Abstract
The year 2025 marked the 80th anniversary of the United Nations, an organisation founded on the promise to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Central to this mission is the UN Security Council (UNSC), which holds the primary mandate for maintaining international peace and security. While scholars commend the UN and UNSC in fulfilling its mandate (Schabas, 2007 and other scholars (e.g., Malone and Day (2020); Pendlebury et al (2025)) argue that the UN and UNSC is not fulfilling its mandate. Against this backdrop, this dissertation poses the following research question: How successful has the UNSC been in fulfilling its mandate to maintain international peace and security by acting in response to genocides?
Through a comparative case study analysis of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ongoing conflict in Gaza; a crisis featuring widespread allegations of genocide; this study applies Institutional Theory and the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The analysis demonstrates that the UNSC has consistently failed to respond effectively and in a timely manner to genocide, this failure is not attributable to isolated instances but to deeply ingrained institutional failures, most notably the veto power of the permanent members of the UNSC and the politicisation of humanitarian intervention.
This study concludes that without significant structural reform, the UNSC will continue to be ineffective in responding to genocides. It proposes specific pathways for reinvigorating the UN’s mechanisms, including strengthening the R2P, improving early warning systems and restraining the veto power concerning instances of genocide. By learning from the failures in Rwanda and the ongoing crisis in Gaza, this dissertation outlines a critical agenda for reforming the UNSC and ensuring it meets its foundational promise for generations to come.