Abstract
This paper explores the similarities and differences between Juliana
Bidadanure’s account of justice across age groups (2021) and my own
(2020). While we both hold that age-based inequalities are objectionable if
they undermine relational equality or cause people’s opportunities to dip
below a threshold level, we differ when it comes to the specific
characterization of a threshold and its basis. Section 1 brings to light three
salient differences and argues that in each case, my rendering of sufficiency
has decisive advantages. Section 2 takes up the first difference, which
concerns the specification of sufficiency as normal opportunities versus
central human capabilities. Section 3 explores the second difference,
which pertains to justifying sufficiency across the lifespan by appealing to
prudence versus dignity. Section 4 considers the third difference, which
relates to whether the standard of sufficiency is relative to a particular
society or to human capabilities broadly understood. Section 5 responds to
two objections. The paper concludes that while Bidadanure’s account of
age-group justice appropriately targets relational equality and threshold
opportunity, the specification of sufficiency falls short. It does not
adequately safeguard people’s ability to lead nonhumiliating human lives.