Abstract
The study aims to provide critical analysis on the AU’s response in the 2011 political crisis in Libya and discuss the dynamics which prevented the AU from playing a frontline role in response to the turbulence in Libya, the study provide insights about the involvement of the international community in the 2011 Libyan crisis and the justification of their involvement in the Libyan crisis within the context of humanitarian intervention and ‘‘responsibility to protect’’. The study followed a qualitative research method because it is a systematic systematic collection, organization and interpretation of textual information. The method was chosen to provide a complex description of the study conducted. The study found that the AU had wielded the effort to handle the conflict as it had instituted a road map to peace as an attempt to address the problem in Libya. The efforts and the initiatives in the road map come to be blocked when the AU dispatched a mission to Libya. The UN without fully recognizing the AU efforts pass resolution 1973 which sidelined the organisation’s efforts. The UN Security Council resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone over Libya making it difficult for the AU to implement the road map. In addition, the AU events were overtaken by the UN involvement while the AU was looking for a diplomatic approach around the notion of ‘‘African solutions to African problems’’. The study also found that the reason why the AU is unable to respond effectively to the conflicts on the continent is due to divergence among its members. Therefore, divisions within the members weaken its structural capacity to implement peace and security mechanism.
M.A. (Political Studies)