Abstract
M.A. (Philosophy)
In this inquiry I reply to the question: What are the philosophical
implications of Benhabib’s cosmopolitan theory for contested migrants? The
publicised waves of immigrants from Africa and Asia reaching Europe are a
recognisable example of the phenomenon of contemporary immigration, even
though there are many more millions of unpublicised immigrants occurring,
for instance, Burundian fleeing to Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Consequently, immigration is not only topical, it brings to
the fore the question of whether the world can be more accepting of
immigrants. Benhabib argues that it can be if we accept that asylum seekers
and refugees are humans like citizens of any polity, have human rights and
that liberal democratic norms provide for their inclusion into political
communities. At the centre of her philosophical defence of contested migrants
is the relationship between the individual and the sovereign state. She argues
that a liberal democratic sovereign state that espouses democratic norms and
claims to be the guardian of human rights ought to conduct itself in ways that
are consistent with these values. She maintains that it is not enough for the
sovereign state to be merely hospitable and grant rights of first admission. This
is woefully inadequate. It is unacceptable that those who cannot return home
for one reason or another should remain stateless, especially if they meet all
the immigration requirements of the host, for them naturalised citizenship is
a human right. She submits compelling arguments for inclusion to political
membership based on cosmopolitanism norms, discourse ethics, human
rights and democratic norms in defence of contested migrants. The inevitable
conclusion: It is hard for liberal democratic sovereign states to justify excluding
resident contested migrants from naturalised citizenship.