Abstract
The main objective of this dissertation is to produce a novel theory of epistemic artefacts. Artefacts, as defined by philosophers, are intentionally designed objects. As instruments of material culture, they are human-made things, with cultural and historical significance. Artefacts are thus objects which are produced as technology or used as tools in everyday social reality. Artefacts can either be physical outputs such as everyday objects and technologies, or cognitive outputs such as mnemonics, idioms, and other heuristic devices used to understand a given environment. Artefacts, as a philosophical category have been the subject of limited sustained epistemological inquiry, until quite recently. I will argue that an untheorised subcategory of artefacts— namely ‘epistemic artefacts’—impinge on all facets of epistemic life. Consequently, they are a valuable resource for doing epistemology, especially in contexts of epistemic marginalisation within the Global South, such as Africa. This study will propose and defend an account termed epistemic artefactualism. This theory maintains that epistemic artefacts contain, produce, embody, or represent epistemic properties to both epistemic experts and laypersons. I argue that epistemic artefacts, within the Global North or African Indigenous knowledge contexts, can be understood within the framework of decolonised interpretations of African social epistemology. This is so especially since understanding epistemic artefacts requires conceptualisations of “epistemic cultures”, “epistemic communities”, and epistemic “expertise”.
In theorising on knowledge in relation to epistemic artefacts, a diverse canon of philosophical work will be referenced across various domains. In this dissertation, Beth Preston, along with Lina Markauskaite and Peter Goodyear, is referenced for an epistemological framework of artefacts, as well as a formative account of the epistemic artefact. I will also introduce novel concepts which will inform this thesis’s account of epistemic artefacts. I propose an account of expert knowledge in knowledge-about, which is theorised as an inextricable aspect of epistemic artefact production, from the perspective and methods of African and social theorisations of knowledge. I deploy the history of ideas method as the most apt for identifying epistemic artefacts across distinct and differently situated epistemic contexts. I draw on the work of Kirstie Dotson for an understanding of why, on a social epistemological account, we ought to consider the plurality of epistemic artefacts, activities, and contexts through the notion of structured epistemic life. Finally, concepts such as artefactual damage and hostile epistemic artefacts proffer a dynamic way of thinking about artefacts within social epistemology. These latter concepts suggest that alongside the liberatory role that epistemic artefacts can play in marginalised epistemic contexts, they can also be deployed as tools of epistemic oppression. Ultimately, by theorising the epistemic artefact, this thesis seeks to establish epistemic artefacts as a cornerstone for novel theorisation within African epistemology.