Abstract
The fiscal scrutiny obligations of legislatures apply to both national and subnational contexts. Fiscal scrutiny, as a form of oversight, emanates from The Magna Carta, but remains a challenge for legislators. Public accounts committees, budget committees, and supreme audit institutions are common tools and information sources that legislators have come to rely on for their fiscal analysis. A comparatively new addition to this suite of practices and offices is the Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI). Sub-national IFIs have mandates similar to those of national offices, although their range tends to be scaled to that of their jurisdictions. Both national and sub-national IFIs share the common function of enhancing fiscal scrutiny and the decision-making environment of fiscal and economic matters. As sub-national IFIs are contemplated by jurisdictions, the article investigates how these offices should be designed and evaluated, whether the standards of practice and evaluation frameworks designed for national IFIs are suitable for sub-national ones, and to determine whether existing national offices’ experiences can inform sub-national counterparts. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on IFIs in terms of extending the analysis to the design of sub-national offices. Sub-national parliamentary budget offices should be underpinned by the same principles of independence, resources, operations, and trust building demonstrated by peer institutions. The methodology entails a desktop approach in terms of a literature and documentary analysis. The findings suggest that the frameworks and guiding principles, originally developed for national offices, are scalable and applicable to sub-national offices. Recognising and legislating for the appropriate mandate, resources, and the independence of an institution are crucial elements for its long-term success.