Abstract
Stakeholders invest in organisations, expecting a return on their investment. These organisations, in turn, invest their revenue streams in productivity or in growth strategies leading to, among other things, an increase in information technology (IT) business initiatives. Given that effective management of a single project is no longer sufficient, organisations are leaning more towards a coordinated way of managing their initiatives to deliver benefits which could not be obtained if these initiatives were managed separately. Programme management has been perceived as the strategy implementation vehicle that links the overall strategy of the organisation with the portfolio of projects. While the use of programmes and programme management has grown, their capability to secure the investment of organisations has not been proven. Numerous failure stories with dramatic consequences for the organisation as a whole have been reported. Over the past decade, research conducted on the performance of IT initiatives has revealed that failure to deliver the benefits from most projects and programmes can be traced to inadequate governance mechanisms, thus prompting the need for an effective mechanism of overseeing these investments. Further to this, the recent series of corporate scandals, meltdowns, fraud and other catastrophic events and the consequent publication of relevant legislation and corporate governance standards have forced top management to become more interested in how their organisational IT initiatives are managed. This paper focuses on establishing a mechanism of overseeing investment made in IT programmes from a corporate governance point of view. Two governance frameworks are considered: one from a developed economy (Sarbanes-Oxley - United States of America) and the other from a developing economy (King Report III - South Africa). An exploratory qualitative approach within a cross-sectional design, combined with a comparative design, was adopted. Qualitative content analysis and document analysis were used for both data collection and analysis. Data were collected from secondary sources to deductively extend the governance mechanism to the temporary aspect of IT programmes. Implications for programme governance from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and King III Report were identified. The outcome of this research is a set of governance mandates that pertain to the temporary aspect of IT programmes. Corporate governance requirements are extended and contextualised to IT programme management. This entails the open, accountable and controlled management of financial and non-financial programme outcomes, which will remain responsive and responsible to the board and key stakeholders.