Rai et al. (2015), who proposes a similar definition to Wolf (2007: 3.12):

> Hydropolitics relate to the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner, i.e., without tensions or conflict between political entities.
> (Rai et al., 2015)

Macro-level hydropolitics have generally encompassed interstate relations over transboundary water resources. This body of literature on hydropolitics pays attention to nation-states and inter-state conflict and cooperation over water resources. Looking at the Middle East and North Africa as examples of this macro-oriented hydropolitics, conflict and co-operation within the framework of the states over shared water resources has been researched (see Waterbury, 1979; Kendie, 1990; Biedler, 2004; Kehl, 2011; Karner, 2012; Madsen, 2013; *Bergeron, 2021*). In Southern Africa, there is literature on the Zambezi Basin riparian states[15] hydropolitics (Turton, 1997; Turton, 2003); and hydropolitics of the Southern African river basin management of the following: Incomati (riparian states: South Africa, eSwatini and Mozambique); Cunene (riparian states: Angola and Namibia); Okavango/Makgadikgadi (riparian states: Angola, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe); Orange River (riparian states: Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia); and Zambezi (Turton, 2005a; 2005b).

Macro-level research on hydropolitics indicates that the use of transboundary water resources by one or more states directly impacts others. These "hydropolitical relations" are generally discussed as a Marxist "zero-sum" game in which one state's gain is perceived as another's loss (Wilner, 2008: 9). Despite the macro-level definitions of hydropolitics that focus on tension and conflict resulting from a shared transboundary river basin, Turton (2002: 16-17) argues for the importance of widening the scope of hydropolitics both in its *scale* and *range* of issues covered. Dominant discourses that emerge are: first, state-centric, revolve around water and conflict; second, couched water within the larger environmental setting; third, focus on the securitisation of water management; and forth and last, a focus on the socio-cultural components and water-related issues (Turton and Henwood, 2002: 13-15).

Evident from the discussion above, access to water is a contested terrain with unequal power relations and tension. This, however, does not only transpire at a macro-level (i.e., between states). Some definitions have been proposed that address a meso and micro-level analysis of hydropolitics. Meissner (in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16)

[15] i.e., Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and South Africa.

draw attention to small-scale interaction by considering the role of all interested stakeholders, like the state, civil society organisations, and individuals, to allocate national and international water resources. He defined hydropolitics as:

> [A] systematic investigation of the interaction between states, non-state actors and other actors, such as individuals within and outside the state, regarding the authoritative allocation and/or use of international and national water resources.
> (Meissner, 1999 in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16)

The above definition is also similar to one proposed by Jankielsohn (2012: 126). Jankielsohn's (2012: 126) definition focuses on the equitable distribution and sustainable management of water resources within a specified context. This definition also indicates the ubiquitous nature of power where hydropolitics entail:

> [a]ttempts to mobilize support in order to consolidate a power base which can secure the equitable and sustainable supply, management, and distribution of water resources to specific areas, communities and activities.
> (Jankielsohn, 2012: 126)

The definition seems to suggest that water can be supplied "equitably" and "sustainably". When reflecting on the role of power, it is apparent that the definition is problematic as it suggests that the power-holder allocates water in an "equitable" and "sustainable" manner. For example, in South Africa, when the 1956 National Water Act was promulgated, it was hailed as important legislation in the regulation of water regulation as it managed to harmonise water regulation in the interests of different sectors: agriculture, mining, and industry in South Africa (Tewari, 2001: 14; 2009: 701). It centred on the "equitable distribution" of water in the country. The Act's primary beneficiaries were people who had access to land and were involved in agriculture, mining, and industry, invariably white, as it did not factor the interest of black people.

While Meissner (1999 in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16) and Jankielsohn's (2012: 126) definitions capture an array of actors within defined contexts; their focus is on water resources. Both definitions do not explicitly refer to engagements around access to water infrastructure services as a crucial component of water provision – which I argue is a core aspect of hydropolitics. Water infrastructure has a significant bearing on the access and distribution of water. So, this gap is crucial as water services are essential for water access. Without adequate water infrastructure, there may be problems accessing water by communities and households.

In broadening the definition of hydropolitics, based on a review of the term's conceptual origins to demonstrate the breadth and depth of politics in people's everyday lives, I argue that hydropolitics occurs in all areas of social life and at varying social analysis levels. So, considering the above discussion, a broadened definition of hydropolitics is critical as it will contribute to a deeper appreciation of water politics within the confines of the everyday lives of Madibeng Local Municipality residents. I, therefore, define hydropolitics **as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context**. This definition is exhaustive and elaborate - it captures how hydropolitics occurs across different *scale* (i.e., macro-, meso- and micro-levels) of social analysis and involves access to water resources and services, thus not limiting the *range* of issues – in support of Turton (2002: 16-17).

The politics of water in South Africa have largely been framed around the limitations of water resources. In order to understand the country's hydropolitics, it was, therefore, very important to look into the "real" and "perceived" causes of water scarcity.

2.3. A reassessment of the causes of water scarcity in South Africa

A widely accepted definition of water scarcity from UN-Water (2018) indicates that the quantity of water available does not meet the demand:

> [T]he point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully.
> (UN-Water, 2018: 4)

The Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] (2008) and Ohlsson and Turton (1999) viewed a core aspect of water scarcity as the quantity of available water not meeting the demand. Zeng et al. (2013: 441) identified the shortcomings of quantity-oriented definitions by highlighting the importance of water quality. Beyond water quantity, its quality is another important factor affecting water's usability (Wang et al., 2021). While one may have access to abundant water resources, its quality will ultimately determine whether it is usable and consumable. From a human perspective, water scarcity is the extent to which water quantity and quality do not meet human needs for domestic and productive purposes (Schreiner et al., 2002: 129).

2.3.1. Biophysical and natural explanations in South Africa

Some proponents of biophysical and natural explanations of water scarcity argue it is most acute in semi-arid and arid regions affected by droughts and climate variability (FAO, 2008; Bischoff-Mattson, 2020). Water scarcity has generally been attributed to natural and biophysical factors. South Africa is semi-arid, receiving low rainfall and low per capita water availability compared to other countries: ~500 mm average annual rainfall and 843 m3 water per capita per annum (Bischoff-Mattson, 2020:3; Colvin and Muruven, 2017: 8). Much of the country's water supply is from dams. Even though a meagre 10% comes from groundwater, this is an important resource, especially when surface water is unavailable and during droughts.

Evidence of the natural and biophysical explanations of water scarcity are droughts that have affected Southern Africa. The region experiences both *el niños* and *el niñas*, and because of this, droughts and floods are distinct features of the regional climate. In South Africa, over the last 25 years, most provinces have experienced extensive droughts (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 506). More recently, during the October 2015 to March 2016

rainy season, much of Southern Africa experienced an *el niño*-induced drought (OCHA, 2016). Due to global climate change, prolonged droughts are becoming a common and recurrent characteristic of Southern Africa's summer climate (Lindesay 1998, Turton and Henwood 2002; Turton et al. 2003; Rouault and Richard 2005).

Natural and biophysical factors do not wholly explain water scarcity in South Africa. Some commentators believe that the state has the capacity and capability to provide adequate water to everyone despite the country's natural and biophysical limitations (Muller et al., 2010: Muller, 2016; 2018; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Sleet, 2020). Muller et al. (2010: 5) argue that there is enough water to meet the country's needs until 2025 and beyond. The current and future challenges regarding water service provision are related largely to inadequate financial resources and institutional capabilities; rather than resource limitations. In South Africa, agriculture uses more than half of the country's water resources, while domestic water use is estimated at only 10%. From a water resources perspective, discussions about the quantity of water available to poor households should be viewed within the context of the relatively small amount of water consumed by the domestic sphere against a relatively larger amount consumed by the agricultural sector (Dugard, 2016: 11). From this angle, it becomes apparent that water scarcity in the country is more of a result of mismanagement or poor management of the available water resources.

2.3.2. Anthropogenic water scarcity in South Africa

Human behaviour has had a profoundly negative impact on water availability. Some scholars have referred to human-induced elements as "manufactured water scarcity" (Mehta, 2003; Johnston, 2003; Wutich, 2020). While the phrase "manufactured water scarcity" may suggest that humans make a conscious and concerted effort to create or cause water scarcity, one needs to consider how all human activities, directly or indirectly, conscious or not, have contributed to water scarcity. A more accurate description of the nature of water scarcity experienced in South Africa requires a critical look at "human involvement" holistically as the primary contributor to water scarcity. Human-induced scarcity is called anthropogenic water scarcity.

The word root "anthro" suggests that a human being is involved, and anthropogenic indicates human origin. From the Greek *anthropogenes*, meaning "born of man", anthropogenic can refer to any natural changes that people cause. The two core facets that define sufficient water are whether the quantity accessed is enough, and secondly, whether the quality in which it is delivered is ideal for use. Both aspects can be influenced by human activities and illustrate water scarcity's anthropogenic nature.

AghaKouchak et al. (2015) make an extensive case on how the United States' (US) state of California experienced "anthropogenic drought" in 2012. Factors contributing to this drought were population growth and increased agriculture - both had almost doubled water use since 1950. The impact of the drought was exacerbated by overuse and obsolete management of scarce water resources (AghaKouchak et al., 2015: 409-410). In supporting anthropogenic droughts in Southern Africa based on drought analyses in other parts of Africa, Earle et al. (2005: 6) argued that anthropogenic climate change explains drought in the sub-region. In South Africa, some scholars argue that the Western Cape province's drought of 2015-2017 had anthropogenic drivers (Otto et al., 2018).

After reviewing recent literature on explanations of poor water service delivery in communities across South Africa, I identified six "real" anthropogenic drivers of water scarcity in South Africa: population growth and urbanisation; pollution and environmental degradation; derelict infrastructure; human resources issues in the water sector; financial mismanagement and corruption; and consumer debt[16]. It is important to note that these drivers may vary depending on the area under investigation (i.e., provinces, cities or municipalities). Figure 1 below is a diagrammatical representation of the six anthropogenic drivers for water scarcity. While this summary is based on an extensive literature analysis on water scarcity in South Africa, it aims to be a starting point for discussion rather than a conclusion.

[16] Consumer debt is defined as "the inability for municipal service consumers to pay for the municipal services consumed" (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333)

Figure 1: An illustration of anthropogenic water scarcity in South Africa



Noteworthy is that the anthropogenic drivers are not mutually exclusive; they are intricately linked and overlap. What follows is a description of the factors beginning with population growth and urbanisation:

(a) Population growth and urbanisation

Population growth, migration, and urbanisation have contributed to anthropogenic water scarcity. Generally, areas more likely to experience demand-driven water scarcity have high population densities with limited freshwater resources, such as Gauteng and the Western Cape. Gauteng is estimated to have received an estimated net immigration of 1.02 million people between 2016 and 2021. The Western Cape is the second major immigration centre in South Africa; from 1995 to 2018, Cape Town's population grew by approximately 79%. Unfortunately, this growth is not matched by a sufficient increase in dam storage capacity (only 15% during the same period) (Mnisi, 2020).

Historically, social arrangements and apartheid spatial planning influenced water service provision quality in "white" and "black" areas. During apartheid, water infrastructure was prioritised for white areas, while black areas received sub-optimal services. In contemporary South Africa, the apartheid legacy of water infrastructure remains evident. Rural areas and townships struggle to access water compared to urban suburbs. South Africa exhibits a very high rate of rural-urban migration. The establishment of bantustans during apartheid as underdeveloped and impoverished black areas led to urban migration as people searched for employment. Former bantustans have remained impoverished communities, contributing to high rates of rural-urban migration (Swatuk, 2010: 533). High rates of urbanisation have often been directly linked to environmental degradation and pollution, which lead to the depletion of freshwater resources (Bayliss, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Rall and Pejan, 2019; Cullis, 2021). There are, however, other causes of pollution in South Africa, and mining is one such activity.

(b) Pollution and environmental degradation – A focus on mining

Mining is one of the biggest threats to sustainable water supply in South Africa through pollution (Edokpayi et al., 2017). There has been extensive and, in some cases, irreversible damage to the environment. The effects of environmental degradation have been severe on groundwater resources. Between 1999 and 2015, major rivers with poor ecological conditions in South Africa increased by 500%. Tributaries with poor

ecological conditions increased by 229% within the same period. South Africa had lost more than half of its wetlands between 1999 and 2015 (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505).

Big mining companies are the major polluters, taking advantage of the government's failure to act as the regulatory system (Watson, 2019). Before the enactment of the National Water Act No.36 of 1998, there were less stringent conditions imposed on mine discharges, and much pollution occurred during this time (Bayliss, 2016). Coal mining profoundly negatively affects water resources as acid mine drainage pollutes both surface and groundwater with acid, salts and metals (CER, 2019: 5). Several areas in South Africa, such as the Witwatersrand Gold Fields, the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal Coal Fields and the O'Kiep Copper District, have acid mine drainage (Bayliss, 2016). Over 6,000 abandoned mines contribute to acidic water, which needs an estimated R30 billion in clean-up costs. The Olifants River, which flows through South Africa's Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces and into Mozambique, is an example of how acid mine pollution can affect freshwater resources. Olifants is one of the most polluted rivers in the country (Rall and Pejan, 2019).

The National Water Act (1998) regulates water use for mining and protecting the resource. The Act supports the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) to enforce the "polluter pays" principle. The principle states that mines responsible for pollution should be held liable for costs associated with cleaning up and legal enforcement. However, this principle has been challenging to enforce, partly due to capacity constraints at the DWS. The Department demonstrates a "complete institutional and regulatory breakdown" (CER, 2019). For example, in Mpumalanga, eight large coal mines were not complying with environmental legislation, and this was because of inefficiencies in the DWS:

> An assessment of the compliance of eight large coal mining operations in Mpumalanga with their water use licences paints a dismal picture: gross violations and water pollution by the operators, as well as massive failures by the Department of Water and Sanitation and supposedly independent auditors…
> (Watson, 2019)

The DWS once issued directives to mining companies in line with the "polluter pays" principle for acid mine drainage costs which were either contested or disregarded. Besides this, some companies left mining sites or went bankrupt, and, in some cases, illegal miners are operating at the abandoned mining shafts (Bayliss, 2016). The department also had staffing issues – there were a meagre 79 inspectors across South Africa to deal with mining applications and infringements (Munnik et al., 2010: 8).

(c) Derelict water infrastructure

South Africa faces an infrastructural problem when it comes to water services provision. Infrastructure is overly in a bad state. Ageing and inadequate maintenance have contributed to poor water service provision (Toxopeüs, 2019b). Some of the water services infrastructure installed by colonial authorities is at least a century old (Bakker, 2013: 282). Over the years, bolts and pipes have been giving in to corrosion (Naidoo, 2017). The infrastructure is obsolete, and it is in a state of "disrepair". Obsolete infrastructure accounts for 35% of the national water infrastructure (Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505).

There is evidence that municipalities are increasingly spending less on maintaining and rehabilitating water services infrastructure in urban areas (Toxopeüs, 2019b). The servicing of infrastructure and its maintenance is no longer done routinely; rather, it occurs in response to a fault (Toxopeüs, 2019b). These factors' long-term implication is that assets deteriorate faster than they usually have with service and maintenance. This rapid deterioration of infrastructure also contributes to increased water losses due to frequent leaks from infrastructural failure and astronomical costs to repair or replace infrastructure (WSP, 2011; Toxopeüs, 2019b). South Africa loses about 40% of the water pumped by Water Services Authorities (WSA) (i.e., districts, metropolitans or municipalities) due to leaks (Sleet, 2018; Venktess, 2018). Pipes leaking water effectively "leak money" from the actual cost of the water, treatment chemicals used, and lost energy used in pumping it (Muller, 2020: 23). Personnel shortages in the water sector have also crippled water service provision.

Beyond obsolete infrastructure and poor maintenance and repairs, vandalism of water infrastructure generally occurs in indigent communities as people in dire circumstances attempt to access water. Illegal connections are made without care, which compromises the integrity of the infrastructure (Tapela and Pointer, 2013; Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The people who make the connections sometimes have rudimentary skills and equipment or lack the funds to spend on proper connection material. For example, connections are made by conjoining a plastic pipe to existing infrastructure with bandaging rubber strips from old tyre tubes (Muller, 2020: 39).

In some poor communities, people remove copper water services infrastructure, like water meters, and sell it as scrap metal (Mogalagadi, 2017). The destruction and vandalism of prepaid water meters have contributed to infrastructural damage resulting in water leaks (van Zyl et al., 2018: 38; Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The proportion of prepaid meters failing due to vandalism was 30% in Johannesburg and almost 8% in eThekwini (van Zyl et al., 2018: 85).

(d) Staffing problems in the water sector

Two key entities involved in water provision are the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) and municipalities. Human resources issues in these two entities play an important role in either mitigating or exacerbating water scarcity.

First, the DWS has suffered from staffing problems and continues to do so. From high staff turnovers to an abnormally high number of vacancies, as well as senior-level suspensions, the entity is working on an inadequate staff complement (South African Water Caucus [SAWC], 2015; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Staffing problems happened particularly under the leadership of the following ministers: Buyelwa Sonjica, who served for two terms (2004-2006 and 2009-2010), and the late Edna Molewa (2010-2014).

These two ministers' tenures created an atmosphere in which staff are vulnerable to arbitrary decision making (Galvin and Roux, 2019). At least four different people occupied the position of Director-General (DG). Of the DGs, no one occupied the post

for more than 24 months. There was also at least 30 months where the DG position was vacant (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 160). Overall, almost 900 positions within DWS were vacant as of mid-2017, including 21 in the Office of the DG (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 160-1). In terms of senior management suspensions, in 2017, four senior officials – all strategic decision-making positions – were suspended (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 161). Between 2009-2017, nine different accounting officers were appointed and left. Such high turnover rates and the lack of staff have meant that DWS has operated on limited capacity for a considerable time.

The DWS has also been negatively affected by a shortage of skilled workers. This is characteristic of the industry because the water sector has experienced a severe lack of critical skills – artisans, engineers, technicians and water scientists (National Treasury, 2011: 140). Engineers, for example, are emigrating, seeking greener pastures overseas (Mlambo and Adetiba, 2019).

Second, staffing issues have negatively impacted municipalities that are WSAs. The deficiency has stunted the Department's capacity to retain and recruit highly skilled staff. Civil engineering capacity[17] in municipalities is too low to deliver, operate and maintain local government infrastructure sustainably. In 1994, there were 20 engineers per 100,000 people. This figure has significantly gone down to as little 2 or 3 per 100,000 people (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2011: 140). The lack of qualified personnel in the water sector makes it difficult to operate.

Some municipal employees were not suitably qualified to execute their roles and responsibilities with due diligence at a satisfactory level (Worku, 2018: 112). The recruitment of unqualified staff can further negatively impact water service provision. Unqualified personnel lack the skills to operate and maintain water infrastructure and other equipment, which contributes to the mismanagement of water infrastructure (Toxopeüs, 2019b). The shortage of skilled staff is linked to rampant nepotism and party cadre deployment to strategic posts in local government structures for which they are

[17] Civil engineering capacity is expressed as civil engineering professionals per 100,000 people.

unqualified (Worku, 2018: 112). Such workplace practices are in contravention to the *Batho Pele* (SeSotho for "people first") Principles established in 1997 (See Appendix 1) as a means or initiative meant to transform public service regardless of the level. Municipal employees have performed poorly, and their conduct has been intolerable in some instances (Worku, 2018: 112). Municipal employees are "out of touch with realities on the ground" as they have no knowledge or information about what is happening in communities they are supposed to serve diligently (Hove et al., 2019: 6).

The result of challenges with operation and maintenance have culminated in water and effluent quality that does not comply with national standards. Poor water quality and limited quantity as well as outbreaks of waterborne diseases, have been experienced in various municipalities across the country (Lawless, 2007). These problems tend to spill over into the water sector's misappropriation and misuse of funds through corrupt activities, thereby affecting water services provision.

(e) Consumer debt

Consumer debt owed to South Africa's 257 municipalities has also contributed to the anthropogenic nature of water scarcity. The South African government funds capital costs for both water and sanitation service provision infrastructure. In promoting access to water by the citizenry, a basic level of 25l per person per day is free – the Free Basic Water (FBW) allocation – and for anything more than this allotment, the users are required to pay. However, some WSAs incorrectly consider the FBW non-revenue water since it is billed "at a zero rate" to consumers (Seago and McKenzie, 2007: 73; McKenzie et al., 2012: 48). The government effectively subsidises this water; therefore, payment is received from a different source (Seago and McKenzie, 2007: 48; McKenzie et al., 2012: 21). FBW cannot be considered Non-Revenue Water since it is used legitimately and is covered by the state (McKenzie et al., 2012: 19). Some consumers struggle to pay for water, having exhausted their FBW allocation, leaving the operation and maintenance costs entirely on national subsidy (AfDB, 2010: 81).

The municipalities' financial models require that those who can afford basic services such as water should pay. Non-payment is believed to contribute significantly to a decline and subsequent collapse of municipalities, and "stringent cost recover measures and cost-cutting measures are solutions. Non-payment, in a latent way, contributes to water scarcity (Tapela and Pointer, 2013). The consequences of non-payment are quite clear to both the municipalities and the citizens. The non-payment of essential services negatively impacts municipal cost recovery and, overly, municipal financial viability (Worku 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Fjeldstad, 2004). Municipalities often lack the financial resources to maintain infrastructure and pay for the cost of human resources (Worku: 2018, 102).

The lack of income has made it very difficult for municipalities to provide water services as they lack funding due to their inability of other users to pay for water services (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505). The inability to get payments from owing consumers has escalated the consumer debt of municipalities. This has contributed to declining the quality of services provided (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333). The total municipal debt in 2016 was R117 billion, R138.2 billion towards the end of 2017, and R184.7 billion in 2018 (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333). The consumer debt at end-December 2020 was R230 billion. This has threatened the financial viability of municipalities.

(f) Financial mismanagement in the water sector

The last anthropogenic cause of water scarcity in South Africa is financial mismanagement, and corruption contributes to poor water service delivery (Muller, 2016; Adom and Simatele, 2021). The DWS has been negatively impacted by financial mismanagement. This has been so widespread that the South African Water Caucus (SAWC) (2015) exclaimed the dysfunction and institutional paralysis in the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS):

> [D]eeply concerning institutional and governance challenges in the DWS [Department of Water and Sanitation]. It lays bare a situation of institutional paralysis within the department and associated deterioration in financial management, service delivery, policy coherence and performance.
> (South African Water Caucus, 2015)

Under Nomvula Mokonyane (Minister of Water and Sanitation from 2014-2018), the water sector experienced gross financial mismanagement. Financial irregularities have marred large-scale national projects such as the Second Phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) came under the spotlight after corruption allegations that involved Mokonyane in 2016 (Makhubu, 2018; Toxopeüs, 2019b; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Gauteng's water security heavily relies on the LHWP. Commentators subsequently dubbed Phase II of the LHWP the "Nomvula Mokonyane's Watergate" after the minister (Makhubu, 2018; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Contractors' appointments did not follow due process, and one of the contractors appointed was LTE Consulting (Timse and Ntaote, 2016; Toxopeüs, 2019b; Galvin and Roux, 2019: 162). LTE had a "long-standing" relationship with Mokonyane. The firm was a "generous funder" of the ANC – a political party in which Mokonyane was a prominent member at the time. Due to these irregularities, the Second Phase was delayed by at least five years (Toxopeüs, 2019b).

During Mokonyane's tenure, former president Jacob Zuma launched the "War on Leaks" programme in 2015 to repair faulty and dilapidated water infrastructure across South Africa. This "War" was scheduled to run until 31 October 2020. Between 2015 and 2019, at least R3 billion was spent training about 10,000 artisans and "water agents", supposedly to help reduce water losses (Muller, 2020: 23). In 2020 alone, the DWS allocated more than R450 million to the "War on Leaks" initiative for training recruits. Unfortunately, the programme has been a disaster. Thus far, the programme has neither has created jobs nor has reduced leaks. The "spurious "war on leaks" project" "never fixed a single leak" (Muller, 2020). To an extent, the programme appears to have been guided by political considerations – in the form of providing temporary jobs - instead of contributing to reducing water losses (Muller, 2020: 23).

Another project which had to be halted by the DWS because of irregularities was the Limpopo province R3 billion Giyani Bulk Water Project - launched in 2014 by Zuma (Sicetsha, 2020). The Lepelle Northern Water Board, a state-owned enterprise supplying bulk potable water, managed the Giyani project. Mokonyane ordered Lepelle to appoint LTE Consulting again on an emergency basis, disregarding the due tendering process for projects of that nature. The Department contracted LTE Consulting at a total cost of R2,2 billion. After being appointed, LTE could not complete the project and then subcontracted Khato Civils and South Zambezi firms. Khato Civils eventually abandoned the incomplete project in 2019. This happened after the DWS could not pay Khato Civils a service fee of R89 million (Matlala, 2019). The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) found Lepelle flouted the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 and Water Board supply chain management regulations. There was also a failure to consider professional advice in construction, poor financial management, and overall poor project management (Shange, 2020).

Financial mismanagement in the DWS cannot solely be attributed to Mokonyane alone. However, her term in office indicates that an individual's mismanagement can have a devastating impact on a critical sector (Muller, 2020: 32). By the time Mokonyane left DWS in February 2018, irregular expenditure had exceeded R4-billion with more cases pending and the DWS bankrupt (Muller, 2020: 18; Sleet, 2020). Some scholars provide a compelling argument that the DWS exhibits state capture traits (Muller, 2016; Galvin and Roux, 2019), which has undermined the state's ability to provide water services. Human-related factors such as corruption have impacted water service provision and ultimately redistributive water justice in post-apartheid South Africa (Thompson et al., 2015; Muller, 2020).

Allegations of financial mismanagement and corruption have also surfaced in municipalities required to fulfil the role of WSAs. Many municipalities have been struggling financially, and the Auditor General's Reports produced in the last five years have demonstrated poor financial management – except for municipalities in the Western Cape province (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021). To some degree, there is a correlation between audit outcomes and the quality of municipal service provision.

Municipalities with poor audit outcomes tend to have poorer performance and service delivery (Aadnesgaard and Willows, 2016; Craig, 2017).

Auditor-General South Africa's reports from 2015/16 to 2019/20 (2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021) indicate that at least 80% of municipalities in South Africa did not get clean audits. The two consistent worst from 2015/16 through to 2018/19 were the Free State and North West provinces, and the latter appeared in all five financial years. These municipalities have struggled the most with water service provision.

Financial year	**Total audited municipalities**	**Clean audits (n)**	**Clean audits (%)**	**Provinces with no clean audits**
2015/16[18]	263	49	19	Free State, Northern Cape and the North West
2016/17[19]	257	33	13	Free State, Limpopo and North West
2017/18[20]	257	18	7	Free State, Limpopo and North West
2018/19[21]	257	20	8	North West and the Free State
2019/20[22]	257	27	11	Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and North West

Water interruptions are not always an indication of an infrastructural problem; they may result from electricity cuts or interruptions to allow repairs, maintenance, and upgrades (Muller, 2020: 36). It then becomes necessary for a municipality to provide affected communities with water in line with their mandate – the provision of basic water services. The dispatching of water tankers is one such way. WSAs can hire tankers through tendering - a process of identifying and selecting a preferred service provider based on stipulated criteria.

[18] AGSA (2017)
[19] AGSA (2018)
[20] AGSA (2019)
[21] AGSA (2020)
[22] AGSA (2021)

Corrupt officials have taken advantage of such processes. Allegations of corruption have tarnished the tankering tendering procedures in South Africa. Apart from contractors and their staff unduly benefiting from the work done, other beneficiaries from this process also included municipal officials who received kickbacks from irregular tendering processes (Masombuka, 2014). In South Africa, an "entrepreneur" who illicitly secures government tenders is referred to as a *tenderpreneur*. The enterprise of securing tenders through illegitimate channels is known as *tenderpreneurship* (Bond, 2014; Galvin, in press). *Tenderpreneurs* generally use political networks to get the tenders (Piper and Charman, 2018). These *tenderpreneurs* are also part of the privatisation thrust (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 15) and have recently come under public scrutiny.

The deployment of water tankers is not an efficient utilisation of state resources as water delivered costs up to 20 times as much as tap water (Muller, 2020). The process of tankering has become an illicit business model that relies on the lack of repairs and maintenance of water infrastructure and the failure of projects to improve water security. This systemic corruption is captured below:

> Failure to maintain water supply systems results in interruptions to the service and the need for emergency supplies (i.e., water tankers). Lack of maintenance thus becomes part of the business model of those with interests in transporting water (and) tankering becomes an operation that is difficult to stop…Where tankering services are contracted in, the owners of these tankers become reliant on the business and have no incentive to see this come to an end…Once one starts tankering it is very hard to stop, as local interests become entrenched. If there is tankering into an area where a project is planned, then that project is going to fail.
> (Muller, 2020: 52)

Reports of *tenderpreneurship* in tankering have been documented in KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and the North West provinces (Muller, 2020: 37). In KwaZulu-Natal, residents of the township of Umlazi protested over water interruptions because the motive behind them was to bring in tankers illicitly. In Limpopo, officials working in municipalities in the Sekhukhune District even purchased tankers for R1,3 million and

leased them to the municipalities. These officials' vehicles were also observed to sell water that they were supposed to deliver at no cost to the communities at R1/litre. This has been the case also in the North West, where there have been protests of poor water service delivery (Muller, 2020: 37).

2.3.3. Anthropogenic water scarcity and hydropolitics in South Africa

There is ample evidence that anthropogenic factors contributed to water scarcity in South Africa. Population growth, migration, and urbanisation linked to historical/apartheid spatial planning mean that ill-planning and continued lack of infrastructural development in rural areas and townships has meant these areas have had poor water services. Additionally, rural-urban migration has meant that poor black people who resided in former bantustans have found themselves residing in densely populated townships struggling with water service provision. The communities most affected by population growth, migration, and urbanisation are low-income urban and rural areas. People greatly whose water access is affected by population growth, migration and urbanisation a disproportionately black.

Big mining corporates have perpetuated pollution from mining activities. The mining companies have taken advantage of the government's inability to act as the regulatory system (Watson, 2019). The "polluter pays" principle has not been effectively implemented, and the DWS is struggling to regulate mining activities. Pollution from mining has significantly contributed to a decline of freshwater resources like rivers and streams.

The South African water sector has also been affected by human capital issues (SAWC, 2015; Galvin and Roux, 2019). These have emerged due to poor management of entities responsible for providing services and a shortage of adequately trained personnel (Worku, 2018: 112; Toxopeüs, 2019b). As noted, the DWS has experienced very high turnover rates in strategic positions, and in some cases, vacancies have taken a long time to be filled (Galvin and Roux, 2019). This situation is exacerbated by the shortage of trained staff in many municipalities. This has significantly contributed to water service

provision by the state. Where water services have been provided, consumers have not paid for usage. Consumer debt has significantly threatened the sustainability of municipalities by impacting their capital base (Worku; Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020; Adom and Simatele, 2021).

Financial mismanagement in the financial sector also demonstrates the complexity of anthropogenic water scarcity. The DWS has had been financially mismanaged, particularly during the tenure of minister Mokonyane. This has meant that much-needed funds have not been properly accounted for. The AGSA reports from 2015/16 to 2019/20 indicate that municipalities in South Africa are struggling with adequate documentation to get clean audits for their expenditure. The mismanagement of funds in municipalities has contributed to poor water services provision. Manipulation of the tendering systems has seen a proliferation of *tenderpreneurs*.

The anthropogenic factors contributing to water scarcity in South Africa demonstrate the complexity of water issues that citizens are facing. The water scarcity narrative grounded on biophysical and natural factors is uncritical and misleading as it conceals issues about asymmetrical water access. Overstating the effects of biophysical and natural elements, such as drought and the effects of climate change, obstructs us from realising the cause of water problems in South Africa are, in reality, human-induced – anthropogenic. By dispelling scarcity associated with natural and biophysical explanations, it becomes very important to investigate a nuanced viewpoint on how citizenship has been conceptulised.

2.4. Citizens and citizenship theory

Citizenship can be acquired at birth, naturalisation, and marriage (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2009: 2). Whilst "citizenship" as a concept has been in use for centuries and has been used in several different contexts to refer to the nature of responsibilities that the state and the "citizen" have between each other. This section defines a citizen and offers an overview of citizenship theory, paying attention to Marshall's (1950) conceptualisation of citizenship.

2.4.1. Introducing the notion of a citizen

The concept of a "citizen" emerged in Ancient Greece, based on the idea that the state was a "creature of nature," and by nature, "man" himself is a "political animal" (Akinboye, 2015). A "man" could only relate to humanity through "his" rights to participate in the state's affairs. Following this logic, the state was a political entity constituted by "men", who were its citizens (Akinboye, 2015: 1). Like Athens, city-states (poleis) had different residents with varying statuses – different social positions - that they occupied. Some of the residents were citizens, while others were not. As a very patriarchal state, Greece identified only males as citizens, and a male inherited citizenship from his father (Stumpf, 1989, in Akinboye, 2015). The Greeks believed that citizenship should be based on obligations to the state rather than on the individuals' rights (Council of Europe [COE], 2017). In defining citizenship, Aristotle's pragmatic view was that "[w]hat effectively distinguishes the "citizen proper" from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office" (Aristotle, 1962).

Until about a century ago, very few people worldwide were "full, equal citizens" (Heisler, 2005: 667). People were excluded from attaining, or achieving, citizenship because of achieved or ascribed statuses that their respective societies considered significant. Those marginalised included women, children, people without property, ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, indigenous people, and others relegated to second-class, third-class or non-citizenship status (Heisler, 2005: 667).

2.4.2. Marshall's (1950) triadic theory of citizenship

Citizenship is a value-laden and amorphous concept with a multifaceted and evolving history (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006: 653). The meaning of citizenship is historically and socially variable. By this, the meaning of citizenship has changed in different temporal and spatial contexts. These facets demonstrate the contentiousness and elusiveness of the concept (Bosniak, 2003: 183; Clarke et al., 2014: 9). McCallum (2004) notes that citizenship has been used normatively or aspirationally; instead of analytically and critically. In its "normative" use, citizenship centres on the values and norms of people

who share a political community membership. Aspirationally, citizenship has become a dominant form of claim-making for people worldwide (de Koning et al., 2015). A widely cited scholar in citizenship theory is British sociologist T.H. Marshall.

Marshall (1950) traced the development of citizenship in England over three centuries in his seminal work titled *Citizenship and Social Class*, proposing a three-dimensional account of citizenship in which civil, political, and social citizenship was attained in an evolutionary sequence. The Marshallian (1950) tripartite conception of citizenship constitutes three successive steps each aligned to a specific element, and these are as follows:

(a) Step 1: Civil citizenship consolidated the rule of law and equality of all before the law. Here, Marshall argued that the *civil element* was:

> [C]omposed of the rights necessary for individual freedom-liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is of a different order from the others because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law. This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice.
> (Marshall, 1950: 10-11)

Marshall (1950: 10-11) argued that civil citizenship came from the civil element. Some of the institutions directly linked with civil rights include the courts. Civil citizenship corresponds to "negative freedoms", like freedom of speech, thought and faith, rights to association, and the right to own property (Moses, 2019: 168). Through "negative freedoms", a constitutional government does not interfere in their exercise (Kreimer, 1984: 1315). Constitutionalism is grounded on restricting coercive force through which governments have conventionally employed to prevent undesirable conduct (Kreimer, 1984: 1295). In 18th century England, the civil element emerged when political systems instituted property protection, equality before the law, and civil liberties. The development of civil freedoms was a vital step in undoing the hierarchical limitations of status or duty to an individual's social superiors (Lister, 2010). These freedoms

necessitated the later development of the second type of rights noted by Marshall as political rights.

(b) Step 2: Political citizenship, that is attainment through the *political element*. Here Marshall referred to:

> [T]he right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government.
> (Marshall, 1950: 10-11)

Marshall (1950: 19) argued that in the 18th century, political rights were flawed, and this was not in what they constituted, but rather, how they were distributed considering the standards set by democratic citizenship. The electorate was less than 20% of the adult male population (Marshall, 1950: 19). The *political element* was developed in the 19th century when the right to vote was granted first to the middle-class and subsequently to working-class men (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006: 653). In the 19th century, political rights were not a core facet of citizenship but rather the privilege of a limited male economic class (Marshall, 1950: 20).

Political citizenship implied the right to vote for officeholders or be candidates for elected positions of power. These were political rights centred on suffrage and democracy (Moses, 2019: 168). Members of the body politic have held the right to participate in the exercise of political power either as members of the body or as its electorate (Marshall, 1950: 11). Institutions affiliated with political rights are parliament and councils of local government. The British Poor Law excluded the poor from enjoying citizenship rights:

> [p]aupers forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty, by internment in the workhouse, and they forfeited by law any political rights they might possess.
> (Marshall, 1950: 24)

This exclusion was also applicable to women who only received the right to vote in 1918 when universal political citizenship was instituted in Britain (Marshall, 1950: 21).

(c) Step 3: Social citizenship, stemming from the realisation of the *social element*. Marshall argues that it arose mainly in the 20th century and included a broad range of rights:

> [T]he whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.
> (Marshall, 1950: 11)

To Marshall (1950), attaining social rights was the final element required to achieve full citizenship status. Social citizenship is defined by "positive freedoms" like the right to education and social welfare. Through this, all citizens have the right to enjoy and access at least a basic level of socio-economic and cultural well-being (Cohen, 2010). Once members of society attain full citizenship, they receive absolute social rights. Thus, attaining social rights was a critical aspect of citizenship in the 20th century (Marshall 1950: 96). He argues that citizenship was "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community, which includes civil, political and social rights and obligations" (Marshall, 1950: 14). His underlying assumption was that citizenship was a status of equality. Citizenship denoted a link between citizens and the rights to live, work, trade, and participate in a community's civic and socio-political spheres.

The triadic conception of citizenship constructed citizenship as a *legal status* drawing from attaining civil, political and social rights. The existence of citizenship as a *legal status* is evident in the presence of the judicial system, the parliament, and the welfare system, which are the cornerstones of liberal democracy (Susen, 2010). The Marshallian (1950) model presupposes that citizenship exists when members of the body politic hold equality of social status that can coexist with inequality of material status. The origins of social rights emerged from a synthesis of civil and political rights (Moses, 2019: 169).

Marshall's (1950) contribution to the sociological study of citizenship is significant, and it is important to assess his citizenship model as a *legal status*. Although his theory has a special place in citizenship studies and British social theory, it does not make it free from flaws. For example, Marshall's (1950) account of citizenship suffered from an "unhealthy degree" of *formalism* (Susen, 2010). His account suggests that the attainment of full citizenship rights in the 20th century was a social process that was both complete and irreversible. Following this logic, citizenship rights – once recognised and institutionalised – represent modern democracies' irrevocable features. The assumption that the realisation of citizenship rights was complete and irreversible is highly problematic for two reasons. First, societies with complex histories require complex citizenship forms. According to Susen (2010), complex forms of citizenship should demonstrate that they can surpass the limitations of Marshall's tripartite theory of citizenship, thereby doing justice to others' normative significance – such as cultural, economic, human and sexual rights (Susen, 2010). Second, recognition and the realisation of citizenship rights are far from irreversible, as is unequivocally illustrated by the continuing presence and frequent resurgence of dictatorial regimes across the world, which can erase citizenship gains and "turn the clock back" (Susen, 2010).

Citizenship can only be adequately understood within the context in which it is investigated (Clarke et al., 2014: 9). Because of this, in theory and practice, citizenship is always in dispute (Clarke et al., 2014: 177). Marshall's (1950) theory of citizenship demonstrates that the claim to offer "ideal citizenship" is far from fruition. Clarke et al. (2014: 11) reject any theoretical purification that claims to propose a "new and better" definition of the concept of citizenship. Balibar (in Clarke et al., 2014: 11) argues that citizenship is "imperfect" (*imparfaite*). Through this concept, some scholars are,

> not only suggesting that citizenship is a defective, rectifiable, improvable institution, it is above all suggesting that citizenship is rather a *practice* and a *process* than a stable form. (Balibar, 2001, in Clarke et al., 2014: 11)

Citizenship is an object of social and political desire. It is always "under construction" (Clarke et al., 2014: 8) or "in the making" (*en travaux*) (Clarke et al., 2014: 177). However, the evolution of citizenship does not end with adopting social rights. The "ideal citizenship" is now facing several challenges (Oxhorn, 2014). What emerges from disputing citizenship is the importance of investigating how the practice of citizenship transpires (Clarke et al., 2014). In the following section, I unpack arguments on how citizenship is practiced.

2.5. Citizenship practice

We know with certainty that citizenship transpires in places and spaces, and it is imagined, practised and enacted in daily behaviour and mobilisations. Since the 1994 election, discourses of "participatory democracy" and "participatory governance" have been widely circulated amongst state officials, civil society actors, scholars, and activists. The experiences of citizenship and the understandings of the state in post-apartheid South Africa are highly differentiated based on several factors, including location, race, gender income, gender (Rodina and Harris, 2016: 337). The first crucial aspect of citizenship practice is the citizenry's awareness of being part of a political community, as expressed in their citizenship conscience. Seeing oneself as a member of a political community has to be supported by some "good citizenship" practices, like participating in elections to ordinary civility virtues in everyday life, such as courtesy, restraint, and respect for other people (Bauböck, 1999: 3).

2.5.1. Citizenship conscience

Citizenship conscience is a subjective sense of belonging, sometimes called the "psychological" characteristics of citizenship (Carens, 2000; De la Paz, 2012). It refers to the conviction of being a citizen within a context in which the state affords citizens to exercise it (De la Paz, 2012). *Citizenship conscience* influences the degree to which a political community has a collective identity. Social cohesion is strengthened if a significant number of citizens demonstrate a strong sense of belonging to the same

political community. Since many factors can restrict or encourage *citizenship conscience*, social integration should be a crucial aspect that citizenship aims to achieve.

The rights enjoyed by a citizen can influence their choice of political activities (Rawls, 1972: 544). The development of civic identity is very important in the realisation of active citizens. By definition, civic identity is a keen sense of connection to a community and the rights and responsibilities linked with membership to a particular community (Atkins and Hart, 2003). It is a feeling of loyalty and unwavering commitment to a community (Nasir and Saxe, 2003). A robust civic identity can motivate citizens to take part in their society's political life actively.

Drawing from Lister (2007), Zamudio (1997)[23] argues that *citizenship conscience* is the sense of being a citizen. *Citizenship conscience* is possessing the conviction that one can act as a citizen - that a citizen is cognisant of a political community of which one is a member, and that this recognition is expressed in concrete practices that ensure citizen exercise (Zamudio, 2007). The fact of possessing the status of citizen is a necessary – although not sufficient– condition to form a citizen conscience in the strict sense, that is, the conscience of "being recognized as" a citizen. It is necessary because the status formally legitimises the condition of citizens (Zamudio, 2007). Zamudio (2007) argues that *citizenship conscience* is an essential corollary of citizenship formed by three elements:

> [First] The knowledge that this status is possessed and its meaning (the rights and obligations that it implies), at least partially, is essential to build a citizen conscience. [Second] It is also essential to identify, on the part of the citizen, the agent responsible for granting said recognition and for translating the contents of the status into practices (legal, political, economic and cultural) that ensure its realization.
>
> Finally, for a citizen conscience to be formed, the citizen must know the legitimate ways to present their demands. This element of recognition is fundamental for my reflection, for which I will expand its meaning in the next section. For now, it is necessary to say that citizen awareness will not be formed if the citizen identifies "other" agents as those

[23] The book chapter is in Spanish and the translated version is can be accessed at https://books.openedition.org/irdeditions/26906?lang=en.

> responsible for granting him recognition as a subject of rights (for example, religious institutions, civil society organizations, business groups, etc.).
> (Zamudio, 2007)

The state has a crucial role in cultivating *citizenship conscience* because it arises from a reflexive process (De la Paz, 2012). For people to perceive themselves as citizens, it is necessary that this "other" (the state) recognises such status (i.e., citizenship as a legal status). Drawing from Mead (1993 in Zamudio, 1997), if one views oneself as a citizen to the extent that you are viewed as such by the person in charge of granting you such recognition, you will possess citizen awareness.

However, the construction of *citizenship consciousness* is not just a cognitive process; it also incorporates affective elements. The various aspects that give materiality to recognition are woven into a "feeling structure" that, instead of opposing feeling to thought, interrelates "thought as meaning and feeling as thought: consciousness practice of a present type, in a living and interrelated continuity", in a continuous process of structuring, with practical expressions located in time and space (Williams, 1977). These expressions have to do with the state's actions towards citizens; and how citizens' respond to them. Another important aspect is how they view themselves as members of a community and, perhaps, a larger community of fellow citizens (Anderson, 1991). The citizen conscience, then, is shaping itself intellectually and affectively in the relationship of mutual recognition between the state and the citizen, and as this relationship is far from being static, the conscience is also constantly restructuring and changing (Zamudio, 2007).

Suppose the state, its authorities and institutions, do not treat individuals as citizens, but as subjects, like in autocratic or dictatorial regimes? In that case, some citizens in those countries may not develop a *citizenship conscience* and, consequently, are incapable of identifying the procedures for making demands. What about in liberal-democratic states? The second element of citizenship practice that needs to be considered is *citizenship exercise*.

2.5.2. Citizenship exercise

Sustaining citizenship requires some activity on the part of citizens. The tension that emerges from this understanding of citizenship is the circumstances under which political agency can be exercised. This links to how *citizenship exercise* is defined as the conditions essential for the realisation of citizenship rights and incorporating new rights, redefining and expanding the previous notion of citizenship. Citizens can enjoy formal recognition by their states. Based on such recognition, they will be able to legitimately organise their demands on using practices that ensure the exercise of citizenship rights and the incorporation of new rights (Zamudio, 2007).

To further understand the exercise of citizenship within the context of expressions of citizenship, it is crucial to look into citizenship participation. I draw from Cornwall's (2004) concept of participatory space to understand the influence of space on citizen participation. She defines participatory space as:

> [T]he situated nature of participation, the bounded yet permeable arenas in which participation is invited, and the domains from within which new intermediary institutions and new opportunities for citizen involvement have been fashioned.
> (Cornwall, 2004: 75).

Space influences how citizens process and identify ways in which they express themselves.

2.6. Factors influencing participation

Several factors influence people to participate in the activities expected of a "good citizen" (Potgieter and Lutz, 2014: 262). Several factors influence people to participate in such forms of political participation. These are a citizen's sense of political efficacy, citizens' trust in the government, and the impact of the triple challenge – i.e., inequality, poverty and unemployment.

2.6.1. Citizens' sense of political efficacy

A citizen's *sense of political efficacy* is a view of their effectiveness in politics. The concept refers to a person's subjective belief that they can influence a political process. Citizens possessing a sense of political efficacy have a greater likelihood of participating in politics. For example, these citizens will be more inclined to stay informed and vote at elections (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). Schulz-Herzenberg (2020: 24) discusses two complementary dimensions of political efficacy – *internal* and *external* political efficacy. According to her, internal efficacy is one's political competence. This is an individual's ability to comprehend politics and influence politics. On the other hand, external efficacy is a citizens perceptions of a government's responsiveness and officials' attentiveness. It is the degree to which they feel the political system is responsive to their demands. Both appear to matter to the decision to vote or not in South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). By 2019, there was evidence of external political efficacy influencing the decision not to vote. Members of the electorate felt the political system was unresponsive to their needs, and they were less likely to vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). This was also revealed in the more recent 2021 local government elections.

2.6.2. Citizens' trust of the government

Starting with citizens' trust in the government, the *2020 Edelman Trust Barometer Survey* indicates that a meagre 20% of South Africans trust the government (Daniel. J. Edelman Holdings Inc. 2020). In recent years, the citizenry's trust in South Africa's democratic institutions and evaluations of the government's performance have all fallen (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 27). The mounting trust deficit has affected many state institutions, as well as the ANC. Trust in the ANC dropped from 62% in 2006 to 38% in 2018 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). Allegations and revelations of ANC officials in state capture, corruption and financial mismanagement have negatively impacted voter sentiments, deterring many staunch ANC supporters from voting for the party. This should ideally leave many more voters with the option to vote for alternative parties (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). However, a significant proportion of the South African

population does not consider opposition parties[24] as viable ANC alternatives[25]. ANC voters generally do not vote for another party despite their unhappiness with the party (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). Opposition political parties and their leaders are generally not viewed positively. For example, at least 38% of black South Africans strongly disliked the Democratic Alliance, and at least 36% strongly disliked the party's leader at the time, Mmusi Maimane. With the Economic Freedom Fighters, 33% of black South Africans strongly disliked the party, and 32% expressed the same sentiment for the EFF leader, Julius Malema (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28).

2.6.3. The triple challenge

The South African population, and the youth particularly, has been particularly affected by what some scholars and commentators have dubbed the "triple challenge" - poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015). Factors that can be partly attributed to the youth's political apathy are unemployment (Sibiya and Ncopo, 2020: 5-6). Coming from a history of colonialism and apartheid, poverty and inequality have co-existed in South Africa. Although the two concepts are linked, poverty and inequality are different: poverty is centred on deprivation, whereas inequality is centred on disadvantage (Plagerson and Mthembu, 2019). Globally inequality is measured by the Gini-Coefficient, and South Africa has the highest index globally, meaning that it is the most unequal country globally. (IBRD and WB, 2018; IMF, 2020). Inequality is manifest through a skewed income distribution, unequal access to opportunities, and regional disparities. Race is a strong predictor of poverty, and the chronically poor group is almost disproportionately black (IBRD and WB, 2018: 20). It has become the key factor determining inequality of opportunity (IBRD and WB, 2018: 66).

[24] The two main opposition parties in South Africa are the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).
[25] There is some evidence from the recent local government election results that took place on 1 November 2021 that this inclination might be changing.

The labour market in South Africa suffers from a history of discrimination and unequal access to jobs. The role of unemployment in driving inequality is particularly strong in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). Inequality in South Africa has an overbearing racial footprint to this inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2007). The unemployment rate is 27,6% (Stats SA, 2019). Rising unemployment remains a grave challenge for South Africa as the country struggles to create enough sustainable jobs. Unemployment is much more prevalent amongst the black population than all the other racial groups in South Africa. The 18–25-year age group exhibits high discontent from unemployment and a lack of job opportunities. However, it should be noted that youth voter apathy is very high, even in established democracies (Chiroro, 2008: 14).

The youth is critical of political leaders and parties who they feel have ignored their needs and failed to engage with them constructively (Roberts, 2019: 39). Factors such as access to and responsiveness of state institutions, quality of education, decent employment opportunities, and the prevalence of corruption influence whether the youth vote. In South Africa, disaffection with the ruling ANC could be why people are not voting (Chiroro, 2008: 14). Many South Africans will continue to abstain from voting until opposition parties are considered credible and viable alternatives (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28).

2.6.4. Local government elections voter turnout from 1999–2021

According to Potgieter and Lutz (2014: 262), voting is generally regarded as the most prominent and frequently performed political participation. Over in the last six local government elections in the new South Africa, voter turnout has declined, and abstainers, eligible voters who do not vote, continue to grow. The following are the percentages of voter turnout in the past local government elections:

Table 1: Election voter turnout percentages from 1999-2021

Year	Voter turnout %
1999	89
2004	77
2009	77
2014	73
2019	66
2021	47
Source: Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) (2021)	

Looking at post-apartheid voting patterns in South Africa, the voting turnout has increasingly declined from the 27 April 1994 election to date, especially amongst the youth. Most literature on this phenomenon has investigated how the youth[26] are exhibiting voting apathy (Chiroro, 2008; Breakfast, 2017; Tshuma and Zvaita, 2019; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020; Sibiya and Ncopo, 2020; Heffernan, 2020; Badaru and Adu, 2020). The decline in voter turnout needs to be seen in the context of a complex set of shifts in citizen and government relations, which may include disaffection with the government (Chiroro, 2008: 14).

Participatory spaces are highly political, and this is manifest in how "particular sites come to be populated, appropriated or designated by particular actors for particular kinds of purpose" (Cornwall, 2004: 75). Cornwall (2002) argues that 'participation extends beyond making active use of invitations to participate, to autonomous forms of action through which citizens create their own opportunities and terms of action' (Cornwall, 2002). Recent international literature on participatory spaces has distinguished spaces as invited and invented [spaces] (Cornwall, 2002; 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2006).

[26] South Africa's National Youth Commission Act, 1996, defines youth as those from ages 14–35 years, and since voting is a preserve for people from 18, persons between the ages of 15 and 17 will not be included in the analysis, I will confine my description of the youth as people aged between 18-35.

2.7. Citizens' participation: The invited/invented spaces' dichotomy

Participatory spaces are highly political, and this is manifest in how "particular sites come to be populated, appropriated or designated by particular actors for particular kinds of purpose" (Cornwall, 2004: 75). Cornwall (2002) argues that 'participation extends beyond making active use of invitations to participate, to autonomous forms of action through which citizens create their own opportunities and terms of action' (Cornwall, 2002). Recent international literature on participatory spaces has distinguished spaces as invited and invented [spaces] (Cornwall, 2002; 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2006).

In scholarly literature, invited spaces of participation are defined as those occupied by citizens and their allied non-governmental actors, legitimised by donors and public authorities (Miraftab, 2014: 1). It is a platform where the citizens, as invitees, can raise their views or share their opinions as a form of public participation. In local government, invited spaces are legislative spaces created by the Constitution (1996) to ensure citizens' right to public participation. Citizens have a right and duty to take part in local government decision-making through, among others, public meetings (*izimbizos*) and ward committees. In invited spaces, citizens participate in decision-making, policy design, project management or implementation. Since invited spaces constitute institutional forms of participatory governance created and managed by public authorities, they are arguably based on the state's normative vision of "good citizenship" (Miraftab, 2004). These spaces are generally constructed for local democracy and citizenship, particularly for low-income residents (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Where non-state actors are involved, invited spaces allow for deliberations on the provision of services where a neoliberal state has withdrawn (Miraftab, 2004).

Invited spaces for participation are deeply frustrating for community members. Participation in these platforms reinforces asymmetric power relations in a society, where citizens are used to legitimising mainstream views of the elites (Dube et al., 2021: 245). Cornwall (2004) argued that invited spaces might be pseudo-democratic because

they may suppress certain voices in the interests of those in power. They have prevented social change by silencing or corrupting civil society leaders and working towards reproducing existing power structures (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

Some invited spaces engineered by the government to "invite people in" are inadequate, lack capacity, are unresponsive and superficial and are essentially used as a rubber stamp for participation and democracy (Cornwall 2004; le Roux, 2015). Restrictions in invited participation, the deafness of the state to poor communities' needs and claims, and the impossibility of competitive electoral politics lead to more radical and possibly more violent forms of participation (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012).

In South Africa, invited spaces of participation developed by authorities in the post-apartheid era have largely been viewed as "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). This is because, in some cases, the inviters control the agenda and set the terms of engagement to ensure that a largely pre-determined outcome is arrived at (Benit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2021: 175; Dube et al., 2021: 245; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Invited spaces mostly have failed to support citizens from urban indigent communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). Furthermore, invited spaces have generally been criticised as less conducive to "real" participation than invented spaces of participation. The citizenry view invited spaces as ones in which they are supposed to show allegiance to the ruling order and access state resources:

> [G]overnment invited spaces are key to display political loyalty, maintain and expand one's political network in a client–patron type of relationship with local councillors as well as local party representatives… they are a crucial way of accessing the state and possibly its resources, where the party channels replace dysfunctional local government participatory structures. In addition there may be other forms of invited spaces (invited by the party rather than by local government as the two are intertwined anyway), that lead to the reproduction of existing power structures and involve a degree of local social control by putting a cap on challenges to policies and powers,

> but also constitute a resource in terms of political networks and possible access to public goods.
> (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012)

Citizens have come up with "extremely innovative strategies" which create "alternative channels and spaces to assert their rights to the city, negotiate their wants, and actively practice their citizenship" (Miraftab and Wills 2005: 207). Citizens invent spaces that challenge the *status quo* in an attempt to foster change and resistance to the dominant power relations (Miraftab, 2014: 1). invented spaces are created by citizens who have been marginalised and left behind in local governance processes. They invent these spaces to reclaim their communities, afford themselves a voice and compel authorities to listen to them (Dube et al., 2021). Invented spaces are formed organically from below, by the people for themselves. Residents or social movements initiate these spaces demanding responses, accountability, or change from the state as the poor express their struggles in accessing basic needs and services such as water (Bénit-Gbffou and Piper, 2021: 175; Chiumbu, 2015: 2). Invented spaces are "often seen as more independent, authentic, and able to contest the established order, where residents take the initiative of the interaction with public authorities and invent their form, place and content" (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

Cornwall (2004) makes a key point that applies to both invited and invented spaces and all the areas where they overlap, is that space is never unbiased nor bounded. Spaces constantly overlap, and the actors within them continuously manoeuvre their way in and out of the spaces, allowing their experiences and actions to influence what happens within them and change the outcomes (Cornwall, 2004: 81). In some cases, invited spaces are "re-invented" and appropriated by invited participants. Importantly, invited and invented spaces may not involve uniquely different participants; however, the futility of the former has contributed to the latter's emergence (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). So, far from being a different group of people with opposed political views and world visions, those who engage in protests, for instance, may also attend engagements at invented spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). When citizens innovate and invent spaces, they show how

their relationship with the state is strained. Some citizens' actions in invented spaces have been defined as insurgent, and thus they have been described as insurgent citizens.

2.8. Insurgent citizens and hydropolitics

Sandercock (1999: 41) argues that "[t]he very word "insurgent" implies something oppositional, a mobilizing against one of the many faces of the state, the market or both". Insurgent citizens "invent" alternative spaces to perform politically to enhance democratic participation. Insurgent citizenship movements have spawned predominantly in the Global South, particularly in Latin American countries and South Africa (Miraftab, 2006; Holston, 2009: 256). Insurgent citizenship is an approach adopted by the poor to hold officials accountable for their civil and political rights to restore their dignity (Miraftab and Wills, 2005: 202). The justification for their actions is based on a demand for what they perceive to be fair and just human rights. More recently, in South Africa, Brown (2015: 7) argues that;

> [c]ontemporary South African politics are being driven by the practices of equality embarked upon by insurgent citizens. The most significant of these acts—those that most disturb the ordinary operations of the existing order—are those made by communities of the poor asserting their agency as political actors. These actions expand the possibilities of politics. The disruption they create is met by the representatives of the existing order—notably the state and its police forces—with responses ranging from engagement to repression … this interplay … shapes the terrain of political opportunity in South Africa and expands and contracts its possibilities.
> (Brown, 2015: 7)

"Invented spaces", to an extent, have been far more effective in representing the views of the poor and potentially bringing about meaningful participation than the state-formed invited spaces (Cornwall 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Insurgent responses to the growing neoliberal agenda, such as t the privatisation of basic services (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Insurgent citizenship challenges "good citizenship" practices that support neoliberalism. In support of this, Miraftab and Wills (2005: 202) state the following:

> As neoliberal practices privatize the city, its infrastructure, and its life spaces, and increasingly exclude urban citizens who are not deemed 'good-paying customers,' insurgent citizenship challenges the hypocrisy of neoliberalism: an ideology that claims to equalize through the promotion of formal political and civil rights yet, through its privatization of life spaces, criminalizes citizens based on their consumption abilities. Insurgent citizenship is a strategy employed by the poor to hold city officials accountable to their civil and political rights to decent housing conditions, as well as to the city itself, and to reclaim their dignity despite the hypocrisy.
> (Miraftab and Wills, 2005: 202)

The ANC's intolerance for dissent and its ability to socially control several invited spaces culminated in opposition expressed through invented spaces. It has been argued further that these spaces have been repressed violently, taking partial responsibility for the violent forms taken by protests (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). Invented spaces of participation have been seen as developing progressive political agendas, efficient tactics, and strategies to ensure that marginalised and disadvantaged communities are heard (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). There is a myriad of ways insurgent citizens in South Africa have responded to a violation of their right of access to water as espoused in the Constitution (RSA, 1996). These are as follows:

2.8.1. Non-payment of water services

Non-payment is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. It is a tactic that evolved during the anti-apartheid struggle in which some black township residents refused to pay for services (Pape and McDonald, 2002; von Schnitzler, 2008: 906; Dawson, 2010: 384; Bayliss, 2016; Worku, 2018). There are a series of explanations that I came across in literature explaining the phenomenon.

First, the affordability thesis presupposes that given the financial burdens experienced by households, rates and service payments are just not affordable for many. Non-payment was a strategy that poor black households used during apartheid to redirect their meagre household income. The racist system of domination rendered black people disadvantaged socially, politically, and economically. In support of this, Naidoo (2007) argued that:

> Under apartheid, non-payment in the form of the rent and service boycotts (or 'payment boycotts'), became modes through which black households negotiated their poverty and circumstances. As opposed to merely surviving in the under resourced and under-serviced ghettoes created by apartheid for its cheap labour force, township residents actively came together to boycott payment for rates and services, giving people greater scope to make use of their low apartheid wages and helping to shape the liberation movement by empowering ordinary people (of the middle and working classes) to take control of their lives and to struggle against the apartheid regime.
> (Naidoo, 2007: 59)

With the "triple challenge" of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015), many low-income black households are struggling as they are perennially in debt (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). This challenge can potentially explain the people's non-payment as emanating from a lack of income instead of a "general unwillingness" to pay. An analysis of the debts owed to municipalities indicates that nearly 80% of household debts are at least 90 days old. If the length of the duration the debt is outstanding is greater the risk of disconnection; the debt profile indicates that these households are unable, rather than unwilling, to pay their debts (Bayliss, 2016). Therefore, the non-payment of water services is because of a lack of money (Centre for Development Support [CDS], 2001; Akinyemi, 2018; Lilley, 2019).

Second, non-payment has also been argued to be "an effective tool of resistance against the apartheid state" (Dawson, 2010: 384). The refusal to pay for basic services was an ANC tactic to render South Africa "ungovernable" (Brown, 2005: 10) or to "destabilise" it (Earle et al., 2005: 10). Non-payment was a "powerful symbolic weapon against the apartheid state" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7). Non-payment continued unabated during apartheid since the authoritarian state feared increasing unrest (Brown, 2005). The refusal to pay culminated in "*de facto* subsidisation of township services" from the massive levels of non-payment (McDonald, 2002: 20; Brown, 2005: 10).

Third, is a belief in a "culture of non-payment" in post-apartheid South Africa. The "culture of non-payment" explanation entails that people got used to not paying for services during apartheid, and this behaviour has not changed since (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). Proponents of this view hold that "[c]itizens…have come to believe that it is their right to continue to receive free services" (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7).

Closely associated with this argument is the fourth explanation that people do not pay for basic services, including water, due to an inherent entitlement culture. At the birth of the "new" South Africa in 1994, many township residents never resumed payment for services, and thus non-payment has come to be defined as stemming from an "entitlement culture" that was born during apartheid (Ajam, 2001. Bond, 2000; von Schnitzler, 2008; Worku, 2018). In the new South Africa, there were drives to motivate residents to pay for services by couching payment in a moral language of "empowered" and "active" citizenship (von Schnitzler, 2008: 906). However, these initiatives "failed spectacularly" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7, 2013: 683). Some people exhibit what some commentators have described as a "general unwillingness" to pay for municipal services (Lilley, 2019).

The non-payment of basic services, water included, has also been related to the fact that black areas have consistently received poor basic services comparatively, a "culture of non-servicing" (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). This argument resonates with some scholars who have attributed non-payment to declining customer satisfaction levels (Akinyemi et al., 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020). The impact of irregular or frequent water interruption has significantly discouraged consumers' payment for water services (Akinyemi et al., 2018). Consumer dissatisfaction often leads to the unwillingness to pay for essential services (Mutyambizi et al., 2020: 19).

Non-payment becomes a strategy in which some citizens claim their right to water and do not allow payment for water services to influence whether they get water. When disconnections are effected, like in the early 2000s, litigation is an avenue that some concerned citizens have employed to safeguard their right to access to water.

2.8.2. Litigation

South African legislation allows people to challenge government decisions related to basic services provision, including water services. An important area requiring the state's protection relates to disconnections. The state must ensure that disconnections are done in a "fair and reasonable" manner and must strive to protect people who cannot afford to pay for water (Chirwa, 2004: 237). South Africa's Water Services Act 108 of 1997 represents an admirable legislative measure of discharging this duty by the state. According to section 4(1) of the Act, a service provider must set conditions for water services. These terms include the circumstances under which water services may be limited or discontinued and procedures for limiting or discontinuing water services. Section 4(3) stipulates that procedures for the limitation or discontinuance of water service must:

> (a) be fair and equitable;
> (b) provide for reasonable notice of intention to limit or discontinue water services and for an opportunity to make representations, unless —
> (i) other consumers would be prejudiced;
> (ii) there is an emergency situation; or
> (iii) the consumer has interfered with a limited or discontinued service; and
> (c) not result in a person being denied access to basic water services for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water service authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services.

In South Africa, there are four prominent legal cases concerning people's right to water which demonstrate citizens taking their grievances to the courts for resolution, and these are:

(a) *Manqele versus Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council* (2001)

In 2001, Christina Manqele, a resident of Chatsworth township, filed a legal claim against the Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council over a disconnection to water services. She claimed that the municipality had acted in contravention to the Water Services Act (1997) through disconnecting her water supply for non-payment (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006; Bulled, 2015: 7-8; Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208).

The Durban High Court initially ordered the municipality to reinstate Manqele's water supply in a short-lived victory. However, in the final judgment, the court argued that Manqele had "chosen" not to limit herself to the Council's free water allowance and had tried to reconnect illegally; she had thus relinquished any right to water (Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208). Thus, in not paying for water services, Manqele had compromised the ability to claim her right to water (Bulled 2015: 7-8; Angel and Loftus 2019: 208).

While the *Manqele case* was a partial victory in the fight for the HRtW, it also strengthened the state as the institution with the sole authority to decide what is and what is not, a just distribution of water. This case further showed that citizens could only claim the HRtW if they met certain obligations (Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208). The following case built on the *Manqele case* regarding the state's role in upholding the HRtW.

(b) *Bon Vista Mansions versus Southern Metropolitan Local Council* (2002)

In 2002, *Residents of Bon Vista Mansions versus Southern Metropolitan Local Council* was heard in court. The applicants, Mr Ngobeni et al., were residents of a block of flats in Johannesburg's Hillbrow area. The Council disconnected the residents' water services due to non-payment. The applicants contended that the discontinuation was unlawful (Chirwa, 2004: 238; de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 69; Pegan et al., 2007).

As an extension of the government, the High Court held that the Southern Metropolitan Local Council was mandated to provide water to everyone as per S27(1) of the Constitution. Even though this may not always be possible, according to law, the Council was expected to take the necessary steps to enact legislation that would eventually bring about the realisation of universal access to clean water, in line with S27(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). The Court subsequently found that the Council's disconnection of existing water supply to water users *prima facie* constituted a breach of its constitutional obligation to respect the right of (existing) access to water and that the applicants had satisfied the requirements for the granting of an interim interdict. The Council subsequently reinstated water supply to the flats. A disconnection might lead to a denial of access to basic water services for non-payment. Services might not be disconnected if a consumer demonstrates to the Court that they could not afford to pay. (Chirwa, 2004: 238).

The Court, citing S4(3) of the Water Services Act (1997), held that all procedures related to disconnection must be fair and equitable. Accordingly, a municipality cannot disconnect basic water supply if a resident demonstrates an inability to pay for it (Pegan et al., 2007: 59). Welch noted that the High Court stated the following:

> Water supply may not be discontinued if it results in a person being denied access to water services for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services.
> (Welch, 2005: 62)

The *Bon Vista case* demonstrated how disadvantaged citizens could use HRtW as a legal tool. Though similar to the *Manqele case*, it was decided before the promulgation of the basic water regulations, the Court in *Bon Vista* relied on the Constitution (1996) and the Act (1997) to operationalise the right to water (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70). The case lends itself to the "generous" approach to interpreting the *Bill of Rights* (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70). This approach gives a broad interpretation of the provisions of the *Bill of Rights*, in contrast to the *Manqele* case, where the Court had adopted a very narrow approach to S27(2) of the Constitution (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70).

(c) *Mazibuko and Others versus City of Johannesburg and Others* (2009)

The faulty water services infrastructure installed during apartheid caused rampant water leaks in Soweto. In Phiri, Soweto, water piping was first installed in the 1940s and 1950s. Poor material was used, and sub-standard engineering resulted in a "chaotic" water reticulation infrastructure and water wastages (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 526-7). Water piped to each household in Phiri was charged for a "deemed" consumption of 20kl of water per month at a flat rate of R68.40. However, Soweto's actual monthly household "consumption" was about 67kl per household per month - officials were unable to distinguish actual consumption from water lost through leaks from poor infrastructure. Moreover, the flat rate of payment in areas of "deemed consumption" was less than 10% (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 527).

Johannesburg Water Pty (Ltd.), the state-owned WSP in Johannesburg, implemented Operation *Gcin'amanzi* (Zulu for 'Save Water') in 2003 to address the severe water supply problems experienced in the area. The project was rolled out first in the area of Phiri, in Soweto. Johannesburg Water replaced faulty and run-down water infrastructure. The WSP installed pre-paid water meters. Community members who used more than their allocated FBW allowance of 6kl per household monthly were billed accordingly (International Commission of Jurists [ICJ], 2018). This was done in tandem with installing flow restrictors and pre-payment meters (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 530).

Some of the elements of Operation *Gcin'amanzi* came under scrutiny in the Lindiwe *Mazibuko and Others versus City of Johannesburg and Others* case particularly concerning the amount of free water allocated to each household or, put conversely, the extent to which residents were now expected to pay for services. The residents raised three key contentions. The first was that installing pre-paid water meters was unlawful in that it was not authorised by national legislation or by municipal by-laws. Secondly, they argued that installing the meters was unfair and illegal for various reasons, including no proper consultation with residents. Mazibuko et al. argued that prepaid water meters represent a threat to dignity and health and immediate risk to life if a fire

occurs. A danger of self-disconnecting prepayment meters was illustrated when two children died in a Soweto shack fire on 27 March 2005, which in turn catalysed the *Mazibuko* case (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 1; Bond, 2010: 5). Residents could not access water to put out the fire because water had been cut. Thirdly, *Mazibuko et al*. argued that the City's policy of allocating 6kl of free water per household was unreasonable in that both rich and poor households benefited from the free allocation of water (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 530; Soyapi, 2017: 14-15).

Ms Lindiwe Mazibuko et al. were aggrieved by the decision of the WSP to abandon the flat-rate consumption charge (Matchaya et al., 2018: 10). Furthermore, 6kl did not provide the constitutionally promised "access to sufficient water" where more than four people occupy a stand because this entails less than 50l per person per day – which the residents argue is the minimum amount that is "sufficient".

In the *Mazibuko et al.* case, the Constitutional Court held that the changes to water consumption introduced by the provider were within the bounds of reasonableness and did not violate the right of access to water (Matchaya et al., 2018: 10-11). While the judgment in the Mazibuko case was not favourable to Mazibuko et al., it offered the judiciary an opportunity to consider the domestic implementation of international human rights norms in South African law – particularly S27(1), which affords everyone the right to access sufficient water (Matchaya et al., 2018). The case demonstrated that socio-economic rights, such as the right to access sufficient water could be, "claimed, contested and [...] realized by [the government's] continual review and adjustment of its water policies in response to ongoing public interest litigation" (Danchin, 2010). It also demonstrated how to hold the state accountable via a constitutional culture of justification and how participatory and deliberative democracy is ultimately deepened by economic and social rights (Danchin, 2010).

(d) *City of Cape Town versus Strümpher* (2012)

The City of Cape Town versus Strümpher case resulted from the disconnection of the water supply to the respondent's property - Marcel Mouzakis Strümpher. Strümpher had an outstanding water bill amounting to R180,000 to settle in two days. He disputed the account because the water meter was faulty (Couzen, 2015: 1171). The City Council argued that Strümpher's water services were lawfully terminated because he did not honour the contract by failing to settle his bill. The court held that to expect the respondent to pay while he disputed the account was unfair. The right to water was not just a personal or contractual one, but it flowed from the constitutional right to water. The court granted a spoliation order to restore the status quo (Matchaya et al., 2018: 11). This case demonstrates that the HRtW is indeed justiciable.

2.8.3. Unregulated private alternatives

In the absence of authorities providing communities with water services, residents of different communities seek alternative ways to access water, amongst others through other residents or non-governmental organisations. Some of these alternatives require that one has containers to store water. These containers come in various shapes and sizes. Residents of communities where frequent water interruptions occur use the containers to store tap water when it is available and use it when there is an interruption. They use the same containers to store water sourced through unregulated private alternatives.

Rainwater harvesting (RWH) is an alternative way of sourcing freshwater (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017). RWH describes rainwater runoff's collection, storage, and use (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1050; Selala et al., 2018: 223). Domestic (D)RWH is one of the broad categories of RWH where people collect water from roofs, courtyards, and other surfaces and store it for household use and domestic agricultural activities (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1050). DRWH is a strategy that can benefit underprivileged communities in urban and rural areas struggling to access clean water (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014;

Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017). Some of these communities may not be connected to water supply networks, or they are in areas where the costs of exploiting available resources are relatively high (Selala et al., 2018: 223). The major challenge with collecting rainwater is that it is expensive to install and maintain RWH systems (Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017: 81; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163), and households may lack space to install infrastructure (Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163). Climate change may also negatively affect the viability of such a system in the long run as droughts are becoming more frequent.

In some instances, communities rely on artisanal technologies such as sinking boreholes and wells for clean and safe water. Some of these services may be provided by NGOs, small businesses, or individuals at a cost (Bakker, 2013: 294). All of these are "private" (in the sense of non-governmental) approaches to service provision undertaken by members of the "public" (Bakker, 2013: 294). In some instances, people have resorted to fetching water from neighbouring areas, boreholes, rivers, wells and surface sources (Hove et al., 2019: 6). These sources have increased their vulnerabilities from consuming contaminated water.

There are possible health risks associated with consuming water from these alternative sources. For example, there are contradictory results on the quality of the water sourced through RWH, and research shows that how and where it is harvested, and levels of pollution affect water quality (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1052; Selala et al., 2018: 223; Dobrowsky et al., 2014: 401; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163), Water from rivers and streams is often dirty and may be contaminated. When communities relied on such sources of water in South Africa, there were outbreaks of diseases like cholera. Noted earlier, during the period 2000-2002, when defaulters had their water services terminated in KwaZulu-Natal, some residents of Ngwelezane ended up consuming contaminated water from the Umfolozi River and streams close to Madlebe (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 7). A similar incident in which people resorted to getting water from contaminated sources happened in Johannesburg. Residents of Alexandra township fetched water from nearby polluted streams after Johannesburg Water had terminated water services from defaulters (McKinley, 2005; Angel and Loftus, 2019).

2.8.4. Destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections[27]

Some residents in predominantly disadvantaged communities have resorted to destroying water meters and making illegal connections (Bakker, 2011; von Schnitzler, 2013; Mogalagadi, 2017; van Zyl et al., 2018; Bond and Galvin, 2019). In a bid to access water, some strategies involve illegally tapping into existing water networks or bypassing their meters (Bakker, 2011: 294) with the aid of "midnight plumbers" (Bakker, 2011: 294; von Schnitzler, 2013: 674) or "informal plumbers" (Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The "plumbers" generally solicit the services of a skilled person, who in some cases is a current or former municipal employee earning an income, or a family member (von Schnitzler, 2013: 674; Muller, 2020: 39). These are current or former municipal employees who have the expertise and the equipment to do it (Muller, 2020:39). In some instances, the connections are made "poorly" (Muller, 2020: 39). Such connections are widespread in South Africa and have a long-term effect on water supply and the reliability and longevity of water infrastructure. Illegal connections shorten the lifespan of infrastructure and allow leaks to develop whilst also allowing pollutants to enter the system. While these connections are frowned upon, the residents view them as "self-help" (Muller, 2020: 39).

In the short run, illegal connections may appear to be a solution; however, the long-term impact may be adverse (Bond and Galvin, 2019: 242). The unwillingness to pay, high water bills, and high debts led to increasing incidents of vandalism and tampering with water infrastructure (van Zyl et al., 2018: 30). Bypassing a pre-paid water meter, or any other meter for that matter, is not an easy decision for consumers; it is arrived at after an extensive evaluation in a household (von Schnitzler, 2013: 674). Bond and Galvin (2019) explain the two strategies as manifestations of urban "commoning, " a survival strategy and a potential eco-socialist project.

[27] I term these connections "illegal" because people who authorise the connections to be done on municipal property do not have the right to do so. By giving permission for the connection to be done, they are undermining the municipal's authority and jurisdiction over the equipment.

In communities outside metros, some households resort to illegal connections because their municipalities do not install water infrastructure from the main pipes, or municipalities may charge a fee for it, which the residents cannot afford. To avert rising tension and conflict with communities in Johannesburg, the City of Johannesburg has instructed its artisans to repair leaks found where illegal connections have been made instead of disconnecting them, fixing the infrastructure, and installing a meter (Muller, 2020: 39).

Another response by insurgent citizens to the violation of their HRtW is through protest activity or *toyi-toying* as an avenue to get heard as citizens get increasingly agitated by the state's response or lack thereof.

2.8.5. *Toyi-toying*

A popular way of expressing resistance in the 1980s to the apartheid state by the youth was *toyi-toying – a* "high-stepping syncopated marching style" (Alexander and McGregor, 2020: 1-2). *Toyi-toying* was done to render townships "ungovernable". During a toyi-toyi, young men and women march and chant struggle songs. Violence is symbolically viewed as a legitimate collective act during a *toyi-toyi*. The dance has been attributed to creating "social solidarity" as well as the "militarization of youth culture" (Alexander and McGregor, 2020: 1-2). Other actions associated with protests from the 1980s which have been adopted include burning barricades, burning down public and private property, chanting and singing struggle songs, the coercion of other community members to ensure participation, and violent clashes with police (von Holdt et al., 2011: 50-51).

There is a prevalent belief that only media coverage can induce urgent intervention from political authorities and the state, and *toyi-toying* is the vehicle to achieve this. The contemporary use of violence in *toyi-toying*, motivated by this current structure of political opportunity, is legitimised by mobilising the past use of violence in the anti-apartheid struggle (Matlala and Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015: 58). Between 2005 and 2017, about 14,200 community protests occurred in the country. In 2006, there were 50

incidents, increasing to a peak of 471 in 2012 and a figure of more than 320 annually from 2012-2017 (Alexander et al., 2018). Service delivery protests generally are described as "community protests" (Alexander et al., 2018: 27); however, the protesters may not specify the exact communal issue (such as water, electricity or housing) (Lancaster, 2018: 31). The rate at which *toyi-toying* has escalated in the "new" South Africa has resulted in the country being dubbed "the protest capital of the world" (Alexander, 2012). Brown (2015: 16) mildly states that "country of protest and its people are protesters".

One of the earliest protests involving water service delivery in South Africa was sparked by an article written by Trevor Ngwane, then-head of the regional ANC in Soweto, in September 1999 (Bond, ND; Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). Ngwane vehemently criticised water commodification through a Suez water contract between the consortium of which it was part, Johannesburg Water Management, and the City of Johannesburg (Bond, ND). Ngwane was dismissed from the ANC in the same month the article was published. Two months after Ngwane's dismissal, about 20,000 members of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) marched in protest after having declared, "To Hell, it's War!", and the rise of a new movement – the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in mid-2000 – just as the contract was formalised (Bond, ND; Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). Ngwane then launched Operation *Vulamanzi* (Water for All), which encouraged people to pull out or bypass their prepaid water meters in Soweto (Piper, 2014: 115).

Another well-noted protest resulting from a water-related issue was in September 2003 when Phiri residents embarked on a protest over Operation *Gcin'amanzi*. In 2003, approximately 275,000 households, translating to at least 1,5 million people, were disconnected from water services at least once due to non-payment (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 17). In 2003 the Coalition against Water Privatisation (CAWP) was formed. It brought together social movements and progressive NGOs (Bayliss and Adam, 2012: 340). CAWP organised protests throughout South Africa against poor service delivery and introducing prepaid meters (Bayliss and Adam, 2012: 340). Both the APF and CAWP no longer exist.

Another well-noted protest linked to prepaid water meters occurred in November 2004. Hundreds of protesters made their way to the Civic Centre in Braamfontein from Mary Fitzgerald Square in Johannesburg. The protest responded to the increasing installation of prepaid meters in townships around Johannesburg (von Schnitzler, 2008: 899). Many protesters brought meters, dumping them at the Civic Centre. In 2011, the "Toilet Wars" erupted in the Western Cape Province, initially protesting only the state's partial provision of flush toilets. Some Western Cape residents noted that private hygiene and sanitation facilities were reminiscent of apartheid, and in the "new" South Africa, this showed the state's failures to deliver public services (Robins, 2014: 480; Bulled, 2015: 539). Residents of Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town, decanted buckets of human waste at the Western Cape Legislature and flung buckets of human waste at the then-Western Cape Premier, Helen Zille, and the city's mayor at the time, Patricia de Lille (Robins, 2014). Other "poo protests" sites were along the N1 highway and the Cape Town International Airport (CPT). Protesters at CPT were detained, arrested and subsequently charged under the Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 for delaying flights (Robins, 2014, 480; Bulled, 2015: 539).

The explosion in protests since the early 2000s makes it clear that many people do not consider forms of engagement other than *toyi-toying* as effective measures to deal with corrupt or incompetent municipal councillors and officials (Tapela and Pointer, 2013). Protests demonstrate the apartheid legacies of inequity, exclusion, and segregation, as well as give a reflection of a robust civic willingness to engage in re-formulating and reimagining the post-apartheid state (Rodina and Harris, 2016: 351). Access to sufficient water is an issue of life or death, and a continuing decline in supply in South Africa is accompanied by increasing conflict and tension. Some scholars have linked *toyi-toying* with violent masculinities emanating from a crisis of representation in local government (Hove et al., 2019: 2).

Von Holdt et al. (2011) argue that violence is a critical aspect of insurgent citizenship in South Africa:

> Violence is integral to insurgent citizenship in South Africa. Violence—both against the state and against collaborators in the community—was very much part of the insurgent movement of the anti-apartheid struggle, which at its heart was a struggle to assert the rights to citizenship of the black majority, and provides a repertoire of practices when frustration and anger become too much.
>
> Violence is understood as a language, a message, a way of calling out to higher authorities about the state of things in their town but its violence makes it a warning at the same time…
> (von Holdt et al., 2011: 27)

I concur with Brown (2015: 7), who argues that the fight for equality, particularly around access to basic needs and services, is what is driving insurgency. He says;

> Contemporary South African politics are being driven by the practices of equality embarked upon by insurgent citizens. Most significant of these acts – those that most disturb the ordinary operations of the existing order – are those made by communities of the poor, asserting their agency as political actors. These actions expand the possibilities of politics. The disruption they create is met by representatives of the existing order – notably, the state and its police forces – with responses ranging from engagement to repression.
> (Brown, 2015: 7)

Tactics embarked on by insurgent citizens are generally negatively received and portrayed by both the state and the media, which delegitimise and criminalise the invented spaces. Protests generally have been dealt with a heavy hand by state security.

2.9. Conclusion

Water scarcity in South Africa has anthropogenic drivers. While the country has natural and biophysical factors that affect freshwater resources, human activities, conscious or not, have significantly to water scarcity. This brings the importance of water politics into the spectrum, particularly how water is allocated, distributed, and accessed.

Therefore, a major starting point was a relook at the definitions of hydropolitics and how it links to power. However, most definitions proposed did not meaningfully encompass small scale interaction, and for this study, an explanation of how citizenship is expressed within the context of access to water. Henwood and Turton's (2002) definition and explanation was very useful as they allowed for an analysis of different *scales* and *range* of issues in hydropolitics. Different actors conceptualised a broadened definition of hydropolitics that paid attention to the allocation, distribution and accessing of water resources and services within a given context.

I looked at citizenship literature and drew from Marshall's triadic theory of citizenship with this definition. According to him, full citizenship was attained in three successive steps: civil, political, and social citizenship. His main contribution lay in the development of citizenship as a *legal status*. His account suggests that the attainment of full citizenship rights in the 20th century was a social process that was both complete and irreversible. Following this logic, once recognised and institutionalised, citizenship rights represent modern democracies' irretrievable features. Citizenship is always "under construction", and the best way to understand it is by acknowledging that citizenship is always in dispute in theory and practice. In practice, two crucial aspects lead to a show of citizenship: *conscience* (a conviction of being a citizen stemming from an awareness of what it means) and *exercise* (an enactment of citizenship roles and responsibilities).

I argue that in contemporary South Africa, invited spaces are in decline, and citizens are increasingly "inventing" spaces of participation. Citizens in these invented spaces have embarked on insurgent forms of expression. Within the context of accessing water, I demonstrate how the following have been avenues for expression: non-payment, litigation, unregulated private alternatives, destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections, and *toyi-toying*. The next chapter focuses on how the allocation of water in the new South Africa

CHAPTER THREE

Flows of Power - Flows of Water: Water Allocation in South Africa

"Water brings us together, and pulls us apart."
Larry A. Swatuk (2017)

3.1. Introduction

Water is deeply political. The allocation of water is a space characterised by power contestations. The exercise of power over access to water resources and services is crucial as it reflects the hydropolitics of a society. Understanding expressions of citizenship within the context of Madibeng Local Municipality hydropolitics requires an analysis of water governance systems in post-apartheid South Africa, as this will demonstrate how current asymmetrical access to water services has emerged. This chapter analyses the social, political, economic, and institutional context in which South African water governance systems have evolved.

By naming the chapter "Flows of Power - Flows of Water", I argue a link between access to water and power. I begin the chapter by defining water governance and mirroring it with hydropolitics. I unpack how South Africa's shift from welfarism reflected in the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is at odds with subsequent and current neoliberal policies. This chapter investigates the disjuncture between mandates supporting the human right to water; and asymmetrical water access by impoverished communities. The chapter ends with an overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as an epitome of South Africa.

3.2. Water governance in South Africa

Water governance refers to a range of social, political, economic and administrative systems to develop and manage water resources and water service delivery in a given society. This set of systems and processes inform the decision-making process about water resource development and management (Batchelor, 2007:1; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019: 2). Water governance pays more attention to the process in which decisions are made, as opposed to the actual decisions themselves (Batchelor, 2007: 1; OECD, 2015; Jacobs-Mata et al., 2021: 10). Governance requires buy-in from various stakeholders with vested interests in water and management uses. These include, but are not limited to, public and private sector stakeholders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (OECD, 2011).

The management of water resources is a highly contentious political and environmental issue (Bakker; 2010; 2012; Jankielsohn, 2012; Hellberg, 2015). Water governance is a critical component in the overall governance of a society, especially in a country like South Africa. As a resource, water connects people in different geopolitical spaces and across all social stratum, state, and non-state actors; and requires high capital investments (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019: 2). Governance systems often include normative ideas of what defines "good governance": for example, adequately liberalised markets, transparent decision-making, water justice, etc. Contextually, we can therefore distinguish between "good" and "bad" water governance. Swatuk (2010: 521) notes that governance includes public consultation and participation, underpinned by responsible authorities' clear and transparent decision-making.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Water Governance Facility (WGF) (2019) proposes four fundamental dimensions of water governance, and these are:

(i) Social - The fair allocation of water resources and services among various socio-economic groups, and its culminating effects on society;

(ii) Economic - Efficiency in water allocation and use, as well as the role of water in economic growth;

(iii) Political - Equal rights and opportunities for different stakeholders involved in the decision-making processes associated with the allocation and distribution of water; and lastly;

(iv) Environmental - The sustainable use of water and related ecosystem services, including fish production, water provisioning, and recreation. Poor regulation in many areas has resulted in declining water quality from heavy agricultural and industrial pollution.

The usefulness of these four dimensions is that they serve as a lens to assess water governance in South Africa by exploring the various social, political, economic, and environmental dimensions of water management. There is a profoundly political element to water governance, and as such, water governance systems usually reflect the political realities at international, national, provincial, and local levels (Batchelor, 2007). Water governance raises a series of issues associated with how, by whom, and under what conditions the decisions are made (Batchelor, 2007; Jacobs-Mata, 2021: 10). It is linked to the following questions, "who gets which water? When and how? And who has the right to water, and related services, and their benefits?" (UNDP-WGF, 2019). Put differently, decisions in hydropolitics revolve around the questions of "who gets what [water], when, where and how" (Turton, 2002: 16).

Water governance is intricately linked with hydropolitics - it is a process and an outcome of water politics. Water governance generally centres on institutions' role in the provision of water and their relationships. Water governances are system and processes that exist that influence the allocation of water. Hydropolitics on the other hand is hydropolitics is *as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context*. The following section critiques water governance systems that were implemented in South Africa post-apartheid.

3.3. Mandates and the human right to water in South Africa

In 1994, the new ANC-led government inherited a highly unequal society, and access to water was one of the areas in which it sought to improve the citizenry's lives. About 14 million people did not have access to a safe water supply, and more than 21 million people, half the population, lacked access to adequate sanitation services in 1994. Lack of access to water was a major problem in rural areas (DWAF, 2004a: 4). Water justice and the realisation of the Human Right to Water are core aspects of historical injustices that amplified the poverty and inequality in black communities. The government implemented a new Constitution (RSA, 1996), which provides arguably the most sophisticated and comprehensive system for protecting the socio-economic rights of all the constitutions in the world today (BBC, 2014; Oechsli and Walker, 2015; Sahle et al., 2019). The Constitution (RSA, 1996) paved the way for legislation that supported the realisation of the right to water. What follows is a discussion of the constitutional right to water and supporting legislation that was promulgated to ensure that the right is realised.

3.3.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996)

The Constitution (RSA, 1996) was founded on creating a just and equal society. It came from a recognition of historical injustices and atrocities from colonialism and apartheid. The envisioned new South African would is based on constitutionalism grounded in democratic values, social justice, and fundamental respect of human rights. South Africa was one of the first countries in the region to have the right to water listed as a constitutional right (Soyapi, 2017: 14).

The post-apartheid state's immediate efforts to improve water access were evident in its pursuit of universalising the Human Right to Water (HRtW). Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), the *Bill of Rights*, is "a cornerstone of South Africa democracy" that details socio-economic rights for everyone in South Africa – citizen or not. Four sections of the *Bill of Rights* reinforce the right to access water. Stemming from a history in which restrictions to the rights of black people entailed a violation of human rights,

S10 states that "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected". This section safeguards citizens from indignity resulting from the lack of access to water and sanitation, which were the state's responsibility. Most directly linked to water, S27 (1)(b) that states, "everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water". To ensure that people live in a habitable environment conducive to life, S24(a) states that "everyone has a right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being". Finally, to hold the state accountable for the ultimate realisation of the right of access to water, S27(2) mandates the state to "The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights [i.e., health care, food, water and social security]". Section 152 of the Constitution (RSA) and indicated that municipalities were "to ensure the provision of services in a sustainable manner". With such directives in the Constitution (1996), it was clear that access to water was one of the issues that the state was going to tackle.

3.3.2. Legislative framework

The international water community has hailed south Africa's water legislation as one of the most progressive pieces of international legislation and a significant step towards achieving the goals of IWRM and making it into law (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 510). Three essential instruments of legislation aimed at ensuring the equitable provision of water services introduced in post-apartheid South Africa stemming from the Constitution (1996) and these are the Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997; the National Water Act No. 36 of 1998, and the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000:

(i) The Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997

The Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997 was instituted per S3(1) of the Republic of South Africa's Constitution, which affirms everyone's right to access basic water and sanitation. The Water Services Act (1997) is the primary legislation regulating access to and the provision of water services. The 1997 Act makes provision for an institutional framework for the delivery of water supplies and sanitation and recognises the right of

access to basic water supply and sanitation necessary to secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to health or wellbeing:

> (a) the right of access to basic water supply and the right to basic sanitation necessary to secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to human health or well-being (*sic*);
> (b) the setting of national standards and norms and standards for tariffs in respect of water services…
> (g) financial assistance to water services institutions…
> (RSA, 1997)

The Act deals with water for consumption and sanitation services to households and other municipal water users by local governments (i.e., municipalities). The Water Services Act (1997) defines both "basic sanitation" and "basic water supply" as follows:

> "basic sanitation" means the prescribed minimum standard of services necessary for the safe, hygienic and adequate collection removal, disposal or purification of human excreta. domestic waste-water and sewage from households, including informal households…
>
> The minimum standard for basic sanitation services is –
> (a) the provision of appropriate health and hygiene education; and
> (b) a toilet which is safe, reliable, environmentally sound, easy to keep clean, provides privacy and protection against the weather, well ventilated, keeps smells to a minimum and prevents the entry and exit of flies and other disease-carrying pests.
>
> "basic water supply" means the prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene…

The Water Services Act (1997) details the provision of free basic water. Section 4(3)(c) indicates that provisions must be made to cater for poor people unable to pay for water services:

> "procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water services must not result in a person being denied access to basic water services for nonpayment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services".

> The minimum standard for basic water supply services is –
> (a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and
> (b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month –
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and
> (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (WSA, 1997)

The Act also mandates a water services institution to ensure that where water services are interrupted, people have access to water:

> A water services institution must take steps to ensure that where the water services usually provided by or on behalf of that water services institution are interrupted for a period of more than 24 hours for reasons other than those contemplated in section 4 of the Act, a consumer has access to alternative water services comprising – (a) at least 10 litres of potable water per person per day; and (b) sanitation services sufficient to protect health.
> (WSA, 1997)

The WSA (1997), through Chapter 6, regulates Water Boards as important Water Service Providers. The Act also acknowledges that while municipalities have authority to control water and sanitation services provision, all the other government spheres must contribute within the limits of physical and financial feasibility (See WSA, 1997 Chapter 9). The Water Services Act (1997) operates in tandem with the National Water Act No. 36 of 1998.

(ii) The National Water Act No. 36 of 1998

Before the implementation of the 1998 National Water Act, South Africa's water legislation was denoted by legal pluralism. It was a fusion of riparian rights, *dominus fluminis*, some permit systems, and unrecognised living customary water rights in former bantustans (Tewari, 2002: 7; 2009: 699; Kidd, 2009: 699; Tempelhoff, 2017: 192; van Koppen, 2017). Principle 3 in the White Paper on a National Water Policy (1997)

withdraws the riparian access principle, a core feature of South African water law since colonialism. The policy states that through the National Water Act (1998) and the Water Services Act (1997), "[t]here shall be no ownership of water but only a right (for environmental and basic human needs) or an authorisation for its use".

In support of universal access to water and the state's role in managing water resources, the National Water Act (1998) was implemented to contribute to ensuring that that the country's water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, and managed sustainably and equitably for the benefit of all people. The preamble of the Act states that:

> [W]ater is a natural resource that belongs to all people, and the discriminatory laws and practices in the past have prevented equal access to water, and the use of water resources.
> (RSA, 1998)

The 1998 NWA repealed more than 100 water laws and amendments, terminating all previous public and private water rights (Tewari, 2009: 703). This act constituted a drastic shift from the earlier water acts, predominantly based on riparian water rights (i.e., the 1906 Cape Colony Irrigation Act, the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act, and the 1956 National Water Act). It defines the state as the nation's water resources custodian. Only water required to meet basic human needs and maintain environmental sustainability is guaranteed as a right.

The NWA (1998) brought in the "public trust" principle, an internationally accepted principle. The South African public trust doctrine constitutes a revival of certain Roman, Roman-Dutch, and indigenous and customary law principles lost due to statutory intervention by the apartheid state. The objective of the South African public trust doctrine is listed as Principle 13 in the *Fundamental Principles and Objectives for a New Water Law for South Africa*:

> As custodian of the nation's water resources, the National Government shall ensure that the development, apportionment, management and use of those resources is carried out using the criteria of public interest, sustainability, equity and efficiency of use in a manner which reflects its public trust obligations and the value of water to society while ensuring that basic domestic needs, the requirements of the environment and international obligations are met.
> (DWAF, 2004b)

According to the 1998 National Water Act, "sufficient water" is the basic water quantity and the minimum standard of water supply that should sustain human life. The Act, therefore, confers on everyone a right of access to the "prescribed minimum standard of water supply necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity to households…to support life and personal hygiene", which is qualified as "basic water supply". Regulation 3(b) further proposes actual measures, or indicators, of this and describes the "minimum standard of water supply service" as:

> [A] minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month –
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and
> (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (NWA, 1998)

In accordance with the HRtW, the National Water Act (1998) gives effect to the water access rights enshrined in the Water Services Act (1997) by providing for a national water reserve. The "reserve" is a critical legal tool meant to help achieve the right of access to sufficient water (du Toit et al., 2009). Indeed, the National Water Act (1998) is not only popular for its objective of fighting against injustices inherited from colonialism and apartheid but globally, it is considered an ambitious water act because of its environmental perspective on the creation of this "reserve" (Bourblanc, 2015: 1).

The reserve comprises two aspects: first, "basic human needs reserve". This aspect entails water provided for free to everyone, which is meant to cover their daily needs, such as consumption and sanitation. The government is mandated by legislation to

ensure adequate water for basic needs such as drinking, cooking, and cleaning, at 25l per person per day (du Toit, 2019).

The second type of reserve is the "ecological reserve". This reserve constitutes water that will remain in the river to ensure the long-term sustainability of aquatic and associated ecosystems (Bourblanc, 2015: 2; du Toit, 2019). The ecological reserve is defined by scientists and adopted by the DWS Minister. Therefore, the reserve prioritises human and environmental needs before any other water uses may be considered. Water access is catered for through the reserve before other water licenses can be granted to strategic water sectors or users. The reserve is a guaranteed right that is not subject to institutional discretion. In this sense, the reserve trumps all other water use claims (du Toit et al., 2009). However, the ecological reserve has not been implemented, and scientific work to understand its implementation has been slow.

The National Water Act (1998) was founded on integrated water resources management (IWRM). The Act called for integrating several facets of water, including biophysical characteristics, societal issues, economic activities, and cultural and organisational aspects (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 4). The National Water Act is explicit on the CMA (Catchment Management Agency) establishment process. The Act stipulates how a CMA should be established, peoples' roles, and how the organisation's governing board should be constituted (RSA 1998). Section 78(1) of the National Water Act (1998) prescribes how CMAs are established in post-apartheid South Africa. Since one of the Act's core principles is decentralisation, there is a greater emphasis on public participation in water management and related decision-making processes. Decentralisation also rests on the subsidiary principles contained in the Constitution (1996). Subsidiarity entails delegating functions that can be more effectively and efficiently carried out by lower government levels to the lowest appropriate level. This, therefore, means that both the Constitution (1996) and the National Water Act (1998) are constitutive in the establishment of CMAs. To reduce redundancy and increase efficiency, Molewa (Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs from 2010–2014) reduced CMAs from 19 to nine in 2012 (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 4-5).

The establishment of nine CMAs was due to a reconsideration of the management model and viability assessments related toWRM, funding, skills, and expertise in regulation and oversight. This was also done in an attempt to improve IWRM. The nine CMAs were as follows: Limpopo and Olifants in the Mpumalanga Province); Inkomati-Usutu, Pongola-Umzimkulu, Vaal, Orange, Mzimvubu-Tsitsikamma, Breede-Gouritz and Berg-Olifants, all in the Western Cape Province. These CMAs were to be the symbol of post-apartheid water management with a shift in management from a central government to a more decentralised approach to give local communities, more so previously disadvantaged communities, a say in the management of water resources (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 5). The CMA rested on public participation.

The major drawback of making the state the public trustee of the country's water resources is that water allocation is done through a licensing system that increases the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) control over the resource. Some commentators have, therefore, described the National Water Act (1998) as an "unnecessarily interventionist [piece of] legislation" (Tewari, 2009). The Act also has had little impact on the reallocation of water because little has changed in the access to and control over water resources (Kemerink et al., 2011: 592). Many South Africans are still waiting for sufficient water access from their municipalities and other WSPs. To ensure that service delivery to disadvantaged communities, the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 was promulgated.

(iii) Municipal Systems Act No. 2000

The Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000, a critical policy framework that directs municipalities' service delivery, including water provision to households. In line with efforts to improve the lives of all in South Africa and attempts to redress past injustices, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) is meant to:

> [M]ove progressively towards the social and economic upliftment [sic] of local communities, and ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all.
> (Municipal Systems Act, 2000)

The Municipal Systems Act (2000) is a pro-poor policy. It centres on ensuring that the most marginalised and impoverished sections of South African communities are factored in when it comes to service provision – even for those who cannot afford it. In support of this, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) states the following:

> [T]o empower the poor and ensure the municipalities put in place service tariffs and credit control policies that take their needs into account by providing a framework for the provision of services.
> (Municipal Systems Act, 2000)

The MSA (2000) stresses two crucial elements in the functionality of municipalities, and these are "access to basic services" and "cost recovery". Regarding accessing basic water, section 74(2)(c) provides that indigent households must access basic services through tariffs that cover costs only, special tariffs or other methods of cross-subsidisation. Section 74 of the MSA (2000) states that,

> "A municipal council must adopt and implement a tariff policy on the levying of fees for municipal services provided by the municipality itself or by way of service delivery agreements, and which complies with....any other applicable legislation".
> [MSA, 2000]

The Act further states in S75 that, "[a] municipal council must adopt by-laws to give effect to the implementation and enforcement of its tariff policy" (MSA, 2000). This demonstrates that tariffs should be implemented differentially, bearing in mind the different socio-economic factors that impact one's affordability, which should not lead to unfair discrimination (MSA, 2000). Section 2 of the *Tariff Policy* pays particular attention to "poor households" due to their ability to pay for municipal services. Indigent households should receive basic services in the following ways:

- tariffs that only meet operating and maintenance costs – this means that there is a charge for services, and this should only be for municipalities to recoup costs for expenses incurred for service provision;
- special tariffs or lifeline tariffs for low levels of use or consumption of services or basic levels of service – indigent households should be provided with a basic allocation at a minimum tariff; and
- any other direct or indirect method of subsidising tariffs for disadvantaged households – and by this, indigent households can access water for free.

In South Africa, 169 municipalities out of 278 are water services authorities. These constituted six metros, 21 district municipalities (mostly in rural areas in former bantustans), and 142 local municipalities. Municipalities can also solicit a public or private WSP to provide water and sanitation services. The regulatory framework provides a range of institutional arrangements to ensure service provision. Providers may include another municipality, a municipal utility, a multi-jurisdictional utility, a water board, a community-based organisation, a private company, or an entity owned by a municipality and national government (Toxopeüs, 2019a).

As WSAs, municipalities may only agree to contract a private-sector provider as WSP after considering all known public sector providers that can perform the functions (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The regulations set out are mandatory contractual provisions that a WSA must observe when contracting with a WSP. These include the range of services to be provided, specific targets and indicators, and the obligations placed on municipalities necessary to achieve the targets (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The appointment of service providers has been a contentious issue in contemporary South Africa as allegations of corruption and mismanagement have marred the process. The contract places a duty on the provider to supply services directly to the water users. The provider must prepare and publish a users' charter that establishes a system for dealing with their complaints and sets out their right to redress (Toxopeüs, 2019a). Consumers within the jurisdiction must participate in developing the charter.

The Municipal Systems Act (2000) mandates local governments to consult with affected communities on any issues related to service provision. However, municipal officials tend to function within their directorates without sufficient cross-directorate interaction (Haigh et al., 2010: 475). There is also a top-down approach in service provision, which contradicts the processes stipulated in the Development Facilitation Act No. 67 of 1995. The Development Facilitation (1995) states that an integrated development plan (IDP) must be prepared to ensure proper coordination and development efforts. IDPs are a very fundamental government mechanism to transform historical structural differences in South Africa. The IDP process is a core means of developing a community by promoting public participation in its analyses and planning phases (Geyer, 2006 in Haigh et al., 2010: 476). This process is a legal requirement of the local government. It capacitates officials and politicians on the importance of integrated planning and management (Haigh et al., 2010: 476). However, as the IDP is presently set out in the Municipal Systems Act (2000), it is not a prerequisite for water availability and demand to be considered during all parts of development planning. Furthermore, the IDP process does not mandate a discussion of how the development will impact natural resources. The IDP deals separately with services that impact water resources, including solid waste and management, and water and sanitation services.

It remains the South African state's constitutional mandate to provide water, though this is done through the DWS and the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). On a national level, and municipalities – which are representative of local governments. To resolve problems associated with governance, planning, and accountability within the context of service delivery, CoGTA was brought in with a long-term objective of improving the operations of municipalities (Toxopeüs, 2019b).

3.3.3. Policy Framework

Several policies have been implemented since 1994. The most important ones I will discuss are the Free Basic Water Policy (2001) that ensured that the HRtW could be realised even for disadvantaged communities from the provision of a basic water

allocation at the state's expense; and the two National Water Resources Strategies (2003; 2008).

(i) Free Basic Water Policy (2001)

In February 2001, Kader Asmal (Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry from 1994–1999) announced that the government would ensure that all disadvantaged households are given a basic supply of water free of charge (i.e. at the cost of the government). This culminated in the *Free Basic Water Implementation Strategy* document – a legal framework for implementation of free basic water is essentially that of tariff setting, which is guided by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996); WSA (1997) and the MSA (2000).

The FBWP (2001) was given legal status by promulgating tariff regulations in June 2001 (Muller, 2008: 74). According to the FBWP (2001), the maximum free allocation for water per household was pegged at 6,000 litres (6 kilolitres) of water per month. This free basic allocation was calculated at 25 litres per person per day for a family of eight. This allocation was insufficient as it lasted less than half a month (Mosdell and Annie Leatt, 2005: Bond and Dugard, 2008; Muller, 2009). People without money then had to wait until the next month when a FBWP allocation was credited. This meant that in post-apartheid South Africa, some citizens could not access their HRtW, raising tensions between the new citizens and the new state.

(ii) National Water Resources Management Strategy

The National Water Resources Management Strategy (NWRMS) determines how South Africa's water resources are developed, protected and managed sustainably. The strategy identified through which this will be accomplished: improved institutional framework, strengthening sector capacity, and through various mechanisms and concepts, such as water re-use and water off-setting. The core objectives of the strategy are listed as follows: water supports the development and the elimination of poverty and inequality; water contributes to the economy and job creation; and; water is

protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled sustainably and equitably. Its major focus is equitable and sustainable access and use of water by all South Africans while sustaining our water resource (seeking to resolve supply-demand issues, water loss and water stress). Equity and redistribution will be attained through the authorisation process and other mechanisms and programmes, such as water allocation reform, financial support to emerging farmers, and urban and rural local economic development initiatives. The NWRS2 builds on the first NWRS published in 2004. It responds to priorities set by the Government within the National Development Plan (NDP) and the National Water Act imperatives that support sustainable development.

3.4. South Africa's shift from welfarism to neoliberalism

Since the insufficient provision of water to black communities was a defining factor of apartheid, asymmetrical access to water between the races was one of the core issues that the new South Africa government needed to address. From the end of apartheid, five key policies were introduced to redress poverty, inequality, and unemployment and contribute to socio-economic development. I will discuss each, where possible, pay particular attention to their core aspects as well as their link to the realisation of the universalisation of the right to water:

3.4.1. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994-1996)

Before the momentous 1994 elections, the ANC began implementing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which had a welfarist slant (Bond, 2007; 2010; Nnadozie, 2011). The programme was an initiative to provide citizens with "a decent living standard and economic security" (Seekings, 2011: 22). It resonated with the aspiration detailed in the 1955 *Freedom Charter*[28] (Sahle et al., 2019: 299). The RDP was the basis of the people's contract with the post-apartheid state (McKinley, 2004: 181). The programme was to ensure that all the citizens get access to the mainstream

[28] On June 25 and 26 in 1955, the Congress of the People adopted the *Freedom Charter* (the Charter) in Kliptown, Soweto. The Charter has been viewed as a "blueprint" for the future of South Africa, in which its "all-embracing content", have been subject to scrutiny (Booyse, 1987: 5).

economy and socio-economic rights, thereby reducing historical imbalances (Nleya, 2008: 270; Kgatle, 2020: 3). The RDP document affirmed a commitment to growth and development through reconstructing South African society and redistributing state resources (Chirwa, 2009: 183; Kgatle, 2017: 4). The state document explicitly noted the importance of an interventionist state that would be the focal point in the reconstruction and development:

> Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the State, a thriving private sector and active involvement by all sectors of civil society. The role of the Government and the public sector within the broader economy has to be redefined so that reconstruction and development are facilitated. In a wide range of areas, the GNU will take the lead in reforming and addressing structural conditions. In doing so, its guidelines will remain the basic people-driven principles of the RDP.
> (RSA 1994, Sections. 3.1.2 and 3.1.3)

The RDP ensured equality in accessing the state resources such as water, hence an active pursuit of the universalisation of the HRtW. The official RDP document stated that "[t]he fundamental principle of our water resources policy is the right to access clean water – 'water security for all'" (RSA, 1994: 28). The provision of water was in line with one of the ANC's first electoral promises - to provide a basic water allocation *free of cost* to all South Africans (Bond, 2007: 6). This was captured in the RDP document, which stated that,

> (T)he first priority is to begin to meet the basic needs of people – jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare.
> (RSA, 1994: 7)

The RDP document stated that "[w]ater is a natural resource and should be made available in a sustainable manner to all South Africans" (RSA, 1994: S2.6.1.). In pursuit of the right of access to adequate water, the RDP determined a minimum quantity of water that an individual should have access to a day in both the short and medium

terms. The short-term aim regarding water services provision was to provide all households with clean water supplied at 20–30 litres per person per day, within 200 metres. In the medium term, the quantity would increase to 50–60 litres per day available on site (ANC, 1994 in Sahle et al., 2019: 300). The RDP also mandated the establishment of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry tasked with managing water supply (Muller, 2008; Nnadozie, 2011).

The RDP document acknowledged HRtW was and the economic value of water and the environment. The document advocated for an economically, environmentally, and politically sustainable approach to managing South Africa's water resources and collecting, treating, and disposing of waste (RSA, 1994: S2.6.3.). Access to water was extended. Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance from 1996-2009), in his 1998 Budget Speech, noted that 1,2 million people had access to water for the first time (ANC Parliamentary Caucus, 2020). Even though the RDP programme attained milestones in social amelioration, the new government struggled economically. In 1996 the Rand fell by more than 25%, and the growth rate was just over 2.5%. Two years after the inception of the RDP, in 1996, the post-apartheid government abandoned the RDP for the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (Nleya, 2008: Mosala et al., 2017; Claar, 2018). The RDP was an ambitious welfarist programme that was unfortunately not supported by a sound economic policy (Eloff, 2011: 112).

3.4.2. Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996-2005)

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy was formulated by technocrats constituting economists, officials from the banking sector and three state departments, academics (Bond, 2010: 82; Mothabi, 2017). The inception of GEAR was influenced by the two Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Among others, GEAR proposed trade liberalisation, the deregulation of the labour market, and privatisation (Kgatle, 2017: 4). The South African government drastically decreased social grants given to impoverished people and in need of state welfare support and subsidies to local municipalities and city councils, supporting the development of financial instruments for privatised delivery. For

McKinley (2005: 182), this "effectively forced local government to turn to the commercialization and privatization of basic services as a means of generating the revenue no longer provided by the state". Trevor Manuel indicated that the GEAR strategy was "non-negotiable", and from this was nicknamed "Trevor Thatcher[29]" (Bond, 2010: 78). The strategy was described by some commentators as a "Thatcherite discourse of fiscal discipline and market forces" while conceding its "refreshing non-dogmatism" (see Eloff: 2011: 115).

GEAR has been considered "a turning point for economic policy planning in South Africa, when ambitious redistribution targets gave way to a so-called neoliberal economic policy approach" (Naidoo and Mare, 2015: 411). Its implementation was based on a belief that a "culture of non-payment" existed among urban poor black people. To encourage responsibility and facilitate social inclusion, people had to pay for basic services. Payment for services ensured the sustainability of basic provision for water and other services. According to Dawson (2010: 384), service delivery was no longer depicted as the government's responsibility but rather a right that individuals could access if they performed their civic duty of paying for basic services. Under GEAR, poor people who could not pay for basic services were very vulnerable because water supply would be cut once they had expended their basic minimum allocation.

Despite criticisms against GEAR, the ANC-led government continued its economic liberalisation policy from 2006 with Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). These policies were not more on reducing unemployment and promoting economic growth. What follows is an overview of the remaining policies.

3.4.3. Other neoliberal macro-economic policies (2006+)

The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) was announced by the Former Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, in 2005, only to be launched in 2006 (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017). Its main objectives were to

[29] Margret Thatcher was the longest serving British Prime-Minister in the 20th century who was a strong proponent of deregulation, a smaller state, free markets and privatisation - neoliberalism.

address poverty, unemployment, low salaries and wages, and poor economic growth, and AsgiSA envisioned poverty reduction by 2010 and halving unemployment by 2014. Although AsgiSA had new aspects, the overall framework was similar to GEAR (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017; Claar, 2018; Kgatle, 2020: 3). The policy was macro-economic and did not explicitly deal with issues around access to water. ASGISA provided an incentive towards South Africa becoming a democratic developmental state. It had the technocratic expertise to drive policy coordination amongst ministries through the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), improving through lessons gained from RDP and GEAR (Mothabi, 2017).

Intra ANC politics led to the ousting of former president Thabo Mbeki, and Zuma took over as the party's president at its 52nd National Congress held in Polokwane, Limpopo, in December 2007, becoming president of South Africa in 2009. Zuma replaced AsgiSA with the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 to redress poverty and inequality and pursue economic growth and employment creation through an infrastructural development programme (Mothabi, 2017; Kgatkle, 2020: 3).

The South African government introduced the National Development Plan (NDP) (2030) as South Africa's long-term socio-economic development roadmap in 2013. The NDP was the foundation of South Africa's future economic and socio-economic development strategy adopted at the 53rd ANC National Conference held in Mangaung, Bloemfontein, in December 2012. NDP, like the forerunners, was a programme set to ensure that all South Africans enjoy a decent standard of living through the eradication of poverty and reduction of inequality in 2030 (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017).

The ANC-led government's shift from welfarism to neoliberalism resulted in a policy focus on socio-economic indicators such as unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and external debt. Despite the progress regarding basic water provisioning, neoliberal macroeconomic policies restricting the gains (Sahle et al., 2019: 298) The demonstrated the state's ambivalence was on hand, a mandate and legislative framework were supporting the HRtW; on the other, there was an expectation for citizens to pay for

water. This contradiction was most evident in the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water in post-apartheid South Africa. The hydropolitics in South Africa have been influenced by the "talk left, walk right" approach adopted by the post-apartheid state (See Sahle et al., 2019: 301).

3.5. Water commodification and privatisation in post-apartheid South Africa

A consideration of the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water in post-apartheid assist us in understanding how the South Africa state has struggled to universalise the right to water in post-apartheid-neoliberal South Africa. The commodification of water - especially in the 1994 Water and Sanitation White Paper and a 1998 Water Pricing Policy - was meant to rationalise the utilisation of scarce water resources, starting with marginal-cost-based pricing (Bond, 2017: 8). The introduction of a free market, neoliberal, economy in South Africa resulted in intensifying budget constraints, cost recovery principles, lower levels of basic municipal services and cut-offs of services, such as water, to citizens who could not afford to pay (Ruiters and Bond, 2010: 1).

3.5.1. Conceptual differences: Commodification and privatisation

Commodification constitutes a social transition (Swyngedouw, 2005). Commodification is not a universal or uniform transition - it can happen in different ways, times and places (Alexander, 2010: 72). Even with varying degrees of commodification in terms of speed and geography, McDonald and Ruiters (2005: 22) contend that "the underlying pressures of commodification remain, with far-reaching transformative effects". As a process, commodification involves "the creation of an economic good through the application of mechanisms intended to appropriate and standardize a class of goods or services, enabling these goods or services to be sold at a price determined through market exchange" (Bakker, 2007: 450). It is "the transformation of an object or practice into a market good (or a commodity), that is, a thing that is bought and sold" (Walsh, 2011: 92). What makes something a commodity is the concretisation of its ability to be exchanged for other goods.

A broad definition of the term privatisation is "a process involving the reduction of the role of the government in asset ownership and service delivery and a corresponding increase in the role of the private sector" (Chirwa, 2009: 185). McDonald and Ruiters (2005: 16; 2006: 11) unpack seven different ways privatisation can be operationalised. In short, they contend that privatisation is not an "either/or situation", where the state exclusively owns and provides a service, or a non-state actor does so. It can be viewed as a continuum of public/private partnerships (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 15). Commodification and privatisation are not the same processes, but both are part of the same system (Flores, 2011: 3). Looking at water, on the one hand, water commodification attaches economic value to water, whereas water privatisation means having a non-state entity involved with a country's water services system. Water privatisation is essentially a formal change of management enabled by commodification (Alexander, 2010; Swyngedouw et al., 2003). Swyngedouw et al. (2003) sum this up in the following words:

> [W]hile commodification, on the one hand, refers to turning water from a public good into a marketable commodity subject to the principles governing a market economy (regardless of the nature of the ownership of both water and the water companies)[;] privatisation…refers to changing ownership of water infrastructure and/or the management of water services from the public sector to the private sector.
> (Swyngedouw et al., 2003: 129)

Water is rightfully a public and merit good, to which access should not be subject to monetary requirements. According to Brown (2003: 19), "commodification reduces to money the range of values humans hold with respect to water". What follows is a discussion of the privatisation of water in South Africa.

3.5.2. The privatisation of water

Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, privatisation has been viewed globally as part of a larger reform package that stabilises economies and creates growth. These reforms were based on the rationale in new economic theory that state planning and expenditure were often less efficient than private actors operating in a free market. Reforms, such as deregulation, reducing public expenditure and privatising publicly owned industries in

the *Global South*, were recommended by Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with the United States (US) government (Hartwick and Peet, 1999; Bond, 2017).

The privatisation debate in South Africa is far from new, although it has received heightened attention in the post-apartheid era. During its final stages the apartheid regime had already started experiencing pressure from the business community to privatise state enterprises (Chirwa, 2009: 181). From the late 1990s, some municipalities privatised public water utilities by contracting multinational water companies. For example, the provision of water and sanitation services in three Eastern Cape municipalities, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown and Stutterheim, became the first basic municipal services to be privatised in 1992, 1993 and 1994, respectively, LyonnaiseWater Southern South Africa, restructured in 1996 as Water and Sanitation Services South Africa[30] (WSSA), was the private actor that won the relevant management contracts (Ruiters, 2002: Chirwa, 2009). In 1999 BiWater, a British-based multinational corporation, was awarded a 30-year contract to provide water services to Nelspruit. BiWater and SAUR International, another multinational corporation, were awarded contracts to provide water and sanitation services to the Dolphin Coast and Durban in the same year.

In 2001, this was extended to Johannesburg, and WSSA got the contract to provide water services (Chirwa 2009: 184) and install a water prepaid meter system in South Africa. French-based Suez controlled the Johannesburg Water Management (JOWAM) from 2001-06. JOWAM managed Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd., established in December 2000 to discharge the City of Johannesburg's water service delivery functions (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). There is extant literature on the processes in which the privatisation of water in South Africa transpired (see Ruiters, 2002: Chirwa et al., 2004); Ruiters, 2004; McKinley, 2005; Bakker, 2010; Bayliss, 2016).

[30] Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) Lts (WSSA) was a subsidiary of the French company Lyonnaise Water Southern Africa (Ruiters, 2002: 42).

3.5.3. The impact and effects of water privatisation

The neoliberalisation of the South Africa economy led to the introduction of a cost recovery policy for service provision. McDonald (2002: 18) states that cost recovery in "simple" terms is "the recovery of all, or most, of the cost associated with providing a particular service by a service provider…[T]he objective is to recoup the full cost of production". Consumers had to pay for the associated costs of water infrastructure, which led to huge increases in the price of water (McKinley, 2004: 189).

The effects of privatisation were catastrophic, especially on the poor, as they had to pay far more than they ever had to for water. Township residents frequently pay higher rates for services than those living in former "white" areas (Ruiters, 2002; McKinley, 2004; Hart, 2006). For example, McKinley (2004: 189) notes that in 1993, black townships around Fort Beaufort were charged a monthly flat rate of R10,60 for all services, including water and refuse removal. With privatisation, from 1994-1996, service charges went up by almost 600% to R60,00 per month. Furthermore, a 100% increase in water connection costs was imposed (McKinley, 2004: 190). Residents in black communities could not afford the new tariffs as they were far more than what was being charged in non-privatised towns (Ruiters, 2002: 46).

The process of water privatisation in South Africa has had enduring negative ramifications on water users, particularly how cost recovery was implemented. Cost recovery methods have raised profound questions about the Human Right to Water (HRtW) in South Africa. Some steps documented in the early 2000s were disconnecting water services, and with a growing number of "delinquents", it may have been closing off water from a couple of weeks to months, and in some cases, the permanent removal of water infrastructure (McDonald, 2002: 19). Cost recovery policies have been "inhumane" regarding the lack of empathy regarding disconnections (Loftus, 2005; Hellberg, 2015). Between 1999-2001 close to 160,000 households in Cape Town and Tygerberg were disconnected due to non-payment (Chirwa, 2009: 197; Dugard, 2016: 12). Cape Town alone had almost 100,000 households disconnected for non-payment (Fjeldstad, 2004: 560). Durban experienced between 800-1,000 disconnections per day

in early 2003, affecting about 25,000 people a week (Smith 2004: 182, Chirwa, 2009: 197; Dugard, 2016: 12). In Johannesburg, in early 2002, officials were disconnecting more than 20,000 households per month from power and water (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 6).

A 2002 survey estimated that between 2000-2001, about 7,5 million people experienced both water and electricity disconnections. These figures were contested by Ronald Kasrils (Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry from 1999-2004), who argued that the population disconnected in that period was much lower. However, Mike Muller (Director-General of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1997-2005) subsequently acknowledged that in 2003 alone, approximately 275,000 households had their water supply disconnected at least once due to non-payment. This affected approximately 1,5 million people. Furthermore, where the disconnection occurs via a prepayment water meter, and there was no process of administrative justice governing or recording such disconnections, which are informally referred to as "silent disconnections" (Dugard, 2016: 12). By the end of 2002, nationally, an estimated 10 million people had been cut off for non-payment of water services (Pauw, 2003; Sahle et al., 2019: 303). Disconnections continue to be routine. In February 2014, it was reported that 26,305 households had been disconnected for non-payment of water and electricity accounts in Durban (Bayliss, 2016). Bond (2017: 1) estimated that mass disconnections due to unaffordability affect more than 1.5 million South Africans each year.

Prepaid meters were introduced as a more efficient and effective way to manage and control water use. McDonald (2002: 19) stated that prepaid meters were the "ultimate cost-recovery mechanism". In a socio-historical account of metering technologies in South Africa, von Schnitzler (2008; 2013) described how the prepaid meter was proposed to solve non-payment of water charges. Prepaid water meters maximise revenue collection and minimise non-payment of water. A prepaid meter, therefore, has a dual function. Apart from measuring water consumption, it automatically disconnects users once they exhaust the allocation they have paid for (von Schnitzler, 2013: 671). Many municipalities favour prepaid water meters because the devices maximise cost recovery and decrease labour costs associated with reading meters and connecting and disconnecting water services (Dugard, 2016: 13).

The privatisation of water supply and corresponding cost recovery methods resulted in one of the worst cholera epidemics in South Africa in the early 2000s. In Johannesburg between 2000-2002, under Suez, a ravaging cholera outbreak devastated thousands of poor families in the township of Alexandra. Thousands of indigent families in the Alexandra township, Johannesburg, were also affected as members resorted to consuming water from nearby polluted streams (McKinley, 2005; 2009; Angel and Loftus, 2019). In KwaZulu-Natal, there was a shift from a free communal tap system to a prepaid metering system (Deedat and Cottle, 2002: 81). This led to cut-offs as poor communities could not afford to pay for water. There was a cholera outbreak in Ngwelezane in August 2000. Ngwelezane residents were cut off and had no choice but to drink water from the Umfolozi River and nearby polluted streams (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 7). At least 100,000 cases had been recorded by 8 August 2001 (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 4). More than 120,000 people were infected with cholera, and more than 300 died (McKinley, 2004: 184). The Department of Health (1999) (in Bond and Dugard, 2008b: 11) highlighted the lack of empathy that which the disconnections were done in the poor communities:

> It is common knowledge that lack of water and sanitation is a common cause of cholera, diarrhoea or other illnesses that afflict so many in our country and that there is a relationship between various communicable diseases, including TB, and conditions of squalor. Yet we often have not structured our institutions and service delivery systems in ways that can easily respond to these realities.

After the Kwa-Zulu Natal cholera outbreak, Ronald Kasrils oversaw the formalisation of the FBW Policy (FBWP) (Bond and Dugard, 2008b). According to the policy:

> The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry announced in February 2001 that government had decided to ensure that poor households are given a basic supply of water free of charge. He said that Cabinet had approved a policy to provide 6 000 litres of safe water per household per month…This standard relating to the amount of a 'basic' level of water supply, that is, a level sufficient to promote healthy living, comes from international practices and norms that recommend 25 litres per person per day. This amounts to about 6 000 litres per household per month for a household of 8 people. The volume of 6 000 litres per month was therefore set as the target for a 'basic' level

> for all households in South Africa using 8 as an average number of people per household.
> (DWAF, 2007)

The pursuit for profit resulted in the disregard for human rights linked to access to adequate water and sanitation. Whether multinational corporation Suez or corporatising KwaZulu-Natal municipalities and water boards which are moving to full cost recovery systems, there was no consideration or social responsibility for the social and personal costs of waterborne diseases as well as others like TB or other AIDS-opportunistic infections incurred by health clinics and the patients (Bond, 2017: 8). In Bond's words,

> A company making profits out of water sales feels no guilt when women and children suffer most. It does not repair environmental damage when women are forced to cut down trees to heat their families' food. It pays none of the local economic costs when electricity cut-offs prevent small businesses from operating, or when workers are less productive because they have lost access to even their water and sanitation.
> [Bond, 2017: 8]

Cost recovery directly threatens the fundamental notion that water is a human right to everyone regardless of income or financial ability. In support of this, Xali (2002: 101) stated the following, "[C]ost recovery undermines the human rights that the South African working class has achieved". Water policy becomes an area administered and managed through water meters, flow restrictors and money (Loftus, 2005: 250).

Some indigent households view prepaid water meters negatively, whereas, for others, they are useful devices for household budgeting. Residents in underprivileged communities generally view prepaid water meters as "inhuman agent[s] working within their homes" (Loftus, 2007: 47). "Water Management Devices" (WMDs) operate differently from prepaid water meters; flow restrictors limit daily usage. Out of anger and disappointment, the acronym "WMDs" has been reassigned to "Weapons of Mass Destruction[/Disempowerment]" (Donne, 2009; EMG, 2016; van Zyl et al., 2018: 17).

Indigent households ultimately view WMDs as a direct threat to life (Donne, 2009; EMG, 2016; van Zyl et al., 2018: 17).

The use of prepaid meters in post-apartheid South Africa has been argued to contribute to "water apartheid" (van Zyl et al., 2018: 17). Jegede and Shikwambane (2021) offer a contextual explanation of "water apartheid" about how "law and its application discriminates unfairly against certain populations", in which

> [d]espite the optimism that accompanied the end of apartheid regime in 1994 and the subsequent approval of the 1996 Constitution, unfair discrimination of the past remains noticeable in areas including access of disadvantaged populations to water. Arguably, this development constitutes water apartheid, a situation whereby the wealthy can pay to access water while the disadvantaged populations, mostly black populations living in rural settings who cannot afford the cost, are largely left to confront with and suffer lack of access to sufficient water.
> (Jegede and Shikwambane, 3: 2021)

For some scholars, the main cause of water apartheid is the failure of water privatisation in South Africa due to the adoption of neoliberal policies (Bond, 2004; Bond and Dugard, 2008). South African water apartheid is indicative of the vast distance between Pretoria's progressive water rhetoric and its pro-privatisation practices (Bond, 2004). The logic for privatisation went against the human right to water. This has raised deep questions on the constitutional right to access water and the states' responsibility to ensure that this right is "progressively" realised and redistributive water justice. The privatisation of water in South Africa has compromised public trust. It has made citizens come into conflict with the state since it is the state's sole responsibility to ensure that its citizens have access to safe and adequate water as mandated in the Constitution (RSA, 1996).

3.6. Gramscian and Foucauldian arguments in South African hydropolitics

The works of neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) and poststructuralist Michel Foucault (1926–1984) have been employed in South African hydropolitics to identify a "more diffuse expression of power at the microlevel and in the ways through which societies are ruled and governed" (Bourblanc and Blanchon, 2019: 6).

3.6.1. Gramscian arguments in South African hydropolitics

Gramsci is well known for the development of the notion of hegemony and offering a philosophy of praxis in his 1971 *Prison Writings*. For Gramsci, hegemony was a way in which a particular worldview was established with its acceptance by different groups (often against the interests of the individuals involved). He theorised hegemony as maintaining one social group's dominance over other groups through consent and coercion (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 702). Gramsci's philosophy of praxis roots the consolidation and contestation of conceptions of the world in everyday practices of making and remaking the world (Loftus, 2009). There is burgeoning South African literature in hydropolitics that draws from the theorisings of Gramsci (Loftus and Lumsden, 2006; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Loftus, 2009; Swatuk, 2010).

The first branch of South African hydropolitics centres on a neo-Gramscian perspective on state formation developed by Cox (1987) to demonstrate how state form has changed from the 19th into the 21st century (Swatuk, 2010). It is about understanding the contemporary South African state form and the issues it is facing regarding water resources management through the lens of history. Swatuk (2010) argues that in its evolution, the South African state behaviour reflects the competing interests of dominant actors in what Robert Cox describes as a "historic bloc". He demonstrates how various discourses – of progress, development, security – are brought to bear supporting particular practices. During apartheid, dominant actors justified harnessing water in the interests of socio-economic development, building an advanced and "modern Western state", and keeping white South Africa safe from communism and the "black peril". The

dominant actors of the post-apartheid era have altered this narrative: harnessing water for economic development, poverty alleviation and justice for all (Swatuk, 2010).

The second branch of South African hydropolitical analysed from a Gramscian vantage point focuses on the relations of power secured through material practices and infrastructural form. Ekers and Loftus (2008) broadly provide an analysis that draws from Gramsci and Foucault's work. They argue that by employing Gramsci's works and Foucault, one can arrive at novel insights that theorise the consolidation of power within liberal capitalist societies and attendant processes of subjectification. Drawing from Gramsci, Ekers and Loftus (2008) encourage us to think about how specific power techniques are connected to everyday practices and broader struggles for hegemony (Ekers and Loftus, 2008). From a Gramscian perspective, water infrastructure can be viewed as a part of hegemonic apparatus through which forms of "common sense", in support of a specific group's interests, come to be constituted (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 706). Ekers and Loftus (2008) are interested in urban water provision and the production of distinctive subjectives in the hydropolitics of everyday life. The employment of hegemony contributes to a development of micro-level hydropolitics as we "move from the grand displays of power represented in large-scale engineering works to the subtler ways in which power works through everyday hydraulic practices" (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 709).

The third and last focus on Gramscian insights employed to a better understanding the historical geography of struggles over water (Loftus and Lumsden, 2006; 2008). Drawing from the township of Inanda, in the KwaZulu-Natal province, political arrangement and service provision from apartheid, Loftus and Lumsden (2006; 2008) show how neoliberal hegemonic formations are temporary. Loftus (2009) argues that Gramsci's philosophy of praxis roots can be used to understand the consolidation and contestation of conceptions of the world in everyday practices of making and remaking the world. By collecting water, paying a bill or struggling to have a household reconnected to its water supply, worldviews are formed that articulate prior conception. Focusing on the informal settlement of Inanda, a township in the Greater Durban Metropolitan Municipality, he argues that 30 years of struggles over access to water have sharpened

critical insights into the current post-apartheid transitions. Activists within the community have sought to raise these insights as part of a radically transformative project. From this, Loftus (2009) argues that Gramsci's perspectives increase our understanding of conjunctural and a socio-natural reading of the consolidation of certain norms within society.

3.6.2. Foucauldian arguments in hydropolitics

From a governance angle, the hydropolitics in South Africa has been widely studied. Foucauldian authors demonstrate how studying water inequalities through focusing on expressions of power at the individual level and in everyday life does not only imply questioning water access but also analysing how such inequalities relate to definitions of "the self" (Bourblanc and Blanchon, 2019: 6). The use of the Foucauldian notion of biopower is well document (Bond, 2010; Bakker, 2012, 2013; Hellberg 2014; 2015; 2017; 2018; 2019; Bulled, 2015; von Schnitzler, 2016; Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). Foucault (1976) argues that the modern state exercises power through its ability to control the physical bodies of its citizens. Biopower is a positive force, and it manifests itself in a collectivised manner, exerting power over the life and life forces of a whole population. Foucault states that:

> We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other.
> (Foucault, 1976: 253)

While the term biopolitics refers to the regulation of populations at the general level, it is defined as a "modern form of power" which is manifest in "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault, 1976: 140). Biopolitics entails the strategies and mechanisms through which human life processes are managed under regimes of authority over knowledge, power, and the techniques of subjectivation:

> Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem.
> (Foucault, 1976: 245)

(a) The political and biopolitical nature of water

Bakker (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013) analysed water governance from a biopolitical perspective referring to South Africa. Bakker (2013) argues that water governance is "a form of biopolitics, based on the categorisation, quantification, and knowledge/power formation of urban residents in an attempt to govern their behaviour" (Bakker, 2013: 283). Bakker (2011) traces the process in which "public" water through the role and policies implemented by the World Bank from 1960 to the 1980s and how this can be understood from a biopolitical vantage point. Water is political, as much as it is biopolitical (Bakker, 2010: 190; 2013, 282). The political nature of water comes from the water cycle; people are linked to water as a resource and their interaction around its access and use. Water flows through different territories, potentially breeding conflict between up and downstream users (Bakker, 2010: 190; 2012; 616; 2013, 282). Water is political because it fuels the contestations of power and authority in different contexts (Bakker, 2010; 2013; 2012).

In South Africa, the biopolitical nature of water is evident through how states employ water management techniques and systems to safeguard and promote "the health and productivity of the population" (Bakker 2010: 190; Bakker 2012: 619). In terms of managing life biopolitically, water use is controlled twofold. Firstly, through "formal regulation", which is through state mechanisms and processes. Formal regulation allows the state to institute water governance systems that are codified into policies and laws. Water supply and sanitation projects are part of a means in modern public healthcare to control, manage and normalise the population (Kotsila and Saravanan, 2017: 2). Secondly, "self -regulation", or "self-policing", which is achieved through "cultural aesthetics of health and hygiene, ranging from entire bodies of water to individual human bodies" as ways of controlling water use (Bakker, 2012: 619; Bakker, 2013: 282). This "self-policing", or "self-regulation", entails that consumers regulate how they utilise

water, and this should ideally be in a "responsible" or "sustainable" manner (Hellberg, 2017: 68).

(b) Citizen/state relations within the context of biopolitics

In South Africa, water infrastructure as a biopolitical tool plays a critical role in public health and hygiene. Beyond this, water infrastructure is important in creating an environment conducive to moral behaviour (von Schnitzler, 2008: 908). The payment for municipal rates and taxes is an ethical obligation linked to citizenship. Unlike taxation, paying for municipal services establishes a direct fiscal relationship between the state and an individual household (von Schnitzler, 2008: 908). This relationship is based on trust that the municipality will provide water, and households will pay for services.

Bulled (2015) teases the limitations of looking at the citizen/state relationship from a purely biopolitical perspective in South Africa. She argues that biopower can be extended in societies with varying forms of alternative forms of authority. She draws from a case study in the Limpopo province, where there is a government system as citizens and the traditional leadership structure as subjects, operating concurrently (Bulled, 2015). In reconceptualising the link between biopolitics and state interactions, Bulled (2015) elucidates three composite cases of water citizenships based on female-headed households. The first one is a "rights-bearing citizen". Here, she argues that such a citizen holds the state accountable for their right to access sufficient water (Bulled, 2015: 538-540). The second case is one of a "responsibilized citizen". In this case, the citizen delinks from state service provision and finds a way to be self-suffice. Because they are financially well-off individuals,

> They drill private boreholes and self-purify the water, use prepayment rather than credit water meters to avoid inaccurate billing by municipalities lacking capacity to function effectively, install solar electricity rather than relying on the frequently interrupted municipally supplied electricity, and use cell phones rather than the government landline telephone system.
> (Von Schnitzler 2013, in Bulled, 2015: 541)

The last case is that of an "ethnic subject". Such a citizen uses freshwater resources within their proximity, such as rivers and streams (Bulled, 2015: 542). In some circumstances, they resort to rainwater harvesting or collecting surface run-off. They generally rely on community elders to represent them in their service delivery related issues with the municipalities (Bulled, 2015: 542). This shows how South African citizens straddle multiple political discourses and logics in their strategic and situated encounters with the new state, traditional authorities, and other sites of power (Bulled, 2015: 545).

In research done by Hellberg (2014), the association of water to "life" is explored in a biopolitical sense within the context of eThekwini, Durban. The state's control of water resources and services influences the lives and lifestyles of different populations. Some technologies involved to manage water use involve biopolitics since they are used for specific people. Indigent communities, for example, have prepaid water meters installed and water management devices installed (Hellberg, 2015; 2017, 2020). von Schnitzler (2008; 2016) analyses how pre-paid water meters in Johannesburg succeed in disciplining the body and regulating the population. Since most of these devices were installed in poor black communities, citizens "were encouraged to subject their daily actions, and indeed their bodily functions, to constant metrological scrutiny" to not use up their FBW allocation (von Schnitzler, 2008: 914). Prepaid meters were aimed to inculcate a "particular budgetary rationality" through which people could better manage water use. Water is "the single most important focus of biopolitical intervention" (Hart, 2010: 3). Hellberg (2017: 68) argues that the biopolitical perspective makes possible an inquiry into how different populations and different forms of lives are governed and the distinctions made between them. Water governance can also be understood as containing a disciplining aspect in terms of how it simultaneously targets other individuals, who, for various reasons, are separated from the rest of the population (Hellberg, 2015: 200).

To no small extent, the introduction of the FBWP demonstrated biopower over the population through the promotion of life by giving citizens a basic allocation of 25l of water per person monthly. In Foucauldian terms, this was a way of "making [people]

live". The biopolitical nature of the prepaid water meter and FBW allocation is also presented by Ruiters (2005), who argues that:

> Widely promoted as the 'ultimate solution' to non-payment, the PPM, and FBW have become a major state techniques in local political 'management'. Since consumers 'self-disconnect' the PPM strategy is 'debt-proof' and convenient for councils as long as consumers do not tamper with the system. The State also argues that the PPM is a convenient way of giving households their free ration of water. The ppm represents an ideal way to teach people to self-regulate and to know their place.

Social hierarchies also emerged in research on the biopolitics of water (Hellberg, 2014). Residents of poor communities would consider themselves lesser citizens as they have had to access water illegally or via a standpipe. Water is not only a resource that keeps us alive but also contributes to people's lifestyles, perceptions of themselves and their place in society. Second, the notion of basic water is related to social hierarchies in several interrelated ways (Hellberg, 2014: 10). According to their socioeconomic class, what is understood to be the basic functions of water services is relative to what people are used to (Hellberg, 2014: 10). She notes the unequal provision of water by using different technologies. Hellberg (2017) argues that different types of water infrastructure produced different water subjectivities based on access and provision by the state. Hellberg (2017) interrogates how people's access to water influences how they view themselves and locate themselves within the broader society. According to Hellberg (2017),

> [D]ifferences in access to water produce biopolitical effects. Such effects include a division of the population between those who are supposed to be content with survival and those who can enjoy a convenient and pleasurable life.
> (Hellberg, 2017: 73)

While residents of impoverished communities' associate water with their struggle to survive for "mere life", their counterparts in affluent areas view water as something that provides pleasure and a "good life". The link between social-economic positions and access to water also emerges in Hellberg's later work. She argues that scarcity in South

African water management has problematised the framings and governing of different populations in relation to their water use (Hellberg, 2020).

Water and biopolitics converge as they both centre on “life” and can both be viewed as tools that can be used for a "transformation of (human) life". In that sense, regulation of access to water is a perfect biopolitical mechanism (Hellberg, 2014: 2; 2017: 68). They were constructing water governance as a system, and water, as a resource, as biopolitical implies a link between the constitution and consolidation of political and economic power, on the one hand, and the control of socio-natures, on the other. Instead of paying attention to only physical infrastructures such as pumps and valves, the articulation between the water services infrastructure, water, rivers, the land, and farmers is significant in a biopolitical analysis of water service provision (Bakker, 2012: 619). Water is a mediated resource. The mediation often takes a socio-technical form; mains, pipes, valves, and meters are central to shaping water flow and how water is perceived and consumed (von Schnitzler, 2010: 9).

Marcatelli and Büscher (2019) propose a biopolitical notion of “liquid violence” about the systematic exclusion of some people from accessing sufficient water and how this should be considered a violent (in)action. In Foucauldian parlance, this type of violence represents the norm rather than the exception – something that does not directly kill people but creates the context within which their living conditions deteriorate. People are being “let die”. In South Africa, water access has always been associated with citizenship during the apartheid era where race was the denominator - the superiority of white compared to black South Africans was used to justify racially segregated water supply systems. In contemporary South Africa, people cannot access water due to structural inequality and are, in a Foucauldian sense, being “let die” – even though the state has no apparent intention to kill them (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). Even though the South African state is not deliberately killing its citizens, specific actions by government officials within a broader socio-political have had a profoundly negative effect on the poor (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). From apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa, the state has “biopolitically normalised” the neglect and further

marginalisation of the poor through a reform of public service provision (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019).

3.7. Reexamining facts and statistics about water access in South Africa

The post-apartheid state has achieved some milestones in universalising water access in South Africa. From 2006 to 2018, "access" to municipal water increased from 76,5% to 85,4% (Stats SA, 2019), an approximate 4,5 million increase in access to piped water from an estimated 9,3 million households in 2006 compared to 13,8 million in 2018. Even though empirical evidence shows that the post-apartheid government has made progress in rolling out water infrastructure in South Africa, the picture is more complex and varied (Angel and Loftus, 2019). Statistics illustrating water infrastructure installation are a proxy for "access to water" (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019). Having access to water goes beyond installing pipes, valves and taps; people need to access water from the infrastructure. Dugard (2016: 11-12) presents the following seven counter-points demonstrating the issues associated with using infrastructure as a proxy to water access:

(i) Statistics on connections do not consider households connected to a water infrastructure grid, but the infrastructure does not function. Statistics also do not show the degree to which, in respect of each formal connection, there is progress in moving the water connection closer into the home;

(ii) Some households in informal settlements and shack dwellers generally do not have in-house connections. In some cases, they depend on water tankers or communal taps. Water tanker services are unreliable. Statistics generally do not show the scale of the problem of land-use areas with insufficient access – informal settlements and rural areas around South Africa;

(iii) Aggregated statistics on the roll-out of water services across South Africa masks the problem of geographic areas with unusually low access to basic water services such as the former homeland areas, such as KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape), which continue to have extremely low levels of access to adequate water provision;

(iv) Statistics on numbers of households having been connected to water services since 1994 do not capture all the households that have subsequently been disconnected due to unaffordability;

(v) The quantitative connection figures do not factor in whether the amount of basic water provided through the FBW reaches the intended beneficiaries or is sufficient to meet their needs. This problem has two dimensions – the low level of registration by formally qualifying households for the FBW (and other) benefits via the municipal indigency register; and the sufficiency of the FBW allocation itself, which is allocated per stand instead of per household or individual; and, finally,

(vi) There are questions about whether the FBW allocation is sufficient to meet basic needs. Even though the policy refers to "households", the allocation is actually per stand. This means that multiple households and individuals might share the allotment.

The contradiction between the statistics on allocation and actual access to water is partly explained by a noticeable decline in the rating of water service delivery by the municipalities from 73% as "good" in 2006 to 62% in 2018 (Stats SA, 2019). Paradoxically, the rating for water-related service delivery as "poor" went up from 7% to 11% in the same time (Stats SA, 2019). There is an inverse relationship between increasing levels of people's frustrations over water service interruptions and decreasing satisfaction levels for water service delivery. From 2011 to 2015, the number of taps that could not supply reliable water increased by almost 2 million (Muller, 2016). This implies that as more people get access to water in South Africa, water services have declined, which is directly attributed to poor water service delivery. In South Africa, rural areas (Muller, 2016; Mnisi, 2020) and townships (Muller et al., 2009) are where people primarily have poor water access.

Stats SA (2019) qualifies the functionality of municipal water supply services as the extent to which households reported receiving water from a municipality over 12 months before the survey. Of significance are interruptions that lasted more than two days at a time or more than 15 days in total during the whole period. Figure 2 below

shows an inverse relationship between the perceived quality of services and the number of interruptions.

Figure 2: 2018 household ratings of water service delivery versus reported interruptions per province



	WC	GP	RSA	KZN	NC	EC	NW	MP	FS	LP
Quality	87,3	76,9	62,4	58,8	49,3	49,2	46,4	44,8	41,1	28,6
Interruptions	1,4	5,4	20,3	24,9	35,1	33,4	37,4	47,7	21,6	48,0

Source: Stats SA (2019: 45)

The provinces with the lowest percentage of households that reported interruptions with water services were the Western Cape (at 1,4%) and Gauteng (at 5,4%), which also reported the highest satisfaction with water delivery services (at 87,3% for the Western Cape, and 76,9% for Gauteng). Conversely, provinces in which interruptions were frequent were less likely to rate water service delivery as "good". For example, in Limpopo, 48% of households reported interruptions, while only 28,6% rated water service delivery as "good".

While there have been notable successes in improving water access in post-apartheid South Africa, there are still pressing issues around inadequate access. Table 2 below presents a comparison of the primary sources of drinking water used by households.

Table 2: Households' primary sources of drinking water (2002 -2018)

Water source	Year									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2018
	Percentage									
Piped water in dwelling	40,4	40,1	41,2	43,6	42,8	44,6	46,4	46,6	46,7	46,3
Piped water on site	27,7	29,3	30,2	27,0	29,1	27,6	27,0	26,8	27,6	28,5
Borehole on site	2,7	1,6	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,4	1,9	1,8	2,0	2,1
Rainwater tank on site	1,3	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,8	1,1	1,2
Neighbour's tap	0,6	2,3	2,1	2,6	2,5	2,9	2,7	2,4	2,2	1,9
Public/ communal tap	13,6	14,8	15,4	15,6	15,5	15,8	14,0	13,2	12,3	12,3
Water-carrier/tanker	0,6	0,6	1,1	1,1	1,4	1,3	1,2	2,3	3,1	3,0
Borehole off-site/communal	5,9	4,7	3,3	3,5	3,2	2,3	2,7	2,1	1,6	1,5
Flowing water/ stream/river	0,7	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,2	1,6	1,7
Stagnant water/dam/ pool	1,4	1,0	1,0	0,6	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,1
Well	2,0	1,8	1,3	1,5	1,5	1,3	0,9	1,0	0,4	0,3
Spring	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,8	0,6
Other	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,4
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Source: Stats SA (2019: 42)

About 46% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings in 2018. A further 29% accessed water on-site, while 12% relied on communal taps, and about 2% relied on neighbours' taps. Although generally households' access to water improved, almost 3% of households still had to fetch water from unprotected water sources such as streams and rivers, stagnant water bodies and dams, and also wells and springs in 2018.

3.8. An overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality

During apartheid, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46 of 1959 re-labelled the reserves as bantustans. In total, ten bantustans were established. One such was Bophuthatswana. The bantustan constituted parts of the Orange Free State (now Free State), North West and Eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga) provinces. It was declared "independent" of South Africa in 1977, under the Presidency of the unpopular Lucas Mangope. He was an ultra-rightwing suppoter who has been dubbed "The Dog of the Boers" who pushed an exclusionary "Pan-Tswanaism" policy in the bantustan (see Lawrence and Mason, 1994). Bophuthatswana remained closely controlled by the apartheid regime and highly dependent on it, financially and politically (Francis, 2006:

9). In 1994, bantustans were reincorporated into South Africa, and political power moved to Pretoria (Francis, 2006: 11).

To contextualise this research, an investigation of expressions of citizenship in Madibeng hydropolitics, this section constitutes an overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality.

3.8.1. Madibeng's profile

The Madibeng Local Municipality is one of the five municipalities in the Bojanala Platinum District of the North West Province, South Africa. The remaining municipalities in Bojana: are Kgetlengrivier, Moses Kotane, Moretele and Rustenburg:

Figure 3: Bojana Platinum District



Source: RSA, 2021

Madibeng is comprised of a properly established and serviced industrial area, urban residential areas, and rural areas constituted of villages and farms (MLM, 2020). The most industrialised and densely populated centre in Madibeng is Brits, where its municipal offices are located. In this subsection, I look at five key items about Madibeng, and these are its demographic composition, its economy, socio-economic problems in the area; local governance and administration, basic municipal service provision and statistics on access to water and sanitation, and mismanagement of the local municipality.

(a) Demographic composition

According to StatsSA (2016: 13), the Madibeng Local Municipality had a population of 537,516 in 2016. Males were more than females and accounted for 54% of the population, whilst females were 46%. Table 3 below shows the racial distribution of Madibeng:

Table 3: Madibeng's racial distribution

Population group	№	Percentage (%)
Black African	492,073	92
White	38,332	7
Coloured	3,601	1
Indian/Asian	2,105	<1
Total	536,110[31]	100

(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 15)

The majority of the Madibeng Local Municipality inhabitants are black Africans at almost 92% of the population, followed by whites who are just over 7%. There is a relatively small population of coloureds and Indians/Asians, at just over 1% combined. Black people mostly reside in townships and rural areas, whereas most whites live in the suburban areas of Brits and on private farms. Coloured and Indian/Asians stay in mostly urban areas – suburbs and townships. The three most spoken languages in the local municipality were SeTswana (43%), followed by XiTsonga (11%) and then Afrikaans (9%) (StatsSA, 2011).

[31] The sum presented is incorrect and is actually 536,111.

(b) Economy

As an economic hub, Madibeng prides itself on several activities that play a significant role in the growth and development of the province and country as a whole. In 2013, the Madibeng Local Municipality's economy was valued at almost R550 million (Urban Econ, 2016: 13). The local municipality contributed 27% to the Bojana Platinum District's GDP, equivalent to 14% of the North West Province's GDP and almost 1% of the national GDP (Urban Econ, 2016: 13). The major economic activities are mining, agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing (MLM, 2015: 42; 2020: 15). What follows is a description of the major economic activities.

Mining is the most dominant form of economic activity in the municipality. Some of the world's richest platinum deposits and the largest chromite reserves are in Madibeng (MLM, 2015: 72). The mining sector comprises platinum-group metals and chromium and intensive granite and sand mining (MLM, 2015: 42). Other mining products include silica sand and vanadium pentoxide (MLM, 2015: 72). The mining sector in the municipality is one of the highest employment creators, contributing considerably to the local economy (MLM, 2015: 72).

According to the MLM (2015: 74-75), four distinct types of agriculture occur in the area. The first one is *intensive agriculture*, the main agricultural type, covering almost the southern half of the municipality. Practitioners rely on irrigation from the Crocodile River and the Hartbeespoort (Harties) and Rooikoppies dams. It covers 44% of the municipality's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). The region's second most common agricultural type is *extensive agriculture*, covering 18% of Madibeng's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). The extensive agriculture relies on the Moretele and Tolwane rivers for irrigation and rainwater. Game farming is the third most common form of agricultural activity, covering 10% of the municipality's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). This occurs in the north-western sector of the municipality, bordered by Rooikoppies Dam and the Elandsberg mountains. The least common form of agriculture is *subsistence farming,* at 3% of Madibeng Local Municipality's area (MLM, 2015: 141). It happens mainly in the north-eastern sector of Madibeng, typically done by residents of

informal settlements. Subsistence farmers utilise land along the banks of the Tolwane River and areas surrounding Jericho (MLM, 2015: 141). The remaining 20% area is for non-agricultural activities.

The Madibeng Local Municipality hydrological system is composed of three dams and three main rivers. These water sources supply water for irrigation across the municipality. The rivers are the Crocodile, Moretele and Tolwane, and the dams are Harties, Klipvoor and Rooikoppies (MLM, 2015: 49-50). The Crocodile River is the biggest in the Madibeng Local municipality. It feeds into Rooikoppies and Harties. Moretele is the second biggest river in Madibeng Local Municipality, a major tributary into the Crocodile River. It feeds into the Rooikoppies dam. This river is characterised by subsistence and agricultural holdings (MLM, 2015: 51). Tolwane is the smallest river of the three.

As for the dams, the Hartebeespoort dam is located in the southern area of the Madibeng, between the Magaliesberg and Witwatersberg Mountain ranges. Water pollution is a big issue. The pollution originates from the Crocodile River. It is mostly caused by invasive plant species and fertilisers (MLM, 2015: 51-52). Klipvoor Dam is located in the northern area of the municipality. There is subsistence agriculture in the northern and western areas of the dam (MLM, 2015: 52). The Rooikoppies Dam is located on the north-western side of Madibeng. A part of the dam falls out of the municipality (MLM, 2015: 51-52). Like Harties, the Crocodile River is the only tributary into Rooikoppies. The dam shores are surrounded by intensive agricultural activity (MLM, 2015: 52).

Tourism, primarily based on the natural systems, plays a significant economic role in the municipality (MLM, 2015: 73). Some of the main attractions in the tourism sector are scenic routes, heritage sites, resorts and nature reserves (MLM, 2015: 73). The municipality has three major tourism attractions: the Magaliesberg Mountain ranges, the Hartebeespoort Dam, and archaeological and historical sites located in the Magaliesberg and Witwatersberg surroundings (MLM, 2015: 73). Other tourists'

activities include game farming around the Elandsberg area and the Klipvoor dam (MLM, 2015: 107).

In Madibeng, Brits is the manufacturing heart of the province. The development of a vehicle component manufacturing hub and a dry port for distribution processes (MLM, 2015: 23). Motor industry-related activities dominate the manufacturing sector (MLM, 2015: 23), while other manufacturing endeavours include metalworking, textile production, chemical industries, breweries, and bottlers. These secondary economic activities are generally linked to primary economic activities like mining and agriculture (MLM, 2015: 97).

(c) Socio-economic issues

There are no recent reliable statistics available on the unemployment rate in Madibeng. The last known unemployment rate was 30.4% in 2011 (with 38.2% youth unemployment). About 4% had become "discouraged" in their search for work (StatsSA, 2011). The unemployment rates were already alarming at the last census, and since then, the rate has gone up across South Africa. Madibeng residents' efforts to start-up businesses have been dismal. More than half of those who tried to set up small businesses failed within the first year (Worku, 2018: 99).

High levels of poverty have accompanied soaring unemployment. The poverty headcount in 2016 was almost 9%, and the intensity of poverty was just over 42%. Grants and subsidies received in the municipality as a percentage of total income was almost 39% (StatsSA, 2016: 14). Compounding poverty is the adverse effects of HIV and AIDS in the municipality. The number of HIV-positive people living in Madibeng equates to about 14% of the total population – a figure slightly higher than provincial and national averages (Urban Econ, 2014: 14). Furthermore, AIDS-related deaths account for more than half the deaths in the municipality (Urban Econ, 2014: 14). There is limited access to healthcare and education services. High rates of infection have been attributed to high rates of labour migration in the mining and agricultural sectors.

(d) Local governance and administration

Madibeng is a category B Municipality, functioning through the Executive Mayoral and ward participation system (MLM, 2020: 11). The municipality is demarcated into 41 wards, and the Municipal Council comprises 82 councillors (of which 10 are members of the Mayoral Committee), with a full-time Speaker, Chief Whip and Executive Mayor (MLM, 2020: 11).

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the local government has been led by the African National Congress, with the Democratic Alliance[32] (DA) as the official opposition. In the 2021 local government elections, the following were results for the three biggest parties: the ANC got 53%, followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters[33] (EFF) with 17%, and the DA with 14%.

Seven political parties have representation in the local government council. From the 81 seats, the ANC had 44, EFF had 17, and the DA had 15. Table 4 below shows the distribution of seats by the top three political parties in the Madibeng Local Council:

Table 4: Madibeng Local Municipality councillors from the top 3 parties

	Political Party	Members	Percentage (%)	Status in Council
1.	African National Congress (ANC)	44	54	Governing Party
2.	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	14	17	Opposition
3.	Democratic Alliance (DA)	12	15	Official Opposition

(Souce: municipalities.co.za)

The ANC-led municipality has struggled to provide basic water and sanitation services in line with the Constitution.

[32] Democratic Alliance Official Website.
[33] Economic Freedom Fighters' Official Website.

3.8.1. Municipal basic water and sanitation provision

The Madibeng Local Municipality functions as both a Water Service Authority and Water Service Provider, as per the Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997. Madibeng is responsible for the supply of potable water, collection, treatment, and disposal of waterborne sewage within its area of jurisdiction in a sustainable, hygienic, environmentally and socially acceptable manner. What follows is a critique of the municipality's water and sanitation provision.

(a) Water services provision

Madibeng Local Municipality states that it has made water services a top priority, seeking to address water backlogs (MLM, 2019: 40). The municipality affirms its commitment to ensuring its jurisdiction receives sustainable and quality water by prioritising upgrading and extending its water service provision infrastructure (MLM, 2019: 40). In support of this commitment, MLM refers to how in 2015, the DWS, in collaboration with the Madibeng Local Municipality, allocated R381 million to upgrade the Brits Water Treatment Works (BWTW). Another way the municipality sought to improve water service delivery was by upgrading water reticulation systems at Hebron, Kgabalatsane, Klipgat and Itsoseng, and drilling and equipping water boreholes.

Madibeng Local Municipality delivers 100Ml comprising of its BWTW, which supplies 60Ml, Schoemansville provides 10Ml, Rand Water 6Ml and 24Ml of potable water in its reticulation systems daily to its consumer consisting of mines, industry, commercial institutions, and households (MLM, 2019: 40). In 2016, 70% of households had access to clean and safe water in Madibeng compared to almost 30% without. Table 5 below shows the level of access to safe water in the municipality:

Table 5: Madibeng household access to safe drinking water (2016)

Access	№ of households	Percentage (%)
Access to safe drinking water	133,674	70
No access to safe drinking water	57,010	30
Total	190,685	100

Note: Total excludes 'Do not know' (14 416) and 'Unspecified' (2 372).
(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 46)

Statistics in Madibeng for access to safe drinking water are less than the national figure, as access to drinking water in South Africa was 89% in the same year (StatsSA, 2018: 41). This difference presents a different picture of the seeming successes that Madibeng presents. Very few households had taps inside their dwelling or house (n = 30,916) (StatsSA, 2018: 47). In the Madibeng Local Municipality, 61% of households accessed water from a tap inside their house or yard (StatsSA, 2018: 48). Worryingly, some households did not have access to piped water within their homes or yards and accessed municipal piped water via community stands, a public tap, and in some instances, from a neighbour's tap. This constituted almost 17% of the households (StatsSA, 2018: 48). A further 6% relied on water tankers to provide drinking water, mostly in communities without water services infrastructure. Borehole water users were almost 12% (StatsSA, 2018: 48).

More than 77% of households in the Madibeng Local Municipality did not agree to the statement that the municipality was actively trying to solve poor water service provision (StatsSA, 2018: 74). Sixty-one per cent "strongly disagreed"; whilst 16% were "disagreed". A meagre 18% agreed that the Madibeng Local Municipality was taking steps to resolve the area's poor water services (StatsSA, 2018: 74). A paltry 8% "strongly agreed". This indicates that the households in the Madibeng Local Municipality were disillusioned by the Madibeng Local Municipality's efforts to improve water service provision.

(b) Access to sanitation

Sanitation is another area intricately linked to access to water. Access to adequate water and sanitation significantly contribute to improved hygiene. Basic sanitation in the Madibeng Local Municipality was still a challenge in 2016 as only 42% of the households in the municipality had access (StatsSA, 2018: 50-52). These households mostly had access to a flush toilet. Due to increased rural-urban migration in the municipality, most informal settlements were located on unserviced land (Bond, 2014). The remaining 58% of households had inadequate to no sanitation services. More than half the households used pit latrines and toilets without a ventilation pipe in the municipality. About 2% of households did not have toilet facilities (StatsSA, 2018: 50-52). The table below demonstrates the distribution of households by type of toilet facilities in Madibeng:

Table 6: Distribution of type of toilet facilities by households in 2016

	Type	№ of households	Percentage (%)
Adequate sanitation[34]	Flush toilet connected to public sewerage system	52,782	27
	Flush toilet connected to septic tank/ conservancy tank	11,010	6
	Pit latrine/toilet with ventilation pipe	17,937	9
	Ecological toilet	150	<1
Inadequate sanitation	Pit latrine/toilet without ventilation pipe	99,367	51
	Chemical toilet	629	<1
	Bucket toilet (collected by municipality)	253	<1
	Bucket toilet (emptied by household)	458	<1
	Other	6,147	3
	None	4,630	2
	Total	193,363[35]	100

(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 51-52)

[34] Adequate toilet facilities are used as proxy for basic sanitation. These include flush toilets as well as ventilated pit latrines that dispose of waste safely and that are within or near the house. Inadequate toilet facilities include unventilated pit latrines, chemical toilets, bucket toilets, or an absence of toilet facilities (http://childrencount.uct.ac.za/indicator.php?domain=3&indicator=42).

[35] Total presented in the StatsSA Report (2018: 51) is 187,217.

Challenges regarding the poor provision of basic services can be linked to governance and management issues in the Municipality. The following section looks at issues around mismanagement at the Madibeng Local Municipality, paying attention to the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA).

3.8.2. Mismanagement at the Madibeng Local Municipality

A look into the AGSA's Reports shows that Madibeng has been one of the most financially mismanaged[36] municipalities in the country. The North West province failed to provide one municipality with a clean audit in five financial years from 2015/16 (AGSA; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021). From the 2015/16 until the 2018/2019 financial year, the Madibeng Local Municipality was consistently among the top three municiaplities in the country with the highest unauthorised expenditure. In the 2015/16 financial year, unauthorised expenditure was R796 million (AGSA, 2017: 53), it went down in the 2016/17 financial year at R561.9 million (AGSA, 2018: 74). The AGSA (2018) report also detailed fraudulently issued MLM credit cards and unauthorised monthly deductions made from the MLM's bank account (AGSA, 2018: 74; Montsho, 2018b). The 2017/18 year presented the same challenges, and this financial year outcomes were the worst since the 2012/13 financial year (AGSA, 2019: 144). This outcome was,

> [A] clear indication of the deteriorating accountability, a blatant disregard of our [i.e. the Auditor General's Office] messages and recommendations, complacency and a lack of commitment to decisively address key areas of concern as well as a lack of political will to effect consequences.
> (AGSA, 2019: 144)

In 2017/8, about 16 municipalities across South Africa invested an estimated R1.6 billion with the now-defunct Venda Building Society[37] (VBS) Mutual Bank (AGSA, 2019: 10). The investments were in contravention of the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003. Five municipalities in the North West Province were

[36] Financial mismanagement entails failure to comply with legislation, specifically in the areas of unauthorised, irregular as well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure; procurement; and contract management.
[37] I conducted my fieldwork between September 2018 and April 2019 in Madibeng. The time coincided with the unravelling of the VBS (Bank) Saga, also referred to as the *#VBSBankHeist*. This issue made headlines in South Africa from late 2018 to late 2019.

implicated for investing R551.2 billion with VBS, and these were Madibeng, Mahikeng, Mompati, Moretele, and Dr Ruth Segomotsi (AGSA, 2019: 144). Such actions contributed to the municipality's inability to provide basic services (AGSA, 2019: 145).

Matters did not improve in the following financial year as the municipality showed a deficit of R1.1 billion in the 2018/9 financial year. About R31.5 million in VBS Mutual Bank was written off as a financial loss. The AGSA (2020) also highlighted a significant problem in terms of debt collection, with R1.7 billion of the consumer debtors of R2 billion (approximately 85% of all debts) being impaired due to it being unlikely to be collected (AGSA, 2020: 120).

The AGSA Office has struggled to work with the municipality's officials. Political instability and the tone and attitude of political leaders in the municipality created "an environment that is not conducive to accountability, good governance and effecting consequences (AGSA, 2019: 144). Municipal staff's intimidation and scare tactics resulted in the audit team withdrawing and further involvement in the South African Police Service (AGSA, 2019: 144).

Systemic management problems at the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2010 have resulted in the entity being placed under administration as per Section 139(1)[38] of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) on several occasions:

(i) S139(1)(b)[39] was invoked from March 2010 – May 2011 (CoGTA, 2014b: 2; CoGTA; 2020). Erick Matlawe was appointed as an Administrator to oversee the intervention process for six months (CoGTA, 2014b: 3). The intervention was extended at the beginning of November 2010 and ended in May 2011, following the local government elections that were held on 18 May 2011 (CoGTA, 2014b: 3);

[38] Section 139 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is invoked when a provincial government intervenes after assessing and concluding that a municipality did not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of both the Constitution and the executive obligation.

[39] Section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), requires the provincial government to assume responsibility because the municipality could not fulfil an obligation.

(ii) S139(1)(b) was again invoked from February 2014 - March 2014 (CoGTA, 2014a; CoGTA; 2020). This happened in February 2014, during a special meeting of the North West Provincial Executive Council. The intervention was effective from 5 February 2014, for a minimum of six months and a maximum of twelve months (CoGTA, 2014a). The Minister disapproved the intervention on 7 March 2014, in terms of S139(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) (CoGTA, 2014a). The Minister held that the challenges in Madibeng Local Municipality could be resolved through supporting it in terms of S154(1) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) (CoGTA, 2014a);

(iii) S139(1)(b) was invoked from May 2015 – August 2016 (CoGTA, 2020). The details of this are scant;

(iv) S139(1)(a)[40] of the Constitution from June – July 2018 (CoGTA, 2021);

(v) S139(1)(b) of the Constitution from May/June 2019 to June 2020. The intervention was for six months ending 30 December 2019. Municipal Council requested the MEC to further extend for another six months ending in June 2020 (AGSA, 2021: 84; CoGTA, 2021);

(vi) S139(1)(b) of the Constitution from August 2020 (RSA, 2020: 13; CoGTA, 2021); and

(vii) Section 139 (1)(b) was implemented from December 2020. Paul Maseko led the intervention team, which consisted of technical, financial, governance and administration experts, who would be there for a period not exceeding 12 months (RSA, 2021).

Allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement at the MLM culminated in Jostina Mothibe, the Executive Mayor, being removed from office through a motion of no confidence tabled by the DA, the Forum 4 Service Delivery (F4SD) and the Freedom Front Plus. The EFF abstained. The ANC's Joseph Ratloi was voted in as the new mayor (Montsho, 2021).

[40] Section 139(1a) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), requires that the provincial government issue a directive to the municipalities.

3.9. Conclusion

The underlying argument in this chapter is that hydropolitics is intricately linked with water governance. The pursuit of neoliberal macro-economic policies has left the poor struggling to access basic water services. While mandates supporting the right to water are available, macro-economic policies grounded in cost-recovery have caused the poor to struggle to access adequate water. The emerging literature on hydropolitics in post-apartheid South Africa was grounded in the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water. This literature assessed the problems that emerged as a result of the state adopting neoliberal policies. The effects of these policies were also investigated, particularly how water privatisation threatened the right to water. New literature emerged that focused on the adoption of Gramscian and Foucauldian frameworks in hydopolitics. What emerges from statistics on water access is the problem of using infrastructure as a proxy for access. The chapter closes with an overview of the research area – the Madibeng Local Municipality.

The next chapter is an explication and a discussion of how I embarked on the collection of data. I critically engage with the different methods I employed, justify my sampling procedure, and overall reflect on the whole process.

CHAPTER FOUR

Researching Expressions of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid Hydropolitics

"Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted."
(Albert Einstein)

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I systematically unpack the research design and methods employed to address the five objectives that I formulated to answer the research question. The first two objectives were linked to the residents of the three communities' perceptions of water services in the area and their coping when there were poor water services. The next two objectives were centred on citizenship and focused on how the residents viewed the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as citizens, how they vindicate their right to water, and lastly, to contribute to citizenship theory. The main research question for this study was how residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics. I start this chapter by detailing why I adopted a qualitative research strategy when addressing the research problem.

4.2. Qualitative research approach

I adopted a qualitative approach. In this study, investigating expressions of citizenship within the context of water politics required that I "study phenomena through a person's perspective, paying attention to the context where they emerge" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 2). It was vital for me to see the world through the participants' eyes so that I would be able to "understand how people experience and interpret events in their lives" (Bernard and Whitley, 2002: 34); I engaged the participants in their "natural settings", allowing them to share their experiences, as well as gather data through other methods, all in an attempt to provide an in-depth account of citizenship and hydropolitics in the

three Madibeng communities. I wanted to understand the participants' experiences and their inner perceptions, attitudes, and feelings of reality on constructing and expressing their citizenship in hydropolitics (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). Since my research focused on the personal, subjective, and experiential basis of knowledge and practice, I adopted the following definition of qualitative research: "multimethod in focus, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to its subject matter" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 2). It was imperative to hear directly from residents of the three Madibeng communities how they have experienced access to water and how they expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng water politics.

Human beings are meaning-making animals. We attach meaning to things, events, relationships and the world at large to make sense of our lives and our experiences. Conducting a qualitative study enabled me to retrieve meaning from my participants' knowledge and experiences. In light of this, I adopted a social constructionist epistemology with my inclusion of, and emphasis on, multiple realities and subjective experiences. This, therefore, meant that my focus was on how participants constructed their own social realities and how their perceptions influenced their behaviour. Knowledge, and many aspects of the participants reality, are not real in and of themselves. For example, they held perceptions about the quality and quantity of water, their perceptions about the municipality officials, as well as democratic spaces o participation. These perceptions, views and beliefs were real to them because of a social agreement by the residents of Madibeng.

The adoption of a constructionist epistemology does not in any way suggest that social constructionism is a superior epistemology or that I disqualify other epistemologies; however, for this study, it was the most appropriate. Social constructionism attempts to "replace the objectivist ideal with a broad tradition of ongoing criticism in which all productions of the human mind are concerned" (Hoffman, 1990: 1). Therefore, in this study, it was imperative to understand how residents of Madibeng viewed the politics of water in the area. Through adopting a social constructionist paradigm, I was devoid of the notions of "truth", objectivity, and value neutrality. I embraced the notion that "truth" is elusive.

4.3. Data collection tools

This study's primary data collection tool was in-depth interviews, complemented by observation, field notes (journal entries), and photographs. What follows is an explanation of each data collection tool in detail:

4.3.1. In-depth interviews

Interviews are ideal for qualitative research (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 341; Halcomb and Davidson, 2006; Tessier, 2012; Hofisi et al., 2014: 60). In-depth interviews allowed me to solicit rich data from the participants (Easwaramoorthy and Zarinpoush, 2006): a "rich picture" (Fox, 2009: 7) or a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973). The phrase "thick descriptions" was first used by philosopher Ryle (1949) and popularised by ethnographer Geertz (1973). Thick descriptions are detailed accounts from participants themselves which aim to depict;

> [A] clear picture of the individuals and groups in the context of their culture and the setting in which they live…Thick description can be contrasted with thin description, [the latter] which is a superficial account and does not explore the underlying meanings of cultural members.
> (Holloway, 1997: 154)

The interview was guided by a list of questions, called an *aide-mémoire* or agenda (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 9; Young et al., 2017: 12; Fox, 2009: 18; Whiting, 2008: 37). The *aide-mémoire*, or agenda, is a general guide to topic issues we covered in the interview, rather than the actual questions I asked (see Appendix 2). It was open-ended and flexible. Unlike conventional interview guides, which provide some form of structuring to the interview process, the *aide-mémoire*, or agenda, did not determine the order of the conversation. I asked open-ended questions about the participant's profile and family or household dynamics, water availability and reliability, their perceptions of the state's role in water provisioning, their views about their citizenship status in the new South Africa, and how they find expression as citizens.

The *aide-mémoire* encouraged a certain degree of consistency across different interview sessions (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 9). In the cases where I picked up an emerging issue, I incorporated it into the following interviews. I adopted this tool to ensure that I give voice to the participants:

> Encouraging a dialogical approach is that it can further the aim of developing voice among those who have been historically silenced. The opportunity to speak, to question and to explore is an important aspect of the process.
> (Gitlin and Russell, 1990: 186)

Typically, the interviews lasted between 45 and 110 minutes. I used observations and recorded them in a field journal to complement the in-depth interviews.

4.3.2. Observation and field notes (Journal entries)

In the field, I also employed observation as a data collection method. By definition, observation is "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artifacts (*sic*) in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 79). Since the human mind has a fascinating ability to re-ordering material and drawing links from information collected within and outside an interview process, I recorded memories and ideas from the interviews when they were freshest in the form of field notes to try and avoid this (Tessier, 2012: 448). Field notes are gnomic, shorthand reconstructions of events, observations, and conversations in the field (Van Maanen in Wolfinger, 2002: 86).

Beyond jotting notes in the field, I dedicated my evenings at my accommodation to writing field notes. The field notes were critical in interpreting the audio recordings and making sense of the transcripts, as they reminded me of important situational factors during data analysis. Field notes were crucial because "ideas and memories from interviews will most likely be lost further down in the research process" (Tessier, 2012: 448). Field notes helped me maintain and comment upon impressions, environmental

contexts, behaviours, and nonverbal cues that the audio recording may not capture adequately (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 227). Some of the notes I took were about the differences between the communities – differences between posh suburbs I saw *en route* to Madibeng and the stark contradiction with townships and villages.

In the three research areas, I took photographs of the impact of water interruptions – storing water in containers, domestic work like doing laundry, and plants drying from a lack of water. Pictures and imagery complemented the field notes.

4.3.3. Photographic observation

Images helped me overcome most observations' fleeting nature as they helped me remember. For this study, I captured images of the September 2018 "shutdown" and different facets of Madibeng life, including water containers, water use by various residents, and faulty water services equipment and infrastructure – such as the state of a Madibeng water reservoir and its pump. These photographs also illustrated features of activities that were not easy to describe.

4.4. Research sites: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau communities

I narrowed my focus to the Brits Town Precinct situated within Madibeng Local Municipality north of Hartbeespoort Dam and adjacent to the N4 Bakwena-Platinum Highway intersection. The precinct covers an area of 54,47 km2 of the total of 3,839 km2 of Madibeng Local Municipality. The town area consists of Brits town, residential suburbs of Elandsrand, Primindia, the Brits Industrial Area, isolated townships[41] of Oukasie, Damonsville and Mothutlung, and farms in-between these areas (MLM, 2019b: 2).

The Brits area has a rich history of resistance politics evidenced by forms of expressions such as *toyi-toying* and non-payment of essentials like water. At the beginning of this

[41] A *township* in South Africa refers to an urban residential area historically designated for black migrant labour. Informal synonyms for township are "location", "*lokasie*", "*ilogishi*". Generally, every town/city has one or several townships associated with it, which are usually located in the fringes of the town/city (Stats SA, 2004: 15).

thesis, I detailed one of the most heart-wrenching protests in South Africa was the 2014 Madibeng protest which resulted in the police shooting of *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela. A week after this protest, another one erupted in Hebron and Jericho. Both areas had not had water services for months (Bond, 2014). In a 2015 incident, the SAPS arrested 26 protesters at another community protest linked to water service delivery. Seven women and 11 men were arrested and charged with public violence in Letlhabile, while two women and six men were arrested in nearby Damonsville (Khumalo and Tau, 2016). In September 2018, there were protests over the lack of water in Damonsville and Mothutlung, in which the police arrested 33 people for public violence (Africa News Agency [ANA], 2018; Montsho, 2018a; Nkuyane, 2018). The most recent documented protest in Madibeng was in November 2019, when Oskraal community residents *toyi-toyed* over the lack of clean water and decent roads. *Toyi-toying* is not only the form of expression; however, insurgent citizens have used it as the most effective way of raising grievances and demanding change, particularly because invited spaces have become "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (see Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Beyond toyi-toying, it was also important to understand the process that led to citizens having to consider. What would be the other forms of expression they would have considered?

These three communities were carefully identified and selected for two reasons. Firstly, the communities are home to poor people located in the same municipality that has experienced tense citizen/state relations over water service provision. Secondly, the communities are serviced with diverse water services and sanitation infrastructure. Damonsville had inside taps and flush toilets, while in Mothutlung, some sections of the area did not have inside taps and flush toilets. Mmakau is a village – it is an underdeveloped community. There is one standpipe per household for water. Sanitation infrastructure in the village is very poor, and about 90% of households use pit latrines without ventilation. However, the purpose of the study was not to draw a comparison between the areas or the residents; rather, to explore how residents in three Madibeng communities expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics. What follows is an image demonstrating the proximity of the three research sites:

Figure 4: An illustration of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau



Source: MLM and DALRRD, 2014: 4

(a) Damonsville

Damonsville was named after Isaac Benjamin Damons, a Dutch Reformed Church priest and political activist (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). Damonsville is located in Ward 21 (MLM, 2019b: 4). Its surface area is 1.91 km² with a population of 3,969. At the 2011 census, there were approximately 1,416 households (Community Survey, 2011). In 2011, Damonsville had more males than females, with a gender representation of 53% versus 47% (Community Survey, 2011). The area was built in 1990 for the coloured community by the apartheid regime (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). In 2011, the largest population group were black Africans at 71%, followed by coloureds at 25%. Most of the original coloured inhabitants came from Cape Town (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). The ethnic groups living in the suburb were Tswanas at 38%, followed by Afrikaans speakers at 27%, Tsongas were 6%, Pedis and Sothos at 5% each, and Vendas, Xhosas, Zulus all under 5% (Community Survey, 2011).

In Damonsville, more than 80% of households had water from a tap inside their home (43%) or in the yard (38%). More than 17% of households accessed piped water from a community stand, and more than 1% did not have access to piped water. Eighty per cent of Damonsville households had a flush toilet connected to the municipal sewerage system. Approximately 19% of households used a pit latrine without ventilation (MLM and DALRRD, 2014: 14).

(b) Mothutlung

The second community was Mothutlung. The township had a population of 11,601 and an estimated 3,495 households. Its total surface area was 5,03 km² (StatsSA, 2011). It's in Madibeng Local Municipality's Ward 20 (MLM, 2019b: 4). It was predominantly a black African community, with 99% of its population categorising themselves as such (StatsSA, 2011). The largest ethnic group in the area were Tswanas at 73%, followed by Pedis at 6%, and Tsongas with 4%. There was an even split between males and females– 50% against 50%. This community was extremely impoverished. More than 30% of households in the area did not have a source of income (StatsSA, 2011). An overwhelming 99% of the population used municipal water in the community. Other sources of water were boreholes, water tankers and water vendors (StatsSA, 2011). Over 99% of the population had a flush toilet. However, some people used bucket toilets, and others did not have access to a toilet.

(c) Mmakau

The third and final community was Mmakau. Mmakau is a *village* with a population of 36,605 and 11,214 households, according to the 2011 census (StatsSA, 2011). The village has been under the Bakgatla ba Mmakau tribal authority since 17 June 1960 under the leadership of the Motsepe family. The area falls in Ward 18 (MLM, 2019b: 4). The area's population was predominantly Black African (99%), with Coloureds, Indian/Asians and Whites making up the other one per cent. Ethnically, Tswanas were the majority grouping at 63% of the population, followed by Pedis and Tsongas, both at eight per cent, and Zulus at three per cent. There were more males (53%) than females (47%)

(StatsSA, 2011). In 2011 Mmakau's household incomes states indicate that it was an impoverished community, with 17% of households indicating that they had no source of income (StatsSA, 2011).

Almost 77% of the population accessed municipal tap water. Nine per cent relied on municipal water tankers. Two per cent utilised borehole water, and another two per cent bought water from vendors. Almost three per cent of the population used water from unsafe sources like dams, pools, stagnant water, rivers and streams. Worryingly, eight per cent indicated that they utilised water from "other" sources (StatsSA, 2011). Mmakau's eastern side receives water from the City of Tshwane's North East ODI 1 Water Scheme (MLM, 2019b: 83). Toilet facilities in the area were appalling. Only three per cent of the population had access to a flush toilet. Ninety per cent of the population used a pit latrine without ventilation. Some people were still using buckets, and two per cent did not have a toilet facility (StatsSA, 2011).

4.5. Research assistants

As an outsider, I was not sufficiently familiar with the community dynamics, and I needed to find an assistant researcher who could help me navigate the research communities and collect data. My supervisor, Professor Mary Galvin, connected me to Siphiwe Mbatha – a research assistant who had a wealth of experience from working in the area of Madibeng. He had assisted Professor Galvin in her work in the area. Mr Mbatha was fluent in English, Afrikaans, SeTswana, as well as IsiZulu – languages spoken in the three communities.

I conducted most of the interviews in English. Where interviews needed to be conducted in Afrikaans or Setswana, I was assisted by Mr Mbatha, who conducted the interviews and translated them to English. Unfortunately, Mr Mbatha could not assist me for the full duration of the data collection process. To fill this void, I recruited Andrew Didibane – a Damonsville resident – to assist me with conducting Afrikaans and Setswana interviews. He met the criteria of a research assistant for this project – he was a matriculant, fluent in English, Afrikaans and Setswana, and had a good

understanding of the area and the people. Furthermore, he intimately knew water services issues and people's general perceptions about these issues. Mr Didibane conducted interviews in the remaining areas of Mothutlung and Mmakau in Afrikaans and Setswana and also transcribed them.

All of the interviews were done in my presence, and if there was a question which either Mr Mbatha or Mr Didibane could not respond to, I would be there to answer it. Based on my previous experiences working with researchers during my master's research, I advised Mr Mbatha or Mr Didibane to state what the participants had said in English so that the participants' phraseology could be maintained (Kumar, 1989: 21). This generally meant that interviews in Afrikaans and SeTswana took much longer to complete than the English ones.

I met Mr Mbatha and Mr Didibane on 9 September 2018 and 5 January 2019, respectively, to do interview training. Before conducting the interviews, the research assistants had to understand the study's objectives fully. To ensure that I addressed the most important aspects of the research, I met them for a "workshop". I used a copy of my research proposal and the interview guide as discussion documents of the study. I addressed all the issues they raised, reflecting on the research's objectives. The session with Mr Mbatha lasted about four hours, and we met at a restaurant in Robertsham, close to Johannesburg CBD. I met with Mr Didibane at his home, and I brought lunch for us. This session lasted five hours – we went on to discuss Madibeng politics, his upbringing in the area and his family's dynamics.

4.6. Selection of participants

When employing a qualitative approach, non-probability sampling methods generally suffice. I used purposive sampling as I needed to identify participants who would clarify or deepen our understanding of how they construct and reconstruct their expressions of citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning in Madibeng. Purposive sampling involves identifying and selecting participants who are especially

knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest. In support of this Denscombe (2010: 34-35) states that,

> Purposive sampling operates on the principle that we can get the best information through focusing on a relatively small number of instances deliberately selected based on their known attributes…the sample is 'hand-picked' for the research…

Neuman (2003: 231) buttresses this indicating that, purposive can be used when "a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation". He draws from a study conducted by Hochschild's study in which 28 people were intensively interviewed about their beliefs. She selected her participants based on incomes and gender (Neuman, 2003: 231).

In this study, participants were selected and recruited based on two specified characteristics which were important in this research. Firstly, participants had to be a household head or, in their absence, the next most senior person. Being a household head is linked to age and income. Heads are generally the decision-makers in households and bear most of the responsibilities associated with it and its members. In the head's absence, the next most senior person was interviewed. This person should have a good grasp of household dynamics. Within the context of access to water, heads and senior members of the households would be responsible for paying bills, including that of water, finding alternative sources of water during an interruption and having the capacity to participate politically in citizens issues. With almost 50% of households headed by women in South Africa, it was also important to have a sample of about half who were women. The gendered nature of domestic and care work means that most people affected are women. Women typically spend disproportionately more time on unpaid domestic and care work than men.

The second characteristic is that they should have resided in their respective community for at least four years. People who lived in the communities for more than four years would be aware of the 2014 killings and might even have been part of the protesters. These people would have had a decent experience living in the communities to shed

their own experiences of water service provision and means and ways through which, individually and collectively, they have embarked on to express themselves as citizens in a new South Africa.

Having identified a potential participant, the two questions I asked initially were whether the person I was talking to was a senior member of the household and their length of stay in the community. If they were a senior member of the household and had resided in the community for at least four years, I would proceed to interview them.

4.7. The three phases of data collection

Data collection transpired in three distinct phases, and in each, it required that I remain in the research areas for about a week. This process spanned from mid-September 2018 to the end of February 2019. We conducted the interviews between 09:00-18:00. Here are the phases:

4.7.1. Phase 1: Data collection in Damonsville (12 to 18 September 2018)

On the morning of 11 September 2018, Mr Mbatha and I left for Damonsville, Madibeng. This maiden trip was a result of months of careful planning. The eve before our departure, Mr Mbatha contacted me via text. He indicated that he had been advised by his contacts in Madibeng that there would be a "shutdown" protest in the Brits central business district area – Madibeng's main city-centre. Below is an image on the *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group on 11 September 2018 advising members of an organised shutdown protest – see Figure 5 below:

Figure 5: Madibeng "shutdown"

Source: The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group

Knowing how community protests in the area have unfolded in the past – the destruction of property and worse, loss of life - I was gripped by fear. Mr Mbatha assured me that we would be safe in Madibeng. As he is an experienced researcher, I followed his advice.

The trip to Madibeng was a peculiar one. As we entered the North West province, we were greeted by peaceful and tranquil golf estates in the Magaliesburg area with well-manicured greeneries and golf courses with undulating fairways and greens. We also saw vast farmlands under irrigation. Brits was different. The area was littered, dry and dusty. Mr Mbatha directed me to the Madibeng Local Municipality offices in Brits CBD. As we got closer to the offices, there was a heavy police presence, and Brits had been

"shutdown" by protestors. We were greeted by a tense and eerie atmosphere as we passed through the offices. The police had cordoned off the municipality, and protestors were requested to be away from the building. Figure 6 below shows the entrance of the MLM building:

Figure 6: Madibeng Local Municipality main entrance in Brits

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A stone's throw from the offices, there were scores of protesters armed with *pangas* and knobkerries singing and chanting revolutionary songs – see Figure 7 below:

Figure 7: Scores of protesters in Brits

Witnessing all of this, I intuitively switched on the car radio and tuned to a local news station. A news reporter broadcast that Damonsville and Mothutlung residents were demanding the immediate restoration of water services, and a protester had thrown a petrol bomb at a vehicle. We cautiously proceeded to exit Brits CBD, proceeding to Damonsville. We saw a convoy of about six or seven Thari busses full of protesters whom we learnt were also participating in this "shutdown" protest. Below is an image of a Thari bus headed to the MLM:

Figure 8: A Thari bus ferrying protesters *en route* to Madibeng offices

The tarmac to Damonsville was full of debris: bricks, concrete blocks, rocks, sticks and branches, and smouldering tyres – a scenery which bore an uncanny resemblance to the scenes of spectacular violence in the townships which rendered them ungovernable in the mid-1980s. The burning of tyres in South Africa is very symbolic. During apartheid, protesters barricaded roads with bricks, concrete blocks, burning tyres, and other debris to prevent apartheid security forces from entering townships and other informal settlements – see Figure 9 below:

Figure 9: Debris along Spoorweg Street, Damonsville

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By the end of that day, the SAPS had recorded many violent incidents. According to the police, a driver of a moving vehicle discharged his gun at protesters. In another incident, several protesters were hurt in a violent attack, and arsonists torched two vehicles (ANA, 2018; Montsho, 2018a; Nkuyane, 2018). This "shutdown" had gained enormous publicity from social media, radio, print media and even television broadcasts.

In Damonsville, we left on 18 September 2018, having conducted 12 interviews: six with men and six with women. Interviews were conducted by participants who were residents spread across the township. When I arrived with Mr Mbatha, we went and parked close to a *spaza*[42] shop. From there, we disembarked and approached houses in surrounding areas. We ensured that the people interviewed were not on the same road or street. We interviewed residents of the *die wit huise*, "the white houses". This part of Damonsville was built during apartheid when the location was established as a Coloured area. The houses were identical, small and painted white. The colloquial name of this are, *die wit huise*, came from the colour of the houses. The area has remained

[42] A *spaza* shop is an informal convenience shop business in South Africa.

predominantly Coloured. We also interviewed residents of the "new area", the part built after the end of apartheid. Residents of this area were mostly Black Africans. This information was collected during the interviews for this research.

Our attempts to interview people in Damonsville were not always positively received. I had one unfortunate incident in Damonsville. I approached a group of about seven youth to interview them, and they treated me with great suspicion, scepticism, and even hostility. As an outsider, they assumed that I was affiliated with the ANC's ruling party, which they blamed for the current crises around service delivery. I explained to them why I was in the area and my study's purpose. They declined to participate as they believed my study would expose them and make them vulnerable to victimisation.

4.7.2. Phase 2: Data collection in Mothutlung (7 to 13 January 2019)

The second phase of data collection in Mothutlung commenced on 7 January 2019. Mr Mbatha was, unfortunately, unable to join me during this trip. When Mr Mbatha advised me of his unavailability, I reached out to Mr Didibane, whom I had been in contact with since I left Madibeng. I advised Mr Didibane of my predicament and kindly requested him to step in and assist as a research assistant, and he accepted. The drive from Johannesburg to Madibeng was never going to be the same for me. This time around, the contradiction between lavish estates in Madibeng versus the area where I was conducting my fieldwork was more apparent. The green manicured grasslands in residential estates and farms going to Madibeng; against the dry and desolate landscape in Damonsville and surrounding areas were ingrained in my mind. I went straight to Mr Didibane's home in Damonsville. I was there at around 10:00 am, and we both made our way expeditiously to Mothutlung. We started at a homestead of an acquaintance of his whom he had asked to assist us. His colleague was, unfortunately, not there.

From there, we had to improvise. We cautiously approached homes where people were outside, introduced ourselves and the purpose of my research. Participants who were selected were from different areas in Mothutlung. Like in Damonsville, we drew participants from different sections of the community.

Overall, the experience in Mothutlung was somewhat different from Damonsville. Participants in Mothutlung were more at ease to talk to us, and in the week I was there with Mr Didibane, there was not a moment when I felt uneasy, unsafe or afraid. By 13 January 2019, we had conducted eight in-depth interviews in the area with six men and two women.

4.7.3. Phase 3: Data collection in Mmakau (18 to 25 February; 16 April 2019)

I returned to Madibeng on 18 February 2018 to conduct the last set of interviews with general participants from Mmakau. Mr Didibane assisted me. Mmakau residents were quite keen to talk to us about water issues in their community. Mmakau was a peculiar site – there were no tarred roads, and some households did not even have standpipes. We made our way into the community on foot because only vehicles with a high ground clearance could drive there – 4X4s and *bakkies*[43]. We conducted seven interviews with five women and two men. The image below is Mr Didibane and me in Mmakau doing fieldwork:

[43] *Bakkie* (plural *bakkies*) – Is a South African/Namibian term referring to a pick-up truck.

Figure 10: Selfie of myself and Mr Didibane in Mmakau

As a qualitative researcher, it was essential to consider saturation in light of my study. The principle of data saturation determined the final number of participants in the respective communities. Data saturation is when the data collection process no longer yields new or different findings (Charmaz, 2006: 113). Data saturation is a critical factor in qualitative research (Mason, 2010). Achieving saturation is the "gold standard" in qualitative research (Vasileiou et al., 2018). The quality of data (i.e. its *richness*) illuminated important aspects of how residents of Madibeng expressed citizenship within the context of local hydropolitics (Morse, 2000). The quantity of the data (i.e. *thickness*) demonstrated how the participants shared some of the experiences and perceptions of water services from the local municipality (Morse, 2000). I reached the point of data saturation after about the twenty-fifth interview.

4.8. Participants' profiles

In this section, I present the biographical profiles of the participants in the study. The profiles provide demographic information about the participants. Bloomberg and Volpe (2018: 118) argue that demographic information such as sex, age, employment and length of stay describes the participants. The significance of this information in the study is that it is a framework that assisted me in explaining the participants' perceptions and allowing for a comparison of views amongst them. The following is a discussion of the participants' profiles per area:

4.8.1. Damonsville participants

Mr Mbatha and I conducted twelve in-depth interviews in Damonsville. The participants were split evenly between the genders – there were six men and six women who took part. Given that I assured confidentiality in this study, all participants were referred to by pseudonyms. Only two of the six men were formally employed – Andre and Kgothatso. *Andre* was a 33-year-old chef. His parents came to Damonsville from Mahikeng when he was only three. The restaurant he worked at had implemented rotational shifts because business was slow, so we found him at home on that day. Andre took care of his daughter, his ill mother, as well as two nieces. He parted ways with the mother of his daughter. *Kgothatso* was a 28-year-old mechanic residing in Damonsville. Kgothatso was cohabiting, and together with his partner, they had a daughter. His parents lived in the homestead's main house, with their two children - Kgothatso's two younger siblings. They lived in a backroom at his parents' homestead. The family had been in Damonsville for the past 16 years.

Taylor was a 25-year-old entrepreneur from Damonsville who operated a car wash. He indicated that he had gotten tired of looking for a job and a carwash business was his chosen route to try and make ends meet. Taylor was abandoned by his mother 16 years ago. When that happened, his grandfather took him in. He took care of his maternal grandfather, who was unwell. A few years before the interview, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) cancelled Taylor's grandfather's old age grant of R1,690 per month in error. SASSA had since requested his grandfather to come there physically and

resolve the issue; however, he had been immobile by that time. Taylor had not been able to resolve this issue by the time of the interview.

The oldest participant whom I interviewed in Damonsville was *Oupa* (Afrikaans for "Grandpa") Andries. He had just turned 75. He had retired and was doing "piece-jobs". He claimed that the opportunities were now fewer than before because African migrants – from Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe – working in the area were offering cheaper service rates. He felt quite aggrieved by this. *Oupa* had been in Damonsville for 30 years. He was taking care of seven people at his household – his recently retrenched 52-year-old daughter and her three children, as well as three other grandchildren.

Only two men, Armand and Eduardo, were not employed. They were actively seeking work; however, the circumstances in Madibeng were proving to be complicated. *Armand* was a 42-year-old father of four. His wife was the main-bread winner in the household as she was formally employed in Brits as a domestic worker. *Eduardo*, a 25-year-old Angolan refugee, was also unemployed. Their family escaped the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002) 18 years back. His parents found refuge in Madibeng with him and his twin sister. Eduardo noted that they had acquired South African citizenship. His parents resided at another house in Damonsville and left him to care for his sister and her two children.

None of the women interviewed in Damonsville had formal employment. The only woman interviewed with a relatively stable source of income was 28-year-old, *Ina*. She operated a day-care centre in Damonsville. She classified herself as single and had three dependants – her late sister's children. Her business had been in operation for four years and had an enrolment of 14 children at the time of the interview. Ina had been in Damonsville for 19 years.

Mmêmogolo (SeTswana for "Grandma") Mmabatho was 64-years old and stayed with her husband, the head of household. Their household consisted the two of them and three grandchildren. Fifty-six-year-old *Ouma* (Afrikaans for "Grandma") *Viola* was a former cashier. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Damonsville for over 28

years. She was a widow, taking care of her retired parents. *Ma'* (SeTswana for "Mum") *Londiwe* was a 54-year-old single woman taking care of her four grandchildren. She survived on the childcare grants she was receiving on behalf of the children, at about R400.00 per child. *Felicity* was a 24-year-old unemployed graduate taking care of two nieces. She moved with her mother to Damonsville 21 years ago. The last woman whom I interviewed in Damonsville was 46-year-old Myra. *Myra* was not married and had three children. Like *Ma'* Londiwe, she relied on childcare grants to survive. Myra had been in Damonsville for the past 19 years.

4.8.2. Mothutlung participants

In total, Mr Didibane and I interviewed eight participants in Mothutlung – six men and two women. Three of the five men were gainfully employed, and these were *Malomê* (SeTswana for "Uncle") Frank, Tshepo and Danny. *Malomê Frank* was a 59-year-old fitter and turner living in Mothutlung for 19 years. His wife and children stayed in another rural village. Twenty-six-year-old *Tshepo* was born in Mothutlung. He was single and took care of his brother and sister. He worked as a winch operator at a nearby mine. His mother lived in another part of the Mothutlung with his ailing father. *Danny* was a 26-year-old welder. Like Tshepo, he was single and took care of his three siblings. He relocated to Mothutlung in search of work and had lived in the area for four years at the time of the interview.

Ntatêmogolo (SeTswana for "Grandpa") *Joe* was a 73-year-old retired artisan. He was married and took care of eight grandchildren from a meagre old age grant of R1,700 and grants for two children. His children assisted him in taking care of his other grandchildren. Of all the Mothutlung participants, he had lived in Mothutlung the longest at 44 years. Twenty-eight-year-old *Tshepang* was married and had three children. He had been retrenched two years ago, and since then, he had been looking for employment – without luck. Tshepang had lived in Mothutlung from birth. The final male participant I interviewed was Mr Kalle. He was a 41-year-old community leader who was born in the community. He was married and had four children with his wife.

Ma' Tshepiso was a 48-year-old *spaza* shop owner married to a police officer. She had lived in Mothutlung for 22 years with her husband, and they stayed together with their three children. The last participant in this area was 60-year-old *Mmêmogolo Angelica*. She lost her husband twenty years ago. She was unemployed and caring for three grandchildren. The children were beneficiaries of the foster care grant, at R960.00 per child.

4.8.3. Mmakau participants

We were able to conduct seven interviews – five with women and two with men. None of the men had a stable source of income. Two of them were involved in "projects" to help them survive. *Thulani* was an 18-year-old dog breeder born in the area. *Thabo* was another young entrepreneur. He was cultivating grapes as a business. At the time of the interview, he was 18-years old, and like Thulani, he was born in Mothutlung. Neither Thulani nor Thabo had any dependants.

The only woman who had a source of income was 37-year-old *Valerie*. She was a shop assistant at a boutique in the Brits CBD. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Mothutlung for four years.

The remaining four women, Ma' Yolanda, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, were all unemployed. Ma' Yolanda was 55-years-old and had lived in Mmakau for 46 years. Of the whole sample, she had lived in the area the longest. Ma' Yolanda had neither close family members nor dependants to take care of. 48-year-old *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude was separated, and like Ma' Yolanda, she also did not have any dependents, and she had been in Mothutlung for 36 years. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere was a 53-year-old unemployed mother and grandmother. Her household had 11 dependants: two children in their early thirties, eight grandchildren, and her ailing husband. She had lived in Mothutlung for the past 36 years. *Mmêmogolo* Maggy was 53 years old. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Mothutlung for 28 years. She was married and had four dependants.

In total, 27 people participated in the study (see Appendix 3: List of participants). When I presented the findings, I developed a code that indicated the participants' biographical profiles. It consisted of a participant's pseudonym, age, sex, and area. For example, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy code was "*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau". I derived the participants' titles from how they preferred we addressed them.

4.9. Recording and transcription

In this research, 27 interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviews were conducted as follows: nine were in English, five were in English and Afrikaans, eight were in SeTswana, and four were in English and Setswana. Looking at the distribution as per community, in Damonsville four interviews were conducted in English, five were in English and Afrikaans, two in SeTswana and one in English and Setswana. In Mothutlung, four interviews were conducted in English, three in SeTswana, and one in English and Setswana. In Mmakau, four interviews were conducted in Setswana, two in SeTswana and English, and one in English.

Two recording devices were used for each interview – a Sony ICD-PX470 recorder, together with an iPhone smartphone as back–up in case one or the other failed. Participants' initial response to my request to record the interviews was generally met with scepticism and suspicion. I would then explain to the participants my reasons for requesting to record – so that post-interview, I could draw an accurate account of the interview from the transcribed recording. After this explanation, the participants generally felt more comfortable with a recorded interview and consented.

Often recording devices are seen to stultify the conversation as respondents are inhibited from expressing themselves (Whiting, 2008: 37). The recording device allowed the interview process to freely flow as it allowed the participants to express themselves with my undivided attention. The interviews were more of conversations than interviews in a formal sense. Noting that poorly translated concepts or phrases impact the interpretation of the data and analysis, thereby threatening the credibility and dependability of this study, I transcribed the English interviews myself, and the ones in

Afrikaans and Setswana were translated, checked and transcribed by Ms Gosiame Noge. I carefully identified and selected Ms Noge. Ideally translators should satisfy criteria proposed by Murray and Wynne (2001: 160), that includes:

(i) have an understanding of qualitative research – Ms Noge was a sociology Master's candidate at a South African university. She once worked for a Johannesburg-based research consultancy firm that did research nationally and internationally. She had great experience collecting data in conducting cross-language interviews in these language as well as transcribing;

(ii) be familiar with the topic of interest in particular – Ms Noge was familiar with water services delivery related issues in her own community; and

(iii) be proficient in languages used – Ms Noge was proficient in SeTswana, English and Afrikaans.

Interviews that Mr Mbatha and Mr Didibane conducted were for the most part conducted in either Setswana and English or Afrikaans and English. Ms Noge translated and transcribed the interviews simultaneously. The main limitation with cross-language transcriptions is the lack of transcriptions in a source language which makes verifying the final transcript difficult. However, this process is like that of same-language transcription in three ways. First, the transcriber is likely to replay the recording until they get it right. Second, the transcribers are working on audio material they are listening to, like written text; and last, the output is in written form, and it can be revised and edited (Osborn, 2017). The above process "yields a product used in the same way as that produced by transcription followed by a translation" (Osborn, 2017).

4.10. Qualitative data analysis

The researcher's role in qualitative research is to access study participants' thoughts and feelings (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating process. It does not proceed linearly. Qualitative data analysis searches general statements about relationships among data categories (Marshall and Rossman 1990: 111). The researcher's role in qualitative data analysis is more explicit than

quantitative data analysis. This section provides a clear explication of how the data analysis process proceeded in this study. In line with Malterud (2001):

> [D]eclaring that qualitative analysis was done, or stating that categories emerged when the material had been read by one or more persons, is not sufficient to explain how and why patterns were noticed…the reader needs to know the principles and choices underlying pattern recognition and category foundation.
> (Malterud, 2001: 486)

I used thematic data analysis in this study. Patton and Cochran (2002: 23) assert that thematic data analysis is that which "looks across all the data to identify the common issues that recur and identify the main themes that summarise all the views you have collected". In analysing interviews, I adopted a thematic data analysis model proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006) and adhered to the following successive steps:

(a) Familiarising myself with the data

Once I received the transcripts from Ms Noge, I went through each one as a final check and queried her where necessary. I then read and re-read all the interviews and listened to the recordings for the ones in English, and where I could, I took down initial ideas. I also spent some time going through the photographs I had taken – this was quite useful as it aided me to remember and describe specific incidents and findings more accurately.

(b) Generating initial codes

I started by identifying initial codes – these were just crude and broad ideas which stood out to me. I would link these to different people and note how they connected to the photographs and my observations.

(c) Searching for themes

Once I had generated codes, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the collated codes. I noted quotations that best expressed the themes I had identified. I started by revisiting the interview schedule, and carefully reading each transcript, picking out extracts. I read all the transcripts at least thrice, which allowed me to develop broad themes and subthemes.

(d) Reviewing themes

Data within themes should cohere together meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes. I read the themes ironing out contradictions from the consolidated themes and subthemes. This resulted in amalgamating, refining, separating, and in some cases, discarding themes.

(e) Defining and naming themes

In the end, I refined and defined the themes and potential subthemes within the data. The ongoing analysis was necessary to enhance the identified themes further to reflect the data patterns.

(f) Producing the report

This was the last phase where I analysed excerpts, discussed and analysed the data in relation to the study's objectives, and answered the main research question.

4.11. Trustworthiness – Lincoln and Guba's (1985) evaluative criteria

When it comes to trustworthiness, the main question posed by stringent qualitative researchers is, "Can the findings…be trusted?" (Korstjens and Moser, 2018: 121). Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose a highly acclaimed model in the social sciences. They refined trustworthiness by introducing the following criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. What follows is an elaborate discussion of each within the context of this research:

4.11.1. Credibility

Credibility is confidence in the "truth" of the findings. Credibility addresses the "fit" between participants' views against what the researcher presents (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I observed how people survived their everyday lives in the research areas in between interviews. I spoke to both men and women, the youth and elderly people, married and unmarried people, employed and unemployed people, about the challenges they experienced concerning access to water as citizens in the "new" South Africa. My affability facilitated the establishment of rapport and relations with different community members. Establishing rapport between myself and the participants created an understanding and deep appreciation of trust and respectability.

4.11.2. Transferability

Transferability refers to the generalisability of inquiry. In qualitative research, this refers only to case-to-case transfer (Tobin and Begley, 2004). The whole idea revolves around the research's ability to elicit "thick descriptions". As the participants shared their water politics experiences in Madibeng, I began to juxtapose these with what I noted in the literature. Since this study was exploratory, findings were specific to the three areas in the Madibeng municipality and cannot and should not be generalised. Be that as it may, the findings can be a point of departure when researching an area that exhibits the same social, economic and political dynamics in South Africa. It should be kept in mind that the generalisability of this study's findings was not an expected attribute since the research relied on social constructionist epistemology.

4.11.3. Dependability

Dependability is another term that links with trustworthiness. It shows whether the findings are consistent with the data I analysed. Sandelowski (1986) noted that a study and its findings are auditable when another researcher can follow the decision trail. In addition to this, another researcher with the same data, perspective, and situation

should arrive at the same or comparable, but not contradictory, conclusions (Koch, 1994). To achieve dependability, I noted everything in a journal that informed the decisions and choices I made (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I have my fieldwork journal, notes taken during interviews, signed consent forms, photographs, transcriptions and other evidence that informed me of decisions and choices regarding theoretical and methodological issues throughout the study (Koch, 1994).

4.11.4. Confirmability

Confirmability is established when credibility, transferability, and dependability are all achieved. Confirmability is about establishing that my interpretations and findings were derived from the data I collected and analysed, and it necessitates that I demonstrate how conclusions and interpretations were reached (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I justified every methodological move against the practices required when employing a qualitative research strategy in this research. I analysed the research findings in relation to literature, and findings were noted.

4.12. Reflexivity and the role of the researcher

Our unique backgrounds and life experiences have a bearing on our understanding of the social world. Such biases and subjectivities are not inherently negative and are unavoidable; however, they surface, and a responsible researcher should always attempt to acknowledge such. Malterud (2001) underscores this point, stating:

> A researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions.
> (Malterud, 2001: 483-484)

A qualitative study seeks to convey why people have thoughts and feelings that might affect how they behave. As a qualitative researcher, reflection on my part before and during the research process was crucial to provide context and understanding for

readers (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). Reflexivity allowed me to articulate my position and subjectivities (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). This enabled me to be self-critical, self-conscious, and, in the end, self-examine (Kock and Herrington in Whiting, 2008: 35). As a reflexive researcher, I kept a self-critical account of the research process, including my internal and external dialogue (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I recorded daily logistics of the research, methodological decisions, and rationales and my reflections of the participants' experiences, perceptions, interests, and other insights that I thought were significant (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Being a non-South African posed some challenges for me as English is the only official language that I can speak. Both research assistants, though, were quite fluent in the languages spoken in Madibeng. They were able to introduce me in a very professional way that was then acceptable to most participants. Even though they conducted the interviews in Setswana and Afrikaans, I would always pick up on the conversation when English was used. I would also engage with the research assistant to ensure that questions were adequately addressed between the interviews.

Researchers are encouraged to assess their impact in social research, and thus my "values, assumptions, prejudices and influence…must therefore be acknowledged" (Kock and Herrington in Whiting, 2008: 35). I continually had to make decisions and choices about how and what to ask the participants (Kvale, 1996: 147). I was very open-minded and, at all times, remained calm and sensitive. I listened to the participants' views and experiences and sought to be interested, attentive and caring about what was shared by the participants. Participants were encouraged to share their experiences.

4.13. Ethical considerations

Everyone agrees that among the highest duties of academics is to make sure that the human beings they study — fellow citizens they probe, query, prod, and palpate — are treated with dignity and respect.
Christopher Shea (2000)

This study's research proposal served at the University of Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee, where it was approved (See Appendix 4: Research Ethics Approval).

This research was conducted in line with the principles of *beneficence* (doing good or at least doing no harm). Once I met a potential participant, I would introduce myself and the research assistant I was with and present an overview of the research as per the information sheet (See Appendix 5). The information sheet contained the title of the project and its background, consent to take part in the study, the approximate length of the interview, *anonymity* and *confidentiality*, and a note about how *participation is voluntary*, as well as the full names and contact details for me and my supervisors – Professors Tina Uys and Mary Galvin.

I also presented them a copy of the informed consent form (See Appendix 6) – which I talked them through, and further explained the possible risks and benefits associated with participating in this research. If they were comfortable participating, they would then complete and sign the consent form. I also assured the participants that I would not disclose their identities. I used pseudonyms to avoid exposing them and refrained from using information that could potentially identify them.

In the Madibeng Municipality, more especially the areas I conducted this research, politics is a very sensitive topic to research. I only probed politics-related questions to the extent that people were comfortable and willing to discuss. During some interviews, it was quite apparent that some participants shied away from politics, whilst others, expressly indicated that they were not comfortable discussing the subject.

Furthermore, since the main focus of the research was on the expressions of citizens, I focused on that aspect to get the most data I could without antagonising the participants or making them feel uncomfortable.

Regarding the principles of *beneficence,* a contributing factor that led to me exiting the field was when continuing the research became dangerous for me as well as potential participants. Mr. Didibane called me, and I could sense fear in his voice as he told me that his life was now under threat because of the work we were doing. He sent me the following disconcerting voice note, which I transcribed:

> The problem is that I haven't heard from Kalle…Kalle is the relevant person, and if I can get close enough to him, he will give me all the leaders…And people that are not gonna shoot us. I am also scared because at the moment, I don't have a gun on me, and I don't have finance to say, I can't protect myself…

Madibeng is not an area to treat a threat on one's life nonchalantly. After receiving the message above, I consulted my supervisors – Professors Tina Uys and Mary Galvin – on the appropriate course of action. Under their guidance, we agreed that it was best to end my fieldwork in Madibeng – as it had gotten dangerous for myself, Mr. Didibane, Mr. Kalle, or anyone else whom I would attempt to interview.

4.14. Conclusion

To investigate how citizens express themselves within the context of hydropolitics, I adopted a qualitative research approach underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. The strategy was ideal because it facilitated a rich and in-depth investigation of Madibeng hydropolitics. I needed to investigate forms of expressions by citizens in an area with these dynamics. Twenty-seven participants were selected purposively from Damonsville, Mothutlung, Mmakau.

Data were collected via in-depth interviews, field notes, observation and visual images. I explained what it constituted and how it was valuable in this research for each method. I collected data in three phases, and a specific area determined each. In total, 27

participants identified purposively took part in the study. I employed thematic data analysis using a six-step model proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006). Trustworthiness was based on the criteria proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Each methodological step was justified, and data collected was analysed against literature collected while noting new findings. I presented challenges I faced and how I navigated them as a reflexive researcher, aware that my subjectivity potentially influenced the research process. I end the chapter with a discussion of ethical issues.

The following chapter is one of the two findings chapters in this thesis. In the first findings chapter, I discuss empirical findings linked to water services in Madibeng. The chapter addresses objectives linked to the participants' views on water service provision by the Madibeng Local Municipality.

CHAPTER FIVE

Water Services in Madibeng: Views of Residents in Three Communities

"Water is the source of life. We cannot think about developing our people if we fail to provide them with a basic supply of water."
Ronnie Kasrils (2002)

5.1. Introduction

Achieving a comprehensive understanding of hydropolitics requires an unpacking of South African water governance and emerging patterns of how residents in Madibeng engage with the state within the context of access to water. To understand residents' expressions of citizenship within the context of hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities, this chapter addresses the first three objectives of the study, which are: to explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality; to explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality ability to deliver water services; and to analyse citizens' coping strategies regarding inadequate water services delivery.

5.2. Participants' views of water service delivery

The Constitution of South Africa (1996), the National Water Act (1998), as well as the Water Services Act (1997) all support the realisation of citizens' right to access sufficient water. In South Africa, it is the state's responsibility to provide citizens with an adequate supply of water. The participants' perceptions of water services were crucial in this research because they influenced their views of the state's role in ensuring the right to water services. In this section, I unpack the participants' views of water services provided by the Madibeng Local Municipal (MLM). The provision of sufficient water relies on two key aspects: the availability and allocation of water resources; and the availability of efficient water services infrastructure. Two key aspects that indicate the sufficiency of water that I unpack are the quantity and quality of water supplied by the MLM to communities.

5.2.1. Limited water quantity

The quantity of water supplied by the Madibeng Local Municipality was a big issue which participants from Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau expressed extreme dissatisfaction about. When there were water cuts, the MLM is constitutionally mandated to provide basic water services to its jurisdiction.. Sending out water tankers was one of the methods. Based on the interviews, the three communities seem to have experienced widespread water interruptions.

From Damonsville, Kgothatso stated that there were frequent water interruptions in the area, and he did not know whether this was deliberate on the part of the MLM – as part of maintenance perhaps – or not. He held the view, however, that the area experienced rampant water interruptions. In support of this, he stated the following:

> They [the Madibeng Local Municipality] constantly cut water…I don't know whether it is intentional, but I know that there's always a problem with water in this area.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Mothutlung participants also had a similar experience of water quantity. Their verbal accounts alluded to rampant water cuts. *Ma'* Tshepiso, for example, indicated that the water supply in her area was erratic. Water services were interrupted with neither a warning nor notice from the MLM. Shestated the following:

> I'd say [water supply is cut] every month, and they don't even give us notice before the water is cut off; it just happens. Like last week, for instance, there was no water on Saturday, and then the water came back on Sunday or Monday…No, it was Thursday…[W]e were without water for seven days.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Participants from the Mmakau Village also indicated that their community was also not spared from limited water quantity supply from the MLM. They generally held the view that municipal water service provision in the area was very unreliable. According to some residents like *Malomê* Daniel, water availability was anyone's guess. He stated the following:

> Sometimes you find that we do have water. Water services will then be interrupted in the afternoon and come back in the middle of the night…Sometimes when the water goes, it goes for a while…
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Other Mmakau participants supported the view that that the water situation was dire in the area, and interruptions extended over prolonged periods. According to *Ma'* Yolanda, her community could be without water for up to three months on end. Here were her remarks:

> Sometimes the water is there, and other times, not. That's my problem…We have a water supply for some time, and after that, they'll cut supply for up to three months.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Thulani, a Greyhound breeder and Mmakau resident, also reiterated the same perception regarding poor water service provision by the MLM. According to him, water supply was inconsistent, and the community would not have water for up to three months and then only have services restored for two days at most. The following were his exact words:

> No one knows when water will come or when it comes back. It can come back after three months…For a day or two.
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

Another Mmakau resident, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, also shared a view of the unreliability of water services in the area. According to her, sometimes water supply was restored very early in the morning, and the water pressure was so low that the tap would be dripping when open. She would then be able to store maybe two buckets' full. She indicated the following:

> Sometimes it's restored in the early hours of the day, and I wake up at 2 am to find water is dripping…From those small drops of water, I might be able to collect at least two buckets of water.

(*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

On the day I interviewed Mmêmogolo Chimere, she was doing two weeks' laundry because the MLM had just restored the water supply. Figure 11 below shows her dangerously plugged-in washing machine connected to a standalone pipe in her garden:

Figure 11: *Mmêmogolo* Chimere's washing machine

Dispatching water tankers is one of the methods taken up by the MLM to ensure that they meet its obligation to provide basic water services during water interruptions This method came up during the interviews. Damonsville participants like Felicity mentioned the role of water tankers supplying water during water interruptions. She stated the following:

> Ooo!!! Another thing that I feel I need to mention is that if we don't have water, the Madibeng Local Municipality sends trucks [water tankers] to come and deliver water to us. So we will have to get buckets, queue and then wait to get water from these tankers…Yes…[nodding]…That's how we sometimes get it [water]…

(Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Ina and Myra, also Damonsville participants, generally held the view that the quantity delivered by the tankers was limited, and not everyone in the community could get water. Once the tankers left, no one knew when they would return. According to Ina, the tankers did not service all the streets in Damonsville as they were always too few. This, unfortunately, meant that some community members could not get water. She indicated that the MLM perhaps sent three trucks to her area in two days – which was inadequate:

> [S]till not everyone gets water, they have to skip this street and stand [sic] there. I don't think that's enough effort...They normally send one water truck [tanker], and the following day if we're lucky, they'll send two [tankers].
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

Myra said the following:

> The truck [tanker] brings water, and once it runs out, it leaves, and no one knows when it will come back.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

It emerged in the interviews that the tankers had a route they followed, and once the water was finished, they left the community. Kgothatso, a Damonsville resident, was of the opinion that the section where he lived hardly got any water from the tankers because water would have run out by the time they got to where he lived. Damonsville community members residing in his section would have to wait for extended hours to get water, and this enraged them:

> They bring two trucks [tankers], and all the tanks' water is finished by the time they get here. You have to wait again. You can wait like the whole day - from early in the morning with your bucket until maybe the truck comes around seven o'clock at night. Some people will have water, while others don't, which also angers the community members very much.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Some residents were infuriated by how the water tanker drivers wasted water when filling containers. Armand vividly recounted an incident when a tanker operator filled the containers without care, and in the process, he lost a lot of water. Describing the process, he stated the following:

> When filling up [our] containers, there's a small generator at the back of that truck [i.e., water tanker] that builds pressure. One driver wasted water as it was spilling, and some people ended up not getting some. A lot of water was spilt onto the tar, and he was not concerned at all... All he wanted was to go home because he didn't have [to deal with] these [water] problems.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Damonsville residents were unsure of when exactly the MLM dispatched the water tankers. According to Myra (46/F/Damonsville), the municipality dispatched water tankers as early as the day after the water interruption. Kgothatso mentioned a similar viewpoint to Myra about how it was not clear. He indicated that municipal officials took somewhere between two to three days for them to dispatch water tankers:

> Let's say there is a shortage of water, and there are water problems, like the recent one. I think it took a while before those tankers got here. It took maybe two or three days...
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

The lack of clarity around the specific delivery times forced people to make their way to water collection areas once there was an interruption. In support of this, Andre stated, "[P]eople go to the streets and wait for those trucks not knowing when and what time they were going to come".

Just like in Damonsville, when water was interrupted in Mothutlung, water tankers were dispatched to the community to provide water. *Malomê* Frank, another Mothutlung resident, went on to say that water provided by tankers was inadequate:

> These trucks move up and down [Mothutlung], so if it parks, everybody must come out with buckets, and it is very difficult to get water because it finishes.
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

The community viewed the water situation as extremely dire to the extent that some residents ended up chasing after the tankers hoping to get a drop of water. In support of this, *Ma'* Tshepiso reiterated that community members followed the tankers to different parts of Mothutlung. The following were her words:

> [T]hey normally bring water for us in those JoJo trucks [water tankers]. [S]ometimes they say, "Water is finished in that section down there", and if we get there and it is finished, that means we'll only get ours on the following day…So we move around the area looking for queues and trucks…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

I noted in the interviews that water tankers came during the day, which meant that people at work would not get water. *Malomê* Frank, a Mothutlung resident, supported this view and made the following comment:

> *Ahi*, you see the truck [water tanker] coming here on the same day, but people are working, and they are not around. Where are they going to get water? You see, those who are not here will suffer. They come back at five, six, or seven in the evening, yet the truck was here at eight o'clock in the morning and noon. So how are they going to get water if they come at eight [at night]?
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Water tankers were also dispatched when there was a water cut in Mmakau, like in Damonsville and Mothutlung. This was Thabo's view, a Mmakau resident, "there are trucks that come with water tanks". Water supply in the area by water tankers was also very limited, and some community members could not get any. The situation was frustrating as people followed tankers in the community, hoping to get a drop of water. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere expressed this community reaction in the following words:

> Yah, sometimes they send out trucks [tankers]. If we don't get water this side, we will follow those trucks [tankers] around these blocks and other sections [of this area].
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

The residents indicated subtle differences that emerged in the dispatching of tankers. Damonsville residents believed that the municipality disbursed water tankers more briskly to Mothutlung than to their community. For Mothutlung, the MLM could send out the tankers as early as "on the day", while for Damonsville, it could happen as late as "after three days, or four days". Routes that the tankers took were also influenced by municipal personnel: These views were corroborated by Mr Kalle, who was employed at the Office of the Premier of the North West, "priority areas" were ones where people in the local government lived in:

> They [the MLM] sends water trucks [tankers], but uhm…Someone who has power directs them. [Perhaps] the Ward Committee Member will request that they first go to his area…Because they control them, they may send three trucks to Mothutlung before other areas.
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau who took part in this study believed that the municipality could not provide adequate water services. Across the three areas, participants of different genders and ages expressed extended and frequent water interruptions in their communities. This meant that for periods up to three months, some communities did not have tap water. To try and ensure the provision of basic water, the MLM dispatched water tankers. Despite this attempt to provide water, the tankers were almost always inadequate, resulting in some people not having water. Another issue that came to light that was linked to inadequate water was the deplorable quality of water supplied by the MLM.

5.2.2. Poor water quality

In addition to the inconsistent, erratic, and inadequate supply of water services in the research areas, the interviews showed clearly that participants viewed the quality of water supplied by the municipality, whether tap water or water supplied by tankers, as appalling. Access to clean water is a life-or-death issue, and people's perception of its quality is especially important as this again influences their relationship with the state. Sheat (1992) argues that "perception may very well become more important than

reality…especially when it comes to the quality of drinking water" (Sheat, 1992: 3). As human beings, we have five basic senses, which we rely on. Sight, smell and taste help us assess water quality. Water has organoleptic properties, such as its colour, taste and how it smells (Crampton and Ragusa, 2016; Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). If water has a peculiar taste or smell, it can be interpreted as a health risk (Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). A peculiar taste or smell is not an entirely accurate way of assessing water quality because water may look, taste, and smell bad but can be safe. However, this is atypical.

(a) Dirty looking water

Damonsville residents like Taylor, Armand, and Kgothatso believed that municipal water was dirty. According to Taylor, the water was so dirty that it did not need an expert to run tests to ascertain this. One just had to pour it into a clear container, and the contaminants were visible:

> The water is dirty…If you put it in something transparent, you can see it [the "dirt"]…Even in a plain bucket, you can see it. It also depends on what kind of a bucket it is and its colour. Yah, so you can see it. (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Armand echoed the above sentiment. He believed tap water was not "100 per cent" clean; clean water could only be purchased. Armand attributed the dirt in the water to corroded pipes that had surpassed their life span. He stated the following:

> The water is not 100 per cent clean. It's not 100 per cent, because 100 per cent clean water is water that we buy. The main problem why our water is like this is because the pipes are rusted at the hall [i.e. Madibeng Local Municipality]. Those pipes need to be changed. (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Kgothatso also reiterated that tap water was generally extremely dirty. According to him, once there was a water interruption when water services were restored, tap water was dirtier than usual for the first few days. Water that came out a few days after the restoration of water services was so filthy that it was unusable:

> Usually, this municipal water is very dirty. Especially when they [Madibeng Local Municipality] cut the water supply, and then restore it, when you open the tap, you will see that there's dirt in the water. It's so dirty you can't even use the first few buckets of water…Water for maybe that day or two, or the next couple of days, will be dirty.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, held the view that tap water was not fit for human consumption. According to her,the water used to be drinkable, but that its quality had progressively deteriorated over the years. When I interviewed her, she said municipal water was not consumable and described its colour as brownish. She was of the opinion that, the Damonsville community was unsure whether the colour change was due to the MLM cleaning the pipes. It would eventually clear up, she further noted. To her, the MLM's water quality was so poor that one could not even storewater because it changed colour. Here is what she stated:

> In terms of drinking the water, you really cannot drink it. At a time, it was drinkable, but now it's not because it's brownish. We [community members] don't know if it is like this because they [Madibeng Local Municipality] are still cleaning the pipes or what…When water is restored, it comes out brown and then it clears. The water here is just something. You can't store it; it discolours with time.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola, a Damonsville resident, supported the view that water was discoloured in storage. She had grown weary of storing water in containers. This was a repetitive and laborious task because each time water was stored, it had to be used within a fortnight before it was discoloured. Therefore, it meant that *Ouma* Viola might have had to throw away the stored water and refill the containers with "fresh" tap water. She stated the following:

> It's irritating…You must always think and do in advance. And it's extra work because this water cannot stay for long. After every two weeks, you must change the water or else [it discolours].
> [*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville]

Figure 12 below shows the bottom of a 5l container that *Ouma* Viola had once used to store drinking water that she got from her tap. The container had dried algae-like contaminants at its base.

Figure 12: Water container with dried algae-like residue

Like Damonsville participants, three Mothutlung residents believed that water was dirty describing is as dirty and brown. According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, the deterioration of water quality started in2012. Tshepo, anther Mothotlung resident, underscored this, and held a similar notion that if the water was kept for two days, sedimentation occurred at the bottom of the container. Here is what he said:

> Because the water is not clean, my brother, if you lived here neh, I'd tell you to pour a glass of water for two days and see the difference. There is brownish mud that settles at the bottom of the glass.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, when water was restored, when you filled a bucket with water, sedimentation was evident in only a few hours:

> Uhm…When there is no water when water comes back, we pour water into a bucket. You'll see a brown layer on top of the water. That is how we can see that the water is not clean. Maybe after a few hours, the layer won't be there at the top; it will now be at the bottom…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, from Mothutlung, also alluded to the discolouration of water. She did not attribute it to the water supply being restored but to the MLM's poor water purification processes:

> Because the water is not properly cleaned, it is brown when water comes back. When it's like that we have to wait for the brown to go down then only can we use the water.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Mmakau residents also shared the same opinions regarding the brown dirt. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere from Mmakau said that the water was "brown and dirty". She further went on to suggest that the water would occasionally get clear. This was a mystery to her. She stated that community members did not know the state of the water services infrastructure or how the water treatment plant was performing.

Some participants were very sceptical about the quality of the water. *Malomê* Frank had not drunk Madibeng tap water for over 15 years of the 19 years he had stayed in Mothutlung. He did not attribute this to any negative personal experiences from drinking tap water. However, his actions were prompted by what he had seen and heard from his neighbours about the water quality. According to him, he had noticed a gradual change in the colour of water supplied by the MLM over time, he heard from his neighbours of people falling ill after drinking water. Commenting on water quality, Tshepo, also from Mothutlung, indicated how dirty the water was and even sarcastically

questioned its source, suggesting that the municipality was getting it from nearby rivers. He stated the following: "We don't know if they suck it straight from the river or what?!" Tshepo believed that quality of water had deteriorated such that he could no longer drink tap water. He also indicated that it was about a decade since water quality was first noted other community residents to deteriorate in the area, and he held MLM wholly accountable for this:

> We blame the municipality for not providing us with water. That's why I'm saying since I've been in Mothutlung since 1996. Then we didn't have any water issues, and we could drink water straight from the taps…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

As for water supplied by water tankers, residents' perceptions of water quality varied. While some participants trusted and consumed tap water, some were generally sceptical and did not drink it. For example, participants like *Ma'* Londiwe and Armand, both from Damonsville, believed that the tankers' water was cleaner than water from the area's taps. *Ma'* Londiwe said:

> You saw how the water looks like from the tap, and water from the truck is not always clean, but it's better than tap water.
> (*Ma'* Londiwe/54/F/Damonsville)

This was echoed by Armand, who believed that water from the tankers could be consumed; however, it was not as clean as "bought water": "Yes, that is clean water, not like bought water, we can drink it and use it for laundry *et cetera*…" (Armand/42/M/Damonsville). For other residents like *Oupa* Andries, water from the tankers was clean in some instances; however, not always. He recounted one incident where he claims to have collected water that had some faecal matter. After he boiled it in a kettle, the kettle had residue:

> Sometimes the water they [i.e. water tankers] deliver is clean, and sometimes it's not. I don't know what to say. The last time they brought water here, there was *kak* [faeces] in it! When I boiled the water, it left a yellow or green residue in the kettle, and at the top of the water, you could see it was brown.
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

The other residents from Mothutlung and Mmakau shared the same views about water supplied by the tankers being dirty. The perceptions of poor water quality resulted in some of the participants of these areas not consuming it. Danny indicated that in Mothutlung, he bought water to drink since water from the tankers was not ideal for consumption:

> Most people don't drink water supplied by tankers. They buy water that they are going to drink because that water is not right for consumption.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung).

Danny drank bottled water and used municipal water for cooking: "You see, when you cook with it, it's fine. When it boils, the bacteria dies". Thabo was of the view thatwater from the tankers was filthy, and he did not drink it or use it for cooking. He reiterated the fact that he only drank water which he bought, and water from the tankers, and municipal water in general, was for cleaning and watering his grapevines:

> [Water] from the tankers...Ooh, eish...I can't drink that water... I buy 5l at the shop that I use to drink and cook. That one [from the tankers] is for my plants and to bath.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

To *Malomê* Daniel, another Mmakau resident, water from the tankers was so dirty that he could see contaminants and other filth with his naked eye. He even claimed that he had seen tadpoles in the water on some occasions:

> You can't drink it! Sometimes when the truck comes, and you collect the water, when you pour it, you find small tadpoles - it is not clean!
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

There were different opinions on what exactly the colour of the contaminants was. While Eduardo, from Damonsville, identified the impurities as "white things", several of the participants saw the water as having "brown dirt-like" particles or a "brownish colour". A possible explanation for the participants' observations of "brown" contaminants in the tap water is that the water contained tannins (humic acid), which is prevalent when water passes through coal seams, earth, and decomposing vegetation (Scherer and Johnson, 2010). This could have entered the system from the compromised pipes. Beyond what tap water looked like, the participants had a word on its smell.

(b) Foul-smelling water

Water's other organoleptic property is its smell. Madibeng tap water had a terrible smell, according to some participants from Mmakau and Damonsville. *Ma'* Yolanda, a Mmakau resident, noted that "sometimes the [tap] water stinks". Andre and *Ouma* Viola were disgusted by the smell of water supplied by the MLM. According to Andre, the smell of the water was so awful that it smelt like something "had died in it". To him, this was a clear indication to him that the water was not clean.

Ouma Viola believed that the water would develop an odour. She stated that stored water developed an odour over a week, and once you opened a water container, a bad smell emitted:

> [W]hat we've realised is that if this water can stand (*sic*) for a week and you open the bottle, you can smell it...It has an ugly (*sic*) smell. I have to change the water every second week.
> [*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville]

Ouma Viola resorted to replacing the water every fortnight to ensure it did not have "an ugly smell". The water's taste was another organoleptic facet that emerged from the data collected.

(c) Bad tasting water

Some participants who drank Madibeng tap water believed that it had a peculiar taste ranging from "salty" to "tasting like mud". Participants like *Mmêmogolo* Chimere from Mmakau stated that the MLM water "is salty *hai*, it changes now and then". *Malomê* Daniel, also from Mmakau, affirmed this. Municipal water only had this taste when it had been restored, and he said: "When the water comes back, it's normally dirty and salty".

One Mothutlung resident also described the water to "taste like mud". *Malomê,* Frank stated the following:

> To me, you can taste it [mud] when you are drinking it. You can try it if you want. You can taste that...*Hai, hai*...There is a little bit of...Hmmm...I can't explain it...Mud or what? I mean mud from the ground. You can taste it...
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Beyond the view that tap water had a peculiar taste, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe was much more concerned about her view of tap water foaming:

> Tap water, yes. And when you drink it sometimes, it tastes uhm...Maybe it's the people who are cleaning the water...But it's not clean. And now, lately, I've been tasting that the quality has slightly improved, but the foam is still there.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

"Off-flavours" in water have generally been dismissed as just an issue of water appearance or "just an aesthetic problem" (Jardine et al., 1999: 91); however, in these three areas, some residents claimed to have fallen ill as a result of drinking tap water. The saltiness that *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, from Mmaka, referred to could indicate the existence of a high salt content – primarily sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate (Scherer and Johnson, 2010). The consequences of consuming such water could be running stomachs as the water has laxative capabilities.

(d) Incidents of illness

Another emerging theme was the perception of people falling ill after consuming tap water. *Ouma* Viola unequivocally believed that in Damonsville, one must treat, or purify, the water before drinking it. She recounted an incident when she believed she fell ill with her very elderly parents after drinking tap water. She had to get everyone medication:

> Yes, you must drink clean water. And last time [we drank tap water], we were sick and had stomach aches *et cetera*. We had to go to the pharmacy and the chemist to buy tablets because this water made us so sick.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Eduardo, another Damonsville resident, also supported the view of people falling ill after drinking municipal water straight from the tap. According to him, his young brother fell ill after drinking tap water. Similar accounts were raised in Mothutlung. Like *Ouma* Viola and Eduardo, Mothutlung residents believed to have either fallen ill or personally knew someone who had so from consuming the MLM water. For example, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica was convinced that she once fell ill after drinking tap water. She noted that after consuming it, her health deteriorated in a very short space of time:

> I mean, sometimes if you drink water straight from the tap, after a few hours you can have a running stomach, then you'll know that you drink the water from the tap. It happened to me once.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants indicated that vulnerable population groups like the elderly and children were susceptible to falling ill from consuming MLM water. People like *Ma'* Tshepiso and her family consumed tap water because they had no alternatives. She believes that her daughter once got gravely ill after drinking water straight from the tap. Her is an excerpt from her interview:

> The water has a problem. My second born got sick in 2006 when she was five. That's when she started getting sick from drinking the water.

> So, we buy water to drink from then until today, and when we don't have, unfortunately, drink this [tap] water.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

This desperation of lacking alternatives to get clean water was also referred to by Mr Kalle and Tshepo, both Mothutlung residents. The two participants were taking care of vulnerable people. According to Mr Kalle the situation was dire for him and people taking care of children and the elderly:

> It affects me, as we have children and old people, and the water quality [is poor and it] makes people [get] sick…
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Tshepo was very worried about his grandmother – his caregiver from infancy. He said she could neither afford to buy water nor make an alternative arrangement. Tshepo himself could not afford to buy water for two households – where he was staying and his grandmother's. She eventually consumed tap water, which he believed had had repeated negative health consequences on her. Here is what he said:

> She suffers a lot because you know she can't afford [to buy water], she's a pensioner. I also can't afford to buy water for two households…Yeah, so yes, it affects me, it affects me negatively so.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Mr Kalle and Tshepo's perceptions were similar to those of Kgothatso, from Damonsville, and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, from Mmakau. Both lamented the poor water quality and how it was a financial burden to source money to buy bottled water for consumption. Tshepo elaborated his view of how the water supplied to Mothutlung made people ill, and the MLM's water was just not fit for human consumption:

> After drinking that water, you'll have a running stomach, which is not good for your health. We've been having this problem since…Madibeng is a no-go zone when it comes to drinking water.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

From Mmakau, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere alluded to how tap water "makes your stomach run". Her son once drank some water straight from the tap when he was at school. According to her, he got very ill and had to be taken to the clinic for treatment. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere recounted:

> [O]ne of my boys drank water at school, and they said the water was dirty, and they took him to the clinic. Here at home, children would have running stomachs....
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Since then, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere has never given her children, or any of her dependants, tap water or water from the tankers to drink. She was adamant that children should only drink bottled water. *Ma'* Yolanda, also from Mothutlung, said she felt unwell each time she drank water straight from the tap. She felt pain in her abdomen.

I came across only two people who drank water straight from the tap: Andre from Damonsville and Danny from Mothutlung. Andre indicated that he had gotten ill from drinking water straight from the tap. He attributed falling ill to several unknown factors, arguing that different people have different allergic reactions, and that explained why some people got ill and others did not:

> We do drink straight from the tap; some people complain about the water...Plenty of people have gotten ill, and even I had diarrhoea from the water. The water can trigger so many things like skin issues because it has different pH levels. How salty or acidic the water is can affect you. So, if they don't look at those kinds of things, they get problems...So it may just be an allergic reaction that some people have to the chemicals that are being used to clean the water [by the Municipality of Madibeng]. You'll never know.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Danny had not fallen ill from drinking the MLM water. He was just uncomfortable with the aftertaste:

> Nothing happens like a running stomach, but it has after taste; it doesn't make me sick or anything.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Municipal water from taps and provided by tanker was described to me as awful. Looking at water's organoleptic properties, the participants generally held the view that municipal water looked dirty, smelt horrible and tasted terrible. The participants depicted a dismal picture of deplorable water services provided by the MLM to Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Having established the participants' views of water services delivery in their communities, the next section delves into their perceptions of the causes of water issues in the municipality.

5.3. Participants views of the causes of the water service delivery crisis in their communities

The Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) is both a water service authority (WSA) and water service provider (WSP) that failed to meet the National Water Act's (1998) "sufficient water" definition - basic water quantity and the minimum standard of water supply that should sustain human life. MLM's responsibility as a WSA is to ensure affordable, efficient and sustainable access to water services for communities in Madibeng. As a WSP, the MLM is also responsible for providing water services by legislation and conditions stipulated by the WSA. There was no privatisation of water services in the municipality as the local government had the sole role of providing water services to communities in its jurisdiction.

Municipalities are mandated to "[m]ove progressively towards the social and economic upliftment [sic] of local communities and ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all" (MSA, 2000). However, participants in this study generally held the view that MLM was performing dismally at providing basic services – water included. This section focuses on the participants' perceptions of the causes of poor water services by the MLM. These factors are very important as the water problems in the three communities resulted from Madibeng hydropolitics. What follows are the five

factors perceived by residents to contribute to water problems in the three communities:

5.3.1. Corruption and financial mismanagement: *Tenderpreneurs*

Participants in the study believed that officials at the MLM were corrupt and financially mismanaged the entity. According to them, this was one of the main factors contributing to water scarcity in the municipality. According to Andre, a Damonsville resident, the MLM has sufficient financial resources to operate efficiently and effectively. He griped that municipal officials were misusing funds that should be spent on water service provision:

> The money is there. Listen, there might be a budget where programmes are planned. The problem is that they do not use that money to replace these things [water infrastructure and equipment]. They eat the money, and then we have a water problem…The money is there, but it's being used for other things.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

This opinion was echoed by another Mmakau resident, Thabo, who attributed failing infrastructure to corruption. According to him, the MLM was not repairing water pipes because the funds available were being diverted for personal use. Here is what he said:

> [In] Madibeng, the people [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] do not fix the pipes because they eat [sic] the money…There is nothing that they are doing on this side.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Ntatêmogolo Joe, a Mothutlung resident, also had a firm conviction that municipal officials misused municipal funds for personal gain. He believed that MLM funds were being directed to personal use by officials there. Reflecting on his experience working at a mine, he alluded to how it was necessary to have critical machinery and equipment on standby if there was a failure. He said:

> They use that money for themselves. There is a budget, but it's not used correctly, which is why equipment is breaking down. I worked at a mine, and they used quite a lot of water uhm…There is machinery

> here that will push water to another section, and it comes in two. There is the one we use, and another one is the spare one. The spare one is ready to perform any time; it's fully functionally. When one breaks down, the other one is ready to kick in. We report it [the breakdown], and it [the machinery] is immediately fixed. So, the municipality doesn't fix the machinery, and they eat [sic] the money. (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe's view reinforced a notion held by participants that the MLM officials were not servicing water services machinery and equipment, which explained why it broke down, causing water interruptions. In times of water interruption, the municipality as a WSP provided water to communities via water tankers during interruptions. This contingency measure was controversial in the communities. Some participants held that the sending out of water tankers was more about the owners of the vehicles and municipal employees making money illicitly, as opposed to the MLM meeting its primary responsibility of providing water services. Views from the participants indicated that tankering was viewed as a *tenderpreneurial* activity in the communities. Some participants believed that these tankers were part of an organised syndicate, in which water interruptions were deliberate so that the MLM could dispatch the water tankers.

Kgothatso from Damonsville was very suspicious of tankers supplying water during water interruptions. He believed that the interruptions were a way for the owners of the water tankers to make money through supplying water. Sheepishly looking at me, Kgothatso said:

> Sometimes I wonder…I often wonder that these things in Madibeng are planned…You know…Maybe some of these people with water trucks [tankers] get something…Other places can go for a while without water interruptions. So what happens to the guys who have those trucks that supply us with water when they do not have a business? You see, sometimes they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] create opportunities for them to make money…They create opportunities so that those guys can work…Sometimes I think people plan these things [water interruptions] so that they can have a piece of the cake…the Madibeng money, municipality money… (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Taylor, another Damonsville resident, further suggested that it was plausible that the owners of the tankers were municipal employees who knew as and when to dispatch the water tankers. So once water services were interrupted, their vehicles could render water delivery services at a cost to the municipality. The following were his words:

> See, maybe that guy who owns the trucks works there [Madibeng Local Municipality]. So he knows that if there is no water, his truck will be hired. It's like a tender thing; he knows for sure that when there is no water, his trucks [tankers] will be utilised because these people are very clever.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Similarly, a Mothutlung resident, Tshepo, was immensely sceptical and suspicious of the tankers. He was not impressed by the sight of water tankers driving around the community. To him, the tankers' presence meant no water in his community. Since municipal pipes serviced his community, all he yearned for was water in their homes coming out of the taps:

> [Y]ou will see trucks gallivanting [*sic*] around the Mothutlung area, and we wonder what these trucks are for because we want water in our houses, coming out of our taps...
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny, another Mothutlung resident, also held the view that owners of the tankers stood to benefit from water interruptions through the involvement of corrupt municipal officials:

> Yah, the thing is that when there is no water, they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] bring trucks [tankers] here. Those trucks [tankers] are paid to bring water here, you see. That money goes to them [owners of tankers], you see. That means they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] are corrupt.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Thabo, a Mmakau resident, negatively viewed tankering as a money-making scheme that relied on the drying out of taps in Madibeng communities for municipal officials and tankers' owners to benefit. To him, the municipal employees were in no way making

concerted efforts to address the water situation in the municipality as they benefited from the *status quo*:

> *Hai*, I don't understand. You know how it's like my brother, they are happy if we don't have water because they bring the trucks [tankers], and these truck [tanker] owners get paid. You see, the trucks [tankers] belong to private individuals who are working elsewhere. It's business for them when there is no water.
>
> You understand me…? Do you know what they do with these trucks, my brother? They [the tanker owners] pay them [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] money, you understand? What I mean is that they are owned by someone, who then takes them to the municipality. The municipality hires them, and those at the top [i.e. Madibeng Local Municipality senior officials] get something in return. Do you understand me? When we have water coming out of our taps, they don't make money because the trucks [tankers] are not operating.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Andre indicated that the MLM hired the water tankers at a daily rate of between R13,000 to R16,000:

> Yes, because these people who hire out their trucks [tankers] get R13,000-R16,000 and get that amount per truck. I don't know…
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Armand mentioned a similar daily rate for hiring out a tanker. He knew of a *tenderpreneur* who had four water tankers. According to Armand, the businessman made between R15,000 to R16,000 per tanker per day for delivering water in Madibeng. What follows were Armand's exact words:

> There is this guy I know who has four water tankers. He'd go and fill them up…And he gets his money - R15,000 to 16,000 for each truck a day.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The vandalism of Madibeng water service provision infrastructure by water tanker owners and their associates is another perception that was help by some of the participants. According to Andre, the water tankers' owners and their associates vandalised water infrastructure so that when water services were interrupted, the

municipality could hire their water tankers to supply water to affected communities. He stated the following:

> Some people break these pipes so that they can make sure that they can get business. Yes, some people have been given contracts in the communities to supply water using their tankers, and they were getting paid per hour…Without making money, these people will not go a whole year, so they create opportunities to make money by causing leaks. They can say to themselves, "Let's break a pipe so we can get money". Anyway, these things [pipes] are old…
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

This allegation is plausible. In the 2014 Mothutlung community protest, one of the residents' main issues was that three water pumps servicing Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau had been vandalised by municipal officials who were believed to be in collaboration with water tank *tenderpreneurs* (Masombuka, 2014; Moore, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014; Khumalo, 2018; Muller 2020). MLM staff received rewards for irregular tendering processes (Masombuka, 2014). Muller (2020) had noted that supplying water by tankers cost 20 times more than tap water. Extensive water tankering can negatively impact the a municipality's budget as tankers should be used as little as possible..

That being said, Felicity from Damonsville was one participant who was optimistic about water service provision by Madibeng. Unlike the other residents who took part in the study, she viewed water tankers positively. She believed that the municipality did not want her community to struggle, and during water interruptions, it was proactive in trying to ensure that the community had access to water. To her, this was evident through the provision of water tankers:

> For me, I think I'll have to say, Madibeng doesn't just always sit back and watch the community members suffer. No, they do take steps to assist. If they did not care, they wouldn't be sending these water trucks [tankers]. But the problem is it's not always enough. So for me to be fair and clear, I would say Madibeng does take steps to address these water problems.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Felicity is, however, the exception. Another aspect that emerged from the interviews was the state of the water services infrastructure in the municipality.

5.3.2. Ageing and derelict infrastructure

Infrastructure is a very important aspect of water provision. An issue that came up in the interviews was that most participants attributed water interruptions to water infrastructure failure, most commonly a burst pipe. Damonsville participants generally held this view. Myra, for example, believed that most interruptions in the area were attributed to failing infrastructure, a commonly held belief in the community. Talking on behalf of the community, she believed that they had gotten to a stage where water interruptions were linked to a burst pipe. She stated the following:

> They [community members] normally tell us that a pipe has burst. We always assume that there's something wrong with a pipe when there's no water.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, asserted that water interruptions resulting from burst pipes were regular occurrences in the area. He added that there would be no water supply about once every two months. The following were his words:

> Water supply, uhm…The major problem is these pipes that burst almost every two months, and the supply is never consistent….Water interruptions can happen anytime, my friend; if there's too much pressure from the municipality, these pipes burst. Then we'll have the same problem we had these past three weeks.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Like some Damonsville participants, participants from Mmakau also gave a similar account of how they attributed erratic water supply to infrastructural problems. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, for example, said the MLM explained water as a result of bursting water pipes:

> Sometimes they cut-off water and they [Madibeng Local Municipality] tell us that a pipe has burst…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Mothutlung residents like Danny and Tshepo also shared this view. According to them, water infrastructure was constantly breaking, and they attributed these bursts to the fact that infrastructure was old – it was installed during apartheid. Danny noted that the pipes were installed before he was born, and at the time of the interview, he was 26 years old, suggesting that the pipes were installed before 1993. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe knew that he could barely remember of a time in democratic South Africa they installed any new infrastructure, and even a contact of his who was a former councillor attributed the water interruptions to dilapidate infrastructure that farmers were vandalising:

> It's always like that [without water]. And again, there's a guy I worked with at the mines who was a councillor. He used to say to me after '94 were going to because of poor water services because they [farmers] sabotaged very old machinery…water and pipes etc…so that the water that the little water can be diverted to their farms.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

According to some residents who took part in this study, human capital was another area that emerged from the interviews as a contributing factor to why Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau were receiving poor services.

5.3.3. Human resources issues in the water sector

Another key issue in the study linked to failing infrastructure was a perception of poor maintenance and servicing from a personnel perspective. Some participants claimed that the use of underqualified or unqualified artisans by the MLM contributed to the failure of water infrastructure, which in turn caused water interruptions. Some Damonsville residents like Armand, Kgothatso and Felicity believed that pipe repairs were done poorly by unqualified artisans. Armand stated that one of the most significant causal factors for pipe bursts was that MLM hired unqualified artisans to carry out repairs such as welding. He stated the following:

> [T]he main problem is that Madibeng [Local Municipality] hires amateurs to fix [burst] pipes… If you had transport, I'd go and show you how that pipe was welded…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Kgothatso based his opinion on the frequency of pipe bursts, which he attributed to the lack of skill of persons repairing the pipes and perhaps a lack of adequate tools. Images that he had seen ok the repairs were poorly done:

> Yes, last of last week [we did not have water]. And it seems like a pipe burst. [The] Madibeng [Local Municipality] hired people to fix it - to join and weld it. And the way they welded it?! When you see the pictures people took, you can see that qualified welders did not do the welding. The pipe was still leaking at the bottom....Why should it take so long to fix it if you have competent people with the right tools and everything? (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Felicity echoed the same sentiments concerning the lack of skills by personnel recruited by the MLM to repair faulty infrastructure. In support of this, she stated the following:

> I think the main reason there are these problems in our communities in terms of service delivery is that the Madibeng Local Municipality is not hiring skilled people. These people would have been doing a good job....
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Mothutlung residents also concurred with Damonsville residents about a perception that the MLM was not bringing in skilled people to repair infrastructure and equipment. A welder by profession, Danny vehemently criticised the quality of artistry of the repairs done on burst pipes. His tone suggested scepticism as if he was implying that the MLM officials wanted an ongoing infrastructural problem; hence the pipes were not fixed properly. He remarked:

> They don't weld it to seal it. [Y]ou must see the other pipes they fixed. The pipes have three lines of welds...It must be sealed, and a weld must be thick. In two weeks, it will burst again.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Tshepo, another Mothutlung resident, held a strong view that the explanation of water cuts in the area was the incompetence of the technicians and artisans working on water infrastructure. According to him:

> [I]ncompetence, and the person who is in charge is not doing their work properly. I don't want to say maybe she or he is eating the money because I have no proof of that, but it clearly shows incompetence… (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

To *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, the people doing maintenance and repair work on water services infrastructure were underqualified. In support of this, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe said the following:

> The machinery that is cleaning the water must be serviced and uhm…The cleaning of water itself must be running efficiently. The right chemicals must be put in at the right time. All this is not happening… (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe suggested that funds to render services from skilled people were not being released by the MLM officials, so the municipality recruited underqualified people.

> The people who are supposed to be servicing those machines should have the capacity and skills, but they [the Madibeng Local Municipality] are not releasing funds to pay such people. They [MLM] cut corners and get people without skills.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

A Damonsville resident, Armand, echoed this view. He noted the delays in payments by the MLM of service providers. He mentioned that curious residents once went to a repair site to see progress, and when they arrived, the team repairing the burst pipe was sitting idle. Upon inquiry as to why they were not working, the team noted that the municipality had not paid them for work done. Linking this non-payment to corruption in tankering, the men further suggested that the MLM redirected funds for their remuneration to hiring water tankers to provide water to communities experiencing water interruptions. The following were Armand's words:

> [T]hey didn't pay the people who were fixing the pipes, so they'd just sit. People with cars around here would check progress, and they'd find the technicians and mechanics sitting. They'd [the technicians and mechanics] say, "Madibeng doesn't want to pay us because they are sending trucks [water tankers]".
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Participants across Damonsville and Mothutlung strongly believed that the water service provision was being hampered partly because the municipality recruited underqualified, or unqualified, personnel to carry out maintenance and repair work. Recruiting such staff directly threatened the entity's financial viability as funds would be used to pay for poor skills. The result is that less qualified people were recruited to do maintenance work and repairs. In the long run, infrastructure would again not last as long as it would have had it been maintained and repaired by skilled persons. The remarks about unqualified personnel conducting shoddy maintenance and repair work to the residents of Damonsville and Mothutlung contributed to water infrastructure deterioration leading to water interruptions.

5.3.4. Erratic power supply

Water service providers require electricity to pump water. Power interruptions directly impact the, in this case, the MLM's ability to pump water. Some participants attitude water interruptions to erratic electricity supply to their communities. According to *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, from Mmakau, Madibeng owed a huge amount of money to Eskom[44], and because of this, she believed that resulting power cuts contributed to water interruptions. Here is what she said:

> Madibeng is doing nothing…about the issue of water *neh*. We find out that the Madibeng Municipality owes a lot of money to Eskom…At the same meeting, while we are talking about water, the electricity goes off, and there they tell us that Madibeng owes Eskom. They are doing absolutely nothing. When the electricity goes, water goes!!!
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

[44] Eskom is a South African electricity public utility.

Malomê Frank, another Mmakau resident, also linked power interruptions with water interruptions as well. Eskom responsible for power interruptions that affected water service delivery in the area:

> Sometimes Eskom cuts electricity at 4 a.m. when we are sleeping, and water goes with it. How does one prepare when there is no water and electricity? *Ahi*, there is no notification [sic].
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

From the management side, the MLM owed Eskom R90 million in 2017 (Molatlhwa, 2017). In 2020, the Eskom debt stood at R138 million (AfriForum, 2020). The power utility company has since published a notice advising Madibeng communities of power interruptions (Kormorant, 2020a). Areas that were going to be affected were Brits, Elandsrand, Lethlabile, Oukasie, Damonsville and Primindia (AfriForum, 2020). This impact of erratic electricity supply also affirms the anthropogenic nature of water scarcity in Madibeng.

5.4. Resident's strategies to mitigate the water service delivery crisis

To deal with frequent interruptions and poor water quality, Madibeng residents resorted to many different strategies that predominantly relied on access to money and networks. Most of these strategies required Madibeng residents to have the capacity to store water, which was in the form of various types of containers.

5.4.1. Water containers used in Madibeng

Storing water was generally the first option when municipal water was available. Community members used an assortment of containers that came in different shapes and sizes. They included: "small" 2l, 5l and 10l containers; "mid-sized" 20l containers and buckets; as well as "large" +180l drums, and JoJo[45] tanks with a 5,000l capacity.

[45] JoJo Tanks (Pty) Ltd is a supplier of "safe water and storage tank solutions" (see https://www.jojo.co.za). The name "JoJo," however, is synonymous to any "large" tank that is used to store water.

Figure 16 below shows an image of a typical 10l sized container with a nozzle used to store drinking water:

Figure 13: Typical 10l container for drinking water

Having the capacity to store water in Madibeng was necessary. Armand's household used two zinc baths to store water, one for water to run their sanitation system and the other for water to consume. The following were his remarks:

> You see that big bath; we fill it up for water to run the toilet and another for water to drink and cook with.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The culture of storing water in containers in the communities led to some people even setting aside storerooms to store water containers. Figure 14 below shows a water storeroom in Mothutlung:

Figure 14: Storeroom for water containers in Mothutlung

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Some residents in the communities utilised bigger containers. In Damonsville, Kgothatso lived in a backroom at his parents' homestead. At the household, there was a 5,000l JoJo tank which they used to store tap water. According to him, municipal water interruptions had frustrated his parents to such an extent that they resolved to buy a JoJo tank. This tank was enough for the household when there were short-term water interruptions. However, during the three-week August/September 2018 water

interruption, which led to the 12 September "shutdown", the tank almost ran out of water. The situation was so grave that even his two older brothers, who had their own homes in the same community, came to fetch water from there. In a sympathetic tone, Kgothatso stated the following:

> I have two older brothers. One lives down there [pointing], and the other one lives here [pointing]... It's quite close. So, when there was no water, all of us relied on the JoJo tank. They also wanted to wash clothes and cook, and here, it was the same thing. So, we ended up using that water quite quickly because it was supporting three households.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Malomê Frank, a Mothutlung resident, also resorted to buying a 260l JoJo tank. He stated that the area had suffered a spate of water interruptions, which compelled him to "make a plan". *Malomê* Frank said, "If you open your tap and water doesn't come out, what do you do? [pointing at his JoJo tank]...You see that JoJo tank there, I made a plan". In addition to his JoJo tank (See Figure 15). When I interviewed him, most of the buckets were full of water. His reason for this was that he always had to be prepared. In the spirit of *Ubuntu,* he stated that if his neighbours ran out of water, he would also give them some – for "water was life". Not far from his home, another resident had a square JoJo tank (See Figure 16):

Figure 15: *Malomê* Frank's JoJo tank

Figure 16: A square JoJo tank

In some instances, the water interruptions were prolonged, and stored water got finished. Once this happened, one's access to water was determined by their access to money.

5.4.2. Private water sources

The participants indicated that their access to private water sources largely relied on whether one could afford it. According to data collected from the interviews, this played out in three key ways in the research sites: first, purchasing bottled water from water vendors such as *spaza* shops, *shisanyamas*[46], minimarkets, supermarkets, grocery stores and filling stations, among other establishments; second, getting water from boreholes; third and last, hiring *bakkies*[47] to fetch water from areas further afield.

[46] *Shisanyama* describes a barbecue or braai where people come together to grill meat in an open fire.
[47] *Bakkie* (plural *bakkies*) – Is a South African/Namibian term referring to a pick-up truck or UTE.

(a) Water vendors

In Damonsville, some participants indicated that they bought bottled water for drinking while using tap water for cleaning and laundry. One such participant was *Ouma* Viola, who stated the following:

> We buy bottled water, and as for the water from Madibeng [Local Municipality], we just use it for basics like cleaning and washing clothes. We don't drink it…
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

A Mothutlung resident, Tshepo, also reiterated this. Buying water for consumption had become a standard practice for him:

> I buy water for everything I need to use inside the house. For instance, I buy bottled water for cooking and drinking especially.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Having to source money to access private water sources was not as easy as it was expensive. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, for example, expressed that having "additional" or "extra" money to buy water was associated with privilege. Buying bottled water was symbolic of affluence. Some residents in the Damonsville community ventured into selling water as it was now a lucrative business in the area. In support of this, Armand stated the following:

> Some people buy water to drink. They have money to buy…At the third house there (pointing) where there's a *shisanyama*, the *Oom* (Uncle) who stays there sells bottled water. He goes to Brits to stock up and sells it there.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Merchants sold bottled water at high prices in the communities. Since unemployment and poverty were rife in Damonsville and Madibeng in general, not many people could afford to buy water. Buying bottled water was the last resort for some. *Oupa* Andries reiterated that he would prefer not to buy water, but the low water quantity and

substandard quality compelled him. If the MLM did not dispatch water tankers, he would have to buy water. He said:

> When the trucks don't come, we have no water. We buy bottled water from a *spaza* shop here…
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville).

Eduardo, another Damonsville resident, reiterated that he would only buy water if the tankers did not come. Eduardo remarked that it was not sustainable to buy bottled water daily, and he hoped the municipality would improve water service provision. Kgothatso (from Damonsville) and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere (from Mmakau) both conveyed that if people are caring for children or are quite delicate and fragile, they have no option but to buy water. Kgothatso stated that children were delicate, and water bought would be consumed only by them, and as adults, they would have to deal with the consequences of consuming municipal water:

> For kids, we buy them water from town. We make sure that they drink good quality water so that they don't get sick. As for us, you know we are grown; we take that risk.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Mmêmogolo Chimere, a Mmakau resident, shared the same sentiment:

> The water is very bad, so bad. I buy water for the young ones that I have. I bought water for them at the shop yesterday. That small bottle cost me R15.00…This is just for them to be safe…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

By the "small bottle", *Mmêmogolo* Chimere meant a 500ml bottle of water, which was sold at an average price of R7.00 in normal grocery shops at the time when I did the interviews. At R15.00 per bottle, water in all three research areas costs more than twice a conventional supermarket price. Participants like *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, another Mmakau resident, alluded to how their lives were negatively impacted by poor access to sufficient water. Compounding this poor access to water, she noted that some people in the community were exploiting this situation by selling water at exorbitant prices:

> We can't cook, we can't take a bath, and we don't have money… We can't afford water that they are selling around here…We just can't afford it.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

If *spaza* shops or other local suppliers ran out of bottled water in Damonsville, which would occasionally happen days after a "shutdown" had commenced, some residents indicated that they would go to surrounding communities like Rankotea[48] to buy bottled water:

> But sometimes, the shop that sells water runs out. If there has been a prolonged water interruption - like for more than seven days - and we've been striking for a couple of days, water in the shops gets finished. We then go and buy it from another community called Rankotea neh…There are shops there.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Another more affordable and convenient option for the residents was buying water from community members with boreholes.

(b) Private boreholes and borehole water

Community members with private boreholes also participated in the lucrative business of selling water. In Damonsville, residents like Andre stated that he bought water from people within the vicinity who had boreholes. Taylor, another Damonsville resident, reiterated the purchase of water from neighbours and gave a price of R3.00 for a 5l container. Taylor qualified the price of borehole water as "cheap", in comparison to buying bottled water:

> You have to buy it [borehole water]. Borehole water is cheap on this side, and it's R3.00 for five litres.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

[48] Rankotea is a village located just outside the town of Brits in the North West province under the Madibeng municipality of South Africa. The area is a15 minute drive from Damonsville.

Like in Damonsville, selling borehole water was also a profitable enterprise in neighbouring Mmakau. *Malomê* Daniel also corroborated the Damonsville residents' experience of buying borehole water in the following words:

> I get water from the ones who sell, those who have boreholes.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Chimere, another Mmakau resident, mentioned that as a result of the water shortages in the area, they were buying borehole water at R2.00 for a 5l container (which was R1.00 cheaper per five-litre container compared to the Damonsville price):

> [W]e [other residents] buy water from another house up there. They have a borehole, and they sell a [5l] container for R2.00. If you do not have R2.00 to buy, then you have a problem.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Valery, another Mmakau resident, also mentioned the cost of R2.00 for a 5l container. The overall differences in pricing between Damonsville and Mmakau can be explained because Damonsville was a more developed area with residents in a relatively better socio-economic space than Mmakau residents. Affordability and demand influenced the R1.00 price difference between the two areas.

In Mothutlung, some community members sold borehole water. A Madibeng Community Development Worker in the study, Mr. Kalle, bought borehole water from an individual in his area because previously his supplier was based in Brits and it had gotten too far for him:

> We were buying water in town at a big shop and now this at least if you don't have a car it's a walking distance.
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Private alternatives of sourcing water in the "new" South Africa can be understood as resulting from a loss of faith in the state's ability to provide sufficient water to communities. In this case, Madibeng residents are aware of the state's responsibility to

provide water services; however, the area's situation is so atrocious that they have resorted to buying water. Some residents used *bakkies* to fetch water.

(c) Water *bakkies*

To mitigate the cost of buying bottled water and borehole water, some residents resorted to hiring *bakkies* and fetching water from afar. To do this, residents put money together and hired a *bakkie* to carry their water containers. One of the residents would then accompany the driver to the collection point, which was, in some cases, a private residence. The *bakkie* owner then "bought" water at the collection point. *Bakkies* proved to be a fairly popular way of getting water in the communities. It was also a lucrative business for *bakkie* owners in Madibeng.

When I was in Damonsville during my fieldwork in September 2018, the MLM had just restored water services. I came across a *bakkie* at a private residence filling up water containers. Some community members had hired this vehicle to fetch water. Below is an image of myself standing next to the water *bakkie*. The vehicle had at least 22 water containers that were being filled up with water at a private residence in Damonsville:

Figure 17: Water *bakkie*

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The containers were varied: 20/25l closed containers and 20l empty paint buckets. The bakkie driver indicated that due to a water crisis in the area, people from Mothutlung had hired him to fetch water in Damonsville.

Some participants mentioned that they hired *bakkies* to go to other areas like Hartbeespoort – which was at least a 25-minute drive away. Incurring such expenses and making such sacrifices was all to get better quality water. *Oupa* Andries was one such participant and said:

> Water supplied to Hartebees [Hartbeespoort] is good. The chemicals they use are good, and the water is clean. There is no problem with that water. Sometimes we don't mind taking a *bakkie* to fetch water… (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Valery also mentioned having taken part in hiring a *bakkie* as she reminisced of times before she had access to a borehole. Herself and others used to get water as far out as Tshwane (a drive time of about 60 minutes):

> We used to buy water, and then other people got water from Tshwane. We had to hire cars [*bakkies*] and collect water from there.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, indicated that he also used the *bakkie* strategy to get water. He said:

> There's someone there who fetches water from Rand Water with a *bakkie*. They deliver [water] door to door. It's a business [for him] so that we can have access to water.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Contributions to hiring the vehicle were about R100.00 per person, and each individual had between five to seven 20/25l containers, according to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, a Mothutlung resident. She preferred water from Rankotea. The lack of money to buy water meant that some participants had to explore different ways of getting water, mostly free (*mahala* in IsiZulu).

From each of the research areas, some residents had the experience of taking part in hiring *bakkies* to fetch water from other areas. These could be going to nearby townships a few minutes drive away or as far as going to another area about an hour's drive away. This strategy required access to money as contributions would need to be made to hire the vehicle to ferry the water containers. If people did not have money to buy water or hire a *bakkie*, they would explore water for *mahala* options.

5.4.3. Water for *mahala*

Some Madibeng residents live in abject poverty. The conditions are so dire that they cannot afford to buy water. They thus resort to getting water at no cost to themselves or for *mahala*. In supporting the point that some people lack the financial means to buy water, Mr. Kalle, succinctly stated, "There are people who don't have money to buy water" (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung). The sources of accessing water for free were both safe and unsafe. The following strategies emerged from the interviews:

(a) Collecting water from work

Gainfully employed individuals like Valery, a Mmakau resident working as a shop assistant in Brits, and Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident employed as a winch operator at a nearby mine, considered themselves fortunate compared to other residents in their communities because they could fetch water from their places of employment. Valery noted that her employer had no problem with her taking water from the establishment. She used the water strictly for drinking and cooking. The amount of water she could take was limited to what she could carry – a 5l container per day - as she used public transport.

Tshepo was a winch operator at a nearby mine. The mine provided water for employees in limited quantities. According to him, the mine bosses were aware of the water crisis in surrounding communities and ensured that employees had access to water. For Tshepo, fetching water would, however, require one to wait patiently for their turn to fill up their containers since the queues were very long. He said:

> There is water, but you find that there's a long queue in the morning because everyone wants some. Everybody wants to fill up a 2-litre bottle…For me, that's water I take home. The company organises us purified water for drinking. They fill a big tank of 250 to 500l daily. (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Some community members were not fortunate enough to have employment places that provided water. Some community members resorted to fetching water from unsafe and unprotected sources in such circumstances.

(b) Water from “dams” and rivers

In Damonsville, some participants indicated that community members found themselves resorting to fetching water from unsafe sources as a survival tactic due to the community's frequent and prolonged water interruptions. The unsafe water sources included nearby “dams” and rivers. Affirming this point, Armand mentioned the existence of a “dam” from which Damonsville residents fetched water during prolonged water interruptions:

> My friend, we didn’t have water for the past three weeks. Many people went to get water from a small “dam” on the other side of this main road.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Once I exited the field, I used Google Earth to locate the “nearby dams”. Figure 21 below is a satellite image of Damonsville and the “dams[49]” across “the main road”. Based on the image, I identified six water masses, or “dams” as they were commonly referred to by some participants, enclosed in the black oval in the image below. The “dams” are numbered from one to six.

[49] The “dams” are unsafe water masses.

Figure 18: "Dams" across Damonsville

Source: Google Earth Satellite Image

The image shows that the water in the "dams" was green in colour, indicating that it was dirty. This colour is similar to how Bond (2014) describes the Hartbeespoort Dam, which has excessive algae, cyanobacteria, and water hyacinth, resulting in bright green water. These "dams" were a short walking distance from *die wit huise*, "the white houses".

Armand believed that the water was only good for running sanitation systems. The water was not even good enough for laundry. The following were his exact words:

> So, the people went to get water for their toilets and to do laundry. It's dirty water, so they mostly use it for the toilets. You really can't use it for laundry, especially for white clothes you can't wash them with that water because they'll turn brown.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina, another resident of the *die wit huise* in Damonsville, also referred to using the "dam" water for flushing toilets. According to her, during a prolonged water interruption, she resorted to fetching water from this nearby "dam" for cleaning and flushing the toilets. Ina's decision to fetch that water came out of desperation, for she had no alternatives:

> We didn't have water for two weeks. That's when we ended up using "dam" water to clean and flush the toilets.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

One participant, *Ouma* Viola, stated that she had read in a local newspaper that out of desperation, people in areas around Damonsville and Mothutlung were fetching water from the rivers which they used to drink, cook with as well as use for bathing:

> [Y]ou read it [such news] in the Daily Sun. They showed a tap that had been dry for months and said that people were using water from rivers to wash. They also took the same sandy water home for cooking and drinking.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Oupa Andries, another Damonsville resident, resorted to rainwater harvesting. A few days before my interview with him, it had rained heavily in Damonsville and surrounding areas. He collected and stored rainwater in 5l containers and 20l buckets. He stated, "[A]nd on Monday it rained for quite a bit, so I also filled some buckets with water". *Oupa* Andries was quite innovative to have come up with RWH as a strategy in his own right. RWH is, unfortunately, not a reliable source of water as it is solely dependent on *mother nature*, and water collected is not necessarily suitable for human consumption (Kahinda et al., 2007: 1052; Selala et al., 2018: 223; Dobrowsky et al., 2014: 401; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163).

Based on the above, "innovative" residents had developed strategies to ensure access to water to overcome what they noted to be poor water services from the Madibeng Local Municipality. These strategies rely mostly on one's access to money to buy water. If one did not have access to money, choices would be restricted and could force them to fetch

and use water from unsafe sources. Having established this, the following section unpacks participants' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver water services.

5.5. Participants' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver services

The participants believed that the MLM and its staff were responsible for service-related challenges that Madibeng communities were experiencing. The participants' commonly held sentiment was that the municipality failed to deliver on its mandate. This is reflected in an excerpt from my interview with Felicity, a Damonsville resident, who posed critical questions about the role of the municipality and service delivery:

> Isn't it that the municipality's main responsibility is to provide water and other basic services to people at all times? For it to provide by all means necessary - whenever possible?
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Felicity also demonstrates a strong citizenship conscience as she was aware of her rights as a citizen and the state's role regarding basic services provisioning. What follows is a discussion of the various aspects that emerged:

5.5.1. "Municipal officials just don't care"

The local government is very important because it connects the state to the people and interacts with the public. A functional municipality provides services efficiently and professionally, putting people first, in line with the *Batho Pele* Principles. The MLM, however, presented a different case according to participants in this study. One of the participants' major issue was that municipal officials "did not care".

Water service provision in Damonsville was so poor that Armand believed that the area was invisible to the MLM. He was suggesting that municipal officials did not "see" their area as part of their jurisdiction by invisibility. He went on to say that the only service provision the community had come to expect, and which was consistently delivered, was refuse collection, which was every Friday:

> It seems to me that Damonsville is invisible to [the] Madibeng [Local Municipality]. They don't consider us as part of Ward 21. All they do is collect rubbish every Friday. That's all they know how to do.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Taylor, also from Damonsville, emphatically believed that the MLM did not look out for people in its jurisdiction. He said the following, "They don't care from my side. They just don't care!!!". This sentiment was supported by *Ouma* Viola, who described the Damonsville water crisis stemming from neglect. She held the opinion that MLM employees had abandoned the Damonsville community:

> The [Madibeng Local] Municipality people who work with water are neglecting us. Because if they weren't neglecting us, we wouldn't be suffering like this.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Mothutlung residents reiterated the view of the MLM's lacking care and concern about the poor water service delivery. *Ma'* Tshepiso stated that such atrocious water service provision was tantamount to an infringement of community members' rights. She said: "I don't think the municipality is bothered, and they don't respect our rights". To *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, the MLM officials made sure that their kin had access to water, and from then, the rest of the community members would have to source water themselves:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't care about us… Before they cut the water supply, they make sure that their families are water secure.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Like Damonsville and Mothutlung residents, Mmakau residents also made reference to the idea that municipal officials lacked of care and compassion for their communities. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere believed that municipal officials had simply forgotten about their mandate to the people – and again reiterated the fact that they were aware that the MLM had a responsibility to provide basic services to communities:

> When I look at them [i.e. the Madibeng Local Municipality], they seem like they don't care about us, do as they please, and not what they are supposed to do.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Furthermore, Valery believed that municipal officials were unqualified and driven by their selfish interests to further personal gain as opposed to delivering on the objectives of the local government:

> Our municipality is run by people who don't know anything; they just want to get rich; they don't care about the community. As long as they are okay, the others don't give a damn about us.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Some participants linked the lack of care to the 2014 deaths that occurred during a water-related community protest failed to elicit a change of behaviour in the municipality. *Malomê* Daniel stated the following:

> There's no urgency or quickness. The water issue is a terrible one. People have been crying and complaining that it's dirty for a very long time. Some people here even died for water.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Ma' Yolanda reiterated the MLM's lack of urgency when dealing with water issues, and also the fact that previously some members lost their lives fighting for their right of access to sufficient water:

> No, I don't see any urgency from the municipality to help Mmakau. We've been fighting for clean water, and many people have passed away. I don't know if the Madibeng Local Municipality will ever resolve this water issue.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

The participants in the study also linked the MLM officials lack care to poor communication. The municipality had a responsibility to ensure that the citizenry was aware of service delivery related issues.

5.5.2. Poor communication

An acute sense of frustration over the MLM's responses, or lack of thereof, to water issues in the researched communities emerged from several residents. They felt communication from the municipality over water issues and other issues were lacking. The lack of communication aroused the residents' suspicion in the operations at the municipality. A Damonsville resident, *Oupa* Andries, voiced a deep frustration based on his negative experience with municipal officials when he once inquired about a water interruption which the community was experiencing. He noted that they supplied the very least information they possibly could to somewhat obscure the problem. He went even as far as suggesting that the DWS should investigate what is transpiring at the MLM:

> Ask them why there's no water, and they'll tell you that a pipe broke. But they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] won't say when the pipe broke or when it will be fixed. Why don't they give us answers? I don't know why…They [the Department of Water and Sanitation] should investigate what's happening at Madibeng [Local Municipality].
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Several participants held that the municipality did not demonstrate any urgency to notify the residents of possible water interruptions. Armand, for example, pleaded the MLM to advise residents ahead of impending water interruptions with details such as the water interruption duration. According to him, this would give them time to implement interim interventions such as storing water. In support of this, here is what he said:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] should notice that the water will be cut off because they're fixing the pipes or something. Madibeng [Local Municipality] doesn't inform us of anything…They must inform us. Whether they send printed letters or discuss this at a community meeting, so we are prepared…[W]e'll make sure that we fill up every bucket for the time where there won't be water.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina, another Damonsville resident, reiterated the view that the water supply was interrupted without warning or notice. This would be followed by the dispatch of water tankers by the municipality. Ina lamented:

> They don't even give us a notice that there's going to be a water cut. The water cuts are always unexpected, and all they do is send water trucks [tankers], but that's not enough.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

This perceived lack of communication was reiterated by Kgothatso, who noted that it was difficult for community members to get any information from the MLM about water services' interruption. Like Ina, he also stressed the importance of being at least given notice so that they can store water in containers:

> They [The Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform us anything…They should inform us…They should give us a heads-up…So they must try and give us enough time to get water and store some in containers because at that time it is still clean.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Like Ina and Kgothatso, Mothutlung resident, Danny, disliked the unexpectedness in which MLM carried out water interruptions. This abruptness meant that he and other community members could not store water in good time. He said the following:

> ...If they told us when they would cut water supply, that would not be a problem. We have buckets so that we can store water. But the problem is they don't tell us. You see, you will find out that the Madibeng Local Municipality has cut water supply, and you were unprepared. Had we been aware in good time, we would have done something...Like putting some in our buckets...
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Furthermore, Ina held the view that the municipality did not alert community members to interventions or repair plans. Their responses to repairing broken and faulty infrastructure were also sluggish. She said:

> They [Municipality of Madibeng officials] don't tell us, and they don't react immediately. They take their time in fixing the issues. I mean, how long does it take for a pipe to be fixed?
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

The eerie silence from the municipality left community members feeling hopeless as they would just have to wait for days which would turn into weeks, and the weeks into a month, or two, in some cases. In support of this, Myra stated the following:

> The water just stops, and they don't even notify us [i.e. Municipality of Madibeng officials]. Or sometimes they'll say the water will be gone for just a day, and it turns into a whole month.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Myra's opinion also corroborated Kgothatso's. There was no communication from the municipality about faults, and community members generally found out about these when they opened the taps needing water:

> Whether they tell you that the valve is broken or that the pipe burst somewhere, they close it off for a couple of days...It usually becomes weeks...They don't usually inform us...You wake up in the morning, open the tap, and then find out that there's no water coming out...They don't usually inform us of water interruptions.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Two other Mothutlung residents: Ntatêmogolo Joe and Mmêmogolo Angelica echoed the view about how abrupt the MLM did water interruptions and its lack of communication. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe indicated that without warning, water services would be cut and sometimes restored. According to him, as all this happens, there would be no official word from the municipality:

> Sometimes what will annoy me is that the water will go away in the evening and only come back at night, and in the morning, by six, it's cut again. People are sleeping when the water comes and, in the morning, when they wake up, it's gone, and not a word from the municipality.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

In a different light, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica held the view that some people in the community had information about water cuts, while others, like herself, did not:

> No, maybe they [i.e. the Madibeng Local Municipality] inform some in the community; not all of us. Unless someone like my neighbour says to me, "You know they're going to cut our water", I won't know. Maybe my neighbour will ask me if I have water coming out the tap, and I'll check, and I'd say, "No", if there is no water.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants like Tshepo, from Mothutlung, and Daniel, from Mmakau, noted that the main concern with the water issues was not that water services were interrupted; but rather that the MLM did not provide any form of communication about the water interruptions. Here is what Tshepo said:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform anyone anything. You see, it would be much better if they notified us that on this date till this date the water will be cut-off due to some reasons, maybe maintenance or something.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

According to some participants, the lack of communication over water interruptions, their causes, and their duration was a significant concern. This impacted the trust between Damonsville residents and the MLM. The growing suspicion between the two

contributed to some participants harbouring feelings that the municipality was not transparent in its operations.

5.5.3. Lack of transparency

Some participants speculated that something dubious was happening within the MLM walls that officials working there did not want the outside world to know. To Mmêmogolo Chimere, some participants only asked for transparency from the municipal officials when there was a water problem. Timelines for repairs should be public information, and if the municipality was implementing any restrictions, it was ideal that people know – like how the Cape Town government dealt with the "Day Zero" water crisis:

> If there is a water problem, they must tell us that, "You won't have for such a period…." This may be because a pipe has burst or dam water needs to be purified…"You will not have water for the week, we are purifying water, or we are saving water as there was no rain in winter". Maybe they are saving water like Cape Town…You see, in Cape Town, they are saving water, and they [Cape Town provincial government] publicised how much water was allocated to a person per day…Here now, it's different. There is nothing like that. There are many dams around us. Water is plenty here…Water should be there, and they must tell us what is going on…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Mothutlung residents, like *Malomê* Frank, detailed his own futile experiences of trying to get information from municipal officials. He expressed a lot of meddling behind the scenes at the MLM. He went on to suggest that no one outside of the municipality knew what the officials were up to – which was evidence of a management crisis:

> [T]hese problems originate behind closed doors. What they are fiddling with, no one knows…Whatever is happening, I don't know. What I know is that sometimes we have water, and other times we don't…My brother, we don't know what is happening there. Whether the pipe has burst or what, they don't act, and they don't communicate. We just find out that we don't have water, that's all…
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Felicity also reiterated the lack of transparency by the MLM. She held the opinion that problems with water service provision would only get fewer once there was more transparency:

> I think if our municipality communicated more with the communities, things would change for the better. But then they don't. I think that's where the problem lies.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Some participants, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, treated the councillor of Mmakau with immense suspicion. She claimed that if the community approached him over water-related issues, he would claim to have gone to the municipal offices to address issues, whereas, in reality, he would not have. They viewed howhe installed a JoJo tank at his mother's house located in the same area, as an indication that the community's water situation was not going to change any time soon. According to him, the community considered his action a sign of betrayal. It demonstrated that he was more interested in his family's welfare than addressing the issues so that the whole community could have access to water. According to the community, he did this for his mother to access water when the municipality failed to provide it. To *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, the councillor was not being fair, and the following were her exact words:

> We have a councillor, but the problem is that he is a liar. Our councillor is a liar. He tells us that he went to Madibeng [Local Municipality], but he wouldn't have gone there. He has just put up a JoJo tank at his mother's compound, but we don't have...
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Participants like Kgothatso attributed water interruptions to politicians disrupting the local governance process in communities. He felt as community members, the residents of Madibeng were being taken advantage of by politicians and their associates. He believed that politicians were only in the communities when they needed something, and once they got it, they left. To Kgothatso, politicians were manipulative and deceitful. Their presence in communities was a means to an end:

> They only care about the people in the communities when they want to use them…When they want to win things, win positions, or win tender documents, or win whatever, that's when they come to the communities. They only do things for the communities until they get the type of response they want, and then after that, they get signatures for whatever. After they get these things, they use them for their benefit, and then they forget about us…
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

5.5.4. A reflection on the *Batho Pele* Principles

Andre, a Damonsville resident, knew about the *Batho Pele* Principles. He directly referenced how officials from the municipality were not executing their roles and responsibilities efficiently, even though municipalities were adequately funded. The attitude and work ethic exhibited by the employees was in stuck contravention of the *Batho Pele* Principles:

> These people [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] must adhere to the *Batho Pele* Principles. The government provides enough resources to municipalities; the only thing failing us is the local municipality. I think the municipal managers…[m]ust do their work properly, so we don't suffer. Because truly speaking, we are suffering.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Some participants like Ouma Viola and Andre held the opinion that the water issue in Damonsville was so severe that they described their lived experiences there as characteristic of "suffering". As I noted in the literature, the MLM officials performed poorly and displayed intolerable conduct (Worku, 2018: 112).

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter depicts a lamentable picture of participants' perceptions of water service delivery in Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau by the Madibeng Local Municipality. The "sufficiency" of water in South Africa depends on two essential indicators: its quantity and quality. While quantity refers to the minimum amount of water required to meet the basic needs of a citizen, which is 25l per person per day, quality, on the other

hand, refers to the minimum standards acceptable to consumers in terms of health-related characteristics – most importantly which is that the water must be safe enough to drink and use for food preparation.

Data collected demonstrated that the participants from the three Madibeng communities viewed the water quantity provided by the municipality to the three areas as grossly inadequate. All three areas had piped infrastructure; however, the areas suffered from frequent and extended water interruptions. To mitigate the impact of the interruptions, the municipality dispatched water tankers. Again, these tankers provided insufficient water according to the participants. Participants in the study did not know when the tankers would be dispatched, and because of that, some of them missed them. They would leave their water containers at collection spots in the communities hoping that the tankers would deliver water. As for water quality, the participants in this study were overall not impressed by the MLM's water quality. Based on municipal's water organoleptic properties, that is, its colour, taste and smell, some participants claimed that the water was dirty. It smelt and tasted "salty" and like mud. Even though water's organoleptic properties are not accurate indicators of water quality, several participants had gotten ill from or knew someone who had from consuming it.

Based on their observations, participants in the study generally attributed water issues to five factors. Firstly, Madibeng officials were viewed as corrupt and mismanaged the entity. A highly contentious issue that emerged was the *tenderpreneurial* nature of the tankering processes in Madibeng. Some participants believed that municipal officials sabotaged water infrastructure so tanker owners could get tenders to provide water, people from whom they received kickbacks for providing "business". Secondly, the water services infrastructure in Madibeng is believed to be ageing and generally in a bad state. Participants explained rampant pipe bursts which caused water interruptions to dilapidated water infrastructure. Thirdly, it was alleged that the municipality recruited unqualified or underqualified artisans to carry out repairs and maintenance. Fourth, the inconsistent supply of electricity influenced the availability of water. Eskom indicated that due to the MLM's debt, the power supply to the municipality would be restricted. This, unfortunately, has had a direct impact on the provision of water services in the

communities. The fifth is population growth. Over the years, the different areas in the municipality have grown exponentially. Unfortunately, the growth has not been addressed from a water infrastructural standpoint. This is because the existing infrastructure cannot supply adequate water to the communities.

As for coping mechanisms to poor water service delivery by the MLM, communities evolved strategies to store and source water; Madibeng residents had containers that ranged from small 2l plastic bottles to 5,000l JoJo tanks. In incidents in which water interruptions were extended, and the residents used up the water, those with financial resources could buy water from *spaza* shops, supermarkets, borehole owners, and other stores, or in some cases, put money together and hire *bakkies* to fetch water from surrounding communities. Those without money found themselves in a very dire and desperate situation as they resorted to fetching water from unsafe sources like water masses close to Damonsville.

Due to these harrowing experiences by Madibeng residents about accessing water services in the area, most of them viewed the MLM's organisational capacity negatively. The participants repeatedly described the municipality's staff as people who did not care about the communities they were mandated to serve. Based on the data collected from the interviews in three Madibeng communities, this chapter notes that residents viewed water services provided in Madibeng were in contravention of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) since the water right was frequently being infringed. The Water Services Act (1997) and the National Water Act's (1998) were violated. Since the municipality was failing to deliver its mandate to provide basic services to the poor, the MLM had also violated the Municipal Systems Act (2000). The next chapter presents findings on the participants' views of how they accessed and expressed themselves as citizens in Madibeng hydropolitics. This chapter juxtaposes critical theoretical concepts with empirical evidence.

CHAPTER SIX

Hydropolitics in Madibeng: A Quest to Access and Express Rights in Three Communities

"There can be no daily democracy without daily citizenship."
Ralph Nader

6.1. Introduction

In a bid to present how residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, express citizenship within the context of hydropolitics, the previous chapter focused on addressing three objectives. These were their perceptions of water services; their coping strategies regarding what I argued is their version of anthropogenic water scarcity experienced in the area; and their overall perceptions of service delivery by the Municipality of Madibeng. These three objectives help to position this thesis to probe the two last objectives of this study which are to investigate how the residents of the three communities responded to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water; and, finally, to contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in Madibeng.

Using citizenship *conscience* and citizenship *exercise*, I look at how the participants in this study constructed their positionality through the lens of the intersection of class, race as this significantly influenced their access to adequate water services and overly experience and participation in Madibeng hydropolitics. I further unpack their perceptions of the various forms of expression they engage in to vindicate their right to water.

6.2. Class, race and access to water

Participants in the research areas believed that payment of water services was a prerequisite for enjoying full citizenship rights. This view is reflected in the literature as von Schnitzler (2008: 907) argued that payment, a "good citizen practice", had come to be viewed as a requirement for inclusion within the new political community. Access to water rested on equal access to a guaranteed minimum level – the 25l per person per month - which the MLM has struggled to provide. As a local government, the ANC-led Madibeng constituency was failing dismally to provide water services, and this is apparent in the fact that some communities could more easily access water than others. Participants believed that because their communities were "poor" and "black", they were not afforded good service by the MLM.

According to data collected from the participants, the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) struggled to provide basic water access to Damonsville, Mmakau and Mothutlung. These communities are already affected by the "triple challenge" of poverty, unemployment and inequality, challenges that affect the rest of the country (Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015; Mzangwa, 2016). Participants in this study generally felt that they were experiencing poor water service delivery because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities.

Starting in Damonsville, Taylor, visibly irritated, described how he felt about his community's marginalisation. He believed that areas receiving better water service provision were where community members paid their municipal water bills. He gave an example of areas like Brits, where residents received better services because, to him, they paid. The following were his words:

> They don't treat other areas like this…[T]heir water is perfect. It's just this area [Damonsville] that doesn't have clean water…You will find out that in town [Brits] they pay bills for water and here we can't afford…Their water is good…
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola, a former cashier who used to work in the Brits CBD, stated that the business hub generally had water services, and interruptions were very unusual. If water supply was cut, services would be restored within the day:

> Uhm…When I was working at Good Value[50] Supermarket, it [a water interruption] happened only once. It was not for the whole day because it's a CBD, and businesses can't stay without water. The Madibeng Local Municipality cut water in the morning, and they restored it before midday.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola and Armand, another Damonsville resident, believed that a difference between the way people who live in "white" and "black" areas influenced how they accessed basic services. To them, this binary also represented a "rich"/"poor" dichotomy. According to *Ouma* Viola, people who stayed in "black" areas struggled with water services. However, residents of "white" areas, such as Elandsrand and suburbs in Pretoria, where housing and services were "expensive", received better water service than Damonsville. She attributed unemployment as defining characteristic of her area. She stated the following:

> As a citizen, you see, in black areas, we struggle with water, but in the white areas, I think they call them suburbs; they don't have these issues with water. In Elandsrand and Pretoria, there are no water issues there…The rent and services there are expensive. We are from a location [Damonsville], and we cannot afford that [expensive] lifestyle. We are unemployed, and we are happy together here. We don't have stress, and neighbours here get along and know each other.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Similarly, Armand stated that the type of area influenced the quality of services provided by municipalities. He expressed that people living in the suburbs, "rich" or "white" areas, did not experience the problems they were facing in Damonsville because they could afford to pay for services. To him, across the continent of Africa, affordability greatly influenced the quality of services people received from the state. The following was his opinion:

[50] This is a pseudonym.

> People who stay in the suburbs don't have this problem because they can afford to pay for services. But for people in the locations, from Cape to Cairo, we struggle to get services wherever there's a location. People struggle with water, tarred roads and electricity. But the main problem is water…[There is no water]…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The perception of a link between an area's affluence level and race was also expressed by *Ma'* Tshepiso and *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, both from Mothutlung. *Ma'* Tshepiso held that the water allocation by the MLM was unfair as it was skewed in favour of suburbs. As a resident of a poor community, she believed that the municipality did not afford them the due attention or respect they deserved. She singled out Brits as an area with a constant water supply – affirming what had been stated by Taylor and *Ouma* Viola. She said the following:

> I don't believe water is allocated fairly in Madibeng Municipality because you'll see that this area [Mothutlung] doesn't have water. Still, people in the suburbs like Brits have water…I think it is because they don't take us seriously at all…Because we are poor…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Mmêmogolo Angelica cited three townships that experienced water service provision issues: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Letlhabile. She had never heard any negative remarks from Brits residents about poor water service delivery. Here is what she said:

> I think Mothutlung, Damonsville and Letlhabile are the ones with water problems, but the ones who stay in town [Brits], I've never heard them complaining.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

The dire conditions in Mmakau – lack of roads, poor water and sanitation services - puzzled participants like *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude. According to her, despite the progress achieved in South Africa in terms of infrastructural development, no one would anticipate that there would be communities lagging behind like Mmakau that lacked water services infrastructure. She said she found herself incapacitated and unable to do anything because she was a poor person. This also resonated with how she interpreted

her citizenship in the new South Africa had been reduced to nothingness because she was poor – her hands were tied. The following were her exact words:

> Now with recent infrastructural development, would you still expect people to suffer from poor water services? Our hands are tied, and we cannot do anything…You are just a poor person…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Danny, another Mothutlung resident, detailed the differences in service provision between "rich" and "poor" areas. According to him, affluent neighbourhoods in Madibeng accommodate white people and "others", people of colour, who are well-off. MLM prioritised these areas in terms of service delivery. Even as recipients of poor service provision, Danny was aware that he could not complain because it was useless:

> It [Mothutlung] is not the same as places like Elandsrand. They [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] also know the kind of people residing there - white people and so on. People who have money. So they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] make sure that their service is right. So we, *hai*, if we can complain *hai*…
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny also suggested that water quality and interruption schedules differed between the two areas – Mothutlung and Elandsrand. In Elandsrand, the MLM provided the community with "better" water quality and interruptions were not erratic. To him, poverty, unfortunately, translated to being voiceless. Access to money is what gave people a voice since they could pay for services. He said:

> Yes, the quality is not the same, and the cut-offs times are not the same. This side [Mothutlung], we have lots of cut-offs, unlike that side [Elandsrand]. Even the other services within the community are different. So it means if you are poor *hai*, you must know that you are in trouble because money talks.
>
> [P]oor people don't have a say; the only people who have a say are those at the top, you see. So your opinion doesn't matter…
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny held the view that people were not being treated equally by the municipality. Even though citizenship was a state of equality, the MLM saw and treated the communities differently, according to him. He believed that equipment and the quality of work in the maintenance and repair of water services infrastructure in both areas were different. While Elandsrand received superior services, areas like Mothutlung received very poor services:

> The thing is that they [Madibeng Local Municipality] should take people as equal, you see…So maybe the pipes that they are installing are different depending on the area. Perhaps in other areas, they put the right pipes, and in other areas not. In other areas, they put pipes deeper, and in other areas, they are not installed as deep, you see…That's why at some point, you will see water coming out of a burst pipe…[T]hose pipes are not made from good quality…At Elandsrand, there is a tarred road, but here you can see there is no tarred road…Or even pavement. There is dust, but what can we say? We already live here…In Elandsrand, they do a good job.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Besides drawing comparisons on different urban areas, Armand believed that farming communities in the municipality received far more consistent water services than Damonsville. Here is what he said:

> The thing is, people on the farms get water from Madibeng, and you must know that those people are paying for the water…There is water on farms. Our water is inconsistent, we have water today, and it'll be cut tomorrow.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The interviews also referred to this keen awareness of hierarchies between different communities and people in the same community. The hierarchies were linked to one's affordability of different water alternatives. People who could afford to buy bottled water were considered richer than those who could not afford it. Danny and Armand held this belief. According to Danny, there were different "classes" of people in Mothutlung. He suggested that "upper class" people could buy water throughout the month, "middle class" people, like himself, could afford to buy water; however, if they overspent money during the month, they would struggle to buy throughout. The last

category was "poor people". These were people who could not afford to buy water at any time of the month. The following were his remarks:

> [T]here are poor people, middle [class] people, and those who are in the upper [class]. Those who do not have money drink tap water because they don't have options - so we are not the same. Even us, we buy water, but when time goes on, we end up drinking it [tap water] because our money would have finished, you see. Let's say we overspend during the month and the water we bought gets finished; we don't have an option but to drink it [tap water]. Most of the time, we buy bottled water, though. They are those at the top who can afford to buy bottled water on any day.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Other alternatives that people used to fetch water was through their cars, for example. A Mmakau resident, Thulani, said for one to access clean water, they needed a car that they could use to fetch water:

> Others do not have money to pay for clean water, and they don't have cars to fetch water; it's a problem for them. It's a problem.
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

If clean and safe water can only be bought from shops, and according to Thabo marginalised groups in the community of Mmakau would not be able to do so. Here were his exact words:

> It's not fair, and it is poor [water] service [delivery], and it is ineffective, my brother. What about poor people, pensioners and people who are disabled? What about their dependents at home without an income? How are they going to afford to buy water?
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, also echoed Thabo's reference to pensioners. His grandmother was a pensioner struggling with getting clean water since she could not afford to buy it.

There is a strong correlation between poverty and race in post-apartheid South Africa. This means that people of colour generally reside in low-income areas. These are the same areas that experience poor basic services delivery. This situation limited these

residents' ability to access invited spaces. In addition, the efficacy of the invited spaces through which they could express themselves as citizens about their disgruntlement over poor basic water provision, invented had declined. The following section explores participants' perceptions that invited spaces available to residents of the three communities often become toxic, in particular as they relate to community meetings.

6.3. From *sterile* to *toxic* invited community meetings

In literature, it was established that in South Africa, invited spaces of participation developed by authorities in the post-apartheid era have largely been viewed as "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). invited spaces were noted to have been unable to support citizens from poor urban communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). Data collected from this research reflected a perception by some of the participants regarding the futility of invited spaces and how the spaces were becoming toxic.

It is important to note that some participants were unaware of invited spaces such as community meetings, like *Ouma* Viola, a Damonsville resident. She held that her community did not have meetings where issues like water were addressed. She went on to say that water as an issue only emerged as a topic of discussion when a strike was being organised. She was aware that members of South Africa's main political parties: the ANC, the EFF and the DA organised these protests. The following were *Ouma* Viola's exact words:

> I've never been to a meeting; we don't have meetings where we discuss water issues. The only time when we talk about water is during a strike. We don't know the finer details about water issues…It's these political parties that are involved in organising everything. If I'm not wrong, it's the ANC, EFF and DA. I'm not sure which one is in charge… (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Some participants knew about regular communitymeetings in their respective areas to discuss issues of mutual concern, like the perceived water crisis. According to Myra, a Damonsville resident, the community held meetings where people discussed water services and other issues of mutual concern. However, what was peculiar was that information on how the meetings were organised was not public; it was the preserve of a select few. This explained could have possibly explained people like Ouma Viola were not aware of the occurrences of the meetings. Myra went on to say that the official signal of a protest in Damonsville was whistling. The following were Myra's remarks:

> No one informs us of community meetings. We just hear people say they were at a meeting about Madibeng water...They [community youth] blow whistles [in the morning]. When the community hears whistling, we know something is wrong, something is about to happen, or something is happening...
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, stopped attending meetings. His experience at the meeting was that "ordinary" community members' input was not considered. He held the view that citizenship had been reduced to nothing in this invited space. In support of this, he stated the following:

> [T]here's no point in me going to meetings because whatever decision they're going to take, they're going to take it irrespective of my view or opinion. I think they do that because I'm just an ordinary citizen.
> (Andre /33/M/Damonsville)

Participants from Mothutlung also viewed attending community meetings as futile.. According to Tshepang, meetings were a sheer waste of time. At the time of the interview, he had stopped attending meetings. He attributed this to the fact that the meeting's conveners were partisan, and decisions taken were not assessed on merit. He indicated that one's ideas would not be considered if you were not one of the "favourites". He believed that these meetings were staged, and decisions taken during the meeting were agreed upon prior to the meeting. Here were his remarks:

> I don't go there. I only hear what people say. And I didn't go there before either when things were not as bad as they are now. When you attend a meeting, I believe that a better argument must win at the end of the day. But here, it's not a matter of a better argument [winning]; it is a matter of who you are. If you're not on their favourite list, they won't listen to you. It's difficult to attend a meeting where you know the decisions were already made.
> (Tshepang/35/M/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe reiterated Tshepang's perception. He had also stopped attending meetings. He even advised his daughter to stop attending meetings because they were not benefiting from the political processes in the area. According to him,community meetings were highly politicised spaces were driven by an ANC agenda. The following were *Ntatêmogolo* Joe's remarks:

> I don't attend the meetings; however, my daughter does. They always go on about the ANC at the meetings, and I always tell her that she's wasting her time. I say to her, "You're not working, and your children are also not working".
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Other participants held the view that politicians had turned community meetings into political party meetings. Armand, a Damonsville resident, indicated that community meetings ideally were platforms on which problems of mutual interest should be tabled and discussed, such as poor water service provision by MLM; however, this was not the case. Armand believed that in Damonsville, community leaders were blatantly and unapologetically partisan and declared that community meetings were strictly ANC meetings. This defeated the whole point of the community coming together. Here was Armand's remark:

> The first thing we do here in Damonsville when we have a problem is to call a community meeting. It is a space in which everybody must raise their own opinions about how we will deal with [the] Madibeng (Local Municipality) and the water issues…Sometimes, the community leaders there will tell you straight that it is an ANC meeting. This is a problem for me. What about if you are not an ANC member living here in Damonsville? They make it a political thing…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Some people were being victimised at meetings. Age was one such factor. According to *Oupa* Andries, he was labelled "old" by both the community members and officials from the MLM. He used to attend community meetings from the time he moved into the community over 30 years ago. The following were his remarks:

> You see, I'm old. When they have meetings, they'd tell me that I'm too old…Both the community and Madibeng [i.e. MLM]. And the young men who attended normally come to tell me what was discussed in the meetings…
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Attacking *Oupa* Andries was in direct contravention of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). S9(3) of the Constitution (1996) states that neither the state nor anyone in the Republic can:

> [U]nfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
> (RSA, 2006)

To some participants, community meetings had become hostile and unwelcoming spaces. While in post-apartheid South Africa, the universality of citizenship is there on paper (i.e. the Constitution, RSA, 1996), some participants viewed community meetings as spaces that were partisan and thus exclusionary. "Ordinary citizenship" had been reduced to nothing, resulting in some participants not attending the meetings. The attendance of the meetings by community members indicated that they possessed *citizenship conscience* – they were fully aware of the reasons for taking part; however, unfortunately, the reception and atmosphere at the meetings were not conducive for them to contribute as citizens. These feelings culminated in some community members expressing reluctance to attend, restricting their *citizenship exercise*. It is important to note that the decision to withdraw was arrived at under duress. Some participants felt that how local government officials managed community meetings contributed to the toxicity of these invented spaces.

Instead of being viewed as state officials interested in the betterment of local communities, politicians were viewed negatively as interfering in the way communities and the MLM were functioning. To some participants, these meetings ended up being were platforms on which politicians pursued their agendas. According to the views of the participants presented above, it appears that invited spaces for participation that were engineered by the local government to "invite people in" are inadequate, lack capacity is unresponsive and superficial, and in essence are simply used as a rubber stamp for participation and democracy (Cornwall 2004; le Roux, 2015). According to the views of some participants, meetings occurred in a way such that there were restrictions in invited participation, and participants were voiceless, and the deafness of the state to the citizenry's demands was problematic, echoing what has been document by Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper (2012). Some community members found participation at these meetings deeply frustrating.

To some extent, some of the participants exhibited a decline in a sense of political efficacy. The attendance of meetings to them did not yield positives for them and when citizens believe that they cannot influence political outcomes, they will not take part in these invented spaces of participation (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). The role of politicians also come under scrutiny. According to some participants, different political groups were violently contesting for political space in Madibeng, and the general populace found it hard to express their interests and demands through legitimate means. The role of politicians in the communities was viewed with great suspicion, and in local politics, there was a rise in violence in the communities. A reluctance to vote in elections was another decline in invited spaces that emerged in the interviews.

6.4. A growing sense of the futility of voting

The literature presented a picture that voter turnout has declined significantly since 1999, and that 2021 has recorded the lowest voter turnout in the history of South Africa. A contributing factor to this was people's experience of the triple challenges – inequality, poverty and unemployment. Based on the data collected, while some participants' indicated that they responded to declining invited citizenship spaces like

the toxicity of community meetings in the research areas, others refrained from participating in political activities such as voting.

Voting in a democratic country has always been compared to having a voice in the country's running. *Oupa* Andries remained grounded in South Africa's democratic process and indicated that he would vote in the elections. According to him:

> I'm a proud citizen of South Africa, from 1994 till now, I'm still proud. I feel good, I still vote, and I know why and whom I'm casting my vote for.
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Several participants alluded to how voting had become redundant as they were now voiceless. According to *Malomê* Daniel, voting had lost value because it should have been for his voice to be heard. *Malomê* Daniel had lost faith in the politicians because their promises to the community never materialised. He conveyed the following:

> When we go vote, we vote for our voices to be heard. Now we vote, and our voices are not heard, and they don't keep the promises they make to us…I'm not happy. Look at where I am living.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

A Mothutlung resident, *Ma'* Tshepiso, indicated that she had withdrawn from voting during elections because she just did not see any benefit in casting a ballot. The perceived water crisis in the area had led her to secure a JoJo tank, and she did not have to rely on the state for water anymore. What was fascinating in her response was her acknowledgement that as a citizen, it was her political right to vote, and not doing so was incorrect:

> I know it's wrong, but I have stopped voting in elections. But what can I do? As long as I have water in my JoJo tank, I'm fine. I know I'm not living out my rights, but it's discouraging knowing that I'm going to cast my ballot, and it won't be heard when it comes to service delivery.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Valery believed that once the elections pass and a respective party candidate is victorious, they disappear only to be seen again during the next campaign period. The victors would also move and leave the community and stay in affluent areas. In support of this, Valery stated the following:

> From January until the time of the elections, there will be no water problems. But after the elections, that is when we begin to have a problem with water again. And then those who campaign will say, "It's me, vote for me, and I'll help you with this and that, and this problem of water will be a thing of the past". Once we elect that person, they even move from here and go live in the suburbs…Not even the suburbs, but estates…Harties [Hartbeespoort] estates.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Thulani from Mmakau believed that even the youth were no longer keen on voting as a form of political participation or expression. He was suspicious of the whole political system from the president to the councillor. He was adamant that he would not participate in voting processes from national to local government. His unwillingness to vote was because of his opinion that political leaders were corrupt. According to him, even though Mmakau has a councillor, there was no service delivery in the area – there were neither roads nor water. He depicted a picture that trust between the community and the councillor had deteriorated such that when the area did not have water, the councillor would run away. He said:

> [Laughing] *Ai*, I will never vote. *Ai*, not for this president, and not for this councillor…They are a problem…They eat money (*sic*). Look at our roads…They cannot fix them…Uhmm…We have a councillor right here - he is eating the money. He is not fixing the roads. That's why I'll never vote. When there is no water, he is not here. That man runs away…
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

Beyond voting being perceived as futile, Valery believed that political leaders did not care for communities that they were required to service, and further, communities were avenues to their self-enrichment at their expense. She said:

> It means that the people at the top don't care about us. And we are only voting to make people rich. We are making people live comfortably, and not us.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Gertrude held that water services were substandard in Mmakau; and, politicians in the area were constantly in conflict. She attributed the internal wrangling amongst politicians to be a consequence of disputes emerging over whose turn it would be to plunder the MLM's coffers. To her, the populacecould not do anything to the political elites. She believed that politicians were now living lavish lifestyles residing in mansions from the resources supposed to uplift disadvantaged communities. The politicians were depicted as corrupt and self-centred. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude alleged that they used houses built under the Reconstruction and Development Programme, a form of social citizenship, to solicit votes from indigent and desperate citizens. She remarked:

> They [politicians] are fighting, taking money, stealing money [from the Madibeng Local Municipality] and look now; they are exposing each other. They stay in double-storey mansions, whereas we stay in shacks. They say they're building RDP (i.e. Reconstruction and Development Programme) houses, but they only build them in some areas. They use them to buy votes in other areas - they will say we must vote for them if we want RDP houses.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

What is fascinating about this growing sense of futility in voting is that the participants did not see any alternatives to the parties they had previously voted for. It was almost implicit in the interviews that when they spoke about voting, they meant to cast a ballot for the party they had previously voted for. The failing local government was ANC-led, and the councillors of the areas were members of the ANC party. So instead of voting for an alternative party to get their voice across or to choose a different party, some of the participants in this study indicated that they preferred not to vote at all.

This finding was consistent with the findings of a recent study by Schulz-Herzenberg (2020: 28). Trust in the ANC as a party had declined significantly as allegations and revelations of officials in state capture, corruption, and financial mismanagement have deterred staunch supporters from voting. The opposition parties were not considered

as viable alternatives by disgruntled ANC supporters. People who participated in this study exhibited a decline in external political efficacy, influencing their decision not to vote. They felt that the political system was unresponsive, and when politicians do not care about what citizens think, people are less likely to vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). Participants presented diverse opinions about their responsibility to pay for water.

6.5. "To pay, or not to pay, for water?"

One of the prerequisites for full citizenship is the existence of a citizen/state relationship. This relationship exists where citizens execute duties to the state, and in turn, the state reciprocates by meeting specified responsibilities towards its citizenry. When the state, represented by the Madibeng Local Municipality, struggled to provide water services, the citizens faced a dilemma. The first response by citizens was centred on whether, as citizens, they should pay for services and hope that services will improve in the near future or withhold payment as a demonstration of dissatisfaction for poor services. This quandary highlights complex hydropolitical considerations informing people's decisions to pay, or not to pay, for water.

6.5.1. "Paying for water is the right thing to do if you get decent service"

Some participants felt morally and ethically obliged to pay for water services. Paying for water was perceived as the "right" course of action. Damonsville residents, Kgothatso and Eduardo, were both in support of people paying for water services. They also viewed non-payment as a significant contributing factor to poor water service delivery. According to Kgothatso, if people paid for the water they consumed, there would be a likelihood that the services would improve. He stated the following:

> I think everyone should pay for their water...If people pay for water, maybe the quality might get better. It might also be allocated to everyone once everyone pays. That's what I think.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Eduardo reinforced the idea that paying for water was the correct action. He noted that non-payment for water leads to erratic and deficient services:

> What can I say? If people don't pay for water, we'll be stranded. We pay for water every month, which is not even consistent because sometimes they shut the water when they're having problems with their reservoirs. We must pay.
> (Eduardo, 25/M/Damonsville)

Danny, a Mothutlung resident, affirmed what participants from Damonsville expressed. He further expressed that paying for water services would give the community leverage and the legitimacy to demand better water service provision from the MLM. He believed that the section in Mothutlung where community members generally paid for water, the MLM improved water service delivery. Here is what he stated:

> I think it's right for people to pay for water because they will have more say if they pay for it. In our case, we don't have a say because we don't pay for it…Here in Mothutlung, you see that place there [pointing to another "section" of the Mothutlung], they pay for water, so sometimes you will find out that they have water, while we don't have [water] this side.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, another Mothutlung resident, understood her role as a "good citizen" and what her paying for water services meant. While she considered paying for water services as the only way, she lamented having to pay for filthy tap water though:

> We have to pay because the money we pay for services funds the municipality's operations, so there is no way we cannot pay. We just don't want to pay for dirty water or water that's always not available.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Participants like *Ma'* Tshepiso were aware of the importance of paying for water. She was aware of how the consequences of non-payment are dear to both the municipalities and the citizens. The non-payment of essential services hampers municipal cost recovery and municipal financial viability (Fjeldstad, 2004; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Worku, 2018).

Some residents were keen on paying for water; however, it disillusioned them since they believed that water services delivery in Madibeng was erratic. From Mmakau, for example, Thabo seemed quite keen on paying for water services; however, he would be more comfortable and willing to pay for a service he claimed he was receiving. He says, "I will pay for water, but from there, there is no water" (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau). *Malomê* Daniel also expressed Mmakau residents' notion of not paying for dirty water. He did not object to paying for good water services:

> We won't pay for dirty water. The water has to be clean. If the water was clean, I wouldn't mind paying for it. I would pay if the water quality here was like that of town [Brits].
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

The discussion above demonstrates that some of the residents in the study were aware of the duties and responsibilities that came with "good citizenship" practices. Paying for services is something that the post-apartheid state has had to motivate indigent communities to do. Based on data collected, it is quite evident that some participants believed it was appropriate for one to pay for water services. This was reinforced through the use of a moral language of "empowered" and "active" citizenship through which citizens have had to relook at their responsibility to the state (von Schnitzler, 2008: 906). It can also be linked to a keen awareness of *citizenship exercise* – since citizens take up their responsibility for paying for water services used over and above the free basic allocation. However, some participants had a very different view of paying for water.

6.5.2. "Pay for water only if you have money"

While some participants felt that it was right to pay for water services, others, unfortunately, could not do so due to financial incapacitation. More than half of the participants indicated that they were "unemployed". Due to a lack of income, some participants could not pay for services, water included. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere directly attributed poor service delivery to the non-payment of water services by people in the

community – herself included. In a grim case of self-pity and despair over her predicament, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere stated the following words:

> How am I going to pay for water while I'm not working? I would pay because we use water a lot if I was working. Perhaps they shut the water because we don't have money to pay [for it]...[Poor water service delivery] is caused by getting free services...Since these services are free, they just do the bare minimum simply because we are not paying. They don't offer us quality service, and if we were paying, maybe they would get us better services and clean water.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

In communities experiencing high poverty levels and increasing unemployment rates, accessing water has been reduced to affordability. Mothutlung resident, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, stated that he was not prepared to pay for MLM water. He indicated that he did not have any additional sources of funds to dedicate towards paying for water services. He was more worried about what his family would eat. He also referred to the unemployment of his children and how they were not able to assist him with buying or paying for water. He just did not have "additional" or "extra" money to pay for water:

> I don't have extra money to buy or pay for water. Where will I get the money from? Today, I don't know what we're going to eat. Where will I get the money? If my children, those who can work, were working, then things would be different...
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Andre from Damonsville also reiterated this point. Poverty in the area undermined people's ability to pay for water services. According to him, the MLM should exempt unemployed people from paying for water:

> [I]t's ridiculous to say people must pay for water. People are not working, look at how we're sitting during this time of the day, and we use water the whole day. How are we going to pay for the water? [T]he [water] bills are very high. People who don't [have] work can't pay for water...You can't [afford to] pay for it, you simply can't.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Ntatêmogolo Joe and Andre both referenced poverty as why they could not afford to pay for water. This finding is consistent with literature that noted that some indigent homes could not afford to pay for water services (CDS, 2001; Pape and McDonald, 2002; Lilley, 2016; Akinyemi et al., 2018). The finding that some participants indicated that they did not oppose paying for water; however, they could not afford it is consistent with the literature (see Xali, 2002). An awareness that people must pay for municipal services existed; however, the lack of access to income had impacted their ability to take part in "good citizenship" practices. The lack of money, or material wealth, negatively impacted some participants' ability to pay for water services, which negatively impacted their exercise of "good citizenship" practices. Non-payment was, therefore, not a result of a "general unwillingness" to pay.

6.5.3. "No one must pay for dirty tap water"

According to most participants in the study, the Madibeng Local Municipality struggled to provide sufficient water to some communities in the area. Several participants were unequivocally against paying for "dirty water", and these were spread across the three research sites – Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. In Damonsville, Taylor was unambiguously against paying for MLM's tap water. According to him, it was unjust for anyone to pay for dirty water, which was erratic in supply. He said the following:

> No one should pay for this kind of water [i.e. dirty water]...You pay for perfect water like when you drink it, and you can taste it's clean and fresh... Even if they [the MLM] send letters demanding us to pay, we don't pay, and we just ignore them.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, supported Taylor's viewpoint. She noted that it should be worth it for one to pay for water. According to her, water provided in the municipality was dirty, and thus community members had to treat it in different ways to make it consumable. She also expressed a reluctance in paying for water which would compromise her health:

> I think for people to pay for it [water] - it must be worth their money. Like I said before, our water is sometimes not good. That is why we sometimes take steps to boil it before considering drinking it…I mean, why is it that there are times when the water is not purified, right? And there are times when it has a certain discolouration? So I wouldn't say that I would honestly pay for it. I don't think it's even healthy.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Some residents indicated that not paying for water services had become an accustomed practice in Damonsville because, like with the other Madibeng residents, the water was alleged to be dirty. In support of this, Andre stated the following:

> Uhm, no one pays for water here…I think it is a thing [i.e. standard practice] because you cannot pay for something you cannot drink…[N]o one pays here. People's bills are coming up to R6,000-R7,000.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Mmakau residents also held the same opinion of not paying for "dirty water". They held the opinion that basic water provision was a prerequisite for payment. If water services met the quantity and quality, it was appropriate for them to pay for water. Valery did not object to paying for clean water; however, as a consumer, she argued that it was of the utmost importance that she was satisfied with MLM water services. If the services were not satisfactory, then she was not prepared to pay for water:

> If this water was of good quality, we would pay for it, but we can't pay for something that is not right. Yes, so why should we pay? We don't have a problem paying, but why should we pay if we are not satisfied?
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Valery's views resounded with *Ma'* Yolanda, who also believed that water services in the area were poor. According to her, it was common that community members did not pay for water in Mmakau – reiterating what Andre had said about Damonsville residents. *Ma'* Yolanda indicated that both water quality and quantity provided by the MLM were substandard, and thus she was not prepared to pay for water at all:

> We don't pay for water in Mmakau…I wouldn't pay for water [here]…Because the water comes out dirty, and it is not always available. Sometimes when you wake up, you find that there is no water.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Some participants held the view that paying for dirty water was "unfair". For example, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica from Mothutlung, being expected to pay for MLM tap water was unfair as the municipality's water services were bad. She reiterated the necessity of boiling water and how it was a possible health hazard if consumed straight from the tap. She expressed the following:

> No, it's not fair [to pay for Madibeng Local Municipality water]. They want us to pay for services, but we don't get good services. Without boiling it, I think we'll put our lives in danger.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Building from what *Mmêmogolo* Angelica had raised concerning boiling MLM tap water, some participants viewed paying for municipal water as a double loss. To *Malomê* Frank, people in Mothutlung stopped paying for water services because the water was very dirty. Paying for municipal water while also buying water was to him losing out:

> *Hai*, it is unnecessary to pay for this water. That's why most people have stopped paying for it…It is dirty…This water is very dirty. Think of it, and I always buy water to drink…Why should I buy again from Madibeng [Local] Municipality [dirty water]? You see, this is the double loss.
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Ouma Viola also expressed the notion of a double loss in a slightly different way from *Malomê* Frank. To her, the community had a challenge of dirty water, which was a health hazard to everyone. The dirty water required additional time, effort and resources to treat. Boiling water to consume was an added expense, as it needed electricity:

> It's just that we're struggling with this dirty water which is unhealthy. Sometimes people in the community tell you that you must boil the water. [I]t is costly because you have to use your electricity. And it's too much effort, as you must boil the water then wait for it to cool before you can pour it into containers.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

One participant had a bill of almost R45,000 (See Figure 19 below):

Figure 19: An outstanding Madibeng Local Municipality water bill

Local Municipality of Madibeng
Brits, Damonsville and Oukasie (012) 318-9636 / 9639
Hartbeespoort (012) 253-1177
Lethabile (012) 251-0132/3
Mothotlung (012) 709-2333

Permit Mail SOUTH AFRICA

Belastingfaktuur / Tax Invoice
BTW Reg. No. / VAT Reg. No. 4500115847

Rekening Nommer / Account Number
Rekening Maand / Account Month: November 2013
Dorpsgebied / Township: DAMONSVILLE X1 BRITS
Gebou Naam / Building No.
Grootte / Extent: 0
Marwaarde / Market Value: 18000
Deposito Waarborg / Deposit Guarantee: 0.00
TO

Rekening en Faktuur Besonderhede / Account and Invoice Detail

DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	READING PREV	READING CURRENT	TARRIF CODE	METER FACTOR	METER UNITS	AMOUNT	VAT	TOTAL
BALANCE BFWD							44013.77	0.00	44013.77
ASSESSMENT RATES RESIDENT							17.93	0.00	17.93
VA-VALUE-EXCLUSION							17.93-	0.00	17.93-
INTEREST							301.02	0.00	301.02

WATER METER 1		WATER METER 2		WATER METER 3		ELECTRICITY METER	
METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT

60 + Days	30 Days	Current Levy	Due Date
43973.85	298.92	301.02	

Total Payable		
AMOUNT	VAT	TOTAL
44573.79	0.00	44573.79

>>>>>> 9 1301 0000 0204 3609 4 KINDLY TAKE NOTE THAT ALL CONSUMER ACCOUNTS NUMBERS WERE CHANGED TO 7 DIGITS LONG USE THEM AS REFERENCE FOR YOUR FUTURE PAYMENTS PROPERTIES WILL BE PHYSICALLY INSPECTED BY THE APPOINTED MUNICIPAL VALUER YOUR CO-OPERATION IS APPRECIATED

BANKING DETAILS: ABSA BRITS, ACC NO: 6400002316, BRANCH CODE: 334146

Post Office 028

18658

Excessively high water bills can also be attributed to incorrect metering; however, this does not appear to be the case here. The resident stated that they had been in arrears for at least a decade and further noted that they would not pay for poor water services from the MLM.

MLM's poor service delivery made some community members very reluctant to pay. Some participants in this study felt that the municipalities' "culture of non-servicing" of poor communities could only be addressed through non-payment of poor services. This argument resonates with some commentators who have attributed non-payment to declining customer satisfaction levels (Akinyemi et al., 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020). The demotivation that came with poor water service provision was documented in research by Akinyemi et al. (2018), where the impact of irregular or frequent water interruption has significantly discouraged consumers' payment for water services. This is also supported by Mutyambizi et al. (2020), who argue that consumer dissatisfaction often leads to the unwillingness to pay for essential services.

Non-payment in Madibeng is still "a powerful symbolic weapon" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7), now not against the apartheid government, but through citizens showing dissatisfaction with the post-apartheid government as it has according to them failed to deliver on promises made in 1994, such as the provision of basic water services. It was perhaps a way to increase their bargaining power in the long run against the local municipality (Ruiters, 2002: 53).

We have established that some participants indicated that they longer participated in community meetings and others did not vote in local and national government elections. This was based on a perception of how the *sterility* and *toxicity* of community meetings and an apparent increasingly waning a sense of *political efficacy* opened up *toyi-toying* as an effective channel for citizens to reclaim power. Once citizens had struggled with getting their water-related grievances addressed by the local municipality, the most drastic or extreme recourse possible to address their demands would be a protest.

6.6. *Toyi-toying* as an expression of insurgent citizenship

Toyi-toying was an avenue through which residents of Madibeng negotiated to have their water issues addressed. *Toyi-toying* has its roots in apartheid, and now in post-apartheid South Africa, it is fascinating that citizens are still pursuing it as a means to get heard. The following is an analysis of the process that culminated in community members engaging in the invented space of taking to the streets.

6.6.1. *Toyi-toying* as a last resort to be heard

Toyi-toying was not a preferred way of expression; however, getting the MLM to respond to communities' demands and pleas through protest was a route they considered after all else had failed. Damonsville resident, Taylor, asserted that *toyi-toying* was meant to show the MLM that there was an issue of grave concern that needed urgent attention. Affirming this point, Taylor stated the following: "Once we strike, it shows that something is going wrong". Some participants held the view that the MLM was infamous for not responding timeously to service delivery issues in the different Madibeng communities. Once there was a water interruption, the community would deliver a Memorandum of Grievances and wait for a response. If there was an occasion when the municipality failed to provide water or give the community a day when water services would be restored, the community had to *toyi-toyi*. According to Danny:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform us, and we see that water is not coming out of the taps. That's why they were striking because they don't tell us when the water would go. We go and come back, and we just see that there is no water.
>
> [We]give them a certain time to respond, and if they don't reply, then we don't have any option but to protest.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Armand, a Damonsville resident, conveyed utter disappointment that even after the community delivered the Memorandum to the MLM, the municipality would not respond in any way, and *toyi-toying* would be the only way for them to be "heard":

> We don't get any answers after submitting a Memorandum [of Grievances], and we are left with no choice but to strike. So, we close the roads and burn tyres. That's the only way they hear us.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina and Kgothatso, both Damonsville residents, viewed the MLM's lack of response as community members not being "heard". According to Ina, her community had gotten to a stage where the municipality's only way to address service delivery issues was if they engaged in violent protest. She indicated this in the following words:

> People believe that they should be violent to be heard and want to feel like they are being heard.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

Kgothatso indicated that for the MLM to take the issues raised by communities "seriously", *toyi-toying* was the one sure way this could happen. Other than that, the municipality did not respond nor address the issues raised. MLM remains "quiet". In support of this, he said the following:

> At the end of it, it usually boils down to us having to strike to get water, or whatever else it is that we want...That's the point where the Madibeng [Local Municipality] starts taking you seriously. If we don't do that, nothing happens - there's no action...They don't listen.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Protest for Danny was the only way communities could be "heard" by the MLM. Danny mentioned that protesting was a popular way of getting through to local municipalities in South Africa. He stated the following:

> There is only one way - *toyi-toyi*. They listen when we strike; here in South Africa, they deal with strikes. If you don't strike, they don't listen.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Malomê Daniel, from Mothutlung, also reiterated the point about not "being heard". She argued that only when the community's demands and pleas had fallen on deaf ears did they *toyi-toyi*. The following were her words:

> Before protesting, you start by talking to them, and when the Madibeng Local Municipality does not listen to the community's pleas, that's when we *toyi-toyi*.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Protesting was the only "language" citizens could communicate to the MLM with.

> Unless we start protesting and blocking roads, that is when they want to talk to us. Other than that, they don't even care…[Protest is] the only language they understand…When we are not going to work, and the kids are not going to school, that is when they want to listen.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

The photo taken on 12 September 2018 below illustrates a barricade that had just been cleared on the road to Mothutlung:

Figure 20: Barricade debris along the road to Mothutlung

Myra, a Damonsville resident, reinforced the efficacy of *toyi-toying* in having water services restored, which she proclaimed as her democratic right. She was adamant that without *toyi-toying*, the MLM simply would not restore water services:

> As I said, the only thing we can do is use our democratic rights and strike. So, we give information and if they don't respond, here's what we're going to do. That's the only way we can make them listen to us. If we don't [strike] and just sit back, we'll be waiting forever. I think one of the leaders…
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

In expressing their desperation, a Mothutlung resident, *Malomê* Frank, claimed the following: "You always have to *toyi-toyi*, and that's wrong". For Tshepo, another Mothutlung resident, before community members *toyi-toyed*, the MLM would not restore water services. Even though a protest would undoubtedly result in the restoration of water services, its quality remained poor. He indicated the following:

> Up until we fight, that's when you'll see water coming from the taps, but not clean water…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Some Mmakau residents also shared their opinion about protesting being a last resort. For instance, Valery went on to say that the councillor and officials from the MLM only came to the Mmakau once there was protest action. The community would have a short-lived victory by having water services restored for a short while. Here is what she said:

> I don't know, but if we don't do that, they won't even come to us…Once we block the road, that is when you see the councillor and the people from the municipality coming and saying, "No, we have a problem of this and this and that". But before we do this, they don't come to explain anything…All the areas in Madibeng had to gather around and go to the municipal office to hand over a Memorandum [of Grievances]. Yes, that is when water started to come out, but not for long…
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

The decision to take part in *toyi-toying* was a complex one. Based on the perceptions of the data collected, *toyi-toying* was a form of expression which had to be taken after all else had failed. It was a space in which some participants felt that they could voice and force local authorities to listen to their demands (Dube et al., 2021). Invented spaces are

formed organically from the grassroots by the people for the people. It was considered a last resort, and people who participate in protest are the same people who would have attempted to get their grievances across to the municipality via community meetings and other less robust methods. The information above indicates that the participants felt that invited and invented spaces may not involve radically different participants (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). For community members to take part in this process, a strong sense of togetherness had to exist. The protesters are not a different group of people with political views; it is the same people who engage in protests, for example, are likely to attend institutional meetings and workshops (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

6.6.2. *Toyi-toying* as a show of solidarity

An important aspect of citizenship was membership in a political community. Some of the participants expressed a sense of "we-ness", and through this, taking part in protests was evidence of the existence of a *citizenship conscience*. Taking to the streets was their final recourse as an effort to emphasise its the community's legitimacy (Clarke et al., 2014: 20) in claiming the right of access to sufficient water.

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, said he joined protests because he wanted to make a difference in his family's life. According to him, joining the other community members symbolised that he was part of a "struggle", a term synonymous with the fight against the apartheid regime. He also termed protest as a "[social] movement", implying that he was part of a broader socio-political group meant to bring about change in the community of Mothutlung. From his perspective, there was something fundamentally wrong in the community, which is why he was taking part. He was prepared to miss going to work, so that he fought for water. He stated the following:

> I joined the struggle; I joined the [social] movement. I'm not a politician, but I fight for what's right. I join the struggle; even if it means I mustn't go to work, it's fine. I fight for what is right for my family and me…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

The existence of *citizenship conscience* also resonated with Kgothatso. He indicated that community members, like himself, felt obligated to participate in protests in general. He had to support his comrades in the fight for water, even though he had access to water through a 5,000l JoJo tank. This was a demonstration of an awareness of citizenship rights, and for him, that was the only way the community was going to triumph. He noted that he participated in all community-led protests – whether water was the reason or another grievance. The following were his comments:

> I have to [take part]…We are a community…I can't be sitting here while my friend or brother is out there fighting for water. I cannot sit at home because I have a JoJo tank. If it is a [community] protest, it has to be a collective thing. That is the only way we can win it – that's if we are a collective. I'm not supposed to think it's fine for my family and me since I have extra water. We have to support one another in a community to win any battle that comes in the future. We know that we're together in all of these things, that's why I take part.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Ntatêmogolo Joe, a Mothutlung resident, was highly critical of the state of democracy in South Africa. According to him, solidarity was very important because the poor only had strength when they were in numbers. He stated the following:

> In the so-called democracy, the poor people are protesting for them to be heard because individually, you're useless.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/M/Mothutlung)

Reflecting on *Ntatêmogolo* Joe reference to the "new" South Africa as a "so-called democracy" shows that his own lived experiences did not reflect the ideals of democratic governance, grounded particularly in Constitutional democracy and the respect for rights. For the residents of Mothutlung to have a voice and express themselves as citizens, they had to be involved in large numbers. Even though some participants saw protesting's efficacy, this view was not shared.

6.6.3. Harmful consequences of *toyi-toying*

Some participants had a negative view of *toyi-toying*. They believed it was counterproductive as they associated this with criminality and the damage to property that sometimes occurred. It was also noted that children could not go to school, and adults could not go to work. Other participants felt that *toyi-toying* could lead to injuries and, worse – death. In all instances, no positive and tangible results would be achieved from protesting this, suggesting that they believed that protesting was a futile exercise.

Mmakau residents like *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude and *Mmêmogolo* Maggy viewed *toyi-toying* as a platform that some community members used to destroy property. She explained that when community members went to the streets, this came from anger. A lot of their behaviour henceforth reflected the anger. She said:

> People are angry, and when I *toyi-toyi,* I can't think…They [protestors] just destroy property, and they say they are *toyi-toying*. But they are destroying, you see. People go to Madibeng and burn the streets going there.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Gertrude also affirmed this. She was also highly critical of protests and protesters and did not view protesting as a solution to any community issue. She was a proponent of dialogue, which she advised was in the community's best interest. To her, taking it to the streets meant protesters damaged property. Basing her response on Mmakau, she notes that the infrastructure damaged during a protest to date has not been repaired. These were her words:

> *Toyi-toying* is not the solution. We should sit down and talk about our issues as a community - call a meeting and talk. Once we have discussed our issues, we don't have to damage property because we won't get infrastructural development in our area. When they fix this thing, we damage another one, you see?… Look, there are other things which haven't been fixed from the previous protests, you see…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Some participants, like *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, reiterated the opportunistic nature of delinquents. She believed that vandals and criminals took advantage of the situation and damaged property, which was unjustifiable. The following were her words;

> I don't think *toyi-toying* is a wise thing to do because people damage property…You cannot destroy someone's car who knows nothing about your issues…You can see that even this *toyi-toying* brings criminal elements.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

The protests were noted to disrupt schooling and economic activities, as children and adults could not leave their homes, and where they did, schools and workplaces were closed. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude also referred to the impact of protests on school attendance. During *toyi-toying*, schools are closed, which has consistently negatively impacted learners as they miss out on classes. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude went further to state that protesting did more harm than good in their communities. In some instances, "shutdowns" were organised during examination times, negatively impacting learners' educational outcomes. Children would not attend class, and educators would not come to school. Poor schooling outcomes negatively affected the children's life chances and possible upward social mobility in the long term. She declared;

> You find that a "shutdown" can be organised during tests or examination times for children. They will stop children from going to write, claiming that they are resolving these issues - but in reality, they are not fixing anything. Grade twelves [Matriculants] suffer the most. They end up messing up our children's future. Why don't they let children go to school? They are negatively affecting their life chances by denying them access to education…They stop children from going to school…The kids have a chance of getting a better future through school…Tomorrow they won't have a future.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

According to *Ouma* Viola, a Damonsville resident, children's education was a very big concern. She worried about children missing out on schooling opportunities due to the *toyi-toying* and the violence that came with the protests. Here is what she said in support of this:

> What worries me the most is that they stop kids from going to school. Some of our kids do not attend school here in Damonsville. Even the school here does not operate because the teachers reside outside the community and cannot come in. The kids leave school because of the violence on the streets. You are afraid your kids will get hurt.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Denying children an opportunity to go to school contraindicated the civic right to education as listed in S29 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). As per the S29, everyone has the right to basic education and further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible. In the context of protesting, the protesters believed that HRtW superseded the right to access education. Even though the Constitution (RSA, 1996) acknowledges the right to protest, such a right is not absolute. Rights are exercised within the context of certain parameters set by the law (Nsibirwa, 2016). The parameters exist to ensure that other people's rights should not be infringed.

On days when there were protests, some people could not leave their communities, which meant they lost income as they did not work. Community members who did not want to participate and those who could not participate for whatever reason had to make alternative accommodation arrangements such as staying with friends or family from other areas for the duration of "shutdowns". This outcome, unfortunately, went against S21 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement" and provides that "[e]very citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside anywhere in, the Republic".*Ouma* Viola from Damonsville was one such person. If she learnt of an organised protest, she made sure that from the night before it was scheduled to happen, she would not be in Damonsville until it ended. This meant that she would have to be away from her home while sleeping at friends' homes in surrounding areas. She stated the following:

> If you hear that tomorrow, there's going to be a strike in Damonsville, make sure that you sleep elsewhere. You go to Elandsrand[51] , or if you have friends in town, you to sleep in town just to be on the safe side with your job. When I was still working, I had to sleep in town or just be out of Damonsville.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Another negative consequence of *toyi-toying* that was of concern in the interviews was the possibility of injury or death. Injuries and deaths during protests were a common occurrence in the area. *Ouma* Viola shared an incident where the police fired rubber bullets at protesters. According to her, a Damonsville youth was shot by the police during protest

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, echoed this. She had observed that protests turned violent, resulting in injuries and casualties. She referred to an incident a few months before the interview in which someone got injured during a protest. She stated the following:

> Unfortunately, these strikes get out of control, and people get hurt, and some even die. A few months ago, there was a strike and people got hurt there. I was supposed to come home on the same day, but people from different communities marched to our municipality [Madibeng Local Municipality]. I don't know how, but they got into a fight and what-not, and some people eventually got hurt.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

A Mmakau participant, *Malomê* Daniel, recalled the 2014 incident and how people lost their lives *toyi-toying* for water. Here is what he said: "A few years ago, they blocked the road in Mothutlung, and people died fighting for water" (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau). Like Felicity and *Malomê* Daniel, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe referred to people dying for water. He said the following: "I don't know if you're aware, but people were killed in this area due to the water issue". *Ouma* Viola, from Damonsville, suggested that that one might get disabled due to injuries sustained during protest action drawing from the 2014 casualties. Here were her exact words:

[51] Elandsrand is a small mining town a 10 minute drive from Damonsville.

> [Protesting] For me is not good. People get hurt, and people die in the process…Like what happened in 2014…I don't think it's a good thing. You can become disabled, and you say you did it for your community. What will the community give you back at the end of the day?
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Some participants like *Malomê* Frank and *Mmêmogolo* Angelica argued that a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis showed that embarking on a protest produced negative outcomes. A person's life was too high a price to pay for water. *Malomê* Frank thought that protests were futile and that they generally ended with injuries and casualties and ultimately were not worth participating in. He said:

> I hate it [*toyi-toying*] because I've been doing this for some years. I hate it, and too many people end up getting injured, and some people die…For what? For water?
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Since the 2014 killings, participants like *Mmêmogolo* Angelica withdrew from *toyi-toying*. What disheartened her the most was that the MLM knew that it was mandated to supply sufficient water, but it was not. According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica:

> It seems like the municipality supplies water as and when it wants. Because you know, ever since those things happened [the 2014 killings], I'm no longer involved. If I don't have water, I'll go and fetch it somewhere. To fight won't solve anything. We are supposed to get quality water, but we don't…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants did not see the protests yielding any positive long-term improvements in the provision of sufficient water services by the MLM. *Mmêmogolo* Angelica saw the futility in protesting and declared that the communities' victories were short-lived as water services would be interrupted again. The following were her remarks:

> Because they fight and hold a Madibeng "shutdown", but after maybe three weeks, if you come back, you'll see that we don't have water. So, it doesn't help us fight; some people are dying, people who died there

> [Mothutlung] because of this water. But that problem continues because they don't solve the problem.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

According to Thabo, a Mmakau resident, communities were losing the fight for their right to sufficient water. *Toyi-toying* only yielded short-term results, and with certainty, he noted that water services would be interrupted again. In his own words, he stated the following:

> We are striking for water; we are fighting for water, but there is nothing. When we are striking for water here, water comes for two weeks and then it is gone. You see, this is the problem.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Whether people protested or not, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude stated that nothing much would change in South Africa and taking part in water politics was a waste of time. Here were her words:

> Anything you try is just a waste of time…It's a waste of time to engage in politics. No one changes anything in this country.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Some participants' pessimism about protesting is related to the state's lack of respect for the citizenry's democratic right to demonstrate. The trauma in the communities over the 2014 deaths was still evident, and for this reason, some participants felt that it was in their best interest to refrain from taking part in protests. Aside from the loss of life, it was also the futility that protests had. The MLM still failed to meet its constitutional requirement to provide water to disadvantaged communities in Madibeng.

6.6.4. Shifting perceptions of the role of the SAPS in *toyi-toying*

The interviews showed varying views of the South African Police Service's (SAPS) role in toyi-toying. Depending on participants' different experiences, they viewed the police as supportive of demonstration as a form of expression, while others viewed them as anti-protest. This meant that in invented spaces, the role of the police could vary from

restricting to supporting *toyi-toying*. Below is an image that was taken on my maiden trip to Madibeng on 12 September 2018, the day when the "shutdown":

Figure 21: South African Police Service in Damonsville

Source: Researcher's photograph

The SAPS is infamously known for using excessive violence. This has been documented across South Africa, and in Madibeng, the most notable and relevant example is the 2014 service delivery related protest that culminated in the deaths of four men. People who took part in these protests recount the police using force to deal with protesters. This negative view of their role was more grounded in coercion in restricting expression; however, more recently, there were emerging positive sentiments about their role.

Some participants expressed dissatisfaction with how the police conducted themselves during community protests. *Ouma* Viola refers to the use of violence one Damonsville youth. She recounted an incident in which the police fired rubber bullets at protesters. According to her, Kyle[52]took part in a violent protest "a few years back" and was shot by the police when they were trying to restore order. *Ouma* Viola expressed the following:

[52] Pseudonym.

> I was not there [at the protest], so it's just what I am told by people coming from there…I spoke to one boy, Kyle. The police shot him during a protest. He now stays put at his house when they go *toyi-toying*. After he was shot, he came to show me. He came and said to me, "*Ouma* Viola, they shot me here – you see…I'm not going back there ever again", showing me his back.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, was convinced that the police officers were intimidated by protesters, and that is why they fired rubber bullets at them. He affirmed that strikes were a constitutional right, and to him, everything they were doing was within the confines of the law. Based on this previous experience of participating in protests, Andre felt that the police's directive to either disperse the crowd or manage it came from the mayor – who had direct contact with the senior police personnel at the precincts. He viewed the polices mandate to stop mass action as a direct way that the MLM did to cover up the dissatisfaction of Madibeng residents. He also referred to the use of force in the form of rubber bullets. Andre said the following:

> They shoot at us with rubber bullets because we are a threat to them…They think we'll confront them, of which we don't. We are just exercising our right to strike. So, they've been given instructions to either disperse us or keep us calm. The instructions came from station commanders who were always in touch with the mayor.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

The use of rubber bullets is not something new for some unique to Damonsville residents. Participants like *Ma'* Tshepiso from Mothutlung was once shot at during a protest "around 2012" for no apparent reason. During this incident, they also used tear gas to disperse the crowd. Based on her experience, she characterised SAPS officers as uncooperative, unsupportive and counterproductive. When they tried to engage with the offices, they dismissively told them that the protest was illegal, and thus they had to disperse immediately. The following were her exact words:

> They [the police] responded very badly…They shot rubber bullets at us. They also threw teargas at us. And we tried to engage with them to tell them we had a mandate [Memorandum of Grievances] and that this was a legal strike. We had the mandate with us, and all we wanted was to submit it to the person in charge [at the Madibeng Local Municipality]. But the police didn't allow us…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Malomê Daniel felt the police were counterproductive, and they thwarted community efforts to fight for their right to water. He put it bluntly that the SAPS officers did not in any way want to assist in their cause. Once they arrived at a protest scene and understood it was for water, they considered it a trivial issue, dismissed the protesters, and requested them to open up the roads. Here is what he said:

> The police did not help us when we protested. When they get there, they ask us what we are protesting for, and if we say "water", and they'll say, "No man, open these roads. You guys can't *toyi-toyi* for water".
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

The younger participants who took part in protests more recently had a difference in experiences of the police. There seems to be shifting perceptions about the role of the police in *toyi-toying,* which is more positive. In supporting protests positively, the SAPS protected property and life and allowed for the expression of the right to protest. Police presence at the protest sites was appreciated by some participants who felt safer and more secure as protesters, and opportunistic criminals, would not damage property. To Valery, a Mmakau resident, police presence also ensured that people did not harm one another:

> They do come, and then they just stand there to ensure no one is harming the other. If someone is injured, that is when they intervene. If there is nothing, they just stand there and monitor from a distance.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Thabo, a Mmakau resident, expressed the police's role in protecting property. He stated the following: "They do nothing. They are just guarding us and making sure that we are not breaking into shops". Another Mmakau resident, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, affirmed

this, saying police presence was great, as this made sure that criminal elements would not run amok destroying property. She was quite fond of police presence and believed that SAPS officers who came to protests were doing an excellent job. Here is what *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude said:

> The police are there to protect so that they [the protestors] don't damage property. If they damage it, everything becomes worse. You see me, and I do love police because they do their work very well and in the end, there aren't any incidents of vandalism.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

The SAPS officers were also depicted as understanding, very empathetic, and supportive of the cause of the protesters. Reflecting on the 12 September 2018 "shutdown" which he took part in, Taylor, a Damonsville resident, noted that:

> They listened to people's demands. The police showed people how they should behave, what they must do, what they mustn't do, and the routes they must use.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Some residents believed that the police were conducting themselves professionally. *Ouma* Viola, another Damonsville resident, indicated that the SAPS were noted to use rubber bullets to disperse protesters, and this was only if there were commotion and chaos. If everything happened peacefully, they then did not use force. *Ouma* Viola stated the following:

> If they strike and do not burn houses or cars, or demolish things, then that is okay. But in the process of striking, if there was violence and people fought, then the police fired rubber bullets.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Communities, however, had a role to play. They needed to refrain from violence and vandalism. This came through in my interview with Danny, a Mothutlung resident. He was aware that it was important to hold it peacefully even when protesting, and this was the only way the police could support their cause. He did, however, note that violent protests were more effective as the MLM listened to protesters more. He said:

> We just have to strike peacefully…When you strike, don't do something that draws negative attention towards you, like closing a road so that people cannot go to Brits for work. Some people have done this because they want the Madibeng [Local Municipality] to listen to them.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, also from Mothutlung, expounded the above point and stated that if the protesters became violent, the police would then intervene:

> If people are just marching, they won't do anything. But if the protesters block roads and the like, not considering that people need to go to work or start throwing stones at cars, that's when the police get involved.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

According to some participants, some protesters were unruly and attempted to access restricted roads or do something they were not allowed to, which brought them into conflict with the police. In support of this, Felicity expressed the following:

> Community members sometimes get out of control. I can't pinpoint how these things go, but I know that the community members tend to get violent towards the police because they may want to pass through an area that they aren't allowed to or want to do whatever they want to do. In these cases, the police won't tolerate such. So it is a matter of the community learning that it doesn't always have to get violent as some of the community members are arrested.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Violence was also noted to be emerging in the communities in a proliferation of gangs and gang violence.

6.7. The rise of gangsterism in Madibeng

Fighting for space and power in the Madibeng political landscape has resulted in open conflict in the communities. Positions in local government were viewed in the communities as avenues to make money. The conflict had escalated such that in Mothutlung, gunfights had gone to the streets with people shooting at each other to gain positions in local government. The major party in the area was the ANC, and most of the conflict was intra-party, as it was alleged by some participants in the study that

it was people within the ANC fighting for positions. In support of this, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe stated the following:

> The ANC has many heads, and sometimes these many heads turn and fight amongst themselves…Within the local groups, they fight each other…They all feel they must get what they want at all costs…[T]hat's why bullets are flying around this community.
>
> Sometimes the children will tell me about the shootings in the streets. When asked what's happening, they'll tell you they [ANC members] are fighting with guns…Fighting over who should be the next councillor.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Tshepang, another Mothutlung resident, went on to describe how to him there was a proliferation of violence during the election period, as though Mothutlung was a warzone where the side with heavier artillery "won":

> When it's election time, people are running around chasing each other with guns, and those that have the most and biggest guns rule the place… When people start chasing each other with guns…It's *The Law of the Jungle* [53].
> (Tshepang/35/M/Mothutlung)

What emerged in some of the interviews was the existence of four groups responsible for perpetuating violence in Madibeng, all linked to the ANC in some ways: *Boko Haram*[54], *Fear Fokol* ("Fear Nothing"), The *A-Team* (short for the ANC Team), and *Bang Fokol* ("No Nonsense"). The *Boko Haram* group was from Oukasie[55]. According to Andre, this group was funded by the MLM to cause chaos during community-led protests. Once this happens, the police would delegitimise the gathering and disburse the protestors. Once this happens, the municipality will not be serviced with a memorandum. Members of *Boko Haram* were depicted as the MLM's soldiers of fortune. During the 12 September 2018 "shutdown", *Boko Haram* members organised and waited for the protesters in Brits. According to Andre, an almost two dozen-strong group

[53] *The Law of the Jungle* describes a situation in which people do whatever they do to survive. There are no rules or laws which govern conduct, and law dictates "kill or be killed".
[54] This group is named after a jihadist terrorist organisation based in Nigeria operating in the West African region.
[55] Ouksie is a township in Madibeng located 13km from Mothutlung.

hurled stones at the Thari busses, bringing protesters from Damonsville and Mothutlung. In support of this, Andre stated the following:

> Yes, when we got there [Madibeng Local Municipality offices in Brits], they [*Boko Haram*] were already there, almost 20 people outside Madibeng [Local Municipality offices]. They even threw stones at the busses we were in...
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Like Andre, Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, also expressed the *Boko Haram*'s attack on busses ferrying protesters to the MLM offices during the "shutdown". *Boko Haram* "boys" were intoxicated as well as carried weapons. The following is what he said:

> They [*Boko Haram*] are a large group of boys at the local municipality acting as security for the municipality. We noticed that they were drunk; they had been bought alcohol [by the Madibeng Local Municipality officials]. This usually happens. Some of them were not even wearing shirts, and they had *pangas* and knives. They had been told that Mothutlung residents were coming. As I'm part of the struggle, we went there peacefully to submit a mandate [Memorandum of Grievances]. Those people stopped us from everything when they saw our buses, and they started attacking us with *pangas*, knives, and stones...They even damaged the busses we came with.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

The violence perpetrated by the said-*Boko Haram* group was noted in some newspaper articles available online. The ANC North interim provincial committee coordinator, Mr Hlomani Chauke, said the group had caused mayhem in the province (Stone, 2019). The *Boko Haram* "gangsters" demanded business from the Matlosana Municipality in the Northwest Province. The group was linked to *tenderpreneurial* activities in the municipality. It was an informal group whose members intimidated and harassed some councillors and disrupted local municipalities' functioning by requesting preferential treatment regarding tendering processes (Stone, 2019).

The second group, *Fear Fokol,* was believed to be involved in *tenderpreneurial* activities at the MLM. It subsequently changed into what is now called the "A-Team", the third group. According to some participants in the study, the former and latter groups have been responsible for intimidating and inciting violence in Madibeng, particularly in Mothutlung. Gangsterism in Madibeng spread from Mothutlung to Damonsville through a group called *Bang Fokol*. This group was responsible for violence and intimidation in both areas. The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group contained a 2016 rally poster which demonstrates a clear link between the ANC and *Bang Fokol* (See Figure 22 below):

Figure 22: *Bang Fokol*/ANC Rally Poster (2016)

Source: The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group

The poster above shows that the *Bang Fokol* group was in a way linked to the ANC and this is evident from its use of the ANC logo, colours and overall branding in a flyer lobbying for the ANC party.

These groups' role in Madibeng communities was a highly problematic one. Through intimidation and actual violence, they created a sense of fear. Their "closeness" to the ANC local government and involvement in tendering processes created an added sense of distrust in communities. These groups were noted to exert pressure on the local government representatives and compel them to give business to their associates. The decline in spaces of expression in Madibeng made some residents hold a gloomy outlook of socio-political life in the municipality.

6.8. Disillusioned citizens

The neoliberal trajectory that the post-apartheid state has taken has left behind indigent communities that had expectations for a decent life grounded in constitutionalism in the new state. The post-apartheid landscape has disillusioned some citizens in the research communities. The promises and dreams they had still have not been realised, and as it is, they are a distant reality. They felt that the government had failed dismally. According to views on the ground in the research areas, the state struggled to provide basic water services.

Participants like Danny, from Mothutlung, were grateful that the ANC paved the way for a multiracial democracy; however, believed that the party had grown complacent over the years. The following is an excerpt from Danny affirming this point:

> I feel good because at least we have freedom, but the way I feel, I feel like the ANC should like give way now to another party. So, if the ANC doesn't do good as our party, then what can we do? We will just sit and wait…I think ANC does try, but they don't do enough.

> The ANC doesn't do things right because they know that the people won't vote them out. If they see that we are changing, they will have pressure to deliver, but right now, they don't have pressure, they have relaxed because they know that the ANC is the ANC since 1994.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Other participants felt that they were being taken advantage of by the whole political system as there was no political representation in the local government. They had gotten to a stage where they could not tell anyone about the challenges they were facing in Madibeng. "It's so painful…It's so painful, and who are you going to tell?" asks *Mmêmogolo* Chimere (53/F/Mmakau). According to *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, politicians were the only people benefiting financially from their activities in Madibeng, and the general citizenry was getting nothing at all. According to her:

> [T]he ANC are the ones who are benefiting…We are supporters; we help people get rich. We are going to remain poor, unfortunately. This thing of saying, "I like this party, or I like that party", is a problem. These parties are doing nothing for us, and only the [party] leaders benefit.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Some participants held a very bleak outlook on life in South Africa. A sense of powerlessness worsened this feeling. *Ma'* Yolanda painted a very disheartening and discouraging picture of what contemporary South Africa represented to her. She saw it as a place and space that was emotionally draining. She stated the following:

> Nothing makes me happy to be in the "new" democratic South Africa, especially without water. Nothing makes me happy to live in the "new" South Africa…It's discouraging and exhausting, and I get emotionally drained; I don't know what to do…
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Angelica from Mothutlung closed the interview by stating that she was not proud to be a South African citizen, and she elaborated that South Africa was a country where people's rights were not respected but abused, demonstrating how powerless citizens were. Thabo, a Mmkau resident, also referred to this sense of loss of power. He stated the following: "I'm just sitting, I don't have power, I don't have power". Felicity,

a Damonsville resident, also reiterated the same sense of powerlessness. She had a series of questions; however, answers were never going to come. According to her:

> [The water situation] makes me powerless because I think if I were to be more involved in the running of the municipality, I would want to get to the root of the problem. I want to know what exactly the problem is. What steps do they take to clean the pipes? What steps do they take to clean the water? Because communities need clean water, especially those who cannot afford to buy water to drink or cook. It leaves me powerless…
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

This sense of powerlessness is evident in failing a democratic state to comply with citizenship in its totality. In support of this, Brendan (cited in Harvey, 2007: 119) argues that:

> The state's ability to protect and promote the public interest has been undermined, and the authority of their citizens usurped. Power has become more remote and less accountable, acquired by an alliance of business interests and supra-national and quasi-state machines.
> (Brendan, cited in Harvey, 2007: 119)

Ntatêmogolo Joe felt that the general quality of life for citizens had regressed. The levels of poverty and inequality in contemporary South Africa had become intolerable. He suggested that politicians had grown pompous over the years, and they felt they could treat the general people, citizens, as they pleased. They viewed themselves as deities to be worshipped and the only ones with the capacity to think. He expressed a keen frustration of people being treated like mere recipients who should just accept whatever is provided to them by the MLM. The burden and abuse from the apartheid state were experienced by everyone alike. Here is what he said:

> People think they are gods and are the only ones with brains because they gave us freedom. We shouldn't talk; we should take whatever they give us. They forget that we were the ones carrying the burden of apartheid. We were beaten, and they chased us with dogs and teargas, all those things they experienced.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Some participants simply felt that the ANC government had betrayed them. Reflecting on the policies and legislation available in the "new" South Africa that promote the citizens right of access to sufficient water, the MLM had failed dismally to provide adequate water services:

> I feel betrayed by the government because water is a key (basic need) and the policy say we must get 6 kilolitres for free, but we don't have access to it, and we then have to buy water.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Politicians' opulence was noted in the interviews as some participants exclaimed that municipal officials drive uber-luxurious vehicles while their constituencies survived in squalid conditions. If one lost their life during a water-related protest, nothing would come from the politicians to show that they are in mourning. *Mmêmogolo* Maggy advised all residents of Mmakau – young and old – to refrain from taking part in anything as their lives may be lost in vain. Here is what she said:

> They are rich…They are driving big and fancy 4X4s. What do we have? Nothing! If you die *toyi-toying* for water, they will never bring a coffin or a bag of tomatoes and say, "The person who was staying there died while *toyi-toying* for water". Let's just leave it because we will die, and our children will die, all for nothing. They must just continue themselves…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

According to Andre, South Africa's multiparty democracy is not genuine. Autocratic leaders have emerged, and they make decisions by themselves, for themselves. Here is what he said:

> We are supposed to be in a democratic country, but this is not so. This is a fake democracy. Because here we're living in a country that is supposed to be democratic…It's autocratic…These people [officials from the Madibeng Local Municipality] make decisions by themselves, which they benefit from.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

The promise of a new South Africa is not a reality lived by everyone, and some participants feel quite disillusioned but remain steadfast in their hope for a better future:

> You know I always strive to be proud of my country, but you know, with how it's being run and how it's being led, it does get me to question whether if at some point I'll be able to get to where I'm proud to say, "I'm happy to be a South African". There are means and resources in our country, but they're not being used fairly...[T]hat being said, I'm still proudly South African because it's our country, and we have to embrace it in every way that it is. So all I can say is that hopefully soon, things will change, and water access will improve. (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Even with all the legal framework supporting South Africans' access to water, residents of Madibeng are struggling to access basic water services. They feel socially excluded because they are residents of "poor" and "black" communities. This elicited a keen sense of powerlessness from them. The case of Madibeng also demonstrated how historically entrenched socio-economic inequalities influence asymmetrical water access along with class and racial lines in the "new" South Africa. This contributed to some participants withdrawing from participating in "good citizenship" activities like paying for water services, participating in community meetings, demonstrations and voting.

Some citizens painted a very gloomy picture on their outlook of South Africa. They were quite disillusioned because the post-apartheid state failed to deliver on promises made at the birth of the new country. The participants' material conditions are deplorable, worsened by a growing concern that the ANC-led government had grown complacent over the years. This culminated in some participants in this study demonstrating disengagement from "good citizenship" practices that manifest in withdrawal from fear, coercion, or duress. Therefore, I argue that some citizens in post-apartheid South Africa demonstrate *disengaged citizenship*, an argument I develop in the final chapter of this thesis.

6.9. Conclusion

This chapter set out to demonstrate how participants from three communities in Madibeng express citizenship. This chapter started by defining the positionality of the participants in the study. It was found that there was a belief that they received poor service delivery because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities. Some participants drew comparisons with areas like Brits and Elandsrand, which were believed to receive better services. From this, it was evident that some participants believed that because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities, they were not accorded full citizenship rights – and in this case, a right to access sufficient water.

To express grievances of service delivery, invented spaces such as community meetings were sterile and had become extremely toxic according to the participants. Community meetings were spaces to discuss and deliberate on issues of mutual concern that had become exclusionary and hostile spaces. Here the organisers of the meetings, presumably community leaders, were alleged to intimidate and bully community members in attendance. In some instances, input from the community members was disregarded. Some participants felt that attending meetings was of no benefit to them and thus a waste of time. They resolved not to attend meetings. This culminated in several participants indicating that they had stopped attending them.

There was a growing sense of futility in casting ballots as well. Some participants felt that politicians were only in their communities for self-enrichment instead of serving the communities that voted for them. Furthermore, some participants held the view that voting did not bring any positive change, and they indicated that they did not have a voice. What was peculiar was that some participants indicated that preferred not to vote entirely. This finding is supported in literature that revelations of corruption and state capture have made ANC supported lose trust in the party. This has resulted in loyal party supporters not voting.

The non-payment of water services was a complex hydropolitical phenomenon. They were varying perceptions about paying for "dirty" water that was supplied inconsistently. The findings on this item suggest that the major inhibitions for people from paying for water were simply because they could not afford to pay for water. Several participants cited unemployment and the lack of access to money as reasons they could not pay for water. Some held the view that paying for water was right, and people should pay. On the other hand, others held the opinion that people should not pay for water.

Toyi-toying as an expression of citizenship came up. Some participants strongly believed that if communities needed an urgent response from the MLM, *toyi-toying* was the only way to get that done. invented spaces such as community meetings had become futile, and this has seen a rise in the use of insurgent channels and invented spaces such as protests. The communities' joining together to pursue a common political goal was indicative of a sense of solidarity built around citizenship. Despite some perceived pros of protesting, some participants did not find it a viable form of expression. Despite the scepticism associated with protests, some participants generally held it as the last and most effective way to be heard.

The hostile meetings and general degeneration of local governance and service provision in the communities were attributed to politicians' interference. This was also noted to spawn gangsterism in the municipality. Madibeng is notorious for ANC factionalism, and gangs have been alleged to perpetuate violence in communities and affected how the MLM is managed. The meddling politicians and gangsters have contributed to some participants withdrawing from political expression in voting.

The promise of a new South Africa, and the reality on the ground, evidenced by the lived experience of the residents of Madibeng, has left many community members feeling disillusioned and ambivalent forms of expression when it comes to negotiating water service delivery.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion: Insurgent versus Disengaged Citizenship

[W]ater has a deep, but hidden power; it shapes the way people respond to its availability.
Johann Tempelhoff (2017)

7.1. Introduction

In order to look at expressions of citizenship within the context of South African hydropolitics, I started by broadening the definition of hydropolitics. From this, I reviewed the literature on water scarcity in the country and argued that it had human-induced drivers and was thus anthropogenic. Anthropogenic water scarcity demonstrates access to water is political. In 1994 when the new democratically government took over, access to water services and many other basic social services were skewed against black people. About one-third of the country's population did not have access to a safe water supply, and more than half lacked access to adequate sanitation (DWAF, 2004a: 4).

Directed by a new Constitution (RSA, 1996), the new dispensation had a mammoth task to redress poverty and inequality. The state implemented a series of measures (i.e., legislation, policies, and programmes) targeting areas such as poor access to water. However, the measures aimed at improving access to water are still falling short as access to water is still a distant reality for many citizens. This has been a result of several factors, including the adoption of macro-economic neoliberal policies that are not in sync with the harsh realities of poverty and inequality throughout the country. Recently, there have been increasing tensions between citizens and the state. One way this is apparent is in the number of protests - a popular form of expression from which South Africa has been dubbed the protest capital of the world. As citizens get increasingly frustrated over the declining quality of water service provision, it was important to investigate the forms of expression they embark on in pursuit of their right to water.

I set out to investigate how residents of households in three communities in the Madibeng Local Municipality, North West Province of South Africa, expressed citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning. Thus, the research question was, "**How do residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics?".** This chapter returns to this research question in light of my findings by showing how citizens in Madibeng engaged in post-apartheid hydropolitics.

7.2. Major findings

To answer the main research question on the expression of citizenship through the context of local hydropolitics in Madibeng, I formulated five objectives: first, to explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality; second, to analyse coping strategies adopted by residents of three Madibeng communities when there is inadequate water services delivery; third, to explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality. The fourth objective was to investigate how the residents of three Madibeng communities respond to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water. The fifth and last objective was to contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities.

In order to discuss cross and interdisciplinary literature on the politics of water, I needed to broaden the definition of the term "hydropolitics". At the core of hydropolitics is power. Drawing from Swyngedouw (2004: 175), I linked access to water to power relations: "[t]he water problem is not merely a question of management and technology, but rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power". The role of power in the allocation of water is also referred to by Bakker (2012: 616), who states that, "[w]ater is…intensely political in a conventional sense: implicated in contested relationships of power and authority". From reviewing Turton's (2002: 16- 17) definition and explanation of hydropolitics that deals with the *scale* and a *range* of

issues, this thesis defines hydropolitics **as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context**.

Southern Africa has dry weather (Henwood and Funke, 2002: 181) and experiences erratic and variable rainfall and climate (Mehta, 2003: 5071). However, does this explain water service delivery issues that we have in communities? Drawing from literature, I challenge a widely held notion that water issues are natural and biophysical. Some commentators argue that despite these limitations, the state can provide water from the available resources if they are utilised efficiently and effectively (Muller, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020). I argued that human activities, whether conscious or unconscious, deliberate or not, were primarily responsible for water scarcity and explained six anthropogenic factors causing scarcity: population growth and urbanisation; pollution and environmental degradation; derelict infrastructure; human resources issues in the water sector; financial mismanagement and corruption; and consumer debt[56]. It is important to note that these drivers may vary depending on the area under investigation (i.e., provinces, cities or municipalities). From this, I argued that politics was a core aspect in the allocation of water.

In order to understand citizens' forms of expression, I needed to understand how citizenship has been defined and theorised. From looking at Marshall's (1950) triadic model of citizenship that explained it as the attainment of political, civic and social rights, citizenship as a *legal status*, I concluded the attainment of citizenship was not a linear and irreversible process. Citizenship was in dispute, always. This led me to look at how citizenship was practised and the importance of two facets: citizenship *conscience* (a conviction of being a citizen stemming from an awareness of what it means) and *exercise* (an enactment of citizenship roles and responsibilities).

[56] Consumer debt is defined as "the inability for municipal service consumers to pay for the municipal services consumed" (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333)

Locating my study post-apartheid South Africa, I demonstrated how invited spaces of participation are becoming increasingly unpopular as citizens find them "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", or "sedative invited spaces" (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). Citizens have thus invented their own spaces of participation in which their forms of expression are insurgent. So, citizens are typically being defined as insurgent citizens (see Brown, 2015).

In order to address the research objectives and answer the main research question, a qualitative approach was adopted, supported by a social constructionist epistemology. Data was collected from twenty-seven residents from Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, who were selected purposively. What follows are the major findings of the study:

7.2.1. Perceptions of poor water services in Madibeng

I found that the participants generally felt that the MLM supplied deplorable water services. Looking at the prescribed minimum allocation of 25l per person per day of water, which is supposed to be consumable, the MLM struggled to meet this. The communities researched experienced rampant and prolonged water interruptions. As for its quality, human beings rely on water's organoleptic properties to assess whether it is safe to consume (Crampton and Ragusa, 2016; Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). Some participants stated that municipal water was dirty, had a bad smell and tasted "salty", and like mud. While water's organoleptic properties are not accurate measures of ascertaining water quality, some participants indicated that they or someone they knew had gotten ill from consuming it.

Some of the participants harboured a great sense of disappointment in the new government. The water services provided were, therefore, in contravention of requirements reflected in the Constitution of South Africa (1996), the National Water Act (1998), as well as the Water Services Act (1997). Looking at the mandates, citizens views indicate that they felt the was failing both as water service authority (WSA) and water service provider (WSP) in failing to provide "sufficient water" as per the National

Water Act's (1998). MLM's responsibility as a WSA is to ensure affordable, efficient and sustainable access to water services for communities in Madibeng. As a WSP, the MLM is also responsible for providing water services by legislation and conditions stipulated by the WSA.

I found that the residents attributed their perceptions to several factors. First, residents believed that officials at the Madibeng Local Municipality were corrupt and financially mismanaged the entity. They cited *tenderpreneurial* activities, particularly in sending water tankers to communities affected by water interruptions. It was widely believed that municipal officials were in cahoots with the owners of water takers and received kickbacks in exchange for interfering with the water supply so that they could "get business". Second, the residents believed that water infrastructure in the municipality was dilapidated. According to the residents, this resulted in infrastructure constantly giving in, which explained rampant water cuts. Third, some participants attributed pipe bursts to the MLM's use of underqualified or unqualified artisans to perform maintenance and repair work. Several participants referred to poor welding of pipes. It is even alleged that *Bra* Mike, the photographer who was shot dead during the January 2014 protests, was assassinated because he had incriminating images of the shoddy work done by artisans hired by the municipality. Erratic power supply in the municipality was the last reason some residents from the three communities believed contributed to poor water service delivery in their communities. They believed that water pumps would not function once power was cut, which affected the water supply. The residents evolved different ways of coping in this space, and one's access to money determining options available.

7.2.2. Coping with poor water services in Madibeng

With poor water service provision and the indispensability of water, it was important to identify the strategies participants engaged in to cope with inadequate water services in Madibeng. I found that the first and most critical step that the participants alluded to was storing municipal water when it was available. The storage containers used ranged

from 2l plastic bottles up to 5,000l JoJo tanks. When water interruptions were prolonged, community members would run out of stored water.

Some residents with financial resources bought bottled water from *spaza* shops, supermarkets, stores and other establishments. This was not a common way of getting water because it was expensive. Water sold in local *spaza* shops was very expensive, and from some residents, it just was not feasible. Other residents had boreholes or bought water from neighbours with boreholes. Borehole water was sold at a more affordable price than bottled water. An interesting strategy I came across was putting money together to hire *bakkies* to fetch water from surrounding communities. Where people could not afford to buy water or contribute to hiring a bakkie, they had to consider getting water for *mahala*. This included collecting water from unsafe sources like nearby water masses or domestic rain-water harvesting. As a coping strategy, some residents ended up finding ways delinked from the state to access water.

7.2.3. Citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality

I found that residents of the three Madibeng communities who took part in the study generally did not positively view the Madibeng Local Municipality. Based on their experiences around water service delivery, there was a widely held notion that municipal officials did not have compassion for the communities they were serving. This was in stark contrast to the *Batho Pele* principles, state officials' oath of office grounded in Ubuntu. One resident indicated that the municipal officials' attitudes had not changed despite the loss of life in the area. Another issue that the residents raised was poor communication. Residents believed that the municipality communicated poorly to its communities, and if they communicated effectively, they could better plan for water interruptions. Municipal officials were also not trusted by the residents. There was a perception that officials were secretive and did not want the public to know what was happening at the municipality. To vindicate their right to water, residents embarked on various forms of expression.

7.2.4. Responses to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water

The residents referred to four different avenues in which they engaged with the state or expressed to the state about their dissatisfaction with their water services. The first one was community meetings. I found that community meetings in the research communities had become toxic spaces, a move beyond what scholars have termed sterile. The public was made to feel unwelcome, resulting in some people no longer attending such platforms. The second form of expression was through the ballot. Several participants expressed that they had stopped voting as this was not benefiting them at all. It was found that participants believed that they were being taken advantage of by politicians who only came to their communities towards elections. Once residents voted and politicians won the elections and positions in local government, they would leave only to return towards the next elections. Another item that surfaced was the non-payment of water services. I found mixed opinions about this. Some residents believed that paying for water, clean or not, was an appropriate form of action. Some participants held the view that they should only pay for water only when they had money to do so. Others vehemently felt that no one must pay for dirty tap water.

As a last resort to express dissatisfaction about water services, some residents indicated that they *toyi-toyed*. It was widely believed that once you went to the streets, the municipality would restore water services immediately. It also demonstrated a show of solidarity, indicating that the community was united over this water issue.

7.2.5. Contribution to citizenship theory: Disengaged citizenship

Citizenship conscience is an awareness of citizenship rights and duties, the state's responsibility for granting the rights and duties and recognising appropriate and acceptable means to make demands. I found that the participants possessed a *citizenship conscience*. They demonstrated an awareness of "good citizenship" behaviours and practices. These were paying for water services, attending community meetings, and, if the former does not yield positive results, they would *toyi-toyi*. Protests, or mobilisations, in public spaces, to emphasise the legitimacy in their claims

(Clarke et al., 2014: 20). I also found that some participants did not agree to pay for water services due to poor service provision and the lack of access to money. While on the one hand, some claimed that they would only be comfortable paying for water services once they were receiving adequate services, others indicated that due to poverty and strife, they were unable to pay for water services.

I found that *citizenship exercise* was a contentious issue in Madibeng hydropolitics. The invited and invented spaces in the communities were not yielding the desired outcomes to some participants. They largely felt a decline in their *sense of political efficacy* - they believed they had become ineffectiveness as political actors, and their voices were no longer being heard. I found an acute sense of frustration over the declining citizenship spaces in which citizens could express themselves. Taking part in community meetings was one way to actively participate in the country's democratic processes and find a constructive way of resolving community issues like poor water service delivery. Politicians and their cadres had turned community meetings into party meetings, where only a select few could participate and inform decision making. I also found that meetings were platforms where prior decisions were rubber-stamped or formalised. I found that community meetings held in the research communities generally did not provide spaces conducive to participating or engaging in discussions. Out of fear and victimisation, some residents felt it was best to refrain from attending community meetings. As a result, some residents resolved not to attend meetings, citing a hostile atmosphere. Community meetings, as an example of an invited space, had become *toxic* for community members.

Building on this, I found that residents felt that politicians were generally interfering in the functioning of the municipality and community processes. This was accompanied by a rise in gangsterism in the area, which created immense insecurity in the communities as it was alleged that armed gangs engaged in violence in public. Politicians were only in the communities when they wanted votes towards the elections, and, after that, they were absent from the communities and did not carry out their mandates. Some participants noted that casting their ballot was again of no benefit because the conditions in the communities were not improving. Due to this, some

participants expressed that they had stopped voting as it was of no benefit to them - demonstrating a withdrawal from *citizenship exercise*. This decision was arrived at reluctantly.

Regarding non-payment, I found that some participants subscribed to paying for water irrespective of quality. Some participants could not afford to pay for water services, citing high poverty levels in the communities. Other participants argued that people should only pay for good quality services, which meant not paying the MLM for poor water services. Poor service provision in the area was the main factor for refusing to pay water services. This finding was in line with Akinyemi et al. (2018) and Mutyambizi et al. (2020) who found that declining customer satisfaction levels contributed to the non-payment of basic services. Hence withdrawing from citizenship exercise can be viewed as a decision that was arrived at under duress.

Due to the municipality's poor service delivery, *toyi-toying* was believed to be the ultimate form of expression of dissatisfaction. As a form of expression, *toyi-toying* demonstrated Zamudio's (2004) *citizenship exercise*. From the data collected, I found that people who took part in protests shared a keen sense of solidarity built around citizenship. This form of expression reinforced citizenship being imagined and revolving around a shared community supported by Anderson (1983: 7). The participants imagined their citizenship, and this is supported by Clarke et al.'s (2014: 108) assertion that a citizen is imagined – and inscribed – as a legitimate member of the imagined national community. I also found that participants did not generally agree about the efficacy of *toyi-toying*. They were sceptical about it as a form of expression. They cited instances where people have been injured and, worse, lost their lives. Since protest is a formally recognised form of expression as per S17 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), which protects the right to assembly, demonstration, picket, and petition, such reluctance in engaging in this was evidence that some participants feared for their personal safety and well-being citing the 2014 police killing of *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela.

Some of the residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau who participated in this study demonstrated *citizenship conscience*; however, they experienced difficulties in *citizenship exercise*. A reluctance to participate in community meetings, withdrawing from voting, non-payment of water services, and declining to take part in protests reflected that they were forgoing "good citizenship" practices. What ties these responses together is that they reluctantly withdrew from "good citizenship" practices due to coercion, fear or duress, which I argue is a manifestation of *disengaged citizenship*.

The participants' inability to fully participate as citizens further demonstrates that despite their attainment of political, civic and social citizenship rights, Marshall's (1950) explication of citizenship as a *legal status*, citizenship is a much more complex process. In theory and practice, citizenship is always in dispute and can only be understood within the context in which it is investigated (Clarke et al., 2014). Madibeng residents who took part in the study attributed their social exclusion to being residents of "poor" and "black" communities.

7.3. Contributions of the study

Through this study, I make three contributions to knowledge"

First, after an extensive review of the literature on hydropolitics, I provided a broadened definition of the term as applied to the three levels of social analysis (i.e. macro, meso, and micro-level). The definition that I proposed is as follows; "hydropolitics are actions and activities associated with relations between different actors or entities in the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services in a given context". This definition builds on previous definitions and explanations to encompass water services, a critical component in water distribution and access, and the role of power.

Second, I contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics by giving an account of Madibeng hydropolitics paying attention to the experiences of purposively selected residents of three communities: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau.

Third, from using *citizenship conscience* and *citizenship exercise* to investigate peoples forms of expression in three communities in a post-apartheid landscape, I demonstrate how the "new" South Africa is an exclusionary space to some citizens. Beyond a decline in the efficacy of invited spaces, the utilisation of invented spaces is also waning. Citizens are withdrawing from community meetings, voting, and even *toyi-toying* out of fear, coercion or duress. Others indicate a blatant refusal to pay for water services. Their decision to withdraw from exercising their political rights did not stem from a loss of interest or indifference in participating, which is generally associated with political apathy. They thus exhibited *disengaged citizenship*.

7.4. Recommendations for future research

In further honing research on hydropolitics, I recommend the following three areas which may need to be investigated further:

First, this study adopted a qualitative approach. It would be interesting to conduct a quantitative study in the same communities with a representative sample on the perceptions of the residents of water services from the Madibeng Local Municipality. With a representative sample, findings can be generalised.

Second, this study relied on residents' views from three communities. There were no views from municipal officials and local government representatives. It would be important to investigate how municipal officials and local government officials view challenges with water services and experience Madibeng hydropolitics.

Third, this study was done in predominantly black areas. It would be interesting to conduct another qualitative study of this nature in other areas in Madibeng, which were generally referred to as "suburbs" or "white areas" like Hartbeespoort, Elandsrand, Brits as well as farming communities so as also to understand how residents view municipal water service provision and how they engage in hydropolitics.

7.5. Conclusion

My interest in researching expressions of citizenship and South African hydropolitics was triggered by two incidents in which protesters lost their lives pursuing their right to water. In the "new" South Africa, the democratically elected government sought to redress past injustices by introducing full citizenship rights to all citizens. The new government has made substantial progress in the implementation of the right of access to sufficient water through the implementation of projects, programmes and legislation to increase water access; however, some sections of the population still struggle to access water services. Like colonialism and apartheid, it is still black people who are predominantly struggling with accessing water. While race plays a lesser role in influencing access to water in the post-apartheid landscape, social class has become a dominant factor. However, indigent black communities in urban and rural areas are predominantly struggling to access water because of the link between race and social class areas. Indigent communities in rural and urban areas struggle with water services.

In this thesis, I contribute to shedding light on how citizenship, particularly forms of expression, is understood and exercised by drawing from data collected in three Madibeng communities: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Findings in this study point to a general sense in a deteriorating relationship between citizens and the state. Citizens indicated that they struggled to access basic water services, which is in contravention of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). Through the concept of *disengaged citizenship*, I note how, as opposed to political apathy, Madibeng citizens indicated that they were reluctantly withdrawing from claiming their full-citizenship rights. Although the findings in this study cannot be generalised to the rest of South Africa, they provide a good basis for investigating the circumstances in other similar areas of South Africa – since the poverty and inequality, systems of governance and administration are the same.

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Appendix 1: *Batho Pele* Principles

Principles

Eight Batho Pele Principles were developed to serve as acceptable policy and legislative framework regarding service delivery in the public service. These principles are aligned with the Constitutional ideals of:

Promoting and maintaining high standards of professional ethics;
Providing service impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;
Utilising resources efficiently and effectively;
Responding to people's needs; the citizens are encouraged to participate in policy-making; and
Rendering an accountable, transparent, and development-oriented public administration
The Batho Pele Principles are as follows:

Consultation

There are many ways to consult users of services including conducting customer surveys, interviews with individual users, consultation with groups, and holding meetings with consumer representative bodies, NGOs and CBOs. Often, more than one method of consultation will be necessary to ensure comprehensiveness and representativeness. Consultation is a powerful tool that enriches and shapes government policies such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and its implementation in Local Government sphere.

Setting service standards

This principle reinforces the need for benchmarks to constantly measure the extent to which citizens are satisfied with the service or products they receive from departments. It also plays a critical role in the development of service delivery improvement plans to ensure a better life for all South Africans. Citizens should be involved in the development of service standards. Required are standards that are precise and measurable so that users can judge for themselves whether or not they are receiving what was promised. Some standards will cover processes, such as the length of time taken to authorise a housing claim, to issue a passport or identity document, or even to respond to letters. To achieve the goal of making South Africa globally competitive, standards should be benchmarked (where applicable) against those used internationally, taking into account South Africa's current level of development.

Increasing access

One of the prime aims of Batho Pele is to provide a framework for making decisions about delivering public services to the many South Africans who do not have access to them. Batho Pele also aims to rectify the inequalities in the distribution of existing services. Examples of initiatives by government to improve access to services include such platforms as the Gateway, Multi-Purpose Community Centres and Call Centres. Access to information and services empowers citizens and creates value for money, quality services. It reduces unnecessary expenditure for the citizens.

Ensuring courtesy

This goes beyond a polite smile, 'please' and 'thank you'. It requires service providers to empathize with the citizens and treat them with as much consideration and respect, as they would like for themselves. The public service is committed to continuous, honest and transparent communication with the citizens. This involves communication of services, products, information and problems, which may hamper or delay the efficient delivery of services to promised standards. If applied properly, the principle will help demystify the negative perceptions that the citizens in general have about the attitude of the public servants.

Providing information

As a requirement, available information about services should be at the point of delivery, but for users who are far from the point of delivery, other arrangements will be needed. In line with the definition of customer in this document, managers and employees should regularly seek to make information about the organisation, and all other service delivery related matters available to fellow staff members.

Openness and transparency

A key aspect of openness and transparency is that the public should know more about the way national, provincial and local government institutions operate, how well they utilise the resources they consume, and who is in charge. It is anticipated that the public will take advantage of this principle and make suggestions for improvement of service delivery mechanisms, and to even make government employees accountable and responsible by raising queries with them.

Redress

This principle emphasises a need to identify quickly and accurately when services are falling below the promised standard and to have procedures in place to remedy the situation. This should be done at the individual transactional level with the public, as well as at the organisational level, in relation to the entire service delivery programme. Public servants are

encouraged to welcome complaints as an opportunity to improve service, and to deal with complaints so that weaknesses can be remedied quickly for the good of the citizen.

Value for money

Many improvements that the public would like to see often require no additional resources and can sometimes even reduce costs. Failure to give a member of the public a simple, satisfactory explanation to an enquiry may for example, result in an incorrectly completed application form, which will cost time to rectify.

Objectives

Batho Pele Strategy on service delivery is developed to meet the following strategic objectives:
To introduce a new approach to service delivery which puts people at the centre of planning and delivering services;
To improve the face of service delivery by fostering new attitudes such as increased commitment, personal sacrifice, dedication;
To improve the image of the Public Service;
It has been noted that many public servants have not yet internalised Batho Pele as part of their day-to-day operation while providing services to members of the public. In order to deal with this, the Department of Public Service and Administration has developed a " Batho Pele revitalisation strategy " whose aim it is to inculcate the Batho Pele culture among the public servants and improve service delivery in the public service.

Encouraging Innovation and Rewarding Excellence

"National and Provincial Departments must ensure that an environment conducive to the delivery of services is created to enhance their staff's capacity to deliver good services."
Organisations need to show that staff commitment, energy and skills are being harnessed to tackle inefficient, outdated and bureaucratic practices to simplify procedures and to identify new and better ways of delivering services.

Service Delivery Impact

This principle calls for a holistic approach to the implementation of Batho Pele. It is all about demonstrating to what extent through the sum total of all their Batho Pele initiatives organizations are achieving the aims of Batho Pele.
Source: https://nwdc.co.za/batho-pele-principles/

Appendix 2: ***Aide-mémoire***

EXPLORING HYDROPOLITICS AND EXPRESSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP: THREE COMMUNITIES IN MADIBENG, SOUTH AFRICA

Name and Surname.....Contact.....
Date of interview.....
Time interview started..... Time interview ended.....
Location/Area.....

1. **Participant Profile**

(1) The participant's profile

- Can you please tell me about yourself? (prompts: age, employment status)

(2) The participants family's/household's dynamics

- Can you please tell me about your family? (prompts: number of members who stay at the household; sources of income)
- How long have you stayed in this community?

The next questions were on water services in the area and the state's role in providing water services. The questions were as follows;

(3) Water availability and reliability in the area

- Where do you get water?
- What are the major issues do you experience concerning water in the area?

(4) The state's role in water service provision in the area

- How do you view the municipality of Madibeng's efforts in providing water to your community?
- How can the water service provider [the municipality] improve water quantity?
- How can the water service provider [the municipality] improve water quality?

I ended by asking questions related to citizenship practices and water services;

(5) Participants views of citizenship in accessing water services

- What does your [lack of] access to water mean to you as a South African citizen?
- How do you view the municipality's urgency in resolving water issues in Madibeng?
- As a concerned citizen in this community, what steps do you individually take to have these water issues [water quality/quantity] resolved?
- As concerned citizens in this community, what steps do you collectively take to resolve these water issues [water quality/quantity]?

(6) Do you have any questions that you would like to ask?

Thank you for your time and patience.

Appendix 3: List of participants

	Name*	Age (y)	Sex**	Marital Status	Employment status	Period of stay (y)
DAMONSVILLE Suburb						
1	*Oupa* Andries	75	M	Married	Retired artisan	30
2	Andre	33	M	Separated	Chef	30
3	Armand	42	M	Married	Unemployed	19
4	Eduardo	25	M	Single	Unemployed	18
5	Felicity	24	F	Single	Unemployed	21
6	Ina	28	F	Single	Day-care operator	19
7	Kgothatso	28	M	Cohabiting	Mechanic	16
8	*Ma'* Londiwe	54	F	Single	Unemployed	25
9	*Mmêmogolo'* Mmabatho	64	F	Married	Unemployed	30
10	Myra	46	F	Single	Unemployed	19
11	Taylor	25	M	Single	Carwash operator	12
12	*Ouma* Viola	56	F	Widow	Unemployed	28
MOTHUTLUNG Township						
13	*Mmêmogolo* Angelica	60	F	Widow	Unemployed	24
14	Danny	26	M	Single	Welder	4
15	*Malomê* Frank	59	M	Married	Fitter and turner	19
16	*Ntatêmogolo* Joe	73	M	Single	Retired artisan	44
17	*Mr Kalle*	41	M	Married	Community leader	41
18	Tshepang	35	M	Married	Unemployed	28
19	*Ma'* Tshepiso	48	F	Married	*Spaza* shop owner	22
20	Tshepo	26	M	Single	Winch operator	26
MMAKAU Village						
21	*Mmêmogolo* Chimere	53	F	Married	Unemployed	37
22	*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude	48	F	Separated	Unemployed	36
23	*Mmêmogolo* Maggy	53	F	Married	Unemployed	28
24	Thabo	25	M	Single	Vintner	25
25	Thulani	18	M	Single	Dog breeder	18
26	Valery	37	F	Single	Shop assistant	37
27	*Ma'* Yolanda	55	F	Single	Unemployed	46

*All pseudonyms
**Sex: M – Male, F - Female

Appendix 4: Research Ethics Approval*

UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

FACULTY OF HUMANTIES

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

26 September 2017

ETHICAL CLEARANCE NUMBER	**REC-02-099-2017**
REVIEW OUTCOME	**Approved with recommendations**
APPLICANT	**Mr A Kaziboni**
TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT	**Hydropolitics in Madibeng: Access to Water and State Provision as Expressions of Citizenship**
DEPARTMENT	**Sociology**
SUPERVISOR/S	**Prof T. Uys** **Prof M. Galvin**

Dear Mr Kaziboni,

The Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee has scrutinised your research proposal and confirm that it complies with the approved ethical standards of the Faculty of Humanities; University of Johannesburg. We have made some recommendations , set out below, for consideration in consultation with your supervisors.

The REC would like to extend their best wishes to you with your postgraduate studies.

Yours sincerely,

Prof Tharina Guse

Chair: Faculty of Humanities REC

Tel: 011 559 3248

email: tguse@uj.ac.za

*The title of the study was changed to: Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa.

Appendix 5: Information sheet

Good day sir/ma'am

As a Madibeng resident and community member, I would like to invite you to participate in this research project, entitled, **"Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa".** The research project is part of my **Doctoral Degree at the University of Johannesburg**. I hope that this project will reveal important information on what it means to be a South African citizen in post-apartheid South Africa in light of the current water crisis we are facing. This research will also contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics (water politics).

If you accept to take part in this research project, you will be required to sign a consent form – indicating that among others, you want to take part in the project. I will conduct one, single interview with you during which I will ask you questions from an interview schedule. The interview is expected to last no longer than 90 minutes and is a one-off event. Upon completing the research project, I will put together a clear and concise summary of the findings that I will share with you if you are interested. Kindly note that I am not in a position to reward you in cash and/or kind for any form of assistance that you would have provided – since this research project is for academic purposes.

If you agree to take part, your name will not be disclosed. Your responses to the questions will only be used for this research project, and I will not have access to any of your private records. You can be assured that you will remain anonymous if you take part in this project and your information will remain confidential.

Your participation in this research project is voluntary. You are not obliged to take part, and you have the right to withdraw at any time. If you do not wish to take part, you do not have to give a reason, and I will not contact you again.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee and received ethical approval.

If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:

Name of researcher: **Anthony Kaziboni**
Full address: **University of Johannesburg, Sociology Department**
Tel: **0115592879**
E-mail: anthonyk@uj.ac.za

Research Supervisors: **Professor Tina Uys and Professor Mary Galvin**
Address: **University of Johannesburg, Sociology Department**
Tel: **0115592885/4865**
E-mail: tuys@uj.ac.za and mgalvin@uj.ac.za

Appendix 6: Informed consent form

TITLE OF RESEARCH STUDY: : Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa
NAME OF THE RESEARCHER: Anthony Kaziboni
INSTITUTION: Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg

DECLARATION BY THE PARTICIPANT

The undersigned..... (Full name and surname), cell contact.....
I hereby confirm as follows:

1. I was invited to participate in the above-mentioned academic study undertaken by Anthony Kaziboni, a doctoral candidate at the University of Johannesburg's, Faculty of Humanities' Department of Sociology.
2. The following aspects have been explained to me:
    a. Aim: The study's broad aim is to understand how citizens' access to water and the state's provisioning inform their expressions of citizenship.
    b. Ethical Clearance: I am aware that this study is for academic purposes, and the University Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee approved it.
    c. Possible Risks: I am aware that the researcher is asking me to share some very personal and confidential information with him and that I may feel uncomfortable talking about some of the topics. I do not have to answer any question or take part in the interview if you do not wish to do so, and that is also fine. I also do not have to give any reason for not responding to any question or refusing to participate in the interview.
    d. Possible Benefits: As a result of my participation in this research study, there will be no direct benefit.
    e. Confidentiality: My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or scientific publications by the investigators.
    f. Anonymity: I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising my identity.
    g. Voluntary Participation: My participation is voluntary.
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without giving any explanation.
4. Pictures taken during this study will not be used for profit and/or business.

Name of Participant	Date	Signature
Name of Researcher	Date	Signature

Acknowledgement of the University of Johannesburg's (UJ) Global Excellence and Stature (GES) Programme and the Faculty of Humanities

The financial assistance of the University of Johannesburg's (UJ) Global Excellence and Stature (GES) Programme and the Faculty of Humanities towards this research is hereby acknowledged and immensely appreciated. Opinions expressed, and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the University of Johannesburg.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank God for blessing me with the gift of life. I am also grateful for the excellent health and well-being which He granted me, as these were necessary to complete this thesis.

My sincere thanks to Professors Tina Uys and Mary Galvin for providing me with all the necessary guidance and supervision to complete this study. Many thanks to Professors Pragna Rugunanan, Tapiwa Chagonda and Alex Broadbent; Drs Oluwaseun Tella, Muhammed Suleman and Letitia Smuts; as well as Ugljesa Radulovic and Paddington Mutekwe for their unceasing support. My sincere gratitude to the people of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau who opened their hearts and homes to me.

My deep appreciation to the examiners for their very insightful comments and suggestions, which helped me to improve the quality of the thesis.

I place on record, my sincere thanks to Professor Kammila Naidoo for her continuous encouragement and support. A word of gratitude to research assistants: Mr Andrew Didibane, Mr Siphiwe Mbatha and Ms Gosiame Noge, for their hard work.

I also thank my parents, James and Marvellous Kaziboni, for their endless encouragement, support, and attention. I am also grateful to Zacharia and Sandrian Mondlane for their support.

To Sonia, Anita, and Marcellus, thank you for always being there for me – I love you.

Finally, a big thank you to all who directly or indirectly lent their hands in this academic venture, family, friends and colleagues.

Dedication

I dedicated this work to Andries Tatane, *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela and everyone else who lost their lives or their loved ones in fighting for their human and democratic right to access sufficient water. These men did not lose their lives in vain. Through this study, I hope to contribute to the realisation of universal access to basic water services.

A luta continua, vitória é certa

Abstract

This study set out to investigate forms of expression in the context of Madibeng Local Municipality hydropolitics, paying particular attention to Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Madibeng was an ideal location for this study because there is evidence that the local municipality has been struggling to provide water services. This has culminated in *toyi-toying* – one form of expression.

I adopted a qualitative research methodology underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. The primary data collection method was in-depth interviews supplemented by observation, field notes (journal entries) and photography. I selected twenty-seven participants purposively. Major findings point to the fact that the participants viewed water services as grossly inadequate – they indicated that their communities experienced rampant and prolonged water interruptions and poor water quality. They perceived the municipality officials as contributing to poor water service delivery through corruption and financial mismanagement of the local municipality. Water infrastructure in the community was noted to be worn and obsolete. In addition to this, I found that some participants held the view that citizenship spaces in the communities were on the decline: politicians highjacked community meetings, there was a rise in gangsterism, and some community members contested "good citizenship" practices like paying for water. While some community members favoured *toyi-toying*, a constitutional right, others did not, in fear of getting hurt, or worse, dying.

From the findings, I make three contributions to the body of knowledge: first, I provide a broadened definition of hydropolitics which moves beyond the macro-level to also include water politics as transpiring on meso and micro-levels; second, I contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics by giving an account of Madibeng hydropolitics paying attention to the experiences of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau residents; third, I present how the "new" South Africa is for some participants viewed as an exclusionary space as they withdraw from expression due to fear, coercion or duress, and coin the term *disengaged citizenship* to describe this social phenomenon.

Keywords

Anthropogenic Water Scarcity, Citizenship, Community Protest, Hydropolitics, Madibeng, Water, Human Right to Water, *Tenderpreneurs,* Water Apartheid

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Acronyms

AG	Auditor-General
ANC	African National Congress
BWTW	Brits Water Treatment Works
DA	Democratic Alliance
DWAF	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
DWS	Department of Water and Sanitation
FBW	Free Basic Water
FBWP	Free Basic Water Policy
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
HRtW	Human Right to Water
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
JOWAM	Johannesburg Water Management
KL	Kilolitres
L	Litres
MLM	Madibeng Local Municipality
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSP	Non-State Water Provider
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PSI	Private Sector Involvement
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAPS	South African Police Services
VBS	Venda Building Society
WMDs	Water Management Devices
WRC	Water Research Commission
WSA	Water Services Authority
WSP	Water Services Provider
WSSA	Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd

CHAPTER ONE

Introducing Citizenship and Hydropolitics in Madibeng

"A water-political order becomes institutionalised in a users' society only when it becomes integrated within its economic, moral and ideological structure. Laws cannot act; only societal forces can shape such change."
Unknown

1.1. Introduction

Watching live news on a local South African television station on 13 April 2011, I saw Andries Tatane die. He was assaulted and shot twice at point-blank range with rubber bullets by seven South African Police Service (SAPS) officers (CNN, 2011; eNCA, 2013; Dugard, 2016; Mashaba, 2020). This incident happened during a community protest in Maqheleng, a township in the Setsoto Local Municipality, Free State Province, South Africa. Tatane, together with 4,000 other Ficksburg residents, was protesting, or *toyi-toying*[1], as it is commonly known in South Africa, over poor service delivery of basic services, most notably water (Hattingh, 2011). He was a community leader, and his untimely death resulted from his altruism - he had been shielding elderly community members from a spraying police water cannon (Dugard, 2016: 1). While the excessive use of force and police brutality are not unique to South Africa (Gilmore, 2013; In on Africa, 2014; Hadebe and Gopal, 2019), Tatane's death drew widespread attention and condemnation as news channels captured it in real-time (Hattingh, 2011; van Schie, 2013).

Then, in 2011, I had been in South Africa for just over a year – having relocated from Zimbabwe. I could not fathom how such brutality could occur in the full view of South Africa and the rest of the world, for, among other issues, water. I could not comprehend how the "champion of democracy", South Africa, could let such a dehumanising act and a gross violation of Tatane's right to life happen. Tatane's death raised questions in me

[1] *Toyi-toyi* is a dance performed in Southern African. It originates from Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the 1970s.It has been used in protests in South Africa (Kellerer, 2017).

around the meaning of "citizenship", "citizenship rights", and ultimately, the "politics of water". The police officers responsible for his unjustifiable death were acquitted in March 2013 (Gilmore, 2013; SABC, 2013; van Schie, 2013).

My interest in citizenship and the politics of water would be re-ignited when SAPS officers again shot and killed protestors in another water-related community protest in Mothutlung and Damonsville (Madibeng Local Municipality, North West Province, South Africa) on 13 January 2014 (Bond, 2014; eNCA, 2014; Masombuka, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). The police used live ammunition during this incident (Moore, 2014). Michael Tshele (*alias Bra* Mike), a 64-year-old freelance journalist, and Osia Rahube, a 28-year-old mineworker, were shot dead at the protest scene (Davis and Lekgowa, 2014; De Vos, 2014; Seseane, 2014). In a case believed to be the silencing of journalists, unarmed *Bra* Mike died in action with his camera in his hands (CPJ, 2014). One of the participants who took part in this study, Andre, knew *Bra* Mike personally and could support the claim that *Bra* Mike was "silenced". He had seen pictures taken by *Bra* Mike showing shoddy repairs of pipes in the area. The following is an excerpt from my interview with Andre attesting to this:

> *Bra* Mike, a loyal Mothutlung resident, took pictures, and he found out that the Madibeng Local Municipality was not doing a proper job. He took pictures and showed them to some of us, saying how [the] Madibeng [Local Municipality] was repairing them was not good.
> (Andre, Personal Interview, September 2018)

The third victim, 27-year-old Lerato "Waap" Seema, subsequently died from injuries sustained after being thrown out of a moving RG-31 Nyala[2] (Maphumulo et al., 2014). The fourth, and last victim, was 36-year-old Enoch Seimela. He died in hospital six days after the protest due to injuries he sustained from police beatings (Nicolson and Lekgowa, 2014; SABC, 2014).

[2] An RG-31 Nyala is a 4x4 armoured personnel carrier vehicle carrying two crew and six passengers (Army Recognition, 2019).

The stories of Tatane and *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela highlight the importance of citizenship - both in rights and as an identity - within the context of post-apartheid South Africa. Unfortunately, such cases are not isolated, and these two cases got global media attention. Mulling over this, I began to ask how people in a democratic South Africa could lose their lives at the hands of the state in pursuit of their right to protest over their right to water. Protest is not the only form of expression – it is the broader experiences of residents in their struggle to access water services in the new South Africa that became an area of interest to me. I became particularly interested in how citizenship is expressed within the context of access to water and state provisioning in post-apartheid South Africa.

Before enrolling for my doctoral studies, I approached Professor Mary Galvin in 2016, who not only researches local water politics but has extensive experience as a development practitioner and social justice activist. We had three more meetings that year in which we discussed my fascination for the politics of water in contemporary South Africa. Professor Galvin also shared her work on the killing of the four people in the Mothutlung protest in the Madibeng Local Municipality, the challenges she encountered researching the area, and how she overcame them. She introduced me to Siphiwe Mbatha – a witty gentleman who had assisted her in her work in the municipality over the last couple of years. Mr Mbatha subsequently aided me in conducting the fieldwork for my study between 2018 and 2019. Professor Galvin co-supervised this thesis.

What follows in this chapter is a problem statement of the thesis leading to a brief conceptualisation of water politics, its scale and range, and then followed by the research question and objectives. I describe the research area, the Madibeng Local Municipality, indicating why it was the ideal location for this study. I move on to present the layout of the thesis providing summaries of each chapter in this thesis. I end this chapter with a conclusion in which I tie together the core arguments I presented.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Water scarcity is considered one of the most pressing problems confronting humankind's well-being in the twenty-first century (Mehta, 2003; UNDP, 2006). In South Africa, water scarcity has generally been attributed to natural and biophysical factors. As a country, South Africa is water-scarce (Kidd, 2009; Muller et al., 2009; Humby and Grandbois, 2010; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017) and is ranked as the 39th driest country in the world (AfricaCheck, 2017). South Africa has the third-lowest precipitation level in the Southern African region (IndexMundi, 2019). The impacts of the *el niño* drought in the country has been devastating in the post-2010 period. As one delves deeper into contemporary debates in water scarcity, some schools of thought argue that natural and biophysical factors do not wholly explain scarcity in the country; and say that the state can provide adequate water (Muller, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020). Several human-related factors constrain the country's ability to harness its water resources to benefit the whole population. Overstating the effects of biophysical and natural elements, such as drought and the effects of climate change, obstructs us from realising the cause of water problems, which are, in reality, human-induced (Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020).

The implementation of the policy of *apartheid* from 1948 to 1994 by the conservative National Party saw the application of "separate development" based on races (Mudiriza and Edwards, 2020: 6). Full citizenship rights were afforded to white people, while black people were relegated to being citizens of the bantustans as per the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act No. 26 of 1970 (Bulled, 2015: 543; Hobden, 2018: 2). Black people were stripped of South African citizenship and corresponding constitutional rights whether they lived in rural areas in the bantustans or slums in urban areas (Mamdani, 1996: Coovadia et al., 2009: 819; Hobden, 2018: 3). Compounding land dispossession, black people faced mobility and employment restrictions and inferior public education and healthcare (Seekings, 2011: 22). The implementation of apartheid further contributed to most black people experiencing high levels of poverty and inequality.

Income poverty was quite apparent as opulence mirrored high inequality, and inequality correlated with race (Seekings, 2011: 21). The African National Congress'[3] (ANC) election manifesto promised that "attacking poverty and deprivation" would be "the first priority of the democratic government" (Seekings, 2011: 22). One of the areas in which inequality was experienced was access to water (Sahle et al., 2019: 298). Pre- and apartheid water politics had resulted in about a third of the country's population, about 14 million people, not having access to a safe water supply, and more than 21 million people, half the population, lacking access to adequate sanitation services in 1994 (DWAF, 2004a: 4). Accordingly, asymmetrical access to water between the races was one of the core issues that the post-apartheid South African government needed to address (Tempelhoff, 2017: 200).

In a bid to redress poverty and inequality inherited by the democratic ANC-led government in 1994 and to establish a society based on social justice and fundamental human rights, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 was promulgated (RSA, 1996). Different scholars and commentators hail the South African Constitution to be one of the most liberal and progressive globally (BBC, 2014; Oechsli and Walker, 2015; Sahle et al., 2019). South Africa was one of the first countries in the region to have the right to water listed as a constitutional right (Soyapi, 2017: 14). The post-apartheid state's immediate efforts to improve water access were evident in its pursuit of universalising the Human Right to Water (HRtW). Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), the *Bill of Rights*, is "a cornerstone of South Africa democracy" that details socio-economic rights for everyone in South Africa – citizen or not. Section 27 (1)(b) states: "everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water". To operationalise the HRtW, the state implemented legislation and various programmes.

Before the 1994 elections, the ANC started implementing a welfarist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Bond, 2007; 2010; Nnadozie, 2011). The programme linked growth and equity, mainly through reducing extreme poverty and imbalances inherited from apartheid (Nleya, 2008: 270). The RDP document affirmed a

[3] The African National Congress is the ruling party in post-apartheid South Africa founded on 8 January, 1912.

commitment to reconstructing South African society and redistributing state resources (Chirwa, 2009: 183). The RDP ensured equality in accessing the state resources such as water, hence an active pursuit of the universalisation of the HRtW. The RDP's short-term aim regarding water services provision was "to provide all households with a clean, safe water supply of 20–30 litres per capita per day (lcd) within 200 metres". In the medium term, it aimed "to provide an on-site supply of 50–60 litres per capita per day" (ANC, 1994 in Sahle et al., 2019: 300).

Two years after the inception of the RDP, in 1996, the post-apartheid government abandoned it for a new macro-economic strategy – the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Nleya, 2008; Eloff, 201; Mosala et al., 2017). Under GEAR, basic service delivery was privatised in various ways, and cost recovery[4] methods were implemented. Policies on basic service provision were located within a neoliberal framework (McKinley, 2004: 182; Sahle et al., 2019: 300). Some of GEAR's neoliberal facets directly contradicted the provisions in the RDP (1994) and the Constitution (1996), which both fostered the universal HRtW (Sahle et al., 2019: 300). GEAR's shift from the RDP left indigent communities unable to pay for basic services very vulnerable. Under GEAR, citizens unable to pay for water services could have their supply cut once they had expended the basic minimum allocation. Policies that were implemented after GEAR in 2006+[5] have reflected the largely neoliberal stance of the South African government. This practice raises questions about the significance of citizenship as well as the realisation of the HRtW.

During this transition from the RDP to GEAR, the Water Services Act (WSA) No. 108 of 1997 was promulgated. This Act is the primary legislation regulating access to basic water and sanitation services. The Act deals with water for consumption and sanitation services to both households and other municipal water users by municipalities. A salient aspect of the WSA (1997) is that Section 1 (i) and (ii) define "basic sanitation" and "basic water supply":

[4] Cost recovery is recouping of costs incurred as the result of providing a service.
[5] These were Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (AsgiSA) (2006); the New Growth Path (NGP) (2010) and the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 (see van der Walt, 2007; Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017; Kgatkle, 2020; Mathonsi and Sithole, 2020).

> 2. Basic sanitation.—The minimum standard for basic sanitation services is —
> (a) the provision of appropriate health and hygiene education; and
> (b) a toilet which is safe, reliable, environmentally sound, easy to keep clean, provides privacy and protection against the weather, well ventilated, keeps smells to a minimum and prevents the entry and exit of flies and other disease-carrying pests.
>
> 3. Basic water supply.—The minimum standard for basic water supply services is —
> (a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and
> (b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month —
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (WSA, 1997)

In 2001 the state introduced the Free Basic Water Policy (FBWP). This policy entailed the implementation of a basic water allocation at the state's expense to support the HRtW, even for indigent households that could not afford to pay for water. The FBWP (2001) was finally given legal status by promulgating tariff regulations in June 2001 (Muller, 2008: 74). According to the FBWP (2001), the maximum free allocation for water per household was pegged at 6,000 litres (6 kilolitres) of water per month. This free basic allocation was calculated at 25 litres per person per day for a family of eight. This allocation was insufficient as it lasted less than half a month, with the household members using it sparingly (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 2). People without money had to wait until the next month when a FBW allocation was credited.

National statistics on access to basic water seem to demonstrate that the state has made remarkable progress in implementing the HRtW. From 2006-2018, access to municipal water increased from 77%-85% (Stats SA, 2019). An estimated 46% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings in 2018. A further 29% accessed water on-site, while 12% relied on communal taps and about 2% on neighbours' taps (Stats SA, 2019:

42). However, these figures do not accurately represent how citizens are experiencing water services as they do not reflect whether the taps produce water. Having access to water goes beyond having pipes, valves, and taps; people need water coming out of the taps. The main problem with water access statistics is that water infrastructure is a proxy for "access to water" (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019). Citizens' experiences of water services are complex and varied (Angel and Loftus, 2019). The problem of defining access in relation to infrastructure means that in some cases, citizens experience water cuts and disconnections that are not factored in. Furthermore, they may receive water of poor quality, and that will still be considered water provision.

There is considerable evidence supporting a growing sense of dissatisfaction by communities over basic services like water. The number of taps that could not supply reliable water increased by almost 2 million from 2011 to 2015 (Muller, 2016). Water access is still highly stratified along with the racial and class lines which dominated the apartheid era (Kemerink, 2011; Bayliss, 2016). Black people residing in rural areas (Muller, 2016; Mnisi, 2020) and townships (Muller et al., 2009) struggle the most with basic access to water. Whilst the infrastructure is physically present in some instances; there is no water coming out. This demonstrates the complexity associated with understanding access to water because, on the one hand, the state presents figures that tell a good story. There is a disjuncture between increases in access to water as per water infrastructure statistics; and people's actual access to water. This is evident two-fold. Firstly, municipalities' "good" rating for water service delivery declined from 73% in 2006 to 62% in 2018 (Stats SA, 2019). Secondly, there has been an increase in the "poor" rating for municipal water-related service delivery from 6.9% to 11% from 2006-18 (Stats SA, 2019). The reduction in the "good" rating and increase in "poor" rating between 2006-18 suggests that municipalities' water services to communities have progressively declined over the years. The citizenry's experience of water services in South Africa is critical in understanding their perceptions of the state's ability to provide and how they respond to the state.

Poor water services delivery in the post-apartheid landscape draws attention to the roles of municipalities in water service provision as listed in the WSA (1997). Municipalities are mandated to provide water services to inhabitants of their jurisdiction. The municipalities' mandate to provide basic services is reinforced by the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) No. 32 of 2000 - a critical policy framework that directs how municipalities should manage service delivery, including water provision to households. All municipalities are potential water service providers (WSP); however, not all are Water Service Authorities (WSA). Only 169 of the 278 municipalities are water services authorities (WSA) (Toxopeüs, 2019a). A water services provider is an entity that provides water services to consumers or any other water services institution; however, it does not include a water services intermediary (RSA, 1997). The entity can be public, private or mixed entities, or even the municipality itself. A water services authority is any municipality, including a district or rural council, as defined in the Local Government Transition Act (No. 209 of 1993), responsible for ensuring access to water services within its jurisdiction (RSA, 1997). In South Africa, only 169 of the 278 municipalities are WSAs (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The assess municipalities' ability to render services to their jurisdictions in line with their mandate, the Auditor-General's[6] (AGSA) reports are very important.

Looking at the five most AGSAs reports (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021), it is evident that is a correlation between municipal audit outcomes and the quality of its service provision to some degree. Municipalities with poor audit outcomes tend to provide poorer services to their constituency (Aadnesgaard and Willows, 2016; Craig, 2017). Less than 20% of South African municipalities have received clean audits (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021) in the last five years. The worst consistent performers have been the Free State and North West provinces, which have failed to produce a single municipality with a clean audit. This strongly indicates that the cause of problems with water services

[6] The Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA) conducts regularity audits of national and provincial government departments, identified public entities, municipalities and municipal entities (its clients or auditees). The AG's Office is the supreme audit institution of the Republic of South Africa that provides oversight in promoting financial accountability in government (Nzewi and Musokeru, 2014: 36). If a municipality can provide accurate financial statements, performance reports and complies with all key legislation, it receives a clean audit from the AG's Office. However, in South Africa, municipalities in most provinces generally perform poorly, with one exception – the Western Cape Province.

provision in these areas was more linked to the functionality of municipalities as opposed to any alternative explanation. Municipalities in the Western Cape Province have performed far better than the other provinces (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

Life in post-apartheid South Africa has become increasingly difficult for indigent communities plagued by the "triple challenge" - high levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015). In the post-apartheid era, some citizens are struggling to access basic water services. The lack of access to water in the new South Africa has been referred to as "water apartheid" (see Bond and Dugard, 2008; Jegede and Shikwambane, 2021). Jegede and Shikwambane (2021: 3) explained this unequal access to water as "water apartheid", as some people still experience "perennial problems" with access to water. Its defining characteristic is that this post-1994 "water apartheid" is no longer discriminating based on race but socio-economic status (Hellberg, 2015; Simmons, 2020). This "water apartheid", as argued by Bond and Dugard (2008: 17), is experienced by South Africa's poor, who are disproportionately the black population. (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 17).

The relationship between citizens and the state post-apartheid has progressively gotten worse, and as citizens get disillusioned and clamour for their right to access water, they have adopted several different strategies. Out of desperation and a loss of faith in the state's ability to provide water services, some residents have resorted to unregulated alternatives like rainwater harvesting (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017) and fetching water from unprotected sources such as rivers and streams (Hemson and Dube, 2004; McKinley, 2005; Angel and Loftus, 2019). Some citizens have adopted apartheid-style tactics employed in urban townships and bantustans during apartheid to fight for water. These include non-payment of water services[7], as well as bypassing municipal meters and making illegal connections[8]. One

[7] See Ajam, 2001; Centre for Development Support [CDS], 2001; Bond, 2000; Brown, 2005; Earle et al., 2005; von Schnitzler, 2008, 2010; Akinyemi et al., 2018; Worku, 2018; Lilley, 2019; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Akinyemi, 2018; Lilley, 2019 Akinyemi et al., 2018.

[8] See McKinley, 2004; Bakker, 2011; Tapela and Pointer, 2013; von Schnitzler, 2013; Piper, 2014; Bayliss, 2016; Mogalagadi, 2017; van Zyl et al., 2018; Bond and Galvin, 2019; Muller, 2020.

of the most popular ways to express dissatisfaction is *toyi-toying*[9] while others take legal action against the state[10].

What is fascinating with some of these responses like non-payment, bypassing meters, and *toyi-toying* is that they emerged during apartheid, a time when black people were not citizens of "white" South Africa. What does this mean when citizens utilise the same apartheid tactics to access their right to water in post-apartheid South Africa? The discussion above highlights problems, tensions, and contradictions associated with the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water services in post-apartheid South Africa. It also highlights how water services provision is a highly contested terrain that is highly politicised. This study, therefore, sought to investigate the varying forms of expressions of citizenship within the post-apartheid landscape within the hydropolitics of the Madibeng Local Municipality.

1.3. Research question and objectives

This study sought to investigate how the residents of three communities in Madibeng express themselves as citizens within the context of access to water and state provisioning. Therefore, my overall research question was, "**How do residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics?**"

This study focused on how individuals express citizenship within hydropolitics in post-apartheid South Africa. To answer the research question, I formulated the following five objectives:

[9] See Bond and Dugard, 2008; von Schnitzler, 2008; von Holdt et al., 2011; Jankielsohn, 2012; Tapela, 2012a,2012b; Cato, 2013; Tapela and Pointer, 2013; Robins, 2014; Bulled, 2015; Rodina and Harris, 2016; Hosken and Mabena, 2017; Hove et al., 2019; Sleet, 2020.

[10] See Welch, 2005; de Visser and Mbazira, 2006; Pegan et al., 2007; Bond and Dugard, 2008; Angel and Loftus, 2019; Bond, 2010; Danchin, 2010; Bond and Dugard, 2008; Bond, 2010; Danchin, 2010; Bulled, 2015; Couzen, 2015; Matchaya et al., 2018.

(i) To explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality;

(ii) To explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver water services;

(iii) To analyse coping strategies adopted by residents of three Madibeng communities when there is inadequate water services delivery;

(iv) To investigate how the residents of three Madibeng communities respond to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water; and

(v) To contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities.

1.4. Madibeng Local Municipality: A "place of water"?

Data was collected in the Madibeng Local Municipality. "Madibeng" means "place of water" in SeTswana, the main language spoken in the municipality. The municipality is approximately 50km from Pretoria and 55km from Johannesburg, covering 3,839 km^2 (MLM, 2020). The area nestles between the Magaliesberg and the Witwatersrand mountain ranges. It is in proximity to abundant water resources:

> Hartbeespoort, Rooikoppies, Vaalkop and Klipvoor Dams are located in the Madibeng Municipality. Four dams…that should be more than enough water for everyone, to drink, wash and wallow in on scorching summer days in the North-West Province.
> (Govender, 2014)

The Madibeng Local Municipality has struggled to provide basic services to its jurisdiction, such as adequate water services. Black communities in Madibeng struggle to access basic water services from the Madibeng (Bond, 2014; Govender, 2014). The 2014 protest sparked by poor water service delivery in the area that resulted in the killings of the four men in Madibeng that I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter provides an important illustration of the issues in Madibeng.

Poor water service delivery that culminated in the 2014 protest was attributed to municipal employees' sabotage of water service provision equipment (Muller, 2020: 36). It is alleged that councillors and municipal employees tampered with the three water pumps at the Madibeng water-treatment plant to hire water tankers to provide water to affected communities (Masombuka, 2014; Masimanga, 2014; Moore, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). Community members believed that the saboteurs were in cahoots with owners of water tankers – popular opinion was that the latter paid bribes to municipal officials to interrupt water supply (Masombuka, 2014). The affected areas were Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau (Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014). While this remains an allegation, it suggests that acts of sabotaging water services infrastructure occur, leading residents in the community to lack adequate water.

Another explanation for the water service delivery problems was poor infrastructure maintenance, which differs from the sabotage hypothesis. Following the 2014 protests, the Democratic Alliance laid criminal charges against the former Executive Mayor of the Madibeng Local Municipality, Jostina Mothibe, and the municipal manager, Morris Maluleka, for their alleged role in the municipality's continuing water and sanitation service delivery crisis. The DA-North West leader, Chris Hattingh, held Edna Molewa (Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs from 2010–2014) responsible for the failure of two water pumps because the municipality had not serviced the equipment. He held the view that the municipality's water infrastructure was not properly maintained; hence it was failing, as is evident from the following:

> The crisis has not been the result, as the minister [Edna Molewa] has implied, of a sudden and unexpected breakdown of the water pumps in Madibeng. During her explanation to the community of Mothutlung, Minister Molewa failed to state that two of the three water pumps (300cubic meter /hour each) serving the Mothutlung and Damonsville communities had been out of service for more than two years. The municipality did not care enough to repair the pumps before. When the third 600-700 cubic meter /hour pump broke down the communities were left with only the water remaining in the reservoirs.
> (Hattingh, 2014)

Another DA Councillor, Leon Basson, supported this and believed that a permanent technician should be appointed at the plant. He stated the following:

> I don't buy this theory of sabotage because the pumps are situated in a confined area with security. They are situated in a building in Brits. The water pump that were supposedly sabotaged – if they were sabotaged – why were the other two standby pumps not functioning for two years? (Basson, in Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014)

This second explanation of the pumps' failing, as a result, is also very important. It suggests that water services infrastructure was in a dire state because the municipality was not servicing or repairing equipment and machinery according to their schedules. This poor maintenance of infrastructure is noted by Worku (2018), who also moved a step further to assert that there was low infrastructural investment. For example, upgrades to water infrastructure have not taken place been according to set timelines. The Brits Water Treatment Works (BWTW) was scheduled for completion end of 2018, and in 2019, the project had not been completed (Frankson, 2015; Montsho, 2019).

Planning appropriately and adequately is also an important area where the municipality struggled. In support of this, Moore (2014) stated the following:

> [T]wenty years the population of the area [i.e., Madibeng] has grown, new townships have been built, existing townships and residential districts have expanded… but the water provision has not kept pace. (Moore, 2014)

Another possible contributing factor to the Madibeng Local Municipality's poor service provision is that the entity is grossly under-resourced. It suffers from, among others, a restricted budget and a shortage of skilled personnel (Worku, 2018: 100). Regarding the restricted budget, Rand Water[11] threatened to reduce water supply to three South African municipalities, Madibeng included, which have been defaulting on payments over the last couple of years (Kgosana, 2020). The financial mismanagement issues in

[11] Rand Water a South African water utility entity that supplies potable water to the Gauteng province and other areas. Its customers include municipalities, mines and industries.

the municipality have been widely reported, and for one to appreciate the gravity, I focused on the AGSA reports to understand how the entity has been (mis)managed.

A look into the AGSA's Reports shows that Madibeng has been one of the most financially mismanaged[12] municipalities in the country. One of the most glaring financial irregularities was when the Madibeng Local Municipality under Mayor Mothibe[13] invested R50 million, from which it could only recover R20 million (Van Huizen, 2018). Systemic management problems at the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2010 have resulted in the entity being placed under administration on several occasions as per Section 139(1)[14] of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) (see CoGTA, 2014b: 3; CoGTA, 2014a; CoGTA; 2020; CoGTA, 2021; RSA, 2021).

There are complex hydropolitical processes that result in some communities struggling to access basic water services in Madibeng. So, from the "place of water" for some, the municipality is a "place of no water" for others. From this standpoint, exploring the situation in some Madibeng communities will possibly allow us to understand how citizens select various forms of expression when the state is struggling to provide basic water services in post-apartheid South Africa.
What follows is a layout of the thesis.

1.5. Thesis layout

This research focuses on how people residing in three communities in Madibeng express citizenship within the context of hydropolitics in that area. This thesis is composed of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter.

[12] Financial mismanagement entails failure to comply with legislation, particularly irregular, unauthorised as well as wasteful expenditure; procurement; and contract management.
[13] ANC's Jostina Mothibe was the Executive Mayor of the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2014 and ousted in 2021 through a motion of no confidence tabled by three opposition parties at a special council meeting.
[14] Section 139 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is invoked when a provincial government intervenes after a municipality has failed to fulfil an executive obligation.

Chapter Two, Post-apartheid Hydropolitics and Insurgent Citizens– In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate how expressions of citizenship are transpiring in invented spaces. I argue that in South Africa, a nuanced understanding of the country's water challenges should focus on the anthropogenic drivers of water scarcity. The existence of these drivers brings forth the political nature of the allocation, distribution and access of water resources and services. I formulate a broadened definition of hydropolitics that I employ throughout this thesis that encapsulates all levels of social analysis and incorporates water services. I also look at the development of citizenship. Taking Marshall's (1950) triadic theory as a point of departure, I argue that he provides an understanding of citizenship as a *legal status*. Citizenship is much more complex and is constantly in dispute. I look at how people's citizenship *conscience* feeds into citizenship *expression*. From these, I demonstrate how invited spaces of participation are on the decline; and how citizens are increasingly becoming insurgents "inventing" spaces. Insurgents have expressed themselves in many ways in (re)claiming their right to water: non-payment, litigation, unregulated private alternatives, destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections, and *toyi-toying*.

Chapter Three, Flows of Power - Flows of Water: Water Allocation in South Africa – In this chapter, I unpack water governance systems in post-apartheid South Africa, demonstrating how current asymmetrical access to water has emerged. Developing the link between power and water, I argue that in the new South Africa, neoliberal policies implemented by the ANC-led government have largely left out the poor who continue to struggle to access basic water services. I draw out core arguments in South African literature on hydropolitics that revolved around the commodification and privatisation of water and the implications of these processes for the poor. In addition to the literature dealing with cost recovery methods and the violation of the right to water, I also unpack literature that employs Gramscian and Foucauldian lenses in hydropolitics. To give a nuanced indication of access to water in South Africa, I interrogate facts and statistics about access to water, paying attention to how installed infrastructure has always been used as a proxy for access to water. The chapter closes with an overview of the research area, the Madibeng Local Municipality.

Chapter Four, Researching Expressions of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid Hydropolitics - This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the entire research process. I adopted a qualitative approach because I wanted to investigate how people express citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning in Madibeng. Epistemologically, I embraced social constructivism, enabling me to look at my participants' perceptions, experiences, and subjectivities. I justify my collection of data in Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, three communities in the Madibeng Local Municipality, in the North West province of South Africa. These three areas have epitomised the struggle for water in the country since some of the most atrocious and widely known protests, and police killings of protesters occurred. Participants were selected purposively. Other central aspects of the research that I unpack are how I achieved data saturation and information redundancy, and trustworthiness and how my subjectivity influenced the research process in terms of reflexivity. I end with the ethical issues involved in the study. The core argument in this chapter is that a qualitative research methodology is ideal for gaining an in-depth understanding of how citizens engage with the state regarding water provisioning.

Chapter Five, Water Services in Madibeng: Views of Residents in Three Communities - My point of departure is looking at Madibeng residents' perceptions of the water services provided by the MLM. I proceed to unpack the causes or explanations of water scarcity in the area and strategies that the communities have evolved to mitigate the impact of water scarcity. I conclude the chapter by presenting the participants' views of the functionality of the municipality. Based on the qualitative data I collected and analysed, I argue in this chapter that the participants from the research communities perceived water services from the state as represented by the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as grossly inadequate. They believed that water cuts were frequent and prolonged, and when water services were available, water quality was deplorable.

Chapter Six, Hydropolitics in Madibeng: A Quest to Access and Express Rights in Three Communities - This chapter constitutes an interrogation of my findings associated with expressions of citizenship within the context of hydropolitics. I interrogate how participants view their positionality against the municipality's water service provision. This chapter argues that the decline of citizenship spaces inhibits full citizenship development as people cannot access their rights. Some community members respond by not participating in political processes such as refusing to participate in meetings, paying for water services, and voting. This chapter further examines the complexities in hydropolitics associated with the various forms of expressions linking them to citizenship theory.

Chapter Seven, Conclusion: Disengaged Citizenship - This chapter provides an overview of the thesis and discusses the main findings. I detail my main contributions to the body of knowledge and provide recommendations for future research.

1.6. Conclusion

The lack of access to sufficient water in the new South Africa has resulted in a loss of dignity. Coming from a history of apartheid, the democratically elected government had to redress the past injustices; these were evident in high levels of inequality – listing the right to access sufficient water in the Constitution (RSA, 1996) as one way of achieving this. The HRtW is under threat. The state is embarking on neoliberal policies in a country experiencing the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Compounding this are problems in local municipalities around the provision of basic services. In this study, I investigate how residents in the communities of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of municipal hydropolitics. To do this, I formulated objectives that could help understand the perceptions of residents causes of water issues in their areas, ultimately narrowing how they express themselves in the new South Africa. In the next chapter, I review literature on conceptualising hydropolitics, the causes of water scarcity, an analysis of citizenship, forms of expression, and their link to hydropolitics, within the context of South Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

Post-apartheid Hydropolitics and Insurgent Citizens

"No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime…"
Kofi Annan (2015)

2.1. Introduction

Water is a fundamental resource – it is indispensable to all forms of life on earth. In order to understand how citizenship is expressed in contemporary South Africa, this chapter begins by conceptualising hydropolitics by unpacking the concept's link to power and its levels and scope to provide a broadened definition. Power is a crucial aspect of hydropolitics as it demonstrates how there are asymmetrical relationships in the allocation, distribution and accessing of power. The other two important aspects linked to hydropolitics are its level and scope. To set the scene to investigating expressions of citizenship, this starts by looking into expanding the definition of hydropolitics.

2.2. Broadening the definition of hydropolitics

Hydropolitics, in its simplest form, translates to "water politics", or the politics of water. In the social sciences, and sociology to be more specific, "politics" is a term synonymous with power. The term is generally associated with the likes of Aristotle, a 4th-century Greek philosopher. The term "politics" largely stirs images of state institutions, political parties, state security and law enforcement agencies, and various departments of, and affiliated to, the state and governance (Modebadze, 2010: 43). However, politics should not be confined to a particular sphere – particularly the governance of an area – as it occurs in all spheres of social life (Modebadze, 2010: 43).

2.2.1. The *power* in hydropolitics

Politics and power are interlinked. Political sociologists Dowse and Hughes (1972) state that "politics is about 'power', [and] politics occurs when there are differentials in power". According to this view, any relationships with asymmetrical power relations are inherently "political" (Modebadze, 2010: 43). What then is power? Max Weber (1864–1920) defined power as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 1946). Weber's point of departure when looking at politics is the distinction between "power as authority" and "power as coercion" (Weber, 1946). Whilst authority is the legitimate use of power; coercion is the illegitimate use of power, requiring force (Weber, 1946). Drawing from Weber's (1946) definition of power, one can argue that access to water is largely determined by who has socio-political and economic power. The link between access to water and power is affirmed by Swyngedouw (2004: 175). He argues that before looking at the processes and systems of water management, one needs to look at power relations that exist: "[t]he water problem is not merely a question of management and technology, but rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power". The political nature of water is underscored by Bakker (2012: 616), who states the following:

> [L]inks individual bodies to one another through the cycling of waters and water-borne effluents between water bodies and organisms – both human and non-human. As it flows, water transgresses geopolitical boundaries, defies jurisdictions, pits upstream against downstream users, and creates competition between economic sectors, both for its use and for its disposal (invoking intertwined issues of water quantity and quality). Water is thus intensely political in a conventional sense: implicated in contested relationships of power and authority.
> (Bakker, 2012: 616)

Across time and space, the repertoires of water law and actual water use are expressions and manifestations of asymmetrical power relationships between people (Kemerink, 2011: 585) and thus hydropolitics. Put differently, decisions in hydropolitics revolve around the questions of "who gets what [water], when, where and how" (Turton, 2002:

16). Turton's question about hydropolitics focuses on the levels/scale and range of issues that the phenomena encompass.

2.2.2. Levels and scope of hydropolitics

Henwood and Turton (2002) argue that at the core of hydropolitics as a social phenomenon are two issues: the *scale* of the issues, which are the levels of social analysis, and the *range* of the issues, which encapsulates the matters interrogated. The authors state the following:

> Central to any understanding of hydropolitics is the issue of *scale*, ranging from the individual, to the household, village, city, social, provincial, national and international level with a number of undefined levels in between. In short, the writer and consumer of hydropolitical literature should always be acutely aware of the issue of scale, best depicted as a vertical axis within any given study.
> (Turton, 2002: 16-17).

This thesis argues that hydropolitics occurs on three levels: micro-, meso- and macro, as is generally accepted in the social sciences (Kirdina, 2016: 101). I start by conceptualising the two extremes: micro-and macro-level analysis. Micro-level analysis centres on the study of human behaviour in small scale everyday interaction, where, to an extent, there are commonly shared expectations in social life (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). In micro-level hydropolitics, the analysis would be individuals and small groups engaging within water services provision. This sheds light on how people understand and employ citizenship to vindicate their right to access adequate water.

A macro-level analysis is on a large scale and is usually represented by a society, a country or an economy in a national or global context (Kirdina, 2016: 101). Macro-level hydropolitics entails the politics of water that plays out at the national or international level. This includes outcomes of processes such as legislation, statutes, policies, and systems put in place by the government to influence the allocation, distribution and accessing of water services infrastructure to facilitate the realisation of the HRtW in South Africa.

Within the vertical continuum between micro-and macro-levels is the "middle" scale, the meso-level of analysis. This level is the intermediate level between the micro (i.e., an individual, and macro-levels. (i.e., a society/country) (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 122). This level of analysis is vital to understanding hydropolitics because it enriches both structural and interactional approaches, emphasising shared and ongoing meaning. The meso-level approach is very important when understanding social life and order – sociology is the study of human interaction and behaviour (Fine 2012 in Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). The meso-level "links the clans, populations of settlements from a village or city to the state, region, [and the] republic" (Kirdina, 2016: 101).

In short, the micro-level analysis entails individual identity, motives, and cognition. Meso-level analysis concentrates on organisations and groups, whereas macro-level analysis focuses on the broader society (Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 121). The employment of these levels does not come without limitations. Besides the paradigmatic and methodological complexities, the influence of micro-, meso-and macro-levels of social analysis has profound implications and even limitations (Kirdina, 2016: 100; Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 120). One of the issues with using levels as a lens is that it ignores:

> [h]ow scales are in fact much more multiple, rich, and messy, but it is also inattentive to how processes, actions, and associations may crisscross various scales as well as how scales are produced in action. (Pyyhtinen, 2017 in Serpa and Ferreira, 2019: 123)

I use "levels of social analysis" in this thesis as a conceptual tool. In the volume, *The Micro-Macro Link*, Alexander and Giesen (1987) (cited in Pawlal 2018: 24) argue that the micro/macro dichotomy is an analytical distinction. The terms "micro" and "macro" can be so vague that they can either mean "nothing" or "a lot" (Pawlak, 2018: 27). Taking the three levels of social analysis as significant levels might be very deceptive, and as scholars, we should not reify the levels (Pawlak, 2018: 27). The main benefit of using these categories sociologically is that they can lead to the generation of knowledge that provides a sociological perception of reality (Pawlak, 2018: 25). This thesis presents a sociological appraisal of the expression of citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics.

The second core aspect of hydropolitics is the scope of topics that it encompasses. Turton (2002: 16-17) argues that;

> Another critical element in the understanding of hydropolitics is the *range of issues* that are covered. These can best be understood as a horizontal dimension of the discipline of hydropolitics. In reality, the range is infinitely wide, including issues such as conflict and its mitigation, states and non-state actors, water service delivery, water for food, the social value of water, the political value of water, the psychological value of water, water demand management (WDM), water as a target of aggression, water as an instrument of peace, water and gender, water and ecosystems, and water as a critical element in sustainable development.
> (Turton, 2002: 16-17)

The above explanation of the scope of hydropolitics demonstrates that the covered topics are broad and diverse. These topics converge at the point where the central issue is access to water.

2.2.3. A broadened definition

Mainstream definitions of hydropolitics have generally been macro-oriented. The earliest known definition of hydropolitics was introduced in the late 1970s by political scientist Waterbury (1979). He defined hydropolitics "[a]s issues that emanated due to a water resource attention more particularly when it spanned more than one country" (Waterbury, 1979). This definition was congruent with the temporal context. In the 1960s and 1970s, conflict over land was a topical subject, and this informed arguments within a geopolitical context that landmass was a finite resource, and as such, nation-states would go to war over it (Jankielsohn, 2012: 126). Similarly, Kraak (2012: 36) argued that "hydro-politics" was "the study of the geopolitics of freshwater resources", and Biedler (2004) stated that "[hydropolitics] dealt with the politics of international water resources". On the issue of geopolitics, Jankielsohn (2012: 125-6) provides a nuanced critique on the similarities between "hydropolitics" and "geopolitics", arguing that by the same right geopolitics is a field of study on its own, hydropolitics is the same.

Macro-level definitions of hydropolitics focus on the contestations that emerge within a space where countries access inter-state water resources. In support of this, Elhance (1997: 218) defined hydropolitics as "[t]he systematic analysis of interstate conflict and cooperation regarding international water resources". Jankielsohn (2012: 126) argued that water was a finite resource, a source of conflict within and between nations. These definitions clearly show that conflict, or the absence of cooperation between nation-states, are considered defining aspects of hydropolitics.

The definitions of hydropolitics presented by Waterbury (1979), Kraak (2012), Elhance (1997), and Biedler (2004) all draw on the same logic of geopolitics – that there is a contestation over mass international waters by nation-states. The definitions focus on a macro-level analysis of how water resources are declining. Like landmass, they are becoming a resource that could result in at least two competing countries getting into conflict. Some definitions of hydropolitics very positively focus on sustainability and the equitable distribution of water resources instead of concentrating on conflict and contestation. These definitions consider the ability to garner solidarity in how the administration of international water resources should deliberate on nation-states' collective benefit. For example, Wolf (2007: 3.12) argued that hydropolitics revolves around conflict and violence over internationally shared freshwater resources. He also focused on nation-states' role in managing the water resources and relations thereof. His definition is as follows:

> [T]he result of substantial attention to the potential for conflict and violence to erupt over international waters and relates to the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner, i.e., without tensions or conflict between political entities.
> (Wolf, 2007: 3.12)

Another example is Rai et al. (2015), who proposes a similar definition to Wolf (2007: 3.12):

> Hydropolitics relate to the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner, i.e., without tensions or conflict between political entities.
> (Rai et al., 2015)

Macro-level hydropolitics have generally encompassed interstate relations over transboundary water resources. This body of literature on hydropolitics pays attention to nation-states and inter-state conflict and cooperation over water resources. Looking at the Middle East and North Africa as examples of this macro-oriented hydropolitics, conflict and co-operation within the framework of the states over shared water resources has been researched (see Waterbury, 1979; Kendie, 1990; Biedler, 2004; Kehl, 2011; Karner, 2012; Madsen, 2013; *Bergeron, 2021*). In Southern Africa, there is literature on the Zambezi Basin riparian states[15] hydropolitics (Turton, 1997; Turton, 2003); and hydropolitics of the Southern African river basin management of the following: Incomati (riparian states: South Africa, eSwatini and Mozambique); Cunene (riparian states: Angola and Namibia); Okavango/Makgadikgadi (riparian states: Angola, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe); Orange River (riparian states: Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia); and Zambezi (Turton, 2005a; 2005b).

Macro-level research on hydropolitics indicates that the use of transboundary water resources by one or more states directly impacts others. These "hydropolitical relations" are generally discussed as a Marxist "zero-sum" game in which one state's gain is perceived as another's loss (Wilner, 2008: 9). Despite the macro-level definitions of hydropolitics that focus on tension and conflict resulting from a shared transboundary river basin, Turton (2002: 16-17) argues for the importance of widening the scope of hydropolitics both in its *scale* and *range* of issues covered. Dominant discourses that emerge are: first, state-centric, revolve around water and conflict; second, couched water within the larger environmental setting; third, focus on the securitisation of water management; and forth and last, a focus on the socio-cultural components and water-related issues (Turton and Henwood, 2002: 13-15).

Evident from the discussion above, access to water is a contested terrain with unequal power relations and tension. This, however, does not only transpire at a macro-level (i.e., between states). Some definitions have been proposed that address a meso and micro-level analysis of hydropolitics. Meissner (in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16)

[15] i.e., Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and South Africa.

draw attention to small-scale interaction by considering the role of all interested stakeholders, like the state, civil society organisations, and individuals, to allocate national and international water resources. He defined hydropolitics as:

> [A] systematic investigation of the interaction between states, non-state actors and other actors, such as individuals within and outside the state, regarding the authoritative allocation and/or use of international and national water resources.
> (Meissner, 1999 in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16)

The above definition is also similar to one proposed by Jankielsohn (2012: 126). Jankielsohn's (2012: 126) definition focuses on the equitable distribution and sustainable management of water resources within a specified context. This definition also indicates the ubiquitous nature of power where hydropolitics entail:

> [a]ttempts to mobilize support in order to consolidate a power base which can secure the equitable and sustainable supply, management, and distribution of water resources to specific areas, communities and activities.
> (Jankielsohn, 2012: 126)

The definition seems to suggest that water can be supplied "equitably" and "sustainably". When reflecting on the role of power, it is apparent that the definition is problematic as it suggests that the power-holder allocates water in an "equitable" and "sustainable" manner. For example, in South Africa, when the 1956 National Water Act was promulgated, it was hailed as important legislation in the regulation of water regulation as it managed to harmonise water regulation in the interests of different sectors: agriculture, mining, and industry in South Africa (Tewari, 2001: 14; 2009: 701). It centred on the "equitable distribution" of water in the country. The Act's primary beneficiaries were people who had access to land and were involved in agriculture, mining, and industry, invariably white, as it did not factor the interest of black people.

While Meissner (1999 in Turton and Henwood, 2002: 15-16) and Jankielsohn's (2012: 126) definitions capture an array of actors within defined contexts; their focus is on water resources. Both definitions do not explicitly refer to engagements around access to water infrastructure services as a crucial component of water provision – which I argue is a core aspect of hydropolitics. Water infrastructure has a significant bearing on the access and distribution of water. So, this gap is crucial as water services are essential for water access. Without adequate water infrastructure, there may be problems accessing water by communities and households.

In broadening the definition of hydropolitics, based on a review of the term's conceptual origins to demonstrate the breadth and depth of politics in people's everyday lives, I argue that hydropolitics occurs in all areas of social life and at varying social analysis levels. So, considering the above discussion, a broadened definition of hydropolitics is critical as it will contribute to a deeper appreciation of water politics within the confines of the everyday lives of Madibeng Local Municipality residents. I, therefore, define hydropolitics **as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context**. This definition is exhaustive and elaborate - it captures how hydropolitics occurs across different *scale* (i.e., macro-, meso- and micro-levels) of social analysis and involves access to water resources and services, thus not limiting the *range* of issues – in support of Turton (2002: 16-17).

The politics of water in South Africa have largely been framed around the limitations of water resources. In order to understand the country's hydropolitics, it was, therefore, very important to look into the "real" and "perceived" causes of water scarcity.

2.3. A reassessment of the causes of water scarcity in South Africa

A widely accepted definition of water scarcity from UN-Water (2018) indicates that the quantity of water available does not meet the demand:

> [T]he point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully.
> (UN-Water, 2018: 4)

The Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] (2008) and Ohlsson and Turton (1999) viewed a core aspect of water scarcity as the quantity of available water not meeting the demand. Zeng et al. (2013: 441) identified the shortcomings of quantity-oriented definitions by highlighting the importance of water quality. Beyond water quantity, its quality is another important factor affecting water's usability (Wang et al., 2021). While one may have access to abundant water resources, its quality will ultimately determine whether it is usable and consumable. From a human perspective, water scarcity is the extent to which water quantity and quality do not meet human needs for domestic and productive purposes (Schreiner et al., 2002: 129).

2.3.1. Biophysical and natural explanations in South Africa

Some proponents of biophysical and natural explanations of water scarcity argue it is most acute in semi-arid and arid regions affected by droughts and climate variability (FAO, 2008; Bischoff-Mattson, 2020). Water scarcity has generally been attributed to natural and biophysical factors. South Africa is semi-arid, receiving low rainfall and low per capita water availability compared to other countries: ~500 mm average annual rainfall and 843 m3 water per capita per annum (Bischoff-Mattson, 2020:3; Colvin and Muruven, 2017: 8). Much of the country's water supply is from dams. Even though a meagre 10% comes from groundwater, this is an important resource, especially when surface water is unavailable and during droughts.

Evidence of the natural and biophysical explanations of water scarcity are droughts that have affected Southern Africa. The region experiences both *el niños* and *el niñas*, and because of this, droughts and floods are distinct features of the regional climate. In South Africa, over the last 25 years, most provinces have experienced extensive droughts (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 506). More recently, during the October 2015 to March 2016

rainy season, much of Southern Africa experienced an *el niño*-induced drought (OCHA, 2016). Due to global climate change, prolonged droughts are becoming a common and recurrent characteristic of Southern Africa's summer climate (Lindesay 1998, Turton and Henwood 2002; Turton et al. 2003; Rouault and Richard 2005).

Natural and biophysical factors do not wholly explain water scarcity in South Africa. Some commentators believe that the state has the capacity and capability to provide adequate water to everyone despite the country's natural and biophysical limitations (Muller et al., 2010: Muller, 2016; 2018; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Sleet, 2020). Muller et al. (2010: 5) argue that there is enough water to meet the country's needs until 2025 and beyond. The current and future challenges regarding water service provision are related largely to inadequate financial resources and institutional capabilities; rather than resource limitations. In South Africa, agriculture uses more than half of the country's water resources, while domestic water use is estimated at only 10%. From a water resources perspective, discussions about the quantity of water available to poor households should be viewed within the context of the relatively small amount of water consumed by the domestic sphere against a relatively larger amount consumed by the agricultural sector (Dugard, 2016: 11). From this angle, it becomes apparent that water scarcity in the country is more of a result of mismanagement or poor management of the available water resources.

2.3.2. Anthropogenic water scarcity in South Africa

Human behaviour has had a profoundly negative impact on water availability. Some scholars have referred to human-induced elements as "manufactured water scarcity" (Mehta, 2003; Johnston, 2003; Wutich, 2020). While the phrase "manufactured water scarcity" may suggest that humans make a conscious and concerted effort to create or cause water scarcity, one needs to consider how all human activities, directly or indirectly, conscious or not, have contributed to water scarcity. A more accurate description of the nature of water scarcity experienced in South Africa requires a critical look at "human involvement" holistically as the primary contributor to water scarcity. Human-induced scarcity is called anthropogenic water scarcity.

The word root "anthro" suggests that a human being is involved, and anthropogenic indicates human origin. From the Greek *anthropogenes*, meaning "born of man", anthropogenic can refer to any natural changes that people cause. The two core facets that define sufficient water are whether the quantity accessed is enough, and secondly, whether the quality in which it is delivered is ideal for use. Both aspects can be influenced by human activities and illustrate water scarcity's anthropogenic nature.

AghaKouchak et al. (2015) make an extensive case on how the United States' (US) state of California experienced "anthropogenic drought" in 2012. Factors contributing to this drought were population growth and increased agriculture - both had almost doubled water use since 1950. The impact of the drought was exacerbated by overuse and obsolete management of scarce water resources (AghaKouchak et al., 2015: 409-410). In supporting anthropogenic droughts in Southern Africa based on drought analyses in other parts of Africa, Earle et al. (2005: 6) argued that anthropogenic climate change explains drought in the sub-region. In South Africa, some scholars argue that the Western Cape province's drought of 2015-2017 had anthropogenic drivers (Otto et al., 2018).

After reviewing recent literature on explanations of poor water service delivery in communities across South Africa, I identified six "real" anthropogenic drivers of water scarcity in South Africa: population growth and urbanisation; pollution and environmental degradation; derelict infrastructure; human resources issues in the water sector; financial mismanagement and corruption; and consumer debt[16]. It is important to note that these drivers may vary depending on the area under investigation (i.e., provinces, cities or municipalities). Figure 1 below is a diagrammatical representation of the six anthropogenic drivers for water scarcity. While this summary is based on an extensive literature analysis on water scarcity in South Africa, it aims to be a starting point for discussion rather than a conclusion.

[16] Consumer debt is defined as "the inability for municipal service consumers to pay for the municipal services consumed" (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333)

Figure 1: An illustration of anthropogenic water scarcity in South Africa



Noteworthy is that the anthropogenic drivers are not mutually exclusive; they are intricately linked and overlap. What follows is a description of the factors beginning with population growth and urbanisation:

(a) Population growth and urbanisation

Population growth, migration, and urbanisation have contributed to anthropogenic water scarcity. Generally, areas more likely to experience demand-driven water scarcity have high population densities with limited freshwater resources, such as Gauteng and the Western Cape. Gauteng is estimated to have received an estimated net immigration of 1.02 million people between 2016 and 2021. The Western Cape is the second major immigration centre in South Africa; from 1995 to 2018, Cape Town's population grew by approximately 79%. Unfortunately, this growth is not matched by a sufficient increase in dam storage capacity (only 15% during the same period) (Mnisi, 2020).

Historically, social arrangements and apartheid spatial planning influenced water service provision quality in "white" and "black" areas. During apartheid, water infrastructure was prioritised for white areas, while black areas received sub-optimal services. In contemporary South Africa, the apartheid legacy of water infrastructure remains evident. Rural areas and townships struggle to access water compared to urban suburbs. South Africa exhibits a very high rate of rural-urban migration. The establishment of bantustans during apartheid as underdeveloped and impoverished black areas led to urban migration as people searched for employment. Former bantustans have remained impoverished communities, contributing to high rates of rural-urban migration (Swatuk, 2010: 533). High rates of urbanisation have often been directly linked to environmental degradation and pollution, which lead to the depletion of freshwater resources (Bayliss, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Rall and Pejan, 2019; Cullis, 2021). There are, however, other causes of pollution in South Africa, and mining is one such activity.

(b) Pollution and environmental degradation – A focus on mining

Mining is one of the biggest threats to sustainable water supply in South Africa through pollution (Edokpayi et al., 2017). There has been extensive and, in some cases, irreversible damage to the environment. The effects of environmental degradation have been severe on groundwater resources. Between 1999 and 2015, major rivers with poor ecological conditions in South Africa increased by 500%. Tributaries with poor

ecological conditions increased by 229% within the same period. South Africa had lost more than half of its wetlands between 1999 and 2015 (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505).

Big mining companies are the major polluters, taking advantage of the government's failure to act as the regulatory system (Watson, 2019). Before the enactment of the National Water Act No.36 of 1998, there were less stringent conditions imposed on mine discharges, and much pollution occurred during this time (Bayliss, 2016). Coal mining profoundly negatively affects water resources as acid mine drainage pollutes both surface and groundwater with acid, salts and metals (CER, 2019: 5). Several areas in South Africa, such as the Witwatersrand Gold Fields, the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal Coal Fields and the O'Kiep Copper District, have acid mine drainage (Bayliss, 2016). Over 6,000 abandoned mines contribute to acidic water, which needs an estimated R30 billion in clean-up costs. The Olifants River, which flows through South Africa's Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces and into Mozambique, is an example of how acid mine pollution can affect freshwater resources. Olifants is one of the most polluted rivers in the country (Rall and Pejan, 2019).

The National Water Act (1998) regulates water use for mining and protecting the resource. The Act supports the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) to enforce the "polluter pays" principle. The principle states that mines responsible for pollution should be held liable for costs associated with cleaning up and legal enforcement. However, this principle has been challenging to enforce, partly due to capacity constraints at the DWS. The Department demonstrates a "complete institutional and regulatory breakdown" (CER, 2019). For example, in Mpumalanga, eight large coal mines were not complying with environmental legislation, and this was because of inefficiencies in the DWS:

> An assessment of the compliance of eight large coal mining operations in Mpumalanga with their water use licences paints a dismal picture: gross violations and water pollution by the operators, as well as massive failures by the Department of Water and Sanitation and supposedly independent auditors…
> (Watson, 2019)

The DWS once issued directives to mining companies in line with the "polluter pays" principle for acid mine drainage costs which were either contested or disregarded. Besides this, some companies left mining sites or went bankrupt, and, in some cases, illegal miners are operating at the abandoned mining shafts (Bayliss, 2016). The department also had staffing issues – there were a meagre 79 inspectors across South Africa to deal with mining applications and infringements (Munnik et al., 2010: 8).

(c) Derelict water infrastructure

South Africa faces an infrastructural problem when it comes to water services provision. Infrastructure is overly in a bad state. Ageing and inadequate maintenance have contributed to poor water service provision (Toxopeüs, 2019b). Some of the water services infrastructure installed by colonial authorities is at least a century old (Bakker, 2013: 282). Over the years, bolts and pipes have been giving in to corrosion (Naidoo, 2017). The infrastructure is obsolete, and it is in a state of "disrepair". Obsolete infrastructure accounts for 35% of the national water infrastructure (Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505).

There is evidence that municipalities are increasingly spending less on maintaining and rehabilitating water services infrastructure in urban areas (Toxopeüs, 2019b). The servicing of infrastructure and its maintenance is no longer done routinely; rather, it occurs in response to a fault (Toxopeüs, 2019b). These factors' long-term implication is that assets deteriorate faster than they usually have with service and maintenance. This rapid deterioration of infrastructure also contributes to increased water losses due to frequent leaks from infrastructural failure and astronomical costs to repair or replace infrastructure (WSP, 2011; Toxopeüs, 2019b). South Africa loses about 40% of the water pumped by Water Services Authorities (WSA) (i.e., districts, metropolitans or municipalities) due to leaks (Sleet, 2018; Venktess, 2018). Pipes leaking water effectively "leak money" from the actual cost of the water, treatment chemicals used, and lost energy used in pumping it (Muller, 2020: 23). Personnel shortages in the water sector have also crippled water service provision.

Beyond obsolete infrastructure and poor maintenance and repairs, vandalism of water infrastructure generally occurs in indigent communities as people in dire circumstances attempt to access water. Illegal connections are made without care, which compromises the integrity of the infrastructure (Tapela and Pointer, 2013; Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The people who make the connections sometimes have rudimentary skills and equipment or lack the funds to spend on proper connection material. For example, connections are made by conjoining a plastic pipe to existing infrastructure with bandaging rubber strips from old tyre tubes (Muller, 2020: 39).

In some poor communities, people remove copper water services infrastructure, like water meters, and sell it as scrap metal (Mogalagadi, 2017). The destruction and vandalism of prepaid water meters have contributed to infrastructural damage resulting in water leaks (van Zyl et al., 2018: 38; Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The proportion of prepaid meters failing due to vandalism was 30% in Johannesburg and almost 8% in eThekwini (van Zyl et al., 2018: 85).

(d) Staffing problems in the water sector

Two key entities involved in water provision are the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) and municipalities. Human resources issues in these two entities play an important role in either mitigating or exacerbating water scarcity.

First, the DWS has suffered from staffing problems and continues to do so. From high staff turnovers to an abnormally high number of vacancies, as well as senior-level suspensions, the entity is working on an inadequate staff complement (South African Water Caucus [SAWC], 2015; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Staffing problems happened particularly under the leadership of the following ministers: Buyelwa Sonjica, who served for two terms (2004-2006 and 2009-2010), and the late Edna Molewa (2010-2014).

These two ministers' tenures created an atmosphere in which staff are vulnerable to arbitrary decision making (Galvin and Roux, 2019). At least four different people occupied the position of Director-General (DG). Of the DGs, no one occupied the post

for more than 24 months. There was also at least 30 months where the DG position was vacant (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 160). Overall, almost 900 positions within DWS were vacant as of mid-2017, including 21 in the Office of the DG (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 160-1). In terms of senior management suspensions, in 2017, four senior officials – all strategic decision-making positions – were suspended (Galvin and Roux, 2019: 161). Between 2009-2017, nine different accounting officers were appointed and left. Such high turnover rates and the lack of staff have meant that DWS has operated on limited capacity for a considerable time.

The DWS has also been negatively affected by a shortage of skilled workers. This is characteristic of the industry because the water sector has experienced a severe lack of critical skills – artisans, engineers, technicians and water scientists (National Treasury, 2011: 140). Engineers, for example, are emigrating, seeking greener pastures overseas (Mlambo and Adetiba, 2019).

Second, staffing issues have negatively impacted municipalities that are WSAs. The deficiency has stunted the Department's capacity to retain and recruit highly skilled staff. Civil engineering capacity[17] in municipalities is too low to deliver, operate and maintain local government infrastructure sustainably. In 1994, there were 20 engineers per 100,000 people. This figure has significantly gone down to as little 2 or 3 per 100,000 people (Lawless, 2007; National Treasury, 2011: 140). The lack of qualified personnel in the water sector makes it difficult to operate.

Some municipal employees were not suitably qualified to execute their roles and responsibilities with due diligence at a satisfactory level (Worku, 2018: 112). The recruitment of unqualified staff can further negatively impact water service provision. Unqualified personnel lack the skills to operate and maintain water infrastructure and other equipment, which contributes to the mismanagement of water infrastructure (Toxopeüs, 2019b). The shortage of skilled staff is linked to rampant nepotism and party cadre deployment to strategic posts in local government structures for which they are

[17] Civil engineering capacity is expressed as civil engineering professionals per 100,000 people.

unqualified (Worku, 2018: 112). Such workplace practices are in contravention to the *Batho Pele* (SeSotho for "people first") Principles established in 1997 (See Appendix 1) as a means or initiative meant to transform public service regardless of the level. Municipal employees have performed poorly, and their conduct has been intolerable in some instances (Worku, 2018: 112). Municipal employees are "out of touch with realities on the ground" as they have no knowledge or information about what is happening in communities they are supposed to serve diligently (Hove et al., 2019: 6).

The result of challenges with operation and maintenance have culminated in water and effluent quality that does not comply with national standards. Poor water quality and limited quantity as well as outbreaks of waterborne diseases, have been experienced in various municipalities across the country (Lawless, 2007). These problems tend to spill over into the water sector's misappropriation and misuse of funds through corrupt activities, thereby affecting water services provision.

(e) Consumer debt

Consumer debt owed to South Africa's 257 municipalities has also contributed to the anthropogenic nature of water scarcity. The South African government funds capital costs for both water and sanitation service provision infrastructure. In promoting access to water by the citizenry, a basic level of 25l per person per day is free – the Free Basic Water (FBW) allocation – and for anything more than this allotment, the users are required to pay. However, some WSAs incorrectly consider the FBW non-revenue water since it is billed "at a zero rate" to consumers (Seago and McKenzie, 2007: 73; McKenzie et al., 2012: 48). The government effectively subsidises this water; therefore, payment is received from a different source (Seago and McKenzie, 2007: 48; McKenzie et al., 2012: 21). FBW cannot be considered Non-Revenue Water since it is used legitimately and is covered by the state (McKenzie et al., 2012: 19). Some consumers struggle to pay for water, having exhausted their FBW allocation, leaving the operation and maintenance costs entirely on national subsidy (AfDB, 2010: 81).

The municipalities' financial models require that those who can afford basic services such as water should pay. Non-payment is believed to contribute significantly to a decline and subsequent collapse of municipalities, and "stringent cost recover measures and cost-cutting measures are solutions. Non-payment, in a latent way, contributes to water scarcity (Tapela and Pointer, 2013). The consequences of non-payment are quite clear to both the municipalities and the citizens. The non-payment of essential services negatively impacts municipal cost recovery and, overly, municipal financial viability (Worku 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Fjeldstad, 2004). Municipalities often lack the financial resources to maintain infrastructure and pay for the cost of human resources (Worku: 2018, 102).

The lack of income has made it very difficult for municipalities to provide water services as they lack funding due to their inability of other users to pay for water services (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 505). The inability to get payments from owing consumers has escalated the consumer debt of municipalities. This has contributed to declining the quality of services provided (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333). The total municipal debt in 2016 was R117 billion, R138.2 billion towards the end of 2017, and R184.7 billion in 2018 (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333). The consumer debt at end-December 2020 was R230 billion. This has threatened the financial viability of municipalities.

(f) Financial mismanagement in the water sector

The last anthropogenic cause of water scarcity in South Africa is financial mismanagement, and corruption contributes to poor water service delivery (Muller, 2016; Adom and Simatele, 2021). The DWS has been negatively impacted by financial mismanagement. This has been so widespread that the South African Water Caucus (SAWC) (2015) exclaimed the dysfunction and institutional paralysis in the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS):

> [D]eeply concerning institutional and governance challenges in the DWS [Department of Water and Sanitation]. It lays bare a situation of institutional paralysis within the department and associated deterioration in financial management, service delivery, policy coherence and performance.
> (South African Water Caucus, 2015)

Under Nomvula Mokonyane (Minister of Water and Sanitation from 2014-2018), the water sector experienced gross financial mismanagement. Financial irregularities have marred large-scale national projects such as the Second Phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) came under the spotlight after corruption allegations that involved Mokonyane in 2016 (Makhubu, 2018; Toxopeüs, 2019b; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Gauteng's water security heavily relies on the LHWP. Commentators subsequently dubbed Phase II of the LHWP the "Nomvula Mokonyane's Watergate" after the minister (Makhubu, 2018; Galvin and Roux, 2019). Contractors' appointments did not follow due process, and one of the contractors appointed was LTE Consulting (Timse and Ntaote, 2016; Toxopeüs, 2019b; Galvin and Roux, 2019: 162). LTE had a "long-standing" relationship with Mokonyane. The firm was a "generous funder" of the ANC – a political party in which Mokonyane was a prominent member at the time. Due to these irregularities, the Second Phase was delayed by at least five years (Toxopeüs, 2019b).

During Mokonyane's tenure, former president Jacob Zuma launched the "War on Leaks" programme in 2015 to repair faulty and dilapidated water infrastructure across South Africa. This "War" was scheduled to run until 31 October 2020. Between 2015 and 2019, at least R3 billion was spent training about 10,000 artisans and "water agents", supposedly to help reduce water losses (Muller, 2020: 23). In 2020 alone, the DWS allocated more than R450 million to the "War on Leaks" initiative for training recruits. Unfortunately, the programme has been a disaster. Thus far, the programme has neither has created jobs nor has reduced leaks. The "spurious "war on leaks" project" "never fixed a single leak" (Muller, 2020). To an extent, the programme appears to have been guided by political considerations – in the form of providing temporary jobs - instead of contributing to reducing water losses (Muller, 2020: 23).

Another project which had to be halted by the DWS because of irregularities was the Limpopo province R3 billion Giyani Bulk Water Project - launched in 2014 by Zuma (Sicetsha, 2020). The Lepelle Northern Water Board, a state-owned enterprise supplying bulk potable water, managed the Giyani project. Mokonyane ordered Lepelle to appoint LTE Consulting again on an emergency basis, disregarding the due tendering process for projects of that nature. The Department contracted LTE Consulting at a total cost of R2,2 billion. After being appointed, LTE could not complete the project and then subcontracted Khato Civils and South Zambezi firms. Khato Civils eventually abandoned the incomplete project in 2019. This happened after the DWS could not pay Khato Civils a service fee of R89 million (Matlala, 2019). The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) found Lepelle flouted the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 and Water Board supply chain management regulations. There was also a failure to consider professional advice in construction, poor financial management, and overall poor project management (Shange, 2020).

Financial mismanagement in the DWS cannot solely be attributed to Mokonyane alone. However, her term in office indicates that an individual's mismanagement can have a devastating impact on a critical sector (Muller, 2020: 32). By the time Mokonyane left DWS in February 2018, irregular expenditure had exceeded R4-billion with more cases pending and the DWS bankrupt (Muller, 2020: 18; Sleet, 2020). Some scholars provide a compelling argument that the DWS exhibits state capture traits (Muller, 2016; Galvin and Roux, 2019), which has undermined the state's ability to provide water services. Human-related factors such as corruption have impacted water service provision and ultimately redistributive water justice in post-apartheid South Africa (Thompson et al., 2015; Muller, 2020).

Allegations of financial mismanagement and corruption have also surfaced in municipalities required to fulfil the role of WSAs. Many municipalities have been struggling financially, and the Auditor General's Reports produced in the last five years have demonstrated poor financial management – except for municipalities in the Western Cape province (AGSA, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021). To some degree, there is a correlation between audit outcomes and the quality of municipal service provision.

Municipalities with poor audit outcomes tend to have poorer performance and service delivery (Aadnesgaard and Willows, 2016; Craig, 2017).

Auditor-General South Africa's reports from 2015/16 to 2019/20 (2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021) indicate that at least 80% of municipalities in South Africa did not get clean audits. The two consistent worst from 2015/16 through to 2018/19 were the Free State and North West provinces, and the latter appeared in all five financial years. These municipalities have struggled the most with water service provision.

Financial year	**Total audited municipalities**	**Clean audits (n)**	**Clean audits (%)**	**Provinces with no clean audits**
2015/16[18]	263	49	19	Free State, Northern Cape and the North West
2016/17[19]	257	33	13	Free State, Limpopo and North West
2017/18[20]	257	18	7	Free State, Limpopo and North West
2018/19[21]	257	20	8	North West and the Free State
2019/20[22]	257	27	11	Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and North West

Water interruptions are not always an indication of an infrastructural problem; they may result from electricity cuts or interruptions to allow repairs, maintenance, and upgrades (Muller, 2020: 36). It then becomes necessary for a municipality to provide affected communities with water in line with their mandate – the provision of basic water services. The dispatching of water tankers is one such way. WSAs can hire tankers through tendering - a process of identifying and selecting a preferred service provider based on stipulated criteria.

[18] AGSA (2017)
[19] AGSA (2018)
[20] AGSA (2019)
[21] AGSA (2020)
[22] AGSA (2021)

Corrupt officials have taken advantage of such processes. Allegations of corruption have tarnished the tankering tendering procedures in South Africa. Apart from contractors and their staff unduly benefiting from the work done, other beneficiaries from this process also included municipal officials who received kickbacks from irregular tendering processes (Masombuka, 2014). In South Africa, an "entrepreneur" who illicitly secures government tenders is referred to as a *tenderpreneur*. The enterprise of securing tenders through illegitimate channels is known as *tenderpreneurship* (Bond, 2014; Galvin, in press). *Tenderpreneurs* generally use political networks to get the tenders (Piper and Charman, 2018). These *tenderpreneurs* are also part of the privatisation thrust (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 15) and have recently come under public scrutiny.

The deployment of water tankers is not an efficient utilisation of state resources as water delivered costs up to 20 times as much as tap water (Muller, 2020). The process of tankering has become an illicit business model that relies on the lack of repairs and maintenance of water infrastructure and the failure of projects to improve water security. This systemic corruption is captured below:

> Failure to maintain water supply systems results in interruptions to the service and the need for emergency supplies (i.e., water tankers). Lack of maintenance thus becomes part of the business model of those with interests in transporting water (and) tankering becomes an operation that is difficult to stop…Where tankering services are contracted in, the owners of these tankers become reliant on the business and have no incentive to see this come to an end…Once one starts tankering it is very hard to stop, as local interests become entrenched. If there is tankering into an area where a project is planned, then that project is going to fail.
> (Muller, 2020: 52)

Reports of *tenderpreneurship* in tankering have been documented in KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and the North West provinces (Muller, 2020: 37). In KwaZulu-Natal, residents of the township of Umlazi protested over water interruptions because the motive behind them was to bring in tankers illicitly. In Limpopo, officials working in municipalities in the Sekhukhune District even purchased tankers for R1,3 million and

leased them to the municipalities. These officials' vehicles were also observed to sell water that they were supposed to deliver at no cost to the communities at R1/litre. This has been the case also in the North West, where there have been protests of poor water service delivery (Muller, 2020: 37).

2.3.3. Anthropogenic water scarcity and hydropolitics in South Africa

There is ample evidence that anthropogenic factors contributed to water scarcity in South Africa. Population growth, migration, and urbanisation linked to historical/apartheid spatial planning mean that ill-planning and continued lack of infrastructural development in rural areas and townships has meant these areas have had poor water services. Additionally, rural-urban migration has meant that poor black people who resided in former bantustans have found themselves residing in densely populated townships struggling with water service provision. The communities most affected by population growth, migration, and urbanisation are low-income urban and rural areas. People greatly whose water access is affected by population growth, migration and urbanisation a disproportionately black.

Big mining corporates have perpetuated pollution from mining activities. The mining companies have taken advantage of the government's inability to act as the regulatory system (Watson, 2019). The "polluter pays" principle has not been effectively implemented, and the DWS is struggling to regulate mining activities. Pollution from mining has significantly contributed to a decline of freshwater resources like rivers and streams.

The South African water sector has also been affected by human capital issues (SAWC, 2015; Galvin and Roux, 2019). These have emerged due to poor management of entities responsible for providing services and a shortage of adequately trained personnel (Worku, 2018: 112; Toxopeüs, 2019b). As noted, the DWS has experienced very high turnover rates in strategic positions, and in some cases, vacancies have taken a long time to be filled (Galvin and Roux, 2019). This situation is exacerbated by the shortage of trained staff in many municipalities. This has significantly contributed to water service

provision by the state. Where water services have been provided, consumers have not paid for usage. Consumer debt has significantly threatened the sustainability of municipalities by impacting their capital base (Worku; Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020; Adom and Simatele, 2021).

Financial mismanagement in the financial sector also demonstrates the complexity of anthropogenic water scarcity. The DWS has had been financially mismanaged, particularly during the tenure of minister Mokonyane. This has meant that much-needed funds have not been properly accounted for. The AGSA reports from 2015/16 to 2019/20 indicate that municipalities in South Africa are struggling with adequate documentation to get clean audits for their expenditure. The mismanagement of funds in municipalities has contributed to poor water services provision. Manipulation of the tendering systems has seen a proliferation of *tenderpreneurs*.

The anthropogenic factors contributing to water scarcity in South Africa demonstrate the complexity of water issues that citizens are facing. The water scarcity narrative grounded on biophysical and natural factors is uncritical and misleading as it conceals issues about asymmetrical water access. Overstating the effects of biophysical and natural elements, such as drought and the effects of climate change, obstructs us from realising the cause of water problems in South Africa are, in reality, human-induced – anthropogenic. By dispelling scarcity associated with natural and biophysical explanations, it becomes very important to investigate a nuanced viewpoint on how citizenship has been conceptulised.

2.4. Citizens and citizenship theory

Citizenship can be acquired at birth, naturalisation, and marriage (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2009: 2). Whilst "citizenship" as a concept has been in use for centuries and has been used in several different contexts to refer to the nature of responsibilities that the state and the "citizen" have between each other. This section defines a citizen and offers an overview of citizenship theory, paying attention to Marshall's (1950) conceptualisation of citizenship.

2.4.1. Introducing the notion of a citizen

The concept of a "citizen" emerged in Ancient Greece, based on the idea that the state was a "creature of nature," and by nature, "man" himself is a "political animal" (Akinboye, 2015). A "man" could only relate to humanity through "his" rights to participate in the state's affairs. Following this logic, the state was a political entity constituted by "men", who were its citizens (Akinboye, 2015: 1). Like Athens, city-states (poleis) had different residents with varying statuses – different social positions - that they occupied. Some of the residents were citizens, while others were not. As a very patriarchal state, Greece identified only males as citizens, and a male inherited citizenship from his father (Stumpf, 1989, in Akinboye, 2015). The Greeks believed that citizenship should be based on obligations to the state rather than on the individuals' rights (Council of Europe [COE], 2017). In defining citizenship, Aristotle's pragmatic view was that "[w]hat effectively distinguishes the "citizen proper" from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office" (Aristotle, 1962).

Until about a century ago, very few people worldwide were "full, equal citizens" (Heisler, 2005: 667). People were excluded from attaining, or achieving, citizenship because of achieved or ascribed statuses that their respective societies considered significant. Those marginalised included women, children, people without property, ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, indigenous people, and others relegated to second-class, third-class or non-citizenship status (Heisler, 2005: 667).

2.4.2. Marshall's (1950) triadic theory of citizenship

Citizenship is a value-laden and amorphous concept with a multifaceted and evolving history (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006: 653). The meaning of citizenship is historically and socially variable. By this, the meaning of citizenship has changed in different temporal and spatial contexts. These facets demonstrate the contentiousness and elusiveness of the concept (Bosniak, 2003: 183; Clarke et al., 2014: 9). McCallum (2004) notes that citizenship has been used normatively or aspirationally; instead of analytically and critically. In its "normative" use, citizenship centres on the values and norms of people

who share a political community membership. Aspirationally, citizenship has become a dominant form of claim-making for people worldwide (de Koning et al., 2015). A widely cited scholar in citizenship theory is British sociologist T.H. Marshall.

Marshall (1950) traced the development of citizenship in England over three centuries in his seminal work titled *Citizenship and Social Class*, proposing a three-dimensional account of citizenship in which civil, political, and social citizenship was attained in an evolutionary sequence. The Marshallian (1950) tripartite conception of citizenship constitutes three successive steps each aligned to a specific element, and these are as follows:

(a) Step 1: Civil citizenship consolidated the rule of law and equality of all before the law. Here, Marshall argued that the *civil element* was:

> [C]omposed of the rights necessary for individual freedom-liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is of a different order from the others because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law. This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice.
> (Marshall, 1950: 10-11)

Marshall (1950: 10-11) argued that civil citizenship came from the civil element. Some of the institutions directly linked with civil rights include the courts. Civil citizenship corresponds to "negative freedoms", like freedom of speech, thought and faith, rights to association, and the right to own property (Moses, 2019: 168). Through "negative freedoms", a constitutional government does not interfere in their exercise (Kreimer, 1984: 1315). Constitutionalism is grounded on restricting coercive force through which governments have conventionally employed to prevent undesirable conduct (Kreimer, 1984: 1295). In 18th century England, the civil element emerged when political systems instituted property protection, equality before the law, and civil liberties. The development of civil freedoms was a vital step in undoing the hierarchical limitations of status or duty to an individual's social superiors (Lister, 2010). These freedoms

necessitated the later development of the second type of rights noted by Marshall as political rights.

(b) Step 2: Political citizenship, that is attainment through the *political element*. Here Marshall referred to:

> [T]he right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government.
> (Marshall, 1950: 10-11)

Marshall (1950: 19) argued that in the 18th century, political rights were flawed, and this was not in what they constituted, but rather, how they were distributed considering the standards set by democratic citizenship. The electorate was less than 20% of the adult male population (Marshall, 1950: 19). The *political element* was developed in the 19th century when the right to vote was granted first to the middle-class and subsequently to working-class men (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006: 653). In the 19th century, political rights were not a core facet of citizenship but rather the privilege of a limited male economic class (Marshall, 1950: 20).

Political citizenship implied the right to vote for officeholders or be candidates for elected positions of power. These were political rights centred on suffrage and democracy (Moses, 2019: 168). Members of the body politic have held the right to participate in the exercise of political power either as members of the body or as its electorate (Marshall, 1950: 11). Institutions affiliated with political rights are parliament and councils of local government. The British Poor Law excluded the poor from enjoying citizenship rights:

> [p]aupers forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty, by internment in the workhouse, and they forfeited by law any political rights they might possess.
> (Marshall, 1950: 24)

This exclusion was also applicable to women who only received the right to vote in 1918 when universal political citizenship was instituted in Britain (Marshall, 1950: 21).

(c) Step 3: Social citizenship, stemming from the realisation of the *social element*. Marshall argues that it arose mainly in the 20th century and included a broad range of rights:

> [T]he whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.
> (Marshall, 1950: 11)

To Marshall (1950), attaining social rights was the final element required to achieve full citizenship status. Social citizenship is defined by "positive freedoms" like the right to education and social welfare. Through this, all citizens have the right to enjoy and access at least a basic level of socio-economic and cultural well-being (Cohen, 2010). Once members of society attain full citizenship, they receive absolute social rights. Thus, attaining social rights was a critical aspect of citizenship in the 20th century (Marshall 1950: 96). He argues that citizenship was "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community, which includes civil, political and social rights and obligations" (Marshall, 1950: 14). His underlying assumption was that citizenship was a status of equality. Citizenship denoted a link between citizens and the rights to live, work, trade, and participate in a community's civic and socio-political spheres.

The triadic conception of citizenship constructed citizenship as a *legal status* drawing from attaining civil, political and social rights. The existence of citizenship as a *legal status* is evident in the presence of the judicial system, the parliament, and the welfare system, which are the cornerstones of liberal democracy (Susen, 2010). The Marshallian (1950) model presupposes that citizenship exists when members of the body politic hold equality of social status that can coexist with inequality of material status. The origins of social rights emerged from a synthesis of civil and political rights (Moses, 2019: 169).

Marshall's (1950) contribution to the sociological study of citizenship is significant, and it is important to assess his citizenship model as a *legal status*. Although his theory has a special place in citizenship studies and British social theory, it does not make it free from flaws. For example, Marshall's (1950) account of citizenship suffered from an "unhealthy degree" of *formalism* (Susen, 2010). His account suggests that the attainment of full citizenship rights in the 20th century was a social process that was both complete and irreversible. Following this logic, citizenship rights – once recognised and institutionalised – represent modern democracies' irrevocable features. The assumption that the realisation of citizenship rights was complete and irreversible is highly problematic for two reasons. First, societies with complex histories require complex citizenship forms. According to Susen (2010), complex forms of citizenship should demonstrate that they can surpass the limitations of Marshall's tripartite theory of citizenship, thereby doing justice to others' normative significance – such as cultural, economic, human and sexual rights (Susen, 2010). Second, recognition and the realisation of citizenship rights are far from irreversible, as is unequivocally illustrated by the continuing presence and frequent resurgence of dictatorial regimes across the world, which can erase citizenship gains and "turn the clock back" (Susen, 2010).

Citizenship can only be adequately understood within the context in which it is investigated (Clarke et al., 2014: 9). Because of this, in theory and practice, citizenship is always in dispute (Clarke et al., 2014: 177). Marshall's (1950) theory of citizenship demonstrates that the claim to offer "ideal citizenship" is far from fruition. Clarke et al. (2014: 11) reject any theoretical purification that claims to propose a "new and better" definition of the concept of citizenship. Balibar (in Clarke et al., 2014: 11) argues that citizenship is "imperfect" (*imparfaite*). Through this concept, some scholars are,

> not only suggesting that citizenship is a defective, rectifiable, improvable institution, it is above all suggesting that citizenship is rather a *practice* and a *process* than a stable form. (Balibar, 2001, in Clarke et al., 2014: 11)

Citizenship is an object of social and political desire. It is always "under construction" (Clarke et al., 2014: 8) or "in the making" (*en travaux*) (Clarke et al., 2014: 177). However, the evolution of citizenship does not end with adopting social rights. The "ideal citizenship" is now facing several challenges (Oxhorn, 2014). What emerges from disputing citizenship is the importance of investigating how the practice of citizenship transpires (Clarke et al., 2014). In the following section, I unpack arguments on how citizenship is practiced.

2.5. Citizenship practice

We know with certainty that citizenship transpires in places and spaces, and it is imagined, practised and enacted in daily behaviour and mobilisations. Since the 1994 election, discourses of "participatory democracy" and "participatory governance" have been widely circulated amongst state officials, civil society actors, scholars, and activists. The experiences of citizenship and the understandings of the state in post-apartheid South Africa are highly differentiated based on several factors, including location, race, gender income, gender (Rodina and Harris, 2016: 337). The first crucial aspect of citizenship practice is the citizenry's awareness of being part of a political community, as expressed in their citizenship conscience. Seeing oneself as a member of a political community has to be supported by some "good citizenship" practices, like participating in elections to ordinary civility virtues in everyday life, such as courtesy, restraint, and respect for other people (Bauböck, 1999: 3).

2.5.1. Citizenship conscience

Citizenship conscience is a subjective sense of belonging, sometimes called the "psychological" characteristics of citizenship (Carens, 2000; De la Paz, 2012). It refers to the conviction of being a citizen within a context in which the state affords citizens to exercise it (De la Paz, 2012). *Citizenship conscience* influences the degree to which a political community has a collective identity. Social cohesion is strengthened if a significant number of citizens demonstrate a strong sense of belonging to the same

political community. Since many factors can restrict or encourage *citizenship conscience*, social integration should be a crucial aspect that citizenship aims to achieve.

The rights enjoyed by a citizen can influence their choice of political activities (Rawls, 1972: 544). The development of civic identity is very important in the realisation of active citizens. By definition, civic identity is a keen sense of connection to a community and the rights and responsibilities linked with membership to a particular community (Atkins and Hart, 2003). It is a feeling of loyalty and unwavering commitment to a community (Nasir and Saxe, 2003). A robust civic identity can motivate citizens to take part in their society's political life actively.

Drawing from Lister (2007), Zamudio (1997)[23] argues that *citizenship conscience* is the sense of being a citizen. *Citizenship conscience* is possessing the conviction that one can act as a citizen - that a citizen is cognisant of a political community of which one is a member, and that this recognition is expressed in concrete practices that ensure citizen exercise (Zamudio, 2007). The fact of possessing the status of citizen is a necessary – although not sufficient– condition to form a citizen conscience in the strict sense, that is, the conscience of "being recognized as" a citizen. It is necessary because the status formally legitimises the condition of citizens (Zamudio, 2007). Zamudio (2007) argues that *citizenship conscience* is an essential corollary of citizenship formed by three elements:

> [First] The knowledge that this status is possessed and its meaning (the rights and obligations that it implies), at least partially, is essential to build a citizen conscience. [Second] It is also essential to identify, on the part of the citizen, the agent responsible for granting said recognition and for translating the contents of the status into practices (legal, political, economic and cultural) that ensure its realization.
>
> Finally, for a citizen conscience to be formed, the citizen must know the legitimate ways to present their demands. This element of recognition is fundamental for my reflection, for which I will expand its meaning in the next section. For now, it is necessary to say that citizen awareness will not be formed if the citizen identifies "other" agents as those

[23] The book chapter is in Spanish and the translated version is can be accessed at https://books.openedition.org/irdeditions/26906?lang=en.

> responsible for granting him recognition as a subject of rights (for example, religious institutions, civil society organizations, business groups, etc.).
> (Zamudio, 2007)

The state has a crucial role in cultivating *citizenship conscience* because it arises from a reflexive process (De la Paz, 2012). For people to perceive themselves as citizens, it is necessary that this "other" (the state) recognises such status (i.e., citizenship as a legal status). Drawing from Mead (1993 in Zamudio, 1997), if one views oneself as a citizen to the extent that you are viewed as such by the person in charge of granting you such recognition, you will possess citizen awareness.

However, the construction of *citizenship consciousness* is not just a cognitive process; it also incorporates affective elements. The various aspects that give materiality to recognition are woven into a "feeling structure" that, instead of opposing feeling to thought, interrelates "thought as meaning and feeling as thought: consciousness practice of a present type, in a living and interrelated continuity", in a continuous process of structuring, with practical expressions located in time and space (Williams, 1977). These expressions have to do with the state's actions towards citizens; and how citizens' respond to them. Another important aspect is how they view themselves as members of a community and, perhaps, a larger community of fellow citizens (Anderson, 1991). The citizen conscience, then, is shaping itself intellectually and affectively in the relationship of mutual recognition between the state and the citizen, and as this relationship is far from being static, the conscience is also constantly restructuring and changing (Zamudio, 2007).

Suppose the state, its authorities and institutions, do not treat individuals as citizens, but as subjects, like in autocratic or dictatorial regimes? In that case, some citizens in those countries may not develop a *citizenship conscience* and, consequently, are incapable of identifying the procedures for making demands. What about in liberal-democratic states? The second element of citizenship practice that needs to be considered is *citizenship exercise*.

2.5.2. Citizenship exercise

Sustaining citizenship requires some activity on the part of citizens. The tension that emerges from this understanding of citizenship is the circumstances under which political agency can be exercised. This links to how *citizenship exercise* is defined as the conditions essential for the realisation of citizenship rights and incorporating new rights, redefining and expanding the previous notion of citizenship. Citizens can enjoy formal recognition by their states. Based on such recognition, they will be able to legitimately organise their demands on using practices that ensure the exercise of citizenship rights and the incorporation of new rights (Zamudio, 2007).

To further understand the exercise of citizenship within the context of expressions of citizenship, it is crucial to look into citizenship participation. I draw from Cornwall's (2004) concept of participatory space to understand the influence of space on citizen participation. She defines participatory space as:

> [T]he situated nature of participation, the bounded yet permeable arenas in which participation is invited, and the domains from within which new intermediary institutions and new opportunities for citizen involvement have been fashioned.
> (Cornwall, 2004: 75).

Space influences how citizens process and identify ways in which they express themselves.

2.6. Factors influencing participation

Several factors influence people to participate in the activities expected of a "good citizen" (Potgieter and Lutz, 2014: 262). Several factors influence people to participate in such forms of political participation. These are a citizen's sense of political efficacy, citizens' trust in the government, and the impact of the triple challenge – i.e., inequality, poverty and unemployment.

2.6.1. Citizens' sense of political efficacy

A citizen's *sense of political efficacy* is a view of their effectiveness in politics. The concept refers to a person's subjective belief that they can influence a political process. Citizens possessing a sense of political efficacy have a greater likelihood of participating in politics. For example, these citizens will be more inclined to stay informed and vote at elections (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). Schulz-Herzenberg (2020: 24) discusses two complementary dimensions of political efficacy – *internal* and *external* political efficacy. According to her, internal efficacy is one's political competence. This is an individual's ability to comprehend politics and influence politics. On the other hand, external efficacy is a citizens perceptions of a government's responsiveness and officials' attentiveness. It is the degree to which they feel the political system is responsive to their demands. Both appear to matter to the decision to vote or not in South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). By 2019, there was evidence of external political efficacy influencing the decision not to vote. Members of the electorate felt the political system was unresponsive to their needs, and they were less likely to vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). This was also revealed in the more recent 2021 local government elections.

2.6.2. Citizens' trust of the government

Starting with citizens' trust in the government, the *2020 Edelman Trust Barometer Survey* indicates that a meagre 20% of South Africans trust the government (Daniel. J. Edelman Holdings Inc. 2020). In recent years, the citizenry's trust in South Africa's democratic institutions and evaluations of the government's performance have all fallen (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 27). The mounting trust deficit has affected many state institutions, as well as the ANC. Trust in the ANC dropped from 62% in 2006 to 38% in 2018 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). Allegations and revelations of ANC officials in state capture, corruption and financial mismanagement have negatively impacted voter sentiments, deterring many staunch ANC supporters from voting for the party. This should ideally leave many more voters with the option to vote for alternative parties (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). However, a significant proportion of the South African

population does not consider opposition parties[24] as viable ANC alternatives[25]. ANC voters generally do not vote for another party despite their unhappiness with the party (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28). Opposition political parties and their leaders are generally not viewed positively. For example, at least 38% of black South Africans strongly disliked the Democratic Alliance, and at least 36% strongly disliked the party's leader at the time, Mmusi Maimane. With the Economic Freedom Fighters, 33% of black South Africans strongly disliked the party, and 32% expressed the same sentiment for the EFF leader, Julius Malema (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28).

2.6.3. The triple challenge

The South African population, and the youth particularly, has been particularly affected by what some scholars and commentators have dubbed the "triple challenge" - poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015). Factors that can be partly attributed to the youth's political apathy are unemployment (Sibiya and Ncopo, 2020: 5-6). Coming from a history of colonialism and apartheid, poverty and inequality have co-existed in South Africa. Although the two concepts are linked, poverty and inequality are different: poverty is centred on deprivation, whereas inequality is centred on disadvantage (Plagerson and Mthembu, 2019). Globally inequality is measured by the Gini-Coefficient, and South Africa has the highest index globally, meaning that it is the most unequal country globally. (IBRD and WB, 2018; IMF, 2020). Inequality is manifest through a skewed income distribution, unequal access to opportunities, and regional disparities. Race is a strong predictor of poverty, and the chronically poor group is almost disproportionately black (IBRD and WB, 2018: 20). It has become the key factor determining inequality of opportunity (IBRD and WB, 2018: 66).

[24] The two main opposition parties in South Africa are the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).
[25] There is some evidence from the recent local government election results that took place on 1 November 2021 that this inclination might be changing.

The labour market in South Africa suffers from a history of discrimination and unequal access to jobs. The role of unemployment in driving inequality is particularly strong in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). Inequality in South Africa has an overbearing racial footprint to this inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2007). The unemployment rate is 27,6% (Stats SA, 2019). Rising unemployment remains a grave challenge for South Africa as the country struggles to create enough sustainable jobs. Unemployment is much more prevalent amongst the black population than all the other racial groups in South Africa. The 18–25-year age group exhibits high discontent from unemployment and a lack of job opportunities. However, it should be noted that youth voter apathy is very high, even in established democracies (Chiroro, 2008: 14).

The youth is critical of political leaders and parties who they feel have ignored their needs and failed to engage with them constructively (Roberts, 2019: 39). Factors such as access to and responsiveness of state institutions, quality of education, decent employment opportunities, and the prevalence of corruption influence whether the youth vote. In South Africa, disaffection with the ruling ANC could be why people are not voting (Chiroro, 2008: 14). Many South Africans will continue to abstain from voting until opposition parties are considered credible and viable alternatives (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 28).

2.6.4. Local government elections voter turnout from 1999–2021

According to Potgieter and Lutz (2014: 262), voting is generally regarded as the most prominent and frequently performed political participation. Over in the last six local government elections in the new South Africa, voter turnout has declined, and abstainers, eligible voters who do not vote, continue to grow. The following are the percentages of voter turnout in the past local government elections:

Table 1: Election voter turnout percentages from 1999-2021

Year	Voter turnout %
1999	89
2004	77
2009	77
2014	73
2019	66
2021	47
Source: Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) (2021)	

Looking at post-apartheid voting patterns in South Africa, the voting turnout has increasingly declined from the 27 April 1994 election to date, especially amongst the youth. Most literature on this phenomenon has investigated how the youth[26] are exhibiting voting apathy (Chiroro, 2008; Breakfast, 2017; Tshuma and Zvaita, 2019; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020; Sibiya and Ncopo, 2020; Heffernan, 2020; Badaru and Adu, 2020). The decline in voter turnout needs to be seen in the context of a complex set of shifts in citizen and government relations, which may include disaffection with the government (Chiroro, 2008: 14).

Participatory spaces are highly political, and this is manifest in how "particular sites come to be populated, appropriated or designated by particular actors for particular kinds of purpose" (Cornwall, 2004: 75). Cornwall (2002) argues that 'participation extends beyond making active use of invitations to participate, to autonomous forms of action through which citizens create their own opportunities and terms of action' (Cornwall, 2002). Recent international literature on participatory spaces has distinguished spaces as invited and invented [spaces] (Cornwall, 2002; 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2006).

[26] South Africa's National Youth Commission Act, 1996, defines youth as those from ages 14–35 years, and since voting is a preserve for people from 18, persons between the ages of 15 and 17 will not be included in the analysis, I will confine my description of the youth as people aged between 18-35.

2.7. Citizens' participation: The invited/invented spaces' dichotomy

Participatory spaces are highly political, and this is manifest in how "particular sites come to be populated, appropriated or designated by particular actors for particular kinds of purpose" (Cornwall, 2004: 75). Cornwall (2002) argues that 'participation extends beyond making active use of invitations to participate, to autonomous forms of action through which citizens create their own opportunities and terms of action' (Cornwall, 2002). Recent international literature on participatory spaces has distinguished spaces as invited and invented [spaces] (Cornwall, 2002; 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2006).

In scholarly literature, invited spaces of participation are defined as those occupied by citizens and their allied non-governmental actors, legitimised by donors and public authorities (Miraftab, 2014: 1). It is a platform where the citizens, as invitees, can raise their views or share their opinions as a form of public participation. In local government, invited spaces are legislative spaces created by the Constitution (1996) to ensure citizens' right to public participation. Citizens have a right and duty to take part in local government decision-making through, among others, public meetings (*izimbizos*) and ward committees. In invited spaces, citizens participate in decision-making, policy design, project management or implementation. Since invited spaces constitute institutional forms of participatory governance created and managed by public authorities, they are arguably based on the state's normative vision of "good citizenship" (Miraftab, 2004). These spaces are generally constructed for local democracy and citizenship, particularly for low-income residents (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Where non-state actors are involved, invited spaces allow for deliberations on the provision of services where a neoliberal state has withdrawn (Miraftab, 2004).

Invited spaces for participation are deeply frustrating for community members. Participation in these platforms reinforces asymmetric power relations in a society, where citizens are used to legitimising mainstream views of the elites (Dube et al., 2021: 245). Cornwall (2004) argued that invited spaces might be pseudo-democratic because

they may suppress certain voices in the interests of those in power. They have prevented social change by silencing or corrupting civil society leaders and working towards reproducing existing power structures (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

Some invited spaces engineered by the government to "invite people in" are inadequate, lack capacity, are unresponsive and superficial and are essentially used as a rubber stamp for participation and democracy (Cornwall 2004; le Roux, 2015). Restrictions in invited participation, the deafness of the state to poor communities' needs and claims, and the impossibility of competitive electoral politics lead to more radical and possibly more violent forms of participation (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012).

In South Africa, invited spaces of participation developed by authorities in the post-apartheid era have largely been viewed as "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). This is because, in some cases, the inviters control the agenda and set the terms of engagement to ensure that a largely pre-determined outcome is arrived at (Benit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2021: 175; Dube et al., 2021: 245; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Invited spaces mostly have failed to support citizens from urban indigent communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). Furthermore, invited spaces have generally been criticised as less conducive to "real" participation than invented spaces of participation. The citizenry view invited spaces as ones in which they are supposed to show allegiance to the ruling order and access state resources:

> [G]overnment invited spaces are key to display political loyalty, maintain and expand one's political network in a client–patron type of relationship with local councillors as well as local party representatives… they are a crucial way of accessing the state and possibly its resources, where the party channels replace dysfunctional local government participatory structures. In addition there may be other forms of invited spaces (invited by the party rather than by local government as the two are intertwined anyway), that lead to the reproduction of existing power structures and involve a degree of local social control by putting a cap on challenges to policies and powers,

> but also constitute a resource in terms of political networks and possible access to public goods.
> (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012)

Citizens have come up with "extremely innovative strategies" which create "alternative channels and spaces to assert their rights to the city, negotiate their wants, and actively practice their citizenship" (Miraftab and Wills 2005: 207). Citizens invent spaces that challenge the *status quo* in an attempt to foster change and resistance to the dominant power relations (Miraftab, 2014: 1). invented spaces are created by citizens who have been marginalised and left behind in local governance processes. They invent these spaces to reclaim their communities, afford themselves a voice and compel authorities to listen to them (Dube et al., 2021). Invented spaces are formed organically from below, by the people for themselves. Residents or social movements initiate these spaces demanding responses, accountability, or change from the state as the poor express their struggles in accessing basic needs and services such as water (Bénit-Gbffou and Piper, 2021: 175; Chiumbu, 2015: 2). Invented spaces are "often seen as more independent, authentic, and able to contest the established order, where residents take the initiative of the interaction with public authorities and invent their form, place and content" (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

Cornwall (2004) makes a key point that applies to both invited and invented spaces and all the areas where they overlap, is that space is never unbiased nor bounded. Spaces constantly overlap, and the actors within them continuously manoeuvre their way in and out of the spaces, allowing their experiences and actions to influence what happens within them and change the outcomes (Cornwall, 2004: 81). In some cases, invited spaces are "re-invented" and appropriated by invited participants. Importantly, invited and invented spaces may not involve uniquely different participants; however, the futility of the former has contributed to the latter's emergence (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). So, far from being a different group of people with opposed political views and world visions, those who engage in protests, for instance, may also attend engagements at invented spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). When citizens innovate and invent spaces, they show how

their relationship with the state is strained. Some citizens' actions in invented spaces have been defined as insurgent, and thus they have been described as insurgent citizens.

2.8. Insurgent citizens and hydropolitics

Sandercock (1999: 41) argues that "[t]he very word "insurgent" implies something oppositional, a mobilizing against one of the many faces of the state, the market or both". Insurgent citizens "invent" alternative spaces to perform politically to enhance democratic participation. Insurgent citizenship movements have spawned predominantly in the Global South, particularly in Latin American countries and South Africa (Miraftab, 2006; Holston, 2009: 256). Insurgent citizenship is an approach adopted by the poor to hold officials accountable for their civil and political rights to restore their dignity (Miraftab and Wills, 2005: 202). The justification for their actions is based on a demand for what they perceive to be fair and just human rights. More recently, in South Africa, Brown (2015: 7) argues that;

> [c]ontemporary South African politics are being driven by the practices of equality embarked upon by insurgent citizens. The most significant of these acts—those that most disturb the ordinary operations of the existing order—are those made by communities of the poor asserting their agency as political actors. These actions expand the possibilities of politics. The disruption they create is met by the representatives of the existing order—notably the state and its police forces—with responses ranging from engagement to repression … this interplay … shapes the terrain of political opportunity in South Africa and expands and contracts its possibilities.
> (Brown, 2015: 7)

"Invented spaces", to an extent, have been far more effective in representing the views of the poor and potentially bringing about meaningful participation than the state-formed invited spaces (Cornwall 2004; Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Insurgent responses to the growing neoliberal agenda, such as t the privatisation of basic services (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Insurgent citizenship challenges "good citizenship" practices that support neoliberalism. In support of this, Miraftab and Wills (2005: 202) state the following:

> As neoliberal practices privatize the city, its infrastructure, and its life spaces, and increasingly exclude urban citizens who are not deemed 'good-paying customers,' insurgent citizenship challenges the hypocrisy of neoliberalism: an ideology that claims to equalize through the promotion of formal political and civil rights yet, through its privatization of life spaces, criminalizes citizens based on their consumption abilities. Insurgent citizenship is a strategy employed by the poor to hold city officials accountable to their civil and political rights to decent housing conditions, as well as to the city itself, and to reclaim their dignity despite the hypocrisy.
> (Miraftab and Wills, 2005: 202)

The ANC's intolerance for dissent and its ability to socially control several invited spaces culminated in opposition expressed through invented spaces. It has been argued further that these spaces have been repressed violently, taking partial responsibility for the violent forms taken by protests (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). Invented spaces of participation have been seen as developing progressive political agendas, efficient tactics, and strategies to ensure that marginalised and disadvantaged communities are heard (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). There is a myriad of ways insurgent citizens in South Africa have responded to a violation of their right of access to water as espoused in the Constitution (RSA, 1996). These are as follows:

2.8.1. Non-payment of water services

Non-payment is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. It is a tactic that evolved during the anti-apartheid struggle in which some black township residents refused to pay for services (Pape and McDonald, 2002; von Schnitzler, 2008: 906; Dawson, 2010: 384; Bayliss, 2016; Worku, 2018). There are a series of explanations that I came across in literature explaining the phenomenon.

First, the affordability thesis presupposes that given the financial burdens experienced by households, rates and service payments are just not affordable for many. Non-payment was a strategy that poor black households used during apartheid to redirect their meagre household income. The racist system of domination rendered black people disadvantaged socially, politically, and economically. In support of this, Naidoo (2007) argued that:

> Under apartheid, non-payment in the form of the rent and service boycotts (or 'payment boycotts'), became modes through which black households negotiated their poverty and circumstances. As opposed to merely surviving in the under resourced and under-serviced ghettoes created by apartheid for its cheap labour force, township residents actively came together to boycott payment for rates and services, giving people greater scope to make use of their low apartheid wages and helping to shape the liberation movement by empowering ordinary people (of the middle and working classes) to take control of their lives and to struggle against the apartheid regime.
> (Naidoo, 2007: 59)

With the "triple challenge" of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Mzangwa, 2016; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015), many low-income black households are struggling as they are perennially in debt (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). This challenge can potentially explain the people's non-payment as emanating from a lack of income instead of a "general unwillingness" to pay. An analysis of the debts owed to municipalities indicates that nearly 80% of household debts are at least 90 days old. If the length of the duration the debt is outstanding is greater the risk of disconnection; the debt profile indicates that these households are unable, rather than unwilling, to pay their debts (Bayliss, 2016). Therefore, the non-payment of water services is because of a lack of money (Centre for Development Support [CDS], 2001; Akinyemi, 2018; Lilley, 2019).

Second, non-payment has also been argued to be "an effective tool of resistance against the apartheid state" (Dawson, 2010: 384). The refusal to pay for basic services was an ANC tactic to render South Africa "ungovernable" (Brown, 2005: 10) or to "destabilise" it (Earle et al., 2005: 10). Non-payment was a "powerful symbolic weapon against the apartheid state" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7). Non-payment continued unabated during apartheid since the authoritarian state feared increasing unrest (Brown, 2005). The refusal to pay culminated in "*de facto* subsidisation of township services" from the massive levels of non-payment (McDonald, 2002: 20; Brown, 2005: 10).

Third, is a belief in a "culture of non-payment" in post-apartheid South Africa. The "culture of non-payment" explanation entails that people got used to not paying for services during apartheid, and this behaviour has not changed since (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). Proponents of this view hold that "[c]itizens…have come to believe that it is their right to continue to receive free services" (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7).

Closely associated with this argument is the fourth explanation that people do not pay for basic services, including water, due to an inherent entitlement culture. At the birth of the "new" South Africa in 1994, many township residents never resumed payment for services, and thus non-payment has come to be defined as stemming from an "entitlement culture" that was born during apartheid (Ajam, 2001. Bond, 2000; von Schnitzler, 2008; Worku, 2018). In the new South Africa, there were drives to motivate residents to pay for services by couching payment in a moral language of "empowered" and "active" citizenship (von Schnitzler, 2008: 906). However, these initiatives "failed spectacularly" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7, 2013: 683). Some people exhibit what some commentators have described as a "general unwillingness" to pay for municipal services (Lilley, 2019).

The non-payment of basic services, water included, has also been related to the fact that black areas have consistently received poor basic services comparatively, a "culture of non-servicing" (Pape and McDonald, 2002: 7). This argument resonates with some scholars who have attributed non-payment to declining customer satisfaction levels (Akinyemi et al., 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020). The impact of irregular or frequent water interruption has significantly discouraged consumers' payment for water services (Akinyemi et al., 2018). Consumer dissatisfaction often leads to the unwillingness to pay for essential services (Mutyambizi et al., 2020: 19).

Non-payment becomes a strategy in which some citizens claim their right to water and do not allow payment for water services to influence whether they get water. When disconnections are effected, like in the early 2000s, litigation is an avenue that some concerned citizens have employed to safeguard their right to access to water.

2.8.2. Litigation

South African legislation allows people to challenge government decisions related to basic services provision, including water services. An important area requiring the state's protection relates to disconnections. The state must ensure that disconnections are done in a "fair and reasonable" manner and must strive to protect people who cannot afford to pay for water (Chirwa, 2004: 237). South Africa's Water Services Act 108 of 1997 represents an admirable legislative measure of discharging this duty by the state. According to section 4(1) of the Act, a service provider must set conditions for water services. These terms include the circumstances under which water services may be limited or discontinued and procedures for limiting or discontinuing water services. Section 4(3) stipulates that procedures for the limitation or discontinuance of water service must:

> (a) be fair and equitable;
> (b) provide for reasonable notice of intention to limit or discontinue water services and for an opportunity to make representations, unless —
> (i) other consumers would be prejudiced;
> (ii) there is an emergency situation; or
> (iii) the consumer has interfered with a limited or discontinued service; and
> (c) not result in a person being denied access to basic water services for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water service authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services.

In South Africa, there are four prominent legal cases concerning people's right to water which demonstrate citizens taking their grievances to the courts for resolution, and these are:

(a) *Manqele versus Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council* (2001)

In 2001, Christina Manqele, a resident of Chatsworth township, filed a legal claim against the Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council over a disconnection to water services. She claimed that the municipality had acted in contravention to the Water Services Act (1997) through disconnecting her water supply for non-payment (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006; Bulled, 2015: 7-8; Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208).

The Durban High Court initially ordered the municipality to reinstate Manqele's water supply in a short-lived victory. However, in the final judgment, the court argued that Manqele had "chosen" not to limit herself to the Council's free water allowance and had tried to reconnect illegally; she had thus relinquished any right to water (Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208). Thus, in not paying for water services, Manqele had compromised the ability to claim her right to water (Bulled 2015: 7-8; Angel and Loftus 2019: 208).

While the *Manqele case* was a partial victory in the fight for the HRtW, it also strengthened the state as the institution with the sole authority to decide what is and what is not, a just distribution of water. This case further showed that citizens could only claim the HRtW if they met certain obligations (Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208). The following case built on the *Manqele case* regarding the state's role in upholding the HRtW.

(b) *Bon Vista Mansions versus Southern Metropolitan Local Council* (2002)

In 2002, *Residents of Bon Vista Mansions versus Southern Metropolitan Local Council* was heard in court. The applicants, Mr Ngobeni et al., were residents of a block of flats in Johannesburg's Hillbrow area. The Council disconnected the residents' water services due to non-payment. The applicants contended that the discontinuation was unlawful (Chirwa, 2004: 238; de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 69; Pegan et al., 2007).

As an extension of the government, the High Court held that the Southern Metropolitan Local Council was mandated to provide water to everyone as per S27(1) of the Constitution. Even though this may not always be possible, according to law, the Council was expected to take the necessary steps to enact legislation that would eventually bring about the realisation of universal access to clean water, in line with S27(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). The Court subsequently found that the Council's disconnection of existing water supply to water users *prima facie* constituted a breach of its constitutional obligation to respect the right of (existing) access to water and that the applicants had satisfied the requirements for the granting of an interim interdict. The Council subsequently reinstated water supply to the flats. A disconnection might lead to a denial of access to basic water services for non-payment. Services might not be disconnected if a consumer demonstrates to the Court that they could not afford to pay. (Chirwa, 2004: 238).

The Court, citing S4(3) of the Water Services Act (1997), held that all procedures related to disconnection must be fair and equitable. Accordingly, a municipality cannot disconnect basic water supply if a resident demonstrates an inability to pay for it (Pegan et al., 2007: 59). Welch noted that the High Court stated the following:

> Water supply may not be discontinued if it results in a person being denied access to water services for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services.
> (Welch, 2005: 62)

The *Bon Vista case* demonstrated how disadvantaged citizens could use HRtW as a legal tool. Though similar to the *Manqele case*, it was decided before the promulgation of the basic water regulations, the Court in *Bon Vista* relied on the Constitution (1996) and the Act (1997) to operationalise the right to water (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70). The case lends itself to the "generous" approach to interpreting the *Bill of Rights* (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70). This approach gives a broad interpretation of the provisions of the *Bill of Rights*, in contrast to the *Manqele* case, where the Court had adopted a very narrow approach to S27(2) of the Constitution (de Visser and Mbazira, 2006: 70).

(c) *Mazibuko and Others versus City of Johannesburg and Others* (2009)

The faulty water services infrastructure installed during apartheid caused rampant water leaks in Soweto. In Phiri, Soweto, water piping was first installed in the 1940s and 1950s. Poor material was used, and sub-standard engineering resulted in a "chaotic" water reticulation infrastructure and water wastages (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 526-7). Water piped to each household in Phiri was charged for a "deemed" consumption of 20kl of water per month at a flat rate of R68.40. However, Soweto's actual monthly household "consumption" was about 67kl per household per month - officials were unable to distinguish actual consumption from water lost through leaks from poor infrastructure. Moreover, the flat rate of payment in areas of "deemed consumption" was less than 10% (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 527).

Johannesburg Water Pty (Ltd.), the state-owned WSP in Johannesburg, implemented Operation *Gcin'amanzi* (Zulu for 'Save Water') in 2003 to address the severe water supply problems experienced in the area. The project was rolled out first in the area of Phiri, in Soweto. Johannesburg Water replaced faulty and run-down water infrastructure. The WSP installed pre-paid water meters. Community members who used more than their allocated FBW allowance of 6kl per household monthly were billed accordingly (International Commission of Jurists [ICJ], 2018). This was done in tandem with installing flow restrictors and pre-payment meters (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 530).

Some of the elements of Operation *Gcin'amanzi* came under scrutiny in the Lindiwe *Mazibuko and Others versus City of Johannesburg and Others* case particularly concerning the amount of free water allocated to each household or, put conversely, the extent to which residents were now expected to pay for services. The residents raised three key contentions. The first was that installing pre-paid water meters was unlawful in that it was not authorised by national legislation or by municipal by-laws. Secondly, they argued that installing the meters was unfair and illegal for various reasons, including no proper consultation with residents. Mazibuko et al. argued that prepaid water meters represent a threat to dignity and health and immediate risk to life if a fire

occurs. A danger of self-disconnecting prepayment meters was illustrated when two children died in a Soweto shack fire on 27 March 2005, which in turn catalysed the *Mazibuko* case (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 1; Bond, 2010: 5). Residents could not access water to put out the fire because water had been cut. Thirdly, *Mazibuko et al*. argued that the City's policy of allocating 6kl of free water per household was unreasonable in that both rich and poor households benefited from the free allocation of water (Humby and Grandbois, 2011: 530; Soyapi, 2017: 14-15).

Ms Lindiwe Mazibuko et al. were aggrieved by the decision of the WSP to abandon the flat-rate consumption charge (Matchaya et al., 2018: 10). Furthermore, 6kl did not provide the constitutionally promised "access to sufficient water" where more than four people occupy a stand because this entails less than 50l per person per day – which the residents argue is the minimum amount that is "sufficient".

In the *Mazibuko et al.* case, the Constitutional Court held that the changes to water consumption introduced by the provider were within the bounds of reasonableness and did not violate the right of access to water (Matchaya et al., 2018: 10-11). While the judgment in the Mazibuko case was not favourable to Mazibuko et al., it offered the judiciary an opportunity to consider the domestic implementation of international human rights norms in South African law – particularly S27(1), which affords everyone the right to access sufficient water (Matchaya et al., 2018). The case demonstrated that socio-economic rights, such as the right to access sufficient water could be, "claimed, contested and [...] realized by [the government's] continual review and adjustment of its water policies in response to ongoing public interest litigation" (Danchin, 2010). It also demonstrated how to hold the state accountable via a constitutional culture of justification and how participatory and deliberative democracy is ultimately deepened by economic and social rights (Danchin, 2010).

(d) *City of Cape Town versus Strümpher* (2012)

The City of Cape Town versus Strümpher case resulted from the disconnection of the water supply to the respondent's property - Marcel Mouzakis Strümpher. Strümpher had an outstanding water bill amounting to R180,000 to settle in two days. He disputed the account because the water meter was faulty (Couzen, 2015: 1171). The City Council argued that Strümpher's water services were lawfully terminated because he did not honour the contract by failing to settle his bill. The court held that to expect the respondent to pay while he disputed the account was unfair. The right to water was not just a personal or contractual one, but it flowed from the constitutional right to water. The court granted a spoliation order to restore the status quo (Matchaya et al., 2018: 11). This case demonstrates that the HRtW is indeed justiciable.

2.8.3. Unregulated private alternatives

In the absence of authorities providing communities with water services, residents of different communities seek alternative ways to access water, amongst others through other residents or non-governmental organisations. Some of these alternatives require that one has containers to store water. These containers come in various shapes and sizes. Residents of communities where frequent water interruptions occur use the containers to store tap water when it is available and use it when there is an interruption. They use the same containers to store water sourced through unregulated private alternatives.

Rainwater harvesting (RWH) is an alternative way of sourcing freshwater (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014; Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017). RWH describes rainwater runoff's collection, storage, and use (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1050; Selala et al., 2018: 223). Domestic (D)RWH is one of the broad categories of RWH where people collect water from roofs, courtyards, and other surfaces and store it for household use and domestic agricultural activities (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1050). DRWH is a strategy that can benefit underprivileged communities in urban and rural areas struggling to access clean water (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007; Dobrowsky et al., 2014;

Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017). Some of these communities may not be connected to water supply networks, or they are in areas where the costs of exploiting available resources are relatively high (Selala et al., 2018: 223). The major challenge with collecting rainwater is that it is expensive to install and maintain RWH systems (Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017: 81; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163), and households may lack space to install infrastructure (Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163). Climate change may also negatively affect the viability of such a system in the long run as droughts are becoming more frequent.

In some instances, communities rely on artisanal technologies such as sinking boreholes and wells for clean and safe water. Some of these services may be provided by NGOs, small businesses, or individuals at a cost (Bakker, 2013: 294). All of these are "private" (in the sense of non-governmental) approaches to service provision undertaken by members of the "public" (Bakker, 2013: 294). In some instances, people have resorted to fetching water from neighbouring areas, boreholes, rivers, wells and surface sources (Hove et al., 2019: 6). These sources have increased their vulnerabilities from consuming contaminated water.

There are possible health risks associated with consuming water from these alternative sources. For example, there are contradictory results on the quality of the water sourced through RWH, and research shows that how and where it is harvested, and levels of pollution affect water quality (Mwenge Kahinda et al., 2007: 1052; Selala et al., 2018: 223; Dobrowsky et al., 2014: 401; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163), Water from rivers and streams is often dirty and may be contaminated. When communities relied on such sources of water in South Africa, there were outbreaks of diseases like cholera. Noted earlier, during the period 2000-2002, when defaulters had their water services terminated in KwaZulu-Natal, some residents of Ngwelezane ended up consuming contaminated water from the Umfolozi River and streams close to Madlebe (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 7). A similar incident in which people resorted to getting water from contaminated sources happened in Johannesburg. Residents of Alexandra township fetched water from nearby polluted streams after Johannesburg Water had terminated water services from defaulters (McKinley, 2005; Angel and Loftus, 2019).

2.8.4. Destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections[27]

Some residents in predominantly disadvantaged communities have resorted to destroying water meters and making illegal connections (Bakker, 2011; von Schnitzler, 2013; Mogalagadi, 2017; van Zyl et al., 2018; Bond and Galvin, 2019). In a bid to access water, some strategies involve illegally tapping into existing water networks or bypassing their meters (Bakker, 2011: 294) with the aid of "midnight plumbers" (Bakker, 2011: 294; von Schnitzler, 2013: 674) or "informal plumbers" (Bond and Galvin, 2019: 241). The "plumbers" generally solicit the services of a skilled person, who in some cases is a current or former municipal employee earning an income, or a family member (von Schnitzler, 2013: 674; Muller, 2020: 39). These are current or former municipal employees who have the expertise and the equipment to do it (Muller, 2020:39). In some instances, the connections are made "poorly" (Muller, 2020: 39). Such connections are widespread in South Africa and have a long-term effect on water supply and the reliability and longevity of water infrastructure. Illegal connections shorten the lifespan of infrastructure and allow leaks to develop whilst also allowing pollutants to enter the system. While these connections are frowned upon, the residents view them as "self-help" (Muller, 2020: 39).

In the short run, illegal connections may appear to be a solution; however, the long-term impact may be adverse (Bond and Galvin, 2019: 242). The unwillingness to pay, high water bills, and high debts led to increasing incidents of vandalism and tampering with water infrastructure (van Zyl et al., 2018: 30). Bypassing a pre-paid water meter, or any other meter for that matter, is not an easy decision for consumers; it is arrived at after an extensive evaluation in a household (von Schnitzler, 2013: 674). Bond and Galvin (2019) explain the two strategies as manifestations of urban "commoning, " a survival strategy and a potential eco-socialist project.

[27] I term these connections "illegal" because people who authorise the connections to be done on municipal property do not have the right to do so. By giving permission for the connection to be done, they are undermining the municipal's authority and jurisdiction over the equipment.

In communities outside metros, some households resort to illegal connections because their municipalities do not install water infrastructure from the main pipes, or municipalities may charge a fee for it, which the residents cannot afford. To avert rising tension and conflict with communities in Johannesburg, the City of Johannesburg has instructed its artisans to repair leaks found where illegal connections have been made instead of disconnecting them, fixing the infrastructure, and installing a meter (Muller, 2020: 39).

Another response by insurgent citizens to the violation of their HRtW is through protest activity or *toyi-toying* as an avenue to get heard as citizens get increasingly agitated by the state's response or lack thereof.

2.8.5. *Toyi-toying*

A popular way of expressing resistance in the 1980s to the apartheid state by the youth was *toyi-toying – a* "high-stepping syncopated marching style" (Alexander and McGregor, 2020: 1-2). *Toyi-toying* was done to render townships "ungovernable". During a toyi-toyi, young men and women march and chant struggle songs. Violence is symbolically viewed as a legitimate collective act during a *toyi-toyi*. The dance has been attributed to creating "social solidarity" as well as the "militarization of youth culture" (Alexander and McGregor, 2020: 1-2). Other actions associated with protests from the 1980s which have been adopted include burning barricades, burning down public and private property, chanting and singing struggle songs, the coercion of other community members to ensure participation, and violent clashes with police (von Holdt et al., 2011: 50-51).

There is a prevalent belief that only media coverage can induce urgent intervention from political authorities and the state, and *toyi-toying* is the vehicle to achieve this. The contemporary use of violence in *toyi-toying*, motivated by this current structure of political opportunity, is legitimised by mobilising the past use of violence in the anti-apartheid struggle (Matlala and Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015: 58). Between 2005 and 2017, about 14,200 community protests occurred in the country. In 2006, there were 50

incidents, increasing to a peak of 471 in 2012 and a figure of more than 320 annually from 2012-2017 (Alexander et al., 2018). Service delivery protests generally are described as "community protests" (Alexander et al., 2018: 27); however, the protesters may not specify the exact communal issue (such as water, electricity or housing) (Lancaster, 2018: 31). The rate at which *toyi-toying* has escalated in the "new" South Africa has resulted in the country being dubbed "the protest capital of the world" (Alexander, 2012). Brown (2015: 16) mildly states that "country of protest and its people are protesters".

One of the earliest protests involving water service delivery in South Africa was sparked by an article written by Trevor Ngwane, then-head of the regional ANC in Soweto, in September 1999 (Bond, ND; Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). Ngwane vehemently criticised water commodification through a Suez water contract between the consortium of which it was part, Johannesburg Water Management, and the City of Johannesburg (Bond, ND). Ngwane was dismissed from the ANC in the same month the article was published. Two months after Ngwane's dismissal, about 20,000 members of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) marched in protest after having declared, "To Hell, it's War!", and the rise of a new movement – the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in mid-2000 – just as the contract was formalised (Bond, ND; Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). Ngwane then launched Operation *Vulamanzi* (Water for All), which encouraged people to pull out or bypass their prepaid water meters in Soweto (Piper, 2014: 115).

Another well-noted protest resulting from a water-related issue was in September 2003 when Phiri residents embarked on a protest over Operation *Gcin'amanzi*. In 2003, approximately 275,000 households, translating to at least 1,5 million people, were disconnected from water services at least once due to non-payment (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 17). In 2003 the Coalition against Water Privatisation (CAWP) was formed. It brought together social movements and progressive NGOs (Bayliss and Adam, 2012: 340). CAWP organised protests throughout South Africa against poor service delivery and introducing prepaid meters (Bayliss and Adam, 2012: 340). Both the APF and CAWP no longer exist.

Another well-noted protest linked to prepaid water meters occurred in November 2004. Hundreds of protesters made their way to the Civic Centre in Braamfontein from Mary Fitzgerald Square in Johannesburg. The protest responded to the increasing installation of prepaid meters in townships around Johannesburg (von Schnitzler, 2008: 899). Many protesters brought meters, dumping them at the Civic Centre. In 2011, the "Toilet Wars" erupted in the Western Cape Province, initially protesting only the state's partial provision of flush toilets. Some Western Cape residents noted that private hygiene and sanitation facilities were reminiscent of apartheid, and in the "new" South Africa, this showed the state's failures to deliver public services (Robins, 2014: 480; Bulled, 2015: 539). Residents of Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town, decanted buckets of human waste at the Western Cape Legislature and flung buckets of human waste at the then-Western Cape Premier, Helen Zille, and the city's mayor at the time, Patricia de Lille (Robins, 2014). Other "poo protests" sites were along the N1 highway and the Cape Town International Airport (CPT). Protesters at CPT were detained, arrested and subsequently charged under the Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 for delaying flights (Robins, 2014, 480; Bulled, 2015: 539).

The explosion in protests since the early 2000s makes it clear that many people do not consider forms of engagement other than *toyi-toying* as effective measures to deal with corrupt or incompetent municipal councillors and officials (Tapela and Pointer, 2013). Protests demonstrate the apartheid legacies of inequity, exclusion, and segregation, as well as give a reflection of a robust civic willingness to engage in re-formulating and reimagining the post-apartheid state (Rodina and Harris, 2016: 351). Access to sufficient water is an issue of life or death, and a continuing decline in supply in South Africa is accompanied by increasing conflict and tension. Some scholars have linked *toyi-toying* with violent masculinities emanating from a crisis of representation in local government (Hove et al., 2019: 2).

Von Holdt et al. (2011) argue that violence is a critical aspect of insurgent citizenship in South Africa:

> Violence is integral to insurgent citizenship in South Africa. Violence—both against the state and against collaborators in the community—was very much part of the insurgent movement of the anti-apartheid struggle, which at its heart was a struggle to assert the rights to citizenship of the black majority, and provides a repertoire of practices when frustration and anger become too much.
>
> Violence is understood as a language, a message, a way of calling out to higher authorities about the state of things in their town but its violence makes it a warning at the same time…
> (von Holdt et al., 2011: 27)

I concur with Brown (2015: 7), who argues that the fight for equality, particularly around access to basic needs and services, is what is driving insurgency. He says;

> Contemporary South African politics are being driven by the practices of equality embarked upon by insurgent citizens. Most significant of these acts – those that most disturb the ordinary operations of the existing order – are those made by communities of the poor, asserting their agency as political actors. These actions expand the possibilities of politics. The disruption they create is met by representatives of the existing order – notably, the state and its police forces – with responses ranging from engagement to repression.
> (Brown, 2015: 7)

Tactics embarked on by insurgent citizens are generally negatively received and portrayed by both the state and the media, which delegitimise and criminalise the invented spaces. Protests generally have been dealt with a heavy hand by state security.

2.9. Conclusion

Water scarcity in South Africa has anthropogenic drivers. While the country has natural and biophysical factors that affect freshwater resources, human activities, conscious or not, have significantly to water scarcity. This brings the importance of water politics into the spectrum, particularly how water is allocated, distributed, and accessed.

Therefore, a major starting point was a relook at the definitions of hydropolitics and how it links to power. However, most definitions proposed did not meaningfully encompass small scale interaction, and for this study, an explanation of how citizenship is expressed within the context of access to water. Henwood and Turton's (2002) definition and explanation was very useful as they allowed for an analysis of different *scales* and *range* of issues in hydropolitics. Different actors conceptualised a broadened definition of hydropolitics that paid attention to the allocation, distribution and accessing of water resources and services within a given context.

I looked at citizenship literature and drew from Marshall's triadic theory of citizenship with this definition. According to him, full citizenship was attained in three successive steps: civil, political, and social citizenship. His main contribution lay in the development of citizenship as a *legal status*. His account suggests that the attainment of full citizenship rights in the 20th century was a social process that was both complete and irreversible. Following this logic, once recognised and institutionalised, citizenship rights represent modern democracies' irretrievable features. Citizenship is always "under construction", and the best way to understand it is by acknowledging that citizenship is always in dispute in theory and practice. In practice, two crucial aspects lead to a show of citizenship: *conscience* (a conviction of being a citizen stemming from an awareness of what it means) and *exercise* (an enactment of citizenship roles and responsibilities).

I argue that in contemporary South Africa, invited spaces are in decline, and citizens are increasingly "inventing" spaces of participation. Citizens in these invented spaces have embarked on insurgent forms of expression. Within the context of accessing water, I demonstrate how the following have been avenues for expression: non-payment, litigation, unregulated private alternatives, destruction of prepaid water meters and illegal connections, and *toyi-toying*. The next chapter focuses on how the allocation of water in the new South Africa

CHAPTER THREE

Flows of Power - Flows of Water: Water Allocation in South Africa

"Water brings us together, and pulls us apart."
Larry A. Swatuk (2017)

3.1. Introduction

Water is deeply political. The allocation of water is a space characterised by power contestations. The exercise of power over access to water resources and services is crucial as it reflects the hydropolitics of a society. Understanding expressions of citizenship within the context of Madibeng Local Municipality hydropolitics requires an analysis of water governance systems in post-apartheid South Africa, as this will demonstrate how current asymmetrical access to water services has emerged. This chapter analyses the social, political, economic, and institutional context in which South African water governance systems have evolved.

By naming the chapter "Flows of Power - Flows of Water", I argue a link between access to water and power. I begin the chapter by defining water governance and mirroring it with hydropolitics. I unpack how South Africa's shift from welfarism reflected in the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is at odds with subsequent and current neoliberal policies. This chapter investigates the disjuncture between mandates supporting the human right to water; and asymmetrical water access by impoverished communities. The chapter ends with an overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as an epitome of South Africa.

3.2. Water governance in South Africa

Water governance refers to a range of social, political, economic and administrative systems to develop and manage water resources and water service delivery in a given society. This set of systems and processes inform the decision-making process about water resource development and management (Batchelor, 2007:1; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019: 2). Water governance pays more attention to the process in which decisions are made, as opposed to the actual decisions themselves (Batchelor, 2007: 1; OECD, 2015; Jacobs-Mata et al., 2021: 10). Governance requires buy-in from various stakeholders with vested interests in water and management uses. These include, but are not limited to, public and private sector stakeholders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (OECD, 2011).

The management of water resources is a highly contentious political and environmental issue (Bakker; 2010; 2012; Jankielsohn, 2012; Hellberg, 2015). Water governance is a critical component in the overall governance of a society, especially in a country like South Africa. As a resource, water connects people in different geopolitical spaces and across all social stratum, state, and non-state actors; and requires high capital investments (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019: 2). Governance systems often include normative ideas of what defines "good governance": for example, adequately liberalised markets, transparent decision-making, water justice, etc. Contextually, we can therefore distinguish between "good" and "bad" water governance. Swatuk (2010: 521) notes that governance includes public consultation and participation, underpinned by responsible authorities' clear and transparent decision-making.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Water Governance Facility (WGF) (2019) proposes four fundamental dimensions of water governance, and these are:

(i) Social - The fair allocation of water resources and services among various socio-economic groups, and its culminating effects on society;

(ii) Economic - Efficiency in water allocation and use, as well as the role of water in economic growth;

(iii) Political - Equal rights and opportunities for different stakeholders involved in the decision-making processes associated with the allocation and distribution of water; and lastly;

(iv) Environmental - The sustainable use of water and related ecosystem services, including fish production, water provisioning, and recreation. Poor regulation in many areas has resulted in declining water quality from heavy agricultural and industrial pollution.

The usefulness of these four dimensions is that they serve as a lens to assess water governance in South Africa by exploring the various social, political, economic, and environmental dimensions of water management. There is a profoundly political element to water governance, and as such, water governance systems usually reflect the political realities at international, national, provincial, and local levels (Batchelor, 2007). Water governance raises a series of issues associated with how, by whom, and under what conditions the decisions are made (Batchelor, 2007; Jacobs-Mata, 2021: 10). It is linked to the following questions, "who gets which water? When and how? And who has the right to water, and related services, and their benefits?" (UNDP-WGF, 2019). Put differently, decisions in hydropolitics revolve around the questions of "who gets what [water], when, where and how" (Turton, 2002: 16).

Water governance is intricately linked with hydropolitics - it is a process and an outcome of water politics. Water governance generally centres on institutions' role in the provision of water and their relationships. Water governances are system and processes that exist that influence the allocation of water. Hydropolitics on the other hand is hydropolitics is *as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context*. The following section critiques water governance systems that were implemented in South Africa post-apartheid.

3.3. Mandates and the human right to water in South Africa

In 1994, the new ANC-led government inherited a highly unequal society, and access to water was one of the areas in which it sought to improve the citizenry's lives. About 14 million people did not have access to a safe water supply, and more than 21 million people, half the population, lacked access to adequate sanitation services in 1994. Lack of access to water was a major problem in rural areas (DWAF, 2004a: 4). Water justice and the realisation of the Human Right to Water are core aspects of historical injustices that amplified the poverty and inequality in black communities. The government implemented a new Constitution (RSA, 1996), which provides arguably the most sophisticated and comprehensive system for protecting the socio-economic rights of all the constitutions in the world today (BBC, 2014; Oechsli and Walker, 2015; Sahle et al., 2019). The Constitution (RSA, 1996) paved the way for legislation that supported the realisation of the right to water. What follows is a discussion of the constitutional right to water and supporting legislation that was promulgated to ensure that the right is realised.

3.3.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996)

The Constitution (RSA, 1996) was founded on creating a just and equal society. It came from a recognition of historical injustices and atrocities from colonialism and apartheid. The envisioned new South African would is based on constitutionalism grounded in democratic values, social justice, and fundamental respect of human rights. South Africa was one of the first countries in the region to have the right to water listed as a constitutional right (Soyapi, 2017: 14).

The post-apartheid state's immediate efforts to improve water access were evident in its pursuit of universalising the Human Right to Water (HRtW). Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), the *Bill of Rights*, is "a cornerstone of South Africa democracy" that details socio-economic rights for everyone in South Africa – citizen or not. Four sections of the *Bill of Rights* reinforce the right to access water. Stemming from a history in which restrictions to the rights of black people entailed a violation of human rights,

S10 states that "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected". This section safeguards citizens from indignity resulting from the lack of access to water and sanitation, which were the state's responsibility. Most directly linked to water, S27 (1)(b) that states, "everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water". To ensure that people live in a habitable environment conducive to life, S24(a) states that "everyone has a right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being". Finally, to hold the state accountable for the ultimate realisation of the right of access to water, S27(2) mandates the state to "The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights [i.e., health care, food, water and social security]". Section 152 of the Constitution (RSA) and indicated that municipalities were "to ensure the provision of services in a sustainable manner". With such directives in the Constitution (1996), it was clear that access to water was one of the issues that the state was going to tackle.

3.3.2. Legislative framework

The international water community has hailed south Africa's water legislation as one of the most progressive pieces of international legislation and a significant step towards achieving the goals of IWRM and making it into law (Adom and Simatele, 2021: 510). Three essential instruments of legislation aimed at ensuring the equitable provision of water services introduced in post-apartheid South Africa stemming from the Constitution (1996) and these are the Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997; the National Water Act No. 36 of 1998, and the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000:

(i) The Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997

The Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997 was instituted per S3(1) of the Republic of South Africa's Constitution, which affirms everyone's right to access basic water and sanitation. The Water Services Act (1997) is the primary legislation regulating access to and the provision of water services. The 1997 Act makes provision for an institutional framework for the delivery of water supplies and sanitation and recognises the right of

access to basic water supply and sanitation necessary to secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to health or wellbeing:

> (a) the right of access to basic water supply and the right to basic sanitation necessary to secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to human health or well-being (*sic*);
> (b) the setting of national standards and norms and standards for tariffs in respect of water services…
> (g) financial assistance to water services institutions…
> (RSA, 1997)

The Act deals with water for consumption and sanitation services to households and other municipal water users by local governments (i.e., municipalities). The Water Services Act (1997) defines both "basic sanitation" and "basic water supply" as follows:

> "basic sanitation" means the prescribed minimum standard of services necessary for the safe, hygienic and adequate collection removal, disposal or purification of human excreta. domestic waste-water and sewage from households, including informal households…
>
> The minimum standard for basic sanitation services is –
> (a) the provision of appropriate health and hygiene education; and
> (b) a toilet which is safe, reliable, environmentally sound, easy to keep clean, provides privacy and protection against the weather, well ventilated, keeps smells to a minimum and prevents the entry and exit of flies and other disease-carrying pests.
>
> "basic water supply" means the prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene…

The Water Services Act (1997) details the provision of free basic water. Section 4(3)(c) indicates that provisions must be made to cater for poor people unable to pay for water services:

> "procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water services must not result in a person being denied access to basic water services for nonpayment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay for basic services".

> The minimum standard for basic water supply services is –
> (a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and
> (b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month –
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and
> (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (WSA, 1997)

The Act also mandates a water services institution to ensure that where water services are interrupted, people have access to water:

> A water services institution must take steps to ensure that where the water services usually provided by or on behalf of that water services institution are interrupted for a period of more than 24 hours for reasons other than those contemplated in section 4 of the Act, a consumer has access to alternative water services comprising – (a) at least 10 litres of potable water per person per day; and (b) sanitation services sufficient to protect health.
> (WSA, 1997)

The WSA (1997), through Chapter 6, regulates Water Boards as important Water Service Providers. The Act also acknowledges that while municipalities have authority to control water and sanitation services provision, all the other government spheres must contribute within the limits of physical and financial feasibility (See WSA, 1997 Chapter 9). The Water Services Act (1997) operates in tandem with the National Water Act No. 36 of 1998.

(ii) The National Water Act No. 36 of 1998

Before the implementation of the 1998 National Water Act, South Africa's water legislation was denoted by legal pluralism. It was a fusion of riparian rights, *dominus fluminis*, some permit systems, and unrecognised living customary water rights in former bantustans (Tewari, 2002: 7; 2009: 699; Kidd, 2009: 699; Tempelhoff, 2017: 192; van Koppen, 2017). Principle 3 in the White Paper on a National Water Policy (1997)

withdraws the riparian access principle, a core feature of South African water law since colonialism. The policy states that through the National Water Act (1998) and the Water Services Act (1997), "[t]here shall be no ownership of water but only a right (for environmental and basic human needs) or an authorisation for its use".

In support of universal access to water and the state's role in managing water resources, the National Water Act (1998) was implemented to contribute to ensuring that that the country's water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, and managed sustainably and equitably for the benefit of all people. The preamble of the Act states that:

> [W]ater is a natural resource that belongs to all people, and the discriminatory laws and practices in the past have prevented equal access to water, and the use of water resources.
> (RSA, 1998)

The 1998 NWA repealed more than 100 water laws and amendments, terminating all previous public and private water rights (Tewari, 2009: 703). This act constituted a drastic shift from the earlier water acts, predominantly based on riparian water rights (i.e., the 1906 Cape Colony Irrigation Act, the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act, and the 1956 National Water Act). It defines the state as the nation's water resources custodian. Only water required to meet basic human needs and maintain environmental sustainability is guaranteed as a right.

The NWA (1998) brought in the "public trust" principle, an internationally accepted principle. The South African public trust doctrine constitutes a revival of certain Roman, Roman-Dutch, and indigenous and customary law principles lost due to statutory intervention by the apartheid state. The objective of the South African public trust doctrine is listed as Principle 13 in the *Fundamental Principles and Objectives for a New Water Law for South Africa*:

> As custodian of the nation's water resources, the National Government shall ensure that the development, apportionment, management and use of those resources is carried out using the criteria of public interest, sustainability, equity and efficiency of use in a manner which reflects its public trust obligations and the value of water to society while ensuring that basic domestic needs, the requirements of the environment and international obligations are met.
> (DWAF, 2004b)

According to the 1998 National Water Act, "sufficient water" is the basic water quantity and the minimum standard of water supply that should sustain human life. The Act, therefore, confers on everyone a right of access to the "prescribed minimum standard of water supply necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity to households…to support life and personal hygiene", which is qualified as "basic water supply". Regulation 3(b) further proposes actual measures, or indicators, of this and describes the "minimum standard of water supply service" as:

> [A] minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month –
> (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
> (ii) within 200 metres of a household; and
> (iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without supply for more than seven full days in any year.
> (NWA, 1998)

In accordance with the HRtW, the National Water Act (1998) gives effect to the water access rights enshrined in the Water Services Act (1997) by providing for a national water reserve. The "reserve" is a critical legal tool meant to help achieve the right of access to sufficient water (du Toit et al., 2009). Indeed, the National Water Act (1998) is not only popular for its objective of fighting against injustices inherited from colonialism and apartheid but globally, it is considered an ambitious water act because of its environmental perspective on the creation of this "reserve" (Bourblanc, 2015: 1).

The reserve comprises two aspects: first, "basic human needs reserve". This aspect entails water provided for free to everyone, which is meant to cover their daily needs, such as consumption and sanitation. The government is mandated by legislation to

ensure adequate water for basic needs such as drinking, cooking, and cleaning, at 25l per person per day (du Toit, 2019).

The second type of reserve is the "ecological reserve". This reserve constitutes water that will remain in the river to ensure the long-term sustainability of aquatic and associated ecosystems (Bourblanc, 2015: 2; du Toit, 2019). The ecological reserve is defined by scientists and adopted by the DWS Minister. Therefore, the reserve prioritises human and environmental needs before any other water uses may be considered. Water access is catered for through the reserve before other water licenses can be granted to strategic water sectors or users. The reserve is a guaranteed right that is not subject to institutional discretion. In this sense, the reserve trumps all other water use claims (du Toit et al., 2009). However, the ecological reserve has not been implemented, and scientific work to understand its implementation has been slow.

The National Water Act (1998) was founded on integrated water resources management (IWRM). The Act called for integrating several facets of water, including biophysical characteristics, societal issues, economic activities, and cultural and organisational aspects (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 4). The National Water Act is explicit on the CMA (Catchment Management Agency) establishment process. The Act stipulates how a CMA should be established, peoples' roles, and how the organisation's governing board should be constituted (RSA 1998). Section 78(1) of the National Water Act (1998) prescribes how CMAs are established in post-apartheid South Africa. Since one of the Act's core principles is decentralisation, there is a greater emphasis on public participation in water management and related decision-making processes. Decentralisation also rests on the subsidiary principles contained in the Constitution (1996). Subsidiarity entails delegating functions that can be more effectively and efficiently carried out by lower government levels to the lowest appropriate level. This, therefore, means that both the Constitution (1996) and the National Water Act (1998) are constitutive in the establishment of CMAs. To reduce redundancy and increase efficiency, Molewa (Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs from 2010–2014) reduced CMAs from 19 to nine in 2012 (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 4-5).

The establishment of nine CMAs was due to a reconsideration of the management model and viability assessments related toWRM, funding, skills, and expertise in regulation and oversight. This was also done in an attempt to improve IWRM. The nine CMAs were as follows: Limpopo and Olifants in the Mpumalanga Province); Inkomati-Usutu, Pongola-Umzimkulu, Vaal, Orange, Mzimvubu-Tsitsikamma, Breede-Gouritz and Berg-Olifants, all in the Western Cape Province. These CMAs were to be the symbol of post-apartheid water management with a shift in management from a central government to a more decentralised approach to give local communities, more so previously disadvantaged communities, a say in the management of water resources (Stuart-Hill and Meissner, 2018: 5). The CMA rested on public participation.

The major drawback of making the state the public trustee of the country's water resources is that water allocation is done through a licensing system that increases the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) control over the resource. Some commentators have, therefore, described the National Water Act (1998) as an "unnecessarily interventionist [piece of] legislation" (Tewari, 2009). The Act also has had little impact on the reallocation of water because little has changed in the access to and control over water resources (Kemerink et al., 2011: 592). Many South Africans are still waiting for sufficient water access from their municipalities and other WSPs. To ensure that service delivery to disadvantaged communities, the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 was promulgated.

(iii) Municipal Systems Act No. 2000

The Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000, a critical policy framework that directs municipalities' service delivery, including water provision to households. In line with efforts to improve the lives of all in South Africa and attempts to redress past injustices, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) is meant to:

> [M]ove progressively towards the social and economic upliftment [sic] of local communities, and ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all.
> (Municipal Systems Act, 2000)

The Municipal Systems Act (2000) is a pro-poor policy. It centres on ensuring that the most marginalised and impoverished sections of South African communities are factored in when it comes to service provision – even for those who cannot afford it. In support of this, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) states the following:

> [T]o empower the poor and ensure the municipalities put in place service tariffs and credit control policies that take their needs into account by providing a framework for the provision of services.
> (Municipal Systems Act, 2000)

The MSA (2000) stresses two crucial elements in the functionality of municipalities, and these are "access to basic services" and "cost recovery". Regarding accessing basic water, section 74(2)(c) provides that indigent households must access basic services through tariffs that cover costs only, special tariffs or other methods of cross-subsidisation. Section 74 of the MSA (2000) states that,

> "A municipal council must adopt and implement a tariff policy on the levying of fees for municipal services provided by the municipality itself or by way of service delivery agreements, and which complies with....any other applicable legislation".
> [MSA, 2000]

The Act further states in S75 that, "[a] municipal council must adopt by-laws to give effect to the implementation and enforcement of its tariff policy" (MSA, 2000). This demonstrates that tariffs should be implemented differentially, bearing in mind the different socio-economic factors that impact one's affordability, which should not lead to unfair discrimination (MSA, 2000). Section 2 of the *Tariff Policy* pays particular attention to "poor households" due to their ability to pay for municipal services. Indigent households should receive basic services in the following ways:

- tariffs that only meet operating and maintenance costs – this means that there is a charge for services, and this should only be for municipalities to recoup costs for expenses incurred for service provision;
- special tariffs or lifeline tariffs for low levels of use or consumption of services or basic levels of service – indigent households should be provided with a basic allocation at a minimum tariff; and
- any other direct or indirect method of subsidising tariffs for disadvantaged households – and by this, indigent households can access water for free.

In South Africa, 169 municipalities out of 278 are water services authorities. These constituted six metros, 21 district municipalities (mostly in rural areas in former bantustans), and 142 local municipalities. Municipalities can also solicit a public or private WSP to provide water and sanitation services. The regulatory framework provides a range of institutional arrangements to ensure service provision. Providers may include another municipality, a municipal utility, a multi-jurisdictional utility, a water board, a community-based organisation, a private company, or an entity owned by a municipality and national government (Toxopeüs, 2019a).

As WSAs, municipalities may only agree to contract a private-sector provider as WSP after considering all known public sector providers that can perform the functions (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The regulations set out are mandatory contractual provisions that a WSA must observe when contracting with a WSP. These include the range of services to be provided, specific targets and indicators, and the obligations placed on municipalities necessary to achieve the targets (Toxopeüs, 2019a). The appointment of service providers has been a contentious issue in contemporary South Africa as allegations of corruption and mismanagement have marred the process. The contract places a duty on the provider to supply services directly to the water users. The provider must prepare and publish a users' charter that establishes a system for dealing with their complaints and sets out their right to redress (Toxopeüs, 2019a). Consumers within the jurisdiction must participate in developing the charter.

The Municipal Systems Act (2000) mandates local governments to consult with affected communities on any issues related to service provision. However, municipal officials tend to function within their directorates without sufficient cross-directorate interaction (Haigh et al., 2010: 475). There is also a top-down approach in service provision, which contradicts the processes stipulated in the Development Facilitation Act No. 67 of 1995. The Development Facilitation (1995) states that an integrated development plan (IDP) must be prepared to ensure proper coordination and development efforts. IDPs are a very fundamental government mechanism to transform historical structural differences in South Africa. The IDP process is a core means of developing a community by promoting public participation in its analyses and planning phases (Geyer, 2006 in Haigh et al., 2010: 476). This process is a legal requirement of the local government. It capacitates officials and politicians on the importance of integrated planning and management (Haigh et al., 2010: 476). However, as the IDP is presently set out in the Municipal Systems Act (2000), it is not a prerequisite for water availability and demand to be considered during all parts of development planning. Furthermore, the IDP process does not mandate a discussion of how the development will impact natural resources. The IDP deals separately with services that impact water resources, including solid waste and management, and water and sanitation services.

It remains the South African state's constitutional mandate to provide water, though this is done through the DWS and the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). On a national level, and municipalities – which are representative of local governments. To resolve problems associated with governance, planning, and accountability within the context of service delivery, CoGTA was brought in with a long-term objective of improving the operations of municipalities (Toxopeüs, 2019b).

3.3.3. Policy Framework

Several policies have been implemented since 1994. The most important ones I will discuss are the Free Basic Water Policy (2001) that ensured that the HRtW could be realised even for disadvantaged communities from the provision of a basic water

allocation at the state's expense; and the two National Water Resources Strategies (2003; 2008).

(i) Free Basic Water Policy (2001)

In February 2001, Kader Asmal (Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry from 1994–1999) announced that the government would ensure that all disadvantaged households are given a basic supply of water free of charge (i.e. at the cost of the government). This culminated in the *Free Basic Water Implementation Strategy* document – a legal framework for implementation of free basic water is essentially that of tariff setting, which is guided by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996); WSA (1997) and the MSA (2000).

The FBWP (2001) was given legal status by promulgating tariff regulations in June 2001 (Muller, 2008: 74). According to the FBWP (2001), the maximum free allocation for water per household was pegged at 6,000 litres (6 kilolitres) of water per month. This free basic allocation was calculated at 25 litres per person per day for a family of eight. This allocation was insufficient as it lasted less than half a month (Mosdell and Annie Leatt, 2005: Bond and Dugard, 2008; Muller, 2009). People without money then had to wait until the next month when a FBWP allocation was credited. This meant that in post-apartheid South Africa, some citizens could not access their HRtW, raising tensions between the new citizens and the new state.

(ii) National Water Resources Management Strategy

The National Water Resources Management Strategy (NWRMS) determines how South Africa's water resources are developed, protected and managed sustainably. The strategy identified through which this will be accomplished: improved institutional framework, strengthening sector capacity, and through various mechanisms and concepts, such as water re-use and water off-setting. The core objectives of the strategy are listed as follows: water supports the development and the elimination of poverty and inequality; water contributes to the economy and job creation; and; water is

protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled sustainably and equitably. Its major focus is equitable and sustainable access and use of water by all South Africans while sustaining our water resource (seeking to resolve supply-demand issues, water loss and water stress). Equity and redistribution will be attained through the authorisation process and other mechanisms and programmes, such as water allocation reform, financial support to emerging farmers, and urban and rural local economic development initiatives. The NWRS2 builds on the first NWRS published in 2004. It responds to priorities set by the Government within the National Development Plan (NDP) and the National Water Act imperatives that support sustainable development.

3.4. South Africa's shift from welfarism to neoliberalism

Since the insufficient provision of water to black communities was a defining factor of apartheid, asymmetrical access to water between the races was one of the core issues that the new South Africa government needed to address. From the end of apartheid, five key policies were introduced to redress poverty, inequality, and unemployment and contribute to socio-economic development. I will discuss each, where possible, pay particular attention to their core aspects as well as their link to the realisation of the universalisation of the right to water:

3.4.1. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994-1996)

Before the momentous 1994 elections, the ANC began implementing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which had a welfarist slant (Bond, 2007; 2010; Nnadozie, 2011). The programme was an initiative to provide citizens with "a decent living standard and economic security" (Seekings, 2011: 22). It resonated with the aspiration detailed in the 1955 *Freedom Charter*[28] (Sahle et al., 2019: 299). The RDP was the basis of the people's contract with the post-apartheid state (McKinley, 2004: 181). The programme was to ensure that all the citizens get access to the mainstream

[28] On June 25 and 26 in 1955, the Congress of the People adopted the *Freedom Charter* (the Charter) in Kliptown, Soweto. The Charter has been viewed as a "blueprint" for the future of South Africa, in which its "all-embracing content", have been subject to scrutiny (Booyse, 1987: 5).

economy and socio-economic rights, thereby reducing historical imbalances (Nleya, 2008: 270; Kgatle, 2020: 3). The RDP document affirmed a commitment to growth and development through reconstructing South African society and redistributing state resources (Chirwa, 2009: 183; Kgatle, 2017: 4). The state document explicitly noted the importance of an interventionist state that would be the focal point in the reconstruction and development:

> Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the State, a thriving private sector and active involvement by all sectors of civil society. The role of the Government and the public sector within the broader economy has to be redefined so that reconstruction and development are facilitated. In a wide range of areas, the GNU will take the lead in reforming and addressing structural conditions. In doing so, its guidelines will remain the basic people-driven principles of the RDP.
> (RSA 1994, Sections. 3.1.2 and 3.1.3)

The RDP ensured equality in accessing the state resources such as water, hence an active pursuit of the universalisation of the HRtW. The official RDP document stated that "[t]he fundamental principle of our water resources policy is the right to access clean water – 'water security for all'" (RSA, 1994: 28). The provision of water was in line with one of the ANC's first electoral promises - to provide a basic water allocation *free of cost* to all South Africans (Bond, 2007: 6). This was captured in the RDP document, which stated that,

> (T)he first priority is to begin to meet the basic needs of people – jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare.
> (RSA, 1994: 7)

The RDP document stated that "[w]ater is a natural resource and should be made available in a sustainable manner to all South Africans" (RSA, 1994: S2.6.1.). In pursuit of the right of access to adequate water, the RDP determined a minimum quantity of water that an individual should have access to a day in both the short and medium

terms. The short-term aim regarding water services provision was to provide all households with clean water supplied at 20–30 litres per person per day, within 200 metres. In the medium term, the quantity would increase to 50–60 litres per day available on site (ANC, 1994 in Sahle et al., 2019: 300). The RDP also mandated the establishment of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry tasked with managing water supply (Muller, 2008; Nnadozie, 2011).

The RDP document acknowledged HRtW was and the economic value of water and the environment. The document advocated for an economically, environmentally, and politically sustainable approach to managing South Africa's water resources and collecting, treating, and disposing of waste (RSA, 1994: S2.6.3.). Access to water was extended. Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance from 1996-2009), in his 1998 Budget Speech, noted that 1,2 million people had access to water for the first time (ANC Parliamentary Caucus, 2020). Even though the RDP programme attained milestones in social amelioration, the new government struggled economically. In 1996 the Rand fell by more than 25%, and the growth rate was just over 2.5%. Two years after the inception of the RDP, in 1996, the post-apartheid government abandoned the RDP for the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (Nleya, 2008: Mosala et al., 2017; Claar, 2018). The RDP was an ambitious welfarist programme that was unfortunately not supported by a sound economic policy (Eloff, 2011: 112).

3.4.2. Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996-2005)

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy was formulated by technocrats constituting economists, officials from the banking sector and three state departments, academics (Bond, 2010: 82; Mothabi, 2017). The inception of GEAR was influenced by the two Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Among others, GEAR proposed trade liberalisation, the deregulation of the labour market, and privatisation (Kgatle, 2017: 4). The South African government drastically decreased social grants given to impoverished people and in need of state welfare support and subsidies to local municipalities and city councils, supporting the development of financial instruments for privatised delivery. For

McKinley (2005: 182), this "effectively forced local government to turn to the commercialization and privatization of basic services as a means of generating the revenue no longer provided by the state". Trevor Manuel indicated that the GEAR strategy was "non-negotiable", and from this was nicknamed "Trevor Thatcher[29]" (Bond, 2010: 78). The strategy was described by some commentators as a "Thatcherite discourse of fiscal discipline and market forces" while conceding its "refreshing non-dogmatism" (see Eloff: 2011: 115).

GEAR has been considered "a turning point for economic policy planning in South Africa, when ambitious redistribution targets gave way to a so-called neoliberal economic policy approach" (Naidoo and Mare, 2015: 411). Its implementation was based on a belief that a "culture of non-payment" existed among urban poor black people. To encourage responsibility and facilitate social inclusion, people had to pay for basic services. Payment for services ensured the sustainability of basic provision for water and other services. According to Dawson (2010: 384), service delivery was no longer depicted as the government's responsibility but rather a right that individuals could access if they performed their civic duty of paying for basic services. Under GEAR, poor people who could not pay for basic services were very vulnerable because water supply would be cut once they had expended their basic minimum allocation.

Despite criticisms against GEAR, the ANC-led government continued its economic liberalisation policy from 2006 with Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). These policies were not more on reducing unemployment and promoting economic growth. What follows is an overview of the remaining policies.

3.4.3. Other neoliberal macro-economic policies (2006+)

The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) was announced by the Former Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, in 2005, only to be launched in 2006 (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017). Its main objectives were to

[29] Margret Thatcher was the longest serving British Prime-Minister in the 20th century who was a strong proponent of deregulation, a smaller state, free markets and privatisation - neoliberalism.

address poverty, unemployment, low salaries and wages, and poor economic growth, and AsgiSA envisioned poverty reduction by 2010 and halving unemployment by 2014. Although AsgiSA had new aspects, the overall framework was similar to GEAR (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017; Claar, 2018; Kgatle, 2020: 3). The policy was macro-economic and did not explicitly deal with issues around access to water. ASGISA provided an incentive towards South Africa becoming a democratic developmental state. It had the technocratic expertise to drive policy coordination amongst ministries through the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), improving through lessons gained from RDP and GEAR (Mothabi, 2017).

Intra ANC politics led to the ousting of former president Thabo Mbeki, and Zuma took over as the party's president at its 52nd National Congress held in Polokwane, Limpopo, in December 2007, becoming president of South Africa in 2009. Zuma replaced AsgiSA with the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 to redress poverty and inequality and pursue economic growth and employment creation through an infrastructural development programme (Mothabi, 2017; Kgatkle, 2020: 3).

The South African government introduced the National Development Plan (NDP) (2030) as South Africa's long-term socio-economic development roadmap in 2013. The NDP was the foundation of South Africa's future economic and socio-economic development strategy adopted at the 53rd ANC National Conference held in Mangaung, Bloemfontein, in December 2012. NDP, like the forerunners, was a programme set to ensure that all South Africans enjoy a decent standard of living through the eradication of poverty and reduction of inequality in 2030 (Mothabi, 2017; Rapanyane and Maphaka, 2017).

The ANC-led government's shift from welfarism to neoliberalism resulted in a policy focus on socio-economic indicators such as unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and external debt. Despite the progress regarding basic water provisioning, neoliberal macroeconomic policies restricting the gains (Sahle et al., 2019: 298) The demonstrated the state's ambivalence was on hand, a mandate and legislative framework were supporting the HRtW; on the other, there was an expectation for citizens to pay for

water. This contradiction was most evident in the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water in post-apartheid South Africa. The hydropolitics in South Africa have been influenced by the "talk left, walk right" approach adopted by the post-apartheid state (See Sahle et al., 2019: 301).

3.5. Water commodification and privatisation in post-apartheid South Africa

A consideration of the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water in post-apartheid assist us in understanding how the South Africa state has struggled to universalise the right to water in post-apartheid-neoliberal South Africa. The commodification of water - especially in the 1994 Water and Sanitation White Paper and a 1998 Water Pricing Policy - was meant to rationalise the utilisation of scarce water resources, starting with marginal-cost-based pricing (Bond, 2017: 8). The introduction of a free market, neoliberal, economy in South Africa resulted in intensifying budget constraints, cost recovery principles, lower levels of basic municipal services and cut-offs of services, such as water, to citizens who could not afford to pay (Ruiters and Bond, 2010: 1).

3.5.1. Conceptual differences: Commodification and privatisation

Commodification constitutes a social transition (Swyngedouw, 2005). Commodification is not a universal or uniform transition - it can happen in different ways, times and places (Alexander, 2010: 72). Even with varying degrees of commodification in terms of speed and geography, McDonald and Ruiters (2005: 22) contend that "the underlying pressures of commodification remain, with far-reaching transformative effects". As a process, commodification involves "the creation of an economic good through the application of mechanisms intended to appropriate and standardize a class of goods or services, enabling these goods or services to be sold at a price determined through market exchange" (Bakker, 2007: 450). It is "the transformation of an object or practice into a market good (or a commodity), that is, a thing that is bought and sold" (Walsh, 2011: 92). What makes something a commodity is the concretisation of its ability to be exchanged for other goods.

A broad definition of the term privatisation is "a process involving the reduction of the role of the government in asset ownership and service delivery and a corresponding increase in the role of the private sector" (Chirwa, 2009: 185). McDonald and Ruiters (2005: 16; 2006: 11) unpack seven different ways privatisation can be operationalised. In short, they contend that privatisation is not an "either/or situation", where the state exclusively owns and provides a service, or a non-state actor does so. It can be viewed as a continuum of public/private partnerships (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 15). Commodification and privatisation are not the same processes, but both are part of the same system (Flores, 2011: 3). Looking at water, on the one hand, water commodification attaches economic value to water, whereas water privatisation means having a non-state entity involved with a country's water services system. Water privatisation is essentially a formal change of management enabled by commodification (Alexander, 2010; Swyngedouw et al., 2003). Swyngedouw et al. (2003) sum this up in the following words:

> [W]hile commodification, on the one hand, refers to turning water from a public good into a marketable commodity subject to the principles governing a market economy (regardless of the nature of the ownership of both water and the water companies)[;] privatisation…refers to changing ownership of water infrastructure and/or the management of water services from the public sector to the private sector.
> (Swyngedouw et al., 2003: 129)

Water is rightfully a public and merit good, to which access should not be subject to monetary requirements. According to Brown (2003: 19), "commodification reduces to money the range of values humans hold with respect to water". What follows is a discussion of the privatisation of water in South Africa.

3.5.2. The privatisation of water

Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, privatisation has been viewed globally as part of a larger reform package that stabilises economies and creates growth. These reforms were based on the rationale in new economic theory that state planning and expenditure were often less efficient than private actors operating in a free market. Reforms, such as deregulation, reducing public expenditure and privatising publicly owned industries in

the *Global South*, were recommended by Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with the United States (US) government (Hartwick and Peet, 1999; Bond, 2017).

The privatisation debate in South Africa is far from new, although it has received heightened attention in the post-apartheid era. During its final stages the apartheid regime had already started experiencing pressure from the business community to privatise state enterprises (Chirwa, 2009: 181). From the late 1990s, some municipalities privatised public water utilities by contracting multinational water companies. For example, the provision of water and sanitation services in three Eastern Cape municipalities, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown and Stutterheim, became the first basic municipal services to be privatised in 1992, 1993 and 1994, respectively, LyonnaiseWater Southern South Africa, restructured in 1996 as Water and Sanitation Services South Africa[30] (WSSA), was the private actor that won the relevant management contracts (Ruiters, 2002: Chirwa, 2009). In 1999 BiWater, a British-based multinational corporation, was awarded a 30-year contract to provide water services to Nelspruit. BiWater and SAUR International, another multinational corporation, were awarded contracts to provide water and sanitation services to the Dolphin Coast and Durban in the same year.

In 2001, this was extended to Johannesburg, and WSSA got the contract to provide water services (Chirwa 2009: 184) and install a water prepaid meter system in South Africa. French-based Suez controlled the Johannesburg Water Management (JOWAM) from 2001-06. JOWAM managed Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd., established in December 2000 to discharge the City of Johannesburg's water service delivery functions (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 5). There is extant literature on the processes in which the privatisation of water in South Africa transpired (see Ruiters, 2002: Chirwa et al., 2004); Ruiters, 2004; McKinley, 2005; Bakker, 2010; Bayliss, 2016).

[30] Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) Lts (WSSA) was a subsidiary of the French company Lyonnaise Water Southern Africa (Ruiters, 2002: 42).

3.5.3. The impact and effects of water privatisation

The neoliberalisation of the South Africa economy led to the introduction of a cost recovery policy for service provision. McDonald (2002: 18) states that cost recovery in "simple" terms is "the recovery of all, or most, of the cost associated with providing a particular service by a service provider…[T]he objective is to recoup the full cost of production". Consumers had to pay for the associated costs of water infrastructure, which led to huge increases in the price of water (McKinley, 2004: 189).

The effects of privatisation were catastrophic, especially on the poor, as they had to pay far more than they ever had to for water. Township residents frequently pay higher rates for services than those living in former "white" areas (Ruiters, 2002; McKinley, 2004; Hart, 2006). For example, McKinley (2004: 189) notes that in 1993, black townships around Fort Beaufort were charged a monthly flat rate of R10,60 for all services, including water and refuse removal. With privatisation, from 1994-1996, service charges went up by almost 600% to R60,00 per month. Furthermore, a 100% increase in water connection costs was imposed (McKinley, 2004: 190). Residents in black communities could not afford the new tariffs as they were far more than what was being charged in non-privatised towns (Ruiters, 2002: 46).

The process of water privatisation in South Africa has had enduring negative ramifications on water users, particularly how cost recovery was implemented. Cost recovery methods have raised profound questions about the Human Right to Water (HRtW) in South Africa. Some steps documented in the early 2000s were disconnecting water services, and with a growing number of "delinquents", it may have been closing off water from a couple of weeks to months, and in some cases, the permanent removal of water infrastructure (McDonald, 2002: 19). Cost recovery policies have been "inhumane" regarding the lack of empathy regarding disconnections (Loftus, 2005; Hellberg, 2015). Between 1999-2001 close to 160,000 households in Cape Town and Tygerberg were disconnected due to non-payment (Chirwa, 2009: 197; Dugard, 2016: 12). Cape Town alone had almost 100,000 households disconnected for non-payment (Fjeldstad, 2004: 560). Durban experienced between 800-1,000 disconnections per day

in early 2003, affecting about 25,000 people a week (Smith 2004: 182, Chirwa, 2009: 197; Dugard, 2016: 12). In Johannesburg, in early 2002, officials were disconnecting more than 20,000 households per month from power and water (Bond and Dugard, 2008: 6).

A 2002 survey estimated that between 2000-2001, about 7,5 million people experienced both water and electricity disconnections. These figures were contested by Ronald Kasrils (Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry from 1999-2004), who argued that the population disconnected in that period was much lower. However, Mike Muller (Director-General of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1997-2005) subsequently acknowledged that in 2003 alone, approximately 275,000 households had their water supply disconnected at least once due to non-payment. This affected approximately 1,5 million people. Furthermore, where the disconnection occurs via a prepayment water meter, and there was no process of administrative justice governing or recording such disconnections, which are informally referred to as "silent disconnections" (Dugard, 2016: 12). By the end of 2002, nationally, an estimated 10 million people had been cut off for non-payment of water services (Pauw, 2003; Sahle et al., 2019: 303). Disconnections continue to be routine. In February 2014, it was reported that 26,305 households had been disconnected for non-payment of water and electricity accounts in Durban (Bayliss, 2016). Bond (2017: 1) estimated that mass disconnections due to unaffordability affect more than 1.5 million South Africans each year.

Prepaid meters were introduced as a more efficient and effective way to manage and control water use. McDonald (2002: 19) stated that prepaid meters were the "ultimate cost-recovery mechanism". In a socio-historical account of metering technologies in South Africa, von Schnitzler (2008; 2013) described how the prepaid meter was proposed to solve non-payment of water charges. Prepaid water meters maximise revenue collection and minimise non-payment of water. A prepaid meter, therefore, has a dual function. Apart from measuring water consumption, it automatically disconnects users once they exhaust the allocation they have paid for (von Schnitzler, 2013: 671). Many municipalities favour prepaid water meters because the devices maximise cost recovery and decrease labour costs associated with reading meters and connecting and disconnecting water services (Dugard, 2016: 13).

The privatisation of water supply and corresponding cost recovery methods resulted in one of the worst cholera epidemics in South Africa in the early 2000s. In Johannesburg between 2000-2002, under Suez, a ravaging cholera outbreak devastated thousands of poor families in the township of Alexandra. Thousands of indigent families in the Alexandra township, Johannesburg, were also affected as members resorted to consuming water from nearby polluted streams (McKinley, 2005; 2009; Angel and Loftus, 2019). In KwaZulu-Natal, there was a shift from a free communal tap system to a prepaid metering system (Deedat and Cottle, 2002: 81). This led to cut-offs as poor communities could not afford to pay for water. There was a cholera outbreak in Ngwelezane in August 2000. Ngwelezane residents were cut off and had no choice but to drink water from the Umfolozi River and nearby polluted streams (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 7). At least 100,000 cases had been recorded by 8 August 2001 (Hemson and Dube, 2004: 4). More than 120,000 people were infected with cholera, and more than 300 died (McKinley, 2004: 184). The Department of Health (1999) (in Bond and Dugard, 2008b: 11) highlighted the lack of empathy that which the disconnections were done in the poor communities:

> It is common knowledge that lack of water and sanitation is a common cause of cholera, diarrhoea or other illnesses that afflict so many in our country and that there is a relationship between various communicable diseases, including TB, and conditions of squalor. Yet we often have not structured our institutions and service delivery systems in ways that can easily respond to these realities.

After the Kwa-Zulu Natal cholera outbreak, Ronald Kasrils oversaw the formalisation of the FBW Policy (FBWP) (Bond and Dugard, 2008b). According to the policy:

> The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry announced in February 2001 that government had decided to ensure that poor households are given a basic supply of water free of charge. He said that Cabinet had approved a policy to provide 6 000 litres of safe water per household per month…This standard relating to the amount of a 'basic' level of water supply, that is, a level sufficient to promote healthy living, comes from international practices and norms that recommend 25 litres per person per day. This amounts to about 6 000 litres per household per month for a household of 8 people. The volume of 6 000 litres per month was therefore set as the target for a 'basic' level

> for all households in South Africa using 8 as an average number of people per household.
> (DWAF, 2007)

The pursuit for profit resulted in the disregard for human rights linked to access to adequate water and sanitation. Whether multinational corporation Suez or corporatising KwaZulu-Natal municipalities and water boards which are moving to full cost recovery systems, there was no consideration or social responsibility for the social and personal costs of waterborne diseases as well as others like TB or other AIDS-opportunistic infections incurred by health clinics and the patients (Bond, 2017: 8). In Bond's words,

> A company making profits out of water sales feels no guilt when women and children suffer most. It does not repair environmental damage when women are forced to cut down trees to heat their families' food. It pays none of the local economic costs when electricity cut-offs prevent small businesses from operating, or when workers are less productive because they have lost access to even their water and sanitation.
> [Bond, 2017: 8]

Cost recovery directly threatens the fundamental notion that water is a human right to everyone regardless of income or financial ability. In support of this, Xali (2002: 101) stated the following, "[C]ost recovery undermines the human rights that the South African working class has achieved". Water policy becomes an area administered and managed through water meters, flow restrictors and money (Loftus, 2005: 250).

Some indigent households view prepaid water meters negatively, whereas, for others, they are useful devices for household budgeting. Residents in underprivileged communities generally view prepaid water meters as "inhuman agent[s] working within their homes" (Loftus, 2007: 47). "Water Management Devices" (WMDs) operate differently from prepaid water meters; flow restrictors limit daily usage. Out of anger and disappointment, the acronym "WMDs" has been reassigned to "Weapons of Mass Destruction[/Disempowerment]" (Donne, 2009; EMG, 2016; van Zyl et al., 2018: 17).

Indigent households ultimately view WMDs as a direct threat to life (Donne, 2009; EMG, 2016; van Zyl et al., 2018: 17).

The use of prepaid meters in post-apartheid South Africa has been argued to contribute to "water apartheid" (van Zyl et al., 2018: 17). Jegede and Shikwambane (2021) offer a contextual explanation of "water apartheid" about how "law and its application discriminates unfairly against certain populations", in which

> [d]espite the optimism that accompanied the end of apartheid regime in 1994 and the subsequent approval of the 1996 Constitution, unfair discrimination of the past remains noticeable in areas including access of disadvantaged populations to water. Arguably, this development constitutes water apartheid, a situation whereby the wealthy can pay to access water while the disadvantaged populations, mostly black populations living in rural settings who cannot afford the cost, are largely left to confront with and suffer lack of access to sufficient water.
> (Jegede and Shikwambane, 3: 2021)

For some scholars, the main cause of water apartheid is the failure of water privatisation in South Africa due to the adoption of neoliberal policies (Bond, 2004; Bond and Dugard, 2008). South African water apartheid is indicative of the vast distance between Pretoria's progressive water rhetoric and its pro-privatisation practices (Bond, 2004). The logic for privatisation went against the human right to water. This has raised deep questions on the constitutional right to access water and the states' responsibility to ensure that this right is "progressively" realised and redistributive water justice. The privatisation of water in South Africa has compromised public trust. It has made citizens come into conflict with the state since it is the state's sole responsibility to ensure that its citizens have access to safe and adequate water as mandated in the Constitution (RSA, 1996).

3.6. Gramscian and Foucauldian arguments in South African hydropolitics

The works of neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) and poststructuralist Michel Foucault (1926–1984) have been employed in South African hydropolitics to identify a "more diffuse expression of power at the microlevel and in the ways through which societies are ruled and governed" (Bourblanc and Blanchon, 2019: 6).

3.6.1. Gramscian arguments in South African hydropolitics

Gramsci is well known for the development of the notion of hegemony and offering a philosophy of praxis in his 1971 *Prison Writings*. For Gramsci, hegemony was a way in which a particular worldview was established with its acceptance by different groups (often against the interests of the individuals involved). He theorised hegemony as maintaining one social group's dominance over other groups through consent and coercion (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 702). Gramsci's philosophy of praxis roots the consolidation and contestation of conceptions of the world in everyday practices of making and remaking the world (Loftus, 2009). There is burgeoning South African literature in hydropolitics that draws from the theorisings of Gramsci (Loftus and Lumsden, 2006; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Loftus, 2009; Swatuk, 2010).

The first branch of South African hydropolitics centres on a neo-Gramscian perspective on state formation developed by Cox (1987) to demonstrate how state form has changed from the 19th into the 21st century (Swatuk, 2010). It is about understanding the contemporary South African state form and the issues it is facing regarding water resources management through the lens of history. Swatuk (2010) argues that in its evolution, the South African state behaviour reflects the competing interests of dominant actors in what Robert Cox describes as a "historic bloc". He demonstrates how various discourses – of progress, development, security – are brought to bear supporting particular practices. During apartheid, dominant actors justified harnessing water in the interests of socio-economic development, building an advanced and "modern Western state", and keeping white South Africa safe from communism and the "black peril". The

dominant actors of the post-apartheid era have altered this narrative: harnessing water for economic development, poverty alleviation and justice for all (Swatuk, 2010).

The second branch of South African hydropolitical analysed from a Gramscian vantage point focuses on the relations of power secured through material practices and infrastructural form. Ekers and Loftus (2008) broadly provide an analysis that draws from Gramsci and Foucault's work. They argue that by employing Gramsci's works and Foucault, one can arrive at novel insights that theorise the consolidation of power within liberal capitalist societies and attendant processes of subjectification. Drawing from Gramsci, Ekers and Loftus (2008) encourage us to think about how specific power techniques are connected to everyday practices and broader struggles for hegemony (Ekers and Loftus, 2008). From a Gramscian perspective, water infrastructure can be viewed as a part of hegemonic apparatus through which forms of "common sense", in support of a specific group's interests, come to be constituted (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 706). Ekers and Loftus (2008) are interested in urban water provision and the production of distinctive subjectives in the hydropolitics of everyday life. The employment of hegemony contributes to a development of micro-level hydropolitics as we "move from the grand displays of power represented in large-scale engineering works to the subtler ways in which power works through everyday hydraulic practices" (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 709).

The third and last focus on Gramscian insights employed to a better understanding the historical geography of struggles over water (Loftus and Lumsden, 2006; 2008). Drawing from the township of Inanda, in the KwaZulu-Natal province, political arrangement and service provision from apartheid, Loftus and Lumsden (2006; 2008) show how neoliberal hegemonic formations are temporary. Loftus (2009) argues that Gramsci's philosophy of praxis roots can be used to understand the consolidation and contestation of conceptions of the world in everyday practices of making and remaking the world. By collecting water, paying a bill or struggling to have a household reconnected to its water supply, worldviews are formed that articulate prior conception. Focusing on the informal settlement of Inanda, a township in the Greater Durban Metropolitan Municipality, he argues that 30 years of struggles over access to water have sharpened

critical insights into the current post-apartheid transitions. Activists within the community have sought to raise these insights as part of a radically transformative project. From this, Loftus (2009) argues that Gramsci's perspectives increase our understanding of conjunctural and a socio-natural reading of the consolidation of certain norms within society.

3.6.2. Foucauldian arguments in hydropolitics

From a governance angle, the hydropolitics in South Africa has been widely studied. Foucauldian authors demonstrate how studying water inequalities through focusing on expressions of power at the individual level and in everyday life does not only imply questioning water access but also analysing how such inequalities relate to definitions of "the self" (Bourblanc and Blanchon, 2019: 6). The use of the Foucauldian notion of biopower is well document (Bond, 2010; Bakker, 2012, 2013; Hellberg 2014; 2015; 2017; 2018; 2019; Bulled, 2015; von Schnitzler, 2016; Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). Foucault (1976) argues that the modern state exercises power through its ability to control the physical bodies of its citizens. Biopower is a positive force, and it manifests itself in a collectivised manner, exerting power over the life and life forces of a whole population. Foucault states that:

> We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other.
> (Foucault, 1976: 253)

While the term biopolitics refers to the regulation of populations at the general level, it is defined as a "modern form of power" which is manifest in "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault, 1976: 140). Biopolitics entails the strategies and mechanisms through which human life processes are managed under regimes of authority over knowledge, power, and the techniques of subjectivation:

> Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem.
> (Foucault, 1976: 245)

(a) The political and biopolitical nature of water

Bakker (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013) analysed water governance from a biopolitical perspective referring to South Africa. Bakker (2013) argues that water governance is "a form of biopolitics, based on the categorisation, quantification, and knowledge/power formation of urban residents in an attempt to govern their behaviour" (Bakker, 2013: 283). Bakker (2011) traces the process in which "public" water through the role and policies implemented by the World Bank from 1960 to the 1980s and how this can be understood from a biopolitical vantage point. Water is political, as much as it is biopolitical (Bakker, 2010: 190; 2013, 282). The political nature of water comes from the water cycle; people are linked to water as a resource and their interaction around its access and use. Water flows through different territories, potentially breeding conflict between up and downstream users (Bakker, 2010: 190; 2012; 616; 2013, 282). Water is political because it fuels the contestations of power and authority in different contexts (Bakker, 2010; 2013; 2012).

In South Africa, the biopolitical nature of water is evident through how states employ water management techniques and systems to safeguard and promote "the health and productivity of the population" (Bakker 2010: 190; Bakker 2012: 619). In terms of managing life biopolitically, water use is controlled twofold. Firstly, through "formal regulation", which is through state mechanisms and processes. Formal regulation allows the state to institute water governance systems that are codified into policies and laws. Water supply and sanitation projects are part of a means in modern public healthcare to control, manage and normalise the population (Kotsila and Saravanan, 2017: 2). Secondly, "self -regulation", or "self-policing", which is achieved through "cultural aesthetics of health and hygiene, ranging from entire bodies of water to individual human bodies" as ways of controlling water use (Bakker, 2012: 619; Bakker, 2013: 282). This "self-policing", or "self-regulation", entails that consumers regulate how they utilise

water, and this should ideally be in a "responsible" or "sustainable" manner (Hellberg, 2017: 68).

(b) Citizen/state relations within the context of biopolitics

In South Africa, water infrastructure as a biopolitical tool plays a critical role in public health and hygiene. Beyond this, water infrastructure is important in creating an environment conducive to moral behaviour (von Schnitzler, 2008: 908). The payment for municipal rates and taxes is an ethical obligation linked to citizenship. Unlike taxation, paying for municipal services establishes a direct fiscal relationship between the state and an individual household (von Schnitzler, 2008: 908). This relationship is based on trust that the municipality will provide water, and households will pay for services.

Bulled (2015) teases the limitations of looking at the citizen/state relationship from a purely biopolitical perspective in South Africa. She argues that biopower can be extended in societies with varying forms of alternative forms of authority. She draws from a case study in the Limpopo province, where there is a government system as citizens and the traditional leadership structure as subjects, operating concurrently (Bulled, 2015). In reconceptualising the link between biopolitics and state interactions, Bulled (2015) elucidates three composite cases of water citizenships based on female-headed households. The first one is a "rights-bearing citizen". Here, she argues that such a citizen holds the state accountable for their right to access sufficient water (Bulled, 2015: 538-540). The second case is one of a "responsibilized citizen". In this case, the citizen delinks from state service provision and finds a way to be self-suffice. Because they are financially well-off individuals,

> They drill private boreholes and self-purify the water, use prepayment rather than credit water meters to avoid inaccurate billing by municipalities lacking capacity to function effectively, install solar electricity rather than relying on the frequently interrupted municipally supplied electricity, and use cell phones rather than the government landline telephone system.
> (Von Schnitzler 2013, in Bulled, 2015: 541)

The last case is that of an "ethnic subject". Such a citizen uses freshwater resources within their proximity, such as rivers and streams (Bulled, 2015: 542). In some circumstances, they resort to rainwater harvesting or collecting surface run-off. They generally rely on community elders to represent them in their service delivery related issues with the municipalities (Bulled, 2015: 542). This shows how South African citizens straddle multiple political discourses and logics in their strategic and situated encounters with the new state, traditional authorities, and other sites of power (Bulled, 2015: 545).

In research done by Hellberg (2014), the association of water to "life" is explored in a biopolitical sense within the context of eThekwini, Durban. The state's control of water resources and services influences the lives and lifestyles of different populations. Some technologies involved to manage water use involve biopolitics since they are used for specific people. Indigent communities, for example, have prepaid water meters installed and water management devices installed (Hellberg, 2015; 2017, 2020). von Schnitzler (2008; 2016) analyses how pre-paid water meters in Johannesburg succeed in disciplining the body and regulating the population. Since most of these devices were installed in poor black communities, citizens "were encouraged to subject their daily actions, and indeed their bodily functions, to constant metrological scrutiny" to not use up their FBW allocation (von Schnitzler, 2008: 914). Prepaid meters were aimed to inculcate a "particular budgetary rationality" through which people could better manage water use. Water is "the single most important focus of biopolitical intervention" (Hart, 2010: 3). Hellberg (2017: 68) argues that the biopolitical perspective makes possible an inquiry into how different populations and different forms of lives are governed and the distinctions made between them. Water governance can also be understood as containing a disciplining aspect in terms of how it simultaneously targets other individuals, who, for various reasons, are separated from the rest of the population (Hellberg, 2015: 200).

To no small extent, the introduction of the FBWP demonstrated biopower over the population through the promotion of life by giving citizens a basic allocation of 25l of water per person monthly. In Foucauldian terms, this was a way of "making [people]

live". The biopolitical nature of the prepaid water meter and FBW allocation is also presented by Ruiters (2005), who argues that:

> Widely promoted as the 'ultimate solution' to non-payment, the PPM, and FBW have become a major state techniques in local political 'management'. Since consumers 'self-disconnect' the PPM strategy is 'debt-proof' and convenient for councils as long as consumers do not tamper with the system. The State also argues that the PPM is a convenient way of giving households their free ration of water. The ppm represents an ideal way to teach people to self-regulate and to know their place.

Social hierarchies also emerged in research on the biopolitics of water (Hellberg, 2014). Residents of poor communities would consider themselves lesser citizens as they have had to access water illegally or via a standpipe. Water is not only a resource that keeps us alive but also contributes to people's lifestyles, perceptions of themselves and their place in society. Second, the notion of basic water is related to social hierarchies in several interrelated ways (Hellberg, 2014: 10). According to their socioeconomic class, what is understood to be the basic functions of water services is relative to what people are used to (Hellberg, 2014: 10). She notes the unequal provision of water by using different technologies. Hellberg (2017) argues that different types of water infrastructure produced different water subjectivities based on access and provision by the state. Hellberg (2017) interrogates how people's access to water influences how they view themselves and locate themselves within the broader society. According to Hellberg (2017),

> [D]ifferences in access to water produce biopolitical effects. Such effects include a division of the population between those who are supposed to be content with survival and those who can enjoy a convenient and pleasurable life.
> (Hellberg, 2017: 73)

While residents of impoverished communities' associate water with their struggle to survive for "mere life", their counterparts in affluent areas view water as something that provides pleasure and a "good life". The link between social-economic positions and access to water also emerges in Hellberg's later work. She argues that scarcity in South

African water management has problematised the framings and governing of different populations in relation to their water use (Hellberg, 2020).

Water and biopolitics converge as they both centre on “life” and can both be viewed as tools that can be used for a "transformation of (human) life". In that sense, regulation of access to water is a perfect biopolitical mechanism (Hellberg, 2014: 2; 2017: 68). They were constructing water governance as a system, and water, as a resource, as biopolitical implies a link between the constitution and consolidation of political and economic power, on the one hand, and the control of socio-natures, on the other. Instead of paying attention to only physical infrastructures such as pumps and valves, the articulation between the water services infrastructure, water, rivers, the land, and farmers is significant in a biopolitical analysis of water service provision (Bakker, 2012: 619). Water is a mediated resource. The mediation often takes a socio-technical form; mains, pipes, valves, and meters are central to shaping water flow and how water is perceived and consumed (von Schnitzler, 2010: 9).

Marcatelli and Büscher (2019) propose a biopolitical notion of “liquid violence” about the systematic exclusion of some people from accessing sufficient water and how this should be considered a violent (in)action. In Foucauldian parlance, this type of violence represents the norm rather than the exception – something that does not directly kill people but creates the context within which their living conditions deteriorate. People are being “let die”. In South Africa, water access has always been associated with citizenship during the apartheid era where race was the denominator - the superiority of white compared to black South Africans was used to justify racially segregated water supply systems. In contemporary South Africa, people cannot access water due to structural inequality and are, in a Foucauldian sense, being “let die” – even though the state has no apparent intention to kill them (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). Even though the South African state is not deliberately killing its citizens, specific actions by government officials within a broader socio-political have had a profoundly negative effect on the poor (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019: 764). From apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa, the state has “biopolitically normalised” the neglect and further

marginalisation of the poor through a reform of public service provision (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019).

3.7. Reexamining facts and statistics about water access in South Africa

The post-apartheid state has achieved some milestones in universalising water access in South Africa. From 2006 to 2018, "access" to municipal water increased from 76,5% to 85,4% (Stats SA, 2019), an approximate 4,5 million increase in access to piped water from an estimated 9,3 million households in 2006 compared to 13,8 million in 2018. Even though empirical evidence shows that the post-apartheid government has made progress in rolling out water infrastructure in South Africa, the picture is more complex and varied (Angel and Loftus, 2019). Statistics illustrating water infrastructure installation are a proxy for "access to water" (Marcatelli and Büscher, 2019). Having access to water goes beyond installing pipes, valves and taps; people need to access water from the infrastructure. Dugard (2016: 11-12) presents the following seven counter-points demonstrating the issues associated with using infrastructure as a proxy to water access:

(i) Statistics on connections do not consider households connected to a water infrastructure grid, but the infrastructure does not function. Statistics also do not show the degree to which, in respect of each formal connection, there is progress in moving the water connection closer into the home;

(ii) Some households in informal settlements and shack dwellers generally do not have in-house connections. In some cases, they depend on water tankers or communal taps. Water tanker services are unreliable. Statistics generally do not show the scale of the problem of land-use areas with insufficient access – informal settlements and rural areas around South Africa;

(iii) Aggregated statistics on the roll-out of water services across South Africa masks the problem of geographic areas with unusually low access to basic water services such as the former homeland areas, such as KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape), which continue to have extremely low levels of access to adequate water provision;

(iv) Statistics on numbers of households having been connected to water services since 1994 do not capture all the households that have subsequently been disconnected due to unaffordability;

(v) The quantitative connection figures do not factor in whether the amount of basic water provided through the FBW reaches the intended beneficiaries or is sufficient to meet their needs. This problem has two dimensions – the low level of registration by formally qualifying households for the FBW (and other) benefits via the municipal indigency register; and the sufficiency of the FBW allocation itself, which is allocated per stand instead of per household or individual; and, finally,

(vi) There are questions about whether the FBW allocation is sufficient to meet basic needs. Even though the policy refers to "households", the allocation is actually per stand. This means that multiple households and individuals might share the allotment.

The contradiction between the statistics on allocation and actual access to water is partly explained by a noticeable decline in the rating of water service delivery by the municipalities from 73% as "good" in 2006 to 62% in 2018 (Stats SA, 2019). Paradoxically, the rating for water-related service delivery as "poor" went up from 7% to 11% in the same time (Stats SA, 2019). There is an inverse relationship between increasing levels of people's frustrations over water service interruptions and decreasing satisfaction levels for water service delivery. From 2011 to 2015, the number of taps that could not supply reliable water increased by almost 2 million (Muller, 2016). This implies that as more people get access to water in South Africa, water services have declined, which is directly attributed to poor water service delivery. In South Africa, rural areas (Muller, 2016; Mnisi, 2020) and townships (Muller et al., 2009) are where people primarily have poor water access.

Stats SA (2019) qualifies the functionality of municipal water supply services as the extent to which households reported receiving water from a municipality over 12 months before the survey. Of significance are interruptions that lasted more than two days at a time or more than 15 days in total during the whole period. Figure 2 below

shows an inverse relationship between the perceived quality of services and the number of interruptions.

Figure 2: 2018 household ratings of water service delivery versus reported interruptions per province



	WC	GP	RSA	KZN	NC	EC	NW	MP	FS	LP
Quality	87,3	76,9	62,4	58,8	49,3	49,2	46,4	44,8	41,1	28,6
Interruptions	1,4	5,4	20,3	24,9	35,1	33,4	37,4	47,7	21,6	48,0

Source: Stats SA (2019: 45)

The provinces with the lowest percentage of households that reported interruptions with water services were the Western Cape (at 1,4%) and Gauteng (at 5,4%), which also reported the highest satisfaction with water delivery services (at 87,3% for the Western Cape, and 76,9% for Gauteng). Conversely, provinces in which interruptions were frequent were less likely to rate water service delivery as "good". For example, in Limpopo, 48% of households reported interruptions, while only 28,6% rated water service delivery as "good".

While there have been notable successes in improving water access in post-apartheid South Africa, there are still pressing issues around inadequate access. Table 2 below presents a comparison of the primary sources of drinking water used by households.

Table 2: Households' primary sources of drinking water (2002 -2018)

Water source	Year									
	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2018
	Percentage									
Piped water in dwelling	40,4	40,1	41,2	43,6	42,8	44,6	46,4	46,6	46,7	46,3
Piped water on site	27,7	29,3	30,2	27,0	29,1	27,6	27,0	26,8	27,6	28,5
Borehole on site	2,7	1,6	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,4	1,9	1,8	2,0	2,1
Rainwater tank on site	1,3	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,8	1,1	1,2
Neighbour's tap	0,6	2,3	2,1	2,6	2,5	2,9	2,7	2,4	2,2	1,9
Public/ communal tap	13,6	14,8	15,4	15,6	15,5	15,8	14,0	13,2	12,3	12,3
Water-carrier/tanker	0,6	0,6	1,1	1,1	1,4	1,3	1,2	2,3	3,1	3,0
Borehole off-site/communal	5,9	4,7	3,3	3,5	3,2	2,3	2,7	2,1	1,6	1,5
Flowing water/ stream/river	0,7	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,2	1,6	1,7
Stagnant water/dam/ pool	1,4	1,0	1,0	0,6	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,1
Well	2,0	1,8	1,3	1,5	1,5	1,3	0,9	1,0	0,4	0,3
Spring	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,8	0,6
Other	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,4
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Source: Stats SA (2019: 42)

About 46% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings in 2018. A further 29% accessed water on-site, while 12% relied on communal taps, and about 2% relied on neighbours' taps. Although generally households' access to water improved, almost 3% of households still had to fetch water from unprotected water sources such as streams and rivers, stagnant water bodies and dams, and also wells and springs in 2018.

3.8. An overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality

During apartheid, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46 of 1959 re-labelled the reserves as bantustans. In total, ten bantustans were established. One such was Bophuthatswana. The bantustan constituted parts of the Orange Free State (now Free State), North West and Eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga) provinces. It was declared "independent" of South Africa in 1977, under the Presidency of the unpopular Lucas Mangope. He was an ultra-rightwing suppoter who has been dubbed "The Dog of the Boers" who pushed an exclusionary "Pan-Tswanaism" policy in the bantustan (see Lawrence and Mason, 1994). Bophuthatswana remained closely controlled by the apartheid regime and highly dependent on it, financially and politically (Francis, 2006:

9). In 1994, bantustans were reincorporated into South Africa, and political power moved to Pretoria (Francis, 2006: 11).

To contextualise this research, an investigation of expressions of citizenship in Madibeng hydropolitics, this section constitutes an overview of the Madibeng Local Municipality.

3.8.1. Madibeng's profile

The Madibeng Local Municipality is one of the five municipalities in the Bojanala Platinum District of the North West Province, South Africa. The remaining municipalities in Bojana: are Kgetlengrivier, Moses Kotane, Moretele and Rustenburg:

Figure 3: Bojana Platinum District



Source: RSA, 2021

Madibeng is comprised of a properly established and serviced industrial area, urban residential areas, and rural areas constituted of villages and farms (MLM, 2020). The most industrialised and densely populated centre in Madibeng is Brits, where its municipal offices are located. In this subsection, I look at five key items about Madibeng, and these are its demographic composition, its economy, socio-economic problems in the area; local governance and administration, basic municipal service provision and statistics on access to water and sanitation, and mismanagement of the local municipality.

(a) Demographic composition

According to StatsSA (2016: 13), the Madibeng Local Municipality had a population of 537,516 in 2016. Males were more than females and accounted for 54% of the population, whilst females were 46%. Table 3 below shows the racial distribution of Madibeng:

Table 3: Madibeng's racial distribution

Population group	№	Percentage (%)
Black African	492,073	92
White	38,332	7
Coloured	3,601	1
Indian/Asian	2,105	<1
Total	536,110[31]	100

(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 15)

The majority of the Madibeng Local Municipality inhabitants are black Africans at almost 92% of the population, followed by whites who are just over 7%. There is a relatively small population of coloureds and Indians/Asians, at just over 1% combined. Black people mostly reside in townships and rural areas, whereas most whites live in the suburban areas of Brits and on private farms. Coloured and Indian/Asians stay in mostly urban areas – suburbs and townships. The three most spoken languages in the local municipality were SeTswana (43%), followed by XiTsonga (11%) and then Afrikaans (9%) (StatsSA, 2011).

[31] The sum presented is incorrect and is actually 536,111.

(b) Economy

As an economic hub, Madibeng prides itself on several activities that play a significant role in the growth and development of the province and country as a whole. In 2013, the Madibeng Local Municipality's economy was valued at almost R550 million (Urban Econ, 2016: 13). The local municipality contributed 27% to the Bojana Platinum District's GDP, equivalent to 14% of the North West Province's GDP and almost 1% of the national GDP (Urban Econ, 2016: 13). The major economic activities are mining, agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing (MLM, 2015: 42; 2020: 15). What follows is a description of the major economic activities.

Mining is the most dominant form of economic activity in the municipality. Some of the world's richest platinum deposits and the largest chromite reserves are in Madibeng (MLM, 2015: 72). The mining sector comprises platinum-group metals and chromium and intensive granite and sand mining (MLM, 2015: 42). Other mining products include silica sand and vanadium pentoxide (MLM, 2015: 72). The mining sector in the municipality is one of the highest employment creators, contributing considerably to the local economy (MLM, 2015: 72).

According to the MLM (2015: 74-75), four distinct types of agriculture occur in the area. The first one is *intensive agriculture*, the main agricultural type, covering almost the southern half of the municipality. Practitioners rely on irrigation from the Crocodile River and the Hartbeespoort (Harties) and Rooikoppies dams. It covers 44% of the municipality's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). The region's second most common agricultural type is *extensive agriculture*, covering 18% of Madibeng's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). The extensive agriculture relies on the Moretele and Tolwane rivers for irrigation and rainwater. Game farming is the third most common form of agricultural activity, covering 10% of the municipality's surface area (MLM, 2015: 97). This occurs in the north-western sector of the municipality, bordered by Rooikoppies Dam and the Elandsberg mountains. The least common form of agriculture is *subsistence farming,* at 3% of Madibeng Local Municipality's area (MLM, 2015: 141). It happens mainly in the north-eastern sector of Madibeng, typically done by residents of

informal settlements. Subsistence farmers utilise land along the banks of the Tolwane River and areas surrounding Jericho (MLM, 2015: 141). The remaining 20% area is for non-agricultural activities.

The Madibeng Local Municipality hydrological system is composed of three dams and three main rivers. These water sources supply water for irrigation across the municipality. The rivers are the Crocodile, Moretele and Tolwane, and the dams are Harties, Klipvoor and Rooikoppies (MLM, 2015: 49-50). The Crocodile River is the biggest in the Madibeng Local municipality. It feeds into Rooikoppies and Harties. Moretele is the second biggest river in Madibeng Local Municipality, a major tributary into the Crocodile River. It feeds into the Rooikoppies dam. This river is characterised by subsistence and agricultural holdings (MLM, 2015: 51). Tolwane is the smallest river of the three.

As for the dams, the Hartebeespoort dam is located in the southern area of the Madibeng, between the Magaliesberg and Witwatersberg Mountain ranges. Water pollution is a big issue. The pollution originates from the Crocodile River. It is mostly caused by invasive plant species and fertilisers (MLM, 2015: 51-52). Klipvoor Dam is located in the northern area of the municipality. There is subsistence agriculture in the northern and western areas of the dam (MLM, 2015: 52). The Rooikoppies Dam is located on the north-western side of Madibeng. A part of the dam falls out of the municipality (MLM, 2015: 51-52). Like Harties, the Crocodile River is the only tributary into Rooikoppies. The dam shores are surrounded by intensive agricultural activity (MLM, 2015: 52).

Tourism, primarily based on the natural systems, plays a significant economic role in the municipality (MLM, 2015: 73). Some of the main attractions in the tourism sector are scenic routes, heritage sites, resorts and nature reserves (MLM, 2015: 73). The municipality has three major tourism attractions: the Magaliesberg Mountain ranges, the Hartebeespoort Dam, and archaeological and historical sites located in the Magaliesberg and Witwatersberg surroundings (MLM, 2015: 73). Other tourists'

activities include game farming around the Elandsberg area and the Klipvoor dam (MLM, 2015: 107).

In Madibeng, Brits is the manufacturing heart of the province. The development of a vehicle component manufacturing hub and a dry port for distribution processes (MLM, 2015: 23). Motor industry-related activities dominate the manufacturing sector (MLM, 2015: 23), while other manufacturing endeavours include metalworking, textile production, chemical industries, breweries, and bottlers. These secondary economic activities are generally linked to primary economic activities like mining and agriculture (MLM, 2015: 97).

(c) Socio-economic issues

There are no recent reliable statistics available on the unemployment rate in Madibeng. The last known unemployment rate was 30.4% in 2011 (with 38.2% youth unemployment). About 4% had become "discouraged" in their search for work (StatsSA, 2011). The unemployment rates were already alarming at the last census, and since then, the rate has gone up across South Africa. Madibeng residents' efforts to start-up businesses have been dismal. More than half of those who tried to set up small businesses failed within the first year (Worku, 2018: 99).

High levels of poverty have accompanied soaring unemployment. The poverty headcount in 2016 was almost 9%, and the intensity of poverty was just over 42%. Grants and subsidies received in the municipality as a percentage of total income was almost 39% (StatsSA, 2016: 14). Compounding poverty is the adverse effects of HIV and AIDS in the municipality. The number of HIV-positive people living in Madibeng equates to about 14% of the total population – a figure slightly higher than provincial and national averages (Urban Econ, 2014: 14). Furthermore, AIDS-related deaths account for more than half the deaths in the municipality (Urban Econ, 2014: 14). There is limited access to healthcare and education services. High rates of infection have been attributed to high rates of labour migration in the mining and agricultural sectors.

(d) Local governance and administration

Madibeng is a category B Municipality, functioning through the Executive Mayoral and ward participation system (MLM, 2020: 11). The municipality is demarcated into 41 wards, and the Municipal Council comprises 82 councillors (of which 10 are members of the Mayoral Committee), with a full-time Speaker, Chief Whip and Executive Mayor (MLM, 2020: 11).

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the local government has been led by the African National Congress, with the Democratic Alliance[32] (DA) as the official opposition. In the 2021 local government elections, the following were results for the three biggest parties: the ANC got 53%, followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters[33] (EFF) with 17%, and the DA with 14%.

Seven political parties have representation in the local government council. From the 81 seats, the ANC had 44, EFF had 17, and the DA had 15. Table 4 below shows the distribution of seats by the top three political parties in the Madibeng Local Council:

Table 4: Madibeng Local Municipality councillors from the top 3 parties

	Political Party	Members	Percentage (%)	Status in Council
1.	African National Congress (ANC)	44	54	Governing Party
2.	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	14	17	Opposition
3.	Democratic Alliance (DA)	12	15	Official Opposition

(Souce: municipalities.co.za)

The ANC-led municipality has struggled to provide basic water and sanitation services in line with the Constitution.

[32] Democratic Alliance Official Website.
[33] Economic Freedom Fighters' Official Website.

3.8.1. Municipal basic water and sanitation provision

The Madibeng Local Municipality functions as both a Water Service Authority and Water Service Provider, as per the Water Services Act No. 108 of 1997. Madibeng is responsible for the supply of potable water, collection, treatment, and disposal of waterborne sewage within its area of jurisdiction in a sustainable, hygienic, environmentally and socially acceptable manner. What follows is a critique of the municipality's water and sanitation provision.

(a) Water services provision

Madibeng Local Municipality states that it has made water services a top priority, seeking to address water backlogs (MLM, 2019: 40). The municipality affirms its commitment to ensuring its jurisdiction receives sustainable and quality water by prioritising upgrading and extending its water service provision infrastructure (MLM, 2019: 40). In support of this commitment, MLM refers to how in 2015, the DWS, in collaboration with the Madibeng Local Municipality, allocated R381 million to upgrade the Brits Water Treatment Works (BWTW). Another way the municipality sought to improve water service delivery was by upgrading water reticulation systems at Hebron, Kgabalatsane, Klipgat and Itsoseng, and drilling and equipping water boreholes.

Madibeng Local Municipality delivers 100Ml comprising of its BWTW, which supplies 60Ml, Schoemansville provides 10Ml, Rand Water 6Ml and 24Ml of potable water in its reticulation systems daily to its consumer consisting of mines, industry, commercial institutions, and households (MLM, 2019: 40). In 2016, 70% of households had access to clean and safe water in Madibeng compared to almost 30% without. Table 5 below shows the level of access to safe water in the municipality:

Table 5: Madibeng household access to safe drinking water (2016)

Access	№ of households	Percentage (%)
Access to safe drinking water	133,674	70
No access to safe drinking water	57,010	30
Total	190,685	100

Note: Total excludes 'Do not know' (14 416) and 'Unspecified' (2 372).
(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 46)

Statistics in Madibeng for access to safe drinking water are less than the national figure, as access to drinking water in South Africa was 89% in the same year (StatsSA, 2018: 41). This difference presents a different picture of the seeming successes that Madibeng presents. Very few households had taps inside their dwelling or house (n = 30,916) (StatsSA, 2018: 47). In the Madibeng Local Municipality, 61% of households accessed water from a tap inside their house or yard (StatsSA, 2018: 48). Worryingly, some households did not have access to piped water within their homes or yards and accessed municipal piped water via community stands, a public tap, and in some instances, from a neighbour's tap. This constituted almost 17% of the households (StatsSA, 2018: 48). A further 6% relied on water tankers to provide drinking water, mostly in communities without water services infrastructure. Borehole water users were almost 12% (StatsSA, 2018: 48).

More than 77% of households in the Madibeng Local Municipality did not agree to the statement that the municipality was actively trying to solve poor water service provision (StatsSA, 2018: 74). Sixty-one per cent "strongly disagreed"; whilst 16% were "disagreed". A meagre 18% agreed that the Madibeng Local Municipality was taking steps to resolve the area's poor water services (StatsSA, 2018: 74). A paltry 8% "strongly agreed". This indicates that the households in the Madibeng Local Municipality were disillusioned by the Madibeng Local Municipality's efforts to improve water service provision.

(b) Access to sanitation

Sanitation is another area intricately linked to access to water. Access to adequate water and sanitation significantly contribute to improved hygiene. Basic sanitation in the Madibeng Local Municipality was still a challenge in 2016 as only 42% of the households in the municipality had access (StatsSA, 2018: 50-52). These households mostly had access to a flush toilet. Due to increased rural-urban migration in the municipality, most informal settlements were located on unserviced land (Bond, 2014). The remaining 58% of households had inadequate to no sanitation services. More than half the households used pit latrines and toilets without a ventilation pipe in the municipality. About 2% of households did not have toilet facilities (StatsSA, 2018: 50-52). The table below demonstrates the distribution of households by type of toilet facilities in Madibeng:

Table 6: Distribution of type of toilet facilities by households in 2016

	Type	№ of households	Percentage (%)
Adequate sanitation[34]	Flush toilet connected to public sewerage system	52,782	27
	Flush toilet connected to septic tank/ conservancy tank	11,010	6
	Pit latrine/toilet with ventilation pipe	17,937	9
	Ecological toilet	150	<1
Inadequate sanitation	Pit latrine/toilet without ventilation pipe	99,367	51
	Chemical toilet	629	<1
	Bucket toilet (collected by municipality)	253	<1
	Bucket toilet (emptied by household)	458	<1
	Other	6,147	3
	None	4,630	2
	Total	193,363[35]	100

(Source: StatsSA, 2018: 51-52)

[34] Adequate toilet facilities are used as proxy for basic sanitation. These include flush toilets as well as ventilated pit latrines that dispose of waste safely and that are within or near the house. Inadequate toilet facilities include unventilated pit latrines, chemical toilets, bucket toilets, or an absence of toilet facilities (http://childrencount.uct.ac.za/indicator.php?domain=3&indicator=42).

[35] Total presented in the StatsSA Report (2018: 51) is 187,217.

Challenges regarding the poor provision of basic services can be linked to governance and management issues in the Municipality. The following section looks at issues around mismanagement at the Madibeng Local Municipality, paying attention to the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA).

3.8.2. Mismanagement at the Madibeng Local Municipality

A look into the AGSA's Reports shows that Madibeng has been one of the most financially mismanaged[36] municipalities in the country. The North West province failed to provide one municipality with a clean audit in five financial years from 2015/16 (AGSA; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021). From the 2015/16 until the 2018/2019 financial year, the Madibeng Local Municipality was consistently among the top three municiaplities in the country with the highest unauthorised expenditure. In the 2015/16 financial year, unauthorised expenditure was R796 million (AGSA, 2017: 53), it went down in the 2016/17 financial year at R561.9 million (AGSA, 2018: 74). The AGSA (2018) report also detailed fraudulently issued MLM credit cards and unauthorised monthly deductions made from the MLM's bank account (AGSA, 2018: 74; Montsho, 2018b). The 2017/18 year presented the same challenges, and this financial year outcomes were the worst since the 2012/13 financial year (AGSA, 2019: 144). This outcome was,

> [A] clear indication of the deteriorating accountability, a blatant disregard of our [i.e. the Auditor General's Office] messages and recommendations, complacency and a lack of commitment to decisively address key areas of concern as well as a lack of political will to effect consequences.
> (AGSA, 2019: 144)

In 2017/8, about 16 municipalities across South Africa invested an estimated R1.6 billion with the now-defunct Venda Building Society[37] (VBS) Mutual Bank (AGSA, 2019: 10). The investments were in contravention of the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003. Five municipalities in the North West Province were

[36] Financial mismanagement entails failure to comply with legislation, specifically in the areas of unauthorised, irregular as well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure; procurement; and contract management.
[37] I conducted my fieldwork between September 2018 and April 2019 in Madibeng. The time coincided with the unravelling of the VBS (Bank) Saga, also referred to as the *#VBSBankHeist*. This issue made headlines in South Africa from late 2018 to late 2019.

implicated for investing R551.2 billion with VBS, and these were Madibeng, Mahikeng, Mompati, Moretele, and Dr Ruth Segomotsi (AGSA, 2019: 144). Such actions contributed to the municipality's inability to provide basic services (AGSA, 2019: 145).

Matters did not improve in the following financial year as the municipality showed a deficit of R1.1 billion in the 2018/9 financial year. About R31.5 million in VBS Mutual Bank was written off as a financial loss. The AGSA (2020) also highlighted a significant problem in terms of debt collection, with R1.7 billion of the consumer debtors of R2 billion (approximately 85% of all debts) being impaired due to it being unlikely to be collected (AGSA, 2020: 120).

The AGSA Office has struggled to work with the municipality's officials. Political instability and the tone and attitude of political leaders in the municipality created "an environment that is not conducive to accountability, good governance and effecting consequences (AGSA, 2019: 144). Municipal staff's intimidation and scare tactics resulted in the audit team withdrawing and further involvement in the South African Police Service (AGSA, 2019: 144).

Systemic management problems at the Madibeng Local Municipality from 2010 have resulted in the entity being placed under administration as per Section 139(1)[38] of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) on several occasions:

(i) S139(1)(b)[39] was invoked from March 2010 – May 2011 (CoGTA, 2014b: 2; CoGTA; 2020). Erick Matlawe was appointed as an Administrator to oversee the intervention process for six months (CoGTA, 2014b: 3). The intervention was extended at the beginning of November 2010 and ended in May 2011, following the local government elections that were held on 18 May 2011 (CoGTA, 2014b: 3);

[38] Section 139 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) is invoked when a provincial government intervenes after assessing and concluding that a municipality did not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of both the Constitution and the executive obligation.

[39] Section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), requires the provincial government to assume responsibility because the municipality could not fulfil an obligation.

(ii) S139(1)(b) was again invoked from February 2014 - March 2014 (CoGTA, 2014a; CoGTA; 2020). This happened in February 2014, during a special meeting of the North West Provincial Executive Council. The intervention was effective from 5 February 2014, for a minimum of six months and a maximum of twelve months (CoGTA, 2014a). The Minister disapproved the intervention on 7 March 2014, in terms of S139(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) (CoGTA, 2014a). The Minister held that the challenges in Madibeng Local Municipality could be resolved through supporting it in terms of S154(1) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) (CoGTA, 2014a);

(iii) S139(1)(b) was invoked from May 2015 – August 2016 (CoGTA, 2020). The details of this are scant;

(iv) S139(1)(a)[40] of the Constitution from June – July 2018 (CoGTA, 2021);

(v) S139(1)(b) of the Constitution from May/June 2019 to June 2020. The intervention was for six months ending 30 December 2019. Municipal Council requested the MEC to further extend for another six months ending in June 2020 (AGSA, 2021: 84; CoGTA, 2021);

(vi) S139(1)(b) of the Constitution from August 2020 (RSA, 2020: 13; CoGTA, 2021); and

(vii) Section 139 (1)(b) was implemented from December 2020. Paul Maseko led the intervention team, which consisted of technical, financial, governance and administration experts, who would be there for a period not exceeding 12 months (RSA, 2021).

Allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement at the MLM culminated in Jostina Mothibe, the Executive Mayor, being removed from office through a motion of no confidence tabled by the DA, the Forum 4 Service Delivery (F4SD) and the Freedom Front Plus. The EFF abstained. The ANC's Joseph Ratloi was voted in as the new mayor (Montsho, 2021).

[40] Section 139(1a) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), requires that the provincial government issue a directive to the municipalities.

3.9. Conclusion

The underlying argument in this chapter is that hydropolitics is intricately linked with water governance. The pursuit of neoliberal macro-economic policies has left the poor struggling to access basic water services. While mandates supporting the right to water are available, macro-economic policies grounded in cost-recovery have caused the poor to struggle to access adequate water. The emerging literature on hydropolitics in post-apartheid South Africa was grounded in the debates on the commodification and privatisation of water. This literature assessed the problems that emerged as a result of the state adopting neoliberal policies. The effects of these policies were also investigated, particularly how water privatisation threatened the right to water. New literature emerged that focused on the adoption of Gramscian and Foucauldian frameworks in hydopolitics. What emerges from statistics on water access is the problem of using infrastructure as a proxy for access. The chapter closes with an overview of the research area – the Madibeng Local Municipality.

The next chapter is an explication and a discussion of how I embarked on the collection of data. I critically engage with the different methods I employed, justify my sampling procedure, and overall reflect on the whole process.

CHAPTER FOUR

Researching Expressions of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid Hydropolitics

"Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted."
(Albert Einstein)

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I systematically unpack the research design and methods employed to address the five objectives that I formulated to answer the research question. The first two objectives were linked to the residents of the three communities' perceptions of water services in the area and their coping when there were poor water services. The next two objectives were centred on citizenship and focused on how the residents viewed the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) as citizens, how they vindicate their right to water, and lastly, to contribute to citizenship theory. The main research question for this study was how residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics. I start this chapter by detailing why I adopted a qualitative research strategy when addressing the research problem.

4.2. Qualitative research approach

I adopted a qualitative approach. In this study, investigating expressions of citizenship within the context of water politics required that I "study phenomena through a person's perspective, paying attention to the context where they emerge" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 2). It was vital for me to see the world through the participants' eyes so that I would be able to "understand how people experience and interpret events in their lives" (Bernard and Whitley, 2002: 34); I engaged the participants in their "natural settings", allowing them to share their experiences, as well as gather data through other methods, all in an attempt to provide an in-depth account of citizenship and hydropolitics in the

three Madibeng communities. I wanted to understand the participants' experiences and their inner perceptions, attitudes, and feelings of reality on constructing and expressing their citizenship in hydropolitics (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). Since my research focused on the personal, subjective, and experiential basis of knowledge and practice, I adopted the following definition of qualitative research: "multimethod in focus, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to its subject matter" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 2). It was imperative to hear directly from residents of the three Madibeng communities how they have experienced access to water and how they expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng water politics.

Human beings are meaning-making animals. We attach meaning to things, events, relationships and the world at large to make sense of our lives and our experiences. Conducting a qualitative study enabled me to retrieve meaning from my participants' knowledge and experiences. In light of this, I adopted a social constructionist epistemology with my inclusion of, and emphasis on, multiple realities and subjective experiences. This, therefore, meant that my focus was on how participants constructed their own social realities and how their perceptions influenced their behaviour. Knowledge, and many aspects of the participants reality, are not real in and of themselves. For example, they held perceptions about the quality and quantity of water, their perceptions about the municipality officials, as well as democratic spaces o participation. These perceptions, views and beliefs were real to them because of a social agreement by the residents of Madibeng.

The adoption of a constructionist epistemology does not in any way suggest that social constructionism is a superior epistemology or that I disqualify other epistemologies; however, for this study, it was the most appropriate. Social constructionism attempts to "replace the objectivist ideal with a broad tradition of ongoing criticism in which all productions of the human mind are concerned" (Hoffman, 1990: 1). Therefore, in this study, it was imperative to understand how residents of Madibeng viewed the politics of water in the area. Through adopting a social constructionist paradigm, I was devoid of the notions of "truth", objectivity, and value neutrality. I embraced the notion that "truth" is elusive.

4.3. Data collection tools

This study's primary data collection tool was in-depth interviews, complemented by observation, field notes (journal entries), and photographs. What follows is an explanation of each data collection tool in detail:

4.3.1. In-depth interviews

Interviews are ideal for qualitative research (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 341; Halcomb and Davidson, 2006; Tessier, 2012; Hofisi et al., 2014: 60). In-depth interviews allowed me to solicit rich data from the participants (Easwaramoorthy and Zarinpoush, 2006): a "rich picture" (Fox, 2009: 7) or a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973). The phrase "thick descriptions" was first used by philosopher Ryle (1949) and popularised by ethnographer Geertz (1973). Thick descriptions are detailed accounts from participants themselves which aim to depict;

> [A] clear picture of the individuals and groups in the context of their culture and the setting in which they live…Thick description can be contrasted with thin description, [the latter] which is a superficial account and does not explore the underlying meanings of cultural members.
> (Holloway, 1997: 154)

The interview was guided by a list of questions, called an *aide-mémoire* or agenda (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 9; Young et al., 2017: 12; Fox, 2009: 18; Whiting, 2008: 37). The *aide-mémoire*, or agenda, is a general guide to topic issues we covered in the interview, rather than the actual questions I asked (see Appendix 2). It was open-ended and flexible. Unlike conventional interview guides, which provide some form of structuring to the interview process, the *aide-mémoire*, or agenda, did not determine the order of the conversation. I asked open-ended questions about the participant's profile and family or household dynamics, water availability and reliability, their perceptions of the state's role in water provisioning, their views about their citizenship status in the new South Africa, and how they find expression as citizens.

The *aide-mémoire* encouraged a certain degree of consistency across different interview sessions (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 9). In the cases where I picked up an emerging issue, I incorporated it into the following interviews. I adopted this tool to ensure that I give voice to the participants:

> Encouraging a dialogical approach is that it can further the aim of developing voice among those who have been historically silenced. The opportunity to speak, to question and to explore is an important aspect of the process.
> (Gitlin and Russell, 1990: 186)

Typically, the interviews lasted between 45 and 110 minutes. I used observations and recorded them in a field journal to complement the in-depth interviews.

4.3.2. Observation and field notes (Journal entries)

In the field, I also employed observation as a data collection method. By definition, observation is "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artifacts (*sic*) in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 79). Since the human mind has a fascinating ability to re-ordering material and drawing links from information collected within and outside an interview process, I recorded memories and ideas from the interviews when they were freshest in the form of field notes to try and avoid this (Tessier, 2012: 448). Field notes are gnomic, shorthand reconstructions of events, observations, and conversations in the field (Van Maanen in Wolfinger, 2002: 86).

Beyond jotting notes in the field, I dedicated my evenings at my accommodation to writing field notes. The field notes were critical in interpreting the audio recordings and making sense of the transcripts, as they reminded me of important situational factors during data analysis. Field notes were crucial because "ideas and memories from interviews will most likely be lost further down in the research process" (Tessier, 2012: 448). Field notes helped me maintain and comment upon impressions, environmental

contexts, behaviours, and nonverbal cues that the audio recording may not capture adequately (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 227). Some of the notes I took were about the differences between the communities – differences between posh suburbs I saw *en route* to Madibeng and the stark contradiction with townships and villages.

In the three research areas, I took photographs of the impact of water interruptions – storing water in containers, domestic work like doing laundry, and plants drying from a lack of water. Pictures and imagery complemented the field notes.

4.3.3. Photographic observation

Images helped me overcome most observations' fleeting nature as they helped me remember. For this study, I captured images of the September 2018 "shutdown" and different facets of Madibeng life, including water containers, water use by various residents, and faulty water services equipment and infrastructure – such as the state of a Madibeng water reservoir and its pump. These photographs also illustrated features of activities that were not easy to describe.

4.4. Research sites: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau communities

I narrowed my focus to the Brits Town Precinct situated within Madibeng Local Municipality north of Hartbeespoort Dam and adjacent to the N4 Bakwena-Platinum Highway intersection. The precinct covers an area of 54,47 km2 of the total of 3,839 km2 of Madibeng Local Municipality. The town area consists of Brits town, residential suburbs of Elandsrand, Primindia, the Brits Industrial Area, isolated townships[41] of Oukasie, Damonsville and Mothutlung, and farms in-between these areas (MLM, 2019b: 2).

The Brits area has a rich history of resistance politics evidenced by forms of expressions such as *toyi-toying* and non-payment of essentials like water. At the beginning of this

[41] A *township* in South Africa refers to an urban residential area historically designated for black migrant labour. Informal synonyms for township are "location", "*lokasie*", "*ilogishi*". Generally, every town/city has one or several townships associated with it, which are usually located in the fringes of the town/city (Stats SA, 2004: 15).

thesis, I detailed one of the most heart-wrenching protests in South Africa was the 2014 Madibeng protest which resulted in the police shooting of *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela. A week after this protest, another one erupted in Hebron and Jericho. Both areas had not had water services for months (Bond, 2014). In a 2015 incident, the SAPS arrested 26 protesters at another community protest linked to water service delivery. Seven women and 11 men were arrested and charged with public violence in Letlhabile, while two women and six men were arrested in nearby Damonsville (Khumalo and Tau, 2016). In September 2018, there were protests over the lack of water in Damonsville and Mothutlung, in which the police arrested 33 people for public violence (Africa News Agency [ANA], 2018; Montsho, 2018a; Nkuyane, 2018). The most recent documented protest in Madibeng was in November 2019, when Oskraal community residents *toyi-toyed* over the lack of clean water and decent roads. *Toyi-toying* is not only the form of expression; however, insurgent citizens have used it as the most effective way of raising grievances and demanding change, particularly because invited spaces have become "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (see Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). Beyond toyi-toying, it was also important to understand the process that led to citizens having to consider. What would be the other forms of expression they would have considered?

These three communities were carefully identified and selected for two reasons. Firstly, the communities are home to poor people located in the same municipality that has experienced tense citizen/state relations over water service provision. Secondly, the communities are serviced with diverse water services and sanitation infrastructure. Damonsville had inside taps and flush toilets, while in Mothutlung, some sections of the area did not have inside taps and flush toilets. Mmakau is a village – it is an underdeveloped community. There is one standpipe per household for water. Sanitation infrastructure in the village is very poor, and about 90% of households use pit latrines without ventilation. However, the purpose of the study was not to draw a comparison between the areas or the residents; rather, to explore how residents in three Madibeng communities expressed citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics. What follows is an image demonstrating the proximity of the three research sites:

Figure 4: An illustration of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau



Source: MLM and DALRRD, 2014: 4

(a) Damonsville

Damonsville was named after Isaac Benjamin Damons, a Dutch Reformed Church priest and political activist (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). Damonsville is located in Ward 21 (MLM, 2019b: 4). Its surface area is 1.91 km² with a population of 3,969. At the 2011 census, there were approximately 1,416 households (Community Survey, 2011). In 2011, Damonsville had more males than females, with a gender representation of 53% versus 47% (Community Survey, 2011). The area was built in 1990 for the coloured community by the apartheid regime (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). In 2011, the largest population group were black Africans at 71%, followed by coloureds at 25%. Most of the original coloured inhabitants came from Cape Town (Thembekwayo, 2010: 99). The ethnic groups living in the suburb were Tswanas at 38%, followed by Afrikaans speakers at 27%, Tsongas were 6%, Pedis and Sothos at 5% each, and Vendas, Xhosas, Zulus all under 5% (Community Survey, 2011).

In Damonsville, more than 80% of households had water from a tap inside their home (43%) or in the yard (38%). More than 17% of households accessed piped water from a community stand, and more than 1% did not have access to piped water. Eighty per cent of Damonsville households had a flush toilet connected to the municipal sewerage system. Approximately 19% of households used a pit latrine without ventilation (MLM and DALRRD, 2014: 14).

(b) Mothutlung

The second community was Mothutlung. The township had a population of 11,601 and an estimated 3,495 households. Its total surface area was 5,03 km² (StatsSA, 2011). It's in Madibeng Local Municipality's Ward 20 (MLM, 2019b: 4). It was predominantly a black African community, with 99% of its population categorising themselves as such (StatsSA, 2011). The largest ethnic group in the area were Tswanas at 73%, followed by Pedis at 6%, and Tsongas with 4%. There was an even split between males and females– 50% against 50%. This community was extremely impoverished. More than 30% of households in the area did not have a source of income (StatsSA, 2011). An overwhelming 99% of the population used municipal water in the community. Other sources of water were boreholes, water tankers and water vendors (StatsSA, 2011). Over 99% of the population had a flush toilet. However, some people used bucket toilets, and others did not have access to a toilet.

(c) Mmakau

The third and final community was Mmakau. Mmakau is a *village* with a population of 36,605 and 11,214 households, according to the 2011 census (StatsSA, 2011). The village has been under the Bakgatla ba Mmakau tribal authority since 17 June 1960 under the leadership of the Motsepe family. The area falls in Ward 18 (MLM, 2019b: 4). The area's population was predominantly Black African (99%), with Coloureds, Indian/Asians and Whites making up the other one per cent. Ethnically, Tswanas were the majority grouping at 63% of the population, followed by Pedis and Tsongas, both at eight per cent, and Zulus at three per cent. There were more males (53%) than females (47%)

(StatsSA, 2011). In 2011 Mmakau's household incomes states indicate that it was an impoverished community, with 17% of households indicating that they had no source of income (StatsSA, 2011).

Almost 77% of the population accessed municipal tap water. Nine per cent relied on municipal water tankers. Two per cent utilised borehole water, and another two per cent bought water from vendors. Almost three per cent of the population used water from unsafe sources like dams, pools, stagnant water, rivers and streams. Worryingly, eight per cent indicated that they utilised water from "other" sources (StatsSA, 2011). Mmakau's eastern side receives water from the City of Tshwane's North East ODI 1 Water Scheme (MLM, 2019b: 83). Toilet facilities in the area were appalling. Only three per cent of the population had access to a flush toilet. Ninety per cent of the population used a pit latrine without ventilation. Some people were still using buckets, and two per cent did not have a toilet facility (StatsSA, 2011).

4.5. Research assistants

As an outsider, I was not sufficiently familiar with the community dynamics, and I needed to find an assistant researcher who could help me navigate the research communities and collect data. My supervisor, Professor Mary Galvin, connected me to Siphiwe Mbatha – a research assistant who had a wealth of experience from working in the area of Madibeng. He had assisted Professor Galvin in her work in the area. Mr Mbatha was fluent in English, Afrikaans, SeTswana, as well as IsiZulu – languages spoken in the three communities.

I conducted most of the interviews in English. Where interviews needed to be conducted in Afrikaans or Setswana, I was assisted by Mr Mbatha, who conducted the interviews and translated them to English. Unfortunately, Mr Mbatha could not assist me for the full duration of the data collection process. To fill this void, I recruited Andrew Didibane – a Damonsville resident – to assist me with conducting Afrikaans and Setswana interviews. He met the criteria of a research assistant for this project – he was a matriculant, fluent in English, Afrikaans and Setswana, and had a good

understanding of the area and the people. Furthermore, he intimately knew water services issues and people's general perceptions about these issues. Mr Didibane conducted interviews in the remaining areas of Mothutlung and Mmakau in Afrikaans and Setswana and also transcribed them.

All of the interviews were done in my presence, and if there was a question which either Mr Mbatha or Mr Didibane could not respond to, I would be there to answer it. Based on my previous experiences working with researchers during my master's research, I advised Mr Mbatha or Mr Didibane to state what the participants had said in English so that the participants' phraseology could be maintained (Kumar, 1989: 21). This generally meant that interviews in Afrikaans and SeTswana took much longer to complete than the English ones.

I met Mr Mbatha and Mr Didibane on 9 September 2018 and 5 January 2019, respectively, to do interview training. Before conducting the interviews, the research assistants had to understand the study's objectives fully. To ensure that I addressed the most important aspects of the research, I met them for a "workshop". I used a copy of my research proposal and the interview guide as discussion documents of the study. I addressed all the issues they raised, reflecting on the research's objectives. The session with Mr Mbatha lasted about four hours, and we met at a restaurant in Robertsham, close to Johannesburg CBD. I met with Mr Didibane at his home, and I brought lunch for us. This session lasted five hours – we went on to discuss Madibeng politics, his upbringing in the area and his family's dynamics.

4.6. Selection of participants

When employing a qualitative approach, non-probability sampling methods generally suffice. I used purposive sampling as I needed to identify participants who would clarify or deepen our understanding of how they construct and reconstruct their expressions of citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning in Madibeng. Purposive sampling involves identifying and selecting participants who are especially

knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest. In support of this Denscombe (2010: 34-35) states that,

> Purposive sampling operates on the principle that we can get the best information through focusing on a relatively small number of instances deliberately selected based on their known attributes…the sample is 'hand-picked' for the research…

Neuman (2003: 231) buttresses this indicating that, purposive can be used when "a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation". He draws from a study conducted by Hochschild's study in which 28 people were intensively interviewed about their beliefs. She selected her participants based on incomes and gender (Neuman, 2003: 231).

In this study, participants were selected and recruited based on two specified characteristics which were important in this research. Firstly, participants had to be a household head or, in their absence, the next most senior person. Being a household head is linked to age and income. Heads are generally the decision-makers in households and bear most of the responsibilities associated with it and its members. In the head's absence, the next most senior person was interviewed. This person should have a good grasp of household dynamics. Within the context of access to water, heads and senior members of the households would be responsible for paying bills, including that of water, finding alternative sources of water during an interruption and having the capacity to participate politically in citizens issues. With almost 50% of households headed by women in South Africa, it was also important to have a sample of about half who were women. The gendered nature of domestic and care work means that most people affected are women. Women typically spend disproportionately more time on unpaid domestic and care work than men.

The second characteristic is that they should have resided in their respective community for at least four years. People who lived in the communities for more than four years would be aware of the 2014 killings and might even have been part of the protesters. These people would have had a decent experience living in the communities to shed

their own experiences of water service provision and means and ways through which, individually and collectively, they have embarked on to express themselves as citizens in a new South Africa.

Having identified a potential participant, the two questions I asked initially were whether the person I was talking to was a senior member of the household and their length of stay in the community. If they were a senior member of the household and had resided in the community for at least four years, I would proceed to interview them.

4.7. The three phases of data collection

Data collection transpired in three distinct phases, and in each, it required that I remain in the research areas for about a week. This process spanned from mid-September 2018 to the end of February 2019. We conducted the interviews between 09:00-18:00. Here are the phases:

4.7.1. Phase 1: Data collection in Damonsville (12 to 18 September 2018)

On the morning of 11 September 2018, Mr Mbatha and I left for Damonsville, Madibeng. This maiden trip was a result of months of careful planning. The eve before our departure, Mr Mbatha contacted me via text. He indicated that he had been advised by his contacts in Madibeng that there would be a "shutdown" protest in the Brits central business district area – Madibeng's main city-centre. Below is an image on the *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group on 11 September 2018 advising members of an organised shutdown protest – see Figure 5 below:

Figure 5: Madibeng "shutdown"

Source: The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group

Knowing how community protests in the area have unfolded in the past – the destruction of property and worse, loss of life - I was gripped by fear. Mr Mbatha assured me that we would be safe in Madibeng. As he is an experienced researcher, I followed his advice.

The trip to Madibeng was a peculiar one. As we entered the North West province, we were greeted by peaceful and tranquil golf estates in the Magaliesburg area with well-manicured greeneries and golf courses with undulating fairways and greens. We also saw vast farmlands under irrigation. Brits was different. The area was littered, dry and dusty. Mr Mbatha directed me to the Madibeng Local Municipality offices in Brits CBD. As we got closer to the offices, there was a heavy police presence, and Brits had been

"shutdown" by protestors. We were greeted by a tense and eerie atmosphere as we passed through the offices. The police had cordoned off the municipality, and protestors were requested to be away from the building. Figure 6 below shows the entrance of the MLM building:

Figure 6: Madibeng Local Municipality main entrance in Brits

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A stone's throw from the offices, there were scores of protesters armed with *pangas* and knobkerries singing and chanting revolutionary songs – see Figure 7 below:

Figure 7: Scores of protesters in Brits

Witnessing all of this, I intuitively switched on the car radio and tuned to a local news station. A news reporter broadcast that Damonsville and Mothutlung residents were demanding the immediate restoration of water services, and a protester had thrown a petrol bomb at a vehicle. We cautiously proceeded to exit Brits CBD, proceeding to Damonsville. We saw a convoy of about six or seven Thari busses full of protesters whom we learnt were also participating in this "shutdown" protest. Below is an image of a Thari bus headed to the MLM:

Figure 8: A Thari bus ferrying protesters *en route* to Madibeng offices

The tarmac to Damonsville was full of debris: bricks, concrete blocks, rocks, sticks and branches, and smouldering tyres – a scenery which bore an uncanny resemblance to the scenes of spectacular violence in the townships which rendered them ungovernable in the mid-1980s. The burning of tyres in South Africa is very symbolic. During apartheid, protesters barricaded roads with bricks, concrete blocks, burning tyres, and other debris to prevent apartheid security forces from entering townships and other informal settlements – see Figure 9 below:

Figure 9: Debris along Spoorweg Street, Damonsville

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By the end of that day, the SAPS had recorded many violent incidents. According to the police, a driver of a moving vehicle discharged his gun at protesters. In another incident, several protesters were hurt in a violent attack, and arsonists torched two vehicles (ANA, 2018; Montsho, 2018a; Nkuyane, 2018). This "shutdown" had gained enormous publicity from social media, radio, print media and even television broadcasts.

In Damonsville, we left on 18 September 2018, having conducted 12 interviews: six with men and six with women. Interviews were conducted by participants who were residents spread across the township. When I arrived with Mr Mbatha, we went and parked close to a *spaza*[42] shop. From there, we disembarked and approached houses in surrounding areas. We ensured that the people interviewed were not on the same road or street. We interviewed residents of the *die wit huise*, "the white houses". This part of Damonsville was built during apartheid when the location was established as a Coloured area. The houses were identical, small and painted white. The colloquial name of this are, *die wit huise*, came from the colour of the houses. The area has remained

[42] A *spaza* shop is an informal convenience shop business in South Africa.

predominantly Coloured. We also interviewed residents of the "new area", the part built after the end of apartheid. Residents of this area were mostly Black Africans. This information was collected during the interviews for this research.

Our attempts to interview people in Damonsville were not always positively received. I had one unfortunate incident in Damonsville. I approached a group of about seven youth to interview them, and they treated me with great suspicion, scepticism, and even hostility. As an outsider, they assumed that I was affiliated with the ANC's ruling party, which they blamed for the current crises around service delivery. I explained to them why I was in the area and my study's purpose. They declined to participate as they believed my study would expose them and make them vulnerable to victimisation.

4.7.2. Phase 2: Data collection in Mothutlung (7 to 13 January 2019)

The second phase of data collection in Mothutlung commenced on 7 January 2019. Mr Mbatha was, unfortunately, unable to join me during this trip. When Mr Mbatha advised me of his unavailability, I reached out to Mr Didibane, whom I had been in contact with since I left Madibeng. I advised Mr Didibane of my predicament and kindly requested him to step in and assist as a research assistant, and he accepted. The drive from Johannesburg to Madibeng was never going to be the same for me. This time around, the contradiction between lavish estates in Madibeng versus the area where I was conducting my fieldwork was more apparent. The green manicured grasslands in residential estates and farms going to Madibeng; against the dry and desolate landscape in Damonsville and surrounding areas were ingrained in my mind. I went straight to Mr Didibane's home in Damonsville. I was there at around 10:00 am, and we both made our way expeditiously to Mothutlung. We started at a homestead of an acquaintance of his whom he had asked to assist us. His colleague was, unfortunately, not there.

From there, we had to improvise. We cautiously approached homes where people were outside, introduced ourselves and the purpose of my research. Participants who were selected were from different areas in Mothutlung. Like in Damonsville, we drew participants from different sections of the community.

Overall, the experience in Mothutlung was somewhat different from Damonsville. Participants in Mothutlung were more at ease to talk to us, and in the week I was there with Mr Didibane, there was not a moment when I felt uneasy, unsafe or afraid. By 13 January 2019, we had conducted eight in-depth interviews in the area with six men and two women.

4.7.3. Phase 3: Data collection in Mmakau (18 to 25 February; 16 April 2019)

I returned to Madibeng on 18 February 2018 to conduct the last set of interviews with general participants from Mmakau. Mr Didibane assisted me. Mmakau residents were quite keen to talk to us about water issues in their community. Mmakau was a peculiar site – there were no tarred roads, and some households did not even have standpipes. We made our way into the community on foot because only vehicles with a high ground clearance could drive there – 4X4s and *bakkies*[43]. We conducted seven interviews with five women and two men. The image below is Mr Didibane and me in Mmakau doing fieldwork:

[43] *Bakkie* (plural *bakkies*) – Is a South African/Namibian term referring to a pick-up truck.

Figure 10: Selfie of myself and Mr Didibane in Mmakau

As a qualitative researcher, it was essential to consider saturation in light of my study. The principle of data saturation determined the final number of participants in the respective communities. Data saturation is when the data collection process no longer yields new or different findings (Charmaz, 2006: 113). Data saturation is a critical factor in qualitative research (Mason, 2010). Achieving saturation is the "gold standard" in qualitative research (Vasileiou et al., 2018). The quality of data (i.e. its *richness*) illuminated important aspects of how residents of Madibeng expressed citizenship within the context of local hydropolitics (Morse, 2000). The quantity of the data (i.e. *thickness*) demonstrated how the participants shared some of the experiences and perceptions of water services from the local municipality (Morse, 2000). I reached the point of data saturation after about the twenty-fifth interview.

4.8. Participants' profiles

In this section, I present the biographical profiles of the participants in the study. The profiles provide demographic information about the participants. Bloomberg and Volpe (2018: 118) argue that demographic information such as sex, age, employment and length of stay describes the participants. The significance of this information in the study is that it is a framework that assisted me in explaining the participants' perceptions and allowing for a comparison of views amongst them. The following is a discussion of the participants' profiles per area:

4.8.1. Damonsville participants

Mr Mbatha and I conducted twelve in-depth interviews in Damonsville. The participants were split evenly between the genders – there were six men and six women who took part. Given that I assured confidentiality in this study, all participants were referred to by pseudonyms. Only two of the six men were formally employed – Andre and Kgothatso. *Andre* was a 33-year-old chef. His parents came to Damonsville from Mahikeng when he was only three. The restaurant he worked at had implemented rotational shifts because business was slow, so we found him at home on that day. Andre took care of his daughter, his ill mother, as well as two nieces. He parted ways with the mother of his daughter. *Kgothatso* was a 28-year-old mechanic residing in Damonsville. Kgothatso was cohabiting, and together with his partner, they had a daughter. His parents lived in the homestead's main house, with their two children - Kgothatso's two younger siblings. They lived in a backroom at his parents' homestead. The family had been in Damonsville for the past 16 years.

Taylor was a 25-year-old entrepreneur from Damonsville who operated a car wash. He indicated that he had gotten tired of looking for a job and a carwash business was his chosen route to try and make ends meet. Taylor was abandoned by his mother 16 years ago. When that happened, his grandfather took him in. He took care of his maternal grandfather, who was unwell. A few years before the interview, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) cancelled Taylor's grandfather's old age grant of R1,690 per month in error. SASSA had since requested his grandfather to come there physically and

resolve the issue; however, he had been immobile by that time. Taylor had not been able to resolve this issue by the time of the interview.

The oldest participant whom I interviewed in Damonsville was *Oupa* (Afrikaans for "Grandpa") Andries. He had just turned 75. He had retired and was doing "piece-jobs". He claimed that the opportunities were now fewer than before because African migrants – from Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe – working in the area were offering cheaper service rates. He felt quite aggrieved by this. *Oupa* had been in Damonsville for 30 years. He was taking care of seven people at his household – his recently retrenched 52-year-old daughter and her three children, as well as three other grandchildren.

Only two men, Armand and Eduardo, were not employed. They were actively seeking work; however, the circumstances in Madibeng were proving to be complicated. *Armand* was a 42-year-old father of four. His wife was the main-bread winner in the household as she was formally employed in Brits as a domestic worker. *Eduardo*, a 25-year-old Angolan refugee, was also unemployed. Their family escaped the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002) 18 years back. His parents found refuge in Madibeng with him and his twin sister. Eduardo noted that they had acquired South African citizenship. His parents resided at another house in Damonsville and left him to care for his sister and her two children.

None of the women interviewed in Damonsville had formal employment. The only woman interviewed with a relatively stable source of income was 28-year-old, *Ina*. She operated a day-care centre in Damonsville. She classified herself as single and had three dependants – her late sister's children. Her business had been in operation for four years and had an enrolment of 14 children at the time of the interview. Ina had been in Damonsville for 19 years.

Mmêmogolo (SeTswana for "Grandma") Mmabatho was 64-years old and stayed with her husband, the head of household. Their household consisted the two of them and three grandchildren. Fifty-six-year-old *Ouma* (Afrikaans for "Grandma") *Viola* was a former cashier. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Damonsville for over 28

years. She was a widow, taking care of her retired parents. *Ma'* (SeTswana for "Mum") *Londiwe* was a 54-year-old single woman taking care of her four grandchildren. She survived on the childcare grants she was receiving on behalf of the children, at about R400.00 per child. *Felicity* was a 24-year-old unemployed graduate taking care of two nieces. She moved with her mother to Damonsville 21 years ago. The last woman whom I interviewed in Damonsville was 46-year-old Myra. *Myra* was not married and had three children. Like *Ma'* Londiwe, she relied on childcare grants to survive. Myra had been in Damonsville for the past 19 years.

4.8.2. Mothutlung participants

In total, Mr Didibane and I interviewed eight participants in Mothutlung – six men and two women. Three of the five men were gainfully employed, and these were *Malomê* (SeTswana for "Uncle") Frank, Tshepo and Danny. *Malomê Frank* was a 59-year-old fitter and turner living in Mothutlung for 19 years. His wife and children stayed in another rural village. Twenty-six-year-old *Tshepo* was born in Mothutlung. He was single and took care of his brother and sister. He worked as a winch operator at a nearby mine. His mother lived in another part of the Mothutlung with his ailing father. *Danny* was a 26-year-old welder. Like Tshepo, he was single and took care of his three siblings. He relocated to Mothutlung in search of work and had lived in the area for four years at the time of the interview.

Ntatêmogolo (SeTswana for "Grandpa") *Joe* was a 73-year-old retired artisan. He was married and took care of eight grandchildren from a meagre old age grant of R1,700 and grants for two children. His children assisted him in taking care of his other grandchildren. Of all the Mothutlung participants, he had lived in Mothutlung the longest at 44 years. Twenty-eight-year-old *Tshepang* was married and had three children. He had been retrenched two years ago, and since then, he had been looking for employment – without luck. Tshepang had lived in Mothutlung from birth. The final male participant I interviewed was Mr Kalle. He was a 41-year-old community leader who was born in the community. He was married and had four children with his wife.

Ma' Tshepiso was a 48-year-old *spaza* shop owner married to a police officer. She had lived in Mothutlung for 22 years with her husband, and they stayed together with their three children. The last participant in this area was 60-year-old *Mmêmogolo Angelica*. She lost her husband twenty years ago. She was unemployed and caring for three grandchildren. The children were beneficiaries of the foster care grant, at R960.00 per child.

4.8.3. Mmakau participants

We were able to conduct seven interviews – five with women and two with men. None of the men had a stable source of income. Two of them were involved in "projects" to help them survive. *Thulani* was an 18-year-old dog breeder born in the area. *Thabo* was another young entrepreneur. He was cultivating grapes as a business. At the time of the interview, he was 18-years old, and like Thulani, he was born in Mothutlung. Neither Thulani nor Thabo had any dependants.

The only woman who had a source of income was 37-year-old *Valerie*. She was a shop assistant at a boutique in the Brits CBD. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Mothutlung for four years.

The remaining four women, Ma' Yolanda, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, were all unemployed. Ma' Yolanda was 55-years-old and had lived in Mmakau for 46 years. Of the whole sample, she had lived in the area the longest. Ma' Yolanda had neither close family members nor dependants to take care of. 48-year-old *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude was separated, and like Ma' Yolanda, she also did not have any dependents, and she had been in Mothutlung for 36 years. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere was a 53-year-old unemployed mother and grandmother. Her household had 11 dependants: two children in their early thirties, eight grandchildren, and her ailing husband. She had lived in Mothutlung for the past 36 years. *Mmêmogolo* Maggy was 53 years old. At the time of the interview, she had lived in Mothutlung for 28 years. She was married and had four dependants.

In total, 27 people participated in the study (see Appendix 3: List of participants). When I presented the findings, I developed a code that indicated the participants' biographical profiles. It consisted of a participant's pseudonym, age, sex, and area. For example, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy code was "*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau". I derived the participants' titles from how they preferred we addressed them.

4.9. Recording and transcription

In this research, 27 interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviews were conducted as follows: nine were in English, five were in English and Afrikaans, eight were in SeTswana, and four were in English and Setswana. Looking at the distribution as per community, in Damonsville four interviews were conducted in English, five were in English and Afrikaans, two in SeTswana and one in English and Setswana. In Mothutlung, four interviews were conducted in English, three in SeTswana, and one in English and Setswana. In Mmakau, four interviews were conducted in Setswana, two in SeTswana and English, and one in English.

Two recording devices were used for each interview – a Sony ICD-PX470 recorder, together with an iPhone smartphone as back–up in case one or the other failed. Participants' initial response to my request to record the interviews was generally met with scepticism and suspicion. I would then explain to the participants my reasons for requesting to record – so that post-interview, I could draw an accurate account of the interview from the transcribed recording. After this explanation, the participants generally felt more comfortable with a recorded interview and consented.

Often recording devices are seen to stultify the conversation as respondents are inhibited from expressing themselves (Whiting, 2008: 37). The recording device allowed the interview process to freely flow as it allowed the participants to express themselves with my undivided attention. The interviews were more of conversations than interviews in a formal sense. Noting that poorly translated concepts or phrases impact the interpretation of the data and analysis, thereby threatening the credibility and dependability of this study, I transcribed the English interviews myself, and the ones in

Afrikaans and Setswana were translated, checked and transcribed by Ms Gosiame Noge. I carefully identified and selected Ms Noge. Ideally translators should satisfy criteria proposed by Murray and Wynne (2001: 160), that includes:

(i) have an understanding of qualitative research – Ms Noge was a sociology Master's candidate at a South African university. She once worked for a Johannesburg-based research consultancy firm that did research nationally and internationally. She had great experience collecting data in conducting cross-language interviews in these language as well as transcribing;

(ii) be familiar with the topic of interest in particular – Ms Noge was familiar with water services delivery related issues in her own community; and

(iii) be proficient in languages used – Ms Noge was proficient in SeTswana, English and Afrikaans.

Interviews that Mr Mbatha and Mr Didibane conducted were for the most part conducted in either Setswana and English or Afrikaans and English. Ms Noge translated and transcribed the interviews simultaneously. The main limitation with cross-language transcriptions is the lack of transcriptions in a source language which makes verifying the final transcript difficult. However, this process is like that of same-language transcription in three ways. First, the transcriber is likely to replay the recording until they get it right. Second, the transcribers are working on audio material they are listening to, like written text; and last, the output is in written form, and it can be revised and edited (Osborn, 2017). The above process "yields a product used in the same way as that produced by transcription followed by a translation" (Osborn, 2017).

4.10. Qualitative data analysis

The researcher's role in qualitative research is to access study participants' thoughts and feelings (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating process. It does not proceed linearly. Qualitative data analysis searches general statements about relationships among data categories (Marshall and Rossman 1990: 111). The researcher's role in qualitative data analysis is more explicit than

quantitative data analysis. This section provides a clear explication of how the data analysis process proceeded in this study. In line with Malterud (2001):

> [D]eclaring that qualitative analysis was done, or stating that categories emerged when the material had been read by one or more persons, is not sufficient to explain how and why patterns were noticed…the reader needs to know the principles and choices underlying pattern recognition and category foundation.
> (Malterud, 2001: 486)

I used thematic data analysis in this study. Patton and Cochran (2002: 23) assert that thematic data analysis is that which "looks across all the data to identify the common issues that recur and identify the main themes that summarise all the views you have collected". In analysing interviews, I adopted a thematic data analysis model proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006) and adhered to the following successive steps:

(a) Familiarising myself with the data

Once I received the transcripts from Ms Noge, I went through each one as a final check and queried her where necessary. I then read and re-read all the interviews and listened to the recordings for the ones in English, and where I could, I took down initial ideas. I also spent some time going through the photographs I had taken – this was quite useful as it aided me to remember and describe specific incidents and findings more accurately.

(b) Generating initial codes

I started by identifying initial codes – these were just crude and broad ideas which stood out to me. I would link these to different people and note how they connected to the photographs and my observations.

(c) Searching for themes

Once I had generated codes, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the collated codes. I noted quotations that best expressed the themes I had identified. I started by revisiting the interview schedule, and carefully reading each transcript, picking out extracts. I read all the transcripts at least thrice, which allowed me to develop broad themes and subthemes.

(d) Reviewing themes

Data within themes should cohere together meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes. I read the themes ironing out contradictions from the consolidated themes and subthemes. This resulted in amalgamating, refining, separating, and in some cases, discarding themes.

(e) Defining and naming themes

In the end, I refined and defined the themes and potential subthemes within the data. The ongoing analysis was necessary to enhance the identified themes further to reflect the data patterns.

(f) Producing the report

This was the last phase where I analysed excerpts, discussed and analysed the data in relation to the study's objectives, and answered the main research question.

4.11. Trustworthiness – Lincoln and Guba's (1985) evaluative criteria

When it comes to trustworthiness, the main question posed by stringent qualitative researchers is, "Can the findings…be trusted?" (Korstjens and Moser, 2018: 121). Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose a highly acclaimed model in the social sciences. They refined trustworthiness by introducing the following criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. What follows is an elaborate discussion of each within the context of this research:

4.11.1. Credibility

Credibility is confidence in the "truth" of the findings. Credibility addresses the "fit" between participants' views against what the researcher presents (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I observed how people survived their everyday lives in the research areas in between interviews. I spoke to both men and women, the youth and elderly people, married and unmarried people, employed and unemployed people, about the challenges they experienced concerning access to water as citizens in the "new" South Africa. My affability facilitated the establishment of rapport and relations with different community members. Establishing rapport between myself and the participants created an understanding and deep appreciation of trust and respectability.

4.11.2. Transferability

Transferability refers to the generalisability of inquiry. In qualitative research, this refers only to case-to-case transfer (Tobin and Begley, 2004). The whole idea revolves around the research's ability to elicit "thick descriptions". As the participants shared their water politics experiences in Madibeng, I began to juxtapose these with what I noted in the literature. Since this study was exploratory, findings were specific to the three areas in the Madibeng municipality and cannot and should not be generalised. Be that as it may, the findings can be a point of departure when researching an area that exhibits the same social, economic and political dynamics in South Africa. It should be kept in mind that the generalisability of this study's findings was not an expected attribute since the research relied on social constructionist epistemology.

4.11.3. Dependability

Dependability is another term that links with trustworthiness. It shows whether the findings are consistent with the data I analysed. Sandelowski (1986) noted that a study and its findings are auditable when another researcher can follow the decision trail. In addition to this, another researcher with the same data, perspective, and situation

should arrive at the same or comparable, but not contradictory, conclusions (Koch, 1994). To achieve dependability, I noted everything in a journal that informed the decisions and choices I made (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I have my fieldwork journal, notes taken during interviews, signed consent forms, photographs, transcriptions and other evidence that informed me of decisions and choices regarding theoretical and methodological issues throughout the study (Koch, 1994).

4.11.4. Confirmability

Confirmability is established when credibility, transferability, and dependability are all achieved. Confirmability is about establishing that my interpretations and findings were derived from the data I collected and analysed, and it necessitates that I demonstrate how conclusions and interpretations were reached (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I justified every methodological move against the practices required when employing a qualitative research strategy in this research. I analysed the research findings in relation to literature, and findings were noted.

4.12. Reflexivity and the role of the researcher

Our unique backgrounds and life experiences have a bearing on our understanding of the social world. Such biases and subjectivities are not inherently negative and are unavoidable; however, they surface, and a responsible researcher should always attempt to acknowledge such. Malterud (2001) underscores this point, stating:

> A researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions.
> (Malterud, 2001: 483-484)

A qualitative study seeks to convey why people have thoughts and feelings that might affect how they behave. As a qualitative researcher, reflection on my part before and during the research process was crucial to provide context and understanding for

readers (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). Reflexivity allowed me to articulate my position and subjectivities (Sutton and Austin, 2015: 226). This enabled me to be self-critical, self-conscious, and, in the end, self-examine (Kock and Herrington in Whiting, 2008: 35). As a reflexive researcher, I kept a self-critical account of the research process, including my internal and external dialogue (Tobin and Begley, 2004). I recorded daily logistics of the research, methodological decisions, and rationales and my reflections of the participants' experiences, perceptions, interests, and other insights that I thought were significant (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Being a non-South African posed some challenges for me as English is the only official language that I can speak. Both research assistants, though, were quite fluent in the languages spoken in Madibeng. They were able to introduce me in a very professional way that was then acceptable to most participants. Even though they conducted the interviews in Setswana and Afrikaans, I would always pick up on the conversation when English was used. I would also engage with the research assistant to ensure that questions were adequately addressed between the interviews.

Researchers are encouraged to assess their impact in social research, and thus my "values, assumptions, prejudices and influence…must therefore be acknowledged" (Kock and Herrington in Whiting, 2008: 35). I continually had to make decisions and choices about how and what to ask the participants (Kvale, 1996: 147). I was very open-minded and, at all times, remained calm and sensitive. I listened to the participants' views and experiences and sought to be interested, attentive and caring about what was shared by the participants. Participants were encouraged to share their experiences.

4.13. Ethical considerations

Everyone agrees that among the highest duties of academics is to make sure that the human beings they study — fellow citizens they probe, query, prod, and palpate — are treated with dignity and respect.
Christopher Shea (2000)

This study's research proposal served at the University of Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee, where it was approved (See Appendix 4: Research Ethics Approval).

This research was conducted in line with the principles of *beneficence* (doing good or at least doing no harm). Once I met a potential participant, I would introduce myself and the research assistant I was with and present an overview of the research as per the information sheet (See Appendix 5). The information sheet contained the title of the project and its background, consent to take part in the study, the approximate length of the interview, *anonymity* and *confidentiality*, and a note about how *participation is voluntary*, as well as the full names and contact details for me and my supervisors – Professors Tina Uys and Mary Galvin.

I also presented them a copy of the informed consent form (See Appendix 6) – which I talked them through, and further explained the possible risks and benefits associated with participating in this research. If they were comfortable participating, they would then complete and sign the consent form. I also assured the participants that I would not disclose their identities. I used pseudonyms to avoid exposing them and refrained from using information that could potentially identify them.

In the Madibeng Municipality, more especially the areas I conducted this research, politics is a very sensitive topic to research. I only probed politics-related questions to the extent that people were comfortable and willing to discuss. During some interviews, it was quite apparent that some participants shied away from politics, whilst others, expressly indicated that they were not comfortable discussing the subject.

Furthermore, since the main focus of the research was on the expressions of citizens, I focused on that aspect to get the most data I could without antagonising the participants or making them feel uncomfortable.

Regarding the principles of *beneficence,* a contributing factor that led to me exiting the field was when continuing the research became dangerous for me as well as potential participants. Mr. Didibane called me, and I could sense fear in his voice as he told me that his life was now under threat because of the work we were doing. He sent me the following disconcerting voice note, which I transcribed:

> The problem is that I haven't heard from Kalle…Kalle is the relevant person, and if I can get close enough to him, he will give me all the leaders…And people that are not gonna shoot us. I am also scared because at the moment, I don't have a gun on me, and I don't have finance to say, I can't protect myself…

Madibeng is not an area to treat a threat on one's life nonchalantly. After receiving the message above, I consulted my supervisors – Professors Tina Uys and Mary Galvin – on the appropriate course of action. Under their guidance, we agreed that it was best to end my fieldwork in Madibeng – as it had gotten dangerous for myself, Mr. Didibane, Mr. Kalle, or anyone else whom I would attempt to interview.

4.14. Conclusion

To investigate how citizens express themselves within the context of hydropolitics, I adopted a qualitative research approach underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. The strategy was ideal because it facilitated a rich and in-depth investigation of Madibeng hydropolitics. I needed to investigate forms of expressions by citizens in an area with these dynamics. Twenty-seven participants were selected purposively from Damonsville, Mothutlung, Mmakau.

Data were collected via in-depth interviews, field notes, observation and visual images. I explained what it constituted and how it was valuable in this research for each method. I collected data in three phases, and a specific area determined each. In total, 27

participants identified purposively took part in the study. I employed thematic data analysis using a six-step model proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006). Trustworthiness was based on the criteria proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Each methodological step was justified, and data collected was analysed against literature collected while noting new findings. I presented challenges I faced and how I navigated them as a reflexive researcher, aware that my subjectivity potentially influenced the research process. I end the chapter with a discussion of ethical issues.

The following chapter is one of the two findings chapters in this thesis. In the first findings chapter, I discuss empirical findings linked to water services in Madibeng. The chapter addresses objectives linked to the participants' views on water service provision by the Madibeng Local Municipality.

CHAPTER FIVE

Water Services in Madibeng: Views of Residents in Three Communities

"Water is the source of life. We cannot think about developing our people if we fail to provide them with a basic supply of water."
Ronnie Kasrils (2002)

5.1. Introduction

Achieving a comprehensive understanding of hydropolitics requires an unpacking of South African water governance and emerging patterns of how residents in Madibeng engage with the state within the context of access to water. To understand residents' expressions of citizenship within the context of hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities, this chapter addresses the first three objectives of the study, which are: to explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality; to explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality ability to deliver water services; and to analyse citizens' coping strategies regarding inadequate water services delivery.

5.2. Participants' views of water service delivery

The Constitution of South Africa (1996), the National Water Act (1998), as well as the Water Services Act (1997) all support the realisation of citizens' right to access sufficient water. In South Africa, it is the state's responsibility to provide citizens with an adequate supply of water. The participants' perceptions of water services were crucial in this research because they influenced their views of the state's role in ensuring the right to water services. In this section, I unpack the participants' views of water services provided by the Madibeng Local Municipal (MLM). The provision of sufficient water relies on two key aspects: the availability and allocation of water resources; and the availability of efficient water services infrastructure. Two key aspects that indicate the sufficiency of water that I unpack are the quantity and quality of water supplied by the MLM to communities.

5.2.1. Limited water quantity

The quantity of water supplied by the Madibeng Local Municipality was a big issue which participants from Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau expressed extreme dissatisfaction about. When there were water cuts, the MLM is constitutionally mandated to provide basic water services to its jurisdiction.. Sending out water tankers was one of the methods. Based on the interviews, the three communities seem to have experienced widespread water interruptions.

From Damonsville, Kgothatso stated that there were frequent water interruptions in the area, and he did not know whether this was deliberate on the part of the MLM – as part of maintenance perhaps – or not. He held the view, however, that the area experienced rampant water interruptions. In support of this, he stated the following:

> They [the Madibeng Local Municipality] constantly cut water…I don't know whether it is intentional, but I know that there's always a problem with water in this area.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Mothutlung participants also had a similar experience of water quantity. Their verbal accounts alluded to rampant water cuts. *Ma'* Tshepiso, for example, indicated that the water supply in her area was erratic. Water services were interrupted with neither a warning nor notice from the MLM. Shestated the following:

> I'd say [water supply is cut] every month, and they don't even give us notice before the water is cut off; it just happens. Like last week, for instance, there was no water on Saturday, and then the water came back on Sunday or Monday…No, it was Thursday…[W]e were without water for seven days.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Participants from the Mmakau Village also indicated that their community was also not spared from limited water quantity supply from the MLM. They generally held the view that municipal water service provision in the area was very unreliable. According to some residents like *Malomê* Daniel, water availability was anyone's guess. He stated the following:

> Sometimes you find that we do have water. Water services will then be interrupted in the afternoon and come back in the middle of the night…Sometimes when the water goes, it goes for a while…
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Other Mmakau participants supported the view that that the water situation was dire in the area, and interruptions extended over prolonged periods. According to *Ma'* Yolanda, her community could be without water for up to three months on end. Here were her remarks:

> Sometimes the water is there, and other times, not. That's my problem…We have a water supply for some time, and after that, they'll cut supply for up to three months.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Thulani, a Greyhound breeder and Mmakau resident, also reiterated the same perception regarding poor water service provision by the MLM. According to him, water supply was inconsistent, and the community would not have water for up to three months and then only have services restored for two days at most. The following were his exact words:

> No one knows when water will come or when it comes back. It can come back after three months…For a day or two.
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

Another Mmakau resident, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, also shared a view of the unreliability of water services in the area. According to her, sometimes water supply was restored very early in the morning, and the water pressure was so low that the tap would be dripping when open. She would then be able to store maybe two buckets' full. She indicated the following:

> Sometimes it's restored in the early hours of the day, and I wake up at 2 am to find water is dripping…From those small drops of water, I might be able to collect at least two buckets of water.

(*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

On the day I interviewed Mmêmogolo Chimere, she was doing two weeks' laundry because the MLM had just restored the water supply. Figure 11 below shows her dangerously plugged-in washing machine connected to a standalone pipe in her garden:

Figure 11: *Mmêmogolo* Chimere's washing machine

Dispatching water tankers is one of the methods taken up by the MLM to ensure that they meet its obligation to provide basic water services during water interruptions This method came up during the interviews. Damonsville participants like Felicity mentioned the role of water tankers supplying water during water interruptions. She stated the following:

> Ooo!!! Another thing that I feel I need to mention is that if we don't have water, the Madibeng Local Municipality sends trucks [water tankers] to come and deliver water to us. So we will have to get buckets, queue and then wait to get water from these tankers…Yes…[nodding]…That's how we sometimes get it [water]…

(Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Ina and Myra, also Damonsville participants, generally held the view that the quantity delivered by the tankers was limited, and not everyone in the community could get water. Once the tankers left, no one knew when they would return. According to Ina, the tankers did not service all the streets in Damonsville as they were always too few. This, unfortunately, meant that some community members could not get water. She indicated that the MLM perhaps sent three trucks to her area in two days – which was inadequate:

> [S]till not everyone gets water, they have to skip this street and stand [sic] there. I don't think that's enough effort...They normally send one water truck [tanker], and the following day if we're lucky, they'll send two [tankers].
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

Myra said the following:

> The truck [tanker] brings water, and once it runs out, it leaves, and no one knows when it will come back.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

It emerged in the interviews that the tankers had a route they followed, and once the water was finished, they left the community. Kgothatso, a Damonsville resident, was of the opinion that the section where he lived hardly got any water from the tankers because water would have run out by the time they got to where he lived. Damonsville community members residing in his section would have to wait for extended hours to get water, and this enraged them:

> They bring two trucks [tankers], and all the tanks' water is finished by the time they get here. You have to wait again. You can wait like the whole day - from early in the morning with your bucket until maybe the truck comes around seven o'clock at night. Some people will have water, while others don't, which also angers the community members very much.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Some residents were infuriated by how the water tanker drivers wasted water when filling containers. Armand vividly recounted an incident when a tanker operator filled the containers without care, and in the process, he lost a lot of water. Describing the process, he stated the following:

> When filling up [our] containers, there's a small generator at the back of that truck [i.e., water tanker] that builds pressure. One driver wasted water as it was spilling, and some people ended up not getting some. A lot of water was spilt onto the tar, and he was not concerned at all... All he wanted was to go home because he didn't have [to deal with] these [water] problems.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Damonsville residents were unsure of when exactly the MLM dispatched the water tankers. According to Myra (46/F/Damonsville), the municipality dispatched water tankers as early as the day after the water interruption. Kgothatso mentioned a similar viewpoint to Myra about how it was not clear. He indicated that municipal officials took somewhere between two to three days for them to dispatch water tankers:

> Let's say there is a shortage of water, and there are water problems, like the recent one. I think it took a while before those tankers got here. It took maybe two or three days...
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

The lack of clarity around the specific delivery times forced people to make their way to water collection areas once there was an interruption. In support of this, Andre stated, "[P]eople go to the streets and wait for those trucks not knowing when and what time they were going to come".

Just like in Damonsville, when water was interrupted in Mothutlung, water tankers were dispatched to the community to provide water. *Malomê* Frank, another Mothutlung resident, went on to say that water provided by tankers was inadequate:

> These trucks move up and down [Mothutlung], so if it parks, everybody must come out with buckets, and it is very difficult to get water because it finishes.
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

The community viewed the water situation as extremely dire to the extent that some residents ended up chasing after the tankers hoping to get a drop of water. In support of this, *Ma'* Tshepiso reiterated that community members followed the tankers to different parts of Mothutlung. The following were her words:

> [T]hey normally bring water for us in those JoJo trucks [water tankers]. [S]ometimes they say, "Water is finished in that section down there", and if we get there and it is finished, that means we'll only get ours on the following day…So we move around the area looking for queues and trucks…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

I noted in the interviews that water tankers came during the day, which meant that people at work would not get water. *Malomê* Frank, a Mothutlung resident, supported this view and made the following comment:

> *Ahi*, you see the truck [water tanker] coming here on the same day, but people are working, and they are not around. Where are they going to get water? You see, those who are not here will suffer. They come back at five, six, or seven in the evening, yet the truck was here at eight o'clock in the morning and noon. So how are they going to get water if they come at eight [at night]?
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Water tankers were also dispatched when there was a water cut in Mmakau, like in Damonsville and Mothutlung. This was Thabo's view, a Mmakau resident, "there are trucks that come with water tanks". Water supply in the area by water tankers was also very limited, and some community members could not get any. The situation was frustrating as people followed tankers in the community, hoping to get a drop of water. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere expressed this community reaction in the following words:

> Yah, sometimes they send out trucks [tankers]. If we don't get water this side, we will follow those trucks [tankers] around these blocks and other sections [of this area].
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

The residents indicated subtle differences that emerged in the dispatching of tankers. Damonsville residents believed that the municipality disbursed water tankers more briskly to Mothutlung than to their community. For Mothutlung, the MLM could send out the tankers as early as "on the day", while for Damonsville, it could happen as late as "after three days, or four days". Routes that the tankers took were also influenced by municipal personnel: These views were corroborated by Mr Kalle, who was employed at the Office of the Premier of the North West, "priority areas" were ones where people in the local government lived in:

> They [the MLM] sends water trucks [tankers], but uhm…Someone who has power directs them. [Perhaps] the Ward Committee Member will request that they first go to his area…Because they control them, they may send three trucks to Mothutlung before other areas.
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau who took part in this study believed that the municipality could not provide adequate water services. Across the three areas, participants of different genders and ages expressed extended and frequent water interruptions in their communities. This meant that for periods up to three months, some communities did not have tap water. To try and ensure the provision of basic water, the MLM dispatched water tankers. Despite this attempt to provide water, the tankers were almost always inadequate, resulting in some people not having water. Another issue that came to light that was linked to inadequate water was the deplorable quality of water supplied by the MLM.

5.2.2. Poor water quality

In addition to the inconsistent, erratic, and inadequate supply of water services in the research areas, the interviews showed clearly that participants viewed the quality of water supplied by the municipality, whether tap water or water supplied by tankers, as appalling. Access to clean water is a life-or-death issue, and people's perception of its quality is especially important as this again influences their relationship with the state. Sheat (1992) argues that "perception may very well become more important than

reality…especially when it comes to the quality of drinking water" (Sheat, 1992: 3). As human beings, we have five basic senses, which we rely on. Sight, smell and taste help us assess water quality. Water has organoleptic properties, such as its colour, taste and how it smells (Crampton and Ragusa, 2016; Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). If water has a peculiar taste or smell, it can be interpreted as a health risk (Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). A peculiar taste or smell is not an entirely accurate way of assessing water quality because water may look, taste, and smell bad but can be safe. However, this is atypical.

(a) Dirty looking water

Damonsville residents like Taylor, Armand, and Kgothatso believed that municipal water was dirty. According to Taylor, the water was so dirty that it did not need an expert to run tests to ascertain this. One just had to pour it into a clear container, and the contaminants were visible:

> The water is dirty…If you put it in something transparent, you can see it [the "dirt"]…Even in a plain bucket, you can see it. It also depends on what kind of a bucket it is and its colour. Yah, so you can see it. (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Armand echoed the above sentiment. He believed tap water was not "100 per cent" clean; clean water could only be purchased. Armand attributed the dirt in the water to corroded pipes that had surpassed their life span. He stated the following:

> The water is not 100 per cent clean. It's not 100 per cent, because 100 per cent clean water is water that we buy. The main problem why our water is like this is because the pipes are rusted at the hall [i.e. Madibeng Local Municipality]. Those pipes need to be changed. (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Kgothatso also reiterated that tap water was generally extremely dirty. According to him, once there was a water interruption when water services were restored, tap water was dirtier than usual for the first few days. Water that came out a few days after the restoration of water services was so filthy that it was unusable:

> Usually, this municipal water is very dirty. Especially when they [Madibeng Local Municipality] cut the water supply, and then restore it, when you open the tap, you will see that there's dirt in the water. It's so dirty you can't even use the first few buckets of water…Water for maybe that day or two, or the next couple of days, will be dirty.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, held the view that tap water was not fit for human consumption. According to her,the water used to be drinkable, but that its quality had progressively deteriorated over the years. When I interviewed her, she said municipal water was not consumable and described its colour as brownish. She was of the opinion that, the Damonsville community was unsure whether the colour change was due to the MLM cleaning the pipes. It would eventually clear up, she further noted. To her, the MLM's water quality was so poor that one could not even storewater because it changed colour. Here is what she stated:

> In terms of drinking the water, you really cannot drink it. At a time, it was drinkable, but now it's not because it's brownish. We [community members] don't know if it is like this because they [Madibeng Local Municipality] are still cleaning the pipes or what…When water is restored, it comes out brown and then it clears. The water here is just something. You can't store it; it discolours with time.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola, a Damonsville resident, supported the view that water was discoloured in storage. She had grown weary of storing water in containers. This was a repetitive and laborious task because each time water was stored, it had to be used within a fortnight before it was discoloured. Therefore, it meant that *Ouma* Viola might have had to throw away the stored water and refill the containers with "fresh" tap water. She stated the following:

> It's irritating…You must always think and do in advance. And it's extra work because this water cannot stay for long. After every two weeks, you must change the water or else [it discolours].
> [*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville]

Figure 12 below shows the bottom of a 5l container that *Ouma* Viola had once used to store drinking water that she got from her tap. The container had dried algae-like contaminants at its base.

Figure 12: Water container with dried algae-like residue

Like Damonsville participants, three Mothutlung residents believed that water was dirty describing is as dirty and brown. According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, the deterioration of water quality started in2012. Tshepo, anther Mothotlung resident, underscored this, and held a similar notion that if the water was kept for two days, sedimentation occurred at the bottom of the container. Here is what he said:

> Because the water is not clean, my brother, if you lived here neh, I'd tell you to pour a glass of water for two days and see the difference. There is brownish mud that settles at the bottom of the glass.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, when water was restored, when you filled a bucket with water, sedimentation was evident in only a few hours:

> Uhm…When there is no water when water comes back, we pour water into a bucket. You'll see a brown layer on top of the water. That is how we can see that the water is not clean. Maybe after a few hours, the layer won't be there at the top; it will now be at the bottom…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, from Mothutlung, also alluded to the discolouration of water. She did not attribute it to the water supply being restored but to the MLM's poor water purification processes:

> Because the water is not properly cleaned, it is brown when water comes back. When it's like that we have to wait for the brown to go down then only can we use the water.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Mmakau residents also shared the same opinions regarding the brown dirt. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere from Mmakau said that the water was "brown and dirty". She further went on to suggest that the water would occasionally get clear. This was a mystery to her. She stated that community members did not know the state of the water services infrastructure or how the water treatment plant was performing.

Some participants were very sceptical about the quality of the water. *Malomê* Frank had not drunk Madibeng tap water for over 15 years of the 19 years he had stayed in Mothutlung. He did not attribute this to any negative personal experiences from drinking tap water. However, his actions were prompted by what he had seen and heard from his neighbours about the water quality. According to him, he had noticed a gradual change in the colour of water supplied by the MLM over time, he heard from his neighbours of people falling ill after drinking water. Commenting on water quality, Tshepo, also from Mothutlung, indicated how dirty the water was and even sarcastically

questioned its source, suggesting that the municipality was getting it from nearby rivers. He stated the following: "We don't know if they suck it straight from the river or what?!" Tshepo believed that quality of water had deteriorated such that he could no longer drink tap water. He also indicated that it was about a decade since water quality was first noted other community residents to deteriorate in the area, and he held MLM wholly accountable for this:

> We blame the municipality for not providing us with water. That's why I'm saying since I've been in Mothutlung since 1996. Then we didn't have any water issues, and we could drink water straight from the taps…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

As for water supplied by water tankers, residents' perceptions of water quality varied. While some participants trusted and consumed tap water, some were generally sceptical and did not drink it. For example, participants like *Ma'* Londiwe and Armand, both from Damonsville, believed that the tankers' water was cleaner than water from the area's taps. *Ma'* Londiwe said:

> You saw how the water looks like from the tap, and water from the truck is not always clean, but it's better than tap water.
> (*Ma'* Londiwe/54/F/Damonsville)

This was echoed by Armand, who believed that water from the tankers could be consumed; however, it was not as clean as "bought water": "Yes, that is clean water, not like bought water, we can drink it and use it for laundry *et cetera*…" (Armand/42/M/Damonsville). For other residents like *Oupa* Andries, water from the tankers was clean in some instances; however, not always. He recounted one incident where he claims to have collected water that had some faecal matter. After he boiled it in a kettle, the kettle had residue:

> Sometimes the water they [i.e. water tankers] deliver is clean, and sometimes it's not. I don't know what to say. The last time they brought water here, there was *kak* [faeces] in it! When I boiled the water, it left a yellow or green residue in the kettle, and at the top of the water, you could see it was brown.
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

The other residents from Mothutlung and Mmakau shared the same views about water supplied by the tankers being dirty. The perceptions of poor water quality resulted in some of the participants of these areas not consuming it. Danny indicated that in Mothutlung, he bought water to drink since water from the tankers was not ideal for consumption:

> Most people don't drink water supplied by tankers. They buy water that they are going to drink because that water is not right for consumption.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung).

Danny drank bottled water and used municipal water for cooking: "You see, when you cook with it, it's fine. When it boils, the bacteria dies". Thabo was of the view thatwater from the tankers was filthy, and he did not drink it or use it for cooking. He reiterated the fact that he only drank water which he bought, and water from the tankers, and municipal water in general, was for cleaning and watering his grapevines:

> [Water] from the tankers...Ooh, eish...I can't drink that water... I buy 5l at the shop that I use to drink and cook. That one [from the tankers] is for my plants and to bath.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

To *Malomê* Daniel, another Mmakau resident, water from the tankers was so dirty that he could see contaminants and other filth with his naked eye. He even claimed that he had seen tadpoles in the water on some occasions:

> You can't drink it! Sometimes when the truck comes, and you collect the water, when you pour it, you find small tadpoles - it is not clean!
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

There were different opinions on what exactly the colour of the contaminants was. While Eduardo, from Damonsville, identified the impurities as "white things", several of the participants saw the water as having "brown dirt-like" particles or a "brownish colour". A possible explanation for the participants' observations of "brown" contaminants in the tap water is that the water contained tannins (humic acid), which is prevalent when water passes through coal seams, earth, and decomposing vegetation (Scherer and Johnson, 2010). This could have entered the system from the compromised pipes. Beyond what tap water looked like, the participants had a word on its smell.

(b) Foul-smelling water

Water's other organoleptic property is its smell. Madibeng tap water had a terrible smell, according to some participants from Mmakau and Damonsville. *Ma'* Yolanda, a Mmakau resident, noted that "sometimes the [tap] water stinks". Andre and *Ouma* Viola were disgusted by the smell of water supplied by the MLM. According to Andre, the smell of the water was so awful that it smelt like something "had died in it". To him, this was a clear indication to him that the water was not clean.

Ouma Viola believed that the water would develop an odour. She stated that stored water developed an odour over a week, and once you opened a water container, a bad smell emitted:

> [W]hat we've realised is that if this water can stand (*sic*) for a week and you open the bottle, you can smell it...It has an ugly (*sic*) smell. I have to change the water every second week.
> [*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville]

Ouma Viola resorted to replacing the water every fortnight to ensure it did not have "an ugly smell". The water's taste was another organoleptic facet that emerged from the data collected.

(c) Bad tasting water

Some participants who drank Madibeng tap water believed that it had a peculiar taste ranging from "salty" to "tasting like mud". Participants like *Mmêmogolo* Chimere from Mmakau stated that the MLM water "is salty *hai*, it changes now and then". *Malomê* Daniel, also from Mmakau, affirmed this. Municipal water only had this taste when it had been restored, and he said: "When the water comes back, it's normally dirty and salty".

One Mothutlung resident also described the water to "taste like mud". *Malomê,* Frank stated the following:

> To me, you can taste it [mud] when you are drinking it. You can try it if you want. You can taste that...*Hai, hai*...There is a little bit of...Hmmm...I can't explain it...Mud or what? I mean mud from the ground. You can taste it...
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Beyond the view that tap water had a peculiar taste, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe was much more concerned about her view of tap water foaming:

> Tap water, yes. And when you drink it sometimes, it tastes uhm...Maybe it's the people who are cleaning the water...But it's not clean. And now, lately, I've been tasting that the quality has slightly improved, but the foam is still there.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

"Off-flavours" in water have generally been dismissed as just an issue of water appearance or "just an aesthetic problem" (Jardine et al., 1999: 91); however, in these three areas, some residents claimed to have fallen ill as a result of drinking tap water. The saltiness that *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, from Mmaka, referred to could indicate the existence of a high salt content – primarily sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate (Scherer and Johnson, 2010). The consequences of consuming such water could be running stomachs as the water has laxative capabilities.

(d) Incidents of illness

Another emerging theme was the perception of people falling ill after consuming tap water. *Ouma* Viola unequivocally believed that in Damonsville, one must treat, or purify, the water before drinking it. She recounted an incident when she believed she fell ill with her very elderly parents after drinking tap water. She had to get everyone medication:

> Yes, you must drink clean water. And last time [we drank tap water], we were sick and had stomach aches *et cetera*. We had to go to the pharmacy and the chemist to buy tablets because this water made us so sick.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Eduardo, another Damonsville resident, also supported the view of people falling ill after drinking municipal water straight from the tap. According to him, his young brother fell ill after drinking tap water. Similar accounts were raised in Mothutlung. Like *Ouma* Viola and Eduardo, Mothutlung residents believed to have either fallen ill or personally knew someone who had so from consuming the MLM water. For example, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica was convinced that she once fell ill after drinking tap water. She noted that after consuming it, her health deteriorated in a very short space of time:

> I mean, sometimes if you drink water straight from the tap, after a few hours you can have a running stomach, then you'll know that you drink the water from the tap. It happened to me once.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants indicated that vulnerable population groups like the elderly and children were susceptible to falling ill from consuming MLM water. People like *Ma'* Tshepiso and her family consumed tap water because they had no alternatives. She believes that her daughter once got gravely ill after drinking water straight from the tap. Her is an excerpt from her interview:

> The water has a problem. My second born got sick in 2006 when she was five. That's when she started getting sick from drinking the water.

> So, we buy water to drink from then until today, and when we don't have, unfortunately, drink this [tap] water.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

This desperation of lacking alternatives to get clean water was also referred to by Mr Kalle and Tshepo, both Mothutlung residents. The two participants were taking care of vulnerable people. According to Mr Kalle the situation was dire for him and people taking care of children and the elderly:

> It affects me, as we have children and old people, and the water quality [is poor and it] makes people [get] sick…
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Tshepo was very worried about his grandmother – his caregiver from infancy. He said she could neither afford to buy water nor make an alternative arrangement. Tshepo himself could not afford to buy water for two households – where he was staying and his grandmother's. She eventually consumed tap water, which he believed had had repeated negative health consequences on her. Here is what he said:

> She suffers a lot because you know she can't afford [to buy water], she's a pensioner. I also can't afford to buy water for two households…Yeah, so yes, it affects me, it affects me negatively so.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Mr Kalle and Tshepo's perceptions were similar to those of Kgothatso, from Damonsville, and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, from Mmakau. Both lamented the poor water quality and how it was a financial burden to source money to buy bottled water for consumption. Tshepo elaborated his view of how the water supplied to Mothutlung made people ill, and the MLM's water was just not fit for human consumption:

> After drinking that water, you'll have a running stomach, which is not good for your health. We've been having this problem since…Madibeng is a no-go zone when it comes to drinking water.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

From Mmakau, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere alluded to how tap water "makes your stomach run". Her son once drank some water straight from the tap when he was at school. According to her, he got very ill and had to be taken to the clinic for treatment. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere recounted:

> [O]ne of my boys drank water at school, and they said the water was dirty, and they took him to the clinic. Here at home, children would have running stomachs....
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Since then, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere has never given her children, or any of her dependants, tap water or water from the tankers to drink. She was adamant that children should only drink bottled water. *Ma'* Yolanda, also from Mothutlung, said she felt unwell each time she drank water straight from the tap. She felt pain in her abdomen.

I came across only two people who drank water straight from the tap: Andre from Damonsville and Danny from Mothutlung. Andre indicated that he had gotten ill from drinking water straight from the tap. He attributed falling ill to several unknown factors, arguing that different people have different allergic reactions, and that explained why some people got ill and others did not:

> We do drink straight from the tap; some people complain about the water...Plenty of people have gotten ill, and even I had diarrhoea from the water. The water can trigger so many things like skin issues because it has different pH levels. How salty or acidic the water is can affect you. So, if they don't look at those kinds of things, they get problems...So it may just be an allergic reaction that some people have to the chemicals that are being used to clean the water [by the Municipality of Madibeng]. You'll never know.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Danny had not fallen ill from drinking the MLM water. He was just uncomfortable with the aftertaste:

> Nothing happens like a running stomach, but it has after taste; it doesn't make me sick or anything.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Municipal water from taps and provided by tanker was described to me as awful. Looking at water's organoleptic properties, the participants generally held the view that municipal water looked dirty, smelt horrible and tasted terrible. The participants depicted a dismal picture of deplorable water services provided by the MLM to Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Having established the participants' views of water services delivery in their communities, the next section delves into their perceptions of the causes of water issues in the municipality.

5.3. Participants views of the causes of the water service delivery crisis in their communities

The Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) is both a water service authority (WSA) and water service provider (WSP) that failed to meet the National Water Act's (1998) "sufficient water" definition - basic water quantity and the minimum standard of water supply that should sustain human life. MLM's responsibility as a WSA is to ensure affordable, efficient and sustainable access to water services for communities in Madibeng. As a WSP, the MLM is also responsible for providing water services by legislation and conditions stipulated by the WSA. There was no privatisation of water services in the municipality as the local government had the sole role of providing water services to communities in its jurisdiction.

Municipalities are mandated to "[m]ove progressively towards the social and economic upliftment [sic] of local communities and ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all" (MSA, 2000). However, participants in this study generally held the view that MLM was performing dismally at providing basic services – water included. This section focuses on the participants' perceptions of the causes of poor water services by the MLM. These factors are very important as the water problems in the three communities resulted from Madibeng hydropolitics. What follows are the five

factors perceived by residents to contribute to water problems in the three communities:

5.3.1. Corruption and financial mismanagement: *Tenderpreneurs*

Participants in the study believed that officials at the MLM were corrupt and financially mismanaged the entity. According to them, this was one of the main factors contributing to water scarcity in the municipality. According to Andre, a Damonsville resident, the MLM has sufficient financial resources to operate efficiently and effectively. He griped that municipal officials were misusing funds that should be spent on water service provision:

> The money is there. Listen, there might be a budget where programmes are planned. The problem is that they do not use that money to replace these things [water infrastructure and equipment]. They eat the money, and then we have a water problem…The money is there, but it's being used for other things.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

This opinion was echoed by another Mmakau resident, Thabo, who attributed failing infrastructure to corruption. According to him, the MLM was not repairing water pipes because the funds available were being diverted for personal use. Here is what he said:

> [In] Madibeng, the people [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] do not fix the pipes because they eat [sic] the money…There is nothing that they are doing on this side.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Ntatêmogolo Joe, a Mothutlung resident, also had a firm conviction that municipal officials misused municipal funds for personal gain. He believed that MLM funds were being directed to personal use by officials there. Reflecting on his experience working at a mine, he alluded to how it was necessary to have critical machinery and equipment on standby if there was a failure. He said:

> They use that money for themselves. There is a budget, but it's not used correctly, which is why equipment is breaking down. I worked at a mine, and they used quite a lot of water uhm…There is machinery

> here that will push water to another section, and it comes in two. There is the one we use, and another one is the spare one. The spare one is ready to perform any time; it's fully functionally. When one breaks down, the other one is ready to kick in. We report it [the breakdown], and it [the machinery] is immediately fixed. So, the municipality doesn't fix the machinery, and they eat [sic] the money. (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe's view reinforced a notion held by participants that the MLM officials were not servicing water services machinery and equipment, which explained why it broke down, causing water interruptions. In times of water interruption, the municipality as a WSP provided water to communities via water tankers during interruptions. This contingency measure was controversial in the communities. Some participants held that the sending out of water tankers was more about the owners of the vehicles and municipal employees making money illicitly, as opposed to the MLM meeting its primary responsibility of providing water services. Views from the participants indicated that tankering was viewed as a *tenderpreneurial* activity in the communities. Some participants believed that these tankers were part of an organised syndicate, in which water interruptions were deliberate so that the MLM could dispatch the water tankers.

Kgothatso from Damonsville was very suspicious of tankers supplying water during water interruptions. He believed that the interruptions were a way for the owners of the water tankers to make money through supplying water. Sheepishly looking at me, Kgothatso said:

> Sometimes I wonder…I often wonder that these things in Madibeng are planned…You know…Maybe some of these people with water trucks [tankers] get something…Other places can go for a while without water interruptions. So what happens to the guys who have those trucks that supply us with water when they do not have a business? You see, sometimes they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] create opportunities for them to make money…They create opportunities so that those guys can work…Sometimes I think people plan these things [water interruptions] so that they can have a piece of the cake…the Madibeng money, municipality money… (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Taylor, another Damonsville resident, further suggested that it was plausible that the owners of the tankers were municipal employees who knew as and when to dispatch the water tankers. So once water services were interrupted, their vehicles could render water delivery services at a cost to the municipality. The following were his words:

> See, maybe that guy who owns the trucks works there [Madibeng Local Municipality]. So he knows that if there is no water, his truck will be hired. It's like a tender thing; he knows for sure that when there is no water, his trucks [tankers] will be utilised because these people are very clever.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Similarly, a Mothutlung resident, Tshepo, was immensely sceptical and suspicious of the tankers. He was not impressed by the sight of water tankers driving around the community. To him, the tankers' presence meant no water in his community. Since municipal pipes serviced his community, all he yearned for was water in their homes coming out of the taps:

> [Y]ou will see trucks gallivanting [*sic*] around the Mothutlung area, and we wonder what these trucks are for because we want water in our houses, coming out of our taps...
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny, another Mothutlung resident, also held the view that owners of the tankers stood to benefit from water interruptions through the involvement of corrupt municipal officials:

> Yah, the thing is that when there is no water, they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] bring trucks [tankers] here. Those trucks [tankers] are paid to bring water here, you see. That money goes to them [owners of tankers], you see. That means they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] are corrupt.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Thabo, a Mmakau resident, negatively viewed tankering as a money-making scheme that relied on the drying out of taps in Madibeng communities for municipal officials and tankers' owners to benefit. To him, the municipal employees were in no way making

concerted efforts to address the water situation in the municipality as they benefited from the *status quo*:

> *Hai*, I don't understand. You know how it's like my brother, they are happy if we don't have water because they bring the trucks [tankers], and these truck [tanker] owners get paid. You see, the trucks [tankers] belong to private individuals who are working elsewhere. It's business for them when there is no water.
>
> You understand me…? Do you know what they do with these trucks, my brother? They [the tanker owners] pay them [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] money, you understand? What I mean is that they are owned by someone, who then takes them to the municipality. The municipality hires them, and those at the top [i.e. Madibeng Local Municipality senior officials] get something in return. Do you understand me? When we have water coming out of our taps, they don't make money because the trucks [tankers] are not operating.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Andre indicated that the MLM hired the water tankers at a daily rate of between R13,000 to R16,000:

> Yes, because these people who hire out their trucks [tankers] get R13,000-R16,000 and get that amount per truck. I don't know…
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Armand mentioned a similar daily rate for hiring out a tanker. He knew of a *tenderpreneur* who had four water tankers. According to Armand, the businessman made between R15,000 to R16,000 per tanker per day for delivering water in Madibeng. What follows were Armand's exact words:

> There is this guy I know who has four water tankers. He'd go and fill them up…And he gets his money - R15,000 to 16,000 for each truck a day.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The vandalism of Madibeng water service provision infrastructure by water tanker owners and their associates is another perception that was help by some of the participants. According to Andre, the water tankers' owners and their associates vandalised water infrastructure so that when water services were interrupted, the

municipality could hire their water tankers to supply water to affected communities. He stated the following:

> Some people break these pipes so that they can make sure that they can get business. Yes, some people have been given contracts in the communities to supply water using their tankers, and they were getting paid per hour…Without making money, these people will not go a whole year, so they create opportunities to make money by causing leaks. They can say to themselves, "Let's break a pipe so we can get money". Anyway, these things [pipes] are old…
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

This allegation is plausible. In the 2014 Mothutlung community protest, one of the residents' main issues was that three water pumps servicing Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau had been vandalised by municipal officials who were believed to be in collaboration with water tank *tenderpreneurs* (Masombuka, 2014; Moore, 2014; Sosibo and Ebrahim, 2014; Khumalo, 2018; Muller 2020). MLM staff received rewards for irregular tendering processes (Masombuka, 2014). Muller (2020) had noted that supplying water by tankers cost 20 times more than tap water. Extensive water tankering can negatively impact the a municipality's budget as tankers should be used as little as possible..

That being said, Felicity from Damonsville was one participant who was optimistic about water service provision by Madibeng. Unlike the other residents who took part in the study, she viewed water tankers positively. She believed that the municipality did not want her community to struggle, and during water interruptions, it was proactive in trying to ensure that the community had access to water. To her, this was evident through the provision of water tankers:

> For me, I think I'll have to say, Madibeng doesn't just always sit back and watch the community members suffer. No, they do take steps to assist. If they did not care, they wouldn't be sending these water trucks [tankers]. But the problem is it's not always enough. So for me to be fair and clear, I would say Madibeng does take steps to address these water problems.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Felicity is, however, the exception. Another aspect that emerged from the interviews was the state of the water services infrastructure in the municipality.

5.3.2. Ageing and derelict infrastructure

Infrastructure is a very important aspect of water provision. An issue that came up in the interviews was that most participants attributed water interruptions to water infrastructure failure, most commonly a burst pipe. Damonsville participants generally held this view. Myra, for example, believed that most interruptions in the area were attributed to failing infrastructure, a commonly held belief in the community. Talking on behalf of the community, she believed that they had gotten to a stage where water interruptions were linked to a burst pipe. She stated the following:

> They [community members] normally tell us that a pipe has burst. We always assume that there's something wrong with a pipe when there's no water.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, asserted that water interruptions resulting from burst pipes were regular occurrences in the area. He added that there would be no water supply about once every two months. The following were his words:

> Water supply, uhm…The major problem is these pipes that burst almost every two months, and the supply is never consistent….Water interruptions can happen anytime, my friend; if there's too much pressure from the municipality, these pipes burst. Then we'll have the same problem we had these past three weeks.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Like some Damonsville participants, participants from Mmakau also gave a similar account of how they attributed erratic water supply to infrastructural problems. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere, for example, said the MLM explained water as a result of bursting water pipes:

> Sometimes they cut-off water and they [Madibeng Local Municipality] tell us that a pipe has burst…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Mothutlung residents like Danny and Tshepo also shared this view. According to them, water infrastructure was constantly breaking, and they attributed these bursts to the fact that infrastructure was old – it was installed during apartheid. Danny noted that the pipes were installed before he was born, and at the time of the interview, he was 26 years old, suggesting that the pipes were installed before 1993. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe knew that he could barely remember of a time in democratic South Africa they installed any new infrastructure, and even a contact of his who was a former councillor attributed the water interruptions to dilapidate infrastructure that farmers were vandalising:

> It's always like that [without water]. And again, there's a guy I worked with at the mines who was a councillor. He used to say to me after '94 were going to because of poor water services because they [farmers] sabotaged very old machinery…water and pipes etc…so that the water that the little water can be diverted to their farms.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

According to some residents who took part in this study, human capital was another area that emerged from the interviews as a contributing factor to why Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau were receiving poor services.

5.3.3. Human resources issues in the water sector

Another key issue in the study linked to failing infrastructure was a perception of poor maintenance and servicing from a personnel perspective. Some participants claimed that the use of underqualified or unqualified artisans by the MLM contributed to the failure of water infrastructure, which in turn caused water interruptions. Some Damonsville residents like Armand, Kgothatso and Felicity believed that pipe repairs were done poorly by unqualified artisans. Armand stated that one of the most significant causal factors for pipe bursts was that MLM hired unqualified artisans to carry out repairs such as welding. He stated the following:

> [T]he main problem is that Madibeng [Local Municipality] hires amateurs to fix [burst] pipes… If you had transport, I'd go and show you how that pipe was welded…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Kgothatso based his opinion on the frequency of pipe bursts, which he attributed to the lack of skill of persons repairing the pipes and perhaps a lack of adequate tools. Images that he had seen ok the repairs were poorly done:

> Yes, last of last week [we did not have water]. And it seems like a pipe burst. [The] Madibeng [Local Municipality] hired people to fix it - to join and weld it. And the way they welded it?! When you see the pictures people took, you can see that qualified welders did not do the welding. The pipe was still leaking at the bottom....Why should it take so long to fix it if you have competent people with the right tools and everything? (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Felicity echoed the same sentiments concerning the lack of skills by personnel recruited by the MLM to repair faulty infrastructure. In support of this, she stated the following:

> I think the main reason there are these problems in our communities in terms of service delivery is that the Madibeng Local Municipality is not hiring skilled people. These people would have been doing a good job....
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Mothutlung residents also concurred with Damonsville residents about a perception that the MLM was not bringing in skilled people to repair infrastructure and equipment. A welder by profession, Danny vehemently criticised the quality of artistry of the repairs done on burst pipes. His tone suggested scepticism as if he was implying that the MLM officials wanted an ongoing infrastructural problem; hence the pipes were not fixed properly. He remarked:

> They don't weld it to seal it. [Y]ou must see the other pipes they fixed. The pipes have three lines of welds...It must be sealed, and a weld must be thick. In two weeks, it will burst again.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Tshepo, another Mothutlung resident, held a strong view that the explanation of water cuts in the area was the incompetence of the technicians and artisans working on water infrastructure. According to him:

> [I]ncompetence, and the person who is in charge is not doing their work properly. I don't want to say maybe she or he is eating the money because I have no proof of that, but it clearly shows incompetence… (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

To *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, the people doing maintenance and repair work on water services infrastructure were underqualified. In support of this, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe said the following:

> The machinery that is cleaning the water must be serviced and uhm…The cleaning of water itself must be running efficiently. The right chemicals must be put in at the right time. All this is not happening… (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe suggested that funds to render services from skilled people were not being released by the MLM officials, so the municipality recruited underqualified people.

> The people who are supposed to be servicing those machines should have the capacity and skills, but they [the Madibeng Local Municipality] are not releasing funds to pay such people. They [MLM] cut corners and get people without skills.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

A Damonsville resident, Armand, echoed this view. He noted the delays in payments by the MLM of service providers. He mentioned that curious residents once went to a repair site to see progress, and when they arrived, the team repairing the burst pipe was sitting idle. Upon inquiry as to why they were not working, the team noted that the municipality had not paid them for work done. Linking this non-payment to corruption in tankering, the men further suggested that the MLM redirected funds for their remuneration to hiring water tankers to provide water to communities experiencing water interruptions. The following were Armand's words:

> [T]hey didn't pay the people who were fixing the pipes, so they'd just sit. People with cars around here would check progress, and they'd find the technicians and mechanics sitting. They'd [the technicians and mechanics] say, "Madibeng doesn't want to pay us because they are sending trucks [water tankers]".
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Participants across Damonsville and Mothutlung strongly believed that the water service provision was being hampered partly because the municipality recruited underqualified, or unqualified, personnel to carry out maintenance and repair work. Recruiting such staff directly threatened the entity's financial viability as funds would be used to pay for poor skills. The result is that less qualified people were recruited to do maintenance work and repairs. In the long run, infrastructure would again not last as long as it would have had it been maintained and repaired by skilled persons. The remarks about unqualified personnel conducting shoddy maintenance and repair work to the residents of Damonsville and Mothutlung contributed to water infrastructure deterioration leading to water interruptions.

5.3.4. Erratic power supply

Water service providers require electricity to pump water. Power interruptions directly impact the, in this case, the MLM's ability to pump water. Some participants attitude water interruptions to erratic electricity supply to their communities. According to *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, from Mmakau, Madibeng owed a huge amount of money to Eskom[44], and because of this, she believed that resulting power cuts contributed to water interruptions. Here is what she said:

> Madibeng is doing nothing…about the issue of water *neh*. We find out that the Madibeng Municipality owes a lot of money to Eskom…At the same meeting, while we are talking about water, the electricity goes off, and there they tell us that Madibeng owes Eskom. They are doing absolutely nothing. When the electricity goes, water goes!!!
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

[44] Eskom is a South African electricity public utility.

Malomê Frank, another Mmakau resident, also linked power interruptions with water interruptions as well. Eskom responsible for power interruptions that affected water service delivery in the area:

> Sometimes Eskom cuts electricity at 4 a.m. when we are sleeping, and water goes with it. How does one prepare when there is no water and electricity? *Ahi*, there is no notification [sic].
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

From the management side, the MLM owed Eskom R90 million in 2017 (Molatlhwa, 2017). In 2020, the Eskom debt stood at R138 million (AfriForum, 2020). The power utility company has since published a notice advising Madibeng communities of power interruptions (Kormorant, 2020a). Areas that were going to be affected were Brits, Elandsrand, Lethlabile, Oukasie, Damonsville and Primindia (AfriForum, 2020). This impact of erratic electricity supply also affirms the anthropogenic nature of water scarcity in Madibeng.

5.4. Resident's strategies to mitigate the water service delivery crisis

To deal with frequent interruptions and poor water quality, Madibeng residents resorted to many different strategies that predominantly relied on access to money and networks. Most of these strategies required Madibeng residents to have the capacity to store water, which was in the form of various types of containers.

5.4.1. Water containers used in Madibeng

Storing water was generally the first option when municipal water was available. Community members used an assortment of containers that came in different shapes and sizes. They included: "small" 2l, 5l and 10l containers; "mid-sized" 20l containers and buckets; as well as "large" +180l drums, and JoJo[45] tanks with a 5,000l capacity.

[45] JoJo Tanks (Pty) Ltd is a supplier of "safe water and storage tank solutions" (see https://www.jojo.co.za). The name "JoJo," however, is synonymous to any "large" tank that is used to store water.

Figure 16 below shows an image of a typical 10l sized container with a nozzle used to store drinking water:

Figure 13: Typical 10l container for drinking water

Having the capacity to store water in Madibeng was necessary. Armand's household used two zinc baths to store water, one for water to run their sanitation system and the other for water to consume. The following were his remarks:

> You see that big bath; we fill it up for water to run the toilet and another for water to drink and cook with.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The culture of storing water in containers in the communities led to some people even setting aside storerooms to store water containers. Figure 14 below shows a water storeroom in Mothutlung:

Figure 14: Storeroom for water containers in Mothutlung

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Some residents in the communities utilised bigger containers. In Damonsville, Kgothatso lived in a backroom at his parents' homestead. At the household, there was a 5,000l JoJo tank which they used to store tap water. According to him, municipal water interruptions had frustrated his parents to such an extent that they resolved to buy a JoJo tank. This tank was enough for the household when there were short-term water interruptions. However, during the three-week August/September 2018 water

interruption, which led to the 12 September "shutdown", the tank almost ran out of water. The situation was so grave that even his two older brothers, who had their own homes in the same community, came to fetch water from there. In a sympathetic tone, Kgothatso stated the following:

> I have two older brothers. One lives down there [pointing], and the other one lives here [pointing]... It's quite close. So, when there was no water, all of us relied on the JoJo tank. They also wanted to wash clothes and cook, and here, it was the same thing. So, we ended up using that water quite quickly because it was supporting three households.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Malomê Frank, a Mothutlung resident, also resorted to buying a 260l JoJo tank. He stated that the area had suffered a spate of water interruptions, which compelled him to "make a plan". *Malomê* Frank said, "If you open your tap and water doesn't come out, what do you do? [pointing at his JoJo tank]...You see that JoJo tank there, I made a plan". In addition to his JoJo tank (See Figure 15). When I interviewed him, most of the buckets were full of water. His reason for this was that he always had to be prepared. In the spirit of *Ubuntu,* he stated that if his neighbours ran out of water, he would also give them some – for "water was life". Not far from his home, another resident had a square JoJo tank (See Figure 16):

Figure 15: *Malomê* Frank's JoJo tank

Figure 16: A square JoJo tank

In some instances, the water interruptions were prolonged, and stored water got finished. Once this happened, one's access to water was determined by their access to money.

5.4.2. Private water sources

The participants indicated that their access to private water sources largely relied on whether one could afford it. According to data collected from the interviews, this played out in three key ways in the research sites: first, purchasing bottled water from water vendors such as *spaza* shops, *shisanyamas*[46], minimarkets, supermarkets, grocery stores and filling stations, among other establishments; second, getting water from boreholes; third and last, hiring *bakkies*[47] to fetch water from areas further afield.

[46] *Shisanyama* describes a barbecue or braai where people come together to grill meat in an open fire.
[47] *Bakkie* (plural *bakkies*) – Is a South African/Namibian term referring to a pick-up truck or UTE.

(a) Water vendors

In Damonsville, some participants indicated that they bought bottled water for drinking while using tap water for cleaning and laundry. One such participant was *Ouma* Viola, who stated the following:

> We buy bottled water, and as for the water from Madibeng [Local Municipality], we just use it for basics like cleaning and washing clothes. We don't drink it…
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

A Mothutlung resident, Tshepo, also reiterated this. Buying water for consumption had become a standard practice for him:

> I buy water for everything I need to use inside the house. For instance, I buy bottled water for cooking and drinking especially.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Having to source money to access private water sources was not as easy as it was expensive. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, for example, expressed that having "additional" or "extra" money to buy water was associated with privilege. Buying bottled water was symbolic of affluence. Some residents in the Damonsville community ventured into selling water as it was now a lucrative business in the area. In support of this, Armand stated the following:

> Some people buy water to drink. They have money to buy…At the third house there (pointing) where there's a *shisanyama*, the *Oom* (Uncle) who stays there sells bottled water. He goes to Brits to stock up and sells it there.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Merchants sold bottled water at high prices in the communities. Since unemployment and poverty were rife in Damonsville and Madibeng in general, not many people could afford to buy water. Buying bottled water was the last resort for some. *Oupa* Andries reiterated that he would prefer not to buy water, but the low water quantity and

substandard quality compelled him. If the MLM did not dispatch water tankers, he would have to buy water. He said:

> When the trucks don't come, we have no water. We buy bottled water from a *spaza* shop here…
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville).

Eduardo, another Damonsville resident, reiterated that he would only buy water if the tankers did not come. Eduardo remarked that it was not sustainable to buy bottled water daily, and he hoped the municipality would improve water service provision. Kgothatso (from Damonsville) and *Mmêmogolo* Chimere (from Mmakau) both conveyed that if people are caring for children or are quite delicate and fragile, they have no option but to buy water. Kgothatso stated that children were delicate, and water bought would be consumed only by them, and as adults, they would have to deal with the consequences of consuming municipal water:

> For kids, we buy them water from town. We make sure that they drink good quality water so that they don't get sick. As for us, you know we are grown; we take that risk.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Mmêmogolo Chimere, a Mmakau resident, shared the same sentiment:

> The water is very bad, so bad. I buy water for the young ones that I have. I bought water for them at the shop yesterday. That small bottle cost me R15.00…This is just for them to be safe…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

By the "small bottle", *Mmêmogolo* Chimere meant a 500ml bottle of water, which was sold at an average price of R7.00 in normal grocery shops at the time when I did the interviews. At R15.00 per bottle, water in all three research areas costs more than twice a conventional supermarket price. Participants like *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, another Mmakau resident, alluded to how their lives were negatively impacted by poor access to sufficient water. Compounding this poor access to water, she noted that some people in the community were exploiting this situation by selling water at exorbitant prices:

> We can't cook, we can't take a bath, and we don't have money… We can't afford water that they are selling around here…We just can't afford it.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

If *spaza* shops or other local suppliers ran out of bottled water in Damonsville, which would occasionally happen days after a "shutdown" had commenced, some residents indicated that they would go to surrounding communities like Rankotea[48] to buy bottled water:

> But sometimes, the shop that sells water runs out. If there has been a prolonged water interruption - like for more than seven days - and we've been striking for a couple of days, water in the shops gets finished. We then go and buy it from another community called Rankotea neh…There are shops there.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Another more affordable and convenient option for the residents was buying water from community members with boreholes.

(b) Private boreholes and borehole water

Community members with private boreholes also participated in the lucrative business of selling water. In Damonsville, residents like Andre stated that he bought water from people within the vicinity who had boreholes. Taylor, another Damonsville resident, reiterated the purchase of water from neighbours and gave a price of R3.00 for a 5l container. Taylor qualified the price of borehole water as "cheap", in comparison to buying bottled water:

> You have to buy it [borehole water]. Borehole water is cheap on this side, and it's R3.00 for five litres.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

[48] Rankotea is a village located just outside the town of Brits in the North West province under the Madibeng municipality of South Africa. The area is a15 minute drive from Damonsville.

Like in Damonsville, selling borehole water was also a profitable enterprise in neighbouring Mmakau. *Malomê* Daniel also corroborated the Damonsville residents' experience of buying borehole water in the following words:

> I get water from the ones who sell, those who have boreholes.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Chimere, another Mmakau resident, mentioned that as a result of the water shortages in the area, they were buying borehole water at R2.00 for a 5l container (which was R1.00 cheaper per five-litre container compared to the Damonsville price):

> [W]e [other residents] buy water from another house up there. They have a borehole, and they sell a [5l] container for R2.00. If you do not have R2.00 to buy, then you have a problem.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Valery, another Mmakau resident, also mentioned the cost of R2.00 for a 5l container. The overall differences in pricing between Damonsville and Mmakau can be explained because Damonsville was a more developed area with residents in a relatively better socio-economic space than Mmakau residents. Affordability and demand influenced the R1.00 price difference between the two areas.

In Mothutlung, some community members sold borehole water. A Madibeng Community Development Worker in the study, Mr. Kalle, bought borehole water from an individual in his area because previously his supplier was based in Brits and it had gotten too far for him:

> We were buying water in town at a big shop and now this at least if you don't have a car it's a walking distance.
> (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung)

Private alternatives of sourcing water in the "new" South Africa can be understood as resulting from a loss of faith in the state's ability to provide sufficient water to communities. In this case, Madibeng residents are aware of the state's responsibility to

provide water services; however, the area's situation is so atrocious that they have resorted to buying water. Some residents used *bakkies* to fetch water.

(c) Water *bakkies*

To mitigate the cost of buying bottled water and borehole water, some residents resorted to hiring *bakkies* and fetching water from afar. To do this, residents put money together and hired a *bakkie* to carry their water containers. One of the residents would then accompany the driver to the collection point, which was, in some cases, a private residence. The *bakkie* owner then "bought" water at the collection point. *Bakkies* proved to be a fairly popular way of getting water in the communities. It was also a lucrative business for *bakkie* owners in Madibeng.

When I was in Damonsville during my fieldwork in September 2018, the MLM had just restored water services. I came across a *bakkie* at a private residence filling up water containers. Some community members had hired this vehicle to fetch water. Below is an image of myself standing next to the water *bakkie*. The vehicle had at least 22 water containers that were being filled up with water at a private residence in Damonsville:

Figure 17: Water *bakkie*

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The containers were varied: 20/25l closed containers and 20l empty paint buckets. The bakkie driver indicated that due to a water crisis in the area, people from Mothutlung had hired him to fetch water in Damonsville.

Some participants mentioned that they hired *bakkies* to go to other areas like Hartbeespoort – which was at least a 25-minute drive away. Incurring such expenses and making such sacrifices was all to get better quality water. *Oupa* Andries was one such participant and said:

> Water supplied to Hartebees [Hartbeespoort] is good. The chemicals they use are good, and the water is clean. There is no problem with that water. Sometimes we don't mind taking a *bakkie* to fetch water… (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Valery also mentioned having taken part in hiring a *bakkie* as she reminisced of times before she had access to a borehole. Herself and others used to get water as far out as Tshwane (a drive time of about 60 minutes):

> We used to buy water, and then other people got water from Tshwane. We had to hire cars [*bakkies*] and collect water from there.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, indicated that he also used the *bakkie* strategy to get water. He said:

> There's someone there who fetches water from Rand Water with a *bakkie*. They deliver [water] door to door. It's a business [for him] so that we can have access to water.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Contributions to hiring the vehicle were about R100.00 per person, and each individual had between five to seven 20/25l containers, according to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, a Mothutlung resident. She preferred water from Rankotea. The lack of money to buy water meant that some participants had to explore different ways of getting water, mostly free (*mahala* in IsiZulu).

From each of the research areas, some residents had the experience of taking part in hiring *bakkies* to fetch water from other areas. These could be going to nearby townships a few minutes drive away or as far as going to another area about an hour's drive away. This strategy required access to money as contributions would need to be made to hire the vehicle to ferry the water containers. If people did not have money to buy water or hire a *bakkie*, they would explore water for *mahala* options.

5.4.3. Water for *mahala*

Some Madibeng residents live in abject poverty. The conditions are so dire that they cannot afford to buy water. They thus resort to getting water at no cost to themselves or for *mahala*. In supporting the point that some people lack the financial means to buy water, Mr. Kalle, succinctly stated, "There are people who don't have money to buy water" (Mr. Kalle/41/M/Mothutlung). The sources of accessing water for free were both safe and unsafe. The following strategies emerged from the interviews:

(a) Collecting water from work

Gainfully employed individuals like Valery, a Mmakau resident working as a shop assistant in Brits, and Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident employed as a winch operator at a nearby mine, considered themselves fortunate compared to other residents in their communities because they could fetch water from their places of employment. Valery noted that her employer had no problem with her taking water from the establishment. She used the water strictly for drinking and cooking. The amount of water she could take was limited to what she could carry – a 5l container per day - as she used public transport.

Tshepo was a winch operator at a nearby mine. The mine provided water for employees in limited quantities. According to him, the mine bosses were aware of the water crisis in surrounding communities and ensured that employees had access to water. For Tshepo, fetching water would, however, require one to wait patiently for their turn to fill up their containers since the queues were very long. He said:

> There is water, but you find that there's a long queue in the morning because everyone wants some. Everybody wants to fill up a 2-litre bottle…For me, that's water I take home. The company organises us purified water for drinking. They fill a big tank of 250 to 500l daily. (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Some community members were not fortunate enough to have employment places that provided water. Some community members resorted to fetching water from unsafe and unprotected sources in such circumstances.

(b) Water from “dams” and rivers

In Damonsville, some participants indicated that community members found themselves resorting to fetching water from unsafe sources as a survival tactic due to the community's frequent and prolonged water interruptions. The unsafe water sources included nearby “dams” and rivers. Affirming this point, Armand mentioned the existence of a “dam” from which Damonsville residents fetched water during prolonged water interruptions:

> My friend, we didn’t have water for the past three weeks. Many people went to get water from a small “dam” on the other side of this main road.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Once I exited the field, I used Google Earth to locate the “nearby dams”. Figure 21 below is a satellite image of Damonsville and the “dams[49]” across “the main road”. Based on the image, I identified six water masses, or “dams” as they were commonly referred to by some participants, enclosed in the black oval in the image below. The “dams” are numbered from one to six.

[49] The “dams” are unsafe water masses.

Figure 18: "Dams" across Damonsville

Source: Google Earth Satellite Image

The image shows that the water in the "dams" was green in colour, indicating that it was dirty. This colour is similar to how Bond (2014) describes the Hartbeespoort Dam, which has excessive algae, cyanobacteria, and water hyacinth, resulting in bright green water. These "dams" were a short walking distance from *die wit huise*, "the white houses".

Armand believed that the water was only good for running sanitation systems. The water was not even good enough for laundry. The following were his exact words:

> So, the people went to get water for their toilets and to do laundry. It's dirty water, so they mostly use it for the toilets. You really can't use it for laundry, especially for white clothes you can't wash them with that water because they'll turn brown.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina, another resident of the *die wit huise* in Damonsville, also referred to using the "dam" water for flushing toilets. According to her, during a prolonged water interruption, she resorted to fetching water from this nearby "dam" for cleaning and flushing the toilets. Ina's decision to fetch that water came out of desperation, for she had no alternatives:

> We didn't have water for two weeks. That's when we ended up using "dam" water to clean and flush the toilets.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

One participant, *Ouma* Viola, stated that she had read in a local newspaper that out of desperation, people in areas around Damonsville and Mothutlung were fetching water from the rivers which they used to drink, cook with as well as use for bathing:

> [Y]ou read it [such news] in the Daily Sun. They showed a tap that had been dry for months and said that people were using water from rivers to wash. They also took the same sandy water home for cooking and drinking.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Oupa Andries, another Damonsville resident, resorted to rainwater harvesting. A few days before my interview with him, it had rained heavily in Damonsville and surrounding areas. He collected and stored rainwater in 5l containers and 20l buckets. He stated, "[A]nd on Monday it rained for quite a bit, so I also filled some buckets with water". *Oupa* Andries was quite innovative to have come up with RWH as a strategy in his own right. RWH is, unfortunately, not a reliable source of water as it is solely dependent on *mother nature*, and water collected is not necessarily suitable for human consumption (Kahinda et al., 2007: 1052; Selala et al., 2018: 223; Dobrowsky et al., 2014: 401; Ndeketeya and Dundu, 2019: 163).

Based on the above, "innovative" residents had developed strategies to ensure access to water to overcome what they noted to be poor water services from the Madibeng Local Municipality. These strategies rely mostly on one's access to money to buy water. If one did not have access to money, choices would be restricted and could force them to fetch

and use water from unsafe sources. Having established this, the following section unpacks participants' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver water services.

5.5. Participants' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality's ability to deliver services

The participants believed that the MLM and its staff were responsible for service-related challenges that Madibeng communities were experiencing. The participants' commonly held sentiment was that the municipality failed to deliver on its mandate. This is reflected in an excerpt from my interview with Felicity, a Damonsville resident, who posed critical questions about the role of the municipality and service delivery:

> Isn't it that the municipality's main responsibility is to provide water and other basic services to people at all times? For it to provide by all means necessary - whenever possible?
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Felicity also demonstrates a strong citizenship conscience as she was aware of her rights as a citizen and the state's role regarding basic services provisioning. What follows is a discussion of the various aspects that emerged:

5.5.1. "Municipal officials just don't care"

The local government is very important because it connects the state to the people and interacts with the public. A functional municipality provides services efficiently and professionally, putting people first, in line with the *Batho Pele* Principles. The MLM, however, presented a different case according to participants in this study. One of the participants' major issue was that municipal officials "did not care".

Water service provision in Damonsville was so poor that Armand believed that the area was invisible to the MLM. He was suggesting that municipal officials did not "see" their area as part of their jurisdiction by invisibility. He went on to say that the only service provision the community had come to expect, and which was consistently delivered, was refuse collection, which was every Friday:

> It seems to me that Damonsville is invisible to [the] Madibeng [Local Municipality]. They don't consider us as part of Ward 21. All they do is collect rubbish every Friday. That's all they know how to do.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Taylor, also from Damonsville, emphatically believed that the MLM did not look out for people in its jurisdiction. He said the following, "They don't care from my side. They just don't care!!!". This sentiment was supported by *Ouma* Viola, who described the Damonsville water crisis stemming from neglect. She held the opinion that MLM employees had abandoned the Damonsville community:

> The [Madibeng Local] Municipality people who work with water are neglecting us. Because if they weren't neglecting us, we wouldn't be suffering like this.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Mothutlung residents reiterated the view of the MLM's lacking care and concern about the poor water service delivery. *Ma'* Tshepiso stated that such atrocious water service provision was tantamount to an infringement of community members' rights. She said: "I don't think the municipality is bothered, and they don't respect our rights". To *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, the MLM officials made sure that their kin had access to water, and from then, the rest of the community members would have to source water themselves:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't care about us… Before they cut the water supply, they make sure that their families are water secure.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Like Damonsville and Mothutlung residents, Mmakau residents also made reference to the idea that municipal officials lacked of care and compassion for their communities. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere believed that municipal officials had simply forgotten about their mandate to the people – and again reiterated the fact that they were aware that the MLM had a responsibility to provide basic services to communities:

> When I look at them [i.e. the Madibeng Local Municipality], they seem like they don't care about us, do as they please, and not what they are supposed to do.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Furthermore, Valery believed that municipal officials were unqualified and driven by their selfish interests to further personal gain as opposed to delivering on the objectives of the local government:

> Our municipality is run by people who don't know anything; they just want to get rich; they don't care about the community. As long as they are okay, the others don't give a damn about us.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Some participants linked the lack of care to the 2014 deaths that occurred during a water-related community protest failed to elicit a change of behaviour in the municipality. *Malomê* Daniel stated the following:

> There's no urgency or quickness. The water issue is a terrible one. People have been crying and complaining that it's dirty for a very long time. Some people here even died for water.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Ma' Yolanda reiterated the MLM's lack of urgency when dealing with water issues, and also the fact that previously some members lost their lives fighting for their right of access to sufficient water:

> No, I don't see any urgency from the municipality to help Mmakau. We've been fighting for clean water, and many people have passed away. I don't know if the Madibeng Local Municipality will ever resolve this water issue.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

The participants in the study also linked the MLM officials lack care to poor communication. The municipality had a responsibility to ensure that the citizenry was aware of service delivery related issues.

5.5.2. Poor communication

An acute sense of frustration over the MLM's responses, or lack of thereof, to water issues in the researched communities emerged from several residents. They felt communication from the municipality over water issues and other issues were lacking. The lack of communication aroused the residents' suspicion in the operations at the municipality. A Damonsville resident, *Oupa* Andries, voiced a deep frustration based on his negative experience with municipal officials when he once inquired about a water interruption which the community was experiencing. He noted that they supplied the very least information they possibly could to somewhat obscure the problem. He went even as far as suggesting that the DWS should investigate what is transpiring at the MLM:

> Ask them why there's no water, and they'll tell you that a pipe broke. But they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] won't say when the pipe broke or when it will be fixed. Why don't they give us answers? I don't know why…They [the Department of Water and Sanitation] should investigate what's happening at Madibeng [Local Municipality].
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Several participants held that the municipality did not demonstrate any urgency to notify the residents of possible water interruptions. Armand, for example, pleaded the MLM to advise residents ahead of impending water interruptions with details such as the water interruption duration. According to him, this would give them time to implement interim interventions such as storing water. In support of this, here is what he said:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] should notice that the water will be cut off because they're fixing the pipes or something. Madibeng [Local Municipality] doesn't inform us of anything…They must inform us. Whether they send printed letters or discuss this at a community meeting, so we are prepared…[W]e'll make sure that we fill up every bucket for the time where there won't be water.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina, another Damonsville resident, reiterated the view that the water supply was interrupted without warning or notice. This would be followed by the dispatch of water tankers by the municipality. Ina lamented:

> They don't even give us a notice that there's going to be a water cut. The water cuts are always unexpected, and all they do is send water trucks [tankers], but that's not enough.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

This perceived lack of communication was reiterated by Kgothatso, who noted that it was difficult for community members to get any information from the MLM about water services' interruption. Like Ina, he also stressed the importance of being at least given notice so that they can store water in containers:

> They [The Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform us anything…They should inform us…They should give us a heads-up…So they must try and give us enough time to get water and store some in containers because at that time it is still clean.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Like Ina and Kgothatso, Mothutlung resident, Danny, disliked the unexpectedness in which MLM carried out water interruptions. This abruptness meant that he and other community members could not store water in good time. He said the following:

> ...If they told us when they would cut water supply, that would not be a problem. We have buckets so that we can store water. But the problem is they don't tell us. You see, you will find out that the Madibeng Local Municipality has cut water supply, and you were unprepared. Had we been aware in good time, we would have done something...Like putting some in our buckets...
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Furthermore, Ina held the view that the municipality did not alert community members to interventions or repair plans. Their responses to repairing broken and faulty infrastructure were also sluggish. She said:

> They [Municipality of Madibeng officials] don't tell us, and they don't react immediately. They take their time in fixing the issues. I mean, how long does it take for a pipe to be fixed?
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

The eerie silence from the municipality left community members feeling hopeless as they would just have to wait for days which would turn into weeks, and the weeks into a month, or two, in some cases. In support of this, Myra stated the following:

> The water just stops, and they don't even notify us [i.e. Municipality of Madibeng officials]. Or sometimes they'll say the water will be gone for just a day, and it turns into a whole month.
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Myra's opinion also corroborated Kgothatso's. There was no communication from the municipality about faults, and community members generally found out about these when they opened the taps needing water:

> Whether they tell you that the valve is broken or that the pipe burst somewhere, they close it off for a couple of days...It usually becomes weeks...They don't usually inform us...You wake up in the morning, open the tap, and then find out that there's no water coming out...They don't usually inform us of water interruptions.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Two other Mothutlung residents: Ntatêmogolo Joe and Mmêmogolo Angelica echoed the view about how abrupt the MLM did water interruptions and its lack of communication. *Ntatêmogolo* Joe indicated that without warning, water services would be cut and sometimes restored. According to him, as all this happens, there would be no official word from the municipality:

> Sometimes what will annoy me is that the water will go away in the evening and only come back at night, and in the morning, by six, it's cut again. People are sleeping when the water comes and, in the morning, when they wake up, it's gone, and not a word from the municipality.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

In a different light, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica held the view that some people in the community had information about water cuts, while others, like herself, did not:

> No, maybe they [i.e. the Madibeng Local Municipality] inform some in the community; not all of us. Unless someone like my neighbour says to me, "You know they're going to cut our water", I won't know. Maybe my neighbour will ask me if I have water coming out the tap, and I'll check, and I'd say, "No", if there is no water.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants like Tshepo, from Mothutlung, and Daniel, from Mmakau, noted that the main concern with the water issues was not that water services were interrupted; but rather that the MLM did not provide any form of communication about the water interruptions. Here is what Tshepo said:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform anyone anything. You see, it would be much better if they notified us that on this date till this date the water will be cut-off due to some reasons, maybe maintenance or something.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

According to some participants, the lack of communication over water interruptions, their causes, and their duration was a significant concern. This impacted the trust between Damonsville residents and the MLM. The growing suspicion between the two

contributed to some participants harbouring feelings that the municipality was not transparent in its operations.

5.5.3. Lack of transparency

Some participants speculated that something dubious was happening within the MLM walls that officials working there did not want the outside world to know. To Mmêmogolo Chimere, some participants only asked for transparency from the municipal officials when there was a water problem. Timelines for repairs should be public information, and if the municipality was implementing any restrictions, it was ideal that people know – like how the Cape Town government dealt with the "Day Zero" water crisis:

> If there is a water problem, they must tell us that, "You won't have for such a period…." This may be because a pipe has burst or dam water needs to be purified…"You will not have water for the week, we are purifying water, or we are saving water as there was no rain in winter". Maybe they are saving water like Cape Town…You see, in Cape Town, they are saving water, and they [Cape Town provincial government] publicised how much water was allocated to a person per day…Here now, it's different. There is nothing like that. There are many dams around us. Water is plenty here…Water should be there, and they must tell us what is going on…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

Mothutlung residents, like *Malomê* Frank, detailed his own futile experiences of trying to get information from municipal officials. He expressed a lot of meddling behind the scenes at the MLM. He went on to suggest that no one outside of the municipality knew what the officials were up to – which was evidence of a management crisis:

> [T]hese problems originate behind closed doors. What they are fiddling with, no one knows…Whatever is happening, I don't know. What I know is that sometimes we have water, and other times we don't…My brother, we don't know what is happening there. Whether the pipe has burst or what, they don't act, and they don't communicate. We just find out that we don't have water, that's all…
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Felicity also reiterated the lack of transparency by the MLM. She held the opinion that problems with water service provision would only get fewer once there was more transparency:

> I think if our municipality communicated more with the communities, things would change for the better. But then they don't. I think that's where the problem lies.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Some participants, *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, treated the councillor of Mmakau with immense suspicion. She claimed that if the community approached him over water-related issues, he would claim to have gone to the municipal offices to address issues, whereas, in reality, he would not have. They viewed howhe installed a JoJo tank at his mother's house located in the same area, as an indication that the community's water situation was not going to change any time soon. According to him, the community considered his action a sign of betrayal. It demonstrated that he was more interested in his family's welfare than addressing the issues so that the whole community could have access to water. According to the community, he did this for his mother to access water when the municipality failed to provide it. To *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, the councillor was not being fair, and the following were her exact words:

> We have a councillor, but the problem is that he is a liar. Our councillor is a liar. He tells us that he went to Madibeng [Local Municipality], but he wouldn't have gone there. He has just put up a JoJo tank at his mother's compound, but we don't have...
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Participants like Kgothatso attributed water interruptions to politicians disrupting the local governance process in communities. He felt as community members, the residents of Madibeng were being taken advantage of by politicians and their associates. He believed that politicians were only in the communities when they needed something, and once they got it, they left. To Kgothatso, politicians were manipulative and deceitful. Their presence in communities was a means to an end:

> They only care about the people in the communities when they want to use them…When they want to win things, win positions, or win tender documents, or win whatever, that's when they come to the communities. They only do things for the communities until they get the type of response they want, and then after that, they get signatures for whatever. After they get these things, they use them for their benefit, and then they forget about us…
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

5.5.4. A reflection on the *Batho Pele* Principles

Andre, a Damonsville resident, knew about the *Batho Pele* Principles. He directly referenced how officials from the municipality were not executing their roles and responsibilities efficiently, even though municipalities were adequately funded. The attitude and work ethic exhibited by the employees was in stuck contravention of the *Batho Pele* Principles:

> These people [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] must adhere to the *Batho Pele* Principles. The government provides enough resources to municipalities; the only thing failing us is the local municipality. I think the municipal managers…[m]ust do their work properly, so we don't suffer. Because truly speaking, we are suffering.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Some participants like Ouma Viola and Andre held the opinion that the water issue in Damonsville was so severe that they described their lived experiences there as characteristic of "suffering". As I noted in the literature, the MLM officials performed poorly and displayed intolerable conduct (Worku, 2018: 112).

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter depicts a lamentable picture of participants' perceptions of water service delivery in Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau by the Madibeng Local Municipality. The "sufficiency" of water in South Africa depends on two essential indicators: its quantity and quality. While quantity refers to the minimum amount of water required to meet the basic needs of a citizen, which is 25l per person per day, quality, on the other

hand, refers to the minimum standards acceptable to consumers in terms of health-related characteristics – most importantly which is that the water must be safe enough to drink and use for food preparation.

Data collected demonstrated that the participants from the three Madibeng communities viewed the water quantity provided by the municipality to the three areas as grossly inadequate. All three areas had piped infrastructure; however, the areas suffered from frequent and extended water interruptions. To mitigate the impact of the interruptions, the municipality dispatched water tankers. Again, these tankers provided insufficient water according to the participants. Participants in the study did not know when the tankers would be dispatched, and because of that, some of them missed them. They would leave their water containers at collection spots in the communities hoping that the tankers would deliver water. As for water quality, the participants in this study were overall not impressed by the MLM's water quality. Based on municipal's water organoleptic properties, that is, its colour, taste and smell, some participants claimed that the water was dirty. It smelt and tasted "salty" and like mud. Even though water's organoleptic properties are not accurate indicators of water quality, several participants had gotten ill from or knew someone who had from consuming it.

Based on their observations, participants in the study generally attributed water issues to five factors. Firstly, Madibeng officials were viewed as corrupt and mismanaged the entity. A highly contentious issue that emerged was the *tenderpreneurial* nature of the tankering processes in Madibeng. Some participants believed that municipal officials sabotaged water infrastructure so tanker owners could get tenders to provide water, people from whom they received kickbacks for providing "business". Secondly, the water services infrastructure in Madibeng is believed to be ageing and generally in a bad state. Participants explained rampant pipe bursts which caused water interruptions to dilapidated water infrastructure. Thirdly, it was alleged that the municipality recruited unqualified or underqualified artisans to carry out repairs and maintenance. Fourth, the inconsistent supply of electricity influenced the availability of water. Eskom indicated that due to the MLM's debt, the power supply to the municipality would be restricted. This, unfortunately, has had a direct impact on the provision of water services in the

communities. The fifth is population growth. Over the years, the different areas in the municipality have grown exponentially. Unfortunately, the growth has not been addressed from a water infrastructural standpoint. This is because the existing infrastructure cannot supply adequate water to the communities.

As for coping mechanisms to poor water service delivery by the MLM, communities evolved strategies to store and source water; Madibeng residents had containers that ranged from small 2l plastic bottles to 5,000l JoJo tanks. In incidents in which water interruptions were extended, and the residents used up the water, those with financial resources could buy water from *spaza* shops, supermarkets, borehole owners, and other stores, or in some cases, put money together and hire *bakkies* to fetch water from surrounding communities. Those without money found themselves in a very dire and desperate situation as they resorted to fetching water from unsafe sources like water masses close to Damonsville.

Due to these harrowing experiences by Madibeng residents about accessing water services in the area, most of them viewed the MLM's organisational capacity negatively. The participants repeatedly described the municipality's staff as people who did not care about the communities they were mandated to serve. Based on the data collected from the interviews in three Madibeng communities, this chapter notes that residents viewed water services provided in Madibeng were in contravention of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) since the water right was frequently being infringed. The Water Services Act (1997) and the National Water Act's (1998) were violated. Since the municipality was failing to deliver its mandate to provide basic services to the poor, the MLM had also violated the Municipal Systems Act (2000). The next chapter presents findings on the participants' views of how they accessed and expressed themselves as citizens in Madibeng hydropolitics. This chapter juxtaposes critical theoretical concepts with empirical evidence.

CHAPTER SIX

Hydropolitics in Madibeng: A Quest to Access and Express Rights in Three Communities

"There can be no daily democracy without daily citizenship."
Ralph Nader

6.1. Introduction

In a bid to present how residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, express citizenship within the context of hydropolitics, the previous chapter focused on addressing three objectives. These were their perceptions of water services; their coping strategies regarding what I argued is their version of anthropogenic water scarcity experienced in the area; and their overall perceptions of service delivery by the Municipality of Madibeng. These three objectives help to position this thesis to probe the two last objectives of this study which are to investigate how the residents of the three communities responded to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water; and, finally, to contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in Madibeng.

Using citizenship *conscience* and citizenship *exercise*, I look at how the participants in this study constructed their positionality through the lens of the intersection of class, race as this significantly influenced their access to adequate water services and overly experience and participation in Madibeng hydropolitics. I further unpack their perceptions of the various forms of expression they engage in to vindicate their right to water.

6.2. Class, race and access to water

Participants in the research areas believed that payment of water services was a prerequisite for enjoying full citizenship rights. This view is reflected in the literature as von Schnitzler (2008: 907) argued that payment, a "good citizen practice", had come to be viewed as a requirement for inclusion within the new political community. Access to water rested on equal access to a guaranteed minimum level – the 25l per person per month - which the MLM has struggled to provide. As a local government, the ANC-led Madibeng constituency was failing dismally to provide water services, and this is apparent in the fact that some communities could more easily access water than others. Participants believed that because their communities were "poor" and "black", they were not afforded good service by the MLM.

According to data collected from the participants, the Madibeng Local Municipality (MLM) struggled to provide basic water access to Damonsville, Mmakau and Mothutlung. These communities are already affected by the "triple challenge" of poverty, unemployment and inequality, challenges that affect the rest of the country (Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2015; Mzangwa, 2016). Participants in this study generally felt that they were experiencing poor water service delivery because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities.

Starting in Damonsville, Taylor, visibly irritated, described how he felt about his community's marginalisation. He believed that areas receiving better water service provision were where community members paid their municipal water bills. He gave an example of areas like Brits, where residents received better services because, to him, they paid. The following were his words:

> They don't treat other areas like this…[T]heir water is perfect. It's just this area [Damonsville] that doesn't have clean water…You will find out that in town [Brits] they pay bills for water and here we can't afford…Their water is good…
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola, a former cashier who used to work in the Brits CBD, stated that the business hub generally had water services, and interruptions were very unusual. If water supply was cut, services would be restored within the day:

> Uhm…When I was working at Good Value[50] Supermarket, it [a water interruption] happened only once. It was not for the whole day because it's a CBD, and businesses can't stay without water. The Madibeng Local Municipality cut water in the morning, and they restored it before midday.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Ouma Viola and Armand, another Damonsville resident, believed that a difference between the way people who live in "white" and "black" areas influenced how they accessed basic services. To them, this binary also represented a "rich"/"poor" dichotomy. According to *Ouma* Viola, people who stayed in "black" areas struggled with water services. However, residents of "white" areas, such as Elandsrand and suburbs in Pretoria, where housing and services were "expensive", received better water service than Damonsville. She attributed unemployment as defining characteristic of her area. She stated the following:

> As a citizen, you see, in black areas, we struggle with water, but in the white areas, I think they call them suburbs; they don't have these issues with water. In Elandsrand and Pretoria, there are no water issues there…The rent and services there are expensive. We are from a location [Damonsville], and we cannot afford that [expensive] lifestyle. We are unemployed, and we are happy together here. We don't have stress, and neighbours here get along and know each other.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Similarly, Armand stated that the type of area influenced the quality of services provided by municipalities. He expressed that people living in the suburbs, "rich" or "white" areas, did not experience the problems they were facing in Damonsville because they could afford to pay for services. To him, across the continent of Africa, affordability greatly influenced the quality of services people received from the state. The following was his opinion:

[50] This is a pseudonym.

> People who stay in the suburbs don't have this problem because they can afford to pay for services. But for people in the locations, from Cape to Cairo, we struggle to get services wherever there's a location. People struggle with water, tarred roads and electricity. But the main problem is water…[There is no water]…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The perception of a link between an area's affluence level and race was also expressed by *Ma'* Tshepiso and *Mmêmogolo* Angelica, both from Mothutlung. *Ma'* Tshepiso held that the water allocation by the MLM was unfair as it was skewed in favour of suburbs. As a resident of a poor community, she believed that the municipality did not afford them the due attention or respect they deserved. She singled out Brits as an area with a constant water supply – affirming what had been stated by Taylor and *Ouma* Viola. She said the following:

> I don't believe water is allocated fairly in Madibeng Municipality because you'll see that this area [Mothutlung] doesn't have water. Still, people in the suburbs like Brits have water…I think it is because they don't take us seriously at all…Because we are poor…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Mmêmogolo Angelica cited three townships that experienced water service provision issues: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Letlhabile. She had never heard any negative remarks from Brits residents about poor water service delivery. Here is what she said:

> I think Mothutlung, Damonsville and Letlhabile are the ones with water problems, but the ones who stay in town [Brits], I've never heard them complaining.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

The dire conditions in Mmakau – lack of roads, poor water and sanitation services - puzzled participants like *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude. According to her, despite the progress achieved in South Africa in terms of infrastructural development, no one would anticipate that there would be communities lagging behind like Mmakau that lacked water services infrastructure. She said she found herself incapacitated and unable to do anything because she was a poor person. This also resonated with how she interpreted

her citizenship in the new South Africa had been reduced to nothingness because she was poor – her hands were tied. The following were her exact words:

> Now with recent infrastructural development, would you still expect people to suffer from poor water services? Our hands are tied, and we cannot do anything…You are just a poor person…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Danny, another Mothutlung resident, detailed the differences in service provision between "rich" and "poor" areas. According to him, affluent neighbourhoods in Madibeng accommodate white people and "others", people of colour, who are well-off. MLM prioritised these areas in terms of service delivery. Even as recipients of poor service provision, Danny was aware that he could not complain because it was useless:

> It [Mothutlung] is not the same as places like Elandsrand. They [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] also know the kind of people residing there - white people and so on. People who have money. So they [Madibeng Local Municipality officials] make sure that their service is right. So we, *hai*, if we can complain *hai*…
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny also suggested that water quality and interruption schedules differed between the two areas – Mothutlung and Elandsrand. In Elandsrand, the MLM provided the community with "better" water quality and interruptions were not erratic. To him, poverty, unfortunately, translated to being voiceless. Access to money is what gave people a voice since they could pay for services. He said:

> Yes, the quality is not the same, and the cut-offs times are not the same. This side [Mothutlung], we have lots of cut-offs, unlike that side [Elandsrand]. Even the other services within the community are different. So it means if you are poor *hai*, you must know that you are in trouble because money talks.
>
> [P]oor people don't have a say; the only people who have a say are those at the top, you see. So your opinion doesn't matter…
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Danny held the view that people were not being treated equally by the municipality. Even though citizenship was a state of equality, the MLM saw and treated the communities differently, according to him. He believed that equipment and the quality of work in the maintenance and repair of water services infrastructure in both areas were different. While Elandsrand received superior services, areas like Mothutlung received very poor services:

> The thing is that they [Madibeng Local Municipality] should take people as equal, you see…So maybe the pipes that they are installing are different depending on the area. Perhaps in other areas, they put the right pipes, and in other areas not. In other areas, they put pipes deeper, and in other areas, they are not installed as deep, you see…That's why at some point, you will see water coming out of a burst pipe…[T]hose pipes are not made from good quality…At Elandsrand, there is a tarred road, but here you can see there is no tarred road…Or even pavement. There is dust, but what can we say? We already live here…In Elandsrand, they do a good job.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Besides drawing comparisons on different urban areas, Armand believed that farming communities in the municipality received far more consistent water services than Damonsville. Here is what he said:

> The thing is, people on the farms get water from Madibeng, and you must know that those people are paying for the water…There is water on farms. Our water is inconsistent, we have water today, and it'll be cut tomorrow.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

The interviews also referred to this keen awareness of hierarchies between different communities and people in the same community. The hierarchies were linked to one's affordability of different water alternatives. People who could afford to buy bottled water were considered richer than those who could not afford it. Danny and Armand held this belief. According to Danny, there were different "classes" of people in Mothutlung. He suggested that "upper class" people could buy water throughout the month, "middle class" people, like himself, could afford to buy water; however, if they overspent money during the month, they would struggle to buy throughout. The last

category was "poor people". These were people who could not afford to buy water at any time of the month. The following were his remarks:

> [T]here are poor people, middle [class] people, and those who are in the upper [class]. Those who do not have money drink tap water because they don't have options - so we are not the same. Even us, we buy water, but when time goes on, we end up drinking it [tap water] because our money would have finished, you see. Let's say we overspend during the month and the water we bought gets finished; we don't have an option but to drink it [tap water]. Most of the time, we buy bottled water, though. They are those at the top who can afford to buy bottled water on any day.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Other alternatives that people used to fetch water was through their cars, for example. A Mmakau resident, Thulani, said for one to access clean water, they needed a car that they could use to fetch water:

> Others do not have money to pay for clean water, and they don't have cars to fetch water; it's a problem for them. It's a problem.
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

If clean and safe water can only be bought from shops, and according to Thabo marginalised groups in the community of Mmakau would not be able to do so. Here were his exact words:

> It's not fair, and it is poor [water] service [delivery], and it is ineffective, my brother. What about poor people, pensioners and people who are disabled? What about their dependents at home without an income? How are they going to afford to buy water?
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, also echoed Thabo's reference to pensioners. His grandmother was a pensioner struggling with getting clean water since she could not afford to buy it.

There is a strong correlation between poverty and race in post-apartheid South Africa. This means that people of colour generally reside in low-income areas. These are the same areas that experience poor basic services delivery. This situation limited these

residents' ability to access invited spaces. In addition, the efficacy of the invited spaces through which they could express themselves as citizens about their disgruntlement over poor basic water provision, invented had declined. The following section explores participants' perceptions that invited spaces available to residents of the three communities often become toxic, in particular as they relate to community meetings.

6.3. From *sterile* to *toxic* invited community meetings

In literature, it was established that in South Africa, invited spaces of participation developed by authorities in the post-apartheid era have largely been viewed as "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", qualified as "sedative invited spaces" (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). invited spaces were noted to have been unable to support citizens from poor urban communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114). Data collected from this research reflected a perception by some of the participants regarding the futility of invited spaces and how the spaces were becoming toxic.

It is important to note that some participants were unaware of invited spaces such as community meetings, like *Ouma* Viola, a Damonsville resident. She held that her community did not have meetings where issues like water were addressed. She went on to say that water as an issue only emerged as a topic of discussion when a strike was being organised. She was aware that members of South Africa's main political parties: the ANC, the EFF and the DA organised these protests. The following were *Ouma* Viola's exact words:

> I've never been to a meeting; we don't have meetings where we discuss water issues. The only time when we talk about water is during a strike. We don't know the finer details about water issues…It's these political parties that are involved in organising everything. If I'm not wrong, it's the ANC, EFF and DA. I'm not sure which one is in charge… (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Some participants knew about regular communitymeetings in their respective areas to discuss issues of mutual concern, like the perceived water crisis. According to Myra, a Damonsville resident, the community held meetings where people discussed water services and other issues of mutual concern. However, what was peculiar was that information on how the meetings were organised was not public; it was the preserve of a select few. This explained could have possibly explained people like Ouma Viola were not aware of the occurrences of the meetings. Myra went on to say that the official signal of a protest in Damonsville was whistling. The following were Myra's remarks:

> No one informs us of community meetings. We just hear people say they were at a meeting about Madibeng water...They [community youth] blow whistles [in the morning]. When the community hears whistling, we know something is wrong, something is about to happen, or something is happening...
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, stopped attending meetings. His experience at the meeting was that "ordinary" community members' input was not considered. He held the view that citizenship had been reduced to nothing in this invited space. In support of this, he stated the following:

> [T]here's no point in me going to meetings because whatever decision they're going to take, they're going to take it irrespective of my view or opinion. I think they do that because I'm just an ordinary citizen.
> (Andre /33/M/Damonsville)

Participants from Mothutlung also viewed attending community meetings as futile.. According to Tshepang, meetings were a sheer waste of time. At the time of the interview, he had stopped attending meetings. He attributed this to the fact that the meeting's conveners were partisan, and decisions taken were not assessed on merit. He indicated that one's ideas would not be considered if you were not one of the "favourites". He believed that these meetings were staged, and decisions taken during the meeting were agreed upon prior to the meeting. Here were his remarks:

> I don't go there. I only hear what people say. And I didn't go there before either when things were not as bad as they are now. When you attend a meeting, I believe that a better argument must win at the end of the day. But here, it's not a matter of a better argument [winning]; it is a matter of who you are. If you're not on their favourite list, they won't listen to you. It's difficult to attend a meeting where you know the decisions were already made.
> (Tshepang/35/M/Mothutlung)

Ntatêmogolo Joe reiterated Tshepang's perception. He had also stopped attending meetings. He even advised his daughter to stop attending meetings because they were not benefiting from the political processes in the area. According to him,community meetings were highly politicised spaces were driven by an ANC agenda. The following were *Ntatêmogolo* Joe's remarks:

> I don't attend the meetings; however, my daughter does. They always go on about the ANC at the meetings, and I always tell her that she's wasting her time. I say to her, "You're not working, and your children are also not working".
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Other participants held the view that politicians had turned community meetings into political party meetings. Armand, a Damonsville resident, indicated that community meetings ideally were platforms on which problems of mutual interest should be tabled and discussed, such as poor water service provision by MLM; however, this was not the case. Armand believed that in Damonsville, community leaders were blatantly and unapologetically partisan and declared that community meetings were strictly ANC meetings. This defeated the whole point of the community coming together. Here was Armand's remark:

> The first thing we do here in Damonsville when we have a problem is to call a community meeting. It is a space in which everybody must raise their own opinions about how we will deal with [the] Madibeng (Local Municipality) and the water issues…Sometimes, the community leaders there will tell you straight that it is an ANC meeting. This is a problem for me. What about if you are not an ANC member living here in Damonsville? They make it a political thing…
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Some people were being victimised at meetings. Age was one such factor. According to *Oupa* Andries, he was labelled "old" by both the community members and officials from the MLM. He used to attend community meetings from the time he moved into the community over 30 years ago. The following were his remarks:

> You see, I'm old. When they have meetings, they'd tell me that I'm too old…Both the community and Madibeng [i.e. MLM]. And the young men who attended normally come to tell me what was discussed in the meetings…
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Attacking *Oupa* Andries was in direct contravention of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). S9(3) of the Constitution (1996) states that neither the state nor anyone in the Republic can:

> [U]nfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
> (RSA, 2006)

To some participants, community meetings had become hostile and unwelcoming spaces. While in post-apartheid South Africa, the universality of citizenship is there on paper (i.e. the Constitution, RSA, 1996), some participants viewed community meetings as spaces that were partisan and thus exclusionary. "Ordinary citizenship" had been reduced to nothing, resulting in some participants not attending the meetings. The attendance of the meetings by community members indicated that they possessed *citizenship conscience* – they were fully aware of the reasons for taking part; however, unfortunately, the reception and atmosphere at the meetings were not conducive for them to contribute as citizens. These feelings culminated in some community members expressing reluctance to attend, restricting their *citizenship exercise*. It is important to note that the decision to withdraw was arrived at under duress. Some participants felt that how local government officials managed community meetings contributed to the toxicity of these invented spaces.

Instead of being viewed as state officials interested in the betterment of local communities, politicians were viewed negatively as interfering in the way communities and the MLM were functioning. To some participants, these meetings ended up being were platforms on which politicians pursued their agendas. According to the views of the participants presented above, it appears that invited spaces for participation that were engineered by the local government to "invite people in" are inadequate, lack capacity is unresponsive and superficial, and in essence are simply used as a rubber stamp for participation and democracy (Cornwall 2004; le Roux, 2015). According to the views of some participants, meetings occurred in a way such that there were restrictions in invited participation, and participants were voiceless, and the deafness of the state to the citizenry's demands was problematic, echoing what has been document by Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper (2012). Some community members found participation at these meetings deeply frustrating.

To some extent, some of the participants exhibited a decline in a sense of political efficacy. The attendance of meetings to them did not yield positives for them and when citizens believe that they cannot influence political outcomes, they will not take part in these invented spaces of participation (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). The role of politicians also come under scrutiny. According to some participants, different political groups were violently contesting for political space in Madibeng, and the general populace found it hard to express their interests and demands through legitimate means. The role of politicians in the communities was viewed with great suspicion, and in local politics, there was a rise in violence in the communities. A reluctance to vote in elections was another decline in invited spaces that emerged in the interviews.

6.4. A growing sense of the futility of voting

The literature presented a picture that voter turnout has declined significantly since 1999, and that 2021 has recorded the lowest voter turnout in the history of South Africa. A contributing factor to this was people's experience of the triple challenges – inequality, poverty and unemployment. Based on the data collected, while some participants' indicated that they responded to declining invited citizenship spaces like

the toxicity of community meetings in the research areas, others refrained from participating in political activities such as voting.

Voting in a democratic country has always been compared to having a voice in the country's running. *Oupa* Andries remained grounded in South Africa's democratic process and indicated that he would vote in the elections. According to him:

> I'm a proud citizen of South Africa, from 1994 till now, I'm still proud. I feel good, I still vote, and I know why and whom I'm casting my vote for.
> (*Oupa* Andries/75/M/Damonsville)

Several participants alluded to how voting had become redundant as they were now voiceless. According to *Malomê* Daniel, voting had lost value because it should have been for his voice to be heard. *Malomê* Daniel had lost faith in the politicians because their promises to the community never materialised. He conveyed the following:

> When we go vote, we vote for our voices to be heard. Now we vote, and our voices are not heard, and they don't keep the promises they make to us…I'm not happy. Look at where I am living.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

A Mothutlung resident, *Ma'* Tshepiso, indicated that she had withdrawn from voting during elections because she just did not see any benefit in casting a ballot. The perceived water crisis in the area had led her to secure a JoJo tank, and she did not have to rely on the state for water anymore. What was fascinating in her response was her acknowledgement that as a citizen, it was her political right to vote, and not doing so was incorrect:

> I know it's wrong, but I have stopped voting in elections. But what can I do? As long as I have water in my JoJo tank, I'm fine. I know I'm not living out my rights, but it's discouraging knowing that I'm going to cast my ballot, and it won't be heard when it comes to service delivery.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Valery believed that once the elections pass and a respective party candidate is victorious, they disappear only to be seen again during the next campaign period. The victors would also move and leave the community and stay in affluent areas. In support of this, Valery stated the following:

> From January until the time of the elections, there will be no water problems. But after the elections, that is when we begin to have a problem with water again. And then those who campaign will say, "It's me, vote for me, and I'll help you with this and that, and this problem of water will be a thing of the past". Once we elect that person, they even move from here and go live in the suburbs…Not even the suburbs, but estates…Harties [Hartbeespoort] estates.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Thulani from Mmakau believed that even the youth were no longer keen on voting as a form of political participation or expression. He was suspicious of the whole political system from the president to the councillor. He was adamant that he would not participate in voting processes from national to local government. His unwillingness to vote was because of his opinion that political leaders were corrupt. According to him, even though Mmakau has a councillor, there was no service delivery in the area – there were neither roads nor water. He depicted a picture that trust between the community and the councillor had deteriorated such that when the area did not have water, the councillor would run away. He said:

> [Laughing] *Ai*, I will never vote. *Ai*, not for this president, and not for this councillor…They are a problem…They eat money (*sic*). Look at our roads…They cannot fix them…Uhmm…We have a councillor right here - he is eating the money. He is not fixing the roads. That's why I'll never vote. When there is no water, he is not here. That man runs away…
> (Thulani/18/M/Mmakau)

Beyond voting being perceived as futile, Valery believed that political leaders did not care for communities that they were required to service, and further, communities were avenues to their self-enrichment at their expense. She said:

> It means that the people at the top don't care about us. And we are only voting to make people rich. We are making people live comfortably, and not us.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Gertrude held that water services were substandard in Mmakau; and, politicians in the area were constantly in conflict. She attributed the internal wrangling amongst politicians to be a consequence of disputes emerging over whose turn it would be to plunder the MLM's coffers. To her, the populacecould not do anything to the political elites. She believed that politicians were now living lavish lifestyles residing in mansions from the resources supposed to uplift disadvantaged communities. The politicians were depicted as corrupt and self-centred. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude alleged that they used houses built under the Reconstruction and Development Programme, a form of social citizenship, to solicit votes from indigent and desperate citizens. She remarked:

> They [politicians] are fighting, taking money, stealing money [from the Madibeng Local Municipality] and look now; they are exposing each other. They stay in double-storey mansions, whereas we stay in shacks. They say they're building RDP (i.e. Reconstruction and Development Programme) houses, but they only build them in some areas. They use them to buy votes in other areas - they will say we must vote for them if we want RDP houses.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

What is fascinating about this growing sense of futility in voting is that the participants did not see any alternatives to the parties they had previously voted for. It was almost implicit in the interviews that when they spoke about voting, they meant to cast a ballot for the party they had previously voted for. The failing local government was ANC-led, and the councillors of the areas were members of the ANC party. So instead of voting for an alternative party to get their voice across or to choose a different party, some of the participants in this study indicated that they preferred not to vote at all.

This finding was consistent with the findings of a recent study by Schulz-Herzenberg (2020: 28). Trust in the ANC as a party had declined significantly as allegations and revelations of officials in state capture, corruption, and financial mismanagement have deterred staunch supporters from voting. The opposition parties were not considered

as viable alternatives by disgruntled ANC supporters. People who participated in this study exhibited a decline in external political efficacy, influencing their decision not to vote. They felt that the political system was unresponsive, and when politicians do not care about what citizens think, people are less likely to vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 24). Participants presented diverse opinions about their responsibility to pay for water.

6.5. "To pay, or not to pay, for water?"

One of the prerequisites for full citizenship is the existence of a citizen/state relationship. This relationship exists where citizens execute duties to the state, and in turn, the state reciprocates by meeting specified responsibilities towards its citizenry. When the state, represented by the Madibeng Local Municipality, struggled to provide water services, the citizens faced a dilemma. The first response by citizens was centred on whether, as citizens, they should pay for services and hope that services will improve in the near future or withhold payment as a demonstration of dissatisfaction for poor services. This quandary highlights complex hydropolitical considerations informing people's decisions to pay, or not to pay, for water.

6.5.1. "Paying for water is the right thing to do if you get decent service"

Some participants felt morally and ethically obliged to pay for water services. Paying for water was perceived as the "right" course of action. Damonsville residents, Kgothatso and Eduardo, were both in support of people paying for water services. They also viewed non-payment as a significant contributing factor to poor water service delivery. According to Kgothatso, if people paid for the water they consumed, there would be a likelihood that the services would improve. He stated the following:

> I think everyone should pay for their water...If people pay for water, maybe the quality might get better. It might also be allocated to everyone once everyone pays. That's what I think.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Eduardo reinforced the idea that paying for water was the correct action. He noted that non-payment for water leads to erratic and deficient services:

> What can I say? If people don't pay for water, we'll be stranded. We pay for water every month, which is not even consistent because sometimes they shut the water when they're having problems with their reservoirs. We must pay.
> (Eduardo, 25/M/Damonsville)

Danny, a Mothutlung resident, affirmed what participants from Damonsville expressed. He further expressed that paying for water services would give the community leverage and the legitimacy to demand better water service provision from the MLM. He believed that the section in Mothutlung where community members generally paid for water, the MLM improved water service delivery. Here is what he stated:

> I think it's right for people to pay for water because they will have more say if they pay for it. In our case, we don't have a say because we don't pay for it…Here in Mothutlung, you see that place there [pointing to another "section" of the Mothutlung], they pay for water, so sometimes you will find out that they have water, while we don't have [water] this side.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, another Mothutlung resident, understood her role as a "good citizen" and what her paying for water services meant. While she considered paying for water services as the only way, she lamented having to pay for filthy tap water though:

> We have to pay because the money we pay for services funds the municipality's operations, so there is no way we cannot pay. We just don't want to pay for dirty water or water that's always not available.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Participants like *Ma'* Tshepiso were aware of the importance of paying for water. She was aware of how the consequences of non-payment are dear to both the municipalities and the citizens. The non-payment of essential services hampers municipal cost recovery and municipal financial viability (Fjeldstad, 2004; Mutyambizi et al., 2020; Worku, 2018).

Some residents were keen on paying for water; however, it disillusioned them since they believed that water services delivery in Madibeng was erratic. From Mmakau, for example, Thabo seemed quite keen on paying for water services; however, he would be more comfortable and willing to pay for a service he claimed he was receiving. He says, "I will pay for water, but from there, there is no water" (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau). *Malomê* Daniel also expressed Mmakau residents' notion of not paying for dirty water. He did not object to paying for good water services:

> We won't pay for dirty water. The water has to be clean. If the water was clean, I wouldn't mind paying for it. I would pay if the water quality here was like that of town [Brits].
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

The discussion above demonstrates that some of the residents in the study were aware of the duties and responsibilities that came with "good citizenship" practices. Paying for services is something that the post-apartheid state has had to motivate indigent communities to do. Based on data collected, it is quite evident that some participants believed it was appropriate for one to pay for water services. This was reinforced through the use of a moral language of "empowered" and "active" citizenship through which citizens have had to relook at their responsibility to the state (von Schnitzler, 2008: 906). It can also be linked to a keen awareness of *citizenship exercise* – since citizens take up their responsibility for paying for water services used over and above the free basic allocation. However, some participants had a very different view of paying for water.

6.5.2. "Pay for water only if you have money"

While some participants felt that it was right to pay for water services, others, unfortunately, could not do so due to financial incapacitation. More than half of the participants indicated that they were "unemployed". Due to a lack of income, some participants could not pay for services, water included. *Mmêmogolo* Chimere directly attributed poor service delivery to the non-payment of water services by people in the

community – herself included. In a grim case of self-pity and despair over her predicament, *Mmêmogolo* Chimere stated the following words:

> How am I going to pay for water while I'm not working? I would pay because we use water a lot if I was working. Perhaps they shut the water because we don't have money to pay [for it]...[Poor water service delivery] is caused by getting free services...Since these services are free, they just do the bare minimum simply because we are not paying. They don't offer us quality service, and if we were paying, maybe they would get us better services and clean water.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Chimere/53/F/Mmakau)

In communities experiencing high poverty levels and increasing unemployment rates, accessing water has been reduced to affordability. Mothutlung resident, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe, stated that he was not prepared to pay for MLM water. He indicated that he did not have any additional sources of funds to dedicate towards paying for water services. He was more worried about what his family would eat. He also referred to the unemployment of his children and how they were not able to assist him with buying or paying for water. He just did not have "additional" or "extra" money to pay for water:

> I don't have extra money to buy or pay for water. Where will I get the money from? Today, I don't know what we're going to eat. Where will I get the money? If my children, those who can work, were working, then things would be different...
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Andre from Damonsville also reiterated this point. Poverty in the area undermined people's ability to pay for water services. According to him, the MLM should exempt unemployed people from paying for water:

> [I]t's ridiculous to say people must pay for water. People are not working, look at how we're sitting during this time of the day, and we use water the whole day. How are we going to pay for the water? [T]he [water] bills are very high. People who don't [have] work can't pay for water...You can't [afford to] pay for it, you simply can't.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Ntatêmogolo Joe and Andre both referenced poverty as why they could not afford to pay for water. This finding is consistent with literature that noted that some indigent homes could not afford to pay for water services (CDS, 2001; Pape and McDonald, 2002; Lilley, 2016; Akinyemi et al., 2018). The finding that some participants indicated that they did not oppose paying for water; however, they could not afford it is consistent with the literature (see Xali, 2002). An awareness that people must pay for municipal services existed; however, the lack of access to income had impacted their ability to take part in "good citizenship" practices. The lack of money, or material wealth, negatively impacted some participants' ability to pay for water services, which negatively impacted their exercise of "good citizenship" practices. Non-payment was, therefore, not a result of a "general unwillingness" to pay.

6.5.3. "No one must pay for dirty tap water"

According to most participants in the study, the Madibeng Local Municipality struggled to provide sufficient water to some communities in the area. Several participants were unequivocally against paying for "dirty water", and these were spread across the three research sites – Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. In Damonsville, Taylor was unambiguously against paying for MLM's tap water. According to him, it was unjust for anyone to pay for dirty water, which was erratic in supply. He said the following:

> No one should pay for this kind of water [i.e. dirty water]...You pay for perfect water like when you drink it, and you can taste it's clean and fresh... Even if they [the MLM] send letters demanding us to pay, we don't pay, and we just ignore them.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, supported Taylor's viewpoint. She noted that it should be worth it for one to pay for water. According to her, water provided in the municipality was dirty, and thus community members had to treat it in different ways to make it consumable. She also expressed a reluctance in paying for water which would compromise her health:

> I think for people to pay for it [water] - it must be worth their money. Like I said before, our water is sometimes not good. That is why we sometimes take steps to boil it before considering drinking it…I mean, why is it that there are times when the water is not purified, right? And there are times when it has a certain discolouration? So I wouldn't say that I would honestly pay for it. I don't think it's even healthy.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Some residents indicated that not paying for water services had become an accustomed practice in Damonsville because, like with the other Madibeng residents, the water was alleged to be dirty. In support of this, Andre stated the following:

> Uhm, no one pays for water here…I think it is a thing [i.e. standard practice] because you cannot pay for something you cannot drink…[N]o one pays here. People's bills are coming up to R6,000-R7,000.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Mmakau residents also held the same opinion of not paying for "dirty water". They held the opinion that basic water provision was a prerequisite for payment. If water services met the quantity and quality, it was appropriate for them to pay for water. Valery did not object to paying for clean water; however, as a consumer, she argued that it was of the utmost importance that she was satisfied with MLM water services. If the services were not satisfactory, then she was not prepared to pay for water:

> If this water was of good quality, we would pay for it, but we can't pay for something that is not right. Yes, so why should we pay? We don't have a problem paying, but why should we pay if we are not satisfied?
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Valery's views resounded with *Ma'* Yolanda, who also believed that water services in the area were poor. According to her, it was common that community members did not pay for water in Mmakau – reiterating what Andre had said about Damonsville residents. *Ma'* Yolanda indicated that both water quality and quantity provided by the MLM were substandard, and thus she was not prepared to pay for water at all:

> We don't pay for water in Mmakau…I wouldn't pay for water [here]…Because the water comes out dirty, and it is not always available. Sometimes when you wake up, you find that there is no water.
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Some participants held the view that paying for dirty water was "unfair". For example, *Mmêmogolo* Angelica from Mothutlung, being expected to pay for MLM tap water was unfair as the municipality's water services were bad. She reiterated the necessity of boiling water and how it was a possible health hazard if consumed straight from the tap. She expressed the following:

> No, it's not fair [to pay for Madibeng Local Municipality water]. They want us to pay for services, but we don't get good services. Without boiling it, I think we'll put our lives in danger.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Building from what *Mmêmogolo* Angelica had raised concerning boiling MLM tap water, some participants viewed paying for municipal water as a double loss. To *Malomê* Frank, people in Mothutlung stopped paying for water services because the water was very dirty. Paying for municipal water while also buying water was to him losing out:

> *Hai*, it is unnecessary to pay for this water. That's why most people have stopped paying for it…It is dirty…This water is very dirty. Think of it, and I always buy water to drink…Why should I buy again from Madibeng [Local] Municipality [dirty water]? You see, this is the double loss.
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Ouma Viola also expressed the notion of a double loss in a slightly different way from *Malomê* Frank. To her, the community had a challenge of dirty water, which was a health hazard to everyone. The dirty water required additional time, effort and resources to treat. Boiling water to consume was an added expense, as it needed electricity:

> It's just that we're struggling with this dirty water which is unhealthy. Sometimes people in the community tell you that you must boil the water. [I]t is costly because you have to use your electricity. And it's too much effort, as you must boil the water then wait for it to cool before you can pour it into containers.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

One participant had a bill of almost R45,000 (See Figure 19 below):

Figure 19: An outstanding Madibeng Local Municipality water bill

Local Municipality of Madibeng
Brits, Damonsville and Oukasie (012) 318-9636 / 9639
Hartbeespoort (012) 253-1177
Lethabile (012) 251-0132/3
Mothotlung (012) 709-2333

Permit Mail SOUTH AFRICA

Belastingfaktuur / Tax Invoice
BTW Reg. No. / VAT Reg. No. 4500115847

Rekening Nommer / Account Number
Rekening Maand / Account Month: November 2013
Dorpsgebied / Township: DAMONSVILLE X1 BRITS
Gebou Naam / Building No.
Grootte / Extent: 0
Marwaarde / Market Value: 18000
Deposito Waarborg / Deposit Guarantee: 0.00
TO

Rekening en Faktuur Besonderhede / Account and Invoice Detail

DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	READING PREV	READING CURRENT	TARRIF CODE	METER FACTOR	METER UNITS	AMOUNT	VAT	TOTAL
BALANCE BFWD							44013.77	0.00	44013.77
ASSESSMENT RATES RESIDENT							17.93	0.00	17.93
VA-VALUE-EXCLUSION							17.93-	0.00	17.93-
INTEREST							301.02	0.00	301.02

WATER METER 1		WATER METER 2		WATER METER 3		ELECTRICITY METER	
METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT	METER REF	QTY RATE AMOUNT

60 + Days	30 Days	Current Levy	Due Date
43973.85	298.92	301.02	

Total Payable		
AMOUNT	VAT	TOTAL
44573.79	0.00	44573.79

>>>>>> 9 1301 0000 0204 3609 4 KINDLY TAKE NOTE THAT ALL CONSUMER ACCOUNTS NUMBERS WERE CHANGED TO 7 DIGITS LONG USE THEM AS REFERENCE FOR YOUR FUTURE PAYMENTS PROPERTIES WILL BE PHYSICALLY INSPECTED BY THE APPOINTED MUNICIPAL VALUER YOUR CO-OPERATION IS APPRECIATED

BANKING DETAILS: ABSA BRITS, ACC NO: 6400002316, BRANCH CODE: 334146

Post Office 028

18658

Excessively high water bills can also be attributed to incorrect metering; however, this does not appear to be the case here. The resident stated that they had been in arrears for at least a decade and further noted that they would not pay for poor water services from the MLM.

MLM's poor service delivery made some community members very reluctant to pay. Some participants in this study felt that the municipalities' "culture of non-servicing" of poor communities could only be addressed through non-payment of poor services. This argument resonates with some commentators who have attributed non-payment to declining customer satisfaction levels (Akinyemi et al., 2018; Mutyambizi et al., 2020). The demotivation that came with poor water service provision was documented in research by Akinyemi et al. (2018), where the impact of irregular or frequent water interruption has significantly discouraged consumers' payment for water services. This is also supported by Mutyambizi et al. (2020), who argue that consumer dissatisfaction often leads to the unwillingness to pay for essential services.

Non-payment in Madibeng is still "a powerful symbolic weapon" (von Schnitzler, 2010: 7), now not against the apartheid government, but through citizens showing dissatisfaction with the post-apartheid government as it has according to them failed to deliver on promises made in 1994, such as the provision of basic water services. It was perhaps a way to increase their bargaining power in the long run against the local municipality (Ruiters, 2002: 53).

We have established that some participants indicated that they longer participated in community meetings and others did not vote in local and national government elections. This was based on a perception of how the *sterility* and *toxicity* of community meetings and an apparent increasingly waning a sense of *political efficacy* opened up *toyi-toying* as an effective channel for citizens to reclaim power. Once citizens had struggled with getting their water-related grievances addressed by the local municipality, the most drastic or extreme recourse possible to address their demands would be a protest.

6.6. *Toyi-toying* as an expression of insurgent citizenship

Toyi-toying was an avenue through which residents of Madibeng negotiated to have their water issues addressed. *Toyi-toying* has its roots in apartheid, and now in post-apartheid South Africa, it is fascinating that citizens are still pursuing it as a means to get heard. The following is an analysis of the process that culminated in community members engaging in the invented space of taking to the streets.

6.6.1. *Toyi-toying* as a last resort to be heard

Toyi-toying was not a preferred way of expression; however, getting the MLM to respond to communities' demands and pleas through protest was a route they considered after all else had failed. Damonsville resident, Taylor, asserted that *toyi-toying* was meant to show the MLM that there was an issue of grave concern that needed urgent attention. Affirming this point, Taylor stated the following: "Once we strike, it shows that something is going wrong". Some participants held the view that the MLM was infamous for not responding timeously to service delivery issues in the different Madibeng communities. Once there was a water interruption, the community would deliver a Memorandum of Grievances and wait for a response. If there was an occasion when the municipality failed to provide water or give the community a day when water services would be restored, the community had to *toyi-toyi*. According to Danny:

> They [Madibeng Local Municipality] don't inform us, and we see that water is not coming out of the taps. That's why they were striking because they don't tell us when the water would go. We go and come back, and we just see that there is no water.
>
> [We]give them a certain time to respond, and if they don't reply, then we don't have any option but to protest.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Armand, a Damonsville resident, conveyed utter disappointment that even after the community delivered the Memorandum to the MLM, the municipality would not respond in any way, and *toyi-toying* would be the only way for them to be "heard":

> We don't get any answers after submitting a Memorandum [of Grievances], and we are left with no choice but to strike. So, we close the roads and burn tyres. That's the only way they hear us.
> (Armand/42/M/Damonsville)

Ina and Kgothatso, both Damonsville residents, viewed the MLM's lack of response as community members not being "heard". According to Ina, her community had gotten to a stage where the municipality's only way to address service delivery issues was if they engaged in violent protest. She indicated this in the following words:

> People believe that they should be violent to be heard and want to feel like they are being heard.
> (Ina/28/F/Damonsville)

Kgothatso indicated that for the MLM to take the issues raised by communities "seriously", *toyi-toying* was the one sure way this could happen. Other than that, the municipality did not respond nor address the issues raised. MLM remains "quiet". In support of this, he said the following:

> At the end of it, it usually boils down to us having to strike to get water, or whatever else it is that we want...That's the point where the Madibeng [Local Municipality] starts taking you seriously. If we don't do that, nothing happens - there's no action...They don't listen.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Protest for Danny was the only way communities could be "heard" by the MLM. Danny mentioned that protesting was a popular way of getting through to local municipalities in South Africa. He stated the following:

> There is only one way - *toyi-toyi*. They listen when we strike; here in South Africa, they deal with strikes. If you don't strike, they don't listen.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Malomê Daniel, from Mothutlung, also reiterated the point about not "being heard". She argued that only when the community's demands and pleas had fallen on deaf ears did they *toyi-toyi*. The following were her words:

> Before protesting, you start by talking to them, and when the Madibeng Local Municipality does not listen to the community's pleas, that's when we *toyi-toyi*.
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

Protesting was the only "language" citizens could communicate to the MLM with.

> Unless we start protesting and blocking roads, that is when they want to talk to us. Other than that, they don't even care…[Protest is] the only language they understand…When we are not going to work, and the kids are not going to school, that is when they want to listen.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

The photo taken on 12 September 2018 below illustrates a barricade that had just been cleared on the road to Mothutlung:

Figure 20: Barricade debris along the road to Mothutlung

Myra, a Damonsville resident, reinforced the efficacy of *toyi-toying* in having water services restored, which she proclaimed as her democratic right. She was adamant that without *toyi-toying*, the MLM simply would not restore water services:

> As I said, the only thing we can do is use our democratic rights and strike. So, we give information and if they don't respond, here's what we're going to do. That's the only way we can make them listen to us. If we don't [strike] and just sit back, we'll be waiting forever. I think one of the leaders…
> (Myra/46/F/Damonsville)

In expressing their desperation, a Mothutlung resident, *Malomê* Frank, claimed the following: "You always have to *toyi-toyi*, and that's wrong". For Tshepo, another Mothutlung resident, before community members *toyi-toyed*, the MLM would not restore water services. Even though a protest would undoubtedly result in the restoration of water services, its quality remained poor. He indicated the following:

> Up until we fight, that's when you'll see water coming from the taps, but not clean water…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

Some Mmakau residents also shared their opinion about protesting being a last resort. For instance, Valery went on to say that the councillor and officials from the MLM only came to the Mmakau once there was protest action. The community would have a short-lived victory by having water services restored for a short while. Here is what she said:

> I don't know, but if we don't do that, they won't even come to us…Once we block the road, that is when you see the councillor and the people from the municipality coming and saying, "No, we have a problem of this and this and that". But before we do this, they don't come to explain anything…All the areas in Madibeng had to gather around and go to the municipal office to hand over a Memorandum [of Grievances]. Yes, that is when water started to come out, but not for long…
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

The decision to take part in *toyi-toying* was a complex one. Based on the perceptions of the data collected, *toyi-toying* was a form of expression which had to be taken after all else had failed. It was a space in which some participants felt that they could voice and force local authorities to listen to their demands (Dube et al., 2021). Invented spaces are

formed organically from the grassroots by the people for the people. It was considered a last resort, and people who participate in protest are the same people who would have attempted to get their grievances across to the municipality via community meetings and other less robust methods. The information above indicates that the participants felt that invited and invented spaces may not involve radically different participants (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015). For community members to take part in this process, a strong sense of togetherness had to exist. The protesters are not a different group of people with political views; it is the same people who engage in protests, for example, are likely to attend institutional meetings and workshops (Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015: 114).

6.6.2. *Toyi-toying* as a show of solidarity

An important aspect of citizenship was membership in a political community. Some of the participants expressed a sense of "we-ness", and through this, taking part in protests was evidence of the existence of a *citizenship conscience*. Taking to the streets was their final recourse as an effort to emphasise its the community's legitimacy (Clarke et al., 2014: 20) in claiming the right of access to sufficient water.

Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, said he joined protests because he wanted to make a difference in his family's life. According to him, joining the other community members symbolised that he was part of a "struggle", a term synonymous with the fight against the apartheid regime. He also termed protest as a "[social] movement", implying that he was part of a broader socio-political group meant to bring about change in the community of Mothutlung. From his perspective, there was something fundamentally wrong in the community, which is why he was taking part. He was prepared to miss going to work, so that he fought for water. He stated the following:

> I joined the struggle; I joined the [social] movement. I'm not a politician, but I fight for what's right. I join the struggle; even if it means I mustn't go to work, it's fine. I fight for what is right for my family and me…
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

The existence of *citizenship conscience* also resonated with Kgothatso. He indicated that community members, like himself, felt obligated to participate in protests in general. He had to support his comrades in the fight for water, even though he had access to water through a 5,000l JoJo tank. This was a demonstration of an awareness of citizenship rights, and for him, that was the only way the community was going to triumph. He noted that he participated in all community-led protests – whether water was the reason or another grievance. The following were his comments:

> I have to [take part]…We are a community…I can't be sitting here while my friend or brother is out there fighting for water. I cannot sit at home because I have a JoJo tank. If it is a [community] protest, it has to be a collective thing. That is the only way we can win it – that's if we are a collective. I'm not supposed to think it's fine for my family and me since I have extra water. We have to support one another in a community to win any battle that comes in the future. We know that we're together in all of these things, that's why I take part.
> (Kgothatso/28/M/Damonsville)

Ntatêmogolo Joe, a Mothutlung resident, was highly critical of the state of democracy in South Africa. According to him, solidarity was very important because the poor only had strength when they were in numbers. He stated the following:

> In the so-called democracy, the poor people are protesting for them to be heard because individually, you're useless.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/M/Mothutlung)

Reflecting on *Ntatêmogolo* Joe reference to the "new" South Africa as a "so-called democracy" shows that his own lived experiences did not reflect the ideals of democratic governance, grounded particularly in Constitutional democracy and the respect for rights. For the residents of Mothutlung to have a voice and express themselves as citizens, they had to be involved in large numbers. Even though some participants saw protesting's efficacy, this view was not shared.

6.6.3. Harmful consequences of *toyi-toying*

Some participants had a negative view of *toyi-toying*. They believed it was counterproductive as they associated this with criminality and the damage to property that sometimes occurred. It was also noted that children could not go to school, and adults could not go to work. Other participants felt that *toyi-toying* could lead to injuries and, worse – death. In all instances, no positive and tangible results would be achieved from protesting this, suggesting that they believed that protesting was a futile exercise.

Mmakau residents like *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude and *Mmêmogolo* Maggy viewed *toyi-toying* as a platform that some community members used to destroy property. She explained that when community members went to the streets, this came from anger. A lot of their behaviour henceforth reflected the anger. She said:

> People are angry, and when I *toyi-toyi,* I can't think…They [protestors] just destroy property, and they say they are *toyi-toying*. But they are destroying, you see. People go to Madibeng and burn the streets going there.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Gertrude also affirmed this. She was also highly critical of protests and protesters and did not view protesting as a solution to any community issue. She was a proponent of dialogue, which she advised was in the community's best interest. To her, taking it to the streets meant protesters damaged property. Basing her response on Mmakau, she notes that the infrastructure damaged during a protest to date has not been repaired. These were her words:

> *Toyi-toying* is not the solution. We should sit down and talk about our issues as a community - call a meeting and talk. Once we have discussed our issues, we don't have to damage property because we won't get infrastructural development in our area. When they fix this thing, we damage another one, you see?… Look, there are other things which haven't been fixed from the previous protests, you see…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Some participants, like *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, reiterated the opportunistic nature of delinquents. She believed that vandals and criminals took advantage of the situation and damaged property, which was unjustifiable. The following were her words;

> I don't think *toyi-toying* is a wise thing to do because people damage property…You cannot destroy someone's car who knows nothing about your issues…You can see that even this *toyi-toying* brings criminal elements.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

The protests were noted to disrupt schooling and economic activities, as children and adults could not leave their homes, and where they did, schools and workplaces were closed. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude also referred to the impact of protests on school attendance. During *toyi-toying*, schools are closed, which has consistently negatively impacted learners as they miss out on classes. *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude went further to state that protesting did more harm than good in their communities. In some instances, "shutdowns" were organised during examination times, negatively impacting learners' educational outcomes. Children would not attend class, and educators would not come to school. Poor schooling outcomes negatively affected the children's life chances and possible upward social mobility in the long term. She declared;

> You find that a "shutdown" can be organised during tests or examination times for children. They will stop children from going to write, claiming that they are resolving these issues - but in reality, they are not fixing anything. Grade twelves [Matriculants] suffer the most. They end up messing up our children's future. Why don't they let children go to school? They are negatively affecting their life chances by denying them access to education…They stop children from going to school…The kids have a chance of getting a better future through school…Tomorrow they won't have a future.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

According to *Ouma* Viola, a Damonsville resident, children's education was a very big concern. She worried about children missing out on schooling opportunities due to the *toyi-toying* and the violence that came with the protests. Here is what she said in support of this:

> What worries me the most is that they stop kids from going to school. Some of our kids do not attend school here in Damonsville. Even the school here does not operate because the teachers reside outside the community and cannot come in. The kids leave school because of the violence on the streets. You are afraid your kids will get hurt.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Denying children an opportunity to go to school contraindicated the civic right to education as listed in S29 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). As per the S29, everyone has the right to basic education and further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible. In the context of protesting, the protesters believed that HRtW superseded the right to access education. Even though the Constitution (RSA, 1996) acknowledges the right to protest, such a right is not absolute. Rights are exercised within the context of certain parameters set by the law (Nsibirwa, 2016). The parameters exist to ensure that other people's rights should not be infringed.

On days when there were protests, some people could not leave their communities, which meant they lost income as they did not work. Community members who did not want to participate and those who could not participate for whatever reason had to make alternative accommodation arrangements such as staying with friends or family from other areas for the duration of "shutdowns". This outcome, unfortunately, went against S21 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement" and provides that "[e]very citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside anywhere in, the Republic".*Ouma* Viola from Damonsville was one such person. If she learnt of an organised protest, she made sure that from the night before it was scheduled to happen, she would not be in Damonsville until it ended. This meant that she would have to be away from her home while sleeping at friends' homes in surrounding areas. She stated the following:

> If you hear that tomorrow, there's going to be a strike in Damonsville, make sure that you sleep elsewhere. You go to Elandsrand[51] , or if you have friends in town, you to sleep in town just to be on the safe side with your job. When I was still working, I had to sleep in town or just be out of Damonsville.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Another negative consequence of *toyi-toying* that was of concern in the interviews was the possibility of injury or death. Injuries and deaths during protests were a common occurrence in the area. *Ouma* Viola shared an incident where the police fired rubber bullets at protesters. According to her, a Damonsville youth was shot by the police during protest

Felicity, another Damonsville resident, echoed this. She had observed that protests turned violent, resulting in injuries and casualties. She referred to an incident a few months before the interview in which someone got injured during a protest. She stated the following:

> Unfortunately, these strikes get out of control, and people get hurt, and some even die. A few months ago, there was a strike and people got hurt there. I was supposed to come home on the same day, but people from different communities marched to our municipality [Madibeng Local Municipality]. I don't know how, but they got into a fight and what-not, and some people eventually got hurt.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

A Mmakau participant, *Malomê* Daniel, recalled the 2014 incident and how people lost their lives *toyi-toying* for water. Here is what he said: "A few years ago, they blocked the road in Mothutlung, and people died fighting for water" (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau). Like Felicity and *Malomê* Daniel, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe referred to people dying for water. He said the following: "I don't know if you're aware, but people were killed in this area due to the water issue". *Ouma* Viola, from Damonsville, suggested that that one might get disabled due to injuries sustained during protest action drawing from the 2014 casualties. Here were her exact words:

[51] Elandsrand is a small mining town a 10 minute drive from Damonsville.

> [Protesting] For me is not good. People get hurt, and people die in the process…Like what happened in 2014…I don't think it's a good thing. You can become disabled, and you say you did it for your community. What will the community give you back at the end of the day?
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Some participants like *Malomê* Frank and *Mmêmogolo* Angelica argued that a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis showed that embarking on a protest produced negative outcomes. A person's life was too high a price to pay for water. *Malomê* Frank thought that protests were futile and that they generally ended with injuries and casualties and ultimately were not worth participating in. He said:

> I hate it [*toyi-toying*] because I've been doing this for some years. I hate it, and too many people end up getting injured, and some people die…For what? For water?
> (*Malomê* Frank/59/M/Mothutlung)

Since the 2014 killings, participants like *Mmêmogolo* Angelica withdrew from *toyi-toying*. What disheartened her the most was that the MLM knew that it was mandated to supply sufficient water, but it was not. According to *Mmêmogolo* Angelica:

> It seems like the municipality supplies water as and when it wants. Because you know, ever since those things happened [the 2014 killings], I'm no longer involved. If I don't have water, I'll go and fetch it somewhere. To fight won't solve anything. We are supposed to get quality water, but we don't…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

Some participants did not see the protests yielding any positive long-term improvements in the provision of sufficient water services by the MLM. *Mmêmogolo* Angelica saw the futility in protesting and declared that the communities' victories were short-lived as water services would be interrupted again. The following were her remarks:

> Because they fight and hold a Madibeng "shutdown", but after maybe three weeks, if you come back, you'll see that we don't have water. So, it doesn't help us fight; some people are dying, people who died there

> [Mothutlung] because of this water. But that problem continues because they don't solve the problem.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Angelica/60/F/Mothutlung)

According to Thabo, a Mmakau resident, communities were losing the fight for their right to sufficient water. *Toyi-toying* only yielded short-term results, and with certainty, he noted that water services would be interrupted again. In his own words, he stated the following:

> We are striking for water; we are fighting for water, but there is nothing. When we are striking for water here, water comes for two weeks and then it is gone. You see, this is the problem.
> (Thabo/25/M/Mmakau)

Whether people protested or not, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude stated that nothing much would change in South Africa and taking part in water politics was a waste of time. Here were her words:

> Anything you try is just a waste of time…It's a waste of time to engage in politics. No one changes anything in this country.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

Some participants' pessimism about protesting is related to the state's lack of respect for the citizenry's democratic right to demonstrate. The trauma in the communities over the 2014 deaths was still evident, and for this reason, some participants felt that it was in their best interest to refrain from taking part in protests. Aside from the loss of life, it was also the futility that protests had. The MLM still failed to meet its constitutional requirement to provide water to disadvantaged communities in Madibeng.

6.6.4. Shifting perceptions of the role of the SAPS in *toyi-toying*

The interviews showed varying views of the South African Police Service's (SAPS) role in toyi-toying. Depending on participants' different experiences, they viewed the police as supportive of demonstration as a form of expression, while others viewed them as anti-protest. This meant that in invented spaces, the role of the police could vary from

restricting to supporting *toyi-toying*. Below is an image that was taken on my maiden trip to Madibeng on 12 September 2018, the day when the "shutdown":

Figure 21: South African Police Service in Damonsville

Source: Researcher's photograph

The SAPS is infamously known for using excessive violence. This has been documented across South Africa, and in Madibeng, the most notable and relevant example is the 2014 service delivery related protest that culminated in the deaths of four men. People who took part in these protests recount the police using force to deal with protesters. This negative view of their role was more grounded in coercion in restricting expression; however, more recently, there were emerging positive sentiments about their role.

Some participants expressed dissatisfaction with how the police conducted themselves during community protests. *Ouma* Viola refers to the use of violence one Damonsville youth. She recounted an incident in which the police fired rubber bullets at protesters. According to her, Kyle[52]took part in a violent protest "a few years back" and was shot by the police when they were trying to restore order. *Ouma* Viola expressed the following:

[52] Pseudonym.

> I was not there [at the protest], so it's just what I am told by people coming from there…I spoke to one boy, Kyle. The police shot him during a protest. He now stays put at his house when they go *toyi-toying*. After he was shot, he came to show me. He came and said to me, "*Ouma* Viola, they shot me here – you see…I'm not going back there ever again", showing me his back.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Andre, another Damonsville resident, was convinced that the police officers were intimidated by protesters, and that is why they fired rubber bullets at them. He affirmed that strikes were a constitutional right, and to him, everything they were doing was within the confines of the law. Based on this previous experience of participating in protests, Andre felt that the police's directive to either disperse the crowd or manage it came from the mayor – who had direct contact with the senior police personnel at the precincts. He viewed the polices mandate to stop mass action as a direct way that the MLM did to cover up the dissatisfaction of Madibeng residents. He also referred to the use of force in the form of rubber bullets. Andre said the following:

> They shoot at us with rubber bullets because we are a threat to them…They think we'll confront them, of which we don't. We are just exercising our right to strike. So, they've been given instructions to either disperse us or keep us calm. The instructions came from station commanders who were always in touch with the mayor.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

The use of rubber bullets is not something new for some unique to Damonsville residents. Participants like *Ma'* Tshepiso from Mothutlung was once shot at during a protest "around 2012" for no apparent reason. During this incident, they also used tear gas to disperse the crowd. Based on her experience, she characterised SAPS officers as uncooperative, unsupportive and counterproductive. When they tried to engage with the offices, they dismissively told them that the protest was illegal, and thus they had to disperse immediately. The following were her exact words:

> They [the police] responded very badly…They shot rubber bullets at us. They also threw teargas at us. And we tried to engage with them to tell them we had a mandate [Memorandum of Grievances] and that this was a legal strike. We had the mandate with us, and all we wanted was to submit it to the person in charge [at the Madibeng Local Municipality]. But the police didn't allow us…
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

Malomê Daniel felt the police were counterproductive, and they thwarted community efforts to fight for their right to water. He put it bluntly that the SAPS officers did not in any way want to assist in their cause. Once they arrived at a protest scene and understood it was for water, they considered it a trivial issue, dismissed the protesters, and requested them to open up the roads. Here is what he said:

> The police did not help us when we protested. When they get there, they ask us what we are protesting for, and if we say "water", and they'll say, "No man, open these roads. You guys can't *toyi-toyi* for water".
> (*Malomê* Daniel/63/M/Mmakau)

The younger participants who took part in protests more recently had a difference in experiences of the police. There seems to be shifting perceptions about the role of the police in *toyi-toying,* which is more positive. In supporting protests positively, the SAPS protected property and life and allowed for the expression of the right to protest. Police presence at the protest sites was appreciated by some participants who felt safer and more secure as protesters, and opportunistic criminals, would not damage property. To Valery, a Mmakau resident, police presence also ensured that people did not harm one another:

> They do come, and then they just stand there to ensure no one is harming the other. If someone is injured, that is when they intervene. If there is nothing, they just stand there and monitor from a distance.
> (Valery/37/F/Mmakau)

Thabo, a Mmakau resident, expressed the police's role in protecting property. He stated the following: "They do nothing. They are just guarding us and making sure that we are not breaking into shops". Another Mmakau resident, *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude, affirmed

this, saying police presence was great, as this made sure that criminal elements would not run amok destroying property. She was quite fond of police presence and believed that SAPS officers who came to protests were doing an excellent job. Here is what *Mmêmogolo* Gertrude said:

> The police are there to protect so that they [the protestors] don't damage property. If they damage it, everything becomes worse. You see me, and I do love police because they do their work very well and in the end, there aren't any incidents of vandalism.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude/48/F/Mmakau)

The SAPS officers were also depicted as understanding, very empathetic, and supportive of the cause of the protesters. Reflecting on the 12 September 2018 "shutdown" which he took part in, Taylor, a Damonsville resident, noted that:

> They listened to people's demands. The police showed people how they should behave, what they must do, what they mustn't do, and the routes they must use.
> (Taylor/25/M/Damonsville)

Some residents believed that the police were conducting themselves professionally. *Ouma* Viola, another Damonsville resident, indicated that the SAPS were noted to use rubber bullets to disperse protesters, and this was only if there were commotion and chaos. If everything happened peacefully, they then did not use force. *Ouma* Viola stated the following:

> If they strike and do not burn houses or cars, or demolish things, then that is okay. But in the process of striking, if there was violence and people fought, then the police fired rubber bullets.
> (*Ouma* Viola/56/F/Damonsville)

Communities, however, had a role to play. They needed to refrain from violence and vandalism. This came through in my interview with Danny, a Mothutlung resident. He was aware that it was important to hold it peacefully even when protesting, and this was the only way the police could support their cause. He did, however, note that violent protests were more effective as the MLM listened to protesters more. He said:

> We just have to strike peacefully…When you strike, don't do something that draws negative attention towards you, like closing a road so that people cannot go to Brits for work. Some people have done this because they want the Madibeng [Local Municipality] to listen to them.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Ma' Tshepiso, also from Mothutlung, expounded the above point and stated that if the protesters became violent, the police would then intervene:

> If people are just marching, they won't do anything. But if the protesters block roads and the like, not considering that people need to go to work or start throwing stones at cars, that's when the police get involved.
> (*Ma'* Tshepiso/48/F/Mothutlung)

According to some participants, some protesters were unruly and attempted to access restricted roads or do something they were not allowed to, which brought them into conflict with the police. In support of this, Felicity expressed the following:

> Community members sometimes get out of control. I can't pinpoint how these things go, but I know that the community members tend to get violent towards the police because they may want to pass through an area that they aren't allowed to or want to do whatever they want to do. In these cases, the police won't tolerate such. So it is a matter of the community learning that it doesn't always have to get violent as some of the community members are arrested.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Violence was also noted to be emerging in the communities in a proliferation of gangs and gang violence.

6.7. The rise of gangsterism in Madibeng

Fighting for space and power in the Madibeng political landscape has resulted in open conflict in the communities. Positions in local government were viewed in the communities as avenues to make money. The conflict had escalated such that in Mothutlung, gunfights had gone to the streets with people shooting at each other to gain positions in local government. The major party in the area was the ANC, and most of the conflict was intra-party, as it was alleged by some participants in the study that

it was people within the ANC fighting for positions. In support of this, *Ntatêmogolo* Joe stated the following:

> The ANC has many heads, and sometimes these many heads turn and fight amongst themselves…Within the local groups, they fight each other…They all feel they must get what they want at all costs…[T]hat's why bullets are flying around this community.
>
> Sometimes the children will tell me about the shootings in the streets. When asked what's happening, they'll tell you they [ANC members] are fighting with guns…Fighting over who should be the next councillor.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Tshepang, another Mothutlung resident, went on to describe how to him there was a proliferation of violence during the election period, as though Mothutlung was a warzone where the side with heavier artillery "won":

> When it's election time, people are running around chasing each other with guns, and those that have the most and biggest guns rule the place… When people start chasing each other with guns…It's *The Law of the Jungle* [53].
> (Tshepang/35/M/Mothutlung)

What emerged in some of the interviews was the existence of four groups responsible for perpetuating violence in Madibeng, all linked to the ANC in some ways: *Boko Haram*[54], *Fear Fokol* ("Fear Nothing"), The *A-Team* (short for the ANC Team), and *Bang Fokol* ("No Nonsense"). The *Boko Haram* group was from Oukasie[55]. According to Andre, this group was funded by the MLM to cause chaos during community-led protests. Once this happens, the police would delegitimise the gathering and disburse the protestors. Once this happens, the municipality will not be serviced with a memorandum. Members of *Boko Haram* were depicted as the MLM's soldiers of fortune. During the 12 September 2018 "shutdown", *Boko Haram* members organised and waited for the protesters in Brits. According to Andre, an almost two dozen-strong group

[53] *The Law of the Jungle* describes a situation in which people do whatever they do to survive. There are no rules or laws which govern conduct, and law dictates "kill or be killed".
[54] This group is named after a jihadist terrorist organisation based in Nigeria operating in the West African region.
[55] Ouksie is a township in Madibeng located 13km from Mothutlung.

hurled stones at the Thari busses, bringing protesters from Damonsville and Mothutlung. In support of this, Andre stated the following:

> Yes, when we got there [Madibeng Local Municipality offices in Brits], they [*Boko Haram*] were already there, almost 20 people outside Madibeng [Local Municipality offices]. They even threw stones at the busses we were in...
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

Like Andre, Tshepo, a Mothutlung resident, also expressed the *Boko Haram*'s attack on busses ferrying protesters to the MLM offices during the "shutdown". *Boko Haram* "boys" were intoxicated as well as carried weapons. The following is what he said:

> They [*Boko Haram*] are a large group of boys at the local municipality acting as security for the municipality. We noticed that they were drunk; they had been bought alcohol [by the Madibeng Local Municipality officials]. This usually happens. Some of them were not even wearing shirts, and they had *pangas* and knives. They had been told that Mothutlung residents were coming. As I'm part of the struggle, we went there peacefully to submit a mandate [Memorandum of Grievances]. Those people stopped us from everything when they saw our buses, and they started attacking us with *pangas*, knives, and stones...They even damaged the busses we came with.
> (Tshepo/26/M/Mothutlung)

The violence perpetrated by the said-*Boko Haram* group was noted in some newspaper articles available online. The ANC North interim provincial committee coordinator, Mr Hlomani Chauke, said the group had caused mayhem in the province (Stone, 2019). The *Boko Haram* "gangsters" demanded business from the Matlosana Municipality in the Northwest Province. The group was linked to *tenderpreneurial* activities in the municipality. It was an informal group whose members intimidated and harassed some councillors and disrupted local municipalities' functioning by requesting preferential treatment regarding tendering processes (Stone, 2019).

The second group, *Fear Fokol,* was believed to be involved in *tenderpreneurial* activities at the MLM. It subsequently changed into what is now called the "A-Team", the third group. According to some participants in the study, the former and latter groups have been responsible for intimidating and inciting violence in Madibeng, particularly in Mothutlung. Gangsterism in Madibeng spread from Mothutlung to Damonsville through a group called *Bang Fokol*. This group was responsible for violence and intimidation in both areas. The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group contained a 2016 rally poster which demonstrates a clear link between the ANC and *Bang Fokol* (See Figure 22 below):

Figure 22: *Bang Fokol*/ANC Rally Poster (2016)

Source: The *Damonsville Community Forum* Facebook Group

The poster above shows that the *Bang Fokol* group was in a way linked to the ANC and this is evident from its use of the ANC logo, colours and overall branding in a flyer lobbying for the ANC party.

These groups' role in Madibeng communities was a highly problematic one. Through intimidation and actual violence, they created a sense of fear. Their "closeness" to the ANC local government and involvement in tendering processes created an added sense of distrust in communities. These groups were noted to exert pressure on the local government representatives and compel them to give business to their associates. The decline in spaces of expression in Madibeng made some residents hold a gloomy outlook of socio-political life in the municipality.

6.8. Disillusioned citizens

The neoliberal trajectory that the post-apartheid state has taken has left behind indigent communities that had expectations for a decent life grounded in constitutionalism in the new state. The post-apartheid landscape has disillusioned some citizens in the research communities. The promises and dreams they had still have not been realised, and as it is, they are a distant reality. They felt that the government had failed dismally. According to views on the ground in the research areas, the state struggled to provide basic water services.

Participants like Danny, from Mothutlung, were grateful that the ANC paved the way for a multiracial democracy; however, believed that the party had grown complacent over the years. The following is an excerpt from Danny affirming this point:

> I feel good because at least we have freedom, but the way I feel, I feel like the ANC should like give way now to another party. So, if the ANC doesn't do good as our party, then what can we do? We will just sit and wait…I think ANC does try, but they don't do enough.

> The ANC doesn't do things right because they know that the people won't vote them out. If they see that we are changing, they will have pressure to deliver, but right now, they don't have pressure, they have relaxed because they know that the ANC is the ANC since 1994.
> (Danny/26/M/Mothutlung)

Other participants felt that they were being taken advantage of by the whole political system as there was no political representation in the local government. They had gotten to a stage where they could not tell anyone about the challenges they were facing in Madibeng. "It's so painful…It's so painful, and who are you going to tell?" asks *Mmêmogolo* Chimere (53/F/Mmakau). According to *Mmêmogolo* Maggy, politicians were the only people benefiting financially from their activities in Madibeng, and the general citizenry was getting nothing at all. According to her:

> [T]he ANC are the ones who are benefiting…We are supporters; we help people get rich. We are going to remain poor, unfortunately. This thing of saying, "I like this party, or I like that party", is a problem. These parties are doing nothing for us, and only the [party] leaders benefit.
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

Some participants held a very bleak outlook on life in South Africa. A sense of powerlessness worsened this feeling. *Ma'* Yolanda painted a very disheartening and discouraging picture of what contemporary South Africa represented to her. She saw it as a place and space that was emotionally draining. She stated the following:

> Nothing makes me happy to be in the "new" democratic South Africa, especially without water. Nothing makes me happy to live in the "new" South Africa…It's discouraging and exhausting, and I get emotionally drained; I don't know what to do…
> (*Ma'* Yolanda/55/F/Mmakau)

Mmêmogolo Angelica from Mothutlung closed the interview by stating that she was not proud to be a South African citizen, and she elaborated that South Africa was a country where people's rights were not respected but abused, demonstrating how powerless citizens were. Thabo, a Mmkau resident, also referred to this sense of loss of power. He stated the following: "I'm just sitting, I don't have power, I don't have power". Felicity,

a Damonsville resident, also reiterated the same sense of powerlessness. She had a series of questions; however, answers were never going to come. According to her:

> [The water situation] makes me powerless because I think if I were to be more involved in the running of the municipality, I would want to get to the root of the problem. I want to know what exactly the problem is. What steps do they take to clean the pipes? What steps do they take to clean the water? Because communities need clean water, especially those who cannot afford to buy water to drink or cook. It leaves me powerless…
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

This sense of powerlessness is evident in failing a democratic state to comply with citizenship in its totality. In support of this, Brendan (cited in Harvey, 2007: 119) argues that:

> The state's ability to protect and promote the public interest has been undermined, and the authority of their citizens usurped. Power has become more remote and less accountable, acquired by an alliance of business interests and supra-national and quasi-state machines.
> (Brendan, cited in Harvey, 2007: 119)

Ntatêmogolo Joe felt that the general quality of life for citizens had regressed. The levels of poverty and inequality in contemporary South Africa had become intolerable. He suggested that politicians had grown pompous over the years, and they felt they could treat the general people, citizens, as they pleased. They viewed themselves as deities to be worshipped and the only ones with the capacity to think. He expressed a keen frustration of people being treated like mere recipients who should just accept whatever is provided to them by the MLM. The burden and abuse from the apartheid state were experienced by everyone alike. Here is what he said:

> People think they are gods and are the only ones with brains because they gave us freedom. We shouldn't talk; we should take whatever they give us. They forget that we were the ones carrying the burden of apartheid. We were beaten, and they chased us with dogs and teargas, all those things they experienced.
> (*Ntatêmogolo* Joe/73/Male/Mothutlung)

Some participants simply felt that the ANC government had betrayed them. Reflecting on the policies and legislation available in the "new" South Africa that promote the citizens right of access to sufficient water, the MLM had failed dismally to provide adequate water services:

> I feel betrayed by the government because water is a key (basic need) and the policy say we must get 6 kilolitres for free, but we don't have access to it, and we then have to buy water.
> (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Politicians' opulence was noted in the interviews as some participants exclaimed that municipal officials drive uber-luxurious vehicles while their constituencies survived in squalid conditions. If one lost their life during a water-related protest, nothing would come from the politicians to show that they are in mourning. *Mmêmogolo* Maggy advised all residents of Mmakau – young and old – to refrain from taking part in anything as their lives may be lost in vain. Here is what she said:

> They are rich…They are driving big and fancy 4X4s. What do we have? Nothing! If you die *toyi-toying* for water, they will never bring a coffin or a bag of tomatoes and say, "The person who was staying there died while *toyi-toying* for water". Let's just leave it because we will die, and our children will die, all for nothing. They must just continue themselves…
> (*Mmêmogolo* Maggy/53/F/Mmakau)

According to Andre, South Africa's multiparty democracy is not genuine. Autocratic leaders have emerged, and they make decisions by themselves, for themselves. Here is what he said:

> We are supposed to be in a democratic country, but this is not so. This is a fake democracy. Because here we're living in a country that is supposed to be democratic…It's autocratic…These people [officials from the Madibeng Local Municipality] make decisions by themselves, which they benefit from.
> (Andre/33/M/Damonsville)

The promise of a new South Africa is not a reality lived by everyone, and some participants feel quite disillusioned but remain steadfast in their hope for a better future:

> You know I always strive to be proud of my country, but you know, with how it's being run and how it's being led, it does get me to question whether if at some point I'll be able to get to where I'm proud to say, "I'm happy to be a South African". There are means and resources in our country, but they're not being used fairly...[T]hat being said, I'm still proudly South African because it's our country, and we have to embrace it in every way that it is. So all I can say is that hopefully soon, things will change, and water access will improve. (Felicity/24/F/Damonsville)

Even with all the legal framework supporting South Africans' access to water, residents of Madibeng are struggling to access basic water services. They feel socially excluded because they are residents of "poor" and "black" communities. This elicited a keen sense of powerlessness from them. The case of Madibeng also demonstrated how historically entrenched socio-economic inequalities influence asymmetrical water access along with class and racial lines in the "new" South Africa. This contributed to some participants withdrawing from participating in "good citizenship" activities like paying for water services, participating in community meetings, demonstrations and voting.

Some citizens painted a very gloomy picture on their outlook of South Africa. They were quite disillusioned because the post-apartheid state failed to deliver on promises made at the birth of the new country. The participants' material conditions are deplorable, worsened by a growing concern that the ANC-led government had grown complacent over the years. This culminated in some participants in this study demonstrating disengagement from "good citizenship" practices that manifest in withdrawal from fear, coercion, or duress. Therefore, I argue that some citizens in post-apartheid South Africa demonstrate *disengaged citizenship*, an argument I develop in the final chapter of this thesis.

6.9. Conclusion

This chapter set out to demonstrate how participants from three communities in Madibeng express citizenship. This chapter started by defining the positionality of the participants in the study. It was found that there was a belief that they received poor service delivery because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities. Some participants drew comparisons with areas like Brits and Elandsrand, which were believed to receive better services. From this, it was evident that some participants believed that because they were residents of "poor" and "black" communities, they were not accorded full citizenship rights – and in this case, a right to access sufficient water.

To express grievances of service delivery, invented spaces such as community meetings were sterile and had become extremely toxic according to the participants. Community meetings were spaces to discuss and deliberate on issues of mutual concern that had become exclusionary and hostile spaces. Here the organisers of the meetings, presumably community leaders, were alleged to intimidate and bully community members in attendance. In some instances, input from the community members was disregarded. Some participants felt that attending meetings was of no benefit to them and thus a waste of time. They resolved not to attend meetings. This culminated in several participants indicating that they had stopped attending them.

There was a growing sense of futility in casting ballots as well. Some participants felt that politicians were only in their communities for self-enrichment instead of serving the communities that voted for them. Furthermore, some participants held the view that voting did not bring any positive change, and they indicated that they did not have a voice. What was peculiar was that some participants indicated that preferred not to vote entirely. This finding is supported in literature that revelations of corruption and state capture have made ANC supported lose trust in the party. This has resulted in loyal party supporters not voting.

The non-payment of water services was a complex hydropolitical phenomenon. They were varying perceptions about paying for "dirty" water that was supplied inconsistently. The findings on this item suggest that the major inhibitions for people from paying for water were simply because they could not afford to pay for water. Several participants cited unemployment and the lack of access to money as reasons they could not pay for water. Some held the view that paying for water was right, and people should pay. On the other hand, others held the opinion that people should not pay for water.

Toyi-toying as an expression of citizenship came up. Some participants strongly believed that if communities needed an urgent response from the MLM, *toyi-toying* was the only way to get that done. invented spaces such as community meetings had become futile, and this has seen a rise in the use of insurgent channels and invented spaces such as protests. The communities' joining together to pursue a common political goal was indicative of a sense of solidarity built around citizenship. Despite some perceived pros of protesting, some participants did not find it a viable form of expression. Despite the scepticism associated with protests, some participants generally held it as the last and most effective way to be heard.

The hostile meetings and general degeneration of local governance and service provision in the communities were attributed to politicians' interference. This was also noted to spawn gangsterism in the municipality. Madibeng is notorious for ANC factionalism, and gangs have been alleged to perpetuate violence in communities and affected how the MLM is managed. The meddling politicians and gangsters have contributed to some participants withdrawing from political expression in voting.

The promise of a new South Africa, and the reality on the ground, evidenced by the lived experience of the residents of Madibeng, has left many community members feeling disillusioned and ambivalent forms of expression when it comes to negotiating water service delivery.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion: Insurgent versus Disengaged Citizenship

[W]ater has a deep, but hidden power; it shapes the way people respond to its availability.
Johann Tempelhoff (2017)

7.1. Introduction

In order to look at expressions of citizenship within the context of South African hydropolitics, I started by broadening the definition of hydropolitics. From this, I reviewed the literature on water scarcity in the country and argued that it had human-induced drivers and was thus anthropogenic. Anthropogenic water scarcity demonstrates access to water is political. In 1994 when the new democratically government took over, access to water services and many other basic social services were skewed against black people. About one-third of the country's population did not have access to a safe water supply, and more than half lacked access to adequate sanitation (DWAF, 2004a: 4).

Directed by a new Constitution (RSA, 1996), the new dispensation had a mammoth task to redress poverty and inequality. The state implemented a series of measures (i.e., legislation, policies, and programmes) targeting areas such as poor access to water. However, the measures aimed at improving access to water are still falling short as access to water is still a distant reality for many citizens. This has been a result of several factors, including the adoption of macro-economic neoliberal policies that are not in sync with the harsh realities of poverty and inequality throughout the country. Recently, there have been increasing tensions between citizens and the state. One way this is apparent is in the number of protests - a popular form of expression from which South Africa has been dubbed the protest capital of the world. As citizens get increasingly frustrated over the declining quality of water service provision, it was important to investigate the forms of expression they embark on in pursuit of their right to water.

I set out to investigate how residents of households in three communities in the Madibeng Local Municipality, North West Province of South Africa, expressed citizenship within the context of access to water and state provisioning. Thus, the research question was, "**How do residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau, in the North West Province of South Africa, express citizenship within the context of Madibeng hydropolitics?".** This chapter returns to this research question in light of my findings by showing how citizens in Madibeng engaged in post-apartheid hydropolitics.

7.2. Major findings

To answer the main research question on the expression of citizenship through the context of local hydropolitics in Madibeng, I formulated five objectives: first, to explore the views of residents from three Madibeng communities on the adequacy of water services provision by the local municipality; second, to analyse coping strategies adopted by residents of three Madibeng communities when there is inadequate water services delivery; third, to explore citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality. The fourth objective was to investigate how the residents of three Madibeng communities respond to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water. The fifth and last objective was to contribute to citizenship theory in post-apartheid South Africa by drawing out nuances from the hydropolitics in three Madibeng communities.

In order to discuss cross and interdisciplinary literature on the politics of water, I needed to broaden the definition of the term "hydropolitics". At the core of hydropolitics is power. Drawing from Swyngedouw (2004: 175), I linked access to water to power relations: "[t]he water problem is not merely a question of management and technology, but rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power". The role of power in the allocation of water is also referred to by Bakker (2012: 616), who states that, "[w]ater is…intensely political in a conventional sense: implicated in contested relationships of power and authority". From reviewing Turton's (2002: 16- 17) definition and explanation of hydropolitics that deals with the *scale* and a *range* of

issues, this thesis defines hydropolitics **as actions and activities associated with different actors or entities that influence the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services within a given context**.

Southern Africa has dry weather (Henwood and Funke, 2002: 181) and experiences erratic and variable rainfall and climate (Mehta, 2003: 5071). However, does this explain water service delivery issues that we have in communities? Drawing from literature, I challenge a widely held notion that water issues are natural and biophysical. Some commentators argue that despite these limitations, the state can provide water from the available resources if they are utilised efficiently and effectively (Muller, 2016; Donnenfeld et al., 2018; Muller, 2020; Sleet, 2020). I argued that human activities, whether conscious or unconscious, deliberate or not, were primarily responsible for water scarcity and explained six anthropogenic factors causing scarcity: population growth and urbanisation; pollution and environmental degradation; derelict infrastructure; human resources issues in the water sector; financial mismanagement and corruption; and consumer debt[56]. It is important to note that these drivers may vary depending on the area under investigation (i.e., provinces, cities or municipalities). From this, I argued that politics was a core aspect in the allocation of water.

In order to understand citizens' forms of expression, I needed to understand how citizenship has been defined and theorised. From looking at Marshall's (1950) triadic model of citizenship that explained it as the attainment of political, civic and social rights, citizenship as a *legal status*, I concluded the attainment of citizenship was not a linear and irreversible process. Citizenship was in dispute, always. This led me to look at how citizenship was practised and the importance of two facets: citizenship *conscience* (a conviction of being a citizen stemming from an awareness of what it means) and *exercise* (an enactment of citizenship roles and responsibilities).

[56] Consumer debt is defined as "the inability for municipal service consumers to pay for the municipal services consumed" (Enwereji and Uwizeyimana, 2020: 333)

Locating my study post-apartheid South Africa, I demonstrated how invited spaces of participation are becoming increasingly unpopular as citizens find them "useless", "inefficient", "sterile", or "sedative invited spaces" (Gbaffou and Piper, 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou and Eulenda Mkwanazi, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012). Citizens have thus invented their own spaces of participation in which their forms of expression are insurgent. So, citizens are typically being defined as insurgent citizens (see Brown, 2015).

In order to address the research objectives and answer the main research question, a qualitative approach was adopted, supported by a social constructionist epistemology. Data was collected from twenty-seven residents from Damonsville, Mothutlung, and Mmakau, in the Madibeng Local Municipality, who were selected purposively. What follows are the major findings of the study:

7.2.1. Perceptions of poor water services in Madibeng

I found that the participants generally felt that the MLM supplied deplorable water services. Looking at the prescribed minimum allocation of 25l per person per day of water, which is supposed to be consumable, the MLM struggled to meet this. The communities researched experienced rampant and prolonged water interruptions. As for its quality, human beings rely on water's organoleptic properties to assess whether it is safe to consume (Crampton and Ragusa, 2016; Gutiérrez-Capitán, 2019). Some participants stated that municipal water was dirty, had a bad smell and tasted "salty", and like mud. While water's organoleptic properties are not accurate measures of ascertaining water quality, some participants indicated that they or someone they knew had gotten ill from consuming it.

Some of the participants harboured a great sense of disappointment in the new government. The water services provided were, therefore, in contravention of requirements reflected in the Constitution of South Africa (1996), the National Water Act (1998), as well as the Water Services Act (1997). Looking at the mandates, citizens views indicate that they felt the was failing both as water service authority (WSA) and water service provider (WSP) in failing to provide "sufficient water" as per the National

Water Act's (1998). MLM's responsibility as a WSA is to ensure affordable, efficient and sustainable access to water services for communities in Madibeng. As a WSP, the MLM is also responsible for providing water services by legislation and conditions stipulated by the WSA.

I found that the residents attributed their perceptions to several factors. First, residents believed that officials at the Madibeng Local Municipality were corrupt and financially mismanaged the entity. They cited *tenderpreneurial* activities, particularly in sending water tankers to communities affected by water interruptions. It was widely believed that municipal officials were in cahoots with the owners of water takers and received kickbacks in exchange for interfering with the water supply so that they could "get business". Second, the residents believed that water infrastructure in the municipality was dilapidated. According to the residents, this resulted in infrastructure constantly giving in, which explained rampant water cuts. Third, some participants attributed pipe bursts to the MLM's use of underqualified or unqualified artisans to perform maintenance and repair work. Several participants referred to poor welding of pipes. It is even alleged that *Bra* Mike, the photographer who was shot dead during the January 2014 protests, was assassinated because he had incriminating images of the shoddy work done by artisans hired by the municipality. Erratic power supply in the municipality was the last reason some residents from the three communities believed contributed to poor water service delivery in their communities. They believed that water pumps would not function once power was cut, which affected the water supply. The residents evolved different ways of coping in this space, and one's access to money determining options available.

7.2.2. Coping with poor water services in Madibeng

With poor water service provision and the indispensability of water, it was important to identify the strategies participants engaged in to cope with inadequate water services in Madibeng. I found that the first and most critical step that the participants alluded to was storing municipal water when it was available. The storage containers used ranged

from 2l plastic bottles up to 5,000l JoJo tanks. When water interruptions were prolonged, community members would run out of stored water.

Some residents with financial resources bought bottled water from *spaza* shops, supermarkets, stores and other establishments. This was not a common way of getting water because it was expensive. Water sold in local *spaza* shops was very expensive, and from some residents, it just was not feasible. Other residents had boreholes or bought water from neighbours with boreholes. Borehole water was sold at a more affordable price than bottled water. An interesting strategy I came across was putting money together to hire *bakkies* to fetch water from surrounding communities. Where people could not afford to buy water or contribute to hiring a bakkie, they had to consider getting water for *mahala*. This included collecting water from unsafe sources like nearby water masses or domestic rain-water harvesting. As a coping strategy, some residents ended up finding ways delinked from the state to access water.

7.2.3. Citizens' perceptions of the Madibeng Local Municipality

I found that residents of the three Madibeng communities who took part in the study generally did not positively view the Madibeng Local Municipality. Based on their experiences around water service delivery, there was a widely held notion that municipal officials did not have compassion for the communities they were serving. This was in stark contrast to the *Batho Pele* principles, state officials' oath of office grounded in Ubuntu. One resident indicated that the municipal officials' attitudes had not changed despite the loss of life in the area. Another issue that the residents raised was poor communication. Residents believed that the municipality communicated poorly to its communities, and if they communicated effectively, they could better plan for water interruptions. Municipal officials were also not trusted by the residents. There was a perception that officials were secretive and did not want the public to know what was happening at the municipality. To vindicate their right to water, residents embarked on various forms of expression.

7.2.4. Responses to the infringement of their right of access to sufficient water

The residents referred to four different avenues in which they engaged with the state or expressed to the state about their dissatisfaction with their water services. The first one was community meetings. I found that community meetings in the research communities had become toxic spaces, a move beyond what scholars have termed sterile. The public was made to feel unwelcome, resulting in some people no longer attending such platforms. The second form of expression was through the ballot. Several participants expressed that they had stopped voting as this was not benefiting them at all. It was found that participants believed that they were being taken advantage of by politicians who only came to their communities towards elections. Once residents voted and politicians won the elections and positions in local government, they would leave only to return towards the next elections. Another item that surfaced was the non-payment of water services. I found mixed opinions about this. Some residents believed that paying for water, clean or not, was an appropriate form of action. Some participants held the view that they should only pay for water only when they had money to do so. Others vehemently felt that no one must pay for dirty tap water.

As a last resort to express dissatisfaction about water services, some residents indicated that they *toyi-toyed*. It was widely believed that once you went to the streets, the municipality would restore water services immediately. It also demonstrated a show of solidarity, indicating that the community was united over this water issue.

7.2.5. Contribution to citizenship theory: Disengaged citizenship

Citizenship conscience is an awareness of citizenship rights and duties, the state's responsibility for granting the rights and duties and recognising appropriate and acceptable means to make demands. I found that the participants possessed a *citizenship conscience*. They demonstrated an awareness of "good citizenship" behaviours and practices. These were paying for water services, attending community meetings, and, if the former does not yield positive results, they would *toyi-toyi*. Protests, or mobilisations, in public spaces, to emphasise the legitimacy in their claims

(Clarke et al., 2014: 20). I also found that some participants did not agree to pay for water services due to poor service provision and the lack of access to money. While on the one hand, some claimed that they would only be comfortable paying for water services once they were receiving adequate services, others indicated that due to poverty and strife, they were unable to pay for water services.

I found that *citizenship exercise* was a contentious issue in Madibeng hydropolitics. The invited and invented spaces in the communities were not yielding the desired outcomes to some participants. They largely felt a decline in their *sense of political efficacy* - they believed they had become ineffectiveness as political actors, and their voices were no longer being heard. I found an acute sense of frustration over the declining citizenship spaces in which citizens could express themselves. Taking part in community meetings was one way to actively participate in the country's democratic processes and find a constructive way of resolving community issues like poor water service delivery. Politicians and their cadres had turned community meetings into party meetings, where only a select few could participate and inform decision making. I also found that meetings were platforms where prior decisions were rubber-stamped or formalised. I found that community meetings held in the research communities generally did not provide spaces conducive to participating or engaging in discussions. Out of fear and victimisation, some residents felt it was best to refrain from attending community meetings. As a result, some residents resolved not to attend meetings, citing a hostile atmosphere. Community meetings, as an example of an invited space, had become *toxic* for community members.

Building on this, I found that residents felt that politicians were generally interfering in the functioning of the municipality and community processes. This was accompanied by a rise in gangsterism in the area, which created immense insecurity in the communities as it was alleged that armed gangs engaged in violence in public. Politicians were only in the communities when they wanted votes towards the elections, and, after that, they were absent from the communities and did not carry out their mandates. Some participants noted that casting their ballot was again of no benefit because the conditions in the communities were not improving. Due to this, some

participants expressed that they had stopped voting as it was of no benefit to them - demonstrating a withdrawal from *citizenship exercise*. This decision was arrived at reluctantly.

Regarding non-payment, I found that some participants subscribed to paying for water irrespective of quality. Some participants could not afford to pay for water services, citing high poverty levels in the communities. Other participants argued that people should only pay for good quality services, which meant not paying the MLM for poor water services. Poor service provision in the area was the main factor for refusing to pay water services. This finding was in line with Akinyemi et al. (2018) and Mutyambizi et al. (2020) who found that declining customer satisfaction levels contributed to the non-payment of basic services. Hence withdrawing from citizenship exercise can be viewed as a decision that was arrived at under duress.

Due to the municipality's poor service delivery, *toyi-toying* was believed to be the ultimate form of expression of dissatisfaction. As a form of expression, *toyi-toying* demonstrated Zamudio's (2004) *citizenship exercise*. From the data collected, I found that people who took part in protests shared a keen sense of solidarity built around citizenship. This form of expression reinforced citizenship being imagined and revolving around a shared community supported by Anderson (1983: 7). The participants imagined their citizenship, and this is supported by Clarke et al.'s (2014: 108) assertion that a citizen is imagined – and inscribed – as a legitimate member of the imagined national community. I also found that participants did not generally agree about the efficacy of *toyi-toying*. They were sceptical about it as a form of expression. They cited instances where people have been injured and, worse, lost their lives. Since protest is a formally recognised form of expression as per S17 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), which protects the right to assembly, demonstration, picket, and petition, such reluctance in engaging in this was evidence that some participants feared for their personal safety and well-being citing the 2014 police killing of *Bra* Mike, Osia Rahube, Lerato Seema, and Enoch Seimela.

Some of the residents of Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau who participated in this study demonstrated *citizenship conscience*; however, they experienced difficulties in *citizenship exercise*. A reluctance to participate in community meetings, withdrawing from voting, non-payment of water services, and declining to take part in protests reflected that they were forgoing "good citizenship" practices. What ties these responses together is that they reluctantly withdrew from "good citizenship" practices due to coercion, fear or duress, which I argue is a manifestation of *disengaged citizenship*.

The participants' inability to fully participate as citizens further demonstrates that despite their attainment of political, civic and social citizenship rights, Marshall's (1950) explication of citizenship as a *legal status*, citizenship is a much more complex process. In theory and practice, citizenship is always in dispute and can only be understood within the context in which it is investigated (Clarke et al., 2014). Madibeng residents who took part in the study attributed their social exclusion to being residents of "poor" and "black" communities.

7.3. Contributions of the study

Through this study, I make three contributions to knowledge"

First, after an extensive review of the literature on hydropolitics, I provided a broadened definition of the term as applied to the three levels of social analysis (i.e. macro, meso, and micro-level). The definition that I proposed is as follows; "hydropolitics are actions and activities associated with relations between different actors or entities in the allocation, distribution, and accessing of water resources and services in a given context". This definition builds on previous definitions and explanations to encompass water services, a critical component in water distribution and access, and the role of power.

Second, I contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics by giving an account of Madibeng hydropolitics paying attention to the experiences of purposively selected residents of three communities: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau.

Third, from using *citizenship conscience* and *citizenship exercise* to investigate peoples forms of expression in three communities in a post-apartheid landscape, I demonstrate how the "new" South Africa is an exclusionary space to some citizens. Beyond a decline in the efficacy of invited spaces, the utilisation of invented spaces is also waning. Citizens are withdrawing from community meetings, voting, and even *toyi-toying* out of fear, coercion or duress. Others indicate a blatant refusal to pay for water services. Their decision to withdraw from exercising their political rights did not stem from a loss of interest or indifference in participating, which is generally associated with political apathy. They thus exhibited *disengaged citizenship*.

7.4. Recommendations for future research

In further honing research on hydropolitics, I recommend the following three areas which may need to be investigated further:

First, this study adopted a qualitative approach. It would be interesting to conduct a quantitative study in the same communities with a representative sample on the perceptions of the residents of water services from the Madibeng Local Municipality. With a representative sample, findings can be generalised.

Second, this study relied on residents' views from three communities. There were no views from municipal officials and local government representatives. It would be important to investigate how municipal officials and local government officials view challenges with water services and experience Madibeng hydropolitics.

Third, this study was done in predominantly black areas. It would be interesting to conduct another qualitative study of this nature in other areas in Madibeng, which were generally referred to as "suburbs" or "white areas" like Hartbeespoort, Elandsrand, Brits as well as farming communities so as also to understand how residents view municipal water service provision and how they engage in hydropolitics.

7.5. Conclusion

My interest in researching expressions of citizenship and South African hydropolitics was triggered by two incidents in which protesters lost their lives pursuing their right to water. In the "new" South Africa, the democratically elected government sought to redress past injustices by introducing full citizenship rights to all citizens. The new government has made substantial progress in the implementation of the right of access to sufficient water through the implementation of projects, programmes and legislation to increase water access; however, some sections of the population still struggle to access water services. Like colonialism and apartheid, it is still black people who are predominantly struggling with accessing water. While race plays a lesser role in influencing access to water in the post-apartheid landscape, social class has become a dominant factor. However, indigent black communities in urban and rural areas are predominantly struggling to access water because of the link between race and social class areas. Indigent communities in rural and urban areas struggle with water services.

In this thesis, I contribute to shedding light on how citizenship, particularly forms of expression, is understood and exercised by drawing from data collected in three Madibeng communities: Damonsville, Mothutlung and Mmakau. Findings in this study point to a general sense in a deteriorating relationship between citizens and the state. Citizens indicated that they struggled to access basic water services, which is in contravention of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). Through the concept of *disengaged citizenship*, I note how, as opposed to political apathy, Madibeng citizens indicated that they were reluctantly withdrawing from claiming their full-citizenship rights. Although the findings in this study cannot be generalised to the rest of South Africa, they provide a good basis for investigating the circumstances in other similar areas of South Africa – since the poverty and inequality, systems of governance and administration are the same.

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Appendix 1: *Batho Pele* Principles

Principles

Eight Batho Pele Principles were developed to serve as acceptable policy and legislative framework regarding service delivery in the public service. These principles are aligned with the Constitutional ideals of:

Promoting and maintaining high standards of professional ethics;
Providing service impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;
Utilising resources efficiently and effectively;
Responding to people's needs; the citizens are encouraged to participate in policy-making; and
Rendering an accountable, transparent, and development-oriented public administration
The Batho Pele Principles are as follows:

Consultation

There are many ways to consult users of services including conducting customer surveys, interviews with individual users, consultation with groups, and holding meetings with consumer representative bodies, NGOs and CBOs. Often, more than one method of consultation will be necessary to ensure comprehensiveness and representativeness. Consultation is a powerful tool that enriches and shapes government policies such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and its implementation in Local Government sphere.

Setting service standards

This principle reinforces the need for benchmarks to constantly measure the extent to which citizens are satisfied with the service or products they receive from departments. It also plays a critical role in the development of service delivery improvement plans to ensure a better life for all South Africans. Citizens should be involved in the development of service standards. Required are standards that are precise and measurable so that users can judge for themselves whether or not they are receiving what was promised. Some standards will cover processes, such as the length of time taken to authorise a housing claim, to issue a passport or identity document, or even to respond to letters. To achieve the goal of making South Africa globally competitive, standards should be benchmarked (where applicable) against those used internationally, taking into account South Africa's current level of development.

Increasing access

One of the prime aims of Batho Pele is to provide a framework for making decisions about delivering public services to the many South Africans who do not have access to them. Batho Pele also aims to rectify the inequalities in the distribution of existing services. Examples of initiatives by government to improve access to services include such platforms as the Gateway, Multi-Purpose Community Centres and Call Centres. Access to information and services empowers citizens and creates value for money, quality services. It reduces unnecessary expenditure for the citizens.

Ensuring courtesy

This goes beyond a polite smile, 'please' and 'thank you'. It requires service providers to empathize with the citizens and treat them with as much consideration and respect, as they would like for themselves. The public service is committed to continuous, honest and transparent communication with the citizens. This involves communication of services, products, information and problems, which may hamper or delay the efficient delivery of services to promised standards. If applied properly, the principle will help demystify the negative perceptions that the citizens in general have about the attitude of the public servants.

Providing information

As a requirement, available information about services should be at the point of delivery, but for users who are far from the point of delivery, other arrangements will be needed. In line with the definition of customer in this document, managers and employees should regularly seek to make information about the organisation, and all other service delivery related matters available to fellow staff members.

Openness and transparency

A key aspect of openness and transparency is that the public should know more about the way national, provincial and local government institutions operate, how well they utilise the resources they consume, and who is in charge. It is anticipated that the public will take advantage of this principle and make suggestions for improvement of service delivery mechanisms, and to even make government employees accountable and responsible by raising queries with them.

Redress

This principle emphasises a need to identify quickly and accurately when services are falling below the promised standard and to have procedures in place to remedy the situation. This should be done at the individual transactional level with the public, as well as at the organisational level, in relation to the entire service delivery programme. Public servants are

encouraged to welcome complaints as an opportunity to improve service, and to deal with complaints so that weaknesses can be remedied quickly for the good of the citizen.

Value for money

Many improvements that the public would like to see often require no additional resources and can sometimes even reduce costs. Failure to give a member of the public a simple, satisfactory explanation to an enquiry may for example, result in an incorrectly completed application form, which will cost time to rectify.

Objectives

Batho Pele Strategy on service delivery is developed to meet the following strategic objectives:
To introduce a new approach to service delivery which puts people at the centre of planning and delivering services;
To improve the face of service delivery by fostering new attitudes such as increased commitment, personal sacrifice, dedication;
To improve the image of the Public Service;
It has been noted that many public servants have not yet internalised Batho Pele as part of their day-to-day operation while providing services to members of the public. In order to deal with this, the Department of Public Service and Administration has developed a " Batho Pele revitalisation strategy " whose aim it is to inculcate the Batho Pele culture among the public servants and improve service delivery in the public service.

Encouraging Innovation and Rewarding Excellence

"National and Provincial Departments must ensure that an environment conducive to the delivery of services is created to enhance their staff's capacity to deliver good services."
Organisations need to show that staff commitment, energy and skills are being harnessed to tackle inefficient, outdated and bureaucratic practices to simplify procedures and to identify new and better ways of delivering services.

Service Delivery Impact

This principle calls for a holistic approach to the implementation of Batho Pele. It is all about demonstrating to what extent through the sum total of all their Batho Pele initiatives organizations are achieving the aims of Batho Pele.
Source: https://nwdc.co.za/batho-pele-principles/

Appendix 2: ***Aide-mémoire***

EXPLORING HYDROPOLITICS AND EXPRESSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP: THREE COMMUNITIES IN MADIBENG, SOUTH AFRICA

Name and Surname.....Contact.....
Date of interview.....
Time interview started..... Time interview ended.....
Location/Area.....

1. **Participant Profile**

(1) The participant's profile

- Can you please tell me about yourself? (prompts: age, employment status)

(2) The participants family's/household's dynamics

- Can you please tell me about your family? (prompts: number of members who stay at the household; sources of income)
- How long have you stayed in this community?

The next questions were on water services in the area and the state's role in providing water services. The questions were as follows;

(3) Water availability and reliability in the area

- Where do you get water?
- What are the major issues do you experience concerning water in the area?

(4) The state's role in water service provision in the area

- How do you view the municipality of Madibeng's efforts in providing water to your community?
- How can the water service provider [the municipality] improve water quantity?
- How can the water service provider [the municipality] improve water quality?

I ended by asking questions related to citizenship practices and water services;

(5) Participants views of citizenship in accessing water services

- What does your [lack of] access to water mean to you as a South African citizen?
- How do you view the municipality's urgency in resolving water issues in Madibeng?
- As a concerned citizen in this community, what steps do you individually take to have these water issues [water quality/quantity] resolved?
- As concerned citizens in this community, what steps do you collectively take to resolve these water issues [water quality/quantity]?

(6) Do you have any questions that you would like to ask?

Thank you for your time and patience.

Appendix 3: List of participants

	Name*	Age (y)	Sex**	Marital Status	Employment status	Period of stay (y)
DAMONSVILLE Suburb						
1	*Oupa* Andries	75	M	Married	Retired artisan	30
2	Andre	33	M	Separated	Chef	30
3	Armand	42	M	Married	Unemployed	19
4	Eduardo	25	M	Single	Unemployed	18
5	Felicity	24	F	Single	Unemployed	21
6	Ina	28	F	Single	Day-care operator	19
7	Kgothatso	28	M	Cohabiting	Mechanic	16
8	*Ma'* Londiwe	54	F	Single	Unemployed	25
9	*Mmêmogolo'* Mmabatho	64	F	Married	Unemployed	30
10	Myra	46	F	Single	Unemployed	19
11	Taylor	25	M	Single	Carwash operator	12
12	*Ouma* Viola	56	F	Widow	Unemployed	28
MOTHUTLUNG Township						
13	*Mmêmogolo* Angelica	60	F	Widow	Unemployed	24
14	Danny	26	M	Single	Welder	4
15	*Malomê* Frank	59	M	Married	Fitter and turner	19
16	*Ntatêmogolo* Joe	73	M	Single	Retired artisan	44
17	*Mr Kalle*	41	M	Married	Community leader	41
18	Tshepang	35	M	Married	Unemployed	28
19	*Ma'* Tshepiso	48	F	Married	*Spaza* shop owner	22
20	Tshepo	26	M	Single	Winch operator	26
MMAKAU Village						
21	*Mmêmogolo* Chimere	53	F	Married	Unemployed	37
22	*Mmêmogolo* Gertrude	48	F	Separated	Unemployed	36
23	*Mmêmogolo* Maggy	53	F	Married	Unemployed	28
24	Thabo	25	M	Single	Vintner	25
25	Thulani	18	M	Single	Dog breeder	18
26	Valery	37	F	Single	Shop assistant	37
27	*Ma'* Yolanda	55	F	Single	Unemployed	46

*All pseudonyms
**Sex: M – Male, F - Female

Appendix 4: Research Ethics Approval*

UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

FACULTY OF HUMANTIES

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

26 September 2017

ETHICAL CLEARANCE NUMBER	**REC-02-099-2017**
REVIEW OUTCOME	**Approved with recommendations**
APPLICANT	**Mr A Kaziboni**
TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT	**Hydropolitics in Madibeng: Access to Water and State Provision as Expressions of Citizenship**
DEPARTMENT	**Sociology**
SUPERVISOR/S	**Prof T. Uys** **Prof M. Galvin**

Dear Mr Kaziboni,

The Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee has scrutinised your research proposal and confirm that it complies with the approved ethical standards of the Faculty of Humanities; University of Johannesburg. We have made some recommendations , set out below, for consideration in consultation with your supervisors.

The REC would like to extend their best wishes to you with your postgraduate studies.

Yours sincerely,

Prof Tharina Guse

Chair: Faculty of Humanities REC

Tel: 011 559 3248

email: tguse@uj.ac.za

*The title of the study was changed to: Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa.

Appendix 5: Information sheet

Good day sir/ma'am

As a Madibeng resident and community member, I would like to invite you to participate in this research project, entitled, **"Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa".** The research project is part of my **Doctoral Degree at the University of Johannesburg**. I hope that this project will reveal important information on what it means to be a South African citizen in post-apartheid South Africa in light of the current water crisis we are facing. This research will also contribute to the literature on citizenship and hydropolitics (water politics).

If you accept to take part in this research project, you will be required to sign a consent form – indicating that among others, you want to take part in the project. I will conduct one, single interview with you during which I will ask you questions from an interview schedule. The interview is expected to last no longer than 90 minutes and is a one-off event. Upon completing the research project, I will put together a clear and concise summary of the findings that I will share with you if you are interested. Kindly note that I am not in a position to reward you in cash and/or kind for any form of assistance that you would have provided – since this research project is for academic purposes.

If you agree to take part, your name will not be disclosed. Your responses to the questions will only be used for this research project, and I will not have access to any of your private records. You can be assured that you will remain anonymous if you take part in this project and your information will remain confidential.

Your participation in this research project is voluntary. You are not obliged to take part, and you have the right to withdraw at any time. If you do not wish to take part, you do not have to give a reason, and I will not contact you again.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee and received ethical approval.

If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:

Name of researcher: **Anthony Kaziboni**
Full address: **University of Johannesburg, Sociology Department**
Tel: **0115592879**
E-mail: anthonyk@uj.ac.za

Research Supervisors: **Professor Tina Uys and Professor Mary Galvin**
Address: **University of Johannesburg, Sociology Department**
Tel: **0115592885/4865**
E-mail: tuys@uj.ac.za and mgalvin@uj.ac.za

Appendix 6: Informed consent form

TITLE OF RESEARCH STUDY: : Exploring Hydropolitics and Expressions of Citizenship: Three Communities in Madibeng, South Africa
NAME OF THE RESEARCHER: Anthony Kaziboni
INSTITUTION: Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg

DECLARATION BY THE PARTICIPANT

The undersigned..... (Full name and surname), cell contact.....
I hereby confirm as follows:

1. I was invited to participate in the above-mentioned academic study undertaken by Anthony Kaziboni, a doctoral candidate at the University of Johannesburg's, Faculty of Humanities' Department of Sociology.
2. The following aspects have been explained to me:
    a. Aim: The study's broad aim is to understand how citizens' access to water and the state's provisioning inform their expressions of citizenship.
    b. Ethical Clearance: I am aware that this study is for academic purposes, and the University Johannesburg's Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee approved it.
    c. Possible Risks: I am aware that the researcher is asking me to share some very personal and confidential information with him and that I may feel uncomfortable talking about some of the topics. I do not have to answer any question or take part in the interview if you do not wish to do so, and that is also fine. I also do not have to give any reason for not responding to any question or refusing to participate in the interview.
    d. Possible Benefits: As a result of my participation in this research study, there will be no direct benefit.
    e. Confidentiality: My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or scientific publications by the investigators.
    f. Anonymity: I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising my identity.
    g. Voluntary Participation: My participation is voluntary.
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without giving any explanation.
4. Pictures taken during this study will not be used for profit and/or business.

Name of Participant	Date	Signature
Name of Researcher	Date	Signature