Abstract
The act of Googling has become second nature to us, we use Google without thinking, seek and search for answers based on the smallest of whims. Given how deeply it is woven into our lives, we can think of Google as having become an invisible part of the infrastructure of our epistemic landscape. Googling is a way of finding something out, a means of accessing knowledge. However, we do not have a sustained philosophical account of how people interact with information from the internet. This work is focussed on understanding the epistemic dimensions of what has come to be second nature to us – our interactions with Google and its place as part of our epistemic infrastructure as a knowledge provider.
If Google is a source of genuine knowledge, it is most likely to be testimonial in nature. So, my approach to disentangling the epistemic issues will be through the lens of testimony. I will argue that Google can be a testifier, provide us with good testimony and thus, provide knowledge. Traditional accounts of testimony typically hold that only intentional agents can give testimony, excluding vast parts of the internet and robots from being sources of knowledge. As such, this thesis is a departure from accounts that are usually centred on forms of testimony that pass from speaker to hearer. My motivation for going against this orthodoxy is this: in the shift towards directly answering user queries instead of only providing links to sources, Google has placed itself as an arbiter and producer of knowledge. Moreover, the use of artificial assistants and chatbots has further encouraged a lack of distinction between those who directly produce knowledge and those who share it. As such, our procuring processes are now more likely to be mediated through technology, implying that our modes of communication and learning through testimony have changed. In light of the recent push towards using ChatGPT style AI’s and assistants, the question of responsible epistemic use of technology has become more pertinent than ever. This thesis is aimed at bridging the gap between traditional accounts of testimony and our new epistemic landscape.
I will argue that Google can be seen as a testifier and that we are epistemically responsible in accepting its testimony. The following two-premise argument captures the overarching structure of the thesis.
P1: Three conditions are jointly sufficient for the responsible acceptance of S’s testimony that p, 1. S is a testifier (chapter 2), 2. S has epistemic authority on p (chapter 4), 3. S is epistemically trustworthy with respect to p (chapter 5)
P2: Google meets the three conditions for the responsible acceptance of testimony: 1. Google is a testifier (chapter 3), 2. Google has the relevant epistemic authority (chapter 4), 3. Google is epistemically trustworthy (chapter 5)
Therefore, it is responsible for one to accept testimony from Google.