Abstract
International research collaboration plays an increasingly important role in shaping global scientific agendas. Yet limited empirical attention has been given to how these dynamics unfold in emerging economies. This paper investigates the effects of collaboration frictions, execution challenges, strategic incentives, and trust asymmetries on scientific outcomes in international research collaborations among BRICS academics. Drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational behavior, and process-based trust theory, we develop and test a structural model using survey data from 396 respondents engaged in international collaborative research. Scientific outcomes are defined as tangible and strategic outputs such as technological innovations, R&D infrastructure, and institutional agreements. Contrary to expectations, execution challenges are positively associated with scientific outcomes, suggesting that operational complexity may reflect innovation ambition rather than dysfunction. Strategic incentives emerge as the strongest positive predictor of scientific outcomes. Trust asymmetries, though not directly associated with outcomes, significantly moderate collaboration mechanisms-attenuating the positive influence of strategic incentives and weakening the positive association between execution challenges and scientific outcomes under relational imbalance, while indicating that the relationship between collaboration frictions and scientific outcomes varies across trust conditions. These results challenge conventional assumptions that prioritize friction-free coordination, instead highlighting how relational imbalances can distort collaboration dynamics. The study contributes to a more context-sensitive understanding of research governance in the Global South and offers practical insights into designing resilient, equitable partnerships in complex environments.