Abstract
This thesis defends Huw Price's revolutionary work on causal perspectivalism, asserting its potential for universal resonance, irrespective of varying cultural and ontological perspectives. The central thesis unequivocally contends that, to achieve the requisite level of rigor, a theory of causation must embrace perspectival ideas, a commitment that permeates this thesis.
Price's work unearths the profound implications of perspectivalism within the ongoing debate between causal realists and causal eliminativists. His conclusion asserts that "causal perspectivalism would imply that the scientific viewpoint is wholly and ineliminably 'embedded.'" (Price, 2007, p. 288) Consequently, Price seeks to reposition causation, considering it a category projected onto the world by our deliberative standpoint.
Several motivations drive my commitment to causal perspectivalism. First and foremost, its elegance stands out in comparison to alternative theories. It proves more defensible by circumventing the inherent problems highlighted in Chapter Two (Bertrand Russell and Causal Eliminativism); Chapters Three (Nancy Cartwright and Causal Realism); and Chapter Five (Interrogating Causation in African Philosophy).