Abstract
William Whewell's nineteenth century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell's account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle's form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell's hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine's view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell's hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call semantic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation, as evident in Whewell's hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance, presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics.