Abstract
In this dissertation, I propose a Southern African-centered account of mental disorders, which defines these conditions in both evaluative and causal terms. It argues that mental illnesses must be understood through value judgments and primary causal factors. According to this account, for a condition to qualify as a mental disorder, it must meet three individually necessary and together sufficient criteria: (1) it must affect the mental state of an individual (beyond normal emotional responses), (2) it must be evaluated negatively by both an individual and the community and (3) there must be an identifiable non-physical cause(s).
Furthermore, I contend that a Southern African-centered account cannot be viewed as a form of naturalism, normativism, or hybridism. Instead, it extends beyond these conceptual approaches by incorporating the primary causal component. However, it does share some common ground with normativism and hybridism, particularly in terms of value judgments. Accordingly, it is my view that a Southern African-centered account is a value-laden and spiritual causal account.