Abstract
This thesis examines the emergence of quasi-criminal jurisdiction within the jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It argues that while the Court was not conceived as a criminal tribunal, its evolving case law has progressively crystallised into a framework whereby states are required to investigate, prosecute, and punish serious human rights violations, and to adopt structural reforms aimed at accountability and deterrence. These developments place the African Court in a space that resembles criminal justice, raising important doctrinal and normative questions about the scope, legitimacy, and desirability of such jurisdiction.
Although debates on the quasi-criminal functions of regional human rights courts have been extensive in the European and Inter-American contexts, the African Court’s practice has only recently begun to attract sustained scholarly attention. Existing studies have generally examined isolated elements, such as reparations, structural orders, or compliance mechanisms, without treating quasi-criminal jurisdiction as a holistic and unifying concept. This thesis fills that gap by providing the first comprehensive analysis of how procedural obligations, remedial practices, and supervisory mechanisms converge to create a distinctive quasi-criminal function under the African Charter.
The study situates the African experience within global debates on coercive human rights adjudication, demonstrating both the shared features and distinctive contributions of the African Court’s jurisprudence. In doing so, it develops a conceptual framework for understanding the normative foundations and institutional implications of quasi-criminal jurisdiction in the African system. The thesis further interrogates whether this expansion is feasible and institutionally appropriate for a regional human rights court whose mandate was originally framed in protective rather than punitive terms. Ultimately, the thesis contributes doctrinally by clarifying the relationship between substantive and procedural obligations in African human rights law, and normatively by proposing a framework for the principled development of quasi-criminal jurisdiction under the African Court. In doing so, it advances scholarly understanding of the Court’s role within both the African and global human rights architecture, and sheds light on the broader question of how far international courts should extend into functions traditionally reserved for criminal justice systems.