Abstract
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained independence on June 30, 1960. Immediately afterwards, it experienced various crises that destabilized the country. The secession of Katanga on July 11, 1960, split the country in two and caused a political crisis. From 1998 to 2002, the DRC descended into another conflict that caused the deaths and displacement of millions of people. This conflict saw the military involvement of nine states and many armed militia and is often referred to as the Great War of Africa.
The United Nations (UN) used peacekeeping operations to try to maintain the enforcement of peace agreements. It established three peacekeeping operations in the Congo, namely, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the UN Peacekeeping in the DRC (MONUC), and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The ability of these three peacekeeping operations to sustain peace in the DRC has been a challenge.
Since the 1960s, every UN peacekeeping operation began with a non-robust Chapter 6 mandate and progressed to a Chapter 7 mandate of peace enforcement, robust operations, including stabilization missions. This thesis provides an overview of the nature, success, and weaknesses of the UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC concentrating on the periods 1960-1964 and 1999-2014.
The study aims to identify and analyze the changes inthe nature of UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the DRC, particularly the deployment of more robust operations.
It questions the ontology and epistemology that inform the peacekeeping operations highlighting the limitations of liberal norms to promote peace and security. It employs Critical Theory to unpack the assumptions underpinning the various generations of peacekeeping in the DRC.
The thesis has five objectives, namely: (1) to outline the nature and functioning of the peacekeeping operations in the DRC, indicating shifts in doctrine, mandates, and practice of the different missions; (2) to critically evaluate the assumptions, approaches, and practices of these different peace operations; (3) to highlight the strengths and limitations of UN peacekeeping interventions in the DRC; (4) to deepen understanding and strengthen the theoretical analysis of peace operations; and (5) to augment knowledge in the field of peace and conflict studies towards developing more effective future peace operations.
The overarching research question is: is why have successive generations of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC not delivered the desired conditions for peace? The thesis argues that the concept of the UN peacekeeping mission itself is flawed and that changes to mandates and implementation are not enough to find a solution to these shortcomings. It contends that the UN should rethink its peacekeeping concept and practice. The UN interventions did not adhere to the key criteria of consent; it fell short in the protection of civilians; the use of force violated the rules of peacekeeping missions; the principle of impartiality lost its efficacy as the missions sided with the government in their operations; and the use of force violated people’s rights as it led to bloodshed instead of civilian protection. The thesis argues that these challenges impacted the success of the peacekeeping missions in the DRC and that, therefore, the UN should rethink peacekeeping operations both theoretically and practically.