Abstract
The root metaphor of this dissertation is that items of knowledge
are as foci against a background:, a situation which it calls
a contextual relation. Truth, meaning and justification are
impossible outside a context.
In terms of this epistemology, the view is defended that Philosophy
is intrinsically concerned with the f amily of skills which
we use in treating knowledge contexts. The treatment of contexts
is a polymorphous practice and includes describing,
creating, analyzing and ordering contexts.
reforming,
In Part One, the above view is introduced and the epistemological
angle for treating the nature of Philosophy is defended. The
origin of the leading theory of knowledge of this dissertation,
namely contextualism, is expounded and in the process arguments
against rival epistemological. paradigms are brought to the fore.
At the same time, it is argued that holisrn is not compatible
with the true aim s of contextualism.
In Part Two, the concept context is analized. The ways in which
truth, meaning and reality are related to contexts are discussed.
It is found that context should not be regarded in substantialist
terms and that an attempt at a linear ordering of all
contexts is a highly unpromising endeavour. In Part Three the meaning o f "the treatment of contexts" is
illustrated by taking Plato's Theory of Forms and Quine's attack
on the two dogmas of empiricism as particular examples.
In Part Four, the model put forward in the dissertation is
applied in a discussion of the nature of Philosophy and the
teaching thereof, as well as the the question of the possibility
of a final context.
D. Phil. (Philosophy)