Abstract
The legislature as the supreme law-making organ of state should maintain oversight over the executive to ensure that policies and programmes are implemented. Independent financial institutions assist parliamentarians to interrogate budgets and government expenditure. These fiscal institutions are expected to work impartially, with authority, and remain non-partisan. International experience shows that these institutions provide budget-related information, economic forecasts that are independent from the executive, research on behalf of Members of Parliament (MPs), and support the activities of the legislature. Ultimately, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) should enhance the legislature’s abilit! y to hold the executive branch of government to account concerning fiscal forecasting and budgeting, as well as generating informative public debates. The South African Parliamentary Budget Office (SAPBO) was established with these objectives in mind. Using a constructivist approach, this article reviews national legislation, policies, annual reports, and literature on independent financial institutions to highlight the contribution that SAPBO makes to enhancing the legislature’s oversight role and deepening democracy in South Africa. This article traces the development of SAPBO to review its impact on the public finance and public policy functions within the context of international best practice. The findings suggest that the potential to enhance the fiscal oversight function for parliament could be improved going forward, through the continued support that is offered by this fiscal institution.