Abstract
D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)
This thesis consists of two parts. First an argument is made to the effect that the contemporary debate on justice does not sufficiently address the specific problems pertinent to radically unjust societies. In the second part an attempt is made to
propose remedies for these deficiencies. In chapter one the following deficiencies in the contemporary debate on justice are pointed out: (i) it does not provide sufficient guidance on how injustice should be identified, (ii) there is a lack of clarity on the universality or particularity of theories of justice; (iii) the methodology of theories of justice is neglected; (iv) a thorough evaluation of forms of political action acceptable for
the transformation of injustice into justice is relatively absent; (v) there is a lack of attention to conflicts of pluralism other than religious and moral pluralism. In the second
chapter it is noted that people in radically unjust societies often accept their situation willingly or endure it passively because they either accept a set of ideas legitimating it, or they perceive their situation as the inevitable product of natural forces that they are powerless to do anything about. Suggestions are made to enable these people to see their society as the product of human activity and thus as something that they as human beings can modify, alter, change, or transform. Having established, at the beginning of chapter three, that the quest for a universal theory of justice is important, various findings
are briefly sketched. It is followed by an attempt to distinguish universal elements that ought to belong to the contents of any theory of justice, justified by reference to features of our common humanity, from ·the particular elements in a theory of justice, brought about by a variety of factors, such as socioeconomic circumstances, cultural values, specific experiences, and so on. In chapter four a theory of justice as complex consensus is expounded in six theses, which leads to a method appropriate for (i) the theoretical articulation and explanation of injustice and (ii) the design, construction, and justification of a theory of the optimally·just society that complements and completes
the universal elements, distinguished above, by means of particular elements so that the resulting theory of justice is applicable to the unique socio-political context of a particular society only. In the fifth chapter views that defend an extrinsic or an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of the transformationof a radically unjust society into a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one, are contrasted. Thereafter an extensive
defense of an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of political transformation is provided. The final chapter starts by indicating what should be counted as gains made in terms of justice once a radically unjust society has been transformed into
a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one. A sketch of the simplest way possible for implementing and securing these gains will be examined and remedies will be proposed that best secure justice for those shortcomings that have been pointed out.