Abstract
M.Com.
The existence of a person is a prerequisite before any liability for tax can come into being. Some of the most successfultax avoidance schemes of the past few years have relied on this principle, but the legislator has now . apparently closed these loopholes by specifically bringing the trust and the deceased estate within the definition of a person as far as the taxability of these entities is concerned. The courts have, however, set the following general principles relating to the taxation of non-existent persons:
(i) The existence of a person is an absolute prerequisite before liability for tax can come into being, nor can there be any representative taxpayer if there is no person to represent. (ii) An aggregate of assets and liabilities, although no legal persona, can to a limited extent take part in day to day economic activities. It is here argued that these principles may be applied to otherareas of the mercantile and private law, resulting in unforseen and beneficial consequences for the taxpayer. Section 35 of the Companies Act creates a possibility for a company to enter into contracts and acquire rights from these, even before being duly incorporated. The company, not being a legal persona before incorporation, would thus not be taxable on income it may receive or which may accrue to it up to the date of incorporation. At present, only two special tax court cases address the issue of pre-incorporation profits. Neither of the decisions handed down, however, reflects the above view, a situation which is highly unsatisfactory and supported by dubious authority. When proper consideration is given to the difference between a person professing to act as agent, and a person professing to act as trustee of a company not yet incorporated, the vesting of income andthe tax effects of
retrospective contracts,it becomes clear thata real possibilityfor substantial tax savings does exist. South African writers on this subject are divided, some of them meekly accepting the present unsatisfactory situation, others acknowledging the obvious flaws in it, but declining to make definite suggestions as to how this issue should be approached. A human being becomes a legal persona at time of birth. The nasciturus
fiction which stems from Roman law, provides that the rights to an inheritance are kept floating until birth of the nesduuus, to determine whether the nasciturus should share in the bequest. Depending on the interpretation of the legal effects of the nasciturus fiction, and the vesting of the right to income from the inheritance, there is a distinct possibility that liability for tax on income, until time of birth of the nasciturus, may altogether be avoided. Provisions similar to section 35 of the Companies Act and the nasciturus
fiction also exist in foreign legal systems. It could, however, not be established how the tax implications resulting from the application of these legal fictions are accommodated within these systems.