Abstract
We find in Husserl’s texts – Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911), and Ideas (1913-4) – that the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is self-evident because consciousness is treated: (a) as the foundation of experience of the world in phenomenology and, (b) as other things in the world in naturalism. Secondly, mental experience (a) is approached using intentionality in phenomenology and, (b) is approached using causality in naturalism. In this dissertation, I argue that Husserl does not mean, in all cases, that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible, specifically, if Husserl’s text, Phenomenological Psychology (1925) is analyzed and the themes of embodiment and enactivism are drawn out from the text. Firstly, I show that since phenomenology treats consciousness as the foundation of experience of the world, including natural experience, phenomenology swallows up naturalism – making them incompatible. Secondly, I abandon the transcendental version of phenomenology and combine some parts of phenomenology and naturalism to explain the mind. By so doing, I draw out, – using the analyses of Jack Reynolds, Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, – the themes of (a) enactivism from the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science, and (b) embodiment from the relationship between phenomenology and biological science, noting that the latter are naturalist disciplines. While embodiment studies the mind as it animates the body, enactivism studies the rise of cognition when the acting body interacts with the environment. Lastly, I present the possibility of compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism by analyzing Husserl’s text, Phenomenological Psychology (1925) and drawing out the themes of embodiment and enactivism in the text. I show from the text that Husserl bypasses the transcendental questions and presents phenomenological psychology as a version that is compatible with naturalism.
M.Phil. (Philosophy)