Abstract
The ethics of laboratory non-human animal testing for medical products and procedures have been widely debated in the literature (for example, Regan, 1986 and Rollin, 2007). While some theorists consider non-human animal testing for medicinal purposes justifiable, they do so with caution (cf. for example Kiani et al., 2022; Shaun Yon-Seng Khoo, 2018). In this context, the R principles are commonly used as ethical guidelines.
The philosophical viability of the R principles is the central theme of the current minor dissertation. I argue that due to numerous problems with the Rs, we should aim instead for the full adoption of the replacement principle only. If we adopt the replacement principle as I suggest, the search for alternative methods in biomedical research becomes more urgent, raising the question: could biomimicry be one of the answers? In this dissertation, I argue that biomimicry could be seen as a viable alternative to nonhuman animal testing for biomedical research. Biomimicry involves learning from nature’s models, systems, and processes to solve human challenges in a way that respects ecological integrity. Ethically, it redefines the human–nature relationship from exploitation to exploration, aligning with Janine Benyus’s view of nature as model, mentor, and measure. By embodying the spirit of the Replacement principle, biomimicry eliminates the need for nonhuman animal testing altogether, while promoting innovation that is sustainable and compassionate.
Ultimately, this dissertation concludes that biomimicry offers more than a scientific solution—it represents a paradigm shift in both ethics and science. It challenges anthropocentric and speciesism assumptions embedded in biomedical research and replaces them with a framework grounded in respect, reciprocity, and responsibility. The study therefore argues that the future of biomedical research depends not on refining practices that cause harm and suffering but on transforming our moral and epistemological relationship with nature.