Abstract
LL.M. (Corporate Law)
Jurisdictions employ several legal methods to regulate loans made by shareholders to companies. This dissertation explores the legal mechanisms employed by Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom as well as Australia that align to the recommendations of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in respect of shareholder loans and seeks to answer the question whether South Africa should adopt similar mechanisms.
German law complies fully with the UNCITRAL recommendations by providing for the automatic subordination of shareholder claims in respect of loans as well as the avoidance of repayments and security interests made and registered within a certain period of the commencement of insolvency proceedings. German law also contains avoidance provisions specific to transactions between the debtor and a shareholder that cause detriment to a third-party creditor and general avoidance provisions which provide for certain presumptions to apply in the case of transactions concluded between the company and a shareholder.
In the United States the doctrine of equitable subordination is legislated and applies in the event that the debtor is thinly-capitalised and mismanaged and legislative provision is made for the avoidance of preference transactions concluded between a creditor and a debtor, which provide for a longer avoidance period in the case of a transaction concluded with a shareholder. In addition to full legislative compliance with the UNCITRAL recommendation relating to shareholder transactions, the wide powers given to the courts to uphold bankruptcy legislation is codified and led to the development of the doctrine of recharacterization, which entails shareholder loans being treated as equity contributions in certain circumstances.
The United Kingdom does not contain legal provisions relating to the subordination of shareholder claims and thus does not comply fully with the UNCITRAL recommendations relating to shareholder loans. However, it does provide specifically for a longer avoidance period in respect of preference transactions involving shareholders and certain presumptions to be applied in the case of transactions concluded between the debtor company and a shareholder.