Abstract
M.A. (Philosophy)
Usually when we think of law, we think of rationality and outcomes that are not swayed by emotion. Modern Western society tends to think of emotion and rationality as incompatible. It is a widely-held belief that it is more morally desirable for people to make ‘rational’ decisions rather than ‘emotional’ decisions in life in general. Perhaps in no other area is this distinction between the two more pronounced as in criminal law, where judges who society considers to be making ‘rational’ judicial decisions are revered, and those who society at large considers to be making ‘emotional’ judicial decisions are distrusted. As Terry Maroney (2006: 120) says, “[a] core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason and emotion are different beasts entirely…the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not belong”.
In this dissertation, I propose to look at the virtue of mercy, where mercy is understood to have a significant emotional component, and to answer the question: Should a judge in a criminal trial employ mercy? If so, under what conditions?
The importance of the question of whether a judge should employ mercy in a criminal case is that it addresses one part of the larger enquiry into how the state should respond to offenders. As moral beings, our emotional responses to criminals and their crimes are varied. Sometimes we feel anger, at other times disgust, and at other times mercy, grief and sadness.