Abstract
This paper examines how practical intentionality is described by Husserl and then Heidegger, and the phenomenological and sociological issues of these descriptions. In Husserl, the phenomenological reduction reveals that the practices that one makes of the world imply two intentionalities which wrap one inside the other, and where the foundation is a theoretical intentionality: there are always reasons which make it possible to understand why such object is surrounded by such value. In young Heidegger, life is not expressed by means of judgments, and it coils around itself, perpetuating itself in the ordinary practices of the world. We show that this phenomenological immanentism is put in tension, by Heidegger himself, with the social source of intentionality. We will ask the question of the compatibility between immanentism and normative source, a dialectic that sheds new light on the phenomenological project.